1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #endif
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #endif
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175
ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 {
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
180 else
181 return (NULL);
182 }
183
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,ssl3_accept,ssl_undefined_function,ssl3_get_server_method)184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
185 ssl3_accept,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
187 #endif
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
190 {
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
192
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
194
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
198 /*
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
200 * login name
201 */
202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
204 } else {
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
206 }
207 }
208 return ret;
209 }
210 #endif
211
ssl3_accept(SSL * s)212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
213 {
214 BUF_MEM *buf;
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
217 int ret = -1;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
219
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
221 ERR_clear_error();
222 clear_sys_error();
223
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
228
229 /* init things to blank */
230 s->in_handshake++;
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
232 SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
236 return (-1);
237 }
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
239 /*
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
242 * handshakes anyway.
243 */
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
247 }
248 #endif
249
250 for (;;) {
251 state = s->state;
252
253 switch (s->state) {
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
255 s->renegotiate = 1;
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
257
258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
262
263 s->server = 1;
264 if (cb != NULL)
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
266
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
270 return -1;
271 }
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
273
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
276 ret = -1;
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
278 goto end;
279 }
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
281 BUF_MEM_free(buf);
282 ret = -1;
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
284 goto end;
285 }
286 s->init_buf = buf;
287 }
288
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
290 ret = -1;
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
292 goto end;
293 }
294
295 s->init_num = 0;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
298 /*
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
300 */
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
302
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
304 /*
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 */
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
309 ret = -1;
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
311 goto end;
312 }
313
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
318 !(s->options &
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
320 /*
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
323 */
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 ret = -1;
328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
329 goto end;
330 } else {
331 /*
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
333 * HelloRequest
334 */
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
337 }
338 break;
339
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
342
343 s->shutdown = 0;
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
345 if (ret <= 0)
346 goto end;
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
349 s->init_num = 0;
350
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
352 break;
353
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
356 break;
357
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
361
362 s->shutdown = 0;
363 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
364 if (ret <= 0)
365 goto end;
366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
369 {
370 int al;
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
372 /*
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
374 */
375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
376 goto end;
377 }
378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
380 /*
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
383 */
384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
386 ret = -1;
387 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
388 goto end;
389 }
390 }
391 #endif
392
393 s->renegotiate = 2;
394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
395 s->init_num = 0;
396 break;
397
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
400 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
401 if (ret <= 0)
402 goto end;
403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
404 if (s->hit) {
405 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
407 else
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
409 }
410 #else
411 if (s->hit)
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
413 #endif
414 else
415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
416 s->init_num = 0;
417 break;
418
419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
423 if (!
424 (s->s3->tmp.
425 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
426 SSL_aSRP))
427 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
428 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
429 if (ret <= 0)
430 goto end;
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
433 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
434 else
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
436 } else {
437 skip = 1;
438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
439 }
440 #else
441 } else
442 skip = 1;
443
444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
445 #endif
446 s->init_num = 0;
447 break;
448
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
451 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
452
453 /*
454 * clear this, it may get reset by
455 * send_server_key_exchange
456 */
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
458
459 /*
460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
465 * key exchange.
466 */
467 if (0
468 /*
469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
470 * provided
471 */
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
474 #endif
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
478 #endif
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
487 )
488 )
489 )
490 ) {
491 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
492 if (ret <= 0)
493 goto end;
494 } else
495 skip = 1;
496
497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
498 s->init_num = 0;
499 break;
500
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
505 /*
506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
507 * during re-negotiation:
508 */
509 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
511 /*
512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
514 * RFC 2246):
515 */
516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
517 /*
518 * ... except when the application insists on
519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
520 * this for SSL 3)
521 */
522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
523 /*
524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
525 */
526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
528 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
529 /*
530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
531 * are omitted
532 */
533 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
534 /* no cert request */
535 skip = 1;
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
537 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
540 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
541 return -1;
542 }
543 }
544 } else {
545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
546 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
547 if (ret <= 0)
548 goto end;
549 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
550 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
551 #else
552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
554 #endif
555 s->init_num = 0;
556 }
557 break;
558
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
561 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
562 if (ret <= 0)
563 goto end;
564 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
565 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
566 s->init_num = 0;
567 break;
568
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
570
571 /*
572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
577 * unconditionally.
578 */
579
580 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
581 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
582 ret = -1;
583 goto end;
584 }
585 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
586
587 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
588 break;
589
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
592 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
593 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
594 if (ret <= 0)
595 goto end;
596 }
597 s->init_num = 0;
598 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
599 break;
600
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
603 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
604 if (ret <= 0)
605 goto end;
606 if (ret == 2) {
607 /*
608 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
609 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
610 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
611 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
612 */
613 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
615 #else
616 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
617 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
618 else
619 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
620 #endif
621 s->init_num = 0;
622 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
624 s->init_num = 0;
625 if (!s->session->peer)
626 break;
627 /*
628 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
629 * digest cached records.
630 */
631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
633 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
634 return -1;
635 }
636 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
638 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
639 return -1;
640 }
641 } else {
642 int offset = 0;
643 int dgst_num;
644
645 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
646 s->init_num = 0;
647
648 /*
649 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
650 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
651 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
652 * step
653 */
654 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
655 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
656 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
657 return -1;
658 }
659 }
660 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
661 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
662 int dgst_size;
663
664 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
665 EVP_MD_CTX_type
666 (s->
667 s3->handshake_dgst
668 [dgst_num]),
669 &(s->s3->
670 tmp.cert_verify_md
671 [offset]));
672 dgst_size =
673 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
674 if (dgst_size < 0) {
675 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
676 ret = -1;
677 goto end;
678 }
679 offset += dgst_size;
680 }
681 }
682 break;
683
684 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
685 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
686 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
687 if (ret <= 0)
688 goto end;
689
690 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
691 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
692 #else
693 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
694 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
695 else
696 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
697 #endif
698 s->init_num = 0;
699 break;
700
701 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
704 /*
705 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
706 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
707 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
708 * cautious.
