[Midnightbsd-cvs] src: geom/eli: Syn eli and label
laffer1 at midnightbsd.org
laffer1 at midnightbsd.org
Tue Sep 30 11:15:07 EDT 2008
Log Message:
-----------
Syn eli and label
Added Files:
-----------
src/sys/geom/eli:
g_eli_integrity.c (r1.1)
g_eli_privacy.c (r1.1)
src/sys/geom/label:
g_label_msdosfs.h (r1.1)
-------------- next part --------------
--- /dev/null
+++ sys/geom/eli/g_eli_integrity.c
@@ -0,0 +1,531 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd at FreeBSD.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: src/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_integrity.c,v 1.4 2006/07/22 10:05:55 pjd Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/kernel.h>
+#include <sys/linker.h>
+#include <sys/module.h>
+#include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/mutex.h>
+#include <sys/bio.h>
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#include <sys/malloc.h>
+#include <sys/kthread.h>
+#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/sched.h>
+#include <sys/smp.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/vnode.h>
+
+#include <vm/uma.h>
+
+#include <geom/geom.h>
+#include <geom/eli/g_eli.h>
+#include <geom/eli/pkcs5v2.h>
+
+/*
+ * The data layout description when integrity verification is configured.
+ *
+ * One of the most important assumption here is that authenticated data and its
+ * HMAC has to be stored in the same place (namely in the same sector) to make
+ * it work reliable.
+ * The problem is that file systems work only with sectors that are multiple of
+ * 512 bytes and a power of two number.
+ * My idea to implement it is as follows.
+ * Let's store HMAC in sector. This is a must. This leaves us 480 bytes for
+ * data. We can't use that directly (ie. we can't create provider with 480 bytes
+ * sector size). We need another sector from where we take only 32 bytes of data
+ * and we store HMAC of this data as well. This takes two sectors from the
+ * original provider at the input and leaves us one sector of authenticated data
+ * at the output. Not very efficient, but you got the idea.
+ * Now, let's assume, we want to create provider with 4096 bytes sector.
+ * To output 4096 bytes of authenticated data we need 8x480 plus 1x256, so we
+ * need nine 512-bytes sectors at the input to get one 4096-bytes sector at the
+ * output. That's better. With 4096 bytes sector we can use 89% of size of the
+ * original provider. I find it as an acceptable cost.
+ * The reliability comes from the fact, that every HMAC stored inside the sector
+ * is calculated only for the data in the same sector, so its impossible to
+ * write new data and leave old HMAC or vice versa.
+ *
+ * And here is the picture:
+ *
+ * da0: +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+-----+
+ * |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |256b |
+ * |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data |
+ * +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+-----+
+ * |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |288 bytes |
+ * +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ |224 unused|
+ * +----------+
+ * da0.eli: +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+ * |480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|256b|
+ * +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+ * | 4096 bytes |
+ * +--------------------------------------------+
+ *
+ * PS. You can use any sector size with geli(8). My example is using 4kB,
+ * because it's most efficient. For 8kB sectors you need 2 extra sectors,
+ * so the cost is the same as for 4kB sectors.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Code paths:
+ * BIO_READ:
+ * g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_read -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_auth_run -> g_eli_auth_read_done -> g_io_deliver
+ * BIO_WRITE:
+ * g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_run -> g_eli_auth_write_done -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver
+ */
+
+MALLOC_DECLARE(M_ELI);
+
+/*
+ * Here we generate key for HMAC. Every sector has its own HMAC key, so it is
+ * not possible to copy sectors.
+ * We cannot depend on fact, that every sector has its own IV, because different
+ * IV doesn't change HMAC, when we use encrypt-then-authenticate method.
+ */
+static void
+g_eli_auth_keygen(struct g_eli_softc *sc, off_t offset, u_char *key)
+{
+ SHA256_CTX ctx;
+
+ /* Copy precalculated SHA256 context. */
+ bcopy(&sc->sc_akeyctx, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&offset, sizeof(offset));
+ SHA256_Final(key, &ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The function is called after we read and decrypt data.
