[Midnightbsd-cvs] src [7390] vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q: tag openssl 1.0.1q
laffer1 at midnightbsd.org
laffer1 at midnightbsd.org
Sat Dec 5 12:57:01 EST 2015
Revision: 7390
http://svnweb.midnightbsd.org/src/?rev=7390
Author: laffer1
Date: 2015-12-05 12:55:59 -0500 (Sat, 05 Dec 2015)
Log Message:
-----------
tag openssl 1.0.1q
Added Paths:
-----------
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CHANGES
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CONTRIBUTING
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Configure
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/FAQ
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.bak
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.org
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/NEWS
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/README
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/apps.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/asn1pars.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ca.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ecparam.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/engine.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/md4.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ocsp.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/pkcs12.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_client.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_server.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/appveyor.yml
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bio.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bntest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cryptlib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/encode.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/mem_clr.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h.in
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslv.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sparccpuid.S
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/mttest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/pthread2.sh
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/easy_tls/README
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/dgst.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/genrsa.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/req.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/x509.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/buffer.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/dir-locals.example.el
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/openssl-c-indent.el
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/e_os.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/engines/e_chil.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/openssl.spec
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/bio_ssl.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/clienthellotest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_both.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_clnt.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_srvr.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s23_clnt.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_cbc.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_clnt.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_enc.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_srvr.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl3.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_cert.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_err.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_locl.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_sess.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssltest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_enc.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/tls1.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bftest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bntest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/casttest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/certs/
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/clienthellotest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/constant_time_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/destest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dhtest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dsatest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdhtest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdsatest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ectest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/enginetest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_extra_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/exptest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/heartbeat_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/hmactest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ideatest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/jpaketest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md2test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md4test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md5test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/mdc2test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/randtest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc2test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc4test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc5test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rmdtest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rsa_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha1test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha256t.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha512t.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/shatest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/srptest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ssltest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/testssl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/verify_extra_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/wp_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/indent.pro
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mk1mf.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkrc.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkstack.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/pl/VC-32.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/selftest.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/toutf8.sh
Removed Paths:
-------------
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CHANGES
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Configure
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/FAQ
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.bak
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.org
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/NEWS
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/README
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/apps.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/asn1pars.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ca.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ecparam.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/engine.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/md4.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ocsp.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/pkcs12.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_client.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_server.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bio.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bntest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cryptlib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/des/t/test
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/encode.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/mem_clr.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h.in
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslv.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sparccpuid.S
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/mttest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/pthread2.sh
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/easy_tls/README
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/dgst.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/genrsa.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/req.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/x509.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/buffer.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/e_os.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/engines/e_chil.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/include/
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/openssl.spec
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/perl/
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/bio_ssl.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_both.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_clnt.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_srvr.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s23_clnt.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_cbc.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_clnt.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_enc.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_srvr.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl3.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_cert.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_err.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_locl.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_sess.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssltest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_enc.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_lib.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/tls1.h
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/Makefile
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bftest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bntest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/casttest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/constant_time_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/destest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dhtest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dsatest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdhtest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdsatest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ectest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/enginetest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_extra_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/exptest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/heartbeat_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/hmactest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ideatest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/jpaketest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md2test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md4test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md5test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/mdc2test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/randtest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc2test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc4test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc5test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rmdtest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rsa_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha1test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha256t.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha512t.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/shatest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/srptest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ssltest.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/testssl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/wp_test.c
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/indent.pro
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mk1mf.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkstack.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/pl/VC-32.pl
vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/selftest.pl
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CHANGES
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/CHANGES 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CHANGES 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,10418 +0,0 @@
-
- OpenSSL CHANGES
- _______________
-
- Changes between 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
-
- *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
- incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
- restored.
-
- Changes between 1.0.1m and 1.0.1n [11 Jun 2015]
-
- *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
-
- When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
- if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
- field.
-
- This can be used to perform denial of service against any
- system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
- certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
- client authentication enabled.
-
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
- (CVE-2015-1788)
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
-
- X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
- string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
- X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
- time string.
-
- An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
- various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
- a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
- that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
- authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
- callbacks.
-
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
- independently by Hanno B\xF6ck.
- (CVE-2015-1789)
- [Emilia K\xE4sper]
-
- *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
-
- The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
- correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
- with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
-
- Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
- structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
- servers are not affected.
-
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
- (CVE-2015-1790)
- [Emilia K\xE4sper]
-
- *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
-
- When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
- if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
- denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
- the CMS code.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
- (CVE-2015-1792)
- [Stephen Henson]
-
- *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
-
- If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
- reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
- a double free of the ticket data.
- (CVE-2015-1791)
- [Matt Caswell]
-
- *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits.
- [Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.1m [19 Mar 2015]
-
- *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
-
- The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
- made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
- certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
- certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
- application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
- OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
- (CVE-2015-0286)
- [Stephen Henson]
-
- *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
-
- Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
- memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
- strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
-
- Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
- components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
- functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
- not affected.
- (CVE-2015-0287)
- [Stephen Henson]
-
- *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
-
- The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
- correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
- missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
-
- Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
- otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
- affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
-
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
- (CVE-2015-0289)
- [Emilia K\xE4sper]
-
- *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
-
- A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
- servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
- a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
-
- This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K\xE4sper
- (OpenSSL development team).
- (CVE-2015-0293)
- [Emilia K\xE4sper]
-
- *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
-
- A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
- could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
- free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
- or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
- for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
- sources. This scenario is considered rare.
-
- This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
- commit 517073cd4b.
- (CVE-2015-0209)
- [Matt Caswell]
-
- *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
-
- The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
- the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
-
- This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
- (CVE-2015-0288)
- [Stephen Henson]
-
- *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
- [Kurt Roeckx]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015]
-
- *) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
- [Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
-
- *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
- message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
- dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
- Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3571)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
- dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
- could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
- sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
- by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
- Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
- (CVE-2015-0206)
- [Matt Caswell]
-
- *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
- built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
- method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
- dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3569)
- [Kurt Roeckx]
-
- *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
- ECDH ciphersuites.
-
- Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
- reporting this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3572)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
- violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
- non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
- downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
- certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
- INRIA or reporting this issue.
- (CVE-2015-0204)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
- An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
- without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
- authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
- which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
- containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
- Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
- this issue.
- (CVE-2015-0205)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
- SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
-
- The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX,
- and can vary with the CTX.
- [Adam Langley]
-
- *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
-
- By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
- certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
- Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
- this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
- certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
-
- 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
-
- If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
- the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
-
- 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
-
- Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
- certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
- errors for some broken certificates.
-
- Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
-
- 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
-
- Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
- signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
-
- This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
- (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
- program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
- (negative or with leading zeroes).
-
- Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
- of the OpenSSL core team.
-
- (CVE-2014-8275)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
- results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
- with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
- way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
- Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
- fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
- Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
- the OpenSSL core team.
- (CVE-2014-3570)
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
- version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
- version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
- sanity and breaks all known clients.
- [David Benjamin, Emilia K\xE4sper]
-
- *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
- early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
- renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
- [Emilia K\xE4sper]
-
- *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
- ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
- the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
- reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
- announced in the initial ServerHello.
-
- Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
- was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
- ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
- [Emilia K\xE4sper]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
-
- *) SRTP Memory Leak.
-
- A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
- sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
- to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
- exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
- 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
- whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
- have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
-
- The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
- (CVE-2014-3513)
- [OpenSSL team]
-
- *) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
-
- When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
- integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
- ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
- causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
- tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
- attack.
- (CVE-2014-3567)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
-
- When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
- could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
- configured to send them.
- (CVE-2014-3568)
- [Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
-
- *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
- Client applications doing fallback retries should call
- SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
- (CVE-2014-3566)
- [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
-
- Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
- verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
- DigestInfo structures.
-
- Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
-
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
-
- *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
- SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
- g, A, B < N to SRP code.
-
- Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
- Group for discovering this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3512)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
- TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
- is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
- downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
- higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
-
- Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
- researching this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3511)
- [David Benjamin]
-
- *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
- to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
- with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
- ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
-
- Thanks to Felix Gr\xF6bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
- issue.
- (CVE-2014-3510)
- [Emilia K\xE4sper]
-
- *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
- to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
- Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3507)
- [Adam Langley]
-
- *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
- processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
- Denial of Service attack.
- Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3506)
- [Adam Langley]
-
- *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
- whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
- can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
- Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
- this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3505)
- [Adam Langley]
-
- *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
- session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
- up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
-
- Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
- issue.
- (CVE-2014-3509)
- [Gabor Tyukasz]
-
- *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
- dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
- properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
- Denial of Service attack.
-
- Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam\xE4ki (Codenomicon) for
- discovering and researching this issue.
- (CVE-2014-5139)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
- X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
- from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
- output to the attacker.
-
- Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3508)
- [Emilia K\xE4sper, and Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
- for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
- bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
-
- *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
- handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
- SSL/TLS clients and servers.
-
- Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
- researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
- [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
- OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
- in a DoS attack.
-
- Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
- (CVE-2014-0221)
- [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
- be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
- client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
- code on a vulnerable client or server.
-
- Thanks to J\xFCri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
- [J\xFCri Aedla, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
- are subject to a denial of service attack.
-
- Thanks to Felix Gr\xF6bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
- this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
- [Felix Gr\xF6bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
- compilation flags.
- [mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>]
-
- *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
- in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
- [mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>]
-
- *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
- [mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
-
- *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
- can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
- server.
-
- Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
- Adam Langley <agl at chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller at acm.org> for
- preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
- [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
- ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
- by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
-
- Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
- flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
- [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
-
- *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
-
- Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
- TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
- less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
- is at least 512 bytes long.
-
- [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
-
- *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
- handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
- Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
- (CVE-2013-4353)
-
- *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
- structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
- to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
- avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
- Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
- several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
- is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
- 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
- [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
-
- *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
- supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
- [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
-
- *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
-
- This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
- Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
- at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
-
- Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
- Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
- (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
- Emilia K\xE4sper for the initial patch.
- (CVE-2013-0169)
- [Emilia K\xE4sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
- ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
- Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl at chromium.org> for discovering
- and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
- <wolfgang.ettlinger at gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
- (CVE-2012-2686)
- [Adam Langley]
-
- *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
- This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make openssl verify return errors.
- [Chris Palmer <palmer at google.com> and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
- the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
- so it returns the certificate actually sent.
- See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
- [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling at comodo.com>]
-
- *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
- if renegotiating.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
-
- *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
- 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
-
- Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
- fuzzing as a service testing platform.
- (CVE-2012-2333)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
- Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
- approved.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]
-
- *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
- 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
- mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
- SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
- TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
- 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
- OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
- will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
- inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
- in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
- disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
- protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
- that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
- above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
- SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
- client side.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
-
- *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
- BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
- in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
-
- Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
- issue and to Adam Langley <agl at chromium.org> for fixing it.
- (CVE-2012-2110)
- [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
-
- *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
- [Adam Langley]
-
- *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
- record length exceeds 255 bytes.
-
- 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
- hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
- 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
- the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
- set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
- -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
- Most broken servers should now work.
- 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
- TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]
-
- *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
- STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
- and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
- OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular
- those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect
- the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate
- support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA
- encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum pemitted
- client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy
- and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
- [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann at fh-muenster.de>]
-
- *) Add support for SCTP.
- [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann at fh-muenster.de>]
-
- *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
- [Paul Green <Paul.Green at stratus.com>]
-
- *) Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably:
-
- - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support;
- - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES);
- - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation;
- - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations;
- - s390x: z196 support;
- - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations;
-
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup
- (removal of unnecessary code)
- [Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester at edelweb.fr>]
-
- *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705.
- [Eric Rescorla]
-
- *) Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764.
- [Eric Rescorla]
-
- *) Add Next Protocol Negotiation,
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be
- disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated
- by Google.
- [Adam Langley <agl at google.com> and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224,
- NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on
- typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is
- required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds).
- Code made available under Apache License version 2.0.
-
- Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command
- line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or
- "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs:
-
- EC_GFp_nistp224_method()
- EC_GFp_nistp256_method()
- EC_GFp_nistp521_method()
-
- EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
- EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
- implementations).
- [Emilia K\xE4sper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
-
- *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
- all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
- header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional
- signature parameters can be passed using this option and in
- particular PSS.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the
- appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the
- corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines.
- New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised
- EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on
- the appropriate parameters.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function
- to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1
- handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used.
- Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked
- against a number of sample certificates.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs.
- [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser <lists at kaiser.cx>]
-
- *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method
- can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump.
-
- More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful
- information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature
- parameters r, s.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing
- RFC3211.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This
- neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required
- for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as
- password based CMS).
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Session-handling fixes:
- - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID,
- but also support Session Tickets.
- - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client
- presented a ticket with an expired session.
- - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable.
- - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information.
- - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets.
- [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
-
- *) Fix PSK session representation.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations.
-
- This work was sponsored by Intel.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split
- the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record)
- portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and
- RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to inlclude GCM and
- add a special AESGCM string for GCM only.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation
- field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support.
- As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for
- versions of TLS earlier than 1.2.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method
- as unset and return the appopriate default but do *not* set the default.
- This means we can return the appopriate method in applications that
- swicth between FIPS and non-FIPS modes.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an
- ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we
- keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities.
- [Peter Eckersley <pde at eff.org>, Ben Laurie and Steve Henson]
-
- *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use
- FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not
- all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen,
- encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt
- to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want
- to use them can use the private_* version instead.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o
- for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical
- order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first.
- This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers
- and enable MD5.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying
- FIPS modules versions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache
- of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use
- until after the certificate request message is received.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms
- extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature
- format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for
- TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch
- to new signature format when needed using client digest preference.
- All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client
- support yet and no support for client certificates.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch
- to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based
- ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with
- TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete
- SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods
- and version checking.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled
- with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal
- structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application
- to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add SRP support.
- [Tom Wu <tjw at cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function
- SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated().
- [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann at fh-muenster.de>]
-
- *) Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used
- automatically instead of needing explicit application support.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705.
- [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann at fh-muenster.de>, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only
- a few changes are required:
-
- Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag.
- Add TLSv1_1 methods.
- Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1.
- Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code).
- Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
-
- *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
- in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
- content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
- needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
- old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
- CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
- an MMA defence is not necessary.
- Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode at us.ibm.com> for discovering
- this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
- client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
- Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode at us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
-
- *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
- Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
- Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
- preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
- [Antonio Martin]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]
-
- *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
- of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
- which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
- the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
- differences arising during decryption processing. A research
- paper describing this attack can be found at:
- http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
- Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
- Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
- (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
- <seggelmann at fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen at fh-muenster.de>
- for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
- [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
-
- *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
- (CVE-2011-4576)
- [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
- *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
- Kadianakis <desnacked at gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
- Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
- [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
- *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
- [Andrey Kulikov <amdeich at gmail.com>]
-
- *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
- Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
- and Rob Austein <sra at hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
- [Rob Austein <sra at hactrn.net>]
-
- *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
- [Paul Green <Paul.Green at stratus.com>]
-
- *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
- [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
- *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
- [Emilia K\xE4sper (Google)]
-
- *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
- interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
- [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
- *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
- BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
- threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
-
- This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
- lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
- BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
- the last update always remained unused).
- [Emilia K\xE4sper (Google)]
-
- *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
- [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]
-
- *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted
- by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207)
- [Kaspar Brand <ossl at velox.ch>]
-
- *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
- for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210)
- [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
- *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check
- signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead.
- Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
- by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
-
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
-
- [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0c and 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]
-
- *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
- [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
-
- *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
- escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
- ambiguous.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]
-
- *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
- and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
- Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
- Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
- Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]
-
- *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
- overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
- be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix WIN32 build system to correctly link an ENGINE directory into
- a DLL.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a [01 Jun 2010]
-
- *) Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover
- (CVE-2010-1633)
- [Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager <hager at dortmund.net>]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]
-
- *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher
- context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in
- case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to
- output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL.
- [Willy Weisz <weisz at vcpc.univie.ac.at>]
-
- *) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the
- compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining
- it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option
- to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Update OCSP request code to permit adding custom headers to the request:
- some responders need this.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) The function EVP_PKEY_sign() returns <=0 on error: check return code
- correctly.
- [Julia Lawall <julia at diku.dk>]
-
- *) Update verify callback code in apps/s_cb.c and apps/verify.c, it
- needlessly dereferenced structures, used obsolete functions and
- didn't handle all updated verify codes correctly.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Disable MD2 in the default configuration.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In BIO_pop() and BIO_push() use the ctrl argument (which was NULL) to
- indicate the initial BIO being pushed or popped. This makes it possible
- to determine whether the BIO is the one explicitly called or as a result
- of the ctrl being passed down the chain. Fix BIO_pop() and SSL BIOs so
- it handles reference counts correctly and doesn't zero out the I/O bio
- when it is not being explicitly popped. WARNING: applications which
- included workarounds for the old buggy behaviour will need to be modified
- or they could free up already freed BIOs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Extend the uni2asc/asc2uni => OPENSSL_uni2asc/OPENSSL_asc2uni
- renaming to all platforms (within the 0.9.8 branch, this was
- done conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash).
- [Guenter <lists at gknw.net>]
-
- *) Add ECDHE and PSK support to DTLS.
- [Michael Tuexen <tuexen at fh-muenster.de>]
-
- *) Add CHECKED_STACK_OF macro to safestack.h, otherwise safestack can't
- be used on C++.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add "missing" function EVP_MD_flags() (without this the only way to
- retrieve a digest flags is by accessing the structure directly. Update
- EVP_MD_do_all*() and EVP_CIPHER_do_all*() to include the name a digest
- or cipher is registered as in the "from" argument. Print out all
- registered digests in the dgst usage message instead of manually
- attempting to work them out.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) If no SSLv2 ciphers are used don't use an SSLv2 compatible client hello:
- this allows the use of compression and extensions. Change default cipher
- string to remove SSLv2 ciphersuites. This effectively avoids ancient SSLv2
- by default unless an application cipher string requests it.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Alter match criteria in PKCS12_parse(). It used to try to use local
- key ids to find matching certificates and keys but some PKCS#12 files
- don't follow the (somewhat unwritten) rules and this strategy fails.
- Now just gather all certificates together and the first private key
- then look for the first certificate that matches the key.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support use of registered digest and cipher names for dgst and cipher
- commands instead of having to add each one as a special case. So now
- you can do:
-
- openssl sha256 foo
-
- as well as:
-
- openssl dgst -sha256 foo
-
- and this works for ENGINE based algorithms too.
-
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Update Gost ENGINE to support parameter files.
- [Victor B. Wagner <vitus at cryptocom.ru>]
-
- *) Support GeneralizedTime in ca utility.
- [Oliver Martin <oliver at volatilevoid.net>, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Enhance the hash format used for certificate directory links. The new
- form uses the canonical encoding (meaning equivalent names will work
- even if they aren't identical) and uses SHA1 instead of MD5. This form
- is incompatible with the older format and as a result c_rehash should
- be used to rebuild symbolic links.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make PKCS#8 the default write format for private keys, replacing the
- traditional format. This form is standardised, more secure and doesn't
- include an implicit MD5 dependency.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a $gcc_devteam_warn option to Configure. The idea is that any code
- committed to OpenSSL should pass this lot as a minimum.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add session ticket override functionality for use by EAP-FAST.
- [Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>]
-
- *) Modify HMAC functions to return a value. Since these can be implemented
- in an ENGINE errors can occur.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch_ex.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch. Also some constification necessitated
- by type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?),
- OBJ_bsearch_ex, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING,
- CONF_VALUE.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_adj() to add a specific number of days and
- seconds to a tm structure directly, instead of going through OS
- specific date routines. This avoids any issues with OS routines such
- as the year 2038 bug. New *_adj() functions for ASN1 time structures
- and X509_time_adj_ex() to cover the extended range. The existing
- X509_time_adj() is still usable and will no longer have any date issues.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Delta CRL support. New use deltas option which will attempt to locate
- and search any appropriate delta CRLs available.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for CRLs partitioned by reason code. Reorganise CRL processing
- code and add additional score elements. Validate alternate CRL paths
- as part of the CRL checking and indicate a new error "CRL path validation
- error" in this case. Applications wanting additional details can use
- the verify callback and check the new "parent" field. If this is not
- NULL CRL path validation is taking place. Existing applications wont
- see this because it requires extended CRL support which is off by
- default.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for freshest CRL extension.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial indirect CRL support. Currently only supported in the CRLs
- passed directly and not via lookup. Process certificate issuer
- CRL entry extension and lookup CRL entries by bother issuer name
- and serial number. Check and process CRL issuer entry in IDP extension.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for distinct certificate and CRL paths. The CRL issuer
- certificate is validated separately in this case. Only enabled if
- an extended CRL support flag is set: this flag will enable additional
- CRL functionality in future.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for policy mappings extension.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixes to pathlength constraint, self issued certificate handling,
- policy processing to align with RFC3280 and PKITS tests.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for name constraints certificate extension. DN, email, DNS
- and URI types are currently supported.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) To cater for systems that provide a pointer-based thread ID rather
- than numeric, deprecate the current numeric thread ID mechanism and
- replace it with a structure and associated callback type. This
- mechanism allows a numeric "hash" to be extracted from a thread ID in
- either case, and on platforms where pointers are larger than 'long',
- mixing is done to help ensure the numeric 'hash' is usable even if it
- can't be guaranteed unique. The default mechanism is to use "&errno"
- as a pointer-based thread ID to distinguish between threads.
-
- Applications that want to provide their own thread IDs should now use
- CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback() to register a callback that will call
- either CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric() or CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer().
-
- Note that ERR_remove_state() is now deprecated, because it is tied
- to the assumption that thread IDs are numeric. ERR_remove_state(0)
- to free the current thread's error state should be replaced by
- ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL).
-
- (This new approach replaces the functions CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback(),
- CRYPTO_get_idptr_callback(), and CRYPTO_thread_idptr() that existed in
- OpenSSL 0.9.9-dev between June 2006 and August 2008. Also, if an
- application was previously providing a numeric thread callback that
- was inappropriate for distinguishing threads, then uniqueness might
- have been obtained with &errno that happened immediately in the
- intermediate development versions of OpenSSL; this is no longer the
- case, the numeric thread callback will now override the automatic use
- of &errno.)
- [Geoff Thorpe, with help from Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Initial support for different CRL issuing certificates. This covers a
- simple case where the self issued certificates in the chain exist and
- the real CRL issuer is higher in the existing chain.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Removed effectively defunct crypto/store from the build.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Revamp of STACK to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come:
- TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE,
- ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add a new SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS mode flag to release unused buffer
- RAM on SSL connections. This option can save about 34k per idle SSL.
- [Nick Mathewson]
-
- *) Revamp of LHASH to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come:
- STACK, TXT_DB, bsearch, qsort.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Initial support for Cryptographic Message Syntax (aka CMS) based
- on RFC3850, RFC3851 and RFC3852. New cms directory and cms utility,
- support for data, signedData, compressedData, digestedData and
- encryptedData, envelopedData types included. Scripts to check against
- RFC4134 examples draft and interop and consistency checks of many
- content types and variants.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add options to enc utility to support use of zlib compression BIO.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Extend mk1mf to support importing of options and assembly language
- files from Configure script, currently only included in VC-WIN32.
- The assembly language rules can now optionally generate the source
- files from the associated perl scripts.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Implement remaining functionality needed to support GOST ciphersuites.
- Interop testing has been performed using CryptoPro implementations.
- [Victor B. Wagner <vitus at cryptocom.ru>]
-
- *) s390x assembler pack.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) ARMv4 assembler pack. ARMv4 refers to v4 and later ISA, not CPU
- "family."
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Implement Opaque PRF Input TLS extension as specified in
- draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt. Since this is not an
- official specification yet and no extension type assignment by
- IANA exists, this extension (for now) will have to be explicitly
- enabled when building OpenSSL by providing the extension number
- to use. For example, specify an option
-
- -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=0x9527
-
- to the "config" or "Configure" script to enable the extension,
- assuming extension number 0x9527 (which is a completely arbitrary
- and unofficial assignment based on the MD5 hash of the Internet
- Draft). Note that by doing so, you potentially lose
- interoperability with other TLS implementations since these might
- be using the same extension number for other purposes.
-
- SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, src, len) is used to set the
- opaque PRF input value to use in the handshake. This will create
- an interal copy of the length-'len' string at 'src', and will
- return non-zero for success.
-
- To get more control and flexibility, provide a callback function
- by using
-
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb)
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg)
-
- where
-
- int (*cb)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
- void *arg;
-
- Callback function 'cb' will be called in handshakes, and is
- expected to use SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input() as appropriate.
- Argument 'arg' is for application purposes (the value as given to
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg() will directly
- be provided to the callback function). The callback function
- has to return non-zero to report success: usually 1 to use opaque
- PRF input just if possible, or 2 to enforce use of the opaque PRF
- input. In the latter case, the library will abort the handshake
- if opaque PRF input is not successfully negotiated.
-
- Arguments 'peerinput' and 'len' given to the callback function
- will always be NULL and 0 in the case of a client. A server will
- see the client's opaque PRF input through these variables if
- available (NULL and 0 otherwise). Note that if the server
- provides an opaque PRF input, the length must be the same as the
- length of the client's opaque PRF input.
-
- Note that the callback function will only be called when creating
- a new session (session resumption can resume whatever was
- previously negotiated), and will not be called in SSL 2.0
- handshakes; thus, SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) or
- SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) is especially recommended
- for applications that need to enforce opaque PRF input.
-
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Update ssl code to support digests other than SHA1+MD5 for handshake
- MAC.
-
- [Victor B. Wagner <vitus at cryptocom.ru>]
-
- *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in
- RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded
- SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically
- supported.
-
- If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure
- support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded
- SSL_SESSION.
-
- The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket
- protection in servers so again support should be possible
- with no application modification.
-
- If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option
- SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set.
-
- Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client
- or server extensions to be examined.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Final changes to avoid use of pointer pointer casts in OpenSSL.
- OpenSSL should now compile cleanly on gcc 4.2
- [Peter Hartley <pdh at utter.chaos.org.uk>, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Update SSL library to use new EVP_PKEY MAC API. Include generic MAC
- support including streaming MAC support: this is required for GOST
- ciphersuite support.
- [Victor B. Wagner <vitus at cryptocom.ru>, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add option -stream to use PKCS#7 streaming in smime utility. New
- function i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() and PEM_write_PKCS7_bio_stream()
- to output in BER and PEM format.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Experimental support for use of HMAC via EVP_PKEY interface. This
- allows HMAC to be handled via the EVP_DigestSign*() interface. The
- EVP_PKEY "key" in this case is the HMAC key, potentially allowing
- ENGINE support for HMAC keys which are unextractable. New -mac and
- -macopt options to dgst utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use
- EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use
- alternative signing paramaters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst
- utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change ssl_cipher_apply_rule(), the internal function that does
- the work each time a ciphersuite string requests enabling
- ("foo+bar"), moving ("+foo+bar"), disabling ("-foo+bar", or
- removing ("!foo+bar") a class of ciphersuites: Now it maintains
- the order of disabled ciphersuites such that those ciphersuites
- that most recently went from enabled to disabled not only stay
- in order with respect to each other, but also have higher priority
- than other disabled ciphersuites the next time ciphersuites are
- enabled again.
-
- This means that you can now say, e.g., "PSK:-PSK:HIGH" to enable
- the same ciphersuites as with "HIGH" alone, but in a specific
- order where the PSK ciphersuites come first (since they are the
- most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed).
-
- Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new
- funcionality) such that between otherwise identical
- cihpersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in
- the default order.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change ssl_create_cipher_list() so that it automatically
- arranges the ciphersuites in reasonable order before starting
- to process the rule string. Thus, the definition for "DEFAULT"
- (SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST) now is just "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL", but
- remains equivalent to "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+aECDH:+kRSA:+RC4:@STRENGTH".
- This makes it much easier to arrive at a reasonable default order
- in applications for which anonymous ciphers are OK (meaning
- that you can't actually use DEFAULT).
- [Bodo Moeller; suggested by Victor Duchovni]
-
- *) Split the SSL/TLS algorithm mask (as used for ciphersuite string
- processing) into multiple integers instead of setting
- "SSL_MKEY_MASK" bits, "SSL_AUTH_MASK" bits, "SSL_ENC_MASK",
- "SSL_MAC_MASK", and "SSL_SSL_MASK" bits all in a single integer.
- (These masks as well as the individual bit definitions are hidden
- away into the non-exported interface ssl/ssl_locl.h, so this
- change to the definition of the SSL_CIPHER structure shouldn't
- affect applications.) This give us more bits for each of these
- categories, so there is no longer a need to coagulate AES128 and
- AES256 into a single algorithm bit, and to coagulate Camellia128
- and Camellia256 into a single algorithm bit, which has led to all
- kinds of kludges.
-
- Thus, among other things, the kludge introduced in 0.9.7m and
- 0.9.8e for masking out AES256 independently of AES128 or masking
- out Camellia256 independently of AES256 is not needed here in 0.9.9.
-
- With the change, we also introduce new ciphersuite aliases that
- so far were missing: "AES128", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", and
- "CAMELLIA256".
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add support for dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256.
- Use the leftmost N bytes of the signature input if the input is
- larger than the prime q (with N being the size in bytes of q).
- [Nils Larsch]
-
- *) Very *very* experimental PKCS#7 streaming encoder support. Nothing uses
- it yet and it is largely untested.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for the ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types.
- [Nils Larsch]
-
- *) Initial incomplete changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL
- some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. Safestack is
- reimplemented. Update ASN1 to avoid use of legacy functions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Win32/64 targets are linked with Winsock2.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected
- to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling
- efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing
- the CRL revoked certificates in a database.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Overhaul of by_dir code. Add support for dynamic loading of CRLs so
- new CRLs added to a directory can be used. New command line option
- -verify_return_error to s_client and s_server. This causes real errors
- to be returned by the verify callback instead of carrying on no matter
- what. This reflects the way a "real world" verify callback would behave.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) GOST engine, supporting several GOST algorithms and public key formats.
- Kindly donated by Cryptocom.
- [Cryptocom]
-
- *) Partial support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. CRLs
- partitioned by DP are handled but no indirect CRL or reason partitioning
- (yet). Complete overhaul of CRL handling: now the most suitable CRL is
- selected via a scoring technique which handles IDP and AKID in CRLs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New X509_STORE_CTX callbacks lookup_crls() and lookup_certs() which
- will ultimately be used for all verify operations: this will remove the
- X509_STORE dependency on certificate verification and allow alternative
- lookup methods. X509_STORE based implementations of these two callbacks.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names.
- Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function X509_CRL_match() to check if two CRLs are identical. Normally
- this would be called X509_CRL_cmp() but that name is already used by
- a function that just compares CRL issuer names. Cache several CRL
- extensions in X509_CRL structure and cache CRLDP in X509.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Store a "canonical" representation of X509_NAME structure (ASN1 Name)
- this maps equivalent X509_NAME structures into a consistent structure.
- Name comparison can then be performed rapidly using memcmp().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Non-blocking OCSP request processing. Add -timeout option to ocsp
- utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Allow digests to supply their own micalg string for S/MIME type using
- the ctrl EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) During PKCS7 signing pass the PKCS7 SignerInfo structure to the
- EVP_PKEY_METHOD before and after signing via the EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN
- ctrl. It can then customise the structure before and/or after signing
- if necessary.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function OBJ_add_sigid() to allow application defined signature OIDs
- to be added to OpenSSLs internal tables. New function OBJ_sigid_free()
- to free up any added signature OIDs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_do_all(), EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(),
- EVP_MD_do_all() and EVP_MD_do_all_sorted() to enumerate internal
- digest and cipher tables. New options added to openssl utility:
- list-message-digest-algorithms and list-cipher-algorithms.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change the array representation of binary polynomials: the list
- of degrees of non-zero coefficients is now terminated with -1.
- Previously it was terminated with 0, which was also part of the
- value; thus, the array representation was not applicable to
- polynomials where t^0 has coefficient zero. This change makes
- the array representation useful in a more general context.
- [Douglas Stebila]
-
- *) Various modifications and fixes to SSL/TLS cipher string
- handling. For ECC, the code now distinguishes between fixed ECDH
- with RSA certificates on the one hand and with ECDSA certificates
- on the other hand, since these are separate ciphersuites. The
- unused code for Fortezza ciphersuites has been removed.
-
- For consistency with EDH, ephemeral ECDH is now called "EECDH"
- (not "ECDHE"). For consistency with the code for DH
- certificates, use of ECDH certificates is now considered ECDH
- authentication, not RSA or ECDSA authentication (the latter is
- merely the CA's signing algorithm and not actively used in the
- protocol).
-
- The temporary ciphersuite alias "ECCdraft" is no longer
- available, and ECC ciphersuites are no longer excluded from "ALL"
- and "DEFAULT". The following aliases now exist for RFC 4492
- ciphersuites, most of these by analogy with the DH case:
-
- kECDHr - ECDH cert, signed with RSA
- kECDHe - ECDH cert, signed with ECDSA
- kECDH - ECDH cert (signed with either RSA or ECDSA)
- kEECDH - ephemeral ECDH
- ECDH - ECDH cert or ephemeral ECDH
-
- aECDH - ECDH cert
- aECDSA - ECDSA cert
- ECDSA - ECDSA cert
-
- AECDH - anonymous ECDH
- EECDH - non-anonymous ephemeral ECDH (equivalent to "kEECDH:-AECDH")
-
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add additional S/MIME capabilities for AES and GOST ciphers if supported.
- Use correct micalg parameters depending on digest(s) in signed message.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add engine support for EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. Add functions to process
- an ENGINE asn1 method. Support ENGINE lookups in the ASN1 code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial engine support for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. New functions to permit
- an engine to register a method. Add ENGINE lookups for methods and
- functional reference processing.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enchance versions of
- EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature
- process.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New -resign option to smime utility. This adds one or more signers
- to an existing PKCS#7 signedData structure. Also -md option to use an
- alternative message digest algorithm for signing.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Tidy up PKCS#7 routines and add new functions to make it easier to
- create PKCS7 structures containing multiple signers. Update smime
- application to support multiple signers.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New -macalg option to pkcs12 utility to allow setting of an alternative
- digest MAC.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PRFs other than default SHA1 HMAC.
- Reorganize PBE internals to lookup from a static table using NIDs,
- add support for HMAC PBE OID translation. Add a EVP_CIPHER ctrl:
- EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID this allows a cipher to specify an alternative
- PRF which will be automatically used with PBES2.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Replace the algorithm specific calls to generate keys in "req" with the
- new API.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Update PKCS#7 enveloped data routines to use new API. This is now
- supported by any public key method supporting the encrypt operation. A
- ctrl is added to allow the public key algorithm to examine or modify
- the PKCS#7 RecipientInfo structure if it needs to: for RSA this is
- a no op.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a ctrl to asn1 method to allow a public key algorithm to express
- a default digest type to use. In most cases this will be SHA1 but some
- algorithms (such as GOST) need to specify an alternative digest. The
- return value indicates how strong the prefernce is 1 means optional and
- 2 is mandatory (that is it is the only supported type). Modify
- ASN1_item_sign() to accept a NULL digest argument to indicate it should
- use the default md. Update openssl utilities to use the default digest
- type for signing if it is not explicitly indicated.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Use OID cross reference table in ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify(). New
- EVP_MD flag EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE. This uses the relevant
- signing method from the key type. This effectively removes the link
- between digests and public key types.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add an OID cross reference table and utility functions. Its purpose is to
- translate between signature OIDs such as SHA1WithrsaEncryption and SHA1,
- rsaEncryption. This will allow some of the algorithm specific hackery
- needed to use the correct OID to be removed.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Remove algorithm specific dependencies when setting PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
- structures for PKCS7_sign(). They are now set up by the relevant public
- key ASN1 method.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add provisional EC pkey method with support for ECDSA and ECDH.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for key derivation (agreement) in the API, DH method and
- pkeyutl.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add DSA pkey method and DH pkey methods, extend DH ASN1 method to support
- public and private key formats. As a side effect these add additional
- command line functionality not previously available: DSA signatures can be
- generated and verified using pkeyutl and DH key support and generation in
- pkey, genpkey.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) BeOS support.
- [Oliver Tappe <zooey at hirschkaefer.de>]
-
- *) New make target "install_html_docs" installs HTML renditions of the
- manual pages.
- [Oliver Tappe <zooey at hirschkaefer.de>]
-
- *) New utility "genpkey" this is analagous to "genrsa" etc except it can
- generate keys for any algorithm. Extend and update EVP_PKEY_METHOD to
- support key and parameter generation and add initial key generation
- functionality for RSA.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add functions for main EVP_PKEY_method operations. The undocumented
- functions EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt} have been renamed to
- EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt}_old.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial definitions for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. This will be a high level public
- key API, doesn't do much yet.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() to retrieve information about
- public key algorithms. New option to openssl utility:
- "list-public-key-algorithms" to print out info.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Implement the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension for
- ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt.
- [Douglas Stebila]
-
- *) Don't free up OIDs in OBJ_cleanup() if they are in use by EVP_MD or
- EVP_CIPHER structures to avoid later problems in EVP_cleanup().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New utilities pkey and pkeyparam. These are similar to algorithm specific
- utilities such as rsa, dsa, dsaparam etc except they process any key
- type.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Transfer public key printing routines to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. New
- functions EVP_PKEY_print_public(), EVP_PKEY_print_private(),
- EVP_PKEY_print_param() to print public key data from an EVP_PKEY
- structure.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial support for pluggable public key ASN1.
- De-spaghettify the public key ASN1 handling. Move public and private
- key ASN1 handling to a new EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure. Relocate
- algorithm specific handling to a single module within the relevant
- algorithm directory. Add functions to allow (near) opaque processing
- of public and private key structures.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for
- ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt.
- [Douglas Stebila]
-
- *) Add initial support for RFC 4279 PSK TLS ciphersuites. Add members
- for the psk identity [hint] and the psk callback functions to the
- SSL_SESSION, SSL and SSL_CTX structure.
-
- New ciphersuites:
- PSK-RC4-SHA, PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA,
- PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
-
- New functions:
- SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint
- SSL_get_psk_identity_hint
- SSL_get_psk_identity
- SSL_use_psk_identity_hint
-
- [Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of Nokia Corporation]
-
- *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
- and response verification functionality.
- [Zolt\xE1n Gl\xF3zik <zglozik at opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
-
- *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
- extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
- have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an
- additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be
- stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the
- SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's
- server_name extension.
-
- New functions (subject to change):
-
- SSL_get_servername()
- SSL_get_servername_type()
- SSL_set_SSL_CTX()
-
- New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change):
-
- SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB
- - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback()
- SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG
- - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg()
- SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name()
-
- openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option.
-
- openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...',
- '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows
- testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
- and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
- negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by
- default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
- option.
-
- [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou]
-
- *) Whirlpool hash implementation is added.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) BIGNUM code on 64-bit SPARCv9 targets is switched from bn(64,64) to
- bn(64,32). Because of instruction set limitations it doesn't have
- any negative impact on performance. This was done mostly in order
- to make it possible to share assembler modules, such as bn_mul_mont
- implementations, between 32- and 64-bit builds without hassle.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c
- to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
- macro.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont,
- dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced.
- BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher
- "64-bit" performance on certain 32-bit targets.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively
- in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size.
- Save memory by seeting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of
- using the maximum available value.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New option -V for 'openssl ciphers'. This prints the ciphersuite code
- in addition to the text details.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Very, very preliminary EXPERIMENTAL support for printing of general
- ASN1 structures. This currently produces rather ugly output and doesn't
- handle several customised structures at all.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Integrated support for PVK file format and some related formats such
- as MS PUBLICKEYBLOB and PRIVATEKEYBLOB. Command line switches to support
- these in the 'rsa' and 'dsa' utilities.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey format on rsa utility command line.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Remove the ancient ASN1_METHOD code. This was only ever used in one
- place for the (very old) "NETSCAPE" format certificates which are now
- handled using new ASN1 code equivalents.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Let the TLSv1_method() etc. functions return a 'const' SSL_METHOD
- pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new,
- SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method 'const'.
- [Nils Larsch]
-
- *) Modify CRL distribution points extension code to print out previously
- unsupported fields. Enhance extension setting code to allow setting of
- all fields.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add print and set support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
- [NTT]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
-
- *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
- update s->server with a new major version number. As of
- - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type,
- - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits,
- the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when
- receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload
- protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740)
- [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley <agl at chromium.org>]
-
- *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL
- could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted).
- [Tomas Hoger <thoger at redhat.com>]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]
-
- *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245)
- [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta]
-
- *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to
- accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause
- excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround
- include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the
- BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused
- the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can
- trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions
- of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally.
- This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the
- highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way
- off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while...
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the
- ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications
- call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when
- restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later.
- This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and
- has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and
- CVE-2009-4355.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., <openssl/cast.h>): a CAST_KEY doesn't
- change when encrypting or decrypting.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
- connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI.
- Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
- a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating
- TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
- the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
- waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
- received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
- applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
- and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
- only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
- peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer
- renegotiation support in s_client/s_server.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with
- the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension
- as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
- turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
- SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
- know what you are doing.
- [Eric Rescorla <ekr at networkresonance.com>, Ben Laurie, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when
- issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during
- servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting
- stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if
- a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello
- (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in
- the handshake.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(),
- CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error
- fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked
- correctly.
- [Julia Lawall <julia at diku.dk>]
-
- *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam
- warnings in other configurations.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This
- makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which
- have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some
- systems need.
- [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley]
-
- *) Don't allow the use of leading 0x80 in OIDs. This is a violation of
- X690 8.9.12 and can produce some misleading textual output of OIDs.
- [Steve Henson, reported by Dan Kaminsky]
-
- *) Delete MD2 from algorithm tables. This follows the recommendation in
- several standards that it is not used in new applications due to
- several cryptographic weaknesses. For binary compatibility reasons
- the MD2 API is still compiled in by default.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add compression id to {d2i,i2d}_SSL_SESSION so it is correctly saved
- and restored.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Rename uni2asc and asc2uni functions to OPENSSL_uni2asc and
- OPENSSL_asc2uni conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name
- clash.