709 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
710 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
711 * the client's Finished message is read.
712 */
713 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
714 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
715
716 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
717 if (ret <= 0)
718 goto end;
719 s->init_num = 0;
720 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
721 break;
722 #endif
723
724 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
726 /*
727 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
728 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
729 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
730 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
731 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
732 * the client's Finished message is read.
733 */
734 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
735 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
736 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
737 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
738 if (ret <= 0)
739 goto end;
740 if (s->hit)
741 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
743 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
744 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
745 #endif
746 else
747 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
748 s->init_num = 0;
749 break;
750
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
752 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
753 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
754 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
755 if (ret <= 0)
756 goto end;
757 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
758 s->init_num = 0;
759 break;
760
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
763 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
764 if (ret <= 0)
765 goto end;
766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
767 s->init_num = 0;
768 break;
769
770 #endif
771
772 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
774
775 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
776 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
777 ret = -1;
778 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
779 goto end;
780 }
781
782 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
783 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
785
786 if (ret <= 0)
787 goto end;
788 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
789 s->init_num = 0;
790
791 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
792 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
793 {
794 ret = -1;
795 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
796 goto end;
797 }
798
799 break;
800
801 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
802 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
803 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
804 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
805 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
806 s->method->
807 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
808 s->method->
809 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
810 if (ret <= 0)
811 goto end;
812 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
813 if (s->hit) {
814 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
815 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
816 #else
817 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
818 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
819 } else
820 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
821 #endif
822 } else
823 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
824 s->init_num = 0;
825 break;
826
827 case SSL_ST_OK:
828 /* clean a few things up */
829 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
830
831 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
832 s->init_buf = NULL;
833
834 /* remove buffering on output */
835 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
836
837 s->init_num = 0;
838
839 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
840 * HelloRequest */
841 s->renegotiate = 0;
842 s->new_session = 0;
843
844 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
845
846 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
847 /* s->server=1; */
848 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
849
850 if (cb != NULL)
851 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
852 }
853
854 ret = 1;
855 goto end;
856 /* break; */
857
858 case SSL_ST_ERR:
859 default:
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
861 ret = -1;
862 goto end;
863 /* break; */
864 }
865
866 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
867 if (s->debug) {
868 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
869 goto end;
870 }
871
872 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
873 new_state = s->state;
874 s->state = state;
875 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
876 s->state = new_state;
877 }
878 }
879 skip = 0;
880 }
881 end:
882 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
883
884 s->in_handshake--;
885 if (cb != NULL)
886 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
887 return (ret);
888 }
889
ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL * s)890 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
891 {
892
893 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
894 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
895 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
896 }
897
898 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
899 return ssl_do_write(s);
900 }
901
ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL * s)902 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
903 {
904 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
905 unsigned int cookie_len;
906 long n;
907 unsigned long id;
908 unsigned char *p, *d;
909 SSL_CIPHER *c;
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
911 unsigned char *q;
912 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
913 #endif
914 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
915
916 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
917 goto retry_cert;
918
919 /*
920 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
921 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
922 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
923 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
924 */
925 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
926 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
927 }
928 s->first_packet = 1;
929 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
930 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
932 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
933 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
934
935 if (!ok)
936 return ((int)n);
937 s->first_packet = 0;
938 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
939
940 /*
941 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
942 * for session id length
943 */
944 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
945 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
947 goto f_err;
948 }
949
950 /*
951 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
952 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
953 */
954 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
955 p += 2;
956
957 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
958 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
959 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
961 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
962 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
963 /*
964 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
965 * number
966 */
967 s->version = s->client_version;
968 }
969 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
970 goto f_err;
971 }
972
973 /*
974 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
975 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
976 * cookie length...
977 */
978 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
979 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
980
981 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
982
983 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
984 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
986 goto f_err;
987 }
988 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
989
990 if (cookie_length == 0)
991 return 1;
992 }
993
994 /* load the client random */
995 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
996 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
997
998 /* get the session-id */
999 j = *(p++);
1000
1001 if (p + j > d + n) {
1002 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1004 goto f_err;
1005 }
1006
1007 s->hit = 0;
1008 /*
1009 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1010 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1011 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1012 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1013 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1014 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1015 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1016 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1017 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1018 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1019 */
1020 if ((s->new_session
1021 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1022 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1023 goto err;
1024 } else {
1025 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1026 /*
1027 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1028 * version.
1029 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1030 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1031 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1032 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1033 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1034 */
1035 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1036 * session */
1037 s->hit = 1;
1038 } else if (i == -1)
1039 goto err;
1040 else { /* i == 0 */
1041
1042 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1043 goto err;
1044 }
1045 }
1046
1047 p += j;
1048
1049 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1050 /* cookie stuff */
1051 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1052 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1054 goto f_err;
1055 }
1056 cookie_len = *(p++);
1057
1058 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1059 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1061 goto f_err;
1062 }
1063
1064 /*
1065 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1066 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1067 * does not cause an overflow.
1068 */
1069 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1070 /* too much data */
1071 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1073 goto f_err;
1074 }
1075
1076 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1077 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1078 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1079
1080 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1081 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1082 cookie_len) == 0) {
1083 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1085 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1086 goto f_err;
1087 }
1088 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1089 }
1090 /* default verification */
1091 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1092 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1093 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1095 goto f_err;
1096 }
1097 cookie_valid = 1;
1098 }
1099
1100 p += cookie_len;
1101 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1102 /* Select version to use */
1103 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1104 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1105 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1106 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1107 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1109 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1110 s->version = s->client_version;
1111 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1112 goto f_err;
1113 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1114 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1115 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1116 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1117 } else {
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1119 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1120 s->version = s->client_version;
1121 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1122 goto f_err;
1123 }
1124 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1125 }
1126 }
1127
1128 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1129 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1131 goto f_err;
1132 }
1133 n2s(p, i);
1134
1135 if (i == 0) {
1136 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1138 goto f_err;
1139 }
1140
1141 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1142 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1143 /* not enough data */
1144 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1146 goto f_err;
1147 }
1148 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1149 goto err;
1150 }
1151 p += i;
1152
1153 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1154 if (s->hit) {
1155 j = 0;
1156 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1157
1158 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1159 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1160 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1161 #endif
1162 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1163 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1164 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1165 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1166 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1167 #endif
1168 if (c->id == id) {
1169 j = 1;
1170 break;
1171 }
1172 }
1173 /*
1174 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1175 * CVE-2010-4180.