+ *
+ * g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_read -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_auth_run -> G_ELI_AUTH_READ_DONE -> g_io_deliver
+ */
+static int
+g_eli_auth_read_done(struct cryptop *crp)
+{
+ struct bio *bp;
+
+ if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
+ if (g_eli_crypto_rerun(crp) == 0)
+ return (0);
+ }
+ bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque;
+ bp->bio_inbed++;
+ if (crp->crp_etype == 0) {
+ bp->bio_completed += crp->crp_olen;
+ G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Crypto READ request done (%d/%d) (add=%jd completed=%jd).",
+ bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, (intmax_t)crp->crp_olen, (intmax_t)bp->bio_completed);
+ } else {
+ G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Crypto READ request failed (%d/%d) error=%d.",
+ bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_etype);
+ if (bp->bio_error == 0)
+ bp->bio_error = crp->crp_etype;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Do we have all sectors already?
+ */
+ if (bp->bio_inbed < bp->bio_children)
+ return (0);
+ if (bp->bio_error == 0) {
+ struct g_eli_softc *sc;
+ u_int i, lsec, nsec, data_secsize, decr_secsize, encr_secsize;
+ u_char *srcdata, *dstdata, *auth;
+ off_t coroff, corsize;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify data integrity based on calculated and read HMACs.
+ */
+ sc = bp->bio_to->geom->softc;
+ /* Sectorsize of decrypted provider eg. 4096. */
+ decr_secsize = bp->bio_to->sectorsize;
+ /* The real sectorsize of encrypted provider, eg. 512. */
+ encr_secsize = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer)->provider->sectorsize;
+ /* Number of data bytes in one encrypted sector, eg. 480. */
+ data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector;
+ /* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 2. */
+ nsec = bp->bio_length / decr_secsize;
+ /* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 18. */
+ nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / encr_secsize;
+ /* Last sector number in every big sector, eg. 9. */
+ lsec = sc->sc_bytes_per_sector / encr_secsize;
+
+ srcdata = bp->bio_driver2;
+ dstdata = bp->bio_data;
+ auth = srcdata + encr_secsize * nsec;
+ coroff = -1;
+ corsize = 0;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= nsec; i++) {
+ data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector;
+ if ((i % lsec) == 0)
+ data_secsize = decr_secsize % data_secsize;
+ if (bcmp(srcdata, auth, sc->sc_alen) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Curruption detected, remember the offset if
+ * this is the first corrupted sector and
+ * increase size.
+ */
+ if (bp->bio_error == 0)
+ bp->bio_error = -1;
+ if (coroff == -1) {
+ coroff = bp->bio_offset +
+ (dstdata - (u_char *)bp->bio_data);
+ }
+ corsize += data_secsize;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * No curruption, good.
+ * Report previous corruption if there was one.
+ */
+ if (coroff != -1) {
+ G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "%s: %jd bytes "
+ "corrupted at offset %jd.",
+ sc->sc_name, (intmax_t)corsize,
+ (intmax_t)coroff);
+ coroff = -1;
+ corsize = 0;
+ }
+ bcopy(srcdata + sc->sc_alen, dstdata,
+ data_secsize);
+ }
+ srcdata += encr_secsize;
+ dstdata += data_secsize;
+ auth += sc->sc_alen;
+ }
+ /* Report previous corruption if there was one. */
+ if (coroff != -1) {
+ G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "%s: %jd bytes corrupted at offset %jd.",
+ sc->sc_name, (intmax_t)corsize, (intmax_t)coroff);
+ }
+ }
+ free(bp->bio_driver2, M_ELI);
+ bp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
+ if (bp->bio_error != 0) {
+ if (bp->bio_error == -1)
+ bp->bio_error = EINVAL;
+ else {
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp,
+ "Crypto READ request failed (error=%d).",
+ bp->bio_error);
+ }
+ bp->bio_completed = 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Read is finished, send it up.
+ */
+ g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The function is called after data encryption.
+ *
+ * g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_run -> G_ELI_AUTH_WRITE_DONE -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver
+ */
+static int
+g_eli_auth_write_done(struct cryptop *crp)
+{
+ struct g_eli_softc *sc;
+ struct g_consumer *cp;
+ struct bio *bp, *cbp, *cbp2;
+ u_int nsec;
+
+ if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
+ if (g_eli_crypto_rerun(crp) == 0)
+ return (0);
+ }
+ bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque;
+ bp->bio_inbed++;
+ if (crp->crp_etype == 0) {
+ G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Crypto WRITE request done (%d/%d).",
+ bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children);
+ } else {
+ G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Crypto WRITE request failed (%d/%d) error=%d.",
+ bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_etype);
+ if (bp->bio_error == 0)
+ bp->bio_error = crp->crp_etype;
+ }
+ /*
+ * All sectors are already encrypted?