- [Guenter <lists at gknw.net>]
-
- *) Fix the server certificate chain building code to use X509_verify_cert(),
- it used to have an ad-hoc builder which was unable to cope with anything
- other than a simple chain.
- [David Woodhouse <dwmw2 at infradead.org>, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert()
- by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without
- adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs
- with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message
- is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory
- allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack
- with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory
- left. Additionally every future messege was buffered, even if the
- sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake.
- So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be
- buffered. (CVE-2009-1378)
- [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz]
-
- *) Records are buffered if they arrive with a future epoch to be
- processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is
- currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform
- a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no
- memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to detemine
- the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries.
- (CVE-2009-1377)
- [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz]
-
- *) Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the
- parent structure is freed. (CVE-2009-1379)
- [Daniel Mentz]
-
- *) Handle non-blocking I/O properly in SSL_shutdown() call.
- [Darryl Miles <darryl-mailinglists at netbauds.net>]
-
- *) Add 2.5.4.* OIDs
- [Ilya O. <vrghost at gmail.com>]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]
-
- *) Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security
- problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all
- renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting
- SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at
- run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what
- you're doing.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]
-
- *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by
- underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in
- zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789)
- [Paolo Ganci <Paolo.Ganci at AdNovum.CH>]
-
- *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not
- checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to
- appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591)
- [Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode at us.ibm.com>]
-
- *) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This
- prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have
- a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Set S/MIME signing as the default purpose rather than setting it
- unconditionally. This allows applications to override it at the store
- level.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Permit restricted recursion of ASN1 strings. This is needed in practice
- to handle some structures.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Improve efficiency of mem_gets: don't search whole buffer each time
- for a '\n'
- [Jeremy Shapiro <jnshapir at us.ibm.com>]
-
- *) New -hex option for openssl rand.
- [Matthieu Herrb]
-
- *) Print out UTF8String and NumericString when parsing ASN1.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support NumericString type for name components.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Allow CC in the environment to override the automatically chosen
- compiler. Note that nothing is done to ensure flags work with the
- chosen compiler.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [07 Jan 2009]
-
- *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values
- (CVE-2008-5077).
- [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team]
-
- *) Enable TLS extensions by default.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Allow the CHIL engine to be loaded, whether the application is
- multithreaded or not. (This does not release the developer from the
- obligation to set up the dynamic locking callbacks.)
- [Sander Temme <sander at temme.net>]
-
- *) Use correct exit code if there is an error in dgst command.
- [Steve Henson; problem pointed out by Roland Dirlewanger]
-
- *) Tweak Configure so that you need to say "experimental-jpake" to enable
- JPAKE, and need to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE in applications.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add experimental JPAKE support, including demo authentication in
- s_client and s_server.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Set the comparison function in v3_addr_canonize().
- [Rob Austein <sra at hactrn.net>]
-
- *) Add support for XMPP STARTTLS in s_client.
- [Philip Paeps <philip at freebsd.org>]
-
- *) Change the server-side SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG behavior
- to ensure that even with this option, only ciphersuites in the
- server's preference list will be accepted. (Note that the option
- applies only when resuming a session, so the earlier behavior was
- just about the algorithm choice for symmetric cryptography.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i [15 Sep 2008]
-
- *) Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received
- ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386).
- [PR #1679]
-
- *) Fix a state transitition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c
- (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...).
- [Nagendra Modadugu]
-
- *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe
- double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding,
- addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been
- doubly unsafe triple-checked locking.
-
- So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro
- in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c.
-
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder]
-
- *) Various precautionary measures:
-
- - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h).
-
- - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c).
- (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key
- to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.)
-
- - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs
- outside the expected range.
-
- - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG
- builds.
-
- [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if
- the load fails. Useful for distros.
- [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team]
-
- *) Add support for Local Machine Keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix BN_GF2m_mod_arr() top-bit cleanup code.
- [Huang Ying]
-
- *) Expand ENGINE to support engine supplied SSL client certificate functions.
-
- This work was sponsored by Logica.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add CryptoAPI ENGINE to support use of RSA and DSA keys held in Windows
- keystores. Support for SSL/TLS client authentication too.
- Not compiled unless enable-capieng specified to Configure.
-
- This work was sponsored by Logica.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: dont set attribute using
- ASN1_TYPE_set1 if MBSTRING flag set. This bug would crash certain
- attribute creation routines such as certifcate requests and PKCS#12
- files.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]
-
- *) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS
- handshake which could lead to a cilent crash as found using the
- Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672)
- [Steve Henson, Mark Cox]
-
- *) Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to
- a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891)
- [Joe Orton]
-
- *) Clear error queue in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file()
-
- Clear the error queue to ensure that error entries left from
- older function calls do not interfere with the correct operation.
- [Lutz Jaenicke, Erik de Castro Lopo]
-
- *) Remove root CA certificates of commercial CAs:
-
- The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not
- have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA.
- Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection
- of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads.
- The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than
- 'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes
- before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where
- the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte
- invalid read after the end of 'db').
- [Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode at us.ibm.com>]
-
- *) Partial backport from 0.9.9-dev:
-
- Introduce bn_mul_mont (dedicated Montgomery multiplication
- procedure) as a candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation.
- While 0.9.9-dev uses assembler for various architectures, only
- x86_64 is available by default here in the 0.9.8 branch, and
- 32-bit x86 is available through a compile-time setting.
-
- To try the 32-bit x86 assembler implementation, use Configure
- option "enable-montasm" (which exists only for this backport).
-
- As "enable-montasm" for 32-bit x86 disclaims code stability
- anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code
- backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements,
- namely BN_from_montgomery_word. (To enable this otherwise,
- e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".)
-
- [Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)]
-
- *) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set
- TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed
- values. This is useful for key rollover for example where several key
- sets may exist with different names.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Reverse ENGINE-internal logic for caching default ENGINE handles.
- This was broken until now in 0.9.8 releases, such that the only way
- a registered ENGINE could be used (assuming it initialises
- successfully on the host) was to explicitly set it as the default
- for the relevant algorithms. This is in contradiction with 0.9.7
- behaviour and the documentation. With this fix, when an ENGINE is
- registered into a given algorithm's table of implementations, the
- 'uptodate' flag is reset so that auto-discovery will be used next
- time a new context for that algorithm attempts to select an
- implementation.
- [Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)]
-
- *) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9
- implemention in the following ways:
-
- Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be
- hard coded.
-
- Lack of BER streaming support means one pass streaming processing is
- only supported if data is detached: setting the streaming flag is
- ignored for embedded content.
-
- CMS support is disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled
- with the enable-cms configuration option.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Update the GMP engine glue to do direct copies between BIGNUM and
- mpz_t when openssl and GMP use the same limb size. Otherwise the
- existing "conversion via a text string export" trick is still used.
- [Paul Sheer <paulsheer at gmail.com>]
-
- *) Zlib compression BIO. This is a filter BIO which compressed and
- uncompresses any data passed through it.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add AES_wrap_key() and AES_unwrap_key() functions to implement
- RFC3394 compatible AES key wrapping.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add utility functions to handle ASN1 structures. ASN1_STRING_set0():
- sets string data without copying. X509_ALGOR_set0() and
- X509_ALGOR_get0(): set and retrieve X509_ALGOR (AlgorithmIdentifier)
- data. Attribute function X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(): retrieves data
- from an X509_ATTRIBUTE structure optionally checking it occurs only
- once. ASN1_TYPE_set1(): set and ASN1_TYPE structure copying supplied
- data.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix BN flag handling in RSA_eay_mod_exp() and BN_MONT_CTX_set()
- to get the expected BN_FLG_CONSTTIME behavior.
- [Bodo Moeller (Google)]
-
- *) Netware support:
-
- - fixed wrong usage of ioctlsocket() when build for LIBC BSD sockets
- - fixed do_tests.pl to run the test suite with CLIB builds too (CLIB_OPT)
- - added some more tests to do_tests.pl
- - fixed RunningProcess usage so that it works with newer LIBC NDKs too
- - removed usage of BN_LLONG for CLIB builds to avoid runtime dependency
- - added new Configure targets netware-clib-bsdsock, netware-clib-gcc,
- netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc, netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc
- - various changes to netware.pl to enable gcc-cross builds on Win32
- platform
- - changed crypto/bio/b_sock.c to work with macro functions (CLIB BSD)
- - various changes to fix missing prototype warnings
- - fixed x86nasm.pl to create correct asm files for NASM COFF output
- - added AES, WHIRLPOOL and CPUID assembler code to build files
- - added missing AES assembler make rules to mk1mf.pl
- - fixed order of includes in apps/ocsp.c so that e_os.h settings apply
- [Guenter Knauf <eflash at gmx.net>]
-
- *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546.
- A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded
- OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters
- and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples
- to s_client and s_server.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]
-
- *) Fix various bugs:
- + Binary incompatibility of ssl_ctx_st structure
- + DTLS interoperation with non-compliant servers
- + Don't call get_session_cb() without proposed session
- + Fix ia64 assembler code
- [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]
-
- *) DTLS Handshake overhaul. There were longstanding issues with
- OpenSSL DTLS implementation, which were making it impossible for
- RFC 4347 compliant client to communicate with OpenSSL server.
- Unfortunately just fixing these incompatibilities would "cut off"
- pre-0.9.8f clients. To allow for hassle free upgrade post-0.9.8e
- server keeps tolerating non RFC compliant syntax. The opposite is
- not true, 0.9.8f client can not communicate with earlier server.
- This update even addresses CVE-2007-4995.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL: some compilers
- (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use.
- [Kurt Roeckx <kurt at roeckx.be>, Peter Hartley <pdh at utter.chaos.org.uk>,
- Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in
- RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded
- SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically
- supported.
-
- If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure
- support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded
- SSL_SESSION.
-
- The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket
- protection in servers so again support should be possible
- with no application modification.
-
- If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option
- SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set.
-
- Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client
- or server extensions to be examined.
-
- This work was sponsored by Google.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
- extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
- have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an
- additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be
- stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the
- SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's
- server_name extension.
-
- New functions (subject to change):
-
- SSL_get_servername()
- SSL_get_servername_type()
- SSL_set_SSL_CTX()
-
- New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change):
-
- SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB
- - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback()
- SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG
- - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg()
- SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name()
-
- openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option.
-
- openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...',
- '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows
- testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
- and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
- negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by
- default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
- option.
-
- [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add AES and SSE2 assembly language support to VC++ build.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Mitigate attack on final subtraction in Montgomery reduction.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Fix crypto/ec/ec_mult.c to work properly with scalars of value 0
- (which previously caused an internal error).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) AES IGE mode speedup.
- [Dean Gaudet (Google)]
-
- *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see
- http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and
- add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162:
-
- TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "SEED-SHA"
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "ADH-SEED-SHA"
-
- To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
- series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
- is configured with 'enable-seed'.
- [KISA, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a
- single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract
- information. For detailed background information, see
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron,
- J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
- and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change
- are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and
- BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(),
- respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant
- conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div()
- and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one
- of the input BIGNUMs. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to
- remove a conditional branch.
-
- BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous
- BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just
- modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag
- in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative
- implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name
- remains as a deprecated alias.
-
- Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general
- RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses
- constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation.
- Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias.
-
- BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that
- the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the
- modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to
- BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now
- essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually
- change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows
- RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to
- enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
-
- [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)]
-
- *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID
- context matching (which matters if an application uses a single
- external cache for different purposes). Previously,
- out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was
- set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that,
- with applications using a single external cache for quite
- different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite
- restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session
- in a different context.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that
- a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
- authentication-only ciphersuites.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was
- not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow
- (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]
-
- *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and
- Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of
- ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a
- kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't
- (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't).
- [Victor Duchovni]
-
- *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
- (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters):
- When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to
- prevent the removal of trailing zero bits to get the proper DER
- encoding. (By default, crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c assumes the case
- of a NamedBitList, for which trailing 0 bits need to be removed.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record
- protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the
- ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the
- particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello
- message has informed the client about his choice.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add RFC 3779 support.
- [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a
- static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded.
- Improve header file function name parsing.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) extend SMTP and IMAP protocol emulation in s_client to use EHLO
- or CAPABILITY handshake as required by RFCs.
- [Goetz Babin-Ebell]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]
-
- *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
- cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940)
- [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
- in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
- (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
-
- *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
- malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343)
- [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
-
- *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites
- match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted
- as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got
- the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only
- have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap.
- That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as
- "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites --
- namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones
- from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0.
-
- So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit
- ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar
- ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions.
- Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0
- ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite.
-
- Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the
- 128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now.
- The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and
- AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning;
- however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release
- (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER
- definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into
- multiple values to extend the available space.
-
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006]
-
- *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
- (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
-
- *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
- possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
- undesirable limitations.
- [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly. Now special
- treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites
- cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias.
- However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for
- non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension
- support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation
- to avoid potential handshake problems.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
-
- - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
- - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
- - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
-
- The latter two were purportedly from
- draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
- appear there.
-
- Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from
- draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as
- unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
- dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key
- versions), which is now available for royalty-free use
- (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html).
- Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132.
-
- To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
- series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
- is configured with 'enable-camellia'.
- [NTT]
-
- *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding
- bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not
- necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false
- positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient
- code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by
- now or any which still have the bug do not support compression.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [04 May 2006]
-
- *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit
- cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed.
- [Austin Ziegler <halostatue at gmail.com>]
-
- *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to
- draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without
- TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9
- branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch).
- [Douglas Stebila]
-
- *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support
- opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use
- "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32
- to conform with the standards mentioned here:
- http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt
- Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include
- --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location
- of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library
- can't be loaded.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code
- sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't
- handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a
- non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries
- under VC++ build system.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO.
- Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]
-
- *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
- (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
- countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
- rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
- idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
-
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
- for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
- Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
-
- *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at
- runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
- [Nils Larsch]
-
- *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman.
- [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add functions for well-known primes.
- [Nick Mathewson]
-
- *) Extended Windows CE support.
- [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during
- runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by
- attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to
- smime utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [05 Jul 2005]
-
- [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
- OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
-
- *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private
- key into the same file any more.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'.
- [Stefan <stf at udoma.org]
-
- *) Removed the macro des_crypt(), as it seems to conflict with some
- libraries. Use DES_crypt().
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Correct naming of the 'chil' and '4758cca' ENGINEs. This
- involves renaming the source and generated shared-libs for
- both. The engines will accept the corrected or legacy ids
- ('ncipher' and '4758_cca' respectively) when binding. NB,
- this only applies when building 'shared'.
- [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen at redhat.com> and Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify
- PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and
- use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code:
- - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after
- a fixed number of uses (currently 32)
- - add new function for parameter creation
- - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the
- BN_BLINDING parameters
- - hide BN_BLINDING structure
- Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve
- performance when a single RSA object is shared among several
- threads.
- [Nils Larsch]
-
- *) Add support for DTLS.
- [Nagendra Modadugu <nagendra at cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
- to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file()
- [Walter Goulet]
-
- *) Remove buggy and incompletet DH cert support from
- ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c
- [Nils Larsch]
-
- *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for
- the apps/openssl applications.
- [Nils Larsch]
-
- *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes
- -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently
- DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default.
- The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx".
-
- The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless
- "enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified.
-
- (IDEA remains enabled despite being patented. This is because IDEA
- is frequently required for interoperability, and there is no license
- fee for non-commercial use. As before, "no-idea" can be used to
- avoid this algorithm.)
-
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add processing of proxy certificates (see RFC 3820). This work was
- sponsored by KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm) and
- EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-science in Europe).
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) RC4 performance overhaul on modern architectures/implementations, such
- as Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) New utility extract-section.pl. This can be used specify an alternative
- section number in a pod file instead of having to treat each file as
- a separate case in Makefile. This can be done by adding two lines to the
- pod file:
-
- =for comment openssl_section:XXX
-
- The blank line is mandatory.
-
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New arguments -certform, -keyform and -pass for s_client and s_server
- to allow alternative format key and certificate files and passphrase
- sources.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New structure X509_VERIFY_PARAM which combines current verify parameters,
- update associated structures and add various utility functions.
-
- Add new policy related verify parameters, include policy checking in
- standard verify code. Enhance 'smime' application with extra parameters
- to support policy checking and print out.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a new engine to support VIA PadLock ACE extensions in the VIA C3
- Nehemiah processors. These extensions support AES encryption in hardware
- as well as RNG (though RNG support is currently disabled).
- [Michal Ludvig <michal at logix.cz>, with help from Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Deprecate BN_[get|set]_params() functions (they were ignored internally).
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) New FIPS 180-2 algorithms, SHA-224/-256/-384/-512 are implemented.
- [Andy Polyakov and a number of other people]
-
- *) Improved PowerPC platform support. Most notably BIGNUM assembler
- implementation contributed by IBM.
- [Suresh Chari, Peter Waltenberg, Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) The new 'RSA_generate_key_ex' function now takes a BIGNUM for the public
- exponent rather than 'unsigned long'. There is a corresponding change to
- the new 'rsa_keygen' element of the RSA_METHOD structure.
- [Jelte Jansen, Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Functionality for creating the initial serial number file is now
- moved from CA.pl to the 'ca' utility with a new option -create_serial.
-
- (Before OpenSSL 0.9.7e, CA.pl used to initialize the serial
- number file to 1, which is bound to cause problems. To avoid
- the problems while respecting compatibility between different 0.9.7
- patchlevels, 0.9.7e employed 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in
- CA.pl for serial number initialization. With the new release 0.9.8,
- we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Reduced header interdepencies by declaring more opaque objects in
- ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will
- give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so
- this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always,
- developers should define this symbol when building and using openssl to
- ensure they track the recommended behaviour, interfaces, [etc], but
- backwards-compatible behaviour prevails when this isn't defined.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) New function X509_POLICY_NODE_print() which prints out policy nodes.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new EVP function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key and associated functionality.
- This will generate a random key of the appropriate length based on the
- cipher context. The EVP_CIPHER can provide its own random key generation
- routine to support keys of a specific form. This is used in the des and
- 3des routines to generate a key of the correct parity. Update S/MIME
- code to use new functions and hence generate correct parity DES keys.
- Add EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY #define to return an error if the key is not
- valid (weak or incorrect parity).
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a local set of CRLs that can be used by X509_verify_cert() as well
- as looking them up. This is useful when the verified structure may contain
- CRLs, for example PKCS#7 signedData. Modify PKCS7_verify() to use any CRLs
- present unless the new PKCS7_NO_CRL flag is asserted.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Extend ASN1 oid configuration module. It now additionally accepts the
- syntax:
-
- shortName = some long name, 1.2.3.4
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Reimplemented the BN_CTX implementation. There is now no more static
- limitation on the number of variables it can handle nor the depth of the
- "stack" handling for BN_CTX_start()/BN_CTX_end() pairs. The stack
- information can now expand as required, and rather than having a single
- static array of bignums, BN_CTX now uses a linked-list of such arrays
- allowing it to expand on demand whilst maintaining the usefulness of
- BN_CTX's "bundling".
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Add a missing BN_CTX parameter to the 'rsa_mod_exp' callback in RSA_METHOD
- to allow all RSA operations to function using a single BN_CTX.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This
- is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing
- of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) bn_dup_expand() has been deprecated, it was introduced in 0.9.7 and
- remained unused and not that useful. A variety of other little bignum
- tweaks and fixes have also been made continuing on from the audit (see
- below).
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Constify all or almost all d2i, c2i, s2i and r2i functions, along with
- associated ASN1, EVP and SSL functions and old ASN1 macros.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) BN_zero() only needs to set 'top' and 'neg' to zero for correct results,
- and this should never fail. So the return value from the use of
- BN_set_word() (which can fail due to needless expansion) is now deprecated;
- if OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined, BN_zero() is a void macro.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
- initialised value as BN_new().
- [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) An audit of the BIGNUM code is underway, for which debugging code is
- enabled when BN_DEBUG is defined. This makes stricter enforcements on what
- is considered valid when processing BIGNUMs, and causes execution to
- assert() when a problem is discovered. If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined,
- further steps are taken to deliberately pollute unused data in BIGNUM
- structures to try and expose faulty code further on. For now, openssl will
- (in its default mode of operation) continue to tolerate the inconsistent
- forms that it has tolerated in the past, but authors and packagers should
- consider trying openssl and their own applications when compiled with
- these debugging symbols defined. It will help highlight potential bugs in
- their own code, and will improve the test coverage for OpenSSL itself. At
- some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
- maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
- in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
- [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
- that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
- initialises it). The presence of this function only made it possible
- to overwrite an existing structure (and cause memory leaks).
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Because of the callback-based approach for implementing LHASH as a
- template type, lh_insert() adds opaque objects to hash-tables and
- lh_doall() or lh_doall_arg() are typically used with a destructor callback
- to clean up those corresponding objects before destroying the hash table
- (and losing the object pointers). So some over-zealous constifications in
- LHASH have been relaxed so that lh_insert() does not take (nor store) the
- objects as "const" and the lh_doall[_arg] callback wrappers are not
- prototyped to have "const" restrictions on the object pointers they are
- given (and so aren't required to cast them away any more).
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) The tmdiff.h API was so ugly and minimal that our own timing utility
- (speed) prefers to use its own implementation. The two implementations
- haven't been consolidated as yet (volunteers?) but the tmdiff API has had
- its object type properly exposed (MS_TM) instead of casting to/from "char
- *". This may still change yet if someone realises MS_TM and "ms_time_***"
- aren't necessarily the greatest nomenclatures - but this is what was used
- internally to the implementation so I've used that for now.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Ensure that deprecated functions do not get compiled when
- OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined. Some "openssl" subcommands and a few of
- the self-tests were still using deprecated key-generation functions so
- these have been updated also.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Reorganise PKCS#7 code to separate the digest location functionality
- into PKCS7_find_digest(), digest addtion into PKCS7_bio_add_digest().
- New function PKCS7_set_digest() to set the digest type for PKCS#7
- digestedData type. Add additional code to correctly generate the
- digestedData type and add support for this type in PKCS7 initialization
- functions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function PKCS7_set0_type_other() this initializes a PKCS7
- structure of type "other".
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix prime generation loop in crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl by making
- sure the loop does correctly stop and breaking ("division by zero")
- modulus operations are not performed. The (pre-generated) prime
- table crypto/bn/bn_prime.h was already correct, but it could not be
- re-generated on some platforms because of the "division by zero"
- situation in the script.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to
- draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt: the KDF1 key derivation function with
- SHA-1 now is only used for "small" curves (where the
- representation of a field element takes up to 24 bytes); for
- larger curves, the field element resulting from ECDH is directly
- used as premaster secret.
- [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) Add code for kP+lQ timings to crypto/ec/ectest.c, and add SEC2
- curve secp160r1 to the tests.
- [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
- [G\xF6tz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell at trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
- control of the error stack.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add support for STORE in ENGINE.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the STORE type. The intention is to provide a common interface
- to certificate and key stores, be they simple file-based stores, or
- HSM-type store, or LDAP stores, or...
- NOTE: The code is currently UNTESTED and isn't really used anywhere.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add a generic structure called OPENSSL_ITEM. This can be used to
- pass a list of arguments to any function as well as provide a way
- for a function to pass data back to the caller.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the functions BUF_strndup() and BUF_memdup(). BUF_strndup()
- works like BUF_strdup() but can be used to duplicate a portion of
- a string. The copy gets NUL-terminated. BUF_memdup() duplicates
- a memory area.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the function sk_find_ex() which works like sk_find(), but will
- return an index to an element even if an exact match couldn't be
- found. The index is guaranteed to point at the element where the
- searched-for key would be inserted to preserve sorting order.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the function OBJ_bsearch_ex() which works like OBJ_bsearch() but
- takes an extra flags argument for optional functionality. Currently,
- the following flags are defined:
-
- OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH
- This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first
- element where the comparing function returns a negative or zero
- number.
-
- OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH
- This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first
- element where the comparing function returns zero. This is useful
- if there are more than one element where the comparing function
- returns zero.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make it possible to create self-signed certificates with 'openssl ca'
- in such a way that the self-signed certificate becomes part of the
- CA database and uses the same mechanisms for serial number generation
- as all other certificate signing. The new flag '-selfsign' enables
- this functionality. Adapt CA.sh and CA.pl.in.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add functionality to check the public key of a certificate request
- against a given private. This is useful to check that a certificate
- request can be signed by that key (self-signing).
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
- subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword
- 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default
- if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved
- with the database itself in a separate index attribute file,
- named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Generate muti valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for
- req and dirName.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for nameConstraints certificate extension.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for policyConstraints certificate extension.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for policyMappings certificate extension.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make sure the default DSA_METHOD implementation only uses its
- dsa_mod_exp() and/or bn_mod_exp() handlers if they are non-NULL,
- and change its own handlers to be NULL so as to remove unnecessary
- indirection. This lets alternative implementations fallback to the
- default implementation more easily.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Support for directoryName in GeneralName related extensions
- in config files.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make it possible to link applications using Makefile.shared.
- Make that possible even when linking against static libraries!
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Support for single pass processing for S/MIME signing. This now
- means that S/MIME signing can be done from a pipe, in addition
- cleartext signing (multipart/signed type) is effectively streaming
- and the signed data does not need to be all held in memory.
-
- This is done with a new flag PKCS7_STREAM. When this flag is set
- PKCS7_sign() only initializes the PKCS7 structure and the actual signing
- is done after the data is output (and digests calculated) in
- SMIME_write_PKCS7().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add full support for -rpath/-R, both in shared libraries and
- applications, at least on the platforms where it's known how
- to do it.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) In crypto/ec/ec_mult.c, implement fast point multiplication with
- precomputation, based on wNAF splitting: EC_GROUP_precompute_mult()
- will now compute a table of multiples of the generator that
- makes subsequent invocations of EC_POINTs_mul() or EC_POINT_mul()
- faster (notably in the case of a single point multiplication,
- scalar * generator).
- [Nils Larsch, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) IPv6 support for certificate extensions. The various extensions
- which use the IP:a.b.c.d can now take IPv6 addresses using the
- formats of RFC1884 2.2 . IPv6 addresses are now also displayed
- correctly.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Added an ENGINE that implements RSA by performing private key
- exponentiations with the GMP library. The conversions to and from
- GMP's mpz_t format aren't optimised nor are any montgomery forms
- cached, and on x86 it appears OpenSSL's own performance has caught up.
- However there are likely to be other architectures where GMP could
- provide a boost. This ENGINE is not built in by default, but it can be
- specified at Configure time and should be accompanied by the necessary
- linker additions, eg;
- ./config -DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -lgmp
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) "openssl engine" will not display ENGINE/DSO load failure errors when
- testing availability of engines with "-t" - the old behaviour is
- produced by increasing the feature's verbosity with "-tt".
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) ECDSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects
- could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early
- enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>
- via PR#459)
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD
- and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal
- software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can
- also be overriden by providing the appropriate method callbacks.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Change the "progress" mechanism used in key-generation and
- primality testing to functions that take a new BN_GENCB pointer in
- place of callback/argument pairs. The new API functions have "_ex"
- postfixes and the older functions are reimplemented as wrappers for
- the new ones. The OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol can be used to hide
- declarations of the old functions to help (graceful) attempts to
- migrate to the new functions. Also, the new key-generation API
- functions operate on a caller-supplied key-structure and return
- success/failure rather than returning a key or NULL - this is to
- help make "keygen" another member function of RSA_METHOD etc.
-
- Example for using the new callback interface:
-
- int (*my_callback)(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *cb) = ...;
- void *my_arg = ...;
- BN_GENCB my_cb;
-
- BN_GENCB_set(&my_cb, my_callback, my_arg);
-
- return BN_is_prime_ex(some_bignum, BN_prime_checks, NULL, &cb);
- /* For the meaning of a, b in calls to my_callback(), see the
- * documentation of the function that calls the callback.
- * cb will point to my_cb; my_arg can be retrieved as cb->arg.
- * my_callback should return 1 if it wants BN_is_prime_ex()
- * to continue, or 0 to stop.
- */
-
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Change the ZLIB compression method to be stateful, and make it
- available to TLS with the number defined in
- draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the ASN.1 structures and functions for CertificatePair, which
- is defined as follows (according to X.509_4thEditionDraftV6.pdf):
-
- CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE {
- forward [0] Certificate OPTIONAL,
- reverse [1] Certificate OPTIONAL,
- -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- }
-
- Also implement the PEM functions to read and write certificate
- pairs, and defined the PEM tag as "CERTIFICATE PAIR".
-
- This needed to be defined, mostly for the sake of the LDAP
- attribute crossCertificatePair, but may prove useful elsewhere as
- well.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make it possible to inhibit symlinking of shared libraries in
- Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function
- void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg);
- and a macro that behave like
- int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a);
-
- to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications.
- [Nils Larsch]
-
- *) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes
- used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c).
- EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() will now automatically use this
- if applicable.
- [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
-
- *) Add new lock type (CRYPTO_LOCK_BN).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change the ENGINE framework to automatically load engines
- dynamically from specific directories unless they could be
- found to already be built in or loaded. Move all the
- current engines except for the cryptodev one to a new
- directory engines/.
- The engines in engines/ are built as shared libraries if
- the "shared" options was given to ./Configure or ./config.
- Otherwise, they are inserted in libcrypto.a.
- /usr/local/ssl/engines is the default directory for dynamic
- engines, but that can be overriden at configure time through
- the usual use of --prefix and/or --openssldir, and at run
- time with the environment variable OPENSSL_ENGINES.
- [Geoff Thorpe and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add Makefile.shared, a helper makefile to build shared
- libraries. Addapt Makefile.org.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add version info to Win32 DLLs.
- [Peter 'Luna' Runestig" <peter at runestig.com>]
-
- *) Add new 'medium level' PKCS#12 API. Certificates and keys
- can be added using this API to created arbitrary PKCS#12
- files while avoiding the low level API.
-
- New options to PKCS12_create(), key or cert can be NULL and
- will then be omitted from the output file. The encryption
- algorithm NIDs can be set to -1 for no encryption, the mac
- iteration count can be set to 0 to omit the mac.
-
- Enhance pkcs12 utility by making the -nokeys and -nocerts
- options work when creating a PKCS#12 file. New option -nomac
- to omit the mac, NONE can be set for an encryption algorithm.
- New code is modified to use the enhanced PKCS12_create()
- instead of the low level API.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Extend ASN1 encoder to support indefinite length constructed
- encoding. This can output sequences tags and octet strings in
- this form. Modify pk7_asn1.c to support indefinite length
- encoding. This is experimental and needs additional code to
- be useful, such as an ASN1 bio and some enhanced streaming
- PKCS#7 code.
-
- Extend template encode functionality so that tagging is passed
- down to the template encoder.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Let 'openssl req' fail if an argument to '-newkey' is not
- recognized instead of using RSA as a default.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add support for ECC-based ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt.
- As these are not official, they are not included in "ALL";
- the "ECCdraft" ciphersuite group alias can be used to select them.
- [Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) Add ECDH engine support.
- [Nils Gura and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) Add ECDH in new directory crypto/ecdh/.
- [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) Let BN_rand_range() abort with an error after 100 iterations
- without success (which indicates a broken PRNG).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change BN_mod_sqrt() so that it verifies that the input value
- is really the square of the return value. (Previously,
- BN_mod_sqrt would show GIGO behaviour.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add named elliptic curves over binary fields from X9.62, SECG,
- and WAP/WTLS; add OIDs that were still missing.
-
- [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
- (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) Extend the EC library for elliptic curves over binary fields
- (new files ec2_smpl.c, ec2_smpt.c, ec2_mult.c in crypto/ec/).
- New EC_METHOD:
-
- EC_GF2m_simple_method
-
- New API functions:
-
- EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m
- EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m
- EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m
- EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m
- EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m
- EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m
-
- Point compression for binary fields is disabled by default for
- patent reasons (compile with OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP defined to
- enable it).
-
- As binary polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs, various members
- of the EC_GROUP and EC_POINT data structures can be shared
- between the implementations for prime fields and binary fields;
- the above ..._GF2m functions (except for EX_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m)
- are essentially identical to their ..._GFp counterparts.
- (For simplicity, the '..._GFp' prefix has been dropped from
- various internal method names.)
-
- An internal 'field_div' method (similar to 'field_mul' and
- 'field_sqr') has been added; this is used only for binary fields.
-
- [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
- (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) Optionally dispatch EC_POINT_mul(), EC_POINT_precompute_mult()
- through methods ('mul', 'precompute_mult').
-
- The generic implementations (now internally called 'ec_wNAF_mul'
- and 'ec_wNAF_precomputed_mult') remain the default if these
- methods are undefined.
-
- [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
- (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) New function EC_GROUP_get_degree, which is defined through
- EC_METHOD. For curves over prime fields, this returns the bit
- length of the modulus.
-
- [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
- (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) New functions EC_GROUP_dup, EC_POINT_dup.
- (These simply call ..._new and ..._copy).
-
- [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
- (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) Add binary polynomial arithmetic software in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c.
- Polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs (where the sign bit is not
- used) in the following functions [macros]:
-
- BN_GF2m_add
- BN_GF2m_sub [= BN_GF2m_add]
- BN_GF2m_mod [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_arr]
- BN_GF2m_mod_mul [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr]
- BN_GF2m_mod_sqr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr]
- BN_GF2m_mod_inv
- BN_GF2m_mod_exp [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr]
- BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr]
- BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr]
- BN_GF2m_cmp [= BN_ucmp]
-
- (Note that only the 'mod' functions are actually for fields GF(2^m).
- BN_GF2m_add() is misnomer, but this is for the sake of consistency.)
-
- For some functions, an the irreducible polynomial defining a
- field can be given as an 'unsigned int[]' with strictly
- decreasing elements giving the indices of those bits that are set;
- i.e., p[] represents the polynomial
- f(t) = t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k]
- where
- p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0.
- This applies to the following functions:
-
- BN_GF2m_mod_arr
- BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr
- BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr
- BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_inv]
- BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_div]
- BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr
- BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr
- BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr
- BN_GF2m_poly2arr
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly
-
- Conversion can be performed by the following functions:
-
- BN_GF2m_poly2arr
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly
-
- bntest.c has additional tests for binary polynomial arithmetic.
-
- Two implementations for BN_GF2m_mod_div() are available.
- The default algorithm simply uses BN_GF2m_mod_inv() and
- BN_GF2m_mod_mul(). The alternative algorithm is compiled in only
- if OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV is defined (patent pending; read the
- copyright notice in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c before enabling it).
-
- [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
- (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
-
- *) Add new error code 'ERR_R_DISABLED' that can be used when some
- functionality is disabled at compile-time.
- [Douglas Stebila <douglas.stebila at sun.com>]
-
- *) Change default behaviour of 'openssl asn1parse' so that more
- information is visible when viewing, e.g., a certificate:
-
- Modify asn1_parse2 (crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c) so that in non-'dump'
- mode the content of non-printable OCTET STRINGs is output in a
- style similar to INTEGERs, but with '[HEX DUMP]' prepended to
- avoid the appearance of a printable string.
- [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
-
- *) Add 'asn1_flag' and 'asn1_form' member to EC_GROUP with access
- functions
- EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag()
- EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag()
- EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form()
- EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form()
- These control ASN1 encoding details:
- - Curves (i.e., groups) are encoded explicitly unless asn1_flag
- has been set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE.
- - Points are encoded in uncompressed form by default; options for
- asn1_for are as for point2oct, namely
- POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
- POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID
-
- Also add 'seed' and 'seed_len' members to EC_GROUP with access
- functions
- EC_GROUP_set_seed()
- EC_GROUP_get0_seed()
- EC_GROUP_get_seed_len()
- This is used only for ASN1 purposes (so far).
- [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
-
- *) Add 'field_type' member to EC_METHOD, which holds the NID
- of the appropriate field type OID. The new function
- EC_METHOD_get_field_type() returns this value.
- [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
-
- *) Add functions
- EC_POINT_point2bn()
- EC_POINT_bn2point()
- EC_POINT_point2hex()
- EC_POINT_hex2point()
- providing useful interfaces to EC_POINT_point2oct() and
- EC_POINT_oct2point().
- [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
-
- *) Change internals of the EC library so that the functions
- EC_GROUP_set_generator()
- EC_GROUP_get_generator()
- EC_GROUP_get_order()
- EC_GROUP_get_cofactor()
- are implemented directly in crypto/ec/ec_lib.c and not dispatched
- to methods, which would lead to unnecessary code duplication when
- adding different types of curves.
- [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de> with input by Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Implement compute_wNAF (crypto/ec/ec_mult.c) without BIGNUM
- arithmetic, and such that modified wNAFs are generated
- (which avoid length expansion in many cases).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add a function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant() (defined via
- EC_METHOD) that verifies that the curve discriminant is non-zero.
-
- Add a function EC_GROUP_check() that makes some sanity tests
- on a EC_GROUP, its generator and order. This includes
- EC_GROUP_check_discriminant().
- [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
-
- *) Add ECDSA in new directory crypto/ecdsa/.
-
- Add applications 'openssl ecparam' and 'openssl ecdsa'
- (these are based on 'openssl dsaparam' and 'openssl dsa').
-
- ECDSA support is also included in various other files across the
- library. Most notably,
- - 'openssl req' now has a '-newkey ecdsa:file' option;
- - EVP_PKCS82PKEY (crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c) now can handle ECDSA;
- - X509_PUBKEY_get (crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c) and
- d2i_PublicKey (crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c) have been modified to make
- them suitable for ECDSA where domain parameters must be
- extracted before the specific public key;
- - ECDSA engine support has been added.
- [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
-
- *) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62,
- SECG, and WAP/WTLS. Each curve can be obtained from the new
- function
- EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(),
- and the list of available named curves can be obtained with
- EC_get_builtin_curves().
- Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be
- accessed via
- EC_GROUP_set_curve_name()
- EC_GROUP_get_curve_name()
- [Nils Larsch <larsch at trustcenter.de, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there
- was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul()
- required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition
- of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and
- bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(),
- bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with
- differing sizes.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7l and 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]
-
- *) Cleanse PEM buffers before freeing them since they may contain
- sensitive data.
- [Benjamin Bennett <ben at psc.edu>]
-
- *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that
- a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
- authentication-only ciphersuites.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of
- ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a
- kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't.
- [Victor Duchovni]
-
- *) Expand security boundary to match 1.1.1 module.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Remove redundant features: hash file source, editing of test vectors
- modify fipsld to use external fips_premain.c signature.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New perl script mkfipsscr.pl to create shell scripts or batch files to
- run algorithm test programs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make algorithm test programs more tolerant of whitespace.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record
- protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the
- ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the
- particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello
- message has informed the client about his choice.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a
- static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]
-
- *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
- cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940)
- [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
- in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
- (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
-
- *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
- malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343)
- [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
-
- *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit
- ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA"
- will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar
- ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that
- "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the
- SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining
- changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006]
-
- *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
- (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
-
- *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
- possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
- undesirable limitations.
- [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
-
- - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
- - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
- - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
-
- The latter two were purportedly from
- draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
- appear there.
-
- Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from
- draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as
- unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
- dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j [04 May 2006]
-
- *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS
- module in FIPS mode.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make
- from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the
- "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++
- build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]
-
- *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS.
- The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not.
- BEWARE! A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be
- safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of
- the difference induced by this change.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]
-
- *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
- (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
- countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
- rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
- idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
-
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
- for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
- Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
-
- *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is
- mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform
- the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise,
- the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key
- after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with
- biased k.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for
- RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of
- squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are
- independent of the particular secret key. This will mitigate
- cache-timing and potential related attacks.
-
- BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation,
- and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag
- BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH
- will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag
- RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or
- DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set.
-
- [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and
- SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0
- Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set.
- (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello
- message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some
- clients need.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in
- a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls
- to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before).
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions
- instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code
- structures constant.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]
-
- [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
- OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
-
- *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because
- the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another
- with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++
- complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included
- nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up
- some needed definitions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Undo Cygwin change.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
- Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
- they must be explicitely allowed in run-time. See
- docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]
-
- *) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating
- server and client random values. Previously
- (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - sizeof(time_t)) would be used which would result in
- less random data when sizeof(time_t) > 4 (some 64 bit platforms).
-
- This change has negligible security impact because:
-
- 1. Server and client random values still have 24 bytes of pseudo random
- data.
-
- 2. Server and client random values are sent in the clear in the initial
- handshake.
-
- 3. The master secret is derived using the premaster secret (48 bytes in
- size for static RSA ciphersuites) as well as client server and random
- values.
-
- The OpenSSL team would like to thank the UK NISCC for bringing this issue
- to our attention.
-
- [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
-
- *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
- prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
- [Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> via Lutz J\xE4nicke, resolves #1014]
-
- *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development
- branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate
- failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs.
- [Nauticus Networks SSL Team <openssl at nauticusnet.com>, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new -passin argument to dgst.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Perform some character comparisons of different types in X509_NAME_cmp:
- this is needed for some certificates that reencode DNs into UTF8Strings
- (in violation of RFC3280) and can't or wont issue name rollover
- certificates.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that
- the CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct. As a
- side effect always do the following basic checks on extensions,
- not just when there's an associated purpose to the check:
-
- - if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user
- has chosen to ignore this fault)
- - if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all)
- - that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has
- been given)
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7d and 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]
-
- *) Avoid a race condition when CRLs are checked in a multi threaded
- environment. This would happen due to the reordering of the revoked
- entries during signature checking and serial number lookup. Now the
- encoding is cached and the serial number sort performed under a lock.
- Add new STACK function sk_is_sorted().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add Delta CRL to the extension code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Various fixes to s3_pkt.c so alerts are sent properly.
- [David Holmes <d.holmes at f5.com>]
-
- *) Reduce the chances of duplicate issuer name and serial numbers (in
- violation of RFC3280) using the OpenSSL certificate creation utilities.
- This is done by creating a random 64 bit value for the initial serial
- number when a serial number file is created or when a self signed
- certificate is created using 'openssl req -x509'. The initial serial
- number file is created using 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl
- rather than being initialized to 1.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]
-
- *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
- by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
- [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
- (CVE-2004-0112)
- [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
- subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword
- 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default
- if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved
- with the database itself in a separate index attribute file,
- named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) X509 verify fixes. Disable broken certificate workarounds when
- X509_V_FLAGS_X509_STRICT is set. Check CRL issuer has cRLSign set if
- keyUsage extension present. Don't accept CRLs with unhandled critical
- extensions: since verify currently doesn't process CRL extensions this
- rejects a CRL with *any* critical extensions. Add new verify error codes
- for these cases.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) When creating an OCSP nonce use an OCTET STRING inside the extnValue.