1176 */
1177 #if 0
1178 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1179 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1180 /*
1181 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1182 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1183 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1184 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1185 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1186 */
1187 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1188 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1189 s->session->cipher = c;
1190 j = 1;
1191 }
1192 }
1193 #endif
1194 if (j == 0) {
1195 /*
1196 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1197 * to reuse it
1198 */
1199 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1201 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1202 goto f_err;
1203 }
1204 }
1205
1206 /* compression */
1207 i = *(p++);
1208 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1209 /* not enough data */
1210 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1212 goto f_err;
1213 }
1214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1215 q = p;
1216 #endif
1217 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1218 if (p[j] == 0)
1219 break;
1220 }
1221
1222 p += i;
1223 if (j >= i) {
1224 /* no compress */
1225 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1227 goto f_err;
1228 }
1229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1230 /* TLS extensions */
1231 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1232 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1234 goto err;
1235 }
1236 }
1237
1238 /*
1239 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1240 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1241 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1242 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1243 */
1244 {
1245 unsigned char *pos;
1246 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1247 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1248 goto f_err;
1249 }
1250 }
1251
1252 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1253 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1254
1255 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1256 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1257 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1258 &pref_cipher,
1259 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1260 s->hit = 1;
1261 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1262 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1263
1264 ciphers = NULL;
1265
1266 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1267 pref_cipher =
1268 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1269 s->
1270 session->ciphers,
1271 SSL_get_ciphers
1272 (s));
1273 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1274 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1276 goto f_err;
1277 }
1278
1279 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1280
1281 if (s->cipher_list)
1282 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1283
1284 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1285 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1286
1287 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1288 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1289 }
1290 }
1291 #endif
1292
1293 /*
1294 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1295 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1296 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1297 */
1298 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1300 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1301 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1302 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1303 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1304 /* Can't disable compression */
1305 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1307 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1308 goto f_err;
1309 }
1310 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1311 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1312 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1313 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1314 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1315 break;
1316 }
1317 }
1318 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1320 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1321 goto f_err;
1322 }
1323 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1324 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1325 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1326 break;
1327 }
1328 if (m >= i) {
1329 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1331 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1332 goto f_err;
1333 }
1334 } else if (s->hit)
1335 comp = NULL;
1336 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1337 /* See if we have a match */
1338 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1339
1340 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1341 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1342 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1343 v = comp->id;
1344 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1345 if (v == q[o]) {
1346 done = 1;
1347 break;
1348 }
1349 }
1350 if (done)
1351 break;
1352 }
1353 if (done)
1354 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1355 else
1356 comp = NULL;
1357 }
1358 #else
1359 /*
1360 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1361 * using compression.
1362 */
1363 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1365 goto f_err;
1366 }
1367 #endif
1368
1369 /*
1370 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1371 */
1372
1373 if (!s->hit) {
1374 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1375 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1376 #else
1377 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1378 #endif
1379 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1380 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1381 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1382 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1383 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 goto f_err;
1386 }
1387 ciphers = NULL;
1388 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1390 goto err;
1391 }
1392 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1393 retry_cert:
1394 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1395 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1396 if (rv == 0) {
1397 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1399 goto f_err;
1400 }
1401 if (rv < 0) {
1402 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1403 return -1;
1404 }
1405 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1406 }
1407 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1408
1409 if (c == NULL) {
1410 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1412 goto f_err;
1413 }
1414 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1415 } else {
1416 /* Session-id reuse */
1417 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1418 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1419 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1420 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1421
1422 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1423 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1424 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1425 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1426 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1427 nc = c;
1428 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1429 ec = c;
1430 }
1431 if (nc != NULL)
1432 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1433 else if (ec != NULL)
1434 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1435 else
1436 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1437 } else
1438 #endif
1439 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1440 }
1441
1442 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1443 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1444 goto f_err;
1445 }
1446
1447 /*-
1448 * we now have the following setup.
1449 * client_random
1450 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1451 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1452 * compression - basically ignored right now
1453 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1454 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1455 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1456 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1457 */
1458
1459 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1460 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1461 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1463 goto err;
1464 }
1465 }
1466
1467 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
1468 if (0) {
1469 f_err:
1470 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1471 err:
1472 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1473 }
1474
1475 if (ciphers != NULL)
1476 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1477 return ret;
1478 }
1479
ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL * s)1480 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1481 {
1482 unsigned char *buf;
1483 unsigned char *p, *d;
1484 int i, sl;
1485 int al = 0;
1486 unsigned long l;
1487
1488 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1489 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1490 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1491 p = s->s3->server_random;
1492 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1493 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1494 return -1;
1495 }
1496 #endif
1497 /* Do the message type and length last */
1498 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1499
1500 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1501 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1502
1503 /* Random stuff */
1504 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1505 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1506
1507 /*-
1508 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1509 * back in the server hello:
1510 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1511 * we send back the old session ID.
1512 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1513 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1514 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1515 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1516 * session ID.
1517 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1518 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1519 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1520 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1521 * to send back.