+ */
+ if (bp->bio_inbed < bp->bio_children)
+ return (0);
+ if (bp->bio_error != 0) {
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp, "Crypto WRITE request failed (error=%d).",
+ bp->bio_error);
+ free(bp->bio_driver2, M_ELI);
+ bp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
+ cbp = bp->bio_driver1;
+ bp->bio_driver1 = NULL;
+ g_destroy_bio(cbp);
+ g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ sc = bp->bio_to->geom->softc;
+ cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer);
+ cbp = bp->bio_driver1;
+ bp->bio_driver1 = NULL;
+ cbp->bio_to = cp->provider;
+ cbp->bio_done = g_eli_write_done;
+
+ /* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 1. */
+ nsec = bp->bio_length / bp->bio_to->sectorsize;
+ /* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 9. */
+ nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / cp->provider->sectorsize;
+
+ cbp->bio_length = cp->provider->sectorsize * nsec;
+ cbp->bio_offset = (bp->bio_offset / bp->bio_to->sectorsize) * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector;
+ cbp->bio_data = bp->bio_driver2;
+
+ /*
+ * We write more than what is requested, so we have to be ready to write
+ * more than MAXPHYS.
+ */
+ cbp2 = NULL;
+ if (cbp->bio_length > MAXPHYS) {
+ cbp2 = g_duplicate_bio(bp);
+ cbp2->bio_length = cbp->bio_length - MAXPHYS;
+ cbp2->bio_data = cbp->bio_data + MAXPHYS;
+ cbp2->bio_offset = cbp->bio_offset + MAXPHYS;
+ cbp2->bio_to = cp->provider;
+ cbp2->bio_done = g_eli_write_done;
+ cbp->bio_length = MAXPHYS;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Send encrypted data to the provider.
+ */
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request.");
+ bp->bio_inbed = 0;
+ bp->bio_children = (cbp2 != NULL ? 2 : 1);
+ g_io_request(cbp, cp);
+ if (cbp2 != NULL) {
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp2, "Sending request.");
+ g_io_request(cbp2, cp);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+void
+g_eli_auth_read(struct g_eli_softc *sc, struct bio *bp)
+{
+ struct g_consumer *cp;
+ struct bio *cbp, *cbp2;
+ size_t size;
+ off_t nsec;
+
+ bp->bio_pflags = 0;
+
+ cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer);
+ cbp = bp->bio_driver1;
+ bp->bio_driver1 = NULL;
+ cbp->bio_to = cp->provider;
+ cbp->bio_done = g_eli_read_done;
+
+ /* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 1. */
+ nsec = bp->bio_length / bp->bio_to->sectorsize;
+ /* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 9. */
+ nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / cp->provider->sectorsize;
+
+ cbp->bio_length = cp->provider->sectorsize * nsec;
+ size = cbp->bio_length;
+ size += sc->sc_alen * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(struct cryptop) * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(struct cryptodesc) * nsec * 2;
+ size += G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(struct uio) * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(struct iovec) * nsec;
+ cbp->bio_offset = (bp->bio_offset / bp->bio_to->sectorsize) * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector;
+ bp->bio_driver2 = malloc(size, M_ELI, M_WAITOK);
+ cbp->bio_data = bp->bio_driver2;
+
+ /*
+ * We read more than what is requested, so we have to be ready to read
+ * more than MAXPHYS.
+ */
+ cbp2 = NULL;
+ if (cbp->bio_length > MAXPHYS) {
+ cbp2 = g_duplicate_bio(bp);
+ cbp2->bio_length = cbp->bio_length - MAXPHYS;
+ cbp2->bio_data = cbp->bio_data + MAXPHYS;
+ cbp2->bio_offset = cbp->bio_offset + MAXPHYS;
+ cbp2->bio_to = cp->provider;
+ cbp2->bio_done = g_eli_read_done;
+ cbp->bio_length = MAXPHYS;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Read encrypted data from provider.
+ */
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request.");
+ g_io_request(cbp, cp);
+ if (cbp2 != NULL) {
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp2, "Sending request.");
+ g_io_request(cbp2, cp);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the main function responsible for cryptography (ie. communication
+ * with crypto(9) subsystem).