- A clarification of RFC2560 will require the use of OCTET STRINGs and
- some implementations cannot handle the current raw format. Since OpenSSL
- copies and compares OCSP nonces as opaque blobs without any attempt at
- parsing them this should not create any compatibility issues.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New md flag EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE this allows md_data to be reused when
- calling EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() to avoid calling OPENSSL_malloc(). Without
- this HMAC (and other) operations are several times slower than OpenSSL
- < 0.9.7.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Print out GeneralizedTime and UTCTime in ASN1_STRING_print_ex().
- [Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester at EdelWeb.fr>]
-
- *) Use the correct content when signing type "other".
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]
-
- *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
-
- Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
- invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
-
- Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545).
-
- If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
- certificate signature with the NULL public key.
-
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New -ignore_err option in ocsp application to stop the server
- exiting on the first error in a request.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate
- if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0
- specifications.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional
- extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0
- but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification).
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe]
-
- *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable
- when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Change AES_cbc_encrypt() so it outputs exact multiple of
- blocks during encryption.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Various fixes to base64 BIO and non blocking I/O. On write
- flushes were not handled properly if the BIO retried. On read
- data was not being buffered properly and had various logic bugs.
- This also affects blocking I/O when the data being decoded is a
- certain size.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Various S/MIME bugfixes and compatibility changes:
- output correct application/pkcs7 MIME type if
- PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE is set. Tolerate some broken signatures.
- Output CR+LF for EOL if PKCS7_CRLFEOL is set (this makes opening
- of files as .eml work). Correctly handle very long lines in MIME
- parser.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]
-
- *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
- Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat
- a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error
- in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation
- to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call
- RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING.
- They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases.
- [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not
- seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as
- an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there
- is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe
- by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and
- having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors
- (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but
- avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared
- between threads, blinding will still be very fast).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fixed a typo bug that would cause ENGINE_set_default() to set an
- ENGINE as defaults for all supported algorithms irrespective of
- the 'flags' parameter. 'flags' is now honoured, so applications
- should make sure they are passing it correctly.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Target "mingw" now allows native Windows code to be generated in
- the Cygwin environment as well as with the MinGW compiler.
- [Ulf Moeller]
-
- Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]
-
- *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked
- via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
- block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
- against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
- between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
-
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
- Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
- Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)]
-
- *) Make the no-err option work as intended. The intention with no-err
- is not to have the whole error stack handling routines removed from
- libcrypto, it's only intended to remove all the function name and
- reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not
- be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway.
-
- NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have it's
- own set of error texts inserted. The routines are there, just not
- used by default when no-err is given.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add support for FreeBSD on IA64.
- [dirk.meyer at dinoex.sub.org via Richard Levitte, resolves #454]
-
- *) Adjust DES_cbc_cksum() so it returns the same value as the MIT
- Kerberos function mit_des_cbc_cksum(). Before this change,
- the value returned by DES_cbc_cksum() was like the one from
- mit_des_cbc_cksum(), except the bytes were swapped.
- [Kevin Greaney <Kevin.Greaney at hp.com> and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Allow an application to disable the automatic SSL chain building.
- Before this a rather primitive chain build was always performed in
- ssl3_output_cert_chain(): an application had no way to send the
- correct chain if the automatic operation produced an incorrect result.
-
- Now the chain builder is disabled if either:
-
- 1. Extra certificates are added via SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert().
-
- 2. The mode flag SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN is set.
-
- The reasoning behind this is that an application would not want the
- auto chain building to take place if extra chain certificates are
- present and it might also want a means of sending no additional
- certificates (for example the chain has two certificates and the
- root is omitted).
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add the possibility to build without the ENGINE framework.
- [Steven Reddie <smr at essemer.com.au> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Under Win32 gmtime() can return NULL: check return value in
- OPENSSL_gmtime(). Add error code for case where gmtime() fails.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) DSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects
- could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early
- enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Ivan D Nestlerode <nestler at MIT.EDU>,
- Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de> via PR#459)
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Another fix for SSLv2 session ID handling: the session ID was incorrectly
- checked on reconnect on the client side, therefore session resumption
- could still fail with a "ssl session id is different" error. This
- behaviour is masked when SSL_OP_ALL is used due to
- SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG being set.
- Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday <crispin at flowerday.cx> as
- followup to PR #377.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) IA-32 assembler support enhancements: unified ELF targets, support
- for SCO/Caldera platforms, fix for Cygwin shared build.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Add support for FreeBSD on sparc64. As a consequence, support for
- FreeBSD on non-x86 processors is separate from x86 processors on
- the config script, much like the NetBSD support.
- [Richard Levitte & Kris Kennaway <kris at obsecurity.org>]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.7 [31 Dec 2002]
-
- [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.6i and later 0.9.6 patch levels were released after
- OpenSSL 0.9.7.]
-
- *) Fix session ID handling in SSLv2 client code: the SERVER FINISHED
- code (06) was taken as the first octet of the session ID and the last
- octet was ignored consequently. As a result SSLv2 client side session
- caching could not have worked due to the session ID mismatch between
- client and server.
- Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday <crispin at flowerday.cx> as
- PR #377.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Change the declaration of needed Kerberos libraries to use EX_LIBS
- instead of the special (and badly supported) LIBKRB5. LIBKRB5 is
- removed entirely.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) The hw_ncipher.c engine requires dynamic locks. Unfortunately, it
- seems that in spite of existing for more than a year, many application
- author have done nothing to provide the necessary callbacks, which
- means that this particular engine will not work properly anywhere.
- This is a very unfortunate situation which forces us, in the name
- of usability, to give the hw_ncipher.c a static lock, which is part
- of libcrypto.
- NOTE: This is for the 0.9.7 series ONLY. This hack will never
- appear in 0.9.8 or later. We EXPECT application authors to have
- dealt properly with this when 0.9.8 is released (unless we actually
- make such changes in the libcrypto locking code that changes will
- have to be made anyway).
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) In asn1_d2i_read_bio() repeatedly call BIO_read() until all content
- octets have been read, EOF or an error occurs. Without this change
- some truncated ASN1 structures will not produce an error.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Disable Heimdal support, since it hasn't been fully implemented.
- Still give the possibility to force the use of Heimdal, but with
- warnings and a request that patches get sent to openssl-dev.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the VC-CE target, introduce the WINCE sysname, and add
- INSTALL.WCE and appropriate conditionals to make it build.
- [Steven Reddie <smr at essemer.com.au> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Change the DLL names for Cygwin to cygcrypto-x.y.z.dll and
- cygssl-x.y.z.dll, where x, y and z are the major, minor and
- edit numbers of the version.
- [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen at redhat.com> and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Introduce safe string copy and catenation functions
- (BUF_strlcpy() and BUF_strlcat()).
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS) and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Avoid using fixed-size buffers for one-line DNs.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Add BUF_MEM_grow_clean() to avoid information leakage when
- resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Avoid using fixed size buffers for configuration file location.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Avoid filename truncation for various CA files.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Use sizeof in preference to magic numbers.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Avoid filename truncation in cert requests.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Add assertions to check for (supposedly impossible) buffer
- overflows.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Don't cache truncated DNS entries in the local cache (this could
- potentially lead to a spoofing attack).
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Fix various buffers to be large enough for hex/decimal
- representations in a platform independent manner.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Add CRYPTO_realloc_clean() to avoid information leakage when
- resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Add BIO_indent() to avoid much slightly worrying code to do
- indents.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Convert sprintf()/BIO_puts() to BIO_printf().
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) buffer_gets() could terminate with the buffer only half
- full. Fixed.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Add assertions to prevent user-supplied crypto functions from
- overflowing internal buffers by having large block sizes, etc.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) New OPENSSL_assert() macro (similar to assert(), but enabled
- unconditionally).
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Eliminate unused copy of key in RC4.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized buffers for IV in pem.h.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Fix off-by-one error in EGD path.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) If RANDFILE path is too long, ignore instead of truncating.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized X.509 structure
- CBCParameter.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Eliminate unused and dangerous function knumber().
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Eliminate unused and dangerous structure, KSSL_ERR.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Protect against overlong session ID context length in an encoded
- session object. Since these are local, this does not appear to be
- exploitable.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Change from security patch (see 0.9.6e below) that did not affect
- the 0.9.6 release series:
-
- Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
- (CVE-2002-0657)
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make -nameopt work fully for req and add -reqopt switch.
- [Michael Bell <michael.bell at rz.hu-berlin.de>, Steve Henson]
-
- *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1.
- [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen <yngve at opera.com>]
-
- *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms
- have been removed entirely. This was also the last step to make
- OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions.
- [Richard Levitte, Doug Kaufman <dkaufman at rahul.net>]
-
- *) Add cipher selection rules COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT
- to allow version independent disabling of normally unselected ciphers,
- which may be activated as a side-effect of selecting a single cipher.
-
- (E.g., cipher list string "RSA" enables ciphersuites that are left
- out of "ALL" because they do not provide symmetric encryption.
- "RSA:!COMPLEMEMENTOFALL" avoids these unsafe ciphersuites.)
- [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add appropriate support for separate platform-dependent build
- directories. The recommended way to make a platform-dependent
- build directory is the following (tested on Linux), maybe with
- some local tweaks:
-
- # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree. In
- # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE
- # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory.
- mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`"
- cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`"
- (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f) | while read F; do
- mkdir -p `dirname $F`
- ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F
- done
-
- To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean"
- is a good thing. If it isn't successfull, don't worry about it,
- it probably means the source directory is very clean.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make sure any ENGINE control commands make local copies of string
- pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
- the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
- data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
- [G\xF6tz Babin-Ebell <babinebell at trustcenter.de>]
-
- *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
- [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com>]
-
- *) Add AES modes CFB and OFB to the object database. Correct an
- error in AES-CFB decryption.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Remove most calls to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() in evp_enc.c, this
- allows existing EVP_CIPHER_CTX structures to be reused after
- calling EVP_*Final(). This behaviour is used by encryption
- BIOs and some applications. This has the side effect that
- applications must explicitly clean up cipher contexts with
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() or they will leak memory.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Check the values of dna and dnb in bn_mul_recursive before calling
- bn_mul_comba (a non zero value means the a or b arrays do not contain
- n2 elements) and fallback to bn_mul_normal if either is not zero.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix escaping of non-ASCII characters when using the -subj option
- of the "openssl req" command line tool. (Robert Joop <joop at fokus.gmd.de>)
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Make object definitions compliant to LDAP (RFC2256): SN is the short
- form for "surname", serialNumber has no short form.
- Use "mail" as the short name for "rfc822Mailbox" according to RFC2798;
- therefore remove "mail" short name for "internet 7".
- The OID for unique identifiers in X509 certificates is
- x500UniqueIdentifier, not uniqueIdentifier.
- Some more OID additions. (Michael Bell <michael.bell at rz.hu-berlin.de>)
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Add an "init" command to the ENGINE config module and auto initialize
- ENGINEs. Without any "init" command the ENGINE will be initialized
- after all ctrl commands have been executed on it. If init=1 the
- ENGINE is initailized at that point (ctrls before that point are run
- on the uninitialized ENGINE and after on the initialized one). If
- init=0 then the ENGINE will not be iniatialized at all.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix the 'app_verify_callback' interface so that the user-defined
- argument is actually passed to the callback: In the
- SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() prototype, the callback
- declaration has been changed from
- int (*cb)()
- into
- int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *);
- in ssl_verify_cert_chain (ssl/ssl_cert.c), the call
- i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx)
- has been changed into
- i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg).
-
- To update applications using SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(),
- a dummy argument can be added to their callback functions.
- [D. K. Smetters <smetters at parc.xerox.com>]
-
- *) Added the '4758cca' ENGINE to support IBM 4758 cards.
- [Maurice Gittens <maurice at gittens.nl>, touchups by Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Add and OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF define which will cause
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() to load the openssl.cnf config file.
- This allows older applications to transparently support certain
- OpenSSL features: such as crypto acceleration and dynamic ENGINE loading.
- Two new functions OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() which will never
- load the config file and OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() which will
- always load it have also been added.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add the OFB, CFB and CTR (all with 128 bit feedback) to AES.
- Adjust NIDs and EVP layer.
- [Stephen Sprunk <stephen at sprunk.org> and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Config modules support in openssl utility.
-
- Most commands now load modules from the config file,
- though in a few (such as version) this isn't done
- because it couldn't be used for anything.
-
- In the case of ca and req the config file used is
- the same as the utility itself: that is the -config
- command line option can be used to specify an
- alternative file.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Move default behaviour from OPENSSL_config(). If appname is NULL
- use "openssl_conf" if filename is NULL use default openssl config file.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add an argument to OPENSSL_config() to allow the use of an alternative
- config section name. Add a new flag to tolerate a missing config file
- and move code to CONF_modules_load_file().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption
- Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep')
- The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted/corrected
- to work with the new engine framework.
- [AEP Inc. and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore
- Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware')
- The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted
- to work with the new engine framework.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Have the CHIL engine fork-safe (as defined by nCipher) and actually
- make the newer ENGINE framework commands for the CHIL engine work.
- [Toomas Kiisk <vix at cyber.ee> and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make it possible to produce shared libraries on ReliantUNIX.
- [Robert Dahlem <Robert.Dahlem at ffm2.siemens.de> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the configuration target debug-linux-ppro.
- Make 'openssl rsa' use the general key loading routines
- implemented in apps.c, and make those routines able to
- handle the key format FORMAT_NETSCAPE and the variant
- FORMAT_IISSGC.
- [Toomas Kiisk <vix at cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey().
- [Toomas Kiisk <vix at cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add -keyform to rsautl, and document -engine.
- [Richard Levitte, inspired by Toomas Kiisk <vix at cyber.ee>]
-
- *) Change BIO_new_file (crypto/bio/bss_file.c) to use new
- BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE error code rather than the generic
- ERR_R_SYS_LIB error code if fopen() fails with ENOENT.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add new functions
- ERR_peek_last_error
- ERR_peek_last_error_line
- ERR_peek_last_error_line_data.
- These are similar to
- ERR_peek_error
- ERR_peek_error_line
- ERR_peek_error_line_data,
- but report on the latest error recorded rather than the first one
- still in the error queue.
- [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) default_algorithms option in ENGINE config module. This allows things
- like:
- default_algorithms = ALL
- default_algorithms = RSA, DSA, RAND, CIPHERS, DIGESTS
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Prelminary ENGINE config module.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New experimental application configuration code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change the AES code to follow the same name structure as all other
- symmetric ciphers, and behave the same way. Move everything to
- the directory crypto/aes, thereby obsoleting crypto/rijndael.
- [Stephen Sprunk <stephen at sprunk.org> and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) SECURITY: remove unsafe setjmp/signal interaction from ui_openssl.c.
- [Ben Laurie and Theo de Raadt]
-
- *) Add option to output public keys in req command.
- [Massimiliano Pala madwolf at openca.org]
-
- *) Use wNAFs in EC_POINTs_mul() for improved efficiency
- (up to about 10% better than before for P-192 and P-224).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New functions/macros
-
- SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cb)
- SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg)
- SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, cb)
- SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg)
-
- to request calling a callback function
-
- void cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
- const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
-
- whenever a protocol message has been completely received
- (write_p == 0) or sent (write_p == 1). Here 'version' is the
- protocol version according to which the SSL library interprets
- the current protocol message (SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, or
- TLS1_VERSION). 'content_type' is 0 in the case of SSL 2.0, or
- the content type as defined in the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol
- specification (change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22)).
- 'buf' and 'len' point to the actual message, 'ssl' to the
- SSL object, and 'arg' is the application-defined value set by
- SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg().
-
- 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server' have new '-msg' options
- to enable a callback that displays all protocol messages.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change the shared library support so shared libraries are built as
- soon as the corresponding static library is finished, and thereby get
- openssl and the test programs linked against the shared library.
- This still only happens when the keyword "shard" has been given to
- the configuration scripts.
-
- NOTE: shared library support is still an experimental thing, and
- backward binary compatibility is still not guaranteed.
- ["Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro at ds2.pg.gda.pl> and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add support for Subject Information Access extension.
- [Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester at EdelWeb.fr>]
-
- *) Make BUF_MEM_grow() behaviour more consistent: Initialise to zero
- additional bytes when new memory had to be allocated, not just
- when reusing an existing buffer.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New command line and configuration option 'utf8' for the req command.
- This allows field values to be specified as UTF8 strings.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add -multi and -mr options to "openssl speed" - giving multiple parallel
- runs for the former and machine-readable output for the latter.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add '-noemailDN' option to 'openssl ca'. This prevents inclusion
- of the e-mail address in the DN (i.e., it will go into a certificate
- extension only). The new configuration file option 'email_in_dn = no'
- has the same effect.
- [Massimiliano Pala madwolf at openca.org]
-
- *) Change all functions with names starting with des_ to be starting
- with DES_ instead. Add wrappers that are compatible with libdes,
- but are named _ossl_old_des_*. Finally, add macros that map the
- des_* symbols to the corresponding _ossl_old_des_* if libdes
- compatibility is desired. If OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility is
- desired, the des_* symbols will be mapped to DES_*, with one
- exception.
-
- Since we provide two compatibility mappings, the user needs to
- define the macro OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY if libdes
- compatibility is desired. The default (i.e., when that macro
- isn't defined) is OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility.
-
- There are also macros that enable and disable the support of old
- des functions altogether. Those are OPENSSL_ENABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT
- and OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT. If none or both of those
- are defined, the default will apply: to support the old des routines.
-
- In either case, one must include openssl/des.h to get the correct
- definitions. Do not try to just include openssl/des_old.h, that
- won't work.
-
- NOTE: This is a major break of an old API into a new one. Software
- authors are encouraged to switch to the DES_ style functions. Some
- time in the future, des_old.h and the libdes compatibility functions
- will be disable (i.e. OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT will be the
- default), and then completely removed.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Test for certificates which contain unsupported critical extensions.
- If such a certificate is found during a verify operation it is
- rejected by default: this behaviour can be overridden by either
- handling the new error X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION or
- by setting the verify flag X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL. A new function
- X509_supported_extension() has also been added which returns 1 if a
- particular extension is supported.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify the behaviour of EVP cipher functions in similar way to digests
- to retain compatibility with existing code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify the behaviour of EVP_DigestInit() and EVP_DigestFinal() to retain
- compatibility with existing code. In particular the 'ctx' parameter does
- not have to be to be initialized before the call to EVP_DigestInit() and
- it is tidied up after a call to EVP_DigestFinal(). New function
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex() which does not tidy up the ctx. Similarly function
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy() changed to not require the destination to be
- initialized valid and new function EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() added which
- requires the destination to be valid.
-
- Modify all the OpenSSL digest calls to use EVP_DigestInit_ex(),
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) and the functions using it
- so that complete 'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory
- instead of overwriting 'msg_type' and 'length' with 'body' data.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add an implementation of SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack for Win32.
- [Massimo Santin via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes
- reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation
- (initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations
- of specific crypto iterfaces. This change also introduces integrated
- support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs
- can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD
- implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README
- as it couldn't be adequately described here. However, there are a few
- API changes worth noting - some RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that
- were changed in the original introduction of ENGINE code have now
- reverted back - the hooking from this code to ENGINE is now a good
- deal more passive and at run-time, operations deal directly with
- RSA_METHODs, DSA_METHODs (etc) as they did before, rather than
- dereferencing through an ENGINE pointer any more. Also, the ENGINE
- functions dealing with BN_MOD_EXP[_CRT] handlers have been removed -
- they were not being used by the framework as there is no concept of a
- BIGNUM_METHOD and they could not be generalised to the new
- 'ENGINE_TABLE' mechanism that underlies the new code. Similarly,
- ENGINE_cpy() has been removed as it cannot be consistently defined in
- the new code.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Change ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() to allow fractional seconds.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change mkdef.pl to sort symbols that get the same entry number,
- and make sure the automatically generated functions ERR_load_*
- become part of libeay.num as well.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) New function SSL_renegotiate_pending(). This returns true once
- renegotiation has been requested (either SSL_renegotiate() call
- or HelloRequest/ClientHello receveived from the peer) and becomes
- false once a handshake has been completed.
- (For servers, SSL_renegotiate() followed by SSL_do_handshake()
- sends a HelloRequest, but does not ensure that a handshake takes
- place. SSL_renegotiate_pending() is useful for checking if the
- client has followed the request.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New SSL option SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION.
- By default, clients may request session resumption even during
- renegotiation (if session ID contexts permit); with this option,
- session resumption is possible only in the first handshake.
-
- SSL_OP_ALL is now 0x00000FFFL instead of 0x000FFFFFL. This makes
- more bits available for options that should not be part of
- SSL_OP_ALL (such as SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add some demos for certificate and certificate request creation.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make maximum certificate chain size accepted from the peer application
- settable (SSL*_get/set_max_cert_list()), as proposed by
- "Douglas E. Engert" <deengert at anl.gov>.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Add support for shared libraries for Unixware-7
- (Boyd Lynn Gerber <gerberb at zenez.com>).
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Add a "destroy" handler to ENGINEs that allows structural cleanup to
- be done prior to destruction. Use this to unload error strings from
- ENGINEs that load their own error strings. NB: This adds two new API
- functions to "get" and "set" this destroy handler in an ENGINE.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Alter all existing ENGINE implementations (except "openssl" and
- "openbsd") to dynamically instantiate their own error strings. This
- makes them more flexible to be built both as statically-linked ENGINEs
- and self-contained shared-libraries loadable via the "dynamic" ENGINE.
- Also, add stub code to each that makes building them as self-contained
- shared-libraries easier (see README.ENGINE).
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Add a "dynamic" ENGINE that provides a mechanism for binding ENGINE
- implementations into applications that are completely implemented in
- self-contained shared-libraries. The "dynamic" ENGINE exposes control
- commands that can be used to configure what shared-library to load and
- to control aspects of the way it is handled. Also, made an update to
- the README.ENGINE file that brings its information up-to-date and
- provides some information and instructions on the "dynamic" ENGINE
- (ie. how to use it, how to build "dynamic"-loadable ENGINEs, etc).
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Make it possible to unload ranges of ERR strings with a new
- "ERR_unload_strings" function.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Add a copy() function to EVP_MD.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Make EVP_MD routines take a context pointer instead of just the
- md_data void pointer.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add flags to EVP_MD and EVP_MD_CTX. EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates
- that the digest can only process a single chunk of data
- (typically because it is provided by a piece of
- hardware). EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the application
- is only going to provide a single chunk of data, and hence the
- framework needn't accumulate the data for oneshot drivers.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) As with "ERR", make it possible to replace the underlying "ex_data"
- functions. This change also alters the storage and management of global
- ex_data state - it's now all inside ex_data.c and all "class" code (eg.
- RSA, BIO, SSL_CTX, etc) no longer stores its own STACKS and per-class
- index counters. The API functions that use this state have been changed
- to take a "class_index" rather than pointers to the class's local STACK
- and counter, and there is now an API function to dynamically create new
- classes. This centralisation allows us to (a) plug a lot of the
- thread-safety problems that existed, and (b) makes it possible to clean
- up all allocated state using "CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data()". W.r.t. (b)
- such data would previously have always leaked in application code and
- workarounds were in place to make the memory debugging turn a blind eye
- to it. Application code that doesn't use this new function will still
- leak as before, but their memory debugging output will announce it now
- rather than letting it slide.
-
- Besides the addition of CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), another API change
- induced by the "ex_data" overhaul is that X509_STORE_CTX_init() now
- has a return value to indicate success or failure.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Make it possible to replace the underlying "ERR" functions such that the
- global state (2 LHASH tables and 2 locks) is only used by the "default"
- implementation. This change also adds two functions to "get" and "set"
- the implementation prior to it being automatically set the first time
- any other ERR function takes place. Ie. an application can call "get",
- pass the return value to a module it has just loaded, and that module
- can call its own "set" function using that value. This means the
- module's "ERR" operations will use (and modify) the error state in the
- application and not in its own statically linked copy of OpenSSL code.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Give DH, DSA, and RSA types their own "**_up_ref()" function to increment
- reference counts. This performs normal REF_PRINT/REF_CHECK macros on
- the operation, and provides a more encapsulated way for external code
- (crypto/evp/ and ssl/) to do this. Also changed the evp and ssl code
- to use these functions rather than manually incrementing the counts.
-
- Also rename "DSO_up()" function to more descriptive "DSO_up_ref()".
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Add EVP test program.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add symmetric cipher support to ENGINE. Expect the API to change!
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) New CRL functions: X509_CRL_set_version(), X509_CRL_set_issuer_name()
- X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(), X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(), X509_CRL_sort(),
- X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), and X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate().
- These allow a CRL to be built without having to access X509_CRL fields
- directly. Modify 'ca' application to use new functions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Move SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG out of the SSL_OP_ALL list of recommended
- bug workarounds. Rollback attack detection is a security feature.
- The problem will only arise on OpenSSL servers when TLSv1 is not
- available (sslv3_server_method() or SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1).
- Software authors not wanting to support TLSv1 will have special reasons
- for their choice and can explicitly enable this option.
- [Bodo Moeller, Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Rationalise EVP so it can be extended: don't include a union of
- cipher/digest structures, add init/cleanup functions for EVP_MD_CTX
- (similar to those existing for EVP_CIPHER_CTX).
- Usage example:
-
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md); /* new function call */
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_sha1());
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, in, len);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, out, NULL);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md); /* new function call */
-
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Make DES key schedule conform to the usual scheme, as well as
- correcting its structure. This means that calls to DES functions
- now have to pass a pointer to a des_key_schedule instead of a
- plain des_key_schedule (which was actually always a pointer
- anyway): E.g.,
-
- des_key_schedule ks;
-
- des_set_key_checked(..., &ks);
- des_ncbc_encrypt(..., &ks, ...);
-
- (Note that a later change renames 'des_...' into 'DES_...'.)
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Initial reduction of linker bloat: the use of some functions, such as
- PEM causes large amounts of unused functions to be linked in due to
- poor organisation. For example pem_all.c contains every PEM function
- which has a knock on effect of linking in large amounts of (unused)
- ASN1 code. Grouping together similar functions and splitting unrelated
- functions prevents this.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Cleanup of EVP macros.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Change historical references to {NID,SN,LN}_des_ede and ede3 to add the
- correct _ecb suffix.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add initial OCSP responder support to ocsp application. The
- revocation information is handled using the text based index
- use by the ca application. The responder can either handle
- requests generated internally, supplied in files (for example
- via a CGI script) or using an internal minimal server.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add configuration choices to get zlib compression for TLS.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Changes to Kerberos SSL for RFC 2712 compliance:
- 1. Implemented real KerberosWrapper, instead of just using
- KRB5 AP_REQ message. [Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw at sxw.org.uk>]
- 2. Implemented optional authenticator field of KerberosWrapper.
-
- Added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for Kerberos ticket, ap_req,
- and authenticator structs; see crypto/krb5/.
-
- Generalized Kerberos calls to support multiple Kerberos libraries.
- [Vern Staats <staatsvr at asc.hpc.mil>,
- Jeffrey Altman <jaltman at columbia.edu>
- via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Cause 'openssl speed' to use fully hard-coded DSA keys as it
- already does with RSA. testdsa.h now has 'priv_key/pub_key'
- values for each of the key sizes rather than having just
- parameters (and 'speed' generating keys each time).
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Speed up EVP routines.
- Before:
-encrypt
-type 8 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes
-des-cbc 4408.85k 5560.51k 5778.46k 5862.20k 5825.16k
-des-cbc 4389.55k 5571.17k 5792.23k 5846.91k 5832.11k
-des-cbc 4394.32k 5575.92k 5807.44k 5848.37k 5841.30k
-decrypt
-des-cbc 3482.66k 5069.49k 5496.39k 5614.16k 5639.28k
-des-cbc 3480.74k 5068.76k 5510.34k 5609.87k 5635.52k
-des-cbc 3483.72k 5067.62k 5504.60k 5708.01k 5724.80k
- After:
-encrypt
-des-cbc 4660.16k 5650.19k 5807.19k 5827.13k 5783.32k
-decrypt
-des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Added the OS2-EMX target.
- ["Brian Havard" <brianh at kheldar.apana.org.au> and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Rewrite apps to use NCONF routines instead of the old CONF. New functions
- to support NCONF routines in extension code. New function CONF_set_nconf()
- to allow functions which take an NCONF to also handle the old LHASH
- structure: this means that the old CONF compatible routines can be
- retained (in particular wrt extensions) without having to duplicate the
- code. New function X509V3_add_ext_nconf_sk to add extensions to a stack.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms for inner control
- and with possibilities to have yes/no kind of prompts.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Change all calls to low level digest routines in the library and
- applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and
- don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy().
- [Verdon Walker <VWalker at novell.com>, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add the possibility to control engines through control names but with
- arbitrary arguments instead of just a string.
- Change the key loaders to take a UI_METHOD instead of a callback
- function pointer. NOTE: this breaks binary compatibility with earlier
- versions of OpenSSL [engine].
- Adapt the nCipher code for these new conditions and add a card insertion
- callback.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms to better support
- dialog box interfaces, application-defined prompts, the possibility
- to use defaults (for example default passwords from somewhere else)
- and interrupts/cancellations.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Tidy up PKCS#12 attribute handling. Add support for the CSP name
- attribute in PKCS#12 files, add new -CSP option to pkcs12 utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix a memory leak in 'sk_dup()' in the case reallocation fails. (Also
- tidy up some unnecessarily weird code in 'sk_new()').
- [Geoff, reported by Diego Tartara <dtartara at novamens.com>]
-
- *) Change the key loading routines for ENGINEs to use the same kind
- callback (pem_password_cb) as all other routines that need this
- kind of callback.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Increase ENTROPY_NEEDED to 32 bytes, as Rijndael can operate with
- 256 bit (=32 byte) keys. Of course seeding with more entropy bytes
- than this minimum value is recommended.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) New random seeder for OpenVMS, using the system process statistics
- that are easily reachable.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Windows apparently can't transparently handle global
- variables defined in DLLs. Initialisations such as:
-
- const ASN1_ITEM *it = &ASN1_INTEGER_it;
-
- wont compile. This is used by the any applications that need to
- declare their own ASN1 modules. This was fixed by adding the option
- EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN to all Win32 platforms, although this isn't strictly
- needed for static libraries under Win32.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New functions X509_PURPOSE_set() and X509_TRUST_set() to handle
- setting of purpose and trust fields. New X509_STORE trust and
- purpose functions and tidy up setting in other SSL functions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add copies of X509_STORE_CTX fields and callbacks to X509_STORE
- structure. These are inherited by X509_STORE_CTX when it is
- initialised. This allows various defaults to be set in the
- X509_STORE structure (such as flags for CRL checking and custom
- purpose or trust settings) for functions which only use X509_STORE_CTX
- internally such as S/MIME.
-
- Modify X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() so it only sets purposes and
- trust settings if they are not set in X509_STORE. This allows X509_STORE
- purposes and trust (in S/MIME for example) to override any set by default.
-
- Add command line options for CRL checking to smime, s_client and s_server
- applications.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial CRL based revocation checking. If the CRL checking flag(s)
- are set then the CRL is looked up in the X509_STORE structure and
- its validity and signature checked, then if the certificate is found
- in the CRL the verify fails with a revoked error.
-
- Various new CRL related callbacks added to X509_STORE_CTX structure.
-
- Command line options added to 'verify' application to support this.
-
- This needs some additional work, such as being able to handle multiple
- CRLs with different times, extension based lookup (rather than just
- by subject name) and ultimately more complete V2 CRL extension
- handling.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a general user interface API (crypto/ui/). This is designed
- to replace things like des_read_password and friends (backward
- compatibility functions using this new API are provided).
- The purpose is to remove prompting functions from the DES code
- section as well as provide for prompting through dialog boxes in
- a window system and the like.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add "ex_data" support to ENGINE so implementations can add state at a
- per-structure level rather than having to store it globally.
- [Geoff]
-
- *) Make it possible for ENGINE structures to be copied when retrieved by
- ENGINE_by_id() if the ENGINE specifies a new flag: ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY.
- This causes the "original" ENGINE structure to act like a template,
- analogous to the RSA vs. RSA_METHOD type of separation. Because of this
- operational state can be localised to each ENGINE structure, despite the
- fact they all share the same "methods". New ENGINE structures returned in
- this case have no functional references and the return value is the single
- structural reference. This matches the single structural reference returned
- by ENGINE_by_id() normally, when it is incremented on the pre-existing
- ENGINE structure.
- [Geoff]
-
- *) Fix ASN1 decoder when decoding type ANY and V_ASN1_OTHER: since this
- needs to match any other type at all we need to manually clear the
- tag cache.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Changes to the "openssl engine" utility to include;
- - verbosity levels ('-v', '-vv', and '-vvv') that provide information
- about an ENGINE's available control commands.
- - executing control commands from command line arguments using the
- '-pre' and '-post' switches. '-post' is only used if '-t' is
- specified and the ENGINE is successfully initialised. The syntax for
- the individual commands are colon-separated, for example;
- openssl engine chil -pre FORK_CHECK:0 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/test.so
- [Geoff]
-
- *) New dynamic control command support for ENGINEs. ENGINEs can now
- declare their own commands (numbers), names (strings), descriptions,
- and input types for run-time discovery by calling applications. A
- subset of these commands are implicitly classed as "executable"
- depending on their input type, and only these can be invoked through
- the new string-based API function ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). (Eg. this
- can be based on user input, config files, etc). The distinction is
- that "executable" commands cannot return anything other than a boolean
- result and can only support numeric or string input, whereas some
- discoverable commands may only be for direct use through
- ENGINE_ctrl(), eg. supporting the exchange of binary data, function
- pointers, or other custom uses. The "executable" commands are to
- support parameterisations of ENGINE behaviour that can be
- unambiguously defined by ENGINEs and used consistently across any
- OpenSSL-based application. Commands have been added to all the
- existing hardware-supporting ENGINEs, noticeably "SO_PATH" to allow
- control over shared-library paths without source code alterations.
- [Geoff]
-
- *) Changed all ENGINE implementations to dynamically allocate their
- ENGINEs rather than declaring them statically. Apart from this being
- necessary with the removal of the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED distinction,
- this also allows the implementations to compile without using the
- internal engine_int.h header.
- [Geoff]
-
- *) Minor adjustment to "rand" code. RAND_get_rand_method() now returns a
- 'const' value. Any code that should be able to modify a RAND_METHOD
- should already have non-const pointers to it (ie. they should only
- modify their own ones).
- [Geoff]
-
- *) Made a variety of little tweaks to the ENGINE code.
- - "atalla" and "ubsec" string definitions were moved from header files
- to C code. "nuron" string definitions were placed in variables
- rather than hard-coded - allowing parameterisation of these values
- later on via ctrl() commands.
- - Removed unused "#if 0"'d code.
- - Fixed engine list iteration code so it uses ENGINE_free() to release
- structural references.
- - Constified the RAND_METHOD element of ENGINE structures.
- - Constified various get/set functions as appropriate and added
- missing functions (including a catch-all ENGINE_cpy that duplicates
- all ENGINE values onto a new ENGINE except reference counts/state).
- - Removed NULL parameter checks in get/set functions. Setting a method
- or function to NULL is a way of cancelling out a previously set
- value. Passing a NULL ENGINE parameter is just plain stupid anyway
- and doesn't justify the extra error symbols and code.
- - Deprecate the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED define and move the area for
- flags from engine_int.h to engine.h.
- - Changed prototypes for ENGINE handler functions (init(), finish(),
- ctrl(), key-load functions, etc) to take an (ENGINE*) parameter.
- [Geoff]
-
- *) Implement binary inversion algorithm for BN_mod_inverse in addition
- to the algorithm using long division. The binary algorithm can be
- used only if the modulus is odd. On 32-bit systems, it is faster
- only for relatively small moduli (roughly 20-30% for 128-bit moduli,
- roughly 5-15% for 256-bit moduli), so we use it only for moduli
- up to 450 bits. In 64-bit environments, the binary algorithm
- appears to be advantageous for much longer moduli; here we use it
- for moduli up to 2048 bits.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Rewrite CHOICE field setting in ASN1_item_ex_d2i(). The old code
- could not support the combine flag in choice fields.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a 'copy_extensions' option to the 'ca' utility. This copies
- extensions from a certificate request to the certificate.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Allow multiple 'certopt' and 'nameopt' options to be separated
- by commas. Add 'namopt' and 'certopt' options to the 'ca' config
- file: this allows the display of the certificate about to be
- signed to be customised, to allow certain fields to be included
- or excluded and extension details. The old system didn't display
- multicharacter strings properly, omitted fields not in the policy
- and couldn't display additional details such as extensions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Function EC_POINTs_mul for multiple scalar multiplication
- of an arbitrary number of elliptic curve points
- \sum scalars[i]*points[i],
- optionally including the generator defined for the EC_GROUP:
- scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i].
-
- EC_POINT_mul is a simple wrapper function for the typical case
- that the point list has just one item (besides the optional
- generator).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) First EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p):
-
- EC_GFp_simple_method() uses the basic BN_mod_mul and BN_mod_sqr
- operations and provides various method functions that can also
- operate with faster implementations of modular arithmetic.
-
- EC_GFp_mont_method() reuses most functions that are part of
- EC_GFp_simple_method, but uses Montgomery arithmetic.
-
- [Bodo Moeller; point addition and point doubling
- implementation directly derived from source code provided by
- Lenka Fibikova <fibikova at exp-math.uni-essen.de>]
-
- *) Framework for elliptic curves (crypto/ec/ec.h, crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h,
- crypto/ec/ec_lib.c):
-
- Curves are EC_GROUP objects (with an optional group generator)
- based on EC_METHODs that are built into the library.
-
- Points are EC_POINT objects based on EC_GROUP objects.
-
- Most of the framework would be able to handle curves over arbitrary
- finite fields, but as there are no obvious types for fields other
- than GF(p), some functions are limited to that for now.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add the -HTTP option to s_server. It is similar to -WWW, but requires
- that the file contains a complete HTTP response.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the ec directory to mkdef.pl and mkfiles.pl. In mkdef.pl
- change the def and num file printf format specifier from "%-40sXXX"
- to "%-39s XXX". The latter will always guarantee a space after the
- field while the former will cause them to run together if the field
- is 40 of more characters long.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Constify the cipher and digest 'method' functions and structures
- and modify related functions to take constant EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER
- pointers.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Hide BN_CTX structure details in bn_lcl.h instead of publishing them
- in <openssl/bn.h>. Also further increase BN_CTX_NUM to 32.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Modify EVP_Digest*() routines so they now return values. Although the
- internal software routines can never fail additional hardware versions
- might.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Clean up crypto/err/err.h and change some error codes to avoid conflicts:
-
- Previously ERR_R_FATAL was too small and coincided with ERR_LIB_PKCS7
- (= ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB); it is now 64 instead of 32.
-
- ASN1 error codes
- ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR
- ...
- ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS
- were 4 .. 9, conflicting with
- ERR_LIB_RSA (= ERR_R_RSA_LIB)
- ...
- ERR_LIB_PEM (= ERR_R_PEM_LIB).
- They are now 58 .. 63 (i.e., just below ERR_R_FATAL).
-
- Add new error code 'ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR'.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Don't overuse locks in crypto/err/err.c: For data retrieval, CRYPTO_r_lock
- suffices.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New option '-subj arg' for 'openssl req' and 'openssl ca'. This
- sets the subject name for a new request or supersedes the
- subject name in a given request. Formats that can be parsed are
- 'CN=Some Name, OU=myOU, C=IT'
- and
- 'CN=Some Name/OU=myOU/C=IT'.
-
- Add options '-batch' and '-verbose' to 'openssl req'.
- [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at hackmasters.net>]
-
- *) Introduce the possibility to access global variables through
- functions on platform were that's the best way to handle exporting
- global variables in shared libraries. To enable this functionality,
- one must configure with "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN" or defined the C macro
- "OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" in crypto/opensslconf.h (the latter
- is normally done by Configure or something similar).
-
- To implement a global variable, use the macro OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL
- in the source file (foo.c) like this:
-
- OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foo)=1;
- OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(double,bar);
-
- To declare a global variable, use the macros OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL
- and OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF in the header file (foo.h) like this:
-
- OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foo);
- #define foo OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foo)
- OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(double,bar);
- #define bar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(bar)
-
- The #defines are very important, and therefore so is including the
- header file everywhere where the defined globals are used.
-
- The macro OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION also affects the definition
- of ASN.1 items, but that structure is a bit different.
-
- The largest change is in util/mkdef.pl which has been enhanced with
- better and easier to understand logic to choose which symbols should
- go into the Windows .def files as well as a number of fixes and code
- cleanup (among others, algorithm keywords are now sorted
- lexicographically to avoid constant rewrites).
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) In BN_div() keep a copy of the sign of 'num' before writing the
- result to 'rm' because if rm==num the value will be overwritten
- and produce the wrong result if 'num' is negative: this caused
- problems with BN_mod() and BN_nnmod().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Function OCSP_request_verify(). This checks the signature on an
- OCSP request and verifies the signer certificate. The signer
- certificate is just checked for a generic purpose and OCSP request
- trust settings.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add OCSP_check_validity() function to check the validity of OCSP
- responses. OCSP responses are prepared in real time and may only
- be a few seconds old. Simply checking that the current time lies
- between thisUpdate and nextUpdate max reject otherwise valid responses
- caused by either OCSP responder or client clock inaccuracy. Instead
- we allow thisUpdate and nextUpdate to fall within a certain period of
- the current time. The age of the response can also optionally be
- checked. Two new options -validity_period and -status_age added to
- ocsp utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) If signature or public key algorithm is unrecognized print out its
- OID rather that just UNKNOWN.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change OCSP_cert_to_id() to tolerate a NULL subject certificate and
- OCSP_cert_id_new() a NULL serialNumber. This allows a partial certificate
- ID to be generated from the issuer certificate alone which can then be
- passed to OCSP_id_issuer_cmp().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New compilation option ASN1_ITEM_FUNCTIONS. This causes the new
- ASN1 modules to export functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers
- instead of the ASN1_ITEM structures themselves. This adds several
- new macros which allow the underlying ASN1 function/structure to
- be accessed transparently. As a result code should not use ASN1_ITEM
- references directly (such as &X509_it) but instead use the relevant
- macros (such as ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)). This option is to allow
- use of the new ASN1 code on platforms where exporting structures
- is problematical (for example in shared libraries) but exporting
- functions returning pointers to structures is not.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for overriding the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs.