1522 */
1523 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1524 && !s->hit)
1525 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1526
1527 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1528 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1531 return -1;
1532 }
1533 *(p++) = sl;
1534 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1535 p += sl;
1536
1537 /* put the cipher */
1538 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1539 p += i;
1540
1541 /* put the compression method */
1542 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1543 *(p++) = 0;
1544 #else
1545 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1546 *(p++) = 0;
1547 else
1548 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1549 #endif
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1551 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1553 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1554 return -1;
1555 }
1556 if ((p =
1557 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1558 &al)) == NULL) {
1559 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1562 return -1;
1563 }
1564 #endif
1565 /* do the header */
1566 l = (p - d);
1567 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1568 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1569 }
1570
1571 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1572 return ssl_do_write(s);
1573 }
1574
ssl3_send_server_done(SSL * s)1575 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1576 {
1577
1578 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1579 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1580 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1581 }
1582
1583 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1584 return ssl_do_write(s);
1585 }
1586
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL * s)1587 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1588 {
1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1590 unsigned char *q;
1591 int j, num;
1592 RSA *rsa;
1593 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1594 unsigned int u;
1595 #endif
1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1597 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1598 #endif
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1600 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1601 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1602 int encodedlen = 0;
1603 int curve_id = 0;
1604 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1605 #endif
1606 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1607 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1608 unsigned char *p, *d;
1609 int al, i;
1610 unsigned long type;
1611 int n;
1612 CERT *cert;
1613 BIGNUM *r[4];
1614 int nr[4], kn;
1615 BUF_MEM *buf;
1616 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1617
1618 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1619 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1620 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1621 cert = s->cert;
1622
1623 buf = s->init_buf;
1624
1625 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1626 n = 0;
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1628 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1629 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1630 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1631 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1632 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1633 tmp.new_cipher),
1634 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1635 tmp.new_cipher));
1636 if (rsa == NULL) {
1637 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1639 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1640 goto f_err;
1641 }
1642 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1643 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1644 }
1645 if (rsa == NULL) {
1646 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1648 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1649 goto f_err;
1650 }
1651 r[0] = rsa->n;
1652 r[1] = rsa->e;
1653 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1654 } else
1655 #endif
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1657 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1658 dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1659 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1660 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1661 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1662 tmp.new_cipher),
1663 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1664 tmp.new_cipher));
1665 if (dhp == NULL) {
1666 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1668 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1669 goto f_err;
1670 }
1671
1672 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1674 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1675 goto err;
1676 }
1677
1678 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1680 goto err;
1681 }
1682
1683 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
1684 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1685 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1686 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1687 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1689 goto err;
1690 }
1691 } else {
1692 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1693 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1694 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1696 goto err;
1697 }
1698 }
1699 r[0] = dh->p;
1700 r[1] = dh->g;
1701 r[2] = dh->pub_key;
1702 } else
1703 #endif
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1705 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1706 const EC_GROUP *group;
1707
1708 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1709 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1710 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1711 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1712 if (nid != NID_undef)
1713 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1714 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1715 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1716 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1717 tmp.new_cipher),
1718 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1719 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1720 }
1721 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1722 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1724 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1725 goto f_err;
1726 }
1727
1728 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1731 goto err;
1732 }
1733
1734 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1735 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1737 goto err;
1738 }
1739 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1740 ecdh = ecdhp;
1741 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1743 goto err;
1744 }
1745
1746 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1747 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1748 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1749 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1750 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1752 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1753 goto err;
1754 }
1755 }
1756
1757 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1758 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1759 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1761 goto err;
1762 }
1763
1764 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1765 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1767 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1768 goto err;
1769 }
1770
1771 /*
1772 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1773 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1774 * non-zero.
1775 */
1776 if ((curve_id =
1777 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1778 == 0) {
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1780 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1781 goto err;
1782 }
1783
1784 /*
1785 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1786 * allocate memory accordingly.
1787 */
1788 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1789 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1790 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1791 NULL, 0, NULL);
1792
1793 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1794 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1795 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1796 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1798 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1799 goto err;
1800 }
1801
1802 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1803 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1804 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1805 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1806
1807 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1809 goto err;
1810 }
1811
1812 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1813 bn_ctx = NULL;
1814
1815 /*
1816 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1817 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1818 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1819 * structure.
1820 */
1821 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1822
1823 /*
1824 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1825 * can set these to NULLs
1826 */
1827 r[0] = NULL;
1828 r[1] = NULL;
1829 r[2] = NULL;
1830 r[3] = NULL;
1831 } else
1832 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1834 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1835 /*
1836 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1837 */
1838 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1839 } else
1840 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1843 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1844 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1845 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1847 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1848 goto err;
1849 }
1850 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1851 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1852 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1853 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1854 } else
1855 #endif
1856 {
1857 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1859 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1860 goto f_err;
1861 }
1862 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1863 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1866 n += 1 + nr[i];
1867 else
1868 #endif
1869 n += 2 + nr[i];
1870 }
1871
1872 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1873 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1874 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1875 == NULL) {
1876 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1877 goto f_err;
1878 }
1879 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1880 } else {
1881 pkey = NULL;
1882 kn = 0;
1883 }
1884
1885 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1887 goto err;
1888 }
1889 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1890
1891 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1893 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1894 *p = nr[i];
1895 p++;
1896 } else
1897 #endif
1898 s2n(nr[i], p);
1899 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
1900 p += nr[i];
1901 }
1902
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1904 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1905 /*
1906 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1907 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1908 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1909 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1910 */
1911 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1912 p += 1;
1913 *p = 0;
1914 p += 1;
1915 *p = curve_id;
1916 p += 1;
1917 *p = encodedlen;
1918 p += 1;
1919 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1920 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1921 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1922 encodedPoint = NULL;
1923 p += encodedlen;
1924 }
1925 #endif
1926
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1928 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1929 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1930 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1931 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1932 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1933 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1934 }
1935 #endif
1936
1937 /* not anonymous */
1938 if (pkey != NULL) {
1939 /*
1940 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1941 * points to the space at the end.