+ */
+void
+g_eli_auth_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp)
+{
+ struct g_eli_softc *sc;
+ struct cryptop *crp;
+ struct cryptodesc *crde, *crda;
+ struct uio *uio;
+ struct iovec *iov;
+ u_int i, lsec, nsec, data_secsize, decr_secsize, encr_secsize;
+ off_t dstoff;
+ int err, error;
+ u_char *p, *data, *auth, *authkey, *plaindata;
+
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(3, bp, "%s", __func__);
+
+ bp->bio_pflags = wr->w_number;
+ sc = wr->w_softc;
+ /* Sectorsize of decrypted provider eg. 4096. */
+ decr_secsize = bp->bio_to->sectorsize;
+ /* The real sectorsize of encrypted provider, eg. 512. */
+ encr_secsize = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer)->provider->sectorsize;
+ /* Number of data bytes in one encrypted sector, eg. 480. */
+ data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector;
+ /* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 2. */
+ nsec = bp->bio_length / decr_secsize;
+ /* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 18. */
+ nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / encr_secsize;
+ /* Last sector number in every big sector, eg. 9. */
+ lsec = sc->sc_bytes_per_sector / encr_secsize;
+ /* Destination offset, used for IV generation. */
+ dstoff = (bp->bio_offset / bp->bio_to->sectorsize) * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector;
+
+ auth = NULL; /* Silence compiler warning. */
+ plaindata = bp->bio_data;
+ if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ) {
+ data = bp->bio_driver2;
+ auth = data + encr_secsize * nsec;
+ p = auth + sc->sc_alen * nsec;
+ } else {
+ size_t size;
+
+ size = encr_secsize * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(*crp) * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(*crde) * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(*crda) * nsec;
+ size += G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(*uio) * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(*iov) * nsec;
+ data = malloc(size, M_ELI, M_WAITOK);
+ bp->bio_driver2 = data;
+ p = data + encr_secsize * nsec;
+ }
+ bp->bio_inbed = 0;
+ bp->bio_children = nsec;
+
+ error = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i <= nsec; i++, dstoff += encr_secsize) {
+ crp = (struct cryptop *)p; p += sizeof(*crp);
+ crde = (struct cryptodesc *)p; p += sizeof(*crde);
+ crda = (struct cryptodesc *)p; p += sizeof(*crda);
+ authkey = (u_char *)p; p += G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN;
+ uio = (struct uio *)p; p += sizeof(*uio);
+ iov = (struct iovec *)p; p += sizeof(*iov);
+
+ data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector;
+ if ((i % lsec) == 0)
+ data_secsize = decr_secsize % data_secsize;
+
+ if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ) {
+ /* Remember read HMAC. */
+ bcopy(data, auth, sc->sc_alen);
+ auth += sc->sc_alen;
+ /* TODO: bzero(9) can be commented out later. */
+ bzero(data, sc->sc_alen);
+ } else {
+ bcopy(plaindata, data + sc->sc_alen, data_secsize);
+ plaindata += data_secsize;
+ }
+
+ iov->iov_len = sc->sc_alen + data_secsize;
+ iov->iov_base = data;
+ data += encr_secsize;
+
+ uio->uio_iov = iov;
+ uio->uio_iovcnt = 1;
+ uio->uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
+ uio->uio_resid = iov->iov_len;
+
+ crp->crp_sid = wr->w_sid;
+ crp->crp_ilen = uio->uio_resid;
+ crp->crp_olen = data_secsize;
+ crp->crp_opaque = (void *)bp;
+ crp->crp_buf = (void *)uio;
+ crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IOV | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC | CRYPTO_F_REL;
+ if (g_eli_batch)
+ crp->crp_flags |= CRYPTO_F_BATCH;
+ if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE) {
+ crp->crp_callback = g_eli_auth_write_done;
+ crp->crp_desc = crde;
+ crde->crd_next = crda;
+ crda->crd_next = NULL;
+ } else {
+ crp->crp_callback = g_eli_auth_read_done;
+ crp->crp_desc = crda;
+ crda->crd_next = crde;
+ crde->crd_next = NULL;
+ }
+
+ crde->crd_skip = sc->sc_alen;
+ crde->crd_len = data_secsize;
+ crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_IV_PRESENT;
+ if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE)
+ crde->crd_flags |= CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
+ crde->crd_alg = sc->sc_ealgo;