- These callbacks can be registered either in an SSL_CTX or per SSL.
- The purpose of this is to allow applications to control, if they wish,
- the arbitrary values chosen for use as session IDs, particularly as it
- can be useful for session caching in multiple-server environments. A
- command-line switch for testing this (and any client code that wishes
- to use such a feature) has been added to "s_server".
- [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Modify mkdef.pl to recognise and parse preprocessor conditionals
- of the form '#if defined(...) || defined(...) || ...' and
- '#if !defined(...) && !defined(...) && ...'. This also avoids
- the growing number of special cases it was previously handling.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make all configuration macros available for application by making
- sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting
- with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making
- sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with
- opensslconf.h.
- Additionally, it is now possible to define configuration/platform-
- specific names (called "system identities"). In the C code, these
- are prefixed with "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_". e_os2.h will create another
- macro with the name beginning with "OPENSSL_SYS_", which is determined
- from "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_*" or compiler-specific macros depending on
- what is available.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) New option -set_serial to 'req' and 'x509' this allows the serial
- number to use to be specified on the command line. Previously self
- signed certificates were hard coded with serial number 0 and the
- CA options of 'x509' had to use a serial number in a file which was
- auto incremented.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New options to 'ca' utility to support V2 CRL entry extensions.
- Currently CRL reason, invalidity date and hold instruction are
- supported. Add new CRL extensions to V3 code and some new objects.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() this is used to
- disable standard block padding (aka PKCS#5 padding) in the EVP
- API, which was previously mandatory. This means that the data is
- not padded in any way and so the total length much be a multiple
- of the block size, otherwise an error occurs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial (incomplete) OCSP SSL support.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function OCSP_parse_url(). This splits up a URL into its host,
- port and path components: primarily to parse OCSP URLs. New -url
- option to ocsp utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New nonce behavior. The return value of OCSP_check_nonce() now
- reflects the various checks performed. Applications can decide
- whether to tolerate certain situations such as an absent nonce
- in a response when one was present in a request: the ocsp application
- just prints out a warning. New function OCSP_add1_basic_nonce()
- this is to allow responders to include a nonce in a response even if
- the request is nonce-less.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Disable stdin buffering in load_cert (apps/apps.c) so that no certs are
- skipped when using openssl x509 multiple times on a single input file,
- e.g. "(openssl x509 -out cert1; openssl x509 -out cert2) <certs".
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Make ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string() and ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string()
- set string type: to handle setting ASN1_TIME structures. Fix ca
- utility to correctly initialize revocation date of CRLs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New option SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE allows the server to override
- the clients preferred ciphersuites and rather use its own preferences.
- Should help to work around M$ SGC (Server Gated Cryptography) bug in
- Internet Explorer by ensuring unchanged hash method during stepup.
- (Also replaces the broken/deactivated SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST option.)
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Make mkdef.pl recognise all DECLARE_ASN1 macros, change rijndael
- to aes and add a new 'exist' option to print out symbols that don't
- appear to exist.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Additional options to ocsp utility to allow flags to be set and
- additional certificates supplied.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add the option -VAfile to 'openssl ocsp', so the user can give the
- OCSP client a number of certificate to only verify the response
- signature against.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Update Rijndael code to version 3.0 and change EVP AES ciphers to
- handle the new API. Currently only ECB, CBC modes supported. Add new
- AES OIDs.
-
- Add TLS AES ciphersuites as described in RFC3268, "Advanced
- Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
- Security (TLS)". (In beta versions of OpenSSL 0.9.7, these were
- not enabled by default and were not part of the "ALL" ciphersuite
- alias because they were not yet official; they could be
- explicitly requested by specifying the "AESdraft" ciphersuite
- group alias. In the final release of OpenSSL 0.9.7, the group
- alias is called "AES" and is part of "ALL".)
- [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New function OCSP_copy_nonce() to copy nonce value (if present) from
- request to response.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Functions for OCSP responders. OCSP_request_onereq_count(),
- OCSP_request_onereq_get0(), OCSP_onereq_get0_id() and OCSP_id_get0_info()
- extract information from a certificate request. OCSP_response_create()
- creates a response and optionally adds a basic response structure.
- OCSP_basic_add1_status() adds a complete single response to a basic
- response and returns the OCSP_SINGLERESP structure just added (to allow
- extensions to be included for example). OCSP_basic_add1_cert() adds a
- certificate to a basic response and OCSP_basic_sign() signs a basic
- response with various flags. New helper functions ASN1_TIME_check()
- (checks validity of ASN1_TIME structure) and ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime()
- (converts ASN1_TIME to GeneralizedTime).
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Various new functions. EVP_Digest() combines EVP_Digest{Init,Update,Final}()
- in a single operation. X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr() extracts the public_key
- structure from a certificate. X509_pubkey_digest() digests the public_key
- contents: this is used in various key identifiers.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make sk_sort() tolerate a NULL argument.
- [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at comune.modena.it>]
-
- *) New OCSP verify flag OCSP_TRUSTOTHER. When set the "other" certificates
- passed by the function are trusted implicitly. If any of them signed the
- response then it is assumed to be valid and is not verified.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In PKCS7_set_type() initialise content_type in PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT
- to data. This was previously part of the PKCS7 ASN1 code. This
- was causing problems with OpenSSL created PKCS#12 and PKCS#7 structures.
- [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette
- <support at securenetterm.com>]
-
- *) Add CRYPTO_push_info() and CRYPTO_pop_info() calls to new ASN1
- routines: without these tracing memory leaks is very painful.
- Fix leaks in PKCS12 and PKCS7 routines.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make X509_time_adj() cope with the new behaviour of ASN1_TIME_new().
- Previously it initialised the 'type' argument to V_ASN1_UTCTIME which
- effectively meant GeneralizedTime would never be used. Now it
- is initialised to -1 but X509_time_adj() now has to check the value
- and use ASN1_TIME_set() if the value is not V_ASN1_UTCTIME or
- V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, without this it always uses GeneralizedTime.
- [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette
- <support at securenetterm.com>]
-
- *) Fixes to BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER when bn is zero. This would previously
- result in a zero length in the ASN1_INTEGER structure which was
- not consistent with the structure when d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() was used
- and would cause ASN1_INTEGER_cmp() to fail. Enhance s2i_ASN1_INTEGER()
- to cope with hex and negative integers. Fix bug in i2a_ASN1_INTEGER()
- where it did not print out a minus for negative ASN1_INTEGER.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add summary printout to ocsp utility. The various functions which
- convert status values to strings have been renamed to:
- OCSP_response_status_str(), OCSP_cert_status_str() and
- OCSP_crl_reason_str() and are no longer static. New options
- to verify nonce values and to disable verification. OCSP response
- printout format cleaned up.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add additional OCSP certificate checks. These are those specified
- in RFC2560. This consists of two separate checks: the CA of the
- certificate being checked must either be the OCSP signer certificate
- or the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate. In the latter case the
- OCSP signer certificate must contain the OCSP signing extended key
- usage. This check is performed by attempting to match the OCSP
- signer or the OCSP signer CA to the issuerNameHash and issuerKeyHash
- in the OCSP_CERTID structures of the response.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial OCSP certificate verification added to OCSP_basic_verify()
- and related routines. This uses the standard OpenSSL certificate
- verify routines to perform initial checks (just CA validity) and
- to obtain the certificate chain. Then additional checks will be
- performed on the chain. Currently the root CA is checked to see
- if it is explicitly trusted for OCSP signing. This is used to set
- a root CA as a global signing root: that is any certificate that
- chains to that CA is an acceptable OCSP signing certificate.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New '-extfile ...' option to 'openssl ca' for reading X.509v3
- extensions from a separate configuration file.
- As when reading extensions from the main configuration file,
- the '-extensions ...' option may be used for specifying the
- section to use.
- [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at comune.modena.it>]
-
- *) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or
- read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output
- parsed, outputed or printed in text form. Not complete yet:
- still needs to check the OCSP response validity.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New subcommands for 'openssl ca':
- 'openssl ca -status <serial>' prints the status of the cert with
- the given serial number (according to the index file).
- 'openssl ca -updatedb' updates the expiry status of certificates
- in the index file.
- [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at comune.modena.it>]
-
- *) New '-newreq-nodes' command option to CA.pl. This is like
- '-newreq', but calls 'openssl req' with the '-nodes' option
- so that the resulting key is not encrypted.
- [Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>]
-
- *) New configuration for the GNU Hurd.
- [Jonathan Bartlett <johnnyb at wolfram.com> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Initial code to implement OCSP basic response verify. This
- is currently incomplete. Currently just finds the signer's
- certificate and verifies the signature on the response.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New SSLeay_version code SSLEAY_DIR to determine the compiled-in
- value of OPENSSLDIR. This is available via the new '-d' option
- to 'openssl version', and is also included in 'openssl version -a'.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Allowing defining memory allocation callbacks that will be given
- file name and line number information in additional arguments
- (a const char* and an int). The basic functionality remains, as
- well as the original possibility to just replace malloc(),
- realloc() and free() by functions that do not know about these
- additional arguments. To register and find out the current
- settings for extended allocation functions, the following
- functions are provided:
-
- CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions
- CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_functions
- CRYPTO_get_mem_ex_functions
- CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_functions
-
- These work the same way as CRYPTO_set_mem_functions and friends.
- CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_functions now writes 0 where such an
- extended allocation function is enabled.
- Similarly, CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_ex_functions writes 0 where
- a conventional allocation function is enabled.
- [Richard Levitte, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Finish off removing the remaining LHASH function pointer casts.
- There should no longer be any prototype-casting required when using
- the LHASH abstraction, and any casts that remain are "bugs". See
- the callback types and macros at the head of lhash.h for details
- (and "OBJ_cleanup" in crypto/objects/obj_dat.c as an example).
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Add automatic query of EGD sockets in RAND_poll() for the unix variant.
- If /dev/[u]random devices are not available or do not return enough
- entropy, EGD style sockets (served by EGD or PRNGD) will automatically
- be queried.
- The locations /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool, and
- /etc/entropy will be queried once each in this sequence, quering stops
- when enough entropy was collected without querying more sockets.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Change the Unix RAND_poll() variant to be able to poll several
- random devices, as specified by DEVRANDOM, until a sufficient amount
- of data has been collected. We spend at most 10 ms on each file
- (select timeout) and read in non-blocking mode. DEVRANDOM now
- defaults to the list "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/srandom"
- (previously it was just the string "/dev/urandom"), so on typical
- platforms the 10 ms delay will never occur.
- Also separate out the Unix variant to its own file, rand_unix.c.
- For VMS, there's a currently-empty rand_vms.c.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Move OCSP client related routines to ocsp_cl.c. These
- provide utility functions which an application needing
- to issue a request to an OCSP responder and analyse the
- response will typically need: as opposed to those which an
- OCSP responder itself would need which will be added later.
-
- OCSP_request_sign() signs an OCSP request with an API similar
- to PKCS7_sign(). OCSP_response_status() returns status of OCSP
- response. OCSP_response_get1_basic() extracts basic response
- from response. OCSP_resp_find_status(): finds and extracts status
- information from an OCSP_CERTID structure (which will be created
- when the request structure is built). These are built from lower
- level functions which work on OCSP_SINGLERESP structures but
- wont normally be used unless the application wishes to examine
- extensions in the OCSP response for example.
-
- Replace nonce routines with a pair of functions.
- OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce value and optionally
- generates a random value. OCSP_check_nonce() checks the
- validity of the nonce in an OCSP response.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change function OCSP_request_add() to OCSP_request_add0_id().
- This doesn't copy the supplied OCSP_CERTID and avoids the
- need to free up the newly created id. Change return type
- to OCSP_ONEREQ to return the internal OCSP_ONEREQ structure.
- This can then be used to add extensions to the request.
- Deleted OCSP_request_new(), since most of its functionality
- is now in OCSP_REQUEST_new() (and the case insensitive name
- clash) apart from the ability to set the request name which
- will be added elsewhere.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Update OCSP API. Remove obsolete extensions argument from
- various functions. Extensions are now handled using the new
- OCSP extension code. New simple OCSP HTTP function which
- can be used to send requests and parse the response.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix the PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code to work with new ASN1. Two new
- ASN1_ITEM structures help with sign and verify. PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN
- uses the special reorder version of SET OF to sort the attributes
- and reorder them to match the encoded order. This resolves a long
- standing problem: a verify on a PKCS7 structure just after signing
- it used to fail because the attribute order did not match the
- encoded order. PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY does not reorder the attributes:
- it uses the received order. This is necessary to tolerate some broken
- software that does not order SET OF. This is handled by encoding
- as a SEQUENCE OF but using implicit tagging (with UNIVERSAL class)
- to produce the required SET OF.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Have mk1mf.pl generate the macros OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO and
- OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL and use them appropriately in the header
- files to get correct declarations of the ASN.1 item variables.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Rewrite of PKCS#12 code to use new ASN1 functionality. Replace many
- PKCS#12 macros with real functions. Fix two unrelated ASN1 bugs:
- asn1_check_tlen() would sometimes attempt to use 'ctx' when it was
- NULL and ASN1_TYPE was not dereferenced properly in asn1_ex_c2i().
- New ASN1 macro: DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM() which just declares the relevant
- ASN1_ITEM and no wrapper functions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New functions or ASN1_item_d2i_fp() and ASN1_item_d2i_bio(). These
- replace the old function pointer based I/O routines. Change most of
- the *_d2i_bio() and *_d2i_fp() functions to use these.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor
- lines, recognice more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make
- it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) New ASN1 functions to handle dup, sign, verify, digest, pack and
- unpack operations in terms of ASN1_ITEM. Modify existing wrappers
- to use new functions. Add NO_ASN1_OLD which can be set to remove
- some old style ASN1 functions: this can be used to determine if old
- code will still work when these eventually go away.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New extension functions for OCSP structures, these follow the
- same conventions as certificates and CRLs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function X509V3_add1_i2d(). This automatically encodes and
- adds an extension. Its behaviour can be customised with various
- flags to append, replace or delete. Various wrappers added for
- certifcates and CRLs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix to avoid calling the underlying ASN1 print routine when
- an extension cannot be parsed. Correct a typo in the
- OCSP_SERVICELOC extension. Tidy up print OCSP format.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make mkdef.pl parse some of the ASN1 macros and add apropriate
- entries for variables.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add functionality to apps/openssl.c for detecting locking
- problems: As the program is single-threaded, all we have
- to do is register a locking callback using an array for
- storing which locks are currently held by the program.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Use a lock around the call to CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() in
- SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_idx(), which is used in
- ssl_verify_cert_chain() and thus can be called at any time
- during TLS/SSL handshakes so that thread-safety is essential.
- Unfortunately, the ex_data design is not at all suited
- for multi-threaded use, so it probably should be abolished.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Added Broadcom "ubsec" ENGINE to OpenSSL.
- [Broadcom, tweaked and integrated by Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Move common extension printing code to new function
- X509V3_print_extensions(). Reorganise OCSP print routines and
- implement some needed OCSP ASN1 functions. Add OCSP extensions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function X509_signature_print() to remove duplication in some
- print routines.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a special meaning when SET OF and SEQUENCE OF flags are both
- set (this was treated exactly the same as SET OF previously). This
- is used to reorder the STACK representing the structure to match the
- encoding. This will be used to get round a problem where a PKCS7
- structure which was signed could not be verified because the STACK
- order did not reflect the encoded order.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Reimplement the OCSP ASN1 module using the new code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Update the X509V3 code to permit the use of an ASN1_ITEM structure
- for its ASN1 operations. The old style function pointers still exist
- for now but they will eventually go away.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Merge in replacement ASN1 code from the ASN1 branch. This almost
- completely replaces the old ASN1 functionality with a table driven
- encoder and decoder which interprets an ASN1_ITEM structure describing
- the ASN1 module. Compatibility with the existing ASN1 API (i2d,d2i) is
- largely maintained. Almost all of the old asn1_mac.h macro based ASN1
- has also been converted to the new form.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change BN_mod_exp_recp so that negative moduli are tolerated
- (the sign is ignored). Similarly, ignore the sign in BN_MONT_CTX_set
- so that BN_mod_exp_mont and BN_mod_exp_mont_word work
- for negative moduli.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix BN_uadd and BN_usub: Always return non-negative results instead
- of not touching the result's sign bit.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) BN_div bugfix: If the result is 0, the sign (res->neg) must not be
- set.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Changed the LHASH code to use prototypes for callbacks, and created
- macros to declare and implement thin (optionally static) functions
- that provide type-safety and avoid function pointer casting for the
- type-specific callbacks.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Added Kerberos Cipher Suites to be used with TLS, as written in
- RFC 2712.
- [Veers Staats <staatsvr at asc.hpc.mil>,
- Jeffrey Altman <jaltman at columbia.edu>, via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Reformat the FAQ so the different questions and answers can be divided
- in sections depending on the subject.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Have the zlib compression code load ZLIB.DLL dynamically under
- Windows.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) New function BN_mod_sqrt for computing square roots modulo a prime
- (using the probabilistic Tonelli-Shanks algorithm unless
- p == 3 (mod 4) or p == 5 (mod 8), which are cases that can
- be handled deterministically).
- [Lenka Fibikova <fibikova at exp-math.uni-essen.de>, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Make BN_mod_inverse faster by explicitly handling small quotients
- in the Euclid loop. (Speed gain about 20% for small moduli [256 or
- 512 bits], about 30% for larger ones [1024 or 2048 bits].)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New function BN_kronecker.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix BN_gcd so that it works on negative inputs; the result is
- positive unless both parameters are zero.
- Previously something reasonably close to an infinite loop was
- possible because numbers could be growing instead of shrinking
- in the implementation of Euclid's algorithm.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix BN_is_word() and BN_is_one() macros to take into account the
- sign of the number in question.
-
- Fix BN_is_word(a,w) to work correctly for w == 0.
-
- The old BN_is_word(a,w) macro is now called BN_abs_is_word(a,w)
- because its test if the absolute value of 'a' equals 'w'.
- Note that BN_abs_is_word does *not* handle w == 0 reliably;
- it exists mostly for use in the implementations of BN_is_zero(),
- BN_is_one(), and BN_is_word().
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New function BN_swap.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Use BN_nnmod instead of BN_mod in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c so that
- the exponentiation functions are more likely to produce reasonable
- results on negative inputs.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change BN_mod_mul so that the result is always non-negative.
- Previously, it could be negative if one of the factors was negative;
- I don't think anyone really wanted that behaviour.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Move BN_mod_... functions into new file crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
- (except for exponentiation, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c,
- and BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_recp.c)
- and add new functions:
-
- BN_nnmod
- BN_mod_sqr
- BN_mod_add
- BN_mod_add_quick
- BN_mod_sub
- BN_mod_sub_quick
- BN_mod_lshift1
- BN_mod_lshift1_quick
- BN_mod_lshift
- BN_mod_lshift_quick
-
- These functions always generate non-negative results.
-
- BN_nnmod otherwise is like BN_mod (if BN_mod computes a remainder r
- such that |m| < r < 0, BN_nnmod will output rem + |m| instead).
-
- BN_mod_XXX_quick(r, a, [b,] m) generates the same result as
- BN_mod_XXX(r, a, [b,] m, ctx), but requires that a [and b]
- be reduced modulo m.
- [Lenka Fibikova <fibikova at exp-math.uni-essen.de>, Bodo Moeller]
-
-#if 0
- The following entry accidentily appeared in the CHANGES file
- distributed with OpenSSL 0.9.7. The modifications described in
- it do *not* apply to OpenSSL 0.9.7.
-
- *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there
- was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul()
- required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition
- of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and
- bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(),
- bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with
- differing sizes.
- [Richard Levitte]
-#endif
-
- *) In 'openssl passwd', verify passwords read from the terminal
- unless the '-salt' option is used (which usually means that
- verification would just waste user's time since the resulting
- hash is going to be compared with some given password hash)
- or the new '-noverify' option is used.
-
- This is an incompatible change, but it does not affect
- non-interactive use of 'openssl passwd' (passwords on the command
- line, '-stdin' option, '-in ...' option) and thus should not
- cause any problems.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Remove all references to RSAref, since there's no more need for it.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make DSO load along a path given through an environment variable
- (SHLIB_PATH) with shl_load().
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Constify the ENGINE code as a result of BIGNUM constification.
- Also constify the RSA code and most things related to it. In a
- few places, most notable in the depth of the ASN.1 code, ugly
- casts back to non-const were required (to be solved at a later
- time)
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make it so the openssl application has all engines loaded by default.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Constify the BIGNUM routines a little more.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the following functions:
-
- ENGINE_load_cswift()
- ENGINE_load_chil()
- ENGINE_load_atalla()
- ENGINE_load_nuron()
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines()
-
- That way, an application can itself choose if external engines that
- are built-in in OpenSSL shall ever be used or not. The benefit is
- that applications won't have to be linked with libdl or other dso
- libraries unless it's really needed.
-
- Changed 'openssl engine' to load all engines on demand.
- Changed the engine header files to avoid the duplication of some
- declarations (they differed!).
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) 'openssl engine' can now list capabilities.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Better error reporting in 'openssl engine'.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Never call load_dh_param(NULL) in s_server.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add engine application. It can currently list engines by name and
- identity, and test if they are actually available.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Improve RPM specification file by forcing symbolic linking and making
- sure the installed documentation is also owned by root.root.
- [Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>]
-
- *) Give the OpenSSL applications more possibilities to make use of
- keys (public as well as private) handled by engines.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add OCSP code that comes from CertCo.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add VMS support for the Rijndael code.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Added untested support for Nuron crypto accelerator.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add support for external cryptographic devices. This code was
- previously distributed separately as the "engine" branch.
- [Geoff Thorpe, Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Rework the filename-translation in the DSO code. It is now possible to
- have far greater control over how a "name" is turned into a filename
- depending on the operating environment and any oddities about the
- different shared library filenames on each system.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Support threads on FreeBSD-elf in Configure.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Fix for SHA1 assembly problem with MASM: it produces
- warnings about corrupt line number information when assembling
- with debugging information. This is caused by the overlapping
- of two sections.
- [Bernd Matthes <mainbug at celocom.de>, Steve Henson]
-
- *) NCONF changes.
- NCONF_get_number() has no error checking at all. As a replacement,
- NCONF_get_number_e() is defined (_e for "error checking") and is
- promoted strongly. The old NCONF_get_number is kept around for
- binary backward compatibility.
- Make it possible for methods to load from something other than a BIO,
- by providing a function pointer that is given a name instead of a BIO.
- For example, this could be used to load configuration data from an
- LDAP server.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Fix for non blocking accept BIOs. Added new I/O special reason
- BIO_RR_ACCEPT to cover this case. Previously use of accept BIOs
- with non blocking I/O was not possible because no retry code was
- implemented. Also added new SSL code SSL_WANT_ACCEPT to cover
- this case.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Added the beginnings of Rijndael support.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Fix for bug in DirectoryString mask setting. Add support for
- X509_NAME_print_ex() in 'req' and X509_print_ex() function
- to allow certificate printing to more controllable, additional
- 'certopt' option to 'x509' to allow new printing options to be
- set.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004]
-
- *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
- by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
- [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003]
-
- *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
-
- Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
- certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]
-
- *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
-
- Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
- invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
-
- If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
- certificate signature with the NULL public key.
-
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate
- if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0
- specifications.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional
- extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0
- but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification).
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe]
-
- *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable
- when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]
-
- *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
- Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat
- a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error
- in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation
- to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call
- RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING.
- They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases.
- [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not
- seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as
- an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there
- is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe
- by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and
- having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors
- (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but
- avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared
- between threads, blinding will still be very fast).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]
-
- *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked
- via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
- block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
- against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
- between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
-
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
- Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
- Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]
-
- *) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of
- memory from it's contents. This is done with a counter that will
- place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve
- two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing
- compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can
- be read through on certain media, for example a swap space on disk.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Bugfix: client side session caching did not work with external caching,
- because the session->cipher setting was not restored when reloading
- from the external cache. This problem was masked, when
- SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) was set.
- (Found by Steve Haslam <steve at araqnid.ddts.net>.)
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Fix client_certificate (ssl/s2_clnt.c): The permissible total
- length of the REQUEST-CERTIFICATE message is 18 .. 34, not 17 .. 33.
- [Zeev Lieber <zeev-l at yahoo.com>]
-
- *) Undo an undocumented change introduced in 0.9.6e which caused
- repeated calls to OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() and
- OpenSSL_add_all_digests() to be ignored, even after calling
- EVP_cleanup().
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Change the default configuration reader to deal with last line not
- being properly terminated.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Change X509_NAME_cmp() so it applies the special rules on handling
- DN values that are of type PrintableString, as well as RDNs of type
- emailAddress where the value has the type ia5String.
- [stefank at valicert.com via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add a SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag to take over half
- the job SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP was inconsistently
- doing, define a new flag (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL) to be
- the bitwise-OR of the two for use by the majority of applications
- wanting this behaviour, and update the docs. The documented
- behaviour and actual behaviour were inconsistent and had been
- changing anyway, so this is more a bug-fix than a behavioural
- change.
- [Geoff Thorpe, diagnosed by Nadav Har'El]
-
- *) Don't impose a 16-byte length minimum on session IDs in ssl/s3_clnt.c
- (the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifications allow any length up to 32 bytes).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix initialization code race conditions in
- SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method(), SSLv23_server_method(),
- SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_client_method(), SSLv2_server_method(),
- SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_client_method(), SSLv3_server_method(),
- TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_client_method(), TLSv1_server_method(),
- ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(),
- ssl3_get_cipher_by_char().
- [Patrick McCormick <patrick at tellme.com>, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after
- the cached sessions are flushed, as the remove_cb() might use ex_data
- contents. Bug found by Sam Varshavchik <mrsam at courier-mta.com>
- (see [openssl.org #212]).
- [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Fix typo in OBJ_txt2obj which incorrectly passed the content
- length, instead of the encoding length to d2i_ASN1_OBJECT.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6f and 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]
-
- *) [In 0.9.6g-engine release:]
- Fix crypto/engine/vendor_defns/cswift.h for WIN32 (use '_stdcall').
- [Lynn Gazis <lgazis at rainbow.com>]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]
-
- *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX
- and get fix the header length calculation.
- [Florian Weimer <Weimer at CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>,
- Alon Kantor <alonk at checkpoint.com> (and others),
- Steve Henson]
-
- *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer
- overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the
- assertions could call abort()).
- [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>, Bodo Moeller]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]
-
- *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
- the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
- negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
- supplied buffer.
- [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav at mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim at ntlp.com>]
-
- *) Fix cipher selection routines: ciphers without encryption had no flags
- for the cipher strength set and where therefore not handled correctly
- by the selection routines (PR #130).
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Fix EVP_dsa_sha macro.
- [Nils Larsch]
-
- *) New option
- SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
- for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure
- that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d.
-
- As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some
- broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL.
- SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL
- implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and
- 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many
- applications.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Changes in security patch:
-
- Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced
- Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory,
- Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number
- F30602-01-2-0537.
-
- *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
- the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
- negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
- supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659)
- [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav at mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim at ntlp.com>]
-
- *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
- happen in practice.
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
- too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655)
- [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm at aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
-
- *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656)
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656)
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]
-
- *) Fix crypto/asn1/a_sign.c so that 'parameters' is omitted (not
- encoded as NULL) with id-dsa-with-sha1.
- [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>; problem pointed out by Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Check various X509_...() return values in apps/req.c.
- [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
-
- *) Fix BASE64 decode (EVP_DecodeUpdate) for data with CR/LF ended lines:
- an end-of-file condition would erronously be flagged, when the CRLF
- was just at the end of a processed block. The bug was discovered when
- processing data through a buffering memory BIO handing the data to a
- BASE64-decoding BIO. Bug fund and patch submitted by Pavel Tsekov
- <ptsekov at syntrex.com> and Nedelcho Stanev.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found
- in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment
- before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs
- with data potentially chosen by the attacker.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix length checks in ssl3_get_client_hello().
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) TLS/SSL library bugfix: use s->s3->in_read_app_data differently
- to prevent ssl3_read_internal() from incorrectly assuming that
- ssl3_read_bytes() found application data while handshake
- processing was enabled when in fact s->s3->in_read_app_data was
- merely automatically cleared during the initial handshake.
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
-
- *) Fix object definitions for Private and Enterprise: they were not
- recognized in their shortname (=lowercase) representation. Extend
- obj_dat.pl to issue an error when using undefined keywords instead
- of silently ignoring the problem (Svenning Sorensen
- <sss at sss.dnsalias.net>).
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Fix DH_generate_parameters() so that it works for 'non-standard'
- generators, i.e. generators other than 2 and 5. (Previously, the
- code did not properly initialise the 'add' and 'rem' values to
- BN_generate_prime().)
-
- In the new general case, we do not insist that 'generator' is
- actually a primitive root: This requirement is rather pointless;
- a generator of the order-q subgroup is just as good, if not
- better.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Map new X509 verification errors to alerts. Discovered and submitted by
- Tom Wu <tom at arcot.com>.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Fix ssl3_pending() (ssl/s3_lib.c) to prevent SSL_pending() from
- returning non-zero before the data has been completely received
- when using non-blocking I/O.
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by John Hughes]
-
- *) Some of the ciphers missed the strength entry (SSL_LOW etc).
- [Ben Laurie, Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Fix bug in SSL_clear(): bad sessions were not removed (found by
- Yoram Zahavi <YoramZ at gilian.com>).
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Add information about CygWin 1.3 and on, and preserve proper
- configuration for the versions before that.
- [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen at redhat.com> and Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make removal from session cache (SSL_CTX_remove_session()) more robust:
- check whether we deal with a copy of a session and do not delete from
- the cache in this case. Problem reported by "Izhar Shoshani Levi"
- <izhar at checkpoint.com>.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Do not store session data into the internal session cache, if it
- is never intended to be looked up (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP
- flag is set). Proposed by Aslam <aslam at funk.com>.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Have ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit() really clear a bit when the requested
- value is 0.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:]
- Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey().
- [Toomas Kiisk <vix at cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x.
- [Neale Ferguson <Neale.Ferguson at SoftwareAG-USA.com> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of
- ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag
- variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been
- received. As the flag value will be lost between multiple
- invocations of ssl3_accept when using non-blocking I/O, the
- function may not be aware that a handshake has actually taken
- place, thus preventing a new session from being added to the
- session cache.
-
- To avoid this problem, we now set s->new_session to 2 instead of
- using a local variable.
- [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Bugfix: Return -1 from ssl3_get_server_done (ssl3/s3_clnt.c)
- if the SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH error is detected.
- [Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New 'shared_ldflag' column in Configure platform table.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Fix EVP_CIPHER_mode macro.
- ["Dan S. Camper" <dan at bti.net>]
-
- *) Fix ssl3_read_bytes (ssl/s3_pkt.c): To ignore messages of unknown
- type, we must throw them away by setting rr->length to 0.
- [D P Chang <dpc at qualys.com>]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6b and 0.9.6c [21 dec 2001]
-
- *) Fix BN_rand_range bug pointed out by Dominikus Scherkl
- <Dominikus.Scherkl at biodata.com>. (The previous implementation
- worked incorrectly for those cases where range = 10..._2 and
- 3*range is two bits longer than range.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Only add signing time to PKCS7 structures if it is not already
- present.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix crypto/objects/objects.h: "ld-ce" should be "id-ce",
- OBJ_ld_ce should be OBJ_id_ce.
- Also some ip-pda OIDs in crypto/objects/objects.txt were
- incorrect (cf. RFC 3039).
- [Matt Cooper, Frederic Giudicelli, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Release CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK when CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid()
- returns early because it has nothing to do.
- [Andy Schneider <andy.schneider at bjss.co.uk>]
-
- *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
- Fix mutex callback return values in crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c.
- [Andy Schneider <andy.schneider at bjss.co.uk>]
-
- *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
- Add support for Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver technology.
- (Use engine 'keyclient')
- [Cryptographic Appliances and Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Add a configuration entry for OS/390 Unix. The C compiler 'c89'
- is called via tools/c89.sh because arguments have to be
- rearranged (all '-L' options must appear before the first object
- modules).
- [Richard Shapiro <rshapiro at abinitio.com>]
-
- *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
- Add support for Broadcom crypto accelerator cards, backported
- from 0.9.7.
- [Broadcom, Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>, Mark Cox]
-
- *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
- Add support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from
- Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware')
- [Baltimore Technologies and Mark Cox]
-
- *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
- Add support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated
- Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep')
- [AEP Inc. and Mark Cox]
-
- *) Add a configuration entry for gcc on UnixWare.
- [Gary Benson <gbenson at redhat.com>]
-
- *) Change ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s2_srvr.c so that received handshake
- messages are stored in a single piece (fixed-length part and
- variable-length part combined) and fix various bugs found on the way.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Disable caching in BIO_gethostbyname(), directly use gethostbyname()
- instead. BIO_gethostbyname() does not know what timeouts are
- appropriate, so entries would stay in cache even when they have
- become invalid.
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Rich Salz <rsalz at zolera.com>
-
- *) Change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) behaviour when
- faced with a pathologically small ClientHello fragment that does
- not contain client_version: Instead of aborting with an error,
- simply choose the highest available protocol version (i.e.,
- TLS 1.0 unless it is disabled). In practice, ClientHello
- messages are never sent like this, but this change gives us
- strictly correct behaviour at least for TLS.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix SSL handshake functions and SSL_clear() such that SSL_clear()
- never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within
- one of the SSL handshake functions.
- [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Niko Baric]
-
- *) In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert
- (sent using the client's version number) if client_version is
- smaller than the protocol version in use. Also change
- ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0 if
- the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then
- the client will at least see that alert.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) to handle message fragmentation
- correctly.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Avoid infinite loop in ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) if a
- client receives HelloRequest while in a handshake.
- [Bodo Moeller; bug noticed by Andy Schneider <andy.schneider at bjss.co.uk>]
-
- *) Bugfix in ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c): Case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
- should end in 'break', not 'goto end' which circuments various
- cleanups done in state SSL_ST_OK. But session related stuff
- must be disabled for SSL_ST_OK in the case that we just sent a
- HelloRequest.
-
- Also avoid some overhead by not calling ssl_init_wbio_buffer()
- before just sending a HelloRequest.
- [Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla <ekr at rtfm.com>]
-
- *) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't
- reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC
- verification error occured. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts
- are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information
- may leak via logfiles.)
-
- Similar changes are not required for the SSL 2.0 implementation
- because the number of padding bytes is sent in clear for SSL 2.0,
- and the extra bytes are just ignored. However ssl/s2_pkt.c
- failed to verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in
- the legal range.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add OpenUNIX-8 support including shared libraries
- (Boyd Lynn Gerber <gerberb at zenez.com>).
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Improve RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() check again to avoid
- 'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf.
- James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper). Note that the
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use
- encoding parameters and hence was not vulnerable.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) BN_sqr() bug fix.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis at cavium.com>]
-
- *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
- so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
- followed by modular reduction.
- [Bodo Moeller; pointed out by Adam Young <AYoung1 at NCSUS.JNJ.COM>]
-
- *) Add BN_pseudo_rand_range() with obvious functionality: BN_rand_range()
- equivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand().
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) s3_srvr.c: allow sending of large client certificate lists (> 16 kB).
- This function was broken, as the check for a new client hello message
- to handle SGC did not allow these large messages.
- (Tracked down by "Douglas E. Engert" <deengert at anl.gov>.)
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Add alert descriptions for TLSv1 to SSL_alert_desc_string[_long]().
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Fix buggy behaviour of BIO_get_num_renegotiates() and BIO_ctrl()
- for BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE ("Stephen Hinton" <shinton at netopia.com>).
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Rework the configuration and shared library support for Tru64 Unix.
- The configuration part makes use of modern compiler features and
- still retains old compiler behavior for those that run older versions
- of the OS. The shared library support part includes a variant that
- uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the special
- configuration target "alpha-cc-rpath", which will never be selected
- automatically.
- [Tim Mooney <mooney at dogbert.cc.ndsu.NoDak.edu> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) In ssl3_get_key_exchange (ssl/s3_clnt.c), call ssl3_get_message()
- with the same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request().
- Otherwise, if no ServerKeyExchange message occurs, CertificateRequest
- messages might inadvertently be reject as too long.
- [Petr Lampa <lampa at fee.vutbr.cz>]
-
- *) Enhanced support for IA-64 Unix platforms (well, Linux and HP-UX).
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set
- specificly for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being
- used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was
- ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of
- the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced
- to allow the necessary settings.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Initialize static variable in crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c and crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
- explicitly to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be
- done automatically (in contradiction to the requirements of the C
- standard). This made problems when used from OpenSSH.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) In OpenSSL 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b, crypto/dh/dh_key.c ignored
- dh->length and always used
-
- BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->p).
-
- BN_rand_range() is not necessary for Diffie-Hellman, and this
- specific range makes Diffie-Hellman unnecessarily inefficient if
- dh->length (recommended exponent length) is much smaller than the
- length of dh->p. We could use BN_rand_range() if the order of
- the subgroup was stored in the DH structure, but we only have
- dh->length.
-
- So switch back to
-
- BN_rand(priv_key, l, ...)
-
- where 'l' is dh->length if this is defined, or BN_num_bits(dh->p)-1
- otherwise.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) In
-
- RSA_eay_public_encrypt
- RSA_eay_private_decrypt
- RSA_eay_private_encrypt (signing)
- RSA_eay_public_decrypt (signature verification)
-
- (default implementations for RSA_public_encrypt,
- RSA_private_decrypt, RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt),
- always reject numbers >= n.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, use a new short-time lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2
- to synchronize access to 'locking_thread'. This is necessary on
- systems where access to 'locking_thread' (an 'unsigned long'
- variable) is not atomic.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, set 'locking_thread' to current thread's ID
- *before* setting the 'crypto_lock_rand' flag. The previous code had
- a race condition if 0 is a valid thread ID.
- [Travis Vitek <vitek at roguewave.com>]
-
- *) Add support for shared libraries under Irix.
- [Albert Chin-A-Young <china at thewrittenword.com>]
-
- *) Add configuration option to build on Linux on both big-endian and
- little-endian MIPS.
- [Ralf Baechle <ralf at uni-koblenz.de>]
-
- *) Add the possibility to create shared libraries on HP-UX.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]
-
- *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c)
- to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by
- Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen at nokia.com>:
- PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of
- one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on
- 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests
- to traverse all of 'state'.
-
- 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md')
- during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous
- 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output.
-
- 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash
- independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested.
-
- The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid
- Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred
- to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the
- half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always
- assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second
- measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never
- mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically
- further strengthens the PRNG.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) When only the key is given to "enc", the IV is undefined. Print out
- an error message in this case.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Handle special case when X509_NAME is empty in X509 printing routines.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In dsa_do_verify (crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c), verify that r and s are
- positive and less than q.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Don't change *pointer in CRYPTO_add_lock() is add_lock_callback is
- used: it isn't thread safe and the add_lock_callback should handle
- that itself.
- [Paul Rose <Paul.Rose at bridge.com>]
-
- *) Verify that incoming data obeys the block size in
- ssl3_enc (ssl/s3_enc.c) and tls1_enc (ssl/t1_enc.c).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix OAEP check.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller, Bodo M\xF6ller]
-
- *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
- RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
- when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client
- hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against
- SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking
- means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is
- around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98
- paper.)
-
- Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a
- random 'decryption result') did not work properly because
- ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would
- detect the supposedly ignored error.
-
- Both problems are now fixed.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) In crypto/bio/bf_buff.c, increase DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE to 4096
- (previously it was 1024).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix for compatibility mode trust settings: ignore trust settings
- unless some valid trust or reject settings are present.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix for blowfish EVP: its a variable length cipher.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix various bugs related to DSA S/MIME verification. Handle missing
- parameters in DSA public key structures and return an error in the
- DSA routines if parameters are absent.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In versions up to 0.9.6, RAND_file_name() resorted to file ".rnd"
- in the current directory if neither $RANDFILE nor $HOME was set.
- RAND_file_name() in 0.9.6a returned NULL in this case. This has
- caused some confusion to Windows users who haven't defined $HOME.
- Thus RAND_file_name() is changed again: e_os.h can define a
- DEFAULT_HOME, which will be used if $HOME is not set.
- For Windows, we use "C:"; on other platforms, we still require
- environment variables.
-
- *) Move 'if (!initialized) RAND_poll()' into regions protected by
- CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND. This is not strictly necessary, but avoids
- having multiple threads call RAND_poll() concurrently.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, replace 'add_do_not_lock' flag by a
- combination of a flag and a thread ID variable.
- Otherwise while one thread is in ssleay_rand_bytes (which sets the
- flag), *other* threads can enter ssleay_add_bytes without obeying
- the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegally release the lock
- that they do not hold after the first thread unsets add_do_not_lock).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change bctest again: '-x' expressions are not available in all
- versions of 'test'.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]
-
- *) Fix a couple of memory leaks in PKCS7_dataDecode()
- [Steve Henson, reported by Heyun Zheng <hzheng at atdsprint.com>]
-
- *) Change Configure and Makefiles to provide EXE_EXT, which will contain
- the default extension for executables, if any. Also, make the perl
- scripts that use symlink() to test if it really exists and use "cp"
- if it doesn't. All this made OpenSSL compilable and installable in
- CygWin.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Fix for asn1_GetSequence() for indefinite length constructed data.
- If SEQUENCE is length is indefinite just set c->slen to the total
- amount of data available.
- [Steve Henson, reported by shige at FreeBSD.org]
- [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
-
- *) Change bctest to avoid here-documents inside command substitution
- (workaround for FreeBSD /bin/sh bug).
- For compatibility with Ultrix, avoid shell functions (introduced
- in the bctest version that searches along $PATH).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes
- with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris
- and UnixWare.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Check the result of RSA-CRT (see D. Boneh, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton:
- On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic
- Computations, J. Cryptology 14 (2001) 2, 101-119,
- http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz).