1942 */
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1944 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1945 q = md_buf;
1946 j = 0;
1947 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1948 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1949 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1950 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1951 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
1952 : s->ctx->sha1,
1953 NULL) <= 0
1954 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1955 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1956 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1957 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1958 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1959 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
1960 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1962 ERR_LIB_EVP);
1963 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 goto f_err;
1965 }
1966 q += i;
1967 j += i;
1968 }
1969 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1970 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1972 goto err;
1973 }
1974 s2n(u, p);
1975 n += u + 2;
1976 } else
1977 #endif
1978 if (md) {
1979 /* send signature algorithm */
1980 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1981 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1982 /* Should never happen */
1983 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1985 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1986 goto f_err;
1987 }
1988 p += 2;
1989 }
1990 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1991 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1992 #endif
1993 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1994 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1995 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1996 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1997 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1998 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1999 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2000 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2002 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2003 goto f_err;
2004 }
2005 s2n(i, p);
2006 n += i + 2;
2007 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2008 n += 2;
2009 } else {
2010 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2011 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2013 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2014 goto f_err;
2015 }
2016 }
2017
2018 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2019 }
2020
2021 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2022 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2023 return ssl_do_write(s);
2024 f_err:
2025 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2026 err:
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2028 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2029 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2030 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2031 #endif
2032 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2033 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2034 return (-1);
2035 }
2036
ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL * s)2037 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2038 {
2039 unsigned char *p, *d;
2040 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2041 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2042 X509_NAME *name;
2043 BUF_MEM *buf;
2044
2045 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2046 buf = s->init_buf;
2047
2048 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2049
2050 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2051 p++;
2052 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2053 d[0] = n;
2054 p += n;
2055 n++;
2056
2057 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2058 const unsigned char *psigs;
2059 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2060 s2n(nl, p);
2061 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2062 p += nl;
2063 n += nl + 2;
2064 }
2065
2066 off = n;
2067 p += 2;
2068 n += 2;
2069
2070 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2071 nl = 0;
2072 if (sk != NULL) {
2073 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2074 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2075 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2076 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2077 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2079 ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2080 goto err;
2081 }
2082 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2083 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2084 s2n(j, p);
2085 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2086 n += 2 + j;
2087 nl += 2 + j;
2088 } else {
2089 d = p;
2090 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2091 j -= 2;
2092 s2n(j, d);
2093 j += 2;
2094 n += j;
2095 nl += j;
2096 }
2097 }
2098 }
2099 /* else no CA names */
2100 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2101 s2n(nl, p);
2102
2103 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2104
2105 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2106 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2107 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2109 goto err;
2110 }
2111 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2112 /* do the header */
2113 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2114 *(p++) = 0;
2115 *(p++) = 0;
2116 *(p++) = 0;
2117 s->init_num += 4;
2118 }
2119 #endif
2120
2121 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2122 }
2123
2124 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2125 return ssl_do_write(s);
2126 err:
2127 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2128 return (-1);
2129 }
2130
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL * s)2131 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2132 {
2133 int i, al, ok;
2134 long n;
2135 unsigned long alg_k;
2136 unsigned char *p;
2137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2138 RSA *rsa = NULL;
2139 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2140 #endif
2141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2142 BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
2143 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2144 #endif
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2146 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2147 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2148
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2150 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2151 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2152 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2153 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2154 #endif
2155
2156 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2157 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2158 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2159 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2160
2161 if (!ok)
2162 return ((int)n);
2163 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2164
2165 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2166
2167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2168 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2169 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2170 int decrypt_len;
2171 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2172 size_t j;
2173
2174 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2175 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2176 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2177 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2178 /*
2179 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2180 */
2181 if (rsa == NULL) {
2182 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2184 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2185 goto f_err;
2186
2187 }
2188 } else {
2189 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2190 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2191 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2192 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2194 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2195 goto f_err;
2196 }
2197 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2198 }
2199
2200 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2201 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2202 n2s(p, i);
2203 if (n != i + 2) {
2204 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2205 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2207 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2208 goto f_err;
2209 } else
2210 p -= 2;
2211 } else
2212 n = i;
2213 }
2214
2215 /*
2216 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2217 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2218 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2219 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2220 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2221 */
2222 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2223 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2225 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2226 goto f_err;
2227 }
2228
2229 /*
2230 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2231 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2232 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2233 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2234 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2235 */
2236
2237 /*
2238 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2239 */
2240 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2241 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2242 goto err;
2243 decrypt_len =
2244 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2245 ERR_clear_error();
2246
2247 /*
2248 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2249 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2250 */
2251 decrypt_good =
2252 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2253
2254 /*
2255 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2256 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2257 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2258 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2259 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2260 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2261 */
2262 version_good =
2263 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2264 version_good &=
2265 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2266
2267 /*
2268 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2269 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2270 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2271 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2272 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2273 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2274 * clients.