+ crde->crd_key = sc->sc_ekey;
+ crde->crd_klen = sc->sc_ekeylen;
+ g_eli_crypto_ivgen(sc, dstoff, crde->crd_iv,
+ sizeof(crde->crd_iv));
+
+ crda->crd_skip = sc->sc_alen;
+ crda->crd_len = data_secsize;
+ crda->crd_inject = 0;
+ crda->crd_flags = CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT;
+ crda->crd_alg = sc->sc_aalgo;
+ g_eli_auth_keygen(sc, dstoff, authkey);
+ crda->crd_key = authkey;
+ crda->crd_klen = G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN * 8;
+
+ crp->crp_etype = 0;
+ err = crypto_dispatch(crp);
+ if (err != 0 && error == 0)
+ error = err;
+ }
+ if (bp->bio_error == 0)
+ bp->bio_error = error;
+}
--- /dev/null
+++ sys/geom/eli/g_eli_privacy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd at FreeBSD.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: src/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_privacy.c,v 1.1 2006/06/05 21:38:54 pjd Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/kernel.h>
+#include <sys/linker.h>
+#include <sys/module.h>
+#include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/mutex.h>
+#include <sys/bio.h>
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#include <sys/malloc.h>
+#include <sys/kthread.h>
+#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/sched.h>
+#include <sys/smp.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/vnode.h>
+
+#include <vm/uma.h>
+
+#include <geom/geom.h>
+#include <geom/eli/g_eli.h>
+#include <geom/eli/pkcs5v2.h>
+
+/*
+ * Code paths:
+ * BIO_READ:
+ * g_eli_start -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_crypto_run -> g_eli_crypto_read_done -> g_io_deliver
+ * BIO_WRITE:
+ * g_eli_start -> g_eli_crypto_run -> g_eli_crypto_write_done -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver
+ */
+
+MALLOC_DECLARE(M_ELI);
+
+/*
+ * The function is called after we read and decrypt data.
+ *
+ * g_eli_start -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_crypto_run -> G_ELI_CRYPTO_READ_DONE -> g_io_deliver
+ */
+static int
+g_eli_crypto_read_done(struct cryptop *crp)
+{
+ struct bio *bp;
+
+ if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
+ if (g_eli_crypto_rerun(crp) == 0)
+ return (0);
+ }
+ bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque;
+ bp->bio_inbed++;
+ if (crp->crp_etype == 0) {
+ G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Crypto READ request done (%d/%d).",
+ bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children);
+ bp->bio_completed += crp->crp_olen;
+ } else {
+ G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Crypto READ request failed (%d/%d) error=%d.",
+ bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_etype);
+ if (bp->bio_error == 0)
+ bp->bio_error = crp->crp_etype;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Do we have all sectors already?
+ */
+ if (bp->bio_inbed < bp->bio_children)
+ return (0);
+ free(bp->bio_driver2, M_ELI);
+ bp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
+ if (bp->bio_error != 0) {
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp, "Crypto READ request failed (error=%d).",
+ bp->bio_error);
+ bp->bio_completed = 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Read is finished, send it up.
+ */
+ g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The function is called after data encryption.
+ *
+ * g_eli_start -> g_eli_crypto_run -> G_ELI_CRYPTO_WRITE_DONE -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver
+ */
+static int
+g_eli_crypto_write_done(struct cryptop *crp)
+{
+ struct g_geom *gp;
+ struct g_consumer *cp;
+ struct bio *bp, *cbp;
+
+ if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
+ if (g_eli_crypto_rerun(crp) == 0)
+ return (0);
+ }
+ bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque;
+ bp->bio_inbed++;
+ if (crp->crp_etype == 0) {
+ G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Crypto WRITE request done (%d/%d).",
+ bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children);
+ } else {
+ G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Crypto WRITE request failed (%d/%d) error=%d.",
+ bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_etype);
+ if (bp->bio_error == 0)
+ bp->bio_error = crp->crp_etype;
+ }
+ /*
+ * All sectors are already encrypted?