- [Ulf Moeller]
-
- *) MIPS assembler BIGNUM division bug fix.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Disabled incorrect Alpha assembler code.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Fix PKCS#7 decode routines so they correctly update the length
- after reading an EOC for the EXPLICIT tag.
- [Steve Henson]
- [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
-
- *) Fix bug in PKCS#12 key generation routines. This was triggered
- if a 3DES key was generated with a 0 initial byte. Include
- PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN compilation option to retain the old
- (but broken) behaviour.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Enhance bctest to search for a working bc along $PATH and print
- it when found.
- [Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net> via Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Fix memory leaks in err.c: free err_data string if necessary;
- don't write to the wrong index in ERR_set_error_data.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Implement ssl23_peek (analogous to ssl23_read), which previously
- did not exist.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Replace rdtsc with _emit statements for VC++ version 5.
- [Jeremy Cooper <jeremy at baymoo.org>]
-
- *) Make it possible to reuse SSLv2 sessions.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) In copy_email() check for >= 0 as a return value for
- X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() since 0 is a valid index.
- [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at opensca.org>]
-
- *) Avoid coredump with unsupported or invalid public keys by checking if
- X509_get_pubkey() fails in PKCS7_verify(). Fix memory leak when
- PKCS7_verify() fails with non detached data.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid.
- New function OPENSSL_issetugid().
- [Ulf Moeller]
-
- *) Avoid false positives in memory leak detection code (crypto/mem_dbg.c)
- due to incorrect handling of multi-threading:
-
- 1. Fix timing glitch in the MemCheck_off() portion of CRYPTO_mem_ctrl().
-
- 2. Fix logical glitch in is_MemCheck_on() aka CRYPTO_is_mem_check_on().
-
- 3. Count how many times MemCheck_off() has been called so that
- nested use can be treated correctly. This also avoids
- inband-signalling in the previous code (which relied on the
- assumption that thread ID 0 is impossible).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add "-rand" option also to s_client and s_server.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Fix CPU detection on Irix 6.x.
- [Kurt Hockenbury <khockenb at stevens-tech.edu> and
- "Bruce W. Forsberg" <bruce.forsberg at baesystems.com>]
-
- *) Fix X509_NAME bug which produced incorrect encoding if X509_NAME
- was empty.
- [Steve Henson]
- [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
-
- *) Use the cached encoding of an X509_NAME structure rather than
- copying it. This is apparently the reason for the libsafe "errors"
- but the code is actually correct.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent
- Bleichenbacher's DSA attack.
- Extend BN_[pseudo_]rand: As before, top=1 forces the highest two bits
- to be set and top=0 forces the highest bit to be set; top=-1 is new
- and leaves the highest bit random.
- [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) In the NCONF_...-based implementations for CONF_... queries
- (crypto/conf/conf_lib.c), if the input LHASH is NULL, avoid using
- a temporary CONF structure with the data component set to NULL
- (which gives segmentation faults in lh_retrieve).
- Instead, use NULL for the CONF pointer in CONF_get_string and
- CONF_get_number (which may use environment variables) and directly
- return NULL from CONF_get_section.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix potential buffer overrun for EBCDIC.
- [Ulf Moeller]
-
- *) Tolerate nonRepudiation as being valid for S/MIME signing and certSign
- keyUsage if basicConstraints absent for a CA.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make SMIME_write_PKCS7() write mail header values with a format that
- is more generally accepted (no spaces before the semicolon), since
- some programs can't parse those values properly otherwise. Also make
- sure BIO's that break lines after each write do not create invalid
- headers.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Make the CRL encoding routines work with empty SEQUENCE OF. The
- macros previously used would not encode an empty SEQUENCE OF
- and break the signature.
- [Steve Henson]
- [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
-
- *) Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in
- DH ciphersuites.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add some EVP_add_digest_alias registrations (as found in
- OpenSSL_add_all_digests()) to SSL_library_init()
- aka OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(). This provides improved
- compatibility with peers using X.509 certificates
- with unconventional AlgorithmIdentifier OIDs.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix for Irix with NO_ASM.
- ["Bruce W. Forsberg" <bruce.forsberg at baesystems.com>]
-
- *) ./config script fixes.
- [Ulf Moeller, Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Fix 'openssl passwd -1'.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change PKCS12_key_gen_asc() so it can cope with non null
- terminated strings whose length is passed in the passlen
- parameter, for example from PEM callbacks. This was done
- by adding an extra length parameter to asc2uni().
- [Steve Henson, reported by <oddissey at samsung.co.kr>]
-
- *) Fix C code generated by 'openssl dsaparam -C': If a BN_bin2bn
- call failed, free the DSA structure.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix to uni2asc() to cope with zero length Unicode strings.
- These are present in some PKCS#12 files.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Increase s2->wbuf allocation by one byte in ssl2_new (ssl/s2_lib.c).
- Otherwise do_ssl_write (ssl/s2_pkt.c) will write beyond buffer limits
- when writing a 32767 byte record.
- [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Eric Day <eday at concentric.net>]
-
- *) In RSA_eay_public_{en,ed}crypt and RSA_eay_mod_exp (rsa_eay.c),
- obtain lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA before setting rsa->_method_mod_{n,p,q}.
-
- (RSA objects have a reference count access to which is protected
- by CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA [see rsa_lib.c, s3_srvr.c, ssl_cert.c, ssl_rsa.c],
- so they are meant to be shared between threads.)
- [Bodo Moeller, Geoff Thorpe; original patch submitted by
- "Reddie, Steven" <Steven.Reddie at ca.com>]
-
- *) Fix a deadlock in CRYPTO_mem_leaks().
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Use better test patterns in bntest.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add a 'bctest' script that checks for some known 'bc' bugs
- so that 'make test' does not abort just because 'bc' is broken.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to
- avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side
- always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original
- result of the server certificate verification.)
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Fix ssl3_pending: If the record in s->s3->rrec is not of type
- SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, return 0.
- Similarly, change ssl2_pending to return 0 if SSL_in_init(s) is true.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix SSL_peek:
- Both ssl2_peek and ssl3_peek, which were totally broken in earlier
- releases, have been re-implemented by renaming the previous
- implementations of ssl2_read and ssl3_read to ssl2_read_internal
- and ssl3_read_internal, respectively, and adding 'peek' parameters
- to them. The new ssl[23]_{read,peek} functions are calls to
- ssl[23]_read_internal with the 'peek' flag set appropriately.
- A 'peek' parameter has also been added to ssl3_read_bytes, which
- does the actual work for ssl3_read_internal.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Initialise "ex_data" member of RSA/DSA/DH structures prior to calling
- the method-specific "init()" handler. Also clean up ex_data after
- calling the method-specific "finish()" handler. Previously, this was
- happening the other way round.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Increase BN_CTX_NUM (the number of BIGNUMs in a BN_CTX) to 16.
- The previous value, 12, was not always sufficient for BN_mod_exp().
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with
- the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the
- shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should
- be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Fix typo in get_cert_by_subject() in by_dir.c
- [Jean-Marc Desperrier <jean-marc.desperrier at certplus.com>]
-
- *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries:
-
- - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and
- if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0
- to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for
- that.
-
- - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible.
-
- - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries.
-
- - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the
- static ones.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Fix SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead macro to actually use its argument.
-
- Copy SSL_CTX's read_ahead flag to SSL object directly in SSL_new
- and not in SSL_clear because the latter is also used by the
- accept/connect functions; previously, the settings made by
- SSL_set_read_ahead would be lost during the handshake.
- [Bodo Moeller; problems reported by Anders Gertz <gertz at epact.se>]
-
- *) Correct util/mkdef.pl to be selective about disabled algorithms.
- Previously, it would create entries for disableed algorithms no
- matter what.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Added several new manual pages for SSL_* function.
- [Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- Changes between 0.9.5a and 0.9.6 [24 Sep 2000]
-
- *) In ssl23_get_client_hello, generate an error message when faced
- with an initial SSL 3.0/TLS record that is too small to contain the
- first two bytes of the ClientHello message, i.e. client_version.
- (Note that this is a pathologic case that probably has never happened
- in real life.) The previous approach was to use the version number
- from the record header as a substitute; but our protocol choice
- should not depend on that one because it is not authenticated
- by the Finished messages.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) More robust randomness gathering functions for Windows.
- [Jeffrey Altman <jaltman at columbia.edu>]
-
- *) For compatibility reasons if the flag X509_V_FLAG_ISSUER_CHECK is
- not set then we don't setup the error code for issuer check errors
- to avoid possibly overwriting other errors which the callback does
- handle. If an application does set the flag then we assume it knows
- what it is doing and can handle the new informational codes
- appropriately.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix for a nasty bug in ASN1_TYPE handling. ASN1_TYPE is used for
- a general "ANY" type, as such it should be able to decode anything
- including tagged types. However it didn't check the class so it would
- wrongly interpret tagged types in the same way as their universal
- counterpart and unknown types were just rejected. Changed so that the
- tagged and unknown types are handled in the same way as a SEQUENCE:
- that is the encoding is stored intact. There is also a new type
- "V_ASN1_OTHER" which is used when the class is not universal, in this
- case we have no idea what the actual type is so we just lump them all
- together.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) On VMS, stdout may very well lead to a file that is written to
- in a record-oriented fashion. That means that every write() will
- write a separate record, which will be read separately by the
- programs trying to read from it. This can be very confusing.
-
- The solution is to put a BIO filter in the way that will buffer
- text until a linefeed is reached, and then write everything a
- line at a time, so every record written will be an actual line,
- not chunks of lines and not (usually doesn't happen, but I've
- seen it once) several lines in one record. BIO_f_linebuffer() is
- the answer.
-
- Currently, it's a VMS-only method, because that's where it has
- been tested well enough.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Remove 'optimized' squaring variant in BN_mod_mul_montgomery,
- it can return incorrect results.
- (Note: The buggy variant was not enabled in OpenSSL 0.9.5a,
- but it was in 0.9.6-beta[12].)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Disable the check for content being present when verifying detached
- signatures in pk7_smime.c. Some versions of Netscape (wrongly)
- include zero length content when signing messages.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
- BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
- [Bodo M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Add DSO method for VMS.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
- wrong sign.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
- packages. The default package contains applications, application
- documentation and run-time libraries. The devel package contains
- include files, static libraries and function documentation. The
- doc package contains the contents of the doc directory. The original
- openssl.spec was provided by Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add a large number of documentation files for many SSL routines.
- [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke at aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>]
-
- *) Add a configuration entry for Sony News 4.
- [NAKAJI Hiroyuki <nakaji at tutrp.tut.ac.jp>]
-
- *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
- random number < q in the DSA library.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default
- behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
- the underlying transport is blocking) if a handshake took place.
- (The default behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client
- and s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read;
- but for applications that know in advance when to expect data, it
- just makes things more complicated.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add RAND_egd_bytes(), which gives control over the number of bytes read
- from EGD.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add a few more EBCDIC conditionals that make `req' and `x509'
- work better on such systems.
- [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>]
-
- *) Add two demo programs for PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create().
- Update PKCS12_parse() so it copies the friendlyName and the
- keyid to the certificates aux info.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix bug in PKCS7_verify() which caused an infinite loop
- if there was more than one signature.
- [Sven Uszpelkat <su at celocom.de>]
-
- *) Major change in util/mkdef.pl to include extra information
- about each symbol, as well as presentig variables as well
- as functions. This change means that there's n more need
- to rebuild the .num files when some algorithms are excluded.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Allow the verify time to be set by an application,
- rather than always using the current time.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate
- verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a
- number of criteria: subject name, authority key id
- and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates
- by the same criteria. The main comparison function is
- X509_check_issued() which performs these checks.
-
- Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this
- without completely rewriting the lookup code.
-
- Authority and subject key identifier are now cached.
-
- The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced
- by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an
- LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with
- the same hash value.
-
- As a result various functions (which were all internal
- use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE
- structure. This will break anything that messed round
- with X509_STORE internally.
-
- The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an
- exact match, rather than just subject name.
-
- The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval
- of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however
- this can be worked round by performing a lookup first
- (which will fill the cache with candidate certificates)
- and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably
- the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP
- entirely (maybe later...).
-
- The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably.
-
- All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer()
- callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it
- can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way
- to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this
- work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques
- in future. A very simple version which uses a simple
- STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided
- using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack().
-
- The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents
- in the X509_STORE_CTX structure.
-
- X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used
- to customise the verify behaviour.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new PKCS#7 signing option PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP which
- excludes S/MIME capabilities.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) When a certificate request is read in keep a copy of the
- original encoding of the signed data and use it when outputing
- again. Signatures then use the original encoding rather than
- a decoded, encoded version which may cause problems if the
- request is improperly encoded.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) For consistency with other BIO_puts implementations, call
- buffer_write(b, ...) directly in buffer_puts instead of calling
- BIO_write(b, ...).
-
- In BIO_puts, increment b->num_write as in BIO_write.
- [Peter.Sylvester at EdelWeb.fr]
-
- *) Fix BN_mul_word for the case where the word is 0. (We have to use
- BN_zero, we may not return a BIGNUM with an array consisting of
- words set to zero.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Avoid calling abort() from within the library when problems are
- detected, except if preprocessor symbols have been defined
- (such as REF_CHECK, BN_DEBUG etc.).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New openssl application 'rsautl'. This utility can be
- used for low level RSA operations. DER public key
- BIO/fp routines also added.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New Configure entry and patches for compiling on QNX 4.
- [Andreas Schneider <andreas at ds3.etech.fh-hamburg.de>]
-
- *) A demo state-machine implementation was sponsored by
- Nuron (http://www.nuron.com/) and is now available in
- demos/state_machine.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) New options added to the 'dgst' utility for signature
- generation and verification.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Unrecognized PKCS#7 content types are now handled via a
- catch all ASN1_TYPE structure. This allows unsupported
- types to be stored as a "blob" and an application can
- encode and decode it manually.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix various signed/unsigned issues to make a_strex.c
- compile under VC++.
- [Oscar Jacobsson <oscar.jacobsson at celocom.com>]
-
- *) ASN1 fixes. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was not returning the correct
- length if passed a buffer. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN failed
- if passed a NULL BN and its argument was negative.
- [Steve Henson, pointed out by Sven Heiberg <sven at tartu.cyber.ee>]
-
- *) Modification to PKCS#7 encoding routines to output definite
- length encoding. Since currently the whole structures are in
- memory there's not real point in using indefinite length
- constructed encoding. However if OpenSSL is compiled with
- the flag PKCS7_INDEFINITE_ENCODING the old form is used.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Added BIO_vprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf().
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Added more prefixes to parse for in the the strings written
- through a logging bio, to cover all the levels that are available
- through syslog. The prefixes are now:
-
- PANIC, EMERG, EMR => LOG_EMERG
- ALERT, ALR => LOG_ALERT
- CRIT, CRI => LOG_CRIT
- ERROR, ERR => LOG_ERR
- WARNING, WARN, WAR => LOG_WARNING
- NOTICE, NOTE, NOT => LOG_NOTICE
- INFO, INF => LOG_INFO
- DEBUG, DBG => LOG_DEBUG
-
- and as before, if none of those prefixes are present at the
- beginning of the string, LOG_ERR is chosen.
-
- On Win32, the LOG_* levels are mapped according to this:
-
- LOG_EMERG, LOG_ALERT, LOG_CRIT, LOG_ERR => EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE
- LOG_WARNING => EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE
- LOG_NOTICE, LOG_INFO, LOG_DEBUG => EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE
-
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Made it possible to reconfigure with just the configuration
- argument "reconf" or "reconfigure". The command line arguments
- are stored in Makefile.ssl in the variable CONFIGURE_ARGS,
- and are retrieved from there when reconfiguring.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) MD4 implemented.
- [Assar Westerlund <assar at sics.se>, Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add the arguments -CAfile and -CApath to the pkcs12 utility.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) The obj_dat.pl script was messing up the sorting of object
- names. The reason was that it compared the quoted version
- of strings as a result "OCSP" > "OCSP Signing" because
- " > SPACE. Changed script to store unquoted versions of
- names and add quotes on output. It was also omitting some
- names from the lookup table if they were given a default
- value (that is if SN is missing it is given the same
- value as LN and vice versa), these are now added on the
- grounds that if an object has a name we should be able to
- look it up. Finally added warning output when duplicate
- short or long names are found.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Changes needed for Tandem NSK.
- [Scott Uroff <scott at xypro.com>]
-
- *) Fix SSL 2.0 rollback checking: Due to an off-by-one error in
- RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(), special padding was never detected
- and thus the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 countermeasure against protocol
- version rollback attacks was not effective.
-
- In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding
- (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the
- client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if
- SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Make it possible to get hexdumps of unprintable data with 'openssl
- asn1parse'. By implication, the functions ASN1_parse_dump() and
- BIO_dump_indent() are added.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) New functions ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex()
- these print out strings and name structures based on various
- flags including RFC2253 support and proper handling of
- multibyte characters. Added options to the 'x509' utility
- to allow the various flags to be set.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Various fixes to use ASN1_TIME instead of ASN1_UTCTIME.
- Also change the functions X509_cmp_current_time() and
- X509_gmtime_adj() work with an ASN1_TIME structure,
- this will enable certificates using GeneralizedTime in validity
- dates to be checked.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make the NEG_PUBKEY_BUG code (which tolerates invalid
- negative public key encodings) on by default,
- NO_NEG_PUBKEY_BUG can be set to disable it.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() which acts on ASN1_OBJECT
- content octets. An i2c_ASN1_OBJECT is unnecessary because
- the encoding can be trivially obtained from the structure.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) crypto/err.c locking bugfix: Use write locks (CRYPTO_w_[un]lock),
- not read locks (CRYPTO_r_[un]lock).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) A first attempt at creating official support for shared
- libraries through configuration. I've kept it so the
- default is static libraries only, and the OpenSSL programs
- are always statically linked for now, but there are
- preparations for dynamic linking in place.
- This has been tested on Linux and Tru64.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
- Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
- Random Numbers.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
- DSA key.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New options to smime application. -inform and -outform
- allow alternative formats for the S/MIME message including
- PEM and DER. The -content option allows the content to be
- specified separately. This should allow things like Netscape
- form signing output easier to verify.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix the ASN1 encoding of tags using the 'long form'.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New ASN1 functions, i2c_* and c2i_* for INTEGER and BIT
- STRING types. These convert content octets to and from the
- underlying type. The actual tag and length octets are
- already assumed to have been read in and checked. These
- are needed because all other string types have virtually
- identical handling apart from the tag. By having versions
- of the ASN1 functions that just operate on content octets
- IMPLICIT tagging can be handled properly. It also allows
- the ASN1_ENUMERATED code to be cut down because ASN1_ENUMERATED
- and ASN1_INTEGER are identical apart from the tag.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change the handling of OID objects as follows:
-
- - New object identifiers are inserted in objects.txt, following
- the syntax given in objects.README.
- - objects.pl is used to process obj_mac.num and create a new
- obj_mac.h.
- - obj_dat.pl is used to create a new obj_dat.h, using the data in
- obj_mac.h.
-
- This is currently kind of a hack, and the perl code in objects.pl
- isn't very elegant, but it works as I intended. The simplest way
- to check that it worked correctly is to look in obj_dat.h and
- check the array nid_objs and make sure the objects haven't moved
- around (this is important!). Additions are OK, as well as
- consistent name changes.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add BSD-style MD5-based passwords to 'openssl passwd' (option '-1').
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Addition of the command line parameter '-rand file' to 'openssl req'.
- The given file adds to whatever has already been seeded into the
- random pool through the RANDFILE configuration file option or
- environment variable, or the default random state file.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) mkstack.pl now sorts each macro group into lexical order.
- Previously the output order depended on the order the files
- appeared in the directory, resulting in needless rewriting
- of safestack.h .
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Patches to make OpenSSL compile under Win32 again. Mostly
- work arounds for the VC++ problem that it treats func() as
- func(void). Also stripped out the parts of mkdef.pl that
- added extra typesafe functions: these no longer exist.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Reorganisation of the stack code. The macros are now all
- collected in safestack.h . Each macro is defined in terms of
- a "stack macro" of the form SKM_<name>(type, a, b). The
- DEBUG_SAFESTACK is now handled in terms of function casts,
- this has the advantage of retaining type safety without the
- use of additional functions. If DEBUG_SAFESTACK is not defined
- then the non typesafe macros are used instead. Also modified the
- mkstack.pl script to handle the new form. Needs testing to see
- if which (if any) compilers it chokes and maybe make DEBUG_SAFESTACK
- the default if no major problems. Similar behaviour for ASN1_SET_OF
- and PKCS12_STACK_OF.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) When some versions of IIS use the 'NET' form of private key the
- key derivation algorithm is different. Normally MD5(password) is
- used as a 128 bit RC4 key. In the modified case
- MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT") is used insted. Added some
- new functions i2d_RSA_NET(), d2i_RSA_NET() etc which are the same
- as the old Netscape_RSA functions except they have an additional
- 'sgckey' parameter which uses the modified algorithm. Also added
- an -sgckey command line option to the rsa utility. Thanks to
- Adrian Peck <bertie at ncipher.com> for posting details of the modified
- algorithm to openssl-dev.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) The evp_local.h macros were using 'c.##kname' which resulted in
- invalid expansion on some systems (SCO 5.0.5 for example).
- Corrected to 'c.kname'.
- [Phillip Porch <root at theporch.com>]
-
- *) New X509_get1_email() and X509_REQ_get1_email() functions that return
- a STACK of email addresses from a certificate or request, these look
- in the subject name and the subject alternative name extensions and
- omit any duplicate addresses.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Re-implement BN_mod_exp2_mont using independent (and larger) windows.
- This makes DSA verification about 2 % faster.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Increase maximum window size in BN_mod_exp_... to 6 bits instead of 5
- (meaning that now 2^5 values will be precomputed, which is only 4 KB
- plus overhead for 1024 bit moduli).
- This makes exponentiations about 0.5 % faster for 1024 bit
- exponents (as measured by "openssl speed rsa2048").
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Rename memory handling macros to avoid conflicts with other
- software:
- Malloc => OPENSSL_malloc
- Malloc_locked => OPENSSL_malloc_locked
- Realloc => OPENSSL_realloc
- Free => OPENSSL_free
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) New function BN_mod_exp_mont_word for small bases (roughly 15%
- faster than BN_mod_exp_mont, i.e. 7% for a full DH exchange).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) CygWin32 support.
- [John Jarvie <jjarvie at newsguy.com>]
-
- *) The type-safe stack code has been rejigged. It is now only compiled
- in when OpenSSL is configured with the DEBUG_SAFESTACK option and
- by default all type-specific stack functions are "#define"d back to
- standard stack functions. This results in more streamlined output
- but retains the type-safety checking possibilities of the original
- approach.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) The STACK code has been cleaned up, and certain type declarations
- that didn't make a lot of sense have been brought in line. This has
- also involved a cleanup of sorts in safestack.h to more correctly
- map type-safe stack functions onto their plain stack counterparts.
- This work has also resulted in a variety of "const"ifications of
- lots of the code, especially "_cmp" operations which should normally
- be prototyped with "const" parameters anyway.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) When generating bytes for the first time in md_rand.c, 'stir the pool'
- by seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes (with zero entropy count).
- (The PRNG state consists of two parts, the large pool 'state' and 'md',
- where all of 'md' is used each time the PRNG is used, but 'state'
- is used only indexed by a cyclic counter. As entropy may not be
- well distributed from the beginning, 'md' is important as a
- chaining variable. However, the output function chains only half
- of 'md', i.e. 80 bits. ssleay_rand_add, on the other hand, chains
- all of 'md', and seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes will result
- in all of 'state' being rewritten, with the new values depending
- on virtually all of 'md'. This overcomes the 80 bit limitation.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) In ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s3_clnt.c, call ERR_clear_error() when
- the handshake is continued after ssl_verify_cert_chain();
- otherwise, if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is set, remaining error codes
- can lead to 'unexplainable' connection aborts later.
- [Bodo Moeller; problem tracked down by Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Major EVP API cipher revision.
- Add hooks for extra EVP features. This allows various cipher
- parameters to be set in the EVP interface. Support added for variable
- key length ciphers via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function and
- setting of RC2 and RC5 parameters.
-
- Modify EVP_OpenInit() and EVP_SealInit() to cope with variable key length
- ciphers.
-
- Remove lots of duplicated code from the EVP library. For example *every*
- cipher init() function handles the 'iv' in the same way according to the
- cipher mode. They also all do nothing if the 'key' parameter is NULL and
- for CFB and OFB modes they zero ctx->num.
-
- New functionality allows removal of S/MIME code RC2 hack.
-
- Most of the routines have the same form and so can be declared in terms
- of macros.
-
- By shifting this to the top level EVP_CipherInit() it can be removed from
- all individual ciphers. If the cipher wants to handle IVs or keys
- differently it can set the EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV or EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT
- flags.
-
- Change lots of functions like EVP_EncryptUpdate() to now return a
- value: although software versions of the algorithms cannot fail
- any installed hardware versions can.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Implement SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG: In ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, if
- this option is set, tolerate broken clients that send the negotiated
- protocol version number instead of the requested protocol version
- number.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Call dh_tmp_cb (set by ..._TMP_DH_CB) with correct 'is_export' flag;
- i.e. non-zero for export ciphersuites, zero otherwise.
- Previous versions had this flag inverted, inconsistent with
- rsa_tmp_cb (..._TMP_RSA_CB).
- [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Amit Chopra]
-
- *) Add missing DSA library text string. Work around for some IIS
- key files with invalid SEQUENCE encoding.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a document (doc/standards.txt) that list all kinds of standards
- and so on that are implemented in OpenSSL.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Enhance c_rehash script. Old version would mishandle certificates
- with the same subject name hash and wouldn't handle CRLs at all.
- Added -fingerprint option to crl utility, to support new c_rehash
- features.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
- rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
- but no ssl client purpose.
- [Steve Henson, reported by Rene Grosser <grosser at hisolutions.com>]
-
- *) Make PKCS#12 code work with no password. The PKCS#12 spec
- is a little unclear about how a blank password is handled.
- Since the password in encoded as a BMPString with terminating
- double NULL a zero length password would end up as just the
- double NULL. However no password at all is different and is
- handled differently in the PKCS#12 key generation code. NS
- treats a blank password as zero length. MSIE treats it as no
- password on export: but it will try both on import. We now do
- the same: PKCS12_parse() tries zero length and no password if
- the password is set to "" or NULL (NULL is now a valid password:
- it wasn't before) as does the pkcs12 application.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Bugfixes in apps/x509.c: Avoid a memory leak; and don't use
- perror when PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ fails, the error message must
- be obtained from the error queue.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Avoid 'thread_hash' memory leak in crypto/err/err.c by freeing
- it in ERR_remove_state if appropriate, and change ERR_get_state
- accordingly to avoid race conditions (this is necessary because
- thread_hash is no longer constant once set).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
- RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
- Previously this was only set during a call to RSA_new()
- or RSA_new_method(NULL) meaning it was possible for
- RSA_get_default_method() to return NULL.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) Added native name translation to the existing DSO code
- that will convert (if the flag to do so is set) filenames
- that are sufficiently small and have no path information
- into a canonical native form. Eg. "blah" converted to
- "libblah.so" or "blah.dll" etc.
- [Geoff Thorpe]
-
- *) New function ERR_error_string_n(e, buf, len) which is like
- ERR_error_string(e, buf), but writes at most 'len' bytes
- including the 0 terminator. For ERR_error_string_n, 'buf'
- may not be NULL.
- [Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) CONF library reworked to become more general. A new CONF
- configuration file reader "class" is implemented as well as a
- new functions (NCONF_*, for "New CONF") to handle it. The now
- old CONF_* functions are still there, but are reimplemented to
- work in terms of the new functions. Also, a set of functions
- to handle the internal storage of the configuration data is
- provided to make it easier to write new configuration file
- reader "classes" (I can definitely see something reading a
- configuration file in XML format, for example), called _CONF_*,
- or "the configuration storage API"...
-
- The new configuration file reading functions are:
-
- NCONF_new, NCONF_free, NCONF_load, NCONF_load_fp, NCONF_load_bio,
- NCONF_get_section, NCONF_get_string, NCONF_get_numbre
-
- NCONF_default, NCONF_WIN32
-
- NCONF_dump_fp, NCONF_dump_bio
-
- NCONF_default and NCONF_WIN32 are method (or "class") choosers,
- NCONF_new creates a new CONF object. This works in the same way
- as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface.
- NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file,
- which is useful for debugging. All other functions take the same
- arguments as the old CONF_* functions wth the exception of the
- first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'.
-
- To make it easer to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions,
- the function CONF_set_default_method is provided.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add '-tls1' option to 'openssl ciphers', which was already
- mentioned in the documentation but had not been implemented.
- (This option is not yet really useful because even the additional
- experimental TLS 1.0 ciphers are currently treated as SSL 3.0 ciphers.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Initial DSO code added into libcrypto for letting OpenSSL (and
- OpenSSL-based applications) load shared libraries and bind to
- them in a portable way.
- [Geoff Thorpe, with contributions from Richard Levitte]
-
- Changes between 0.9.5 and 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]
-
- *) Make sure _lrotl and _lrotr are only used with MSVC.
-
- *) Use lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND correctly in ssleay_rand_status
- (the default implementation of RAND_status).
-
- *) Rename openssl x509 option '-crlext', which was added in 0.9.5,
- to '-clrext' (= clear extensions), as intended and documented.
- [Bodo Moeller; inconsistency pointed out by Michael Attili
- <attili at amaxo.com>]
-
- *) Fix for HMAC. It wasn't zeroing the rest of the block if the key length
- was larger than the MD block size.
- [Steve Henson, pointed out by Yost William <YostW at tce.com>]
-
- *) Modernise PKCS12_parse() so it uses STACK_OF(X509) for its ca argument
- fix a leak when the ca argument was passed as NULL. Stop X509_PUBKEY_set()
- using the passed key: if the passed key was a private key the result
- of X509_print(), for example, would be to print out all the private key
- components.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
- the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow at DEMENTIA.ORG>]
-
- *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
- discouraged.
- [Steve Henson, pointed out by Brian Korver <briank at cs.stanford.edu>]
-
- *) For easily testing in shell scripts whether some command
- 'openssl XXX' exists, the new pseudo-command 'openssl no-XXX'
- returns with exit code 0 iff no command of the given name is available.
- 'no-XXX' is printed in this case, 'XXX' otherwise. In both cases,
- the output goes to stdout and nothing is printed to stderr.
- Additional arguments are always ignored.
-
- Since for each cipher there is a command of the same name,
- the 'no-cipher' compilation switches can be tested this way.
-
- ('openssl no-XXX' is not able to detect pseudo-commands such
- as 'quit', 'list-XXX-commands', or 'no-XXX' itself.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Update test suite so that 'make test' succeeds in 'no-rsa' configuration.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) For SSL_[CTX_]set_tmp_dh, don't create a DH key if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
- is set; it will be thrown away anyway because each handshake creates
- its own key.
- ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition
- to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the
- 'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meanining
- you effectivly got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and
- 'Q' and 'R' lose their special meanings (quit/renegotiate).
- This is part of what -quiet does; unlike -quiet, -ign_eof
- does not suppress any output.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add compatibility options to the purpose and trust code. The
- purpose X509_PURPOSE_ANY is "any purpose" which automatically
- accepts a certificate or CA, this was the previous behaviour,
- with all the associated security issues.
-
- X509_TRUST_COMPAT is the old trust behaviour: only and
- automatically trust self signed roots in certificate store. A
- new trust setting X509_TRUST_DEFAULT is used to specify that
- a purpose has no associated trust setting and it should instead
- use the value in the default purpose.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix the PKCS#8 DSA private key code so it decodes keys again
- and fix a memory leak.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In util/mkerr.pl (which implements 'make errors'), preserve
- reason strings from the previous version of the .c file, as
- the default to have only downcase letters (and digits) in
- automatically generated reasons codes is not always appropriate.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) In ERR_load_ERR_strings(), build an ERR_LIB_SYS error reason table
- using strerror. Previously, ERR_reason_error_string() returned
- library names as reason strings for SYSerr; but SYSerr is a special
- case where small numbers are errno values, not library numbers.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add '-dsaparam' option to 'openssl dhparam' application. This
- converts DSA parameters into DH parameters. (When creating parameters,
- DSA_generate_parameters is used.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Include 'length' (recommended exponent length) in C code generated
- by 'openssl dhparam -C'.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) The second argument to set_label in perlasm was already being used
- so couldn't be used as a "file scope" flag. Moved to third argument
- which was free.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In PEM_ASN1_write_bio and some other functions, use RAND_pseudo_bytes
- instead of RAND_bytes for encryption IVs and salts.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Include RAND_status() into RAND_METHOD instead of implementing
- it only for md_rand.c Otherwise replacing the PRNG by calling
- RAND_set_rand_method would be impossible.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Don't let DSA_generate_key() enter an infinite loop if the random
- number generation fails.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New 'rand' application for creating pseudo-random output.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Added configuration support for Linux/IA64
- [Rolf Haberrecker <rolf at suse.de>]
-
- *) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
- [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke at aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
-
- *) Shared library support for Solaris gcc.
- [Lutz Behnke <behnke at trustcenter.de>]
-
- Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5 [28 Feb 2000]
-
- *) PKCS7_encrypt() was adding text MIME headers twice because they
- were added manually and by SMIME_crlf_copy().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) In bntest.c don't call BN_rand with zero bits argument.
- [Steve Henson, pointed out by Andrew W. Gray <agray at iconsinc.com>]
-
- *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
- case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
- assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
- to 1 it signals that the assembler should use a symbol whose
- scope is the entire file, not just the current function. This
- is needed with MASM which uses the format label:: for this scope.
- [Steve Henson, pointed out by Peter Runestig <peter at runestig.com>]
-
- *) Change the ASN1 types so they are typedefs by default. Before
- almost all types were #define'd to ASN1_STRING which was causing
- STACK_OF() problems: you couldn't declare STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING)
- for example.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change names of new functions to the new get1/get0 naming
- convention: After 'get1', the caller owns a reference count
- and has to call ..._free; 'get0' returns a pointer to some
- data structure without incrementing reference counters.
- (Some of the existing 'get' functions increment a reference
- counter, some don't.)
- Similarly, 'set1' and 'add1' functions increase reference
- counters or duplicate objects.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Allow for the possibility of temp RSA key generation failure:
- the code used to assume it always worked and crashed on failure.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
- [Ulf M\xF6ller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
- pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33 at cornell.edu>]
-
- *) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>. New functions
- RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application,
- the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
- or -rand.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
- Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Remove the SSL_ALLOW_ADH compile option and set the default cipher
- list to exclude them. This means that no special compilation option
- is needed to use anonymous DH: it just needs to be included in the
- cipher list.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change the EVP_MD_CTX_type macro so its meaning consistent with
- EVP_MD_type. The old functionality is available in a new macro called
- EVP_MD_md(). Change code that uses it and update docs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) ..._ctrl functions now have corresponding ..._callback_ctrl functions
- where the 'void *' argument is replaced by a function pointer argument.
- Previously 'void *' was abused to point to functions, which works on
- many platforms, but is not correct. As these functions are usually
- called by macros defined in OpenSSL header files, most source code
- should work without changes.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) <openssl/opensslconf.h> (which is created by Configure) now contains
- sections with information on -D... compiler switches used for
- compiling the library so that applications can see them. To enable
- one of these sections, a pre-processor symbol OPENSSL_..._DEFINES
- must be defined. E.g.,
- #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
- #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
- defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
- [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
- record layer.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change the 'other' type in certificate aux info to a STACK_OF
- X509_ALGOR. Although not an AlgorithmIdentifier as such it has
- the required ASN1 format: arbitrary types determined by an OID.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add some PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW() functions and a command line
- argument to 'req'. This is not because the function is newer or
- better than others it just uses the work 'NEW' in the certificate
- request header lines. Some software needs this.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Reorganise password command line arguments: now passwords can be
- obtained from various sources. Delete the PEM_cb function and make
- it the default behaviour: i.e. if the callback is NULL and the
- usrdata argument is not NULL interpret it as a null terminated pass
- phrase. If usrdata and the callback are NULL then the pass phrase
- is prompted for as usual.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for the Compaq Atalla crypto accelerator. If it is installed,
- the support is automatically enabled. The resulting binaries will
- autodetect the card and use it if present.
- [Ben Laurie and Compaq Inc.]
-
- *) Work around for Netscape hang bug. This sends certificate request
- and server done in one record. Since this is perfectly legal in the
- SSL/TLS protocol it isn't a "bug" option and is on by default. See
- the bugs/SSLv3 entry for more info.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) HP-UX tune-up: new unified configs, HP C compiler bug workaround.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Add -rand argument to smime and pkcs12 applications and read/write
- of seed file.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New 'passwd' tool for crypt(3) and apr1 password hashes.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add command line password options to the remaining applications.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
- bits.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
- equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
- options to produce them.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
- get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
- for p == 0.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
- include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
- was that statically linked binaries could for example just call
- SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() to just add ciphers to the table and not
- link with digests. This never worked becayse SSLeay_add_all_digests()
- and SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() were in the same source file so calling
- one would link with the other. They are now in separate source files.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a new -notext option to 'ca' and a -pubkey option to 'spkac'.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Use a less unusual form of the Miller-Rabin primality test (it used
- a binary algorithm for exponentiation integrated into the Miller-Rabin
- loop, our standard modexp algorithms are faster).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Support for the EBCDIC character set completed.
- [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at Mch.SNI.De>]
-
- *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
- use void * instead of char * in lhash.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
- (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
- this the server could overwrite ephemeral keys that the client
- has already seen).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Turn DSA_is_prime into a macro that calls BN_is_prime,
- using 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test.
-
- DSA_generate_parameters now uses BN_is_prime_fasttest (with 50
- iterations of the Rabin-Miller test as required by the appendix
- to FIPS PUB 186[-1]) instead of DSA_is_prime.
- As BN_is_prime_fasttest includes trial division, DSA parameter
- generation becomes much faster.
-
- This implies a change for the callback functions in DSA_is_prime
- and DSA_generate_parameters: The callback function is called once
- for each positive witness in the Rabin-Miller test, not just
- occasionally in the inner loop; and the parameters to the
- callback function now provide an iteration count for the outer
- loop rather than for the current invocation of the inner loop.
- DSA_generate_parameters additionally can call the callback
- function with an 'iteration count' of -1, meaning that a
- candidate has passed the trial division test (when q is generated
- from an application-provided seed, trial division is skipped).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New function BN_is_prime_fasttest that optionally does trial
- division before starting the Rabin-Miller test and has
- an additional BN_CTX * argument (whereas BN_is_prime always
- has to allocate at least one BN_CTX).
- 'callback(1, -1, cb_arg)' is called when a number has passed the
- trial division stage.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix for bug in CRL encoding. The validity dates weren't being handled
- as ASN1_TIME.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New -pkcs12 option to CA.pl script to write out a PKCS#12 file.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
- bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
- SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
- the comments.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
- made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
- SSL2 clients in multiple threads.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
- by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
- to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
- [Ulf M\xF6ller, Bodo M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
- used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
- BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
- BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
- Rabin-Miller iterations.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
- DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
- (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
- "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
- (instead of parameters) in future.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make the ciphers, s_server and s_client programs check the return values
- when a new cipher list is set.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Enhance the SSL/TLS cipher mechanism to correctly handle the TLS 56bit
- ciphers. Before when the 56bit ciphers were enabled the sorting was
- wrong.
-
- The syntax for the cipher sorting has been extended to support sorting by
- cipher-strength (using the strength_bits hard coded in the tables).
- The new command is "@STRENGTH" (see also doc/apps/ciphers.pod).
-
- Fix a bug in the cipher-command parser: when supplying a cipher command
- string with an "undefined" symbol (neither command nor alphanumeric
- [A-Za-z0-9], ssl_set_cipher_list used to hang in an endless loop. Now
- an error is flagged.
-
- Due to the strength-sorting extension, the code of the
- ssl_create_cipher_list() function was completely rearranged. I hope that
- the readability was also increased :-)
- [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke at aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>]
-
- *) Minor change to 'x509' utility. The -CAcreateserial option now uses 1
- for the first serial number and places 2 in the serial number file. This
- avoids problems when the root CA is created with serial number zero and
- the first user certificate has the same issuer name and serial number
- as the root CA.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities, change the 'req' program so it uses
- the new code. Add documentation for this stuff.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities. These have been renamed from
- X509_*() to X509at_*() on the grounds that they don't handle X509
- structures and behave in an analagous way to the X509v3 functions:
- they shouldn't be called directly but wrapper functions should be used
- instead.
-
- So we also now have some wrapper functions that call the X509at functions
- when passed certificate requests. (TO DO: similar things can be done with
- PKCS#7 signed and unsigned attributes, PKCS#12 attributes and a few other
- things. Some of these need some d2i or i2d and print functionality
- because they handle more complex structures.)
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
- as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
- NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c.
- [Kris Kennaway <kris at hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
- has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
- (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). Also an error is recorded on the thread's
- error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is
- guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
- RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
- (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
- 3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
- instead of only 2 for all lengths; see BN_prime_checks_for_size definition
- in crypto/bn/bn_prime.c for the complete table). This guarantees a
- false-positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Rewrite ssl3_read_n (ssl/s3_pkt.c) avoiding a couple of bugs.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New function X509_CTX_rget_chain() (renamed to X509_CTX_get1_chain
- in the 0.9.5 release), this returns the chain
- from an X509_CTX structure with a dup of the stack and all
- the X509 reference counts upped: so the stack will exist
- after X509_CTX_cleanup() has been called. Modify pkcs12.c
- to use this.
-
- Also make SSL_SESSION_print() print out the verify return
- code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add manpage for the pkcs12 command. Also change the default
- behaviour so MAC iteration counts are used unless the new
- -nomaciter option is used. This improves file security and
- only older versions of MSIE (4.0 for example) need it.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword,
- unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
- draft PKCS#9 v2.0 but are compatible with v1.2 provided no
- international characters are used.