2275 */
2276 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2277 unsigned char workaround_good;
2278 workaround_good =
2279 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2280 workaround_good &=
2281 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2282 version_good |= workaround_good;
2283 }
2284
2285 /*
2286 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2287 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2288 */
2289 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2290
2291 /*
2292 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2293 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2294 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2295 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2296 */
2297 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2298 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2299 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2300 }
2301
2302 s->session->master_key_length =
2303 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2304 s->
2305 session->master_key,
2306 p,
2307 sizeof
2308 (rand_premaster_secret));
2309 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2310 } else
2311 #endif
2312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2313 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2314 int idx = -1;
2315 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2316 if (n > 1) {
2317 n2s(p, i);
2318 } else {
2319 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2320 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2322 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2323 goto f_err;
2324 }
2325 i = 0;
2326 }
2327 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2328 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2330 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2331 goto err;
2332 } else {
2333 p -= 2;
2334 i = (int)n;
2335 }
2336 }
2337 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2338 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2339 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2340 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2341 if (idx >= 0) {
2342 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2343 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2344 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2345 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2347 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2348 goto f_err;
2349 }
2350 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2351 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2352 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2354 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2355 goto f_err;
2356 } else
2357 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2358
2359 if (n == 0L) {
2360 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2361 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2362 if (clkey) {
2363 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2364 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2365 }
2366 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2367 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2369 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2370 goto f_err;
2371 }
2372 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2373 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2374 } else
2375 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2376 if (pub == NULL) {
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2378 goto err;
2379 }
2380
2381 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2382
2383 if (i <= 0) {
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2385 BN_clear_free(pub);
2386 goto err;
2387 }
2388
2389 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2390 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2391 if (dh_clnt)
2392 DH_free(dh_clnt);
2393 else
2394 BN_clear_free(pub);
2395 pub = NULL;
2396 s->session->master_key_length =
2397 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2398 s->
2399 session->master_key,
2400 p, i);
2401 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2402 if (dh_clnt)
2403 return 2;
2404 } else
2405 #endif
2406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2407 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2408 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2409 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2410 krb5_data authenticator;
2411 krb5_data enc_pms;
2412 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2413 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2414 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2415 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2416 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2417 int padl, outl;
2418 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2419 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2420 int kerr = 0;
2421
2422 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2423
2424 if (!kssl_ctx)
2425 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2426
2427 n2s(p, i);
2428 enc_ticket.length = i;
2429
2430 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2433 goto err;
2434 }
2435
2436 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2437 p += enc_ticket.length;
2438
2439 n2s(p, i);
2440 authenticator.length = i;
2441
2442 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2444 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2445 goto err;
2446 }
2447
2448 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2449 p += authenticator.length;
2450
2451 n2s(p, i);
2452 enc_pms.length = i;
2453 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2454 p += enc_pms.length;
2455
2456 /*
2457 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2458 */
2459 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2461 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2462 goto err;
2463 }
2464
2465 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2466 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2468 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2469 goto err;
2470 }
2471
2472 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2473 &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2474 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2475 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2476 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2477 if (kssl_err.text)
2478 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2479 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2481 goto err;
2482 }
2483
2484 /*
2485 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2486 * return authtime == 0.
2487 */
2488 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2489 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2490 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2491 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2492 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2493 if (kssl_err.text)
2494 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2495 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2497 goto err;
2498 }
2499
2500 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2502 goto err;
2503 }
2504 # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2505 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2506 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2507
2508 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2509 if (enc == NULL)
2510 goto err;
2511
2512 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2513
2514 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2516 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2517 goto err;
2518 }
2519 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2520 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2521 {
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2523 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2524 kerr = 1;
2525 goto kclean;
2526 }
2527 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2530 kerr = 1;
2531 goto kclean;
2532 }
2533 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2535 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2536 kerr = 1;
2537 goto kclean;
2538 }
2539 outl += padl;
2540 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2542 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2543 kerr = 1;
2544 goto kclean;
2545 }
2546 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2547 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2548 /*
2549 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2550 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2551 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2552 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2553 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2554 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2555 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2556 * cipher)
2557 */
2558 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2560 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2561 kerr = 1;
2562 goto kclean;
2563 }
2564 }
2565
2566 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2567
2568 s->session->master_key_length =
2569 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2570 s->
2571 session->master_key,
2572 pms, outl);
2573
2574 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2575 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2576 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2577 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2578 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2579 len);
2580 }
2581 }
2582
2583 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2584 * but it caused problems for apache.
2585 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2586 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2587 */
2588
2589 kclean:
2590 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
2591 if (kerr)
2592 goto err;
2593 } else
2594 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2595
2596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2597 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2598 int ret = 1;
2599 int field_size = 0;
2600 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2601 const EC_GROUP *group;
2602 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2603
2604 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2605 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2607 goto err;
2608 }
2609
2610 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2611 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2612 /* use the certificate */
2613 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2614 } else {
2615 /*
2616 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2617 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2618 */
2619 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2620 }
2621
2622 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2623 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2624
2625 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2626 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2628 goto err;
2629 }
2630
2631 /* Let's get client's public key */
2632 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2634 goto err;
2635 }
2636
2637 if (n == 0L) {
2638 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2639
2640 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2641 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2643 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2644 goto f_err;
2645 }
2646 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2647 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2648 /*
2649 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2650 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2651 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2652 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2653 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2654 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2655 */
2656 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2658 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2659 goto f_err;
2660 }
2661
2662 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2663 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2664 pkey.ec)) == 0) {
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2666 goto err;
2667 }
2668 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2669 } else {
2670 /*
2671 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2672 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2673 */
2674 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2676 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2677 goto err;
2678 }
2679
2680 /* Get encoded point length */
2681 i = *p;
2682 p += 1;
2683 if (n != 1 + i) {
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2685 goto err;
2686 }
2687 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2689 goto err;
2690 }
2691 /*
2692 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2693 * to the start
2694 */
2695 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2696 }
2697
2698 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2699 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2700 if (field_size <= 0) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2702 goto err;
2703 }
2704 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2705 NULL);
2706 if (i <= 0) {
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2708 goto err;
2709 }
2710
2711 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2712 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2713 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2714 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2715 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2716 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2717
2718 /* Compute the master secret */
2719 s->session->master_key_length =
2720 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2721 s->
2722 session->master_key,
2723 p, i);
2724
2725 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2726 return (ret);
2727 } else
2728 #endif
2729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2730 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2731 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2732 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2733 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2734 int psk_err = 1;
2735 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2736
2737 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2738
2739 n2s(p, i);
2740 if (n != i + 2) {
2741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2742 goto psk_err;
2743 }
2744 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2746 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2747 goto psk_err;
2748 }
2749 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2751 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2752 goto psk_err;
2753 }
2754
2755 /*
2756 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2757 */
2758 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2759 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2760 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2761 psk_or_pre_ms,
2762 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2763 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2764
2765 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2767 goto psk_err;
2768 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2769 /*
2770 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2771 */
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2773 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2774 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2775 goto psk_err;
2776 }
2777
2778 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2779 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2780 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2781 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2782 s2n(psk_len, t);
2783 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2784 t += psk_len;
2785 s2n(psk_len, t);
2786
2787 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2788 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2789 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
2790 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2792 goto psk_err;
2793 }
2794
2795 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2796 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2797 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2798 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2799 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2801 goto psk_err;
2802 }
2803
2804 s->session->master_key_length =
2805 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2806 s->
2807 session->master_key,
2808 psk_or_pre_ms,
2809 pre_ms_len);
2810 psk_err = 0;
2811 psk_err:
2812 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2813 if (psk_err != 0)
2814 goto f_err;
2815 } else
2816 #endif
2817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2818 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2819 int param_len;
2820
2821 n2s(p, i);
2822 param_len = i + 2;
2823 if (param_len > n) {
2824 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2826 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2827 goto f_err;
2828 }
2829 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2831 goto err;
2832 }
2833 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2834 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2835 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2837 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2838 goto f_err;
2839 }
2840 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2841 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2842 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2843 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2845 goto err;
2846 }
2847
2848 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2849 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2850 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2852 goto err;
2853 }
2854
2855 p += i;
2856 } else
2857 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2858 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2859 int ret = 0;
2860 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2861 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2862 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2863 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2864 unsigned long alg_a;
2865 int Ttag, Tclass;
2866 long Tlen;
2867
2868 /* Get our certificate private key */
2869 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2870 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2871 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2872 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2873 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2874
2875 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2876 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2877 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2879 goto f_err;
2880 }
2881 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2883 goto gerr;
2884 }
2885 /*
2886 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2887 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2888 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2889 * client certificate for authorization only.