+ */
+ if (bp->bio_inbed < bp->bio_children)
+ return (0);
+ bp->bio_inbed = 0;
+ bp->bio_children = 1;
+ cbp = bp->bio_driver1;
+ bp->bio_driver1 = NULL;
+ if (bp->bio_error != 0) {
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp, "Crypto WRITE request failed (error=%d).",
+ bp->bio_error);
+ free(bp->bio_driver2, M_ELI);
+ bp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
+ g_destroy_bio(cbp);
+ g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ cbp->bio_data = bp->bio_driver2;
+ cbp->bio_done = g_eli_write_done;
+ gp = bp->bio_to->geom;
+ cp = LIST_FIRST(&gp->consumer);
+ cbp->bio_to = cp->provider;
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request.");
+ /*
+ * Send encrypted data to the provider.
+ */
+ g_io_request(cbp, cp);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the main function responsible for cryptography (ie. communication
+ * with crypto(9) subsystem).
+ */
+void
+g_eli_crypto_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp)
+{
+ struct g_eli_softc *sc;
+ struct cryptop *crp;
+ struct cryptodesc *crd;
+ struct uio *uio;
+ struct iovec *iov;
+ u_int i, nsec, add, secsize;
+ int err, error;
+ size_t size;
+ u_char *p, *data;
+
+ G_ELI_LOGREQ(3, bp, "%s", __func__);
+
+ bp->bio_pflags = wr->w_number;
+ sc = wr->w_softc;
+ secsize = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->provider)->sectorsize;
+ nsec = bp->bio_length / secsize;
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate how much memory do we need.
+ * We need separate crypto operation for every single sector.
+ * It is much faster to calculate total amount of needed memory here and
+ * do the allocation once instead of allocating memory in pieces (many,
+ * many pieces).
+ */
+ size = sizeof(*crp) * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(*crd) * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(*uio) * nsec;
+ size += sizeof(*iov) * nsec;
+ /*
+ * If we write the data we cannot destroy current bio_data content,
+ * so we need to allocate more memory for encrypted data.
+ */
+ if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE)
+ size += bp->bio_length;
+ p = malloc(size, M_ELI, M_WAITOK);
+
+ bp->bio_inbed = 0;
+ bp->bio_children = nsec;
+ bp->bio_driver2 = p;
+
+ if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ)
+ data = bp->bio_data;
+ else {
+ data = p;
+ p += bp->bio_length;
+ bcopy(bp->bio_data, data, bp->bio_length);
+ }
+
+ error = 0;
+ for (i = 0, add = 0; i < nsec; i++, add += secsize) {
+ crp = (struct cryptop *)p; p += sizeof(*crp);
+ crd = (struct cryptodesc *)p; p += sizeof(*crd);
+ uio = (struct uio *)p; p += sizeof(*uio);
+ iov = (struct iovec *)p; p += sizeof(*iov);
+
+ iov->iov_len = secsize;
+ iov->iov_base = data;
+ data += secsize;
+
+ uio->uio_iov = iov;
+ uio->uio_iovcnt = 1;
+ uio->uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
+ uio->uio_resid = secsize;
+
+ crp->crp_sid = wr->w_sid;
+ crp->crp_ilen = secsize;
+ crp->crp_olen = secsize;
+ crp->crp_opaque = (void *)bp;
+ crp->crp_buf = (void *)uio;
+ if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE)
+ crp->crp_callback = g_eli_crypto_write_done;
+ else /* if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ) */
+ crp->crp_callback = g_eli_crypto_read_done;
+ crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IOV | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC | CRYPTO_F_REL;
+ if (g_eli_batch)
+ crp->crp_flags |= CRYPTO_F_BATCH;
+ crp->crp_desc = crd;
+
+ crd->crd_skip = 0;
+ crd->crd_len = secsize;
+ crd->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_IV_PRESENT;
+ if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE)
+ crd->crd_flags |= CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
+ crd->crd_alg = sc->sc_ealgo;
+ crd->crd_key = sc->sc_ekey;
+ crd->crd_klen = sc->sc_ekeylen;
+ g_eli_crypto_ivgen(sc, bp->bio_offset + add, crd->crd_iv,
+ sizeof(crd->crd_iv));
+ crd->crd_next = NULL;
+
+ crp->crp_etype = 0;
+ err = crypto_dispatch(crp);
+ if (error == 0)
+ error = err;
+ }
+ if (bp->bio_error == 0)
+ bp->bio_error = error;
+}
--- /dev/null
+++ sys/geom/label/g_label_msdosfs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Tobias Reifenberger
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD: src/sys/geom/label/g_label_msdosfs.h,v 1.2 2006/09/30 08:16:49 pjd Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * Conversion macros for little endian encoded unsigned integers
+ * in byte streams to the local unsigned integer format.