-
- More changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE code: allow the setting of types
- based on strings. Remove the 'loc' parameter when adding
- attributes because these will be a SET OF encoding which is sorted
- in ASN1 order.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial changes to the 'req' utility to allow request generation
- automation. This will allow an application to just generate a template
- file containing all the field values and have req construct the
- request.
-
- Initial support for X509_ATTRIBUTE handling. Stacks of these are
- used all over the place including certificate requests and PKCS#7
- structures. They are currently handled manually where necessary with
- some primitive wrappers for PKCS#7. The new functions behave in a
- manner analogous to the X509 extension functions: they allow
- attributes to be looked up by NID and added.
-
- Later something similar to the X509V3 code would be desirable to
- automatically handle the encoding, decoding and printing of the
- more complex types. The string types like challengePassword can
- be handled by the string table functions.
-
- Also modified the multi byte string table handling. Now there is
- a 'global mask' which masks out certain types. The table itself
- can use the flag STABLE_NO_MASK to ignore the mask setting: this
- is useful when for example there is only one permissible type
- (as in countryName) and using the mask might result in no valid
- types at all.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Clean up 'Finished' handling, and add functions SSL_get_finished and
- SSL_get_peer_finished to allow applications to obtain the latest
- Finished messages sent to the peer or expected from the peer,
- respectively. (SSL_get_peer_finished is usually the Finished message
- actually received from the peer, otherwise the protocol will be aborted.)
-
- As the Finished message are message digests of the complete handshake
- (with a total of 192 bits for TLS 1.0 and more for SSL 3.0), they can
- be used for external authentication procedures when the authentication
- provided by SSL/TLS is not desired or is not enough.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Enhanced support for Alpha Linux is added. Now ./config checks if
- the host supports BWX extension and if Compaq C is present on the
- $PATH. Just exploiting of the BWX extension results in 20-30%
- performance kick for some algorithms, e.g. DES and RC4 to mention
- a couple. Compaq C in turn generates ~20% faster code for MD5 and
- SHA1.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Add support for MS "fast SGC". This is arguably a violation of the
- SSL3/TLS protocol. Netscape SGC does two handshakes: the first with
- weak crypto and after checking the certificate is SGC a second one
- with strong crypto. MS SGC stops the first handshake after receiving
- the server certificate message and sends a second client hello. Since
- a server will typically do all the time consuming operations before
- expecting any further messages from the client (server key exchange
- is the most expensive) there is little difference between the two.
-
- To get OpenSSL to support MS SGC we have to permit a second client
- hello message after we have sent server done. In addition we have to
- reset the MAC if we do get this second client hello.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a function 'd2i_AutoPrivateKey()' this will automatically decide
- if a DER encoded private key is RSA or DSA traditional format. Changed
- d2i_PrivateKey_bio() to use it. This is only needed for the "traditional"
- format DER encoded private key. Newer code should use PKCS#8 format which
- has the key type encoded in the ASN1 structure. Added DER private key
- support to pkcs8 application.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) SSL 3/TLS 1 servers now don't request certificates when an anonymous
- ciphersuites has been selected (as required by the SSL 3/TLS 1
- specifications). Exception: When SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
- is set, we interpret this as a request to violate the specification
- (the worst that can happen is a handshake failure, and 'correct'
- behaviour would result in a handshake failure anyway).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) In SSL_CTX_add_session, take into account that there might be multiple
- SSL_SESSION structures with the same session ID (e.g. when two threads
- concurrently obtain them from an external cache).
- The internal cache can handle only one SSL_SESSION with a given ID,
- so if there's a conflict, we now throw out the old one to achieve
- consistency.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add OIDs for idea and blowfish in CBC mode. This will allow both
- to be used in PKCS#5 v2.0 and S/MIME. Also add checking to
- some routines that use cipher OIDs: some ciphers do not have OIDs
- defined and so they cannot be used for S/MIME and PKCS#5 v2.0 for
- example.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Simplify the trust setting structure and code. Now we just have
- two sequences of OIDs for trusted and rejected settings. These will
- typically have values the same as the extended key usage extension
- and any application specific purposes.
-
- The trust checking code now has a default behaviour: it will just
- check for an object with the same NID as the passed id. Functions can
- be provided to override either the default behaviour or the behaviour
- for a given id. SSL client, server and email already have functions
- in place for compatibility: they check the NID and also return "trusted"
- if the certificate is self signed.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add d2i,i2d bio/fp functions for PrivateKey: these convert the
- traditional format into an EVP_PKEY structure.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a password callback function PEM_cb() which either prompts for
- a password if usr_data is NULL or otherwise assumes it is a null
- terminated password. Allow passwords to be passed on command line
- environment or config files in a few more utilities.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a bunch of DER and PEM functions to handle PKCS#8 format private
- keys. Add some short names for PKCS#8 PBE algorithms and allow them
- to be specified on the command line for the pkcs8 and pkcs12 utilities.
- Update documentation.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for ASN1 "NULL" type. This could be handled before by using
- ASN1_TYPE but there wasn't any function that would try to read a NULL
- and produce an error if it couldn't. For compatibility we also have
- ASN1_NULL_new() and ASN1_NULL_free() functions but these are faked and
- don't allocate anything because they don't need to.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial support for MacOS is now provided. Examine INSTALL.MacOS
- for details.
- [Andy Polyakov, Roy Woods <roy at centicsystems.ca>]
-
- *) Rebuild of the memory allocation routines used by OpenSSL code and
- possibly others as well. The purpose is to make an interface that
- provide hooks so anyone can build a separate set of allocation and
- deallocation routines to be used by OpenSSL, for example memory
- pool implementations, or something else, which was previously hard
- since Malloc(), Realloc() and Free() were defined as macros having
- the values malloc, realloc and free, respectively (except for Win32
- compilations). The same is provided for memory debugging code.
- OpenSSL already comes with functionality to find memory leaks, but
- this gives people a chance to debug other memory problems.
-
- With these changes, a new set of functions and macros have appeared:
-
- CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() [F]
- CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions() [F]
- CRYPTO_dbg_set_options() [F]
- CRYPTO_dbg_get_options() [F]
- CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() [M]
-
- The memory debug functions are NULL by default, unless the library
- is compiled with CRYPTO_MDEBUG or friends is defined. If someone
- wants to debug memory anyway, CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() (which
- gives the standard debugging functions that come with OpenSSL) or
- CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() (tells OpenSSL to use functions
- provided by the library user) must be used. When the standard
- debugging functions are used, CRYPTO_dbg_set_options can be used to
- request additional information:
- CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CYRPTO_MDEBUG_xxx) corresponds to setting
- the CRYPTO_MDEBUG_xxx macro when compiling the library.
-
- Also, things like CRYPTO_set_mem_functions will always give the
- expected result (the new set of functions is used for allocation
- and deallocation) at all times, regardless of platform and compiler
- options.
-
- To finish it up, some functions that were never use in any other
- way than through macros have a new API and new semantic:
-
- CRYPTO_dbg_malloc()
- CRYPTO_dbg_realloc()
- CRYPTO_dbg_free()
-
- All macros of value have retained their old syntax.
- [Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Some S/MIME fixes. The OID for SMIMECapabilities was wrong, the
- ordering of SMIMECapabilities wasn't in "strength order" and there
- was a missing NULL in the AlgorithmIdentifier for the SHA1 signature
- algorithm.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Some ASN1 types with illegal zero length encoding (INTEGER,
- ENUMERATED and OBJECT IDENTIFIER) choked the ASN1 routines.
- [Frans Heymans <fheymans at isaserver.be>, modified by Steve Henson]
-
- *) Merge in my S/MIME library for OpenSSL. This provides a simple
- S/MIME API on top of the PKCS#7 code, a MIME parser (with enough
- functionality to handle multipart/signed properly) and a utility
- called 'smime' to call all this stuff. This is based on code I
- originally wrote for Celo who have kindly allowed it to be
- included in OpenSSL.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add variants des_set_key_checked and des_set_key_unchecked of
- des_set_key (aka des_key_sched). Global variable des_check_key
- decides which of these is called by des_set_key; this way
- des_check_key behaves as it always did, but applications and
- the library itself, which was buggy for des_check_key == 1,
- have a cleaner way to pick the version they need.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New function PKCS12_newpass() which changes the password of a
- PKCS12 structure.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify X509_TRUST and X509_PURPOSE so it also uses a static and
- dynamic mix. In both cases the ids can be used as an index into the
- table. Also modified the X509_TRUST_add() and X509_PURPOSE_add()
- functions so they accept a list of the field values and the
- application doesn't need to directly manipulate the X509_TRUST
- structure.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify the ASN1_STRING_TABLE stuff so it also uses bsearch and doesn't
- need initialising.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify the way the V3 extension code looks up extensions. This now
- works in a similar way to the object code: we have some "standard"
- extensions in a static table which is searched with OBJ_bsearch()
- and the application can add dynamic ones if needed. The file
- crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h now has the info: this file needs to be
- updated whenever a new extension is added to the core code and kept
- in ext_nid order. There is a simple program 'tabtest.c' which checks
- this. New extensions are not added too often so this file can readily
- be maintained manually.
-
- There are two big advantages in doing things this way. The extensions
- can be looked up immediately and no longer need to be "added" using
- X509V3_add_standard_extensions(): this function now does nothing.
- [Side note: I get *lots* of email saying the extension code doesn't
- work because people forget to call this function]
- Also no dynamic allocation is done unless new extensions are added:
- so if we don't add custom extensions there is no need to call
- X509V3_EXT_cleanup().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify enc utility's salting as follows: make salting the default. Add a
- magic header, so unsalted files fail gracefully instead of just decrypting
- to garbage. This is because not salting is a big security hole, so people
- should be discouraged from doing it.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Fixes and enhancements to the 'x509' utility. It allowed a message
- digest to be passed on the command line but it only used this
- parameter when signing a certificate. Modified so all relevant
- operations are affected by the digest parameter including the
- -fingerprint and -x509toreq options. Also -x509toreq choked if a
- DSA key was used because it didn't fix the digest.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial certificate chain verify code. Currently tests the untrusted
- certificates for consistency with the verify purpose (which is set
- when the X509_STORE_CTX structure is set up) and checks the pathlength.
-
- There is a NO_CHAIN_VERIFY compilation option to keep the old behaviour:
- this is because it will reject chains with invalid extensions whereas
- every previous version of OpenSSL and SSLeay made no checks at all.
-
- Trust code: checks the root CA for the relevant trust settings. Trust
- settings have an initial value consistent with the verify purpose: e.g.
- if the verify purpose is for SSL client use it expects the CA to be
- trusted for SSL client use. However the default value can be changed to
- permit custom trust settings: one example of this would be to only trust
- certificates from a specific "secure" set of CAs.
-
- Also added X509_STORE_CTX_new() and X509_STORE_CTX_free() functions
- which should be used for version portability: especially since the
- verify structure is likely to change more often now.
-
- SSL integration. Add purpose and trust to SSL_CTX and SSL and functions
- to set them. If not set then assume SSL clients will verify SSL servers
- and vice versa.
-
- Two new options to the verify program: -untrusted allows a set of
- untrusted certificates to be passed in and -purpose which sets the
- intended purpose of the certificate. If a purpose is set then the
- new chain verify code is used to check extension consistency.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for the authority information access extension.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify RSA and DSA PEM read routines to transparently handle
- PKCS#8 format private keys. New *_PUBKEY_* functions that handle
- public keys in a format compatible with certificate
- SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures. Unfortunately there were already
- functions called *_PublicKey_* which used various odd formats so
- these are retained for compatibility: however the DSA variants were
- never in a public release so they have been deleted. Changed dsa/rsa
- utilities to handle the new format: note no releases ever handled public
- keys so we should be OK.
-
- The primary motivation for this change is to avoid the same fiasco
- that dogs private keys: there are several incompatible private key
- formats some of which are standard and some OpenSSL specific and
- require various evil hacks to allow partial transparent handling and
- even then it doesn't work with DER formats. Given the option anything
- other than PKCS#8 should be dumped: but the other formats have to
- stay in the name of compatibility.
-
- With public keys and the benefit of hindsight one standard format
- is used which works with EVP_PKEY, RSA or DSA structures: though
- it clearly returns an error if you try to read the wrong kind of key.
-
- Added a -pubkey option to the 'x509' utility to output the public key.
- Also rename the EVP_PKEY_get_*() to EVP_PKEY_rget_*()
- (renamed to EVP_PKEY_get1_*() in the OpenSSL 0.9.5 release) and add
- EVP_PKEY_rset_*() functions (renamed to EVP_PKEY_set1_*())
- that do the same as the EVP_PKEY_assign_*() except they up the
- reference count of the added key (they don't "swallow" the
- supplied key).
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixes to crypto/x509/by_file.c the code to read in certificates and
- CRLs would fail if the file contained no certificates or no CRLs:
- added a new function to read in both types and return the number
- read: this means that if none are read it will be an error. The
- DER versions of the certificate and CRL reader would always fail
- because it isn't possible to mix certificates and CRLs in DER format
- without choking one or the other routine. Changed this to just read
- a certificate: this is the best we can do. Also modified the code
- in apps/verify.c to take notice of return codes: it was previously
- attempting to read in certificates from NULL pointers and ignoring
- any errors: this is one reason why the cert and CRL reader seemed
- to work. It doesn't check return codes from the default certificate
- routines: these may well fail if the certificates aren't installed.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Code to support otherName option in GeneralName.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) First update to verify code. Change the verify utility
- so it warns if it is passed a self signed certificate:
- for consistency with the normal behaviour. X509_verify
- has been modified to it will now verify a self signed
- certificate if *exactly* the same certificate appears
- in the store: it was previously impossible to trust a
- single self signed certificate. This means that:
- openssl verify ss.pem
- now gives a warning about a self signed certificate but
- openssl verify -CAfile ss.pem ss.pem
- is OK.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) For servers, store verify_result in SSL_SESSION data structure
- (and add it to external session representation).
- This is needed when client certificate verifications fails,
- but an application-provided verification callback (set by
- SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback) allows accepting the session
- anyway (i.e. leaves x509_store_ctx->error != X509_V_OK
- but returns 1): When the session is reused, we have to set
- ssl->verify_result to the appropriate error code to avoid
- security holes.
- [Bodo Moeller, problem pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke]
-
- *) Fix a bug in the new PKCS#7 code: it didn't consider the
- case in PKCS7_dataInit() where the signed PKCS7 structure
- didn't contain any existing data because it was being created.
- [Po-Cheng Chen <pocheng at nst.com.tw>, slightly modified by Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a salt to the key derivation routines in enc.c. This
- forms the first 8 bytes of the encrypted file. Also add a
- -S option to allow a salt to be input on the command line.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function X509_cmp(). Oddly enough there wasn't a function
- to compare two certificates. We do this by working out the SHA1
- hash and comparing that. X509_cmp() will be needed by the trust
- code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) SSL_get1_session() is like SSL_get_session(), but increments
- the reference count in the SSL_SESSION returned.
- [Geoff Thorpe <geoff at eu.c2.net>]
-
- *) Fix for 'req': it was adding a null to request attributes.
- Also change the X509_LOOKUP and X509_INFO code to handle
- certificate auxiliary information.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for 40 and 64 bit RC2 and RC4 algorithms: document
- the 'enc' command.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add the possibility to add extra information to the memory leak
- detecting output, to form tracebacks, showing from where each
- allocation was originated: CRYPTO_push_info("constant string") adds
- the string plus current file name and line number to a per-thread
- stack, CRYPTO_pop_info() does the obvious, CRYPTO_remove_all_info()
- is like calling CYRPTO_pop_info() until the stack is empty.
- Also updated memory leak detection code to be multi-thread-safe.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
- *) Add options -text and -noout to pkcs7 utility and delete the
- encryption options which never did anything. Update docs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add options to some of the utilities to allow the pass phrase
- to be included on either the command line (not recommended on
- OSes like Unix) or read from the environment. Update the
- manpages and fix a few bugs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a few manpages for some of the openssl commands.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix the -revoke option in ca. It was freeing up memory twice,
- leaking and not finding already revoked certificates.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Extensive changes to support certificate auxiliary information.
- This involves the use of X509_CERT_AUX structure and X509_AUX
- functions. An X509_AUX function such as PEM_read_X509_AUX()
- can still read in a certificate file in the usual way but it
- will also read in any additional "auxiliary information". By
- doing things this way a fair degree of compatibility can be
- retained: existing certificates can have this information added
- using the new 'x509' options.
-
- Current auxiliary information includes an "alias" and some trust
- settings. The trust settings will ultimately be used in enhanced
- certificate chain verification routines: currently a certificate
- can only be trusted if it is self signed and then it is trusted
- for all purposes.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix assembler for Alpha (tested only on DEC OSF not Linux or *BSD).
- The problem was that one of the replacement routines had not been working
- since SSLeay releases. For now the offending routine has been replaced
- with non-optimised assembler. Even so, this now gives around 95%
- performance improvement for 1024 bit RSA signs.
- [Mark Cox]
-
- *) Hack to fix PKCS#7 decryption when used with some unorthodox RC2
- handling. Most clients have the effective key size in bits equal to
- the key length in bits: so a 40 bit RC2 key uses a 40 bit (5 byte) key.
- A few however don't do this and instead use the size of the decrypted key
- to determine the RC2 key length and the AlgorithmIdentifier to determine
- the effective key length. In this case the effective key length can still
- be 40 bits but the key length can be 168 bits for example. This is fixed
- by manually forcing an RC2 key into the EVP_PKEY structure because the
- EVP code can't currently handle unusual RC2 key sizes: it always assumes
- the key length and effective key length are equal.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a bunch of functions that should simplify the creation of
- X509_NAME structures. Now you should be able to do:
- X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Steve", -1, -1, 0);
- and have it automatically work out the correct field type and fill in
- the structures. The more adventurous can try:
- X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, field, MBSTRING_UTF8, str, -1, -1, 0);
- and it will (hopefully) work out the correct multibyte encoding.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change the 'req' utility to use the new field handling and multibyte
- copy routines. Before the DN field creation was handled in an ad hoc
- way in req, ca, and x509 which was rather broken and didn't support
- BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. Since some software doesn't implement
- BMPStrings or UTF8Strings yet, they can be enabled using the config file
- using the dirstring_type option. See the new comment in the default
- openssl.cnf for more info.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make crypto/rand/md_rand.c more robust:
- - Assure unique random numbers after fork().
- - Make sure that concurrent threads access the global counter and
- md serializably so that we never lose entropy in them
- or use exactly the same state in multiple threads.
- Access to the large state is not always serializable because
- the additional locking could be a performance killer, and
- md should be large enough anyway.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New file apps/app_rand.c with commonly needed functionality
- for handling the random seed file.
-
- Use the random seed file in some applications that previously did not:
- ca,
- dsaparam -genkey (which also ignored its '-rand' option),
- s_client,
- s_server,
- x509 (when signing).
- Except on systems with /dev/urandom, it is crucial to have a random
- seed file at least for key creation, DSA signing, and for DH exchanges;
- for RSA signatures we could do without one.
-
- gendh and gendsa (unlike genrsa) used to read only the first byte
- of each file listed in the '-rand' option. The function as previously
- found in genrsa is now in app_rand.c and is used by all programs
- that support '-rand'.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) In RAND_write_file, use mode 0600 for creating files;
- don't just chmod when it may be too late.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Report an error from X509_STORE_load_locations
- when X509_LOOKUP_load_file or X509_LOOKUP_add_dir failed.
- [Bill Perry]
-
- *) New function ASN1_mbstring_copy() this copies a string in either
- ASCII, Unicode, Universal (4 bytes per character) or UTF8 format
- into an ASN1_STRING type. A mask of permissible types is passed
- and it chooses the "minimal" type to use or an error if not type
- is suitable.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add function equivalents to the various macros in asn1.h. The old
- macros are retained with an M_ prefix. Code inside the library can
- use the M_ macros. External code (including the openssl utility)
- should *NOT* in order to be "shared library friendly".
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add various functions that can check a certificate's extensions
- to see if it usable for various purposes such as SSL client,
- server or S/MIME and CAs of these types. This is currently
- VERY EXPERIMENTAL but will ultimately be used for certificate chain
- verification. Also added a -purpose flag to x509 utility to
- print out all the purposes.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a CRYPTO_EX_DATA to X509 certificate structure and associated
- functions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New X509V3_{X509,CRL,REVOKED}_get_d2i() functions. These will search
- for, obtain and decode and extension and obtain its critical flag.
- This allows all the necessary extension code to be handled in a
- single function call.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) RC4 tune-up featuring 30-40% performance improvement on most RISC
- platforms. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) New -noout option to asn1parse. This causes no output to be produced
- its main use is when combined with -strparse and -out to extract data
- from a file (which may not be in ASN.1 format).
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix for pkcs12 program. It was hashing an invalid certificate pointer
- when producing the local key id.
- [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
-
- *) New option -dhparam in s_server. This allows a DH parameter file to be
- stated explicitly. If it is not stated then it tries the first server
- certificate file. The previous behaviour hard coded the filename
- "server.pem".
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add -pubin and -pubout options to the rsa and dsa commands. These allow
- a public key to be input or output. For example:
- openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
- Also added necessary DSA public key functions to handle this.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix so PKCS7_dataVerify() doesn't crash if no certificates are contained
- in the message. This was handled by allowing
- X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial() to tolerate a NULL passed to it.
- [Steve Henson, reported by Sampo Kellomaki <sampo at mail.neuronio.pt>]
-
- *) Fix for bug in d2i_ASN1_bytes(): other ASN1 functions add an extra null
- to the end of the strings whereas this didn't. This would cause problems
- if strings read with d2i_ASN1_bytes() were later modified.
- [Steve Henson, reported by Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
-
- *) Fix for base64 decode bug. When a base64 bio reads only one line of
- data and it contains EOF it will end up returning an error. This is
- caused by input 46 bytes long. The cause is due to the way base64
- BIOs find the start of base64 encoded data. They do this by trying a
- trial decode on each line until they find one that works. When they
- do a flag is set and it starts again knowing it can pass all the
- data directly through the decoder. Unfortunately it doesn't reset
- the context it uses. This means that if EOF is reached an attempt
- is made to pass two EOFs through the context and this causes the
- resulting error. This can also cause other problems as well. As is
- usual with these problems it takes *ages* to find and the fix is
- trivial: move one line.
- [Steve Henson, reported by ian at uns.ns.ac.yu (Ivan Nejgebauer) ]
-
- *) Ugly workaround to get s_client and s_server working under Windows. The
- old code wouldn't work because it needed to select() on sockets and the
- tty (for keypresses and to see if data could be written). Win32 only
- supports select() on sockets so we select() with a 1s timeout on the
- sockets and then see if any characters are waiting to be read, if none
- are present then we retry, we also assume we can always write data to
- the tty. This isn't nice because the code then blocks until we've
- received a complete line of data and it is effectively polling the
- keyboard at 1s intervals: however it's quite a bit better than not
- working at all :-) A dedicated Windows application might handle this
- with an event loop for example.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Enhance RSA_METHOD structure. Now there are two extra methods, rsa_sign
- and rsa_verify. When the RSA_FLAGS_SIGN_VER option is set these functions
- will be called when RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are used. This is useful
- if rsa_pub_dec() and rsa_priv_enc() equivalents are not available.
- For this to work properly RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt()
- should *not* be used: RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() must be used instead.
- This necessitated the support of an extra signature type NID_md5_sha1
- for SSL signatures and modifications to the SSL library to use it instead
- of calling RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new -verify -CAfile and -CApath options to the crl program, these
- will lookup a CRL issuers certificate and verify the signature in a
- similar way to the verify program. Tidy up the crl program so it
- no longer accesses structures directly. Make the ASN1 CRL parsing a bit
- less strict. It will now permit CRL extensions even if it is not
- a V2 CRL: this will allow it to tolerate some broken CRLs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initialize all non-automatic variables each time one of the openssl
- sub-programs is started (this is necessary as they may be started
- multiple times from the "OpenSSL>" prompt).
- [Lennart Bang, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Preliminary compilation option RSA_NULL which disables RSA crypto without
- removing all other RSA functionality (this is what NO_RSA does). This
- is so (for example) those in the US can disable those operations covered
- by the RSA patent while allowing storage and parsing of RSA keys and RSA
- key generation.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Non-copying interface to BIO pairs.
- (still largely untested)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New function ANS1_tag2str() to convert an ASN1 tag to a descriptive
- ASCII string. This was handled independently in various places before.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New functions UTF8_getc() and UTF8_putc() that parse and generate
- UTF8 strings a character at a time.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Use client_version from client hello to select the protocol
- (s23_srvr.c) and for RSA client key exchange verification
- (s3_srvr.c), as required by the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 specifications.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add various utility functions to handle SPKACs, these were previously
- handled by poking round in the structure internals. Added new function
- NETSCAPE_SPKI_print() to print out SPKAC and a new utility 'spkac' to
- print, verify and generate SPKACs. Based on an original idea from
- Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at comune.modena.it> but extensively modified.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) RIPEMD160 is operational on all platforms and is back in 'make test'.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Allow the config file extension section to be overwritten on the
- command line. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala
- <madwolf at comune.modena.it>. The new option is called -extensions
- and can be applied to ca, req and x509. Also -reqexts to override
- the request extensions in req and -crlexts to override the crl extensions
- in ca.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new feature to the SPKAC handling in ca. Now you can include
- the same field multiple times by preceding it by "XXXX." for example:
- 1.OU="Unit name 1"
- 2.OU="Unit name 2"
- this is the same syntax as used in the req config file.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Allow certificate extensions to be added to certificate requests. These
- are specified in a 'req_extensions' option of the req section of the
- config file. They can be printed out with the -text option to req but
- are otherwise ignored at present.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix a horrible bug in enc_read() in crypto/evp/bio_enc.c: if the first
- data read consists of only the final block it would not decrypted because
- EVP_CipherUpdate() would correctly report zero bytes had been decrypted.
- A misplaced 'break' also meant the decrypted final block might not be
- copied until the next read.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial support for DH_METHOD. Again based on RSA_METHOD. Also added
- a few extra parameters to the DH structure: these will be useful if
- for example we want the value of 'q' or implement X9.42 DH.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial support for DSA_METHOD. This is based on the RSA_METHOD and
- provides hooks that allow the default DSA functions or functions on a
- "per key" basis to be replaced. This allows hardware acceleration and
- hardware key storage to be handled without major modification to the
- library. Also added low level modexp hooks and CRYPTO_EX structure and
- associated functions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a new flag to memory BIOs, BIO_FLAG_MEM_RDONLY. This marks the BIO
- as "read only": it can't be written to and the buffer it points to will
- not be freed. Reading from a read only BIO is much more efficient than
- a normal memory BIO. This was added because there are several times when
- an area of memory needs to be read from a BIO. The previous method was
- to create a memory BIO and write the data to it, this results in two
- copies of the data and an O(n^2) reading algorithm. There is a new
- function BIO_new_mem_buf() which creates a read only memory BIO from
- an area of memory. Also modified the PKCS#7 routines to use read only
- memory BIOs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in
- state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of
- a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read,
- but a retry condition occured while trying to read the rest.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as
- NID_pkcs7_encrypted by default: this was wrong since this should almost
- always be NID_pkcs7_data. Also modified the PKCS7_set_type() to handle
- the encrypted data type: this is a more sensible place to put it and it
- allows the PKCS#12 code to be tidied up that duplicated this
- functionality.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Changed obj_dat.pl script so it takes its input and output files on
- the command line. This should avoid shell escape redirection problems
- under Win32.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial support for certificate extension requests, these are included
- in things like Xenroll certificate requests. Included functions to allow
- extensions to be obtained and added.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) -crlf option to s_client and s_server for sending newlines as
- CRLF (as required by many protocols).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- Changes between 0.9.3a and 0.9.4 [09 Aug 1999]
-
- *) Install libRSAglue.a when OpenSSL is built with RSAref.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) A few more ``#ifndef NO_FP_API / #endif'' pairs for consistency.
- [Andrija Antonijevic <TheAntony2 at bigfoot.com>]
-
- *) Fix -startdate and -enddate (which was missing) arguments to 'ca'
- program.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function DSA_dup_DH, which duplicates DSA parameters/keys as
- DH parameters/keys (q is lost during that conversion, but the resulting
- DH parameters contain its length).
-
- For 1024-bit p, DSA_generate_parameters followed by DSA_dup_DH is
- much faster than DH_generate_parameters (which creates parameters
- where p = 2*q + 1), and also the smaller q makes DH computations
- much more efficient (160-bit exponentiation instead of 1024-bit
- exponentiation); so this provides a convenient way to support DHE
- ciphersuites in SSL/TLS servers (see ssl/ssltest.c). It is of
- utter importance to use
- SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
- or
- SSL_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
- when such DH parameters are used, because otherwise small subgroup
- attacks may become possible!
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Avoid memory leak in i2d_DHparams.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Allow the -k option to be used more than once in the enc program:
- this allows the same encrypted message to be read by multiple recipients.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, no_name), this converts
- an ASN1_OBJECT to a text string. If the "no_name" parameter is set then
- it will always use the numerical form of the OID, even if it has a short
- or long name.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Added an extra RSA flag: RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY. Previously the rsa_mod_exp
- method only got called if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp components were present,
- otherwise bn_mod_exp was called. In the case of hardware keys for example
- no private key components need be present and it might store extra data
- in the RSA structure, which cannot be accessed from bn_mod_exp.
- By setting RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY rsa_mod_exp will always be called for
- private key operations.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Added support for SPARC Linux.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) pem_password_cb function type incompatibly changed from
- typedef int pem_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag);
- to
- ....(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata);
- so that applications can pass data to their callbacks:
- The PEM[_ASN1]_{read,write}... functions and macros now take an
- additional void * argument, which is just handed through whenever
- the password callback is called.
- [Damien Miller <dmiller at ilogic.com.au>; tiny changes by Bodo Moeller]
-
- New function SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata.
-
- Compatibility note: As many C implementations push function arguments
- onto the stack in reverse order, the new library version is likely to
- interoperate with programs that have been compiled with the old
- pem_password_cb definition (PEM_whatever takes some data that
- happens to be on the stack as its last argument, and the callback
- just ignores this garbage); but there is no guarantee whatsoever that
- this will work.
-
- *) The -DPLATFORM="\"$(PLATFORM)\"" definition and the similar -DCFLAGS=...
- (both in crypto/Makefile.ssl for use by crypto/cversion.c) caused
- problems not only on Windows, but also on some Unix platforms.
- To avoid problematic command lines, these definitions are now in an
- auto-generated file crypto/buildinf.h (created by crypto/Makefile.ssl
- for standard "make" builds, by util/mk1mf.pl for "mk1mf" builds).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) MIPS III/IV assembler module is reimplemented.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
- delete an unused file.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
- since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
- This is currently experimental but it seems to work OK and pass all
- the tests. Check out INSTALL.W32 for info.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix memory leaks in s3_clnt.c: All non-anonymous SSL3/TLS1 connections
- without temporary keys kept an extra copy of the server key,
- and connections with temporary keys did not free everything in case
- of an error.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New function RSA_check_key and new openssl rsa option -check
- for verifying the consistency of RSA keys.
- [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Various changes to make Win32 compile work:
- 1. Casts to avoid "loss of data" warnings in p5_crpt2.c
- 2. Change unsigned int to int in b_dump.c to avoid "signed/unsigned
- comparison" warnings.
- 3. Add sk_<TYPE>_sort to DEF file generator and do make update.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a debugging option to PKCS#5 v2 key generation function: when
- you #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 passwords, salts, iteration counts and
- derived keys are printed to stderr.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Copy the flags in ASN1_STRING_dup().
- [Roman E. Pavlov <pre at mo.msk.ru>]
-
- *) The x509 application mishandled signing requests containing DSA
- keys when the signing key was also DSA and the parameters didn't match.
-
- It was supposed to omit the parameters when they matched the signing key:
- the verifying software was then supposed to automatically use the CA's
- parameters if they were absent from the end user certificate.
-
- Omitting parameters is no longer recommended. The test was also
- the wrong way round! This was probably due to unusual behaviour in
- EVP_cmp_parameters() which returns 1 if the parameters match.
- This meant that parameters were omitted when they *didn't* match and
- the certificate was useless. Certificates signed with 'ca' didn't have
- this bug.
- [Steve Henson, reported by Doug Erickson <Doug.Erickson at Part.NET>]
-
- *) Memory leak checking (-DCRYPTO_MDEBUG) had some problems.
- The interface is as follows:
- Applications can use
- CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) aka MemCheck_start(),
- CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) aka MemCheck_stop();
- "off" is now the default.
- The library internally uses
- CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE) aka MemCheck_off(),
- CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE) aka MemCheck_on()
- to disable memory-checking temporarily.
-
- Some inconsistent states that previously were possible (and were
- even the default) are now avoided.
-
- -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME is new and additionally stores the current time
- with each memory chunk allocated; this is occasionally more helpful
- than just having a counter.
-
- -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_THREAD is also new and adds the thread ID.
-
- -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL enables all of the above, plus any future
- extensions.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Introduce "mode" for SSL structures (with defaults in SSL_CTX),
- which largely parallels "options", but is for changing API behaviour,
- whereas "options" are about protocol behaviour.
- Initial "mode" flags are:
-
- SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE Allow SSL_write to report success when
- a single record has been written.
- SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER Don't insist that SSL_write
- retries use the same buffer location.
- (But all of the contents must be
- copied!)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Bugfix: SSL_set_options ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_options
- worked.
-
- *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling at tislabs.com>]
-
- *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
- RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
- to mess around with the internals of an RSA structure.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix memory leaks in DSA_do_sign and DSA_is_prime.
- Also really enable memory leak checks in openssl.c and in some
- test programs.
- [Chad C. Mulligan, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix a bug in d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() which can mess
- up the length of negative integers. This has now been simplified to just
- store the length when it is first determined and use it later, rather
- than trying to keep track of where data is copied and updating it to
- point to the end.
- [Steve Henson, reported by Brien Wheeler
- <bwheeler at authentica-security.com>]
-
- *) Add a new function PKCS7_signatureVerify. This allows the verification
- of a PKCS#7 signature but with the signing certificate passed to the
- function itself. This contrasts with PKCS7_dataVerify which assumes the
- certificate is present in the PKCS#7 structure. This isn't always the
- case: certificates can be omitted from a PKCS#7 structure and be
- distributed by "out of band" means (such as a certificate database).
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Complete the PEM_* macros with DECLARE_PEM versions to replace the
- function prototypes in pem.h, also change util/mkdef.pl to add the
- necessary function names.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) mk1mf.pl (used by Windows builds) did not properly read the
- options set by Configure in the top level Makefile, and Configure
- was not even able to write more than one option correctly.
- Fixed, now "no-idea no-rc5 -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG" etc. works as intended.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New functions CONF_load_bio() and CONF_load_fp() to allow a config
- file to be loaded from a BIO or FILE pointer. The BIO version will
- for example allow memory BIOs to contain config info.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function "CRYPTO_num_locks" that returns CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS.
- Whoever hopes to achieve shared-library compatibility across versions
- must use this, not the compile-time macro.
- (Exercise 0.9.4: Which is the minimum library version required by
- such programs?)
- Note: All this applies only to multi-threaded programs, others don't
- need locks.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add missing case to s3_clnt.c state machine -- one of the new SSL tests
- through a BIO pair triggered the default case, i.e.
- SSLerr(...,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New "BIO pair" concept (crypto/bio/bss_bio.c) so that applications
- can use the SSL library even if none of the specific BIOs is
- appropriate.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix a bug in i2d_DSAPublicKey() which meant it returned the wrong value
- for the encoded length.
- [Jeon KyoungHo <khjeon at sds.samsung.co.kr>]
-
- *) Add initial documentation of the X509V3 functions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a new pair of functions PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() and
- PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() that are equivalent to
- PEM_write_PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() but use the more
- secure PKCS#8 private key format with a high iteration count.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix determination of Perl interpreter: A perl or perl5
- _directory_ in $PATH was also accepted as the interpreter.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Fix demos/sign/sign.c: well there wasn't anything strictly speaking
- wrong with it but it was very old and did things like calling
- PEM_ASN1_read() directly and used MD5 for the hash not to mention some
- unusual formatting.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix demos/selfsign.c: it used obsolete and deleted functions, changed
- to use the new extension code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Implement the PEM_read/PEM_write functions in crypto/pem/pem_all.c
- with macros. This should make it easier to change their form, add extra
- arguments etc. Fix a few PEM prototypes which didn't have cipher as a
- constant.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add to configuration table a new entry that can specify an alternative
- name for unistd.h (for pre-POSIX systems); we need this for NeXTstep,
- according to Mark Crispin <MRC at Panda.COM>.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
-#if 0
- *) DES CBC did not update the IV. Weird.
- [Ben Laurie]
-#else
- des_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV, but des_ncbc_encrypt does.
- Changing the behaviour of the former might break existing programs --
- where IV updating is needed, des_ncbc_encrypt can be used.
-#endif
-
- *) When bntest is run from "make test" it drives bc to check its
- calculations, as well as internally checking them. If an internal check
- fails, it needs to cause bc to give a non-zero result or make test carries
- on without noticing the failure. Fixed.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) DES library cleanups.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
- used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
- ciphers. NOTE: although the key derivation function has been verified
- against some published test vectors it has not been extensively tested
- yet. Added a -v2 "cipher" option to pkcs8 application to allow the use
- of v2.0.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Instead of "mkdir -p", which is not fully portable, use new
- Perl script "util/mkdir-p.pl".
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Rewrite the way password based encryption (PBE) is handled. It used to
- assume that the ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier parameter was a PBEParameter
- structure. This was true for the PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 PBE algorithms
- but doesn't apply to PKCS#5 v2.0 where it can be something else. Now
- the 'parameter' field of the AlgorithmIdentifier is passed to the
- underlying key generation function so it must do its own ASN1 parsing.
- This has also changed the EVP_PBE_CipherInit() function which now has a
- 'parameter' argument instead of literal salt and iteration count values
- and the function EVP_PBE_ALGOR_CipherInit() has been deleted.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for PKCS#5 v1.5 compatible password based encryption algorithms
- and PKCS#8 functionality. New 'pkcs8' application linked to openssl.
- Needed to change the PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY value which was just "PRIVATE
- KEY" because this clashed with PKCS#8 unencrypted string. Since this
- value was just used as a "magic string" and not used directly its
- value doesn't matter.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Introduce some semblance of const correctness to BN. Shame C doesn't
- support mutable.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) "linux-sparc64" configuration (ultrapenguin).
- [Ray Miller <ray.miller at oucs.ox.ac.uk>]
- "linux-sparc" configuration.
- [Christian Forster <fo at hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]
-
- *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
- File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
- [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>]
-
- *) Support BS2000/OSD-POSIX.
- [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>]
-
- *) Make callbacks for key generation use void * instead of char *.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Make S/MIME samples compile (not yet tested).
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Additional typesafe stacks.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) New configuration variants "bsdi-elf-gcc" (BSD/OS 4.x).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
-
- Changes between 0.9.3 and 0.9.3a [29 May 1999]
-
- *) New configuration variant "sco5-gcc".
-
- *) Updated some demos.
- [Sean O Riordain, Wade Scholine]
-
- *) Add missing BIO_free at exit of pkcs12 application.
- [Wu Zhigang]
-
- *) Fix memory leak in conf.c.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Updates for Win32 to assembler version of MD5.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Set #! path to perl in apps/der_chop to where we found it
- instead of using a fixed path.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) SHA library changes for irix64-mips4-cc.
- [Andy Polyakov]
-
- *) Improvements for VMS support.
- [Richard Levitte]
-
-
- Changes between 0.9.2b and 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]
-
- *) Bignum library bug fix. IRIX 6 passes "make test" now!
- This also avoids the problems with SC4.2 and unpatched SC5.
- [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
-
- *) New functions sk_num, sk_value and sk_set to replace the previous macros.
- These are required because of the typesafe stack would otherwise break
- existing code. If old code used a structure member which used to be STACK
- and is now STACK_OF (for example cert in a PKCS7_SIGNED structure) with
- sk_num or sk_value it would produce an error because the num, data members
- are not present in STACK_OF. Now it just produces a warning. sk_set
- replaces the old method of assigning a value to sk_value
- (e.g. sk_value(x, i) = y) which the library used in a few cases. Any code
- that does this will no longer work (and should use sk_set instead) but
- this could be regarded as a "questionable" behaviour anyway.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix most of the other PKCS#7 bugs. The "experimental" code can now
- correctly handle encrypted S/MIME data.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change type of various DES function arguments from des_cblock
- (which means, in function argument declarations, pointer to char)
- to des_cblock * (meaning pointer to array with 8 char elements),
- which allows the compiler to do more typechecking; it was like
- that back in SSLeay, but with lots of ugly casts.
-
- Introduce new type const_des_cblock.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Reorganise the PKCS#7 library and get rid of some of the more obvious
- problems: find RecipientInfo structure that matches recipient certificate
- and initialise the ASN1 structures properly based on passed cipher.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Belatedly make the BN tests actually check the results.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Fix the encoding and decoding of negative ASN1 INTEGERS and conversion
- to and from BNs: it was completely broken. New compilation option
- NEG_PUBKEY_BUG to allow for some broken certificates that encode public
- key elements as negative integers.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Reorganize and speed up MD5.
- [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
-
- *) VMS support.
- [Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org>]
-
- *) New option -out to asn1parse to allow the parsed structure to be
- output to a file. This is most useful when combined with the -strparse
- option to examine the output of things like OCTET STRINGS.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make SSL library a little more fool-proof by not requiring any longer
- that SSL_set_{accept,connect}_state be called before
- SSL_{accept,connect} may be used (SSL_set_..._state is omitted
- in many applications because usually everything *appeared* to work as
- intended anyway -- now it really works as intended).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
- -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
- -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs -Winline'' with EGCS 1.1.2+
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Various fixes to the EVP and PKCS#7 code. It may now be able to
- handle PKCS#7 enveloped data properly.
- [Sebastian Akerman <sak at parallelconsulting.com>, modified by Steve]
-
- *) Create a duplicate of the SSL_CTX's CERT in SSL_new instead of
- copying pointers. The cert_st handling is changed by this in
- various ways (and thus what used to be known as ctx->default_cert
- is now called ctx->cert, since we don't resort to s->ctx->[default_]cert
- any longer when s->cert does not give us what we need).
- ssl_cert_instantiate becomes obsolete by this change.