2890 */
2891 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2892 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2893 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2894 ERR_clear_error();
2895 }
2896 /* Decrypt session key */
2897 if (ASN1_get_object
2898 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2899 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2900 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2902 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2903 goto gerr;
2904 }
2905 start = p;
2906 inlen = Tlen;
2907 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2908 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2910 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2911 goto gerr;
2912 }
2913 /* Generate master secret */
2914 s->session->master_key_length =
2915 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2916 s->
2917 session->master_key,
2918 premaster_secret, 32);
2919 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
2920 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2921 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2922 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2923 ret = 2;
2924 else
2925 ret = 1;
2926 gerr:
2927 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2928 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2929 if (ret)
2930 return ret;
2931 else
2932 goto err;
2933 } else {
2934 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2936 goto f_err;
2937 }
2938
2939 return (1);
2940 f_err:
2941 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2942 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2943 err:
2944 #endif
2945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2946 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2947 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2948 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2949 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2950 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2951 #endif
2952 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2953 return (-1);
2954 }
2955
ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL * s)2956 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2957 {
2958 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2959 unsigned char *p;
2960 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2961 long n;
2962 int type = 0, i, j;
2963 X509 *peer;
2964 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2965 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2966 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2967
2968 /*
2969 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2970 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2971 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2972 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2973 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2974 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2975 */
2976 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2977 ret = 1;
2978 goto end;
2979 }
2980
2981 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2982 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2983 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2984 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2985 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2986
2987 if (!ok)
2988 return ((int)n);
2989
2990 peer = s->session->peer;
2991 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2992 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2993
2994 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2996 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2997 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2998 goto f_err;
2999 }
3000
3001 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3002 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3003 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3004 /*
3005 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3006 * length field
3007 */
3008 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3009 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3010 i = 64;
3011 } else {
3012 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3013 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3014 if (rv == -1) {
3015 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3016 goto f_err;
3017 } else if (rv == 0) {
3018 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3019 goto f_err;
3020 }
3021 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3022 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3023 #endif
3024 p += 2;
3025 n -= 2;
3026 }
3027 n2s(p, i);
3028 n -= 2;
3029 if (i > n) {
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3032 goto f_err;
3033 }
3034 }
3035 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3036 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3038 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3039 goto f_err;
3040 }
3041
3042 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3043 long hdatalen = 0;
3044 void *hdata;
3045 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3046 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3048 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3049 goto f_err;
3050 }
3051 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3052 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3053 EVP_MD_name(md));
3054 #endif
3055 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3056 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3058 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3059 goto f_err;
3060 }
3061
3062 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3063 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3065 goto f_err;
3066 }
3067 } else
3068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3069 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3070 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3071 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3072 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3073 if (i < 0) {
3074 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3076 goto f_err;
3077 }
3078 if (i == 0) {
3079 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3081 goto f_err;
3082 }
3083 } else
3084 #endif
3085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3086 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3087 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3088 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3089 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3090 if (j <= 0) {
3091 /* bad signature */
3092 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3094 goto f_err;
3095 }
3096 } else
3097 #endif
3098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3099 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3100 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3101 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3102 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3103 if (j <= 0) {
3104 /* bad signature */
3105 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3107 goto f_err;
3108 }
3109 } else
3110 #endif
3111 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3112 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3113 unsigned char signature[64];
3114 int idx;
3115 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3116 if (pctx == NULL) {
3117 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3119 goto f_err;
3120 }
3121 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
3122 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3123 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3125 goto f_err;
3126 }
3127 if (i != 64) {
3128 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3129 }
3130 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3131 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3132 }
3133 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3134 32);
3135 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3136 if (j <= 0) {
3137 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3139 goto f_err;
3140 }
3141 } else {
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3143 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3144 goto f_err;
3145 }
3146
3147 ret = 1;
3148 if (0) {
3149 f_err:
3150 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3151 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3152 }
3153 end:
3154 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3155 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3156 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3157 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3158 }
3159 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3160 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3161 return (ret);
3162 }
3163
ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL * s)3164 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3165 {
3166 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3167 X509 *x = NULL;
3168 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3169 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3170 unsigned char *d;
3171 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3172
3173 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3174 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3175 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3176 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3177
3178 if (!ok)
3179 return ((int)n);
3180
3181 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3182 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3183 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3186 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3187 goto f_err;
3188 }
3189 /*
3190 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3191 */
3192 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3194 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3195 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3196 goto f_err;
3197 }
3198 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3199 return (1);
3200 }
3201
3202 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3203 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3205 goto f_err;
3206 }
3207 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3208
3209 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3211 goto err;
3212 }
3213
3214 n2l3(p, llen);
3215 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3216 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3218 goto f_err;
3219 }
3220 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3221 n2l3(p, l);
3222 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3223 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3225 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3226 goto f_err;
3227 }
3228
3229 q = p;
3230 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3231 if (x == NULL) {
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3233 goto err;
3234 }
3235 if (p != (q + l)) {
3236 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3238 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3239 goto f_err;
3240 }
3241 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3243 goto err;
3244 }
3245 x = NULL;
3246 nc += l + 3;
3247 }
3248
3249 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3250 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3251 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3252 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3254 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3255 goto f_err;
3256 }
3257 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3258 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3259 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3261 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3262 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3263 goto f_err;
3264 }
3265 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3266 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3267 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3268 goto f_err;
3269 }
3270 } else {
3271 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3272 if (i <= 0) {
3273 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3275 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3276 goto f_err;
3277 }
3278 }
3279
3280 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3281 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3282 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3283 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3284
3285 /*
3286 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3287 * arrive here.