+ */
+#define UINT16BYTES(p) ((uint32_t)((p)[0] + (256*(p)[1])))
+#define UINT32BYTES(p) ((uint32_t)((p)[0] + (256*(p)[1]) + \
+ (65536*(p)[2]) + (16777216*(p)[3])))
+
+/*
+ * All following structures are according to:
+ *
+ * Microsoft Extensible Firmware Initiative FAT32 File System Specification
+ * FAT: General Overview of On-Disk Format
+ * Version 1.03, December 6, 2000
+ * Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+/*
+ * FAT boot sector and boot parameter block for
+ * FAT12 and FAT16 volumes
+ */
+typedef struct fat_bsbpb {
+ /* common fields */
+ uint8_t BS_jmpBoot[3];
+ uint8_t BS_OEMName[8];
+ uint8_t BPB_BytsPerSec[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_SecPerClus;
+ uint8_t BPB_RsvdSecCnt[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_NumFATs;
+ uint8_t BPB_RootEntCnt[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_TotSec16[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_Media;
+ uint8_t BPB_FATSz16[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_SecPerTrack[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_NumHeads[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_HiddSec[4];
+ uint8_t BPB_TotSec32[4];
+ /* FAT12/FAT16 only fields */
+ uint8_t BS_DrvNum;
+ uint8_t BS_Reserved1;
+ uint8_t BS_BootSig;
+ uint8_t BS_VolID[4];
+ uint8_t BS_VolLab[11];
+ uint8_t BS_FilSysType[8];
+} FAT_BSBPB; /* 62 bytes */
+
+/*
+ * FAT boot sector and boot parameter block for
+ * FAT32 volumes
+ */
+typedef struct fat32_bsbpb {
+ /* common fields */
+ uint8_t BS_jmpBoot[3];
+ uint8_t BS_OEMName[8];
+ uint8_t BPB_BytsPerSec[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_SecPerClus;
+ uint8_t BPB_RsvdSecCnt[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_NumFATs;
+ uint8_t BPB_RootEntCnt[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_TotSec16[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_Media;
+ uint8_t BPB_FATSz16[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_SecPerTrack[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_NumHeads[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_HiddSec[4];
+ uint8_t BPB_TotSec32[4];
+ /* FAT32 only fields */
+ uint8_t BPB_FATSz32[4];
+ uint8_t BPB_ExtFlags[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_FSVer[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_RootClus[4];
+ uint8_t BPB_FSInfo[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_BkBootSec[2];
+ uint8_t BPB_Reserved[12];
+ uint8_t BS_DrvNum;
+ uint8_t BS_Reserved1;
+ uint8_t BS_BootSig;
+ uint8_t BS_VolID[4];
+ uint8_t BS_VolLab[11];
+ uint8_t BS_FilSysType[8];
+} FAT32_BSBPB; /* 90 bytes */
+
+/*
+ * FAT directory entry structure
+ */
+#define FAT_DES_ATTR_READ_ONLY 0x01
+#define FAT_DES_ATTR_HIDDEN 0x02
+#define FAT_DES_ATTR_SYSTEM 0x04
+#define FAT_DES_ATTR_VOLUME_ID 0x08
+#define FAT_DES_ATTR_DIRECTORY 0x10
+#define FAT_DES_ATTR_ARCHIVE 0x20
+#define FAT_DES_ATTR_LONG_NAME (FAT_DES_ATTR_READ_ONLY | \
+ FAT_DES_ATTR_HIDDEN | \
+ FAT_DES_ATTR_SYSTEM | \
+ FAT_DES_ATTR_VOLUME_ID)
+
+typedef struct fat_des {
+ uint8_t DIR_Name[11];
+ uint8_t DIR_Attr;
+ uint8_t DIR_NTRes;
+ uint8_t DIR_CrtTimeTenth;
+ uint8_t DIR_CrtTime[2];
+ uint8_t DIR_CrtDate[2];
+ uint8_t DIR_LstAccDate[2];
+ uint8_t DIR_FstClusHI[2];
+ uint8_t DIR_WrtTime[2];
+ uint8_t DIR_WrtDate[2];
+ uint8_t DIR_FstClusLO[2];
+ uint8_t DIR_FileSize[4];
+} FAT_DES;
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