- As soon as we've got the new code right (possibly it already is?),
- we have solved a couple of bugs of the earlier code where s->cert
- was used as if it could not have been shared with other SSL structures.
-
- Note that using the SSL API in certain dirty ways now will result
- in different behaviour than observed with earlier library versions:
- Changing settings for an SSL_CTX *ctx after having done s = SSL_new(ctx)
- does not influence s as it used to.
-
- In order to clean up things more thoroughly, inside SSL_SESSION
- we don't use CERT any longer, but a new structure SESS_CERT
- that holds per-session data (if available); currently, this is
- the peer's certificate chain and, for clients, the server's certificate
- and temporary key. CERT holds only those values that can have
- meaningful defaults in an SSL_CTX.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New function X509V3_EXT_i2d() to create an X509_EXTENSION structure
- from the internal representation. Various PKCS#7 fixes: remove some
- evil casts and set the enc_dig_alg field properly based on the signing
- key type.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Allow PKCS#12 password to be set from the command line or the
- environment. Let 'ca' get its config file name from the environment
- variables "OPENSSL_CONF" or "SSLEAY_CONF" (for consistency with 'req'
- and 'x509').
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Allow certificate policies extension to use an IA5STRING for the
- organization field. This is contrary to the PKIX definition but
- VeriSign uses it and IE5 only recognises this form. Document 'x509'
- extension option.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add PEDANTIC compiler flag to allow compilation with gcc -pedantic,
- without disallowing inline assembler and the like for non-pedantic builds.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Support Borland C++ builder.
- [Janez Jere <jj at void.si>, modified by Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Support Mingw32.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
- [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
-
- *) Sparc v8plus assembler for the bignum library.
- [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
-
- *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Update HPUX configuration.
- [Anonymous]
-
- *) Add missing sk_<type>_unshift() function to safestack.h
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) New function SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file that sets the
- "extra_cert"s in addition to the certificate. (This makes sense
- only for "PEM" format files, as chains as a whole are not
- DER-encoded.)
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Support verify_depth from the SSL API.
- x509_vfy.c had what can be considered an off-by-one-error:
- Its depth (which was not part of the external interface)
- was actually counting the number of certificates in a chain;
- now it really counts the depth.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Bugfix in crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c: The SSLerr macro was used
- instead of X509err, which often resulted in confusing error
- messages since the error codes are not globally unique
- (e.g. an alleged error in ssl3_accept when a certificate
- didn't match the private key).
-
- *) New function SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context that allows to set a default
- value (so that you don't need SSL_set_session_id_context for each
- connection using the SSL_CTX).
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) OAEP decoding bug fix.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
- David Harris.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New Configure options "threads" and "no-threads". For systems
- where the proper compiler options are known (currently Solaris
- and Linux), "threads" is the default.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New script util/mklink.pl as a faster substitute for util/mklink.sh.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Install various scripts to $(OPENSSLDIR)/misc, not to
- $(INSTALLTOP)/bin -- they shouldn't clutter directories
- such as /usr/local/bin.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) "make linux-shared" to build shared libraries.
- [Niels Poppe <niels at netbox.org>]
-
- *) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
- extension adding in x509 utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
- prototypes.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
- by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
- header rewriting and C source file generation. It should be much better
- than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to
- read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions
- aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of
- translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code imbedded
- in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which
- have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all
- on one line (which resulted in some large lines...).
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Change #include filenames from <foo.h> to <openssl/foo.h>.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Change behaviour of ssl2_read when facing length-0 packets: Don't return
- 0 (which usually indicates a closed connection), but continue reading.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix some race conditions.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Add support for CRL distribution points extension. Add Certificate
- Policies and CRL distribution points documentation.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
- 8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
- between OpenSSL and Baltimore C/SSL 2.0 and J/SSL 2.0.
- [Merlin Hughes <merlin at baltimore.ie>]
-
- *) Fix lots of warnings.
- [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
-
- *) In add_cert_dir() in crypto/x509/by_dir.c, break out of the loop if
- the directory spec didn't end with a LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR.
- [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
-
- *) Fix problems with sizeof(long) == 8.
- [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
-
- *) Change functions to ANSI C.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Fix typos in error codes.
- [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
- [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
-
- *) Support for Certificate Policies extension: both print and set.
- Various additions to support the r2i method this uses.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) A lot of constification, and fix a bug in X509_NAME_oneline() that could
- return a const string when you are expecting an allocated buffer.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add support for ASN1 types UTF8String and VISIBLESTRING, also the CHOICE
- types DirectoryString and DisplayText.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add code to allow r2i extensions to access the configuration database,
- add an LHASH database driver and add several ctx helper functions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix an evil bug in bn_expand2() which caused various BN functions to
- fail when they extended the size of a BIGNUM.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Various utility functions to handle SXNet extension. Modify mkdef.pl to
- support typesafe stack.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix typo in SSL_[gs]et_options().
- [Nils Frostberg <nils at medcom.se>]
-
- *) Delete various functions and files that belonged to the (now obsolete)
- old X509V3 handling code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New Configure option "rsaref".
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Introduce type-safe ASN.1 SETs.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Convert various additional casted stacks to type-safe STACK_OF() variants.
- [Ben Laurie, Ralf S. Engelschall, Steve Henson]
-
- *) Introduce type-safe STACKs. This will almost certainly break lots of code
- that links with OpenSSL (well at least cause lots of warnings), but fear
- not: the conversion is trivial, and it eliminates loads of evil casts. A
- few STACKed things have been converted already. Feel free to convert more.
- In the fullness of time, I'll do away with the STACK type altogether.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add `openssl ca -revoke <certfile>' facility which revokes a certificate
- specified in <certfile> by updating the entry in the index.txt file.
- This way one no longer has to edit the index.txt file manually for
- revoking a certificate. The -revoke option does the gory details now.
- [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at openca.org>, Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Fix `openssl crl -noout -text' combination where `-noout' killed the
- `-text' option at all and this way the `-noout -text' combination was
- inconsistent in `openssl crl' with the friends in `openssl x509|rsa|dsa'.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Make sure a corresponding plain text error message exists for the
- X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED/23 error number which can occur when a
- verify callback function determined that a certificate was revoked.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Bugfix: In test/testenc, don't test "openssl <cipher>" for
- ciphers that were excluded, e.g. by -DNO_IDEA. Also, test
- all available cipers including rc5, which was forgotten until now.
- In order to let the testing shell script know which algorithms
- are available, a new (up to now undocumented) command
- "openssl list-cipher-commands" is used.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Bugfix: s_client occasionally would sleep in select() when
- it should have checked SSL_pending() first.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
- the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Tweaks to Configure
- [Niels Poppe <niels at netbox.org>]
-
- *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 ASN1 PBES2 structures. No other support,
- yet...
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
- The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller]
-
- *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
- SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
- same as SSL2_VERSION anyway.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) New "-showcerts" option for s_client.
- [Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Still more PKCS#12 integration. Add pkcs12 application to openssl
- application. Various cleanups and fixes.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) More PKCS#12 integration. Add new pkcs12 directory with Makefile.ssl and
- modify error routines to work internally. Add error codes and PBE init
- to library startup routines.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Further PKCS#12 integration. Added password based encryption, PKCS#8 and
- packing functions to asn1 and evp. Changed function names and error
- codes along the way.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) PKCS12 integration: and so it begins... First of several patches to
- slowly integrate PKCS#12 functionality into OpenSSL. Add PKCS#12
- objects to objects.h
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a new 'indent' option to some X509V3 extension code. Initial ASN1
- and display support for Thawte strong extranet extension.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add LinuxPPC support.
- [Jeff Dubrule <igor at pobox.org>]
-
- *) Get rid of redundant BN file bn_mulw.c, and rename bn_div64 to
- bn_div_words in alpha.s.
- [Hannes Reinecke <H.Reinecke at hw.ac.uk> and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Make sure the RSA OAEP test is skipped under -DRSAref because
- OAEP isn't supported when OpenSSL is built with RSAref.
- [Ulf Moeller <ulf at fitug.de>]
-
- *) Move definitions of IS_SET/IS_SEQUENCE inside crypto/asn1/asn1.h
- so they no longer are missing under -DNOPROTO.
- [Soren S. Jorvang <soren at t.dk>]
-
-
- Changes between 0.9.1c and 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]
-
- *) Make SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() work in servers. Unfortunately, it still
- doesn't work when the session is reused. Coming soon!
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Fix a security hole, that allows sessions to be reused in the wrong
- context thus bypassing client cert protection! All software that uses
- client certs and session caches in multiple contexts NEEDS PATCHING to
- allow session reuse! A fuller solution is in the works.
- [Ben Laurie, problem pointed out by Holger Reif, Bodo Moeller (and ???)]
-
- *) Some more source tree cleanups (removed obsolete files
- crypto/bf/asm/bf586.pl, test/test.txt and crypto/sha/asm/f.s; changed
- permission on "config" script to be executable) and a fix for the INSTALL
- document.
- [Ulf Moeller <ulf at fitug.de>]
-
- *) Remove some legacy and erroneous uses of malloc, free instead of
- Malloc, Free.
- [Lennart Bang <lob at netstream.se>, with minor changes by Steve]
-
- *) Make rsa_oaep_test return non-zero on error.
- [Ulf Moeller <ulf at fitug.de>]
-
- *) Add support for native Solaris shared libraries. Configure
- solaris-sparc-sc4-pic, make, then run shlib/solaris-sc4.sh. It'd be nice
- if someone would make that last step automatic.
- [Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe at AdNovum.CH>]
-
- *) ctx_size was not built with the right compiler during "make links". Fixed.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Change the meaning of 'ALL' in the cipher list. It now means "everything
- except NULL ciphers". This means the default cipher list will no longer
- enable NULL ciphers. They need to be specifically enabled e.g. with
- the string "DEFAULT:eNULL".
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix to RSA private encryption routines: if p < q then it would
- occasionally produce an invalid result. This will only happen with
- externally generated keys because OpenSSL (and SSLeay) ensure p > q.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Be less restrictive and allow also `perl util/perlpath.pl
- /path/to/bin/perl' in addition to `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin',
- because this way one can also use an interpreter named `perl5' (which is
- usually the name of Perl 5.xxx on platforms where an Perl 4.x is still
- installed as `perl').
- [Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe at adnovum.ch>]
-
- *) Let util/clean-depend.pl work also with older Perl 5.00x versions.
- [Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe at adnovum.ch>]
-
- *) Fix Makefile.org so CC,CFLAG etc are passed to 'make links' add
- advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparision
- to fc.exe (thanks to Ulrich Kroener <kroneru at yahoo.com> for the
- suggestion). Fix misplaced ASNI prototypes and declarations in evp.h
- and crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) DES quad checksum was broken on big-endian architectures. Fixed.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Comment out two functions in bio.h that aren't implemented. Fix up the
- Win32 test batch file so it (might) work again. The Win32 test batch file
- is horrible: I feel ill....
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Move various #ifdefs around so NO_SYSLOG, NO_DIRENT etc are now selected
- in e_os.h. Audit of header files to check ANSI and non ANSI
- sections: 10 functions were absent from non ANSI section and not exported
- from Windows DLLs. Fixed up libeay.num for new functions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make `openssl version' output lines consistent.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Fix Win32 symbol export lists for BIO functions: Added
- BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_get_ex_num, BIO_get_ex_data and BIO_set_ex_data
- to ms/libeay{16,32}.def.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Second round of fixing the OpenSSL perl/ stuff. It now at least compiled
- fine under Unix and passes some trivial tests I've now added. But the
- whole stuff is horribly incomplete, so a README.1ST with a disclaimer was
- added to make sure no one expects that this stuff really works in the
- OpenSSL 0.9.2 release. Additionally I've started to clean the XS sources
- up and fixed a few little bugs and inconsistencies in OpenSSL.{pm,xs} and
- openssl_bio.xs.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Fix the generation of two part addresses in perl.
- [Kenji Miyake <kenji at miyake.org>, integrated by Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add config entry for Linux on MIPS.
- [John Tobey <jtobey at channel1.com>]
-
- *) Make links whenever Configure is run, unless we are on Windoze.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Permit extensions to be added to CRLs using crl_section in openssl.cnf.
- Currently only issuerAltName and AuthorityKeyIdentifier make any sense
- in CRLs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and
- other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the
- Configure script everytime: One now can use ``perl Configure
- <id>:<details>'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended
- to them (seperated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static
- pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key <id> with value
- <details> and ``perl Configure <id>'' is called. So, when you want to
- perform a quick test-compile under FreeBSD 3.1 with pgcc and without
- assembler stuff you can use ``perl Configure "FreeBSD-elf:pgcc:-O6:::"''
- now, which overrides the FreeBSD-elf entry on-the-fly.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Disable new TLS1 ciphersuites by default: they aren't official yet.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Allow DSO flags like -fpic, -fPIC, -KPIC etc. to be specified
- on the `perl Configure ...' command line. This way one can compile
- OpenSSL libraries with Position Independent Code (PIC) which is needed
- for linking it into DSOs.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Remarkably, export ciphers were totally broken and no-one had noticed!
- Fixed.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Cleaned up the LICENSE document: The official contact for any license
- questions now is the OpenSSL core team under openssl-core at openssl.org.
- And add a paragraph about the dual-license situation to make sure people
- recognize that _BOTH_ the OpenSSL license _AND_ the SSLeay license apply
- to the OpenSSL toolkit.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) General source tree makefile cleanups: Made `making xxx in yyy...'
- display consistent in the source tree and replaced `/bin/rm' by `rm'.
- Additonally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary
- semicolons, subsequent redundant removes, inline point.sh into mklink.sh
- to speed processing and no longer clutter the display with confusing
- stuff. Instead only the actually done links are displayed.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Permit null encryption ciphersuites, used for authentication only. It used
- to be necessary to set the preprocessor define SSL_ALLOW_ENULL to do this.
- It is now necessary to set SSL_FORBID_ENULL to prevent the use of null
- encryption.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add a bunch of fixes to the PKCS#7 stuff. It used to sometimes reorder
- signed attributes when verifying signatures (this would break them),
- the detached data encoding was wrong and public keys obtained using
- X509_get_pubkey() weren't freed.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add text documentation for the BUFFER functions. Also added a work around
- to a Win95 console bug. This was triggered by the password read stuff: the
- last character typed gets carried over to the next fread(). If you were
- generating a new cert request using 'req' for example then the last
- character of the passphrase would be CR which would then enter the first
- field as blank.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Added the new `Includes OpenSSL Cryptography Software' button as
- doc/openssl_button.{gif,html} which is similar in style to the old SSLeay
- button and can be used by applications based on OpenSSL to show the
- relationship to the OpenSSL project.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Remove confusing variables in function signatures in files
- ssl/ssl_lib.c and ssl/ssl.h.
- [Lennart Bong <lob at kulthea.stacken.kth.se>]
-
- *) Don't install bss_file.c under PREFIX/include/
- [Lennart Bong <lob at kulthea.stacken.kth.se>]
-
- *) Get the Win32 compile working again. Modify mkdef.pl so it can handle
- functions that return function pointers and has support for NT specific
- stuff. Fix mk1mf.pl and VC-32.pl to support NT differences also. Various
- #ifdef WIN32 and WINNTs sprinkled about the place and some changes from
- unsigned to signed types: this was killing the Win32 compile.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new certificate file to stack functions,
- SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() and
- SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(). These largely supplant
- SSL_load_client_CA_file(), and can be used to add multiple certs easily
- to a stack (usually this is then handed to SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list()).
- This means that Apache-SSL and similar packages don't have to mess around
- to add as many CAs as they want to the preferred list.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Experiment with doxygen documentation. Currently only partially applied to
- ssl/ssl_lib.c.
- See http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html, and run doxygen with
- openssl.doxy as the configuration file.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Get rid of remaining C++-style comments which strict C compilers hate.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall, pointed out by Carlos Amengual]
-
- *) Changed BN_RECURSION in bn_mont.c to BN_RECURSION_MONT so it is not
- compiled in by default: it has problems with large keys.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add a bunch of SSL_xxx() functions for configuring the temporary RSA and
- DH private keys and/or callback functions which directly correspond to
- their SSL_CTX_xxx() counterparts but work on a per-connection basis. This
- is needed for applications which have to configure certificates on a
- per-connection basis (e.g. Apache+mod_ssl) instead of a per-context basis
- (e.g. s_server).
- For the RSA certificate situation is makes no difference, but
- for the DSA certificate situation this fixes the "no shared cipher"
- problem where the OpenSSL cipher selection procedure failed because the
- temporary keys were not overtaken from the context and the API provided
- no way to reconfigure them.
- The new functions now let applications reconfigure the stuff and they
- are in detail: SSL_need_tmp_RSA, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_dh,
- SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback. Additionally a new
- non-public-API function ssl_cert_instantiate() is used as a helper
- function and also to reduce code redundancy inside ssl_rsa.c.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Move s_server -dcert and -dkey options out of the undocumented feature
- area because they are useful for the DSA situation and should be
- recognized by the users.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Fix the cipher decision scheme for export ciphers: the export bits are
- *not* within SSL_MKEY_MASK or SSL_AUTH_MASK, they are within
- SSL_EXP_MASK. So, the original variable has to be used instead of the
- already masked variable.
- [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
-
- *) Fix 'port' variable from `int' to `unsigned int' in crypto/bio/b_sock.c
- [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
-
- *) Change type of another md_len variable in pk7_doit.c:PKCS7_dataFinal()
- from `int' to `unsigned int' because it's a length and initialized by
- EVP_DigestFinal() which expects an `unsigned int *'.
- [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
-
- *) Don't hard-code path to Perl interpreter on shebang line of Configure
- script. Instead use the usual Shell->Perl transition trick.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Make `openssl x509 -noout -modulus' functional also for DSA certificates
- (in addition to RSA certificates) to match the behaviour of `openssl dsa
- -noout -modulus' as it's already the case for `openssl rsa -noout
- -modulus'. For RSA the -modulus is the real "modulus" while for DSA
- currently the public key is printed (a decision which was already done by
- `openssl dsa -modulus' in the past) which serves a similar purpose.
- Additionally the NO_RSA no longer completely removes the whole -modulus
- option; it now only avoids using the RSA stuff. Same applies to NO_DSA
- now, too.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Add Arne Ansper's reliable BIO - this is an encrypted, block-digested
- BIO. See the source (crypto/evp/bio_ok.c) for more info.
- [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
-
- *) Dump the old yucky req code that tried (and failed) to allow raw OIDs
- to be added. Now both 'req' and 'ca' can use new objects defined in the
- config file.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add cool BIO that does syslog (or event log on NT).
- [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>, integrated by Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add support for new TLS ciphersuites, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
- TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 and
- TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, as specified in "56-bit Export Cipher
- Suites For TLS", draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-00.txt.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add preliminary config info for new extension code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make RSA_NO_PADDING really use no padding.
- [Ulf Moeller <ulf at fitug.de>]
-
- *) Generate errors when private/public key check is done.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Overhaul for 'crl' utility. New function X509_CRL_print. Partial support
- for some CRL extensions and new objects added.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Really fix the ASN1 IMPLICIT bug this time... Partial support for private
- key usage extension and fuller support for authority key id.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add OAEP encryption for the OpenSSL crypto library. OAEP is the improved
- padding method for RSA, which is recommended for new applications in PKCS
- #1 v2.0 (RFC 2437, October 1998).
- OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) has better theoretical
- foundations than the ad-hoc padding used in PKCS #1 v1.5. It is secure
- against Bleichbacher's attack on RSA.
- [Ulf Moeller <ulf at fitug.de>, reformatted, corrected and integrated by
- Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Updates to the new SSL compression code
- [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
-
- *) Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
- via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
- (because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
- is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
- [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
-
- *) Run extensive memory leak checks on SSL apps. Fixed *lots* of memory
- leaks in ssl/ relating to new X509_get_pubkey() behaviour. Also fixes
- in apps/ and an unrelated leak in crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for RAW extensions where an arbitrary extension can be
- created by including its DER encoding. See apps/openssl.cnf for
- an example.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make sure latest Perl versions don't interpret some generated C array
- code as Perl array code in the crypto/err/err_genc.pl script.
- [Lars Weber <3weber at informatik.uni-hamburg.de>]
-
- *) Modify ms/do_ms.bat to not generate assembly language makefiles since
- not many people have the assembler. Various Win32 compilation fixes and
- update to the INSTALL.W32 file with (hopefully) more accurate Win32
- build instructions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify configure script 'Configure' to automatically create crypto/date.h
- file under Win32 and also build pem.h from pem.org. New script
- util/mkfiles.pl to create the MINFO file on environments that can't do a
- 'make files': perl util/mkfiles.pl >MINFO should work.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Major rework of DES function declarations, in the pursuit of correctness
- and purity. As a result, many evil casts evaporated, and some weirdness,
- too. You may find this causes warnings in your code. Zapping your evil
- casts will probably fix them. Mostly.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Fix for a typo in asn1.h. Bug fix to object creation script
- obj_dat.pl. It considered a zero in an object definition to mean
- "end of object": none of the objects in objects.h have any zeros
- so it wasn't spotted.
- [Steve Henson, reported by Erwann ABALEA <eabalea at certplus.com>]
-
- *) Add support for Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output Feedback
- Masking (CBCM). In the absence of test vectors, the best I have been able
- to do is check that the decrypt undoes the encrypt, so far. Send me test
- vectors if you have them.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Correct calculation of key length for export ciphers (too much space was
- allocated for null ciphers). This has not been tested!
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Modifications to the mkdef.pl for Win32 DEF file creation. The usage
- message is now correct (it understands "crypto" and "ssl" on its
- command line). There is also now an "update" option. This will update
- the util/ssleay.num and util/libeay.num files with any new functions.
- If you do a:
- perl util/mkdef.pl crypto ssl update
- it will update them.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Overhauled the Perl interface (perl/*):
- - ported BN stuff to OpenSSL's different BN library
- - made the perl/ source tree CVS-aware
- - renamed the package from SSLeay to OpenSSL (the files still contain
- their history because I've copied them in the repository)
- - removed obsolete files (the test scripts will be replaced
- by better Test::Harness variants in the future)
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) First cut for a very conservative source tree cleanup:
- 1. merge various obsolete readme texts into doc/ssleay.txt
- where we collect the old documents and readme texts.
- 2. remove the first part of files where I'm already sure that we no
- longer need them because of three reasons: either they are just temporary
- files which were left by Eric or they are preserved original files where
- I've verified that the diff is also available in the CVS via "cvs diff
- -rSSLeay_0_8_1b" or they were renamed (as it was definitely the case for
- the crypto/md/ stuff).
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) More extension code. Incomplete support for subject and issuer alt
- name, issuer and authority key id. Change the i2v function parameters
- and add an extra 'crl' parameter in the X509V3_CTX structure: guess
- what that's for :-) Fix to ASN1 macro which messed up
- IMPLICIT tag and add f_enum.c which adds a2i, i2a for ENUMERATED.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Preliminary support for ENUMERATED type. This is largely copied from the
- INTEGER code.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new function, EVP_MD_CTX_copy() to replace frequent use of memcpy.
- [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
-
- *) Make sure `make rehash' target really finds the `openssl' program.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall, Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe at adnovum.ch>]
-
- *) Squeeze another 7% of speed out of MD5 assembler, at least on a P2. I'd
- like to hear about it if this slows down other processors.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Add CygWin32 platform information to Configure script.
- [Alan Batie <batie at aahz.jf.intel.com>]
-
- *) Fixed ms/32all.bat script: `no_asm' -> `no-asm'
- [Rainer W. Gerling <gerling at mpg-gv.mpg.de>]
-
- *) New program nseq to manipulate netscape certificate sequences
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify crl2pkcs7 so it supports multiple -certfile arguments. Fix a
- few typos.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixes to BN code. Previously the default was to define BN_RECURSION
- but the BN code had some problems that would cause failures when
- doing certificate verification and some other functions.
- [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
-
- *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add several PKIX and private extended key usage OIDs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify the 'ca' program to handle the new extension code. Modify
- openssl.cnf for new extension format, add comments.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) More X509 V3 changes. Fix typo in v3_bitstr.c. Add support to 'req'
- and add a sample to openssl.cnf so req -x509 now adds appropriate
- CA extensions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Continued X509 V3 changes. Add to other makefiles, integrate with the
- error code, add initial support to X509_print() and x509 application.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Takes a deep breath and start addding X509 V3 extension support code. Add
- files in crypto/x509v3. Move original stuff to crypto/x509v3/old. All this
- stuff is currently isolated and isn't even compiled yet.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Continuing patches for GeneralizedTime. Fix up certificate and CRL
- ASN1 to use ASN1_TIME and modify print routines to use ASN1_TIME_print.
- Removed the versions check from X509 routines when loading extensions:
- this allows certain broken certificates that don't set the version
- properly to be processed.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Deal with irritating shit to do with dependencies, in YAAHW (Yet Another
- Ad Hoc Way) - Makefile.ssls now all contain local dependencies, which
- can still be regenerated with "make depend".
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Spelling mistake in C version of CAST-128.
- [Ben Laurie, reported by Jeremy Hylton <jeremy at cnri.reston.va.us>]
-
- *) Changes to the error generation code. The perl script err-code.pl
- now reads in the old error codes and retains the old numbers, only
- adding new ones if necessary. It also only changes the .err files if new
- codes are added. The makefiles have been modified to only insert errors
- when needed (to avoid needlessly modifying header files). This is done
- by only inserting errors if the .err file is newer than the auto generated
- C file. To rebuild all the error codes from scratch (the old behaviour)
- either modify crypto/Makefile.ssl to pass the -regen flag to err_code.pl
- or delete all the .err files.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) CAST-128 was incorrectly implemented for short keys. The C version has
- been fixed, but is untested. The assembler versions are also fixed, but
- new assembler HAS NOT BEEN GENERATED FOR WIN32 - the Makefile needs fixing
- to regenerate it if needed.
- [Ben Laurie, reported (with fix for C version) by Jun-ichiro itojun
- Hagino <itojun at kame.net>]
-
- *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
-
- *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
- functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
- GeneralizedTime. ASN1_TIME is the proper type used in certificates et
- al: it's just almost always a UTCTime. Note this patch adds new error
- codes so do a "make errors" if there are problems.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
- [Ulf M\xF6ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
-
- *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
- [Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
-
- *) Generate an error if given an empty string as a cert directory. Also
- generate an error if handed NULL (previously returned 0 to indicate an
- error, but didn't set one).
- [Ben Laurie, reported by Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
-
- *) Add prototypes to SSL methods. Make SSL_write's buffer const, at last.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Fix the dummy function BN_ref_mod_exp() in rsaref.c to have the correct
- parameters. This was causing a warning which killed off the Win32 compile.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Remove C++ style comments from crypto/bn/bn_local.h.
- [Neil Costigan <neil.costigan at celocom.com>]
-
- *) The function OBJ_txt2nid was broken. It was supposed to return a nid
- based on a text string, looking up short and long names and finally
- "dot" format. The "dot" format stuff didn't work. Added new function
- OBJ_txt2obj to do the same but return an ASN1_OBJECT and rewrote
- OBJ_txt2nid to use it. OBJ_txt2obj can also return objects even if the
- OID is not part of the table.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add prototypes to X509 lookup/verify methods, fixing a bug in
- X509_LOOKUP_by_alias().
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Sort openssl functions by name.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Get the gendsa program working (hopefully) and add it to app list. Remove
- encryption from sample DSA keys (in case anyone is interested the password
- was "1234").
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make _all_ *_free functions accept a NULL pointer.
- [Frans Heymans <fheymans at isaserver.be>]
-
- *) If a DH key is generated in s3_srvr.c, don't blow it by trying to use
- NULL pointers.
- [Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
-
- *) s_server should send the CAfile as acceptable CAs, not its own cert.
- [Bodo Moeller <3moeller at informatik.uni-hamburg.de>]
-
- *) Don't blow it for numeric -newkey arguments to apps/req.
- [Bodo Moeller <3moeller at informatik.uni-hamburg.de>]
-
- *) Temp key "for export" tests were wrong in s3_srvr.c.
- [Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
-
- *) Add prototype for temp key callback functions
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_{rsa,dh}_callback().
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Make DH_free() tolerate being passed a NULL pointer (like RSA_free() and
- DSA_free()). Make X509_PUBKEY_set() check for errors in d2i_PublicKey().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) X509_name_add_entry() freed the wrong thing after an error.
- [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
-
- *) rsa_eay.c would attempt to free a NULL context.
- [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
-
- *) BIO_s_socket() had a broken should_retry() on Windoze.
- [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
-
- *) BIO_f_buffer() didn't pass on BIO_CTRL_FLUSH.
- [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
-
- *) Make sure the already existing X509_STORE->depth variable is initialized
- in X509_STORE_new(), but document the fact that this variable is still
- unused in the certificate verification process.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Fix the various library and apps files to free up pkeys obtained from
- X509_PUBKEY_get() et al. Also allow x509.c to handle netscape extensions.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix reference counting in X509_PUBKEY_get(). This makes
- demos/maurice/example2.c work, amongst others, probably.
- [Steve Henson and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) First cut of a cleanup for apps/. First the `ssleay' program is now named
- `openssl' and second, the shortcut symlinks for the `openssl <command>'
- are no longer created. This way we have a single and consistent command
- line interface `openssl <command>', similar to `cvs <command>'.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall, Paul Sutton and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) ca.c: move test for DSA keys inside #ifndef NO_DSA. Make pubkey
- BIT STRING wrapper always have zero unused bits.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add CA.pl, perl version of CA.sh, add extended key usage OID.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make the top-level INSTALL documentation easier to understand.
- [Paul Sutton]
-
- *) Makefiles updated to exit if an error occurs in a sub-directory
- make (including if user presses ^C) [Paul Sutton]
-
- *) Make Montgomery context stuff explicit in RSA data structure.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Fix build order of pem and err to allow for generated pem.h.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Fix renumbering bug in X509_NAME_delete_entry().
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Enhanced the err-ins.pl script so it makes the error library number
- global and can add a library name. This is needed for external ASN1 and
- other error libraries.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fixed sk_insert which never worked properly.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Fix ASN1 macros so they can handle indefinite length construted
- EXPLICIT tags. Some non standard certificates use these: they can now
- be read in.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Merged the various old/obsolete SSLeay documentation files (doc/xxx.doc)
- into a single doc/ssleay.txt bundle. This way the information is still
- preserved but no longer messes up this directory. Now it's new room for
- the new set of documenation files.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) SETs were incorrectly DER encoded. This was a major pain, because they
- shared code with SEQUENCEs, which aren't coded the same. This means that
- almost everything to do with SETs or SEQUENCEs has either changed name or
- number of arguments.
- [Ben Laurie, based on a partial fix by GP Jayan <gp at nsj.co.jp>]
-
- *) Fix test data to work with the above.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
- was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
- [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf M\xF6ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
-
- *) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Fix various bugs in Configure. This affects the following platforms:
- nextstep
- ncr-scde
- unixware-2.0
- unixware-2.0-pentium
- sco5-cc.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Eliminate generated files from CVS. Reorder tests to regenerate files
- before they are needed.
- [Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Generate Makefile.ssl from Makefile.org (to keep CVS happy).
- [Ben Laurie]
-
-
- Changes between 0.9.1b and 0.9.1c [23-Dec-1998]
-
- *) Added OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to crypto/crypto.h and
- changed SSLeay to OpenSSL in version strings.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Some fixups to the top-level documents.
- [Paul Sutton]
-
- *) Fixed the nasty bug where rsaref.h was not found under compile-time
- because the symlink to include/ was missing.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Incorporated the popular no-RSA/DSA-only patches
- which allow to compile a RSA-free SSLeay.
- [Andrew Cooke / Interrader Ldt., Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Fixed nasty rehash problem under `make -f Makefile.ssl links'
- when "ssleay" is still not found.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Added more platforms to Configure: Cray T3E, HPUX 11,
- [Ralf S. Engelschall, Beckmann <beckman at acl.lanl.gov>]
-
- *) Updated the README file.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Added various .cvsignore files in the CVS repository subdirs
- to make a "cvs update" really silent.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Recompiled the error-definition header files and added
- missing symbols to the Win32 linker tables.
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Cleaned up the top-level documents;
- o new files: CHANGES and LICENSE
- o merged VERSION, HISTORY* and README* files a CHANGES.SSLeay
- o merged COPYRIGHT into LICENSE
- o removed obsolete TODO file
- o renamed MICROSOFT to INSTALL.W32
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Removed dummy files from the 0.9.1b source tree:
- crypto/asn1/x crypto/bio/cd crypto/bio/fg crypto/bio/grep crypto/bio/vi
- crypto/bn/asm/......add.c crypto/bn/asm/a.out crypto/dsa/f crypto/md5/f
- crypto/pem/gmon.out crypto/perlasm/f crypto/pkcs7/build crypto/rsa/f
- crypto/sha/asm/f crypto/threads/f ms/zzz ssl/f ssl/f.mak test/f
- util/f.mak util/pl/f util/pl/f.mak crypto/bf/bf_locl.old apps/f
- [Ralf S. Engelschall]
-
- *) Added various platform portability fixes.
- [Mark J. Cox]
-
- *) The Genesis of the OpenSSL rpject:
- We start with the latest (unreleased) SSLeay version 0.9.1b which Eric A.
- Young and Tim J. Hudson created while they were working for C2Net until
- summer 1998.
- [The OpenSSL Project]
-
-
- Changes between 0.9.0b and 0.9.1b [not released]
-
- *) Updated a few CA certificates under certs/
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Changed some BIGNUM api stuff.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Various platform ports: OpenBSD, Ultrix, IRIX 64bit, NetBSD,
- DGUX x86, Linux Alpha, etc.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) New COMP library [crypto/comp/] for SSL Record Layer Compression:
- RLE (dummy implemented) and ZLIB (really implemented when ZLIB is
- available).
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Add -strparse option to asn1pars program which parses nested
- binary structures
- [Dr Stephen Henson <shenson at bigfoot.com>]
-
- *) Added "oid_file" to ssleay.cnf for "ca" and "req" programs.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) DSA fix for "ca" program.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added "-genkey" option to "dsaparam" program.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added RIPE MD160 (rmd160) message digest.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added -a (all) option to "ssleay version" command.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added PLATFORM define which is the id given to Configure.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added MemCheck_XXXX functions to crypto/mem.c for memory checking.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Extended the ASN.1 parser routines.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Extended BIO routines to support REUSEADDR, seek, tell, etc.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added a BN_CTX to the BN library.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Fixed the weak key values in DES library
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Changed API in EVP library for cipher aliases.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added support for RC2/64bit cipher.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Converted the lhash library to the crypto/mem.c functions.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added more recognized ASN.1 object ids.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added more RSA padding checks for SSL/TLS.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added BIO proxy/filter functionality.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added extra_certs to SSL_CTX which can be used
- send extra CA certificates to the client in the CA cert chain sending
- process. It can be configured with SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert().
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Now Fortezza is denied in the authentication phase because
- this is key exchange mechanism is not supported by SSLeay at all.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Additional PKCS1 checks.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Support the string "TLSv1" for all TLS v1 ciphers.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Added function SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() which gives the
- ex_data index of the SSL context in the X509_STORE_CTX ex_data.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Fixed a few memory leaks.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) Fixed various code and comment typos.
- [Eric A. Young]
-
- *) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0
- bytes sent in the client random.
- [Edward Bishop <ebishop at spyglass.com>]
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CHANGES (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/CHANGES)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CHANGES (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CHANGES 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,10484 @@
+
+ OpenSSL CHANGES
+ _______________
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1p and 1.0.1q [3 Dec 2015]
+
+ *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
+
+ The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+ dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+ algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
+ routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
+ used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
+ DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
+ vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
+ authentication.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
+ (CVE-2015-3194)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+
+ When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
+ memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
+ application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
+ affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ (CVE-2015-3195)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
+ This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
+ though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
+ legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+ return an error
+ [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen at intel.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1o and 1.0.1p [9 Jul 2015]
+
+ *) Alternate chains certificate forgery
+
+ During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+ alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
+ fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
+ attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
+ bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
+ certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
+ (Google/BoringSSL).
+ (CVE-2015-1793)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Race condition handling PSK identify hint
+
+ If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
+ the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
+ result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
+ identify hint data.
+ (CVE-2015-3196)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
+ *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
+ incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
+ restored.
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1m and 1.0.1n [11 Jun 2015]
+
+ *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
+
+ When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
+ if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
+ field.
+
+ This can be used to perform denial of service against any
+ system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
+ certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
+ client authentication enabled.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
+ (CVE-2015-1788)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+
+ X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
+ string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
+ X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
+ time string.
+
+ An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
+ various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
+ a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
+ that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
+ authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
+ callbacks.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
+ independently by Hanno Böck.
+ (CVE-2015-1789)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
+ with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
+ structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
+ servers are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ (CVE-2015-1790)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+
+ When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
+ if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
+ denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
+ the CMS code.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
+ (CVE-2015-1792)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+
+ If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
+ reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
+ a double free of the ticket data.
+ (CVE-2015-1791)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits.
+ [Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper]
+
+ *) dhparam: generate 2048-bit parameters by default.
+ [Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.1m [19 Mar 2015]
+
+ *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
+
+ The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
+ made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
+ certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
+ certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+ application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+ OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+ (CVE-2015-0286)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
+
+ Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
+ memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
+ strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
+
+ Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
+ components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
+ functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
+ not affected.
+ (CVE-2015-0287)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
+ missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
+ otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
+ affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ (CVE-2015-0289)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
+
+ A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
+ servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
+ a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
+
+ This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
+ (OpenSSL development team).
+ (CVE-2015-0293)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
+
+ A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
+ could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
+ free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
+ or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
+ for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
+ sources. This scenario is considered rare.
+
+ This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
+ commit 517073cd4b.
+ (CVE-2015-0209)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
+
+ The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
+ the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
+
+ This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
+ (CVE-2015-0288)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015]
+
+ *) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
+ [Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
+ message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
+ dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
+ Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3571)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
+ dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
+ could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
+ sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
+ by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
+ Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2015-0206)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
+ built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
+ method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
+ dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3569)
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
+ ECDH ciphersuites.
+
+ Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
+ reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3572)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
+ violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
+ non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
+ downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
+ certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
+ INRIA or reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2015-0204)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
+ An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
+ without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
+ authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
+ which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
+ containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
+ Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
+ this issue.
+ (CVE-2015-0205)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
+ SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
+
+ The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX,
+ and can vary with the CTX.
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+
+ By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+ certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+ Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+ this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+ certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+ 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+ If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+ the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+ 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+ Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+ certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+ errors for some broken certificates.
+
+ Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+
+ 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+ Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+ signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+ This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+ (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+ program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+ (negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+ Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+ of the OpenSSL core team.
+
+ (CVE-2014-8275)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+ results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+ with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+ way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+ Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+ fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+ Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+ the OpenSSL core team.
+ (CVE-2014-3570)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
+ version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
+ version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
+ sanity and breaks all known clients.
+ [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
+ early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
+ renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
+ ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
+ the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
+ announced in the initial ServerHello.
+
+ Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
+ was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
+
+ *) SRTP Memory Leak.
+
+ A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
+ sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
+ to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
+ exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
+ 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
+ whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
+ have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
+
+ The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
+ (CVE-2014-3513)
+ [OpenSSL team]
+
+ *) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
+
+ When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
+ integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
+ ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
+ causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
+ tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
+ attack.
+ (CVE-2014-3567)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
+
+ When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
+ could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
+ configured to send them.
+ (CVE-2014-3568)
+ [Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
+
+ *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
+ Client applications doing fallback retries should call
+ SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
+ (CVE-2014-3566)
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
+
+ Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
+ verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
+ DigestInfo structures.
+
+ Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+ *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
+ SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
+ g, A, B < N to SRP code.
+
+ Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
+ Group for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3512)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
+ TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
+ is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
+ downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
+ higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
+
+ Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
+ researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3511)
+ [David Benjamin]
+
+ *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
+ to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
+ with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
+ ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
+
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3510)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
+ to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3507)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
+ processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3506)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
+ whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
+ can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
+ this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3505)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
+ session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
+ up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
+
+ Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3509)
+ [Gabor Tyukasz]
+
+ *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
+ dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
+ properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+
+ Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
+ discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-5139)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+ X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
+ from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
+ output to the attacker.
+
+ Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3508)
+ [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+ *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+ handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+ SSL/TLS clients and servers.
+
+ Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+ researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
+ [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+ OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+ in a DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-0221)
+ [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+ be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+ client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+ code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+ Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+ [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+ are subject to a denial of service attack.
+
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
+ [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+ compilation flags.
+ [mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>]
+
+ *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+ in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+ [mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>]
+
+ *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
+ [mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+ *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+ can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+ server.
+
+ Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+ Adam Langley <agl at chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller at acm.org> for
+ preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+ ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+ by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+ Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+ [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+ *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+
+ Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+ TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+ less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+ is at least 512 bytes long.
+
+ [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+ *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
+ handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+ Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+ (CVE-2013-4353)
+
+ *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+ structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+ to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+ avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+ Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+ several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
+ is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+ 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+ [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
+ supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
+ ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
+ Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl at chromium.org> for discovering
+ and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
+ <wolfgang.ettlinger at gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2012-2686)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+ [Chris Palmer <palmer at google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling at comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
+ if renegotiating.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
+ 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
+ approved.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
+ 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
+ mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
+ SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
+ TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
+ 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+ will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
+ inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
+ in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
+ disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
+ protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
+ that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
+ above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
+ SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
+ client side.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl at chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
+ record length exceeds 255 bytes.
+
+ 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
+ hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
+ 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
+ the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+ set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
+ -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
+ Most broken servers should now work.
+ 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
+ TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
+ STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
+ and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
+ OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular
+ those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect
+ the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate
+ support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA
+ encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum pemitted
+ client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy
+ and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann at fh-muenster.de>]
+
+ *) Add support for SCTP.
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann at fh-muenster.de>]
+
+ *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+ [Paul Green <Paul.Green at stratus.com>]
+
+ *) Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably:
+
+ - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support;
+ - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES);
+ - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation;
+ - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations;
+ - s390x: z196 support;
+ - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations;
+
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup
+ (removal of unnecessary code)
+ [Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester at edelweb.fr>]
+
+ *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705.
+ [Eric Rescorla]
+
+ *) Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764.
+ [Eric Rescorla]
+
+ *) Add Next Protocol Negotiation,
+ http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be
+ disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated
+ by Google.
+ [Adam Langley <agl at google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224,
+ NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on
+ typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is
+ required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds).
+ Code made available under Apache License version 2.0.
+
+ Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command
+ line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or
+ "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs:
+
+ EC_GFp_nistp224_method()
+ EC_GFp_nistp256_method()
+ EC_GFp_nistp521_method()
+
+ EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
+ implementations).
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
+ all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
+ header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional
+ signature parameters can be passed using this option and in
+ particular PSS.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the
+ appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the
+ corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines.
+ New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised
+ EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on
+ the appropriate parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function
+ to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1
+ handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used.
+ Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked
+ against a number of sample certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs.
+ [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser <lists at kaiser.cx>]
+
+ *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method
+ can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump.
+
+ More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful
+ information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature
+ parameters r, s.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing
+ RFC3211.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This
+ neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required
+ for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as
+ password based CMS).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Session-handling fixes:
+ - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID,
+ but also support Session Tickets.
+ - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client
+ presented a ticket with an expired session.
+ - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable.
+ - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information.
+ - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets.
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix PSK session representation.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Intel.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split
+ the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record)
+ portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and
+ RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to inlclude GCM and
+ add a special AESGCM string for GCM only.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation
+ field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support.
+ As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for
+ versions of TLS earlier than 1.2.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method
+ as unset and return the appopriate default but do *not* set the default.
+ This means we can return the appopriate method in applications that
+ swicth between FIPS and non-FIPS modes.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an
+ ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we
+ keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities.
+ [Peter Eckersley <pde at eff.org>, Ben Laurie and Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use
+ FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not
+ all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen,
+ encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt
+ to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want
+ to use them can use the private_* version instead.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o
+ for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical
+ order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first.
+ This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers
+ and enable MD5.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying
+ FIPS modules versions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache
+ of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use
+ until after the certificate request message is received.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms
+ extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature
+ format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for
+ TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch
+ to new signature format when needed using client digest preference.
+ All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client
+ support yet and no support for client certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch
+ to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based
+ ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with
+ TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete
+ SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods
+ and version checking.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled
+ with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal
+ structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application
+ to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add SRP support.
+ [Tom Wu <tjw at cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function
+ SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated().
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann at fh-muenster.de>]
+
+ *) Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used
+ automatically instead of needing explicit application support.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705.
+ [Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann at fh-muenster.de>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only
+ a few changes are required:
+
+ Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag.
+ Add TLSv1_1 methods.
+ Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1.
+ Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code).
+ Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+ an MMA defence is not necessary.
+ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode at us.ibm.com> for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
+ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+ Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode at us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+ Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+ preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+ [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+ of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+ which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+ the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+ differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+ paper describing this attack can be found at:
+ http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+ <seggelmann at fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen at fh-muenster.de>
+ for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+ *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+ (CVE-2011-4576)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+ Kadianakis <desnacked at gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
+ [Andrey Kulikov <amdeich at gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+ Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+ and Rob Austein <sra at hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+ [Rob Austein <sra at hactrn.net>]
+
+ *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+ [Paul Green <Paul.Green at stratus.com>]
+
+ *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+ interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+ BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+ threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+ This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+ lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+ BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+ the last update always remained unused).
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
+ [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]
+
+ *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted
+ by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207)
+ [Kaspar Brand <ossl at velox.ch>]
+
+ *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
+ for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check
+ signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead.
+ Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
+ by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
+
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
+
+ [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0c and 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]
+
+ *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
+ [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
+ escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
+ ambiguous.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]
+
+ *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
+ and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
+ Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
+ Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
+ Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]
+
+ *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
+ overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
+ be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix WIN32 build system to correctly link an ENGINE directory into
+ a DLL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a [01 Jun 2010]
+
+ *) Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover
+ (CVE-2010-1633)
+ [Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager <hager at dortmund.net>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]
+
+ *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher
+ context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in
+ case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to
+ output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Willy Weisz <weisz at vcpc.univie.ac.at>]
+
+ *) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the
+ compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining
+ it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option
+ to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update OCSP request code to permit adding custom headers to the request:
+ some responders need this.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The function EVP_PKEY_sign() returns <=0 on error: check return code
+ correctly.
+ [Julia Lawall <julia at diku.dk>]
+
+ *) Update verify callback code in apps/s_cb.c and apps/verify.c, it
+ needlessly dereferenced structures, used obsolete functions and
+ didn't handle all updated verify codes correctly.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Disable MD2 in the default configuration.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In BIO_pop() and BIO_push() use the ctrl argument (which was NULL) to
+ indicate the initial BIO being pushed or popped. This makes it possible
+ to determine whether the BIO is the one explicitly called or as a result
+ of the ctrl being passed down the chain. Fix BIO_pop() and SSL BIOs so
+ it handles reference counts correctly and doesn't zero out the I/O bio
+ when it is not being explicitly popped. WARNING: applications which
+ included workarounds for the old buggy behaviour will need to be modified
+ or they could free up already freed BIOs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extend the uni2asc/asc2uni => OPENSSL_uni2asc/OPENSSL_asc2uni
+ renaming to all platforms (within the 0.9.8 branch, this was
+ done conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash).
+ [Guenter <lists at gknw.net>]
+
+ *) Add ECDHE and PSK support to DTLS.
+ [Michael Tuexen <tuexen at fh-muenster.de>]
+
+ *) Add CHECKED_STACK_OF macro to safestack.h, otherwise safestack can't
+ be used on C++.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add "missing" function EVP_MD_flags() (without this the only way to
+ retrieve a digest flags is by accessing the structure directly. Update
+ EVP_MD_do_all*() and EVP_CIPHER_do_all*() to include the name a digest
+ or cipher is registered as in the "from" argument. Print out all
+ registered digests in the dgst usage message instead of manually
+ attempting to work them out.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If no SSLv2 ciphers are used don't use an SSLv2 compatible client hello:
+ this allows the use of compression and extensions. Change default cipher
+ string to remove SSLv2 ciphersuites. This effectively avoids ancient SSLv2
+ by default unless an application cipher string requests it.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Alter match criteria in PKCS12_parse(). It used to try to use local
+ key ids to find matching certificates and keys but some PKCS#12 files
+ don't follow the (somewhat unwritten) rules and this strategy fails.
+ Now just gather all certificates together and the first private key
+ then look for the first certificate that matches the key.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support use of registered digest and cipher names for dgst and cipher
+ commands instead of having to add each one as a special case. So now
+ you can do:
+
+ openssl sha256 foo
+
+ as well as:
+
+ openssl dgst -sha256 foo
+
+ and this works for ENGINE based algorithms too.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update Gost ENGINE to support parameter files.
+ [Victor B. Wagner <vitus at cryptocom.ru>]
+
+ *) Support GeneralizedTime in ca utility.
+ [Oliver Martin <oliver at volatilevoid.net>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Enhance the hash format used for certificate directory links. The new
+ form uses the canonical encoding (meaning equivalent names will work
+ even if they aren't identical) and uses SHA1 instead of MD5. This form
+ is incompatible with the older format and as a result c_rehash should
+ be used to rebuild symbolic links.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make PKCS#8 the default write format for private keys, replacing the
+ traditional format. This form is standardised, more secure and doesn't
+ include an implicit MD5 dependency.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a $gcc_devteam_warn option to Configure. The idea is that any code
+ committed to OpenSSL should pass this lot as a minimum.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add session ticket override functionality for use by EAP-FAST.
+ [Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>]
+
+ *) Modify HMAC functions to return a value. Since these can be implemented
+ in an ENGINE errors can occur.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch_ex.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch. Also some constification necessitated
+ by type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?),
+ OBJ_bsearch_ex, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING,
+ CONF_VALUE.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_adj() to add a specific number of days and
+ seconds to a tm structure directly, instead of going through OS
+ specific date routines. This avoids any issues with OS routines such
+ as the year 2038 bug. New *_adj() functions for ASN1 time structures
+ and X509_time_adj_ex() to cover the extended range. The existing
+ X509_time_adj() is still usable and will no longer have any date issues.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Delta CRL support. New use deltas option which will attempt to locate
+ and search any appropriate delta CRLs available.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for CRLs partitioned by reason code. Reorganise CRL processing
+ code and add additional score elements. Validate alternate CRL paths
+ as part of the CRL checking and indicate a new error "CRL path validation
+ error" in this case. Applications wanting additional details can use
+ the verify callback and check the new "parent" field. If this is not
+ NULL CRL path validation is taking place. Existing applications wont
+ see this because it requires extended CRL support which is off by
+ default.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for freshest CRL extension.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial indirect CRL support. Currently only supported in the CRLs
+ passed directly and not via lookup. Process certificate issuer
+ CRL entry extension and lookup CRL entries by bother issuer name
+ and serial number. Check and process CRL issuer entry in IDP extension.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for distinct certificate and CRL paths. The CRL issuer
+ certificate is validated separately in this case. Only enabled if
+ an extended CRL support flag is set: this flag will enable additional
+ CRL functionality in future.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for policy mappings extension.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes to pathlength constraint, self issued certificate handling,
+ policy processing to align with RFC3280 and PKITS tests.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for name constraints certificate extension. DN, email, DNS
+ and URI types are currently supported.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) To cater for systems that provide a pointer-based thread ID rather
+ than numeric, deprecate the current numeric thread ID mechanism and
+ replace it with a structure and associated callback type. This
+ mechanism allows a numeric "hash" to be extracted from a thread ID in
+ either case, and on platforms where pointers are larger than 'long',
+ mixing is done to help ensure the numeric 'hash' is usable even if it
+ can't be guaranteed unique. The default mechanism is to use "&errno"
+ as a pointer-based thread ID to distinguish between threads.
+
+ Applications that want to provide their own thread IDs should now use
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback() to register a callback that will call
+ either CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric() or CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer().
+
+ Note that ERR_remove_state() is now deprecated, because it is tied
+ to the assumption that thread IDs are numeric. ERR_remove_state(0)
+ to free the current thread's error state should be replaced by
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL).
+
+ (This new approach replaces the functions CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback(),
+ CRYPTO_get_idptr_callback(), and CRYPTO_thread_idptr() that existed in
+ OpenSSL 0.9.9-dev between June 2006 and August 2008. Also, if an
+ application was previously providing a numeric thread callback that
+ was inappropriate for distinguishing threads, then uniqueness might
+ have been obtained with &errno that happened immediately in the
+ intermediate development versions of OpenSSL; this is no longer the
+ case, the numeric thread callback will now override the automatic use
+ of &errno.)
+ [Geoff Thorpe, with help from Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Initial support for different CRL issuing certificates. This covers a
+ simple case where the self issued certificates in the chain exist and
+ the real CRL issuer is higher in the existing chain.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Removed effectively defunct crypto/store from the build.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Revamp of STACK to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come:
+ TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE,
+ ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add a new SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS mode flag to release unused buffer
+ RAM on SSL connections. This option can save about 34k per idle SSL.
+ [Nick Mathewson]
+
+ *) Revamp of LHASH to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come:
+ STACK, TXT_DB, bsearch, qsort.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Initial support for Cryptographic Message Syntax (aka CMS) based
+ on RFC3850, RFC3851 and RFC3852. New cms directory and cms utility,
+ support for data, signedData, compressedData, digestedData and
+ encryptedData, envelopedData types included. Scripts to check against
+ RFC4134 examples draft and interop and consistency checks of many
+ content types and variants.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add options to enc utility to support use of zlib compression BIO.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extend mk1mf to support importing of options and assembly language
+ files from Configure script, currently only included in VC-WIN32.
+ The assembly language rules can now optionally generate the source
+ files from the associated perl scripts.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement remaining functionality needed to support GOST ciphersuites.
+ Interop testing has been performed using CryptoPro implementations.
+ [Victor B. Wagner <vitus at cryptocom.ru>]
+
+ *) s390x assembler pack.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) ARMv4 assembler pack. ARMv4 refers to v4 and later ISA, not CPU
+ "family."
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Implement Opaque PRF Input TLS extension as specified in
+ draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt. Since this is not an
+ official specification yet and no extension type assignment by
+ IANA exists, this extension (for now) will have to be explicitly
+ enabled when building OpenSSL by providing the extension number
+ to use. For example, specify an option
+
+ -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=0x9527
+
+ to the "config" or "Configure" script to enable the extension,
+ assuming extension number 0x9527 (which is a completely arbitrary
+ and unofficial assignment based on the MD5 hash of the Internet
+ Draft). Note that by doing so, you potentially lose
+ interoperability with other TLS implementations since these might
+ be using the same extension number for other purposes.
+
+ SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, src, len) is used to set the
+ opaque PRF input value to use in the handshake. This will create
+ an interal copy of the length-'len' string at 'src', and will
+ return non-zero for success.
+
+ To get more control and flexibility, provide a callback function
+ by using
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb)
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg)
+
+ where
+
+ int (*cb)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
+ void *arg;
+
+ Callback function 'cb' will be called in handshakes, and is
+ expected to use SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input() as appropriate.
+ Argument 'arg' is for application purposes (the value as given to
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg() will directly
+ be provided to the callback function). The callback function
+ has to return non-zero to report success: usually 1 to use opaque
+ PRF input just if possible, or 2 to enforce use of the opaque PRF
+ input. In the latter case, the library will abort the handshake
+ if opaque PRF input is not successfully negotiated.
+
+ Arguments 'peerinput' and 'len' given to the callback function
+ will always be NULL and 0 in the case of a client. A server will
+ see the client's opaque PRF input through these variables if
+ available (NULL and 0 otherwise). Note that if the server
+ provides an opaque PRF input, the length must be the same as the
+ length of the client's opaque PRF input.
+
+ Note that the callback function will only be called when creating
+ a new session (session resumption can resume whatever was
+ previously negotiated), and will not be called in SSL 2.0
+ handshakes; thus, SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) or
+ SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) is especially recommended
+ for applications that need to enforce opaque PRF input.
+
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Update ssl code to support digests other than SHA1+MD5 for handshake
+ MAC.
+
+ [Victor B. Wagner <vitus at cryptocom.ru>]
+
+ *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in
+ RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded
+ SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically
+ supported.
+
+ If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure
+ support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded
+ SSL_SESSION.
+
+ The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket
+ protection in servers so again support should be possible
+ with no application modification.
+
+ If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option
+ SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set.
+
+ Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client
+ or server extensions to be examined.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Final changes to avoid use of pointer pointer casts in OpenSSL.
+ OpenSSL should now compile cleanly on gcc 4.2
+ [Peter Hartley <pdh at utter.chaos.org.uk>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update SSL library to use new EVP_PKEY MAC API. Include generic MAC
+ support including streaming MAC support: this is required for GOST
+ ciphersuite support.
+ [Victor B. Wagner <vitus at cryptocom.ru>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add option -stream to use PKCS#7 streaming in smime utility. New
+ function i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() and PEM_write_PKCS7_bio_stream()
+ to output in BER and PEM format.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Experimental support for use of HMAC via EVP_PKEY interface. This
+ allows HMAC to be handled via the EVP_DigestSign*() interface. The
+ EVP_PKEY "key" in this case is the HMAC key, potentially allowing
+ ENGINE support for HMAC keys which are unextractable. New -mac and
+ -macopt options to dgst utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use
+ EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use
+ alternative signing paramaters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst
+ utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change ssl_cipher_apply_rule(), the internal function that does
+ the work each time a ciphersuite string requests enabling
+ ("foo+bar"), moving ("+foo+bar"), disabling ("-foo+bar", or
+ removing ("!foo+bar") a class of ciphersuites: Now it maintains
+ the order of disabled ciphersuites such that those ciphersuites
+ that most recently went from enabled to disabled not only stay
+ in order with respect to each other, but also have higher priority
+ than other disabled ciphersuites the next time ciphersuites are
+ enabled again.
+
+ This means that you can now say, e.g., "PSK:-PSK:HIGH" to enable
+ the same ciphersuites as with "HIGH" alone, but in a specific
+ order where the PSK ciphersuites come first (since they are the
+ most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed).
+
+ Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new
+ funcionality) such that between otherwise identical
+ cihpersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in
+ the default order.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change ssl_create_cipher_list() so that it automatically
+ arranges the ciphersuites in reasonable order before starting
+ to process the rule string. Thus, the definition for "DEFAULT"
+ (SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST) now is just "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL", but
+ remains equivalent to "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+aECDH:+kRSA:+RC4:@STRENGTH".
+ This makes it much easier to arrive at a reasonable default order
+ in applications for which anonymous ciphers are OK (meaning
+ that you can't actually use DEFAULT).
+ [Bodo Moeller; suggested by Victor Duchovni]
+
+ *) Split the SSL/TLS algorithm mask (as used for ciphersuite string
+ processing) into multiple integers instead of setting
+ "SSL_MKEY_MASK" bits, "SSL_AUTH_MASK" bits, "SSL_ENC_MASK",
+ "SSL_MAC_MASK", and "SSL_SSL_MASK" bits all in a single integer.
+ (These masks as well as the individual bit definitions are hidden
+ away into the non-exported interface ssl/ssl_locl.h, so this
+ change to the definition of the SSL_CIPHER structure shouldn't
+ affect applications.) This give us more bits for each of these
+ categories, so there is no longer a need to coagulate AES128 and
+ AES256 into a single algorithm bit, and to coagulate Camellia128
+ and Camellia256 into a single algorithm bit, which has led to all
+ kinds of kludges.
+
+ Thus, among other things, the kludge introduced in 0.9.7m and
+ 0.9.8e for masking out AES256 independently of AES128 or masking
+ out Camellia256 independently of AES256 is not needed here in 0.9.9.
+
+ With the change, we also introduce new ciphersuite aliases that
+ so far were missing: "AES128", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", and
+ "CAMELLIA256".
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add support for dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256.
+ Use the leftmost N bytes of the signature input if the input is
+ larger than the prime q (with N being the size in bytes of q).
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Very *very* experimental PKCS#7 streaming encoder support. Nothing uses
+ it yet and it is largely untested.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for the ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Initial incomplete changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL
+ some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. Safestack is
+ reimplemented. Update ASN1 to avoid use of legacy functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Win32/64 targets are linked with Winsock2.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected
+ to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling
+ efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing
+ the CRL revoked certificates in a database.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Overhaul of by_dir code. Add support for dynamic loading of CRLs so
+ new CRLs added to a directory can be used. New command line option
+ -verify_return_error to s_client and s_server. This causes real errors
+ to be returned by the verify callback instead of carrying on no matter
+ what. This reflects the way a "real world" verify callback would behave.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) GOST engine, supporting several GOST algorithms and public key formats.
+ Kindly donated by Cryptocom.
+ [Cryptocom]
+
+ *) Partial support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. CRLs
+ partitioned by DP are handled but no indirect CRL or reason partitioning
+ (yet). Complete overhaul of CRL handling: now the most suitable CRL is
+ selected via a scoring technique which handles IDP and AKID in CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New X509_STORE_CTX callbacks lookup_crls() and lookup_certs() which
+ will ultimately be used for all verify operations: this will remove the
+ X509_STORE dependency on certificate verification and allow alternative
+ lookup methods. X509_STORE based implementations of these two callbacks.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names.
+ Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function X509_CRL_match() to check if two CRLs are identical. Normally
+ this would be called X509_CRL_cmp() but that name is already used by
+ a function that just compares CRL issuer names. Cache several CRL
+ extensions in X509_CRL structure and cache CRLDP in X509.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Store a "canonical" representation of X509_NAME structure (ASN1 Name)
+ this maps equivalent X509_NAME structures into a consistent structure.
+ Name comparison can then be performed rapidly using memcmp().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Non-blocking OCSP request processing. Add -timeout option to ocsp
+ utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow digests to supply their own micalg string for S/MIME type using
+ the ctrl EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) During PKCS7 signing pass the PKCS7 SignerInfo structure to the
+ EVP_PKEY_METHOD before and after signing via the EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN
+ ctrl. It can then customise the structure before and/or after signing
+ if necessary.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function OBJ_add_sigid() to allow application defined signature OIDs
+ to be added to OpenSSLs internal tables. New function OBJ_sigid_free()
+ to free up any added signature OIDs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_do_all(), EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(),
+ EVP_MD_do_all() and EVP_MD_do_all_sorted() to enumerate internal
+ digest and cipher tables. New options added to openssl utility:
+ list-message-digest-algorithms and list-cipher-algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change the array representation of binary polynomials: the list
+ of degrees of non-zero coefficients is now terminated with -1.
+ Previously it was terminated with 0, which was also part of the
+ value; thus, the array representation was not applicable to
+ polynomials where t^0 has coefficient zero. This change makes
+ the array representation useful in a more general context.
+ [Douglas Stebila]
+
+ *) Various modifications and fixes to SSL/TLS cipher string
+ handling. For ECC, the code now distinguishes between fixed ECDH
+ with RSA certificates on the one hand and with ECDSA certificates
+ on the other hand, since these are separate ciphersuites. The
+ unused code for Fortezza ciphersuites has been removed.
+
+ For consistency with EDH, ephemeral ECDH is now called "EECDH"
+ (not "ECDHE"). For consistency with the code for DH
+ certificates, use of ECDH certificates is now considered ECDH
+ authentication, not RSA or ECDSA authentication (the latter is
+ merely the CA's signing algorithm and not actively used in the
+ protocol).
+
+ The temporary ciphersuite alias "ECCdraft" is no longer
+ available, and ECC ciphersuites are no longer excluded from "ALL"
+ and "DEFAULT". The following aliases now exist for RFC 4492
+ ciphersuites, most of these by analogy with the DH case:
+
+ kECDHr - ECDH cert, signed with RSA
+ kECDHe - ECDH cert, signed with ECDSA
+ kECDH - ECDH cert (signed with either RSA or ECDSA)
+ kEECDH - ephemeral ECDH
+ ECDH - ECDH cert or ephemeral ECDH
+
+ aECDH - ECDH cert
+ aECDSA - ECDSA cert
+ ECDSA - ECDSA cert
+
+ AECDH - anonymous ECDH
+ EECDH - non-anonymous ephemeral ECDH (equivalent to "kEECDH:-AECDH")
+
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add additional S/MIME capabilities for AES and GOST ciphers if supported.
+ Use correct micalg parameters depending on digest(s) in signed message.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add engine support for EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. Add functions to process
+ an ENGINE asn1 method. Support ENGINE lookups in the ASN1 code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial engine support for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. New functions to permit
+ an engine to register a method. Add ENGINE lookups for methods and
+ functional reference processing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enchance versions of
+ EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature
+ process.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -resign option to smime utility. This adds one or more signers
+ to an existing PKCS#7 signedData structure. Also -md option to use an
+ alternative message digest algorithm for signing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Tidy up PKCS#7 routines and add new functions to make it easier to
+ create PKCS7 structures containing multiple signers. Update smime
+ application to support multiple signers.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -macalg option to pkcs12 utility to allow setting of an alternative
+ digest MAC.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PRFs other than default SHA1 HMAC.
+ Reorganize PBE internals to lookup from a static table using NIDs,
+ add support for HMAC PBE OID translation. Add a EVP_CIPHER ctrl:
+ EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID this allows a cipher to specify an alternative
+ PRF which will be automatically used with PBES2.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Replace the algorithm specific calls to generate keys in "req" with the
+ new API.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update PKCS#7 enveloped data routines to use new API. This is now
+ supported by any public key method supporting the encrypt operation. A
+ ctrl is added to allow the public key algorithm to examine or modify
+ the PKCS#7 RecipientInfo structure if it needs to: for RSA this is
+ a no op.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a ctrl to asn1 method to allow a public key algorithm to express
+ a default digest type to use. In most cases this will be SHA1 but some
+ algorithms (such as GOST) need to specify an alternative digest. The
+ return value indicates how strong the prefernce is 1 means optional and
+ 2 is mandatory (that is it is the only supported type). Modify
+ ASN1_item_sign() to accept a NULL digest argument to indicate it should
+ use the default md. Update openssl utilities to use the default digest
+ type for signing if it is not explicitly indicated.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Use OID cross reference table in ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify(). New
+ EVP_MD flag EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE. This uses the relevant
+ signing method from the key type. This effectively removes the link
+ between digests and public key types.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add an OID cross reference table and utility functions. Its purpose is to
+ translate between signature OIDs such as SHA1WithrsaEncryption and SHA1,
+ rsaEncryption. This will allow some of the algorithm specific hackery
+ needed to use the correct OID to be removed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove algorithm specific dependencies when setting PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
+ structures for PKCS7_sign(). They are now set up by the relevant public
+ key ASN1 method.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add provisional EC pkey method with support for ECDSA and ECDH.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for key derivation (agreement) in the API, DH method and
+ pkeyutl.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add DSA pkey method and DH pkey methods, extend DH ASN1 method to support
+ public and private key formats. As a side effect these add additional
+ command line functionality not previously available: DSA signatures can be
+ generated and verified using pkeyutl and DH key support and generation in
+ pkey, genpkey.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) BeOS support.
+ [Oliver Tappe <zooey at hirschkaefer.de>]
+
+ *) New make target "install_html_docs" installs HTML renditions of the
+ manual pages.
+ [Oliver Tappe <zooey at hirschkaefer.de>]
+
+ *) New utility "genpkey" this is analagous to "genrsa" etc except it can
+ generate keys for any algorithm. Extend and update EVP_PKEY_METHOD to
+ support key and parameter generation and add initial key generation
+ functionality for RSA.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions for main EVP_PKEY_method operations. The undocumented
+ functions EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt} have been renamed to
+ EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt}_old.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial definitions for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. This will be a high level public
+ key API, doesn't do much yet.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() to retrieve information about
+ public key algorithms. New option to openssl utility:
+ "list-public-key-algorithms" to print out info.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension for
+ ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt.
+ [Douglas Stebila]
+
+ *) Don't free up OIDs in OBJ_cleanup() if they are in use by EVP_MD or
+ EVP_CIPHER structures to avoid later problems in EVP_cleanup().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New utilities pkey and pkeyparam. These are similar to algorithm specific
+ utilities such as rsa, dsa, dsaparam etc except they process any key
+ type.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Transfer public key printing routines to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. New
+ functions EVP_PKEY_print_public(), EVP_PKEY_print_private(),
+ EVP_PKEY_print_param() to print public key data from an EVP_PKEY
+ structure.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial support for pluggable public key ASN1.
+ De-spaghettify the public key ASN1 handling. Move public and private
+ key ASN1 handling to a new EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure. Relocate
+ algorithm specific handling to a single module within the relevant
+ algorithm directory. Add functions to allow (near) opaque processing
+ of public and private key structures.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for
+ ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt.
+ [Douglas Stebila]
+
+ *) Add initial support for RFC 4279 PSK TLS ciphersuites. Add members
+ for the psk identity [hint] and the psk callback functions to the
+ SSL_SESSION, SSL and SSL_CTX structure.
+
+ New ciphersuites:
+ PSK-RC4-SHA, PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA,
+ PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+
+ New functions:
+ SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint
+ SSL_get_psk_identity_hint
+ SSL_get_psk_identity
+ SSL_use_psk_identity_hint
+
+ [Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of Nokia Corporation]
+
+ *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
+ and response verification functionality.
+ [Zoltán Glózik <zglozik at opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
+
+ *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
+ extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
+ have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an
+ additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be
+ stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the
+ SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's
+ server_name extension.
+
+ New functions (subject to change):
+
+ SSL_get_servername()
+ SSL_get_servername_type()
+ SSL_set_SSL_CTX()
+
+ New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change):
+
+ SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB
+ - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback()
+ SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG
+ - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg()
+ SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name()
+
+ openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option.
+
+ openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...',
+ '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows
+ testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
+ and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
+ negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by
+ default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
+ option.
+
+ [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou]
+
+ *) Whirlpool hash implementation is added.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) BIGNUM code on 64-bit SPARCv9 targets is switched from bn(64,64) to
+ bn(64,32). Because of instruction set limitations it doesn't have
+ any negative impact on performance. This was done mostly in order
+ to make it possible to share assembler modules, such as bn_mul_mont
+ implementations, between 32- and 64-bit builds without hassle.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c
+ to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
+ macro.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont,
+ dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced.
+ BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher
+ "64-bit" performance on certain 32-bit targets.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively
+ in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size.
+ Save memory by seeting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of
+ using the maximum available value.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option -V for 'openssl ciphers'. This prints the ciphersuite code
+ in addition to the text details.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Very, very preliminary EXPERIMENTAL support for printing of general
+ ASN1 structures. This currently produces rather ugly output and doesn't
+ handle several customised structures at all.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Integrated support for PVK file format and some related formats such
+ as MS PUBLICKEYBLOB and PRIVATEKEYBLOB. Command line switches to support
+ these in the 'rsa' and 'dsa' utilities.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey format on rsa utility command line.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove the ancient ASN1_METHOD code. This was only ever used in one
+ place for the (very old) "NETSCAPE" format certificates which are now
+ handled using new ASN1 code equivalents.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Let the TLSv1_method() etc. functions return a 'const' SSL_METHOD
+ pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new,
+ SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method 'const'.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Modify CRL distribution points extension code to print out previously
+ unsupported fields. Enhance extension setting code to allow setting of
+ all fields.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add print and set support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
+ [NTT]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
+
+ *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
+ update s->server with a new major version number. As of
+ - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type,
+ - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits,
+ the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when
+ receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload
+ protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740)
+ [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley <agl at chromium.org>]
+
+ *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL
+ could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted).
+ [Tomas Hoger <thoger at redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]
+
+ *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245)
+ [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta]
+
+ *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to
+ accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause
+ excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround
+ include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the
+ BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused
+ the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can
+ trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions
+ of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally.
+ This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the
+ highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way
+ off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while...
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the
+ ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications
+ call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when
+ restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later.
+ This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and
+ has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and
+ CVE-2009-4355.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., <openssl/cast.h>): a CAST_KEY doesn't
+ change when encrypting or decrypting.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
+ connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI.
+ Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
+ a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating
+ TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
+ the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
+ waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
+ received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
+ applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
+ and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
+ only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
+ peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer
+ renegotiation support in s_client/s_server.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with
+ the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension
+ as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
+ know what you are doing.
+ [Eric Rescorla <ekr at networkresonance.com>, Ben Laurie, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when
+ issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during
+ servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting
+ stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if
+ a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello
+ (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in
+ the handshake.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(),
+ CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error
+ fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked
+ correctly.
+ [Julia Lawall <julia at diku.dk>]
+
+ *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam
+ warnings in other configurations.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This
+ makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which
+ have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some
+ systems need.
+ [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley]
+
+ *) Don't allow the use of leading 0x80 in OIDs. This is a violation of
+ X690 8.9.12 and can produce some misleading textual output of OIDs.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Dan Kaminsky]
+
+ *) Delete MD2 from algorithm tables. This follows the recommendation in
+ several standards that it is not used in new applications due to
+ several cryptographic weaknesses. For binary compatibility reasons
+ the MD2 API is still compiled in by default.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add compression id to {d2i,i2d}_SSL_SESSION so it is correctly saved
+ and restored.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Rename uni2asc and asc2uni functions to OPENSSL_uni2asc and
+ OPENSSL_asc2uni conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name
+ clash.
+ [Guenter <lists at gknw.net>]
+
+ *) Fix the server certificate chain building code to use X509_verify_cert(),
+ it used to have an ad-hoc builder which was unable to cope with anything
+ other than a simple chain.
+ [David Woodhouse <dwmw2 at infradead.org>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert()
+ by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without
+ adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs
+ with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message
+ is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory
+ allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack
+ with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory
+ left. Additionally every future messege was buffered, even if the
+ sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake.
+ So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be
+ buffered. (CVE-2009-1378)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz]
+
+ *) Records are buffered if they arrive with a future epoch to be
+ processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is
+ currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform
+ a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no
+ memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to detemine
+ the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries.
+ (CVE-2009-1377)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz]
+
+ *) Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the
+ parent structure is freed. (CVE-2009-1379)
+ [Daniel Mentz]
+
+ *) Handle non-blocking I/O properly in SSL_shutdown() call.
+ [Darryl Miles <darryl-mailinglists at netbauds.net>]
+
+ *) Add 2.5.4.* OIDs
+ [Ilya O. <vrghost at gmail.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]
+
+ *) Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security
+ problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all
+ renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting
+ SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at
+ run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what
+ you're doing.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]
+
+ *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by
+ underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in
+ zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789)
+ [Paolo Ganci <Paolo.Ganci at AdNovum.CH>]
+
+ *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not
+ checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to
+ appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591)
+ [Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode at us.ibm.com>]
+
+ *) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This
+ prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have
+ a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Set S/MIME signing as the default purpose rather than setting it
+ unconditionally. This allows applications to override it at the store
+ level.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Permit restricted recursion of ASN1 strings. This is needed in practice
+ to handle some structures.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Improve efficiency of mem_gets: don't search whole buffer each time
+ for a '\n'
+ [Jeremy Shapiro <jnshapir at us.ibm.com>]
+
+ *) New -hex option for openssl rand.
+ [Matthieu Herrb]
+
+ *) Print out UTF8String and NumericString when parsing ASN1.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support NumericString type for name components.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow CC in the environment to override the automatically chosen
+ compiler. Note that nothing is done to ensure flags work with the
+ chosen compiler.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [07 Jan 2009]
+
+ *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values
+ (CVE-2008-5077).
+ [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Enable TLS extensions by default.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Allow the CHIL engine to be loaded, whether the application is
+ multithreaded or not. (This does not release the developer from the
+ obligation to set up the dynamic locking callbacks.)
+ [Sander Temme <sander at temme.net>]
+
+ *) Use correct exit code if there is an error in dgst command.
+ [Steve Henson; problem pointed out by Roland Dirlewanger]
+
+ *) Tweak Configure so that you need to say "experimental-jpake" to enable
+ JPAKE, and need to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE in applications.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add experimental JPAKE support, including demo authentication in
+ s_client and s_server.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Set the comparison function in v3_addr_canonize().
+ [Rob Austein <sra at hactrn.net>]
+
+ *) Add support for XMPP STARTTLS in s_client.
+ [Philip Paeps <philip at freebsd.org>]
+
+ *) Change the server-side SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG behavior
+ to ensure that even with this option, only ciphersuites in the
+ server's preference list will be accepted. (Note that the option
+ applies only when resuming a session, so the earlier behavior was
+ just about the algorithm choice for symmetric cryptography.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i [15 Sep 2008]
+
+ *) Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received
+ ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386).
+ [PR #1679]
+
+ *) Fix a state transitition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c
+ (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...).
+ [Nagendra Modadugu]
+
+ *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe
+ double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding,
+ addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been
+ doubly unsafe triple-checked locking.
+
+ So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro
+ in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c.
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder]
+
+ *) Various precautionary measures:
+
+ - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h).
+
+ - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c).
+ (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key
+ to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.)
+
+ - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs
+ outside the expected range.
+
+ - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG
+ builds.
+
+ [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if
+ the load fails. Useful for distros.
+ [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team]
+
+ *) Add support for Local Machine Keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix BN_GF2m_mod_arr() top-bit cleanup code.
+ [Huang Ying]
+
+ *) Expand ENGINE to support engine supplied SSL client certificate functions.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Logica.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add CryptoAPI ENGINE to support use of RSA and DSA keys held in Windows
+ keystores. Support for SSL/TLS client authentication too.
+ Not compiled unless enable-capieng specified to Configure.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Logica.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: dont set attribute using
+ ASN1_TYPE_set1 if MBSTRING flag set. This bug would crash certain
+ attribute creation routines such as certifcate requests and PKCS#12
+ files.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]
+
+ *) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS
+ handshake which could lead to a cilent crash as found using the
+ Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672)
+ [Steve Henson, Mark Cox]
+
+ *) Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to
+ a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891)
+ [Joe Orton]
+
+ *) Clear error queue in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file()
+
+ Clear the error queue to ensure that error entries left from
+ older function calls do not interfere with the correct operation.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke, Erik de Castro Lopo]
+
+ *) Remove root CA certificates of commercial CAs:
+
+ The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not
+ have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA.
+ Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection
+ of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads.
+ The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than
+ 'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes
+ before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where
+ the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte
+ invalid read after the end of 'db').
+ [Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode at us.ibm.com>]
+
+ *) Partial backport from 0.9.9-dev:
+
+ Introduce bn_mul_mont (dedicated Montgomery multiplication
+ procedure) as a candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation.
+ While 0.9.9-dev uses assembler for various architectures, only
+ x86_64 is available by default here in the 0.9.8 branch, and
+ 32-bit x86 is available through a compile-time setting.
+
+ To try the 32-bit x86 assembler implementation, use Configure
+ option "enable-montasm" (which exists only for this backport).
+
+ As "enable-montasm" for 32-bit x86 disclaims code stability
+ anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code
+ backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements,
+ namely BN_from_montgomery_word. (To enable this otherwise,
+ e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".)
+
+ [Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)]
+
+ *) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set
+ TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed
+ values. This is useful for key rollover for example where several key
+ sets may exist with different names.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Reverse ENGINE-internal logic for caching default ENGINE handles.
+ This was broken until now in 0.9.8 releases, such that the only way
+ a registered ENGINE could be used (assuming it initialises
+ successfully on the host) was to explicitly set it as the default
+ for the relevant algorithms. This is in contradiction with 0.9.7
+ behaviour and the documentation. With this fix, when an ENGINE is
+ registered into a given algorithm's table of implementations, the
+ 'uptodate' flag is reset so that auto-discovery will be used next
+ time a new context for that algorithm attempts to select an
+ implementation.
+ [Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)]
+
+ *) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9
+ implemention in the following ways:
+
+ Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be
+ hard coded.
+
+ Lack of BER streaming support means one pass streaming processing is
+ only supported if data is detached: setting the streaming flag is
+ ignored for embedded content.
+
+ CMS support is disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled
+ with the enable-cms configuration option.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update the GMP engine glue to do direct copies between BIGNUM and
+ mpz_t when openssl and GMP use the same limb size. Otherwise the
+ existing "conversion via a text string export" trick is still used.
+ [Paul Sheer <paulsheer at gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Zlib compression BIO. This is a filter BIO which compressed and
+ uncompresses any data passed through it.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add AES_wrap_key() and AES_unwrap_key() functions to implement
+ RFC3394 compatible AES key wrapping.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add utility functions to handle ASN1 structures. ASN1_STRING_set0():
+ sets string data without copying. X509_ALGOR_set0() and
+ X509_ALGOR_get0(): set and retrieve X509_ALGOR (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ data. Attribute function X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(): retrieves data
+ from an X509_ATTRIBUTE structure optionally checking it occurs only
+ once. ASN1_TYPE_set1(): set and ASN1_TYPE structure copying supplied
+ data.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix BN flag handling in RSA_eay_mod_exp() and BN_MONT_CTX_set()
+ to get the expected BN_FLG_CONSTTIME behavior.
+ [Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Netware support:
+
+ - fixed wrong usage of ioctlsocket() when build for LIBC BSD sockets
+ - fixed do_tests.pl to run the test suite with CLIB builds too (CLIB_OPT)
+ - added some more tests to do_tests.pl
+ - fixed RunningProcess usage so that it works with newer LIBC NDKs too
+ - removed usage of BN_LLONG for CLIB builds to avoid runtime dependency
+ - added new Configure targets netware-clib-bsdsock, netware-clib-gcc,
+ netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc, netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc
+ - various changes to netware.pl to enable gcc-cross builds on Win32
+ platform
+ - changed crypto/bio/b_sock.c to work with macro functions (CLIB BSD)
+ - various changes to fix missing prototype warnings
+ - fixed x86nasm.pl to create correct asm files for NASM COFF output
+ - added AES, WHIRLPOOL and CPUID assembler code to build files
+ - added missing AES assembler make rules to mk1mf.pl
+ - fixed order of includes in apps/ocsp.c so that e_os.h settings apply
+ [Guenter Knauf <eflash at gmx.net>]
+
+ *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546.
+ A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded
+ OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters
+ and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples
+ to s_client and s_server.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]
+
+ *) Fix various bugs:
+ + Binary incompatibility of ssl_ctx_st structure
+ + DTLS interoperation with non-compliant servers
+ + Don't call get_session_cb() without proposed session
+ + Fix ia64 assembler code
+ [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]
+
+ *) DTLS Handshake overhaul. There were longstanding issues with
+ OpenSSL DTLS implementation, which were making it impossible for
+ RFC 4347 compliant client to communicate with OpenSSL server.
+ Unfortunately just fixing these incompatibilities would "cut off"
+ pre-0.9.8f clients. To allow for hassle free upgrade post-0.9.8e
+ server keeps tolerating non RFC compliant syntax. The opposite is
+ not true, 0.9.8f client can not communicate with earlier server.
+ This update even addresses CVE-2007-4995.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL: some compilers
+ (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use.
+ [Kurt Roeckx <kurt at roeckx.be>, Peter Hartley <pdh at utter.chaos.org.uk>,
+ Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in
+ RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded
+ SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically
+ supported.
+
+ If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure
+ support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded
+ SSL_SESSION.
+
+ The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket
+ protection in servers so again support should be possible
+ with no application modification.
+
+ If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option
+ SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set.
+
+ Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client
+ or server extensions to be examined.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Google.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
+ extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
+ have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an
+ additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be
+ stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the
+ SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's
+ server_name extension.
+
+ New functions (subject to change):
+
+ SSL_get_servername()
+ SSL_get_servername_type()
+ SSL_set_SSL_CTX()
+
+ New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change):
+
+ SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB
+ - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback()
+ SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG
+ - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg()
+ SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name()
+
+ openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option.
+
+ openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...',
+ '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows
+ testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
+ and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
+ negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by
+ default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
+ option.
+
+ [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add AES and SSE2 assembly language support to VC++ build.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Mitigate attack on final subtraction in Montgomery reduction.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Fix crypto/ec/ec_mult.c to work properly with scalars of value 0
+ (which previously caused an internal error).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) AES IGE mode speedup.
+ [Dean Gaudet (Google)]
+
+ *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see
+ http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and
+ add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162:
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "SEED-SHA"
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "ADH-SEED-SHA"
+
+ To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
+ series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
+ is configured with 'enable-seed'.
+ [KISA, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a
+ single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract
+ information. For detailed background