3288 */
3289 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3290 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3291 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3293 goto err;
3294 }
3295 }
3296 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3297 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3298 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3299 /*
3300 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3301 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3302 */
3303
3304 sk = NULL;
3305
3306 ret = 1;
3307 if (0) {
3308 f_err:
3309 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3310 err:
3311 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3312 }
3313
3314 if (x != NULL)
3315 X509_free(x);
3316 if (sk != NULL)
3317 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3318 return (ret);
3319 }
3320
ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL * s)3321 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3322 {
3323 CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3324
3325 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3326 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3327 if (cpk == NULL) {
3328 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3329 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3330 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3332 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3333 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3334 return (0);
3335 }
3336 }
3337
3338 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3340 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3341 return (0);
3342 }
3343 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3344 }
3345
3346 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3347 return ssl_do_write(s);
3348 }
3349
3350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3351 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL * s)3352 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3353 {
3354 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3355 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3356 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3357
3358 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3359 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3360 const unsigned char *const_p;
3361 int len, slen_full, slen;
3362 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3363 unsigned int hlen;
3364 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3365 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3366 unsigned char key_name[16];
3367
3368 /* get session encoding length */
3369 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3370 /*
3371 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3372 * long
3373 */
3374 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3375 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3376 return -1;
3377 }
3378 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3379 if (!senc) {
3380 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3381 return -1;
3382 }
3383
3384 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3385 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3386
3387 p = senc;
3388 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3389 goto err;
3390
3391 /*
3392 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3393 */
3394 const_p = senc;
3395 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3396 if (sess == NULL)
3397 goto err;
3398 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3399
3400 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3401 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3402 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3403 goto err;
3404 }
3405 p = senc;
3406 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3407 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3408 goto err;
3409 }
3410 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3411
3412 /*-
3413 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3414 * follows handshake_header_length +
3415 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3416 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3417 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3418 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3419 */
3420 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3421 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3422 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3423 goto err;
3424
3425 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3426 /*
3427 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3428 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3429 */
3430 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3431 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3432 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3433 goto err;
3434 } else {
3435 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3436 goto err;
3437 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3438 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3439 goto err;
3440 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3441 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3442 goto err;
3443 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3444 }
3445
3446 /*
3447 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3448 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3449 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3450 */
3451 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3452
3453 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3454 p += 2;
3455 /* Output key name */
3456 macstart = p;
3457 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3458 p += 16;
3459 /* output IV */
3460 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3461 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3462 /* Encrypt session data */
3463 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3464 goto err;
3465 p += len;
3466 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3467 goto err;
3468 p += len;
3469
3470 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3471 goto err;
3472 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3473 goto err;
3474
3475 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3476 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3477
3478 p += hlen;
3479 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3480 /* Total length */
3481 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3482 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3483 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3484 s2n(len - 6, p);
3485 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3486 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3487 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3488 }
3489
3490 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3491 return ssl_do_write(s);
3492 err:
3493 if (senc)
3494 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3495 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3496 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3497 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3498 return -1;
3499 }
3500
ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL * s)3501 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3502 {
3503 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3504 unsigned char *p;
3505 /*-
3506 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3507 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3508 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3509 * + (ocsp response)
3510 */
3511 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3512 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3513 return -1;
3514 }
3515
3516 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3517
3518 /* do the header */
3519 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3520 /* message length */
3521 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3522 /* status type */
3523 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3524 /* length of OCSP response */
3525 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3526 /* actual response */
3527 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3528 /* number of bytes to write */
3529 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3530 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3531 s->init_off = 0;
3532 }
3533
3534 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3535 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3536 }
3537
3538 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3539 /*
3540 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3541 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3542 */
ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL * s)3543 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3544 {
3545 int ok;
3546 int proto_len, padding_len;
3547 long n;
3548 const unsigned char *p;
3549
3550 /*
3551 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3552 * extension in their ClientHello
3553 */
3554 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3556 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3557 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3558 return -1;
3559 }
3560
3561 /* See the payload format below */
3562 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3563 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3564 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3565 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3566
3567 if (!ok)
3568 return ((int)n);
3569
3570 /*
3571 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3572 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3573 * ssl3_get_finished).
3574 */
3575 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3577 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3578 return -1;
3579 }
3580
3581 if (n < 2) {
3582 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3583 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3584 }
3585
3586 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3587
3588 /*-
3589 * The payload looks like:
3590 * uint8 proto_len;
3591 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3592 * uint8 padding_len;
3593 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3594 */
3595 proto_len = p[0];
3596 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3597 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3598 return 0;
3599 }
3600 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3601 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3602 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3603 return 0;
3604 }
3605
3606 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3607 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3609 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3610 return 0;
3611 }
3612 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3613 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3614
3615 return 1;
3616 }
3617 # endif
3618
3619 #endif
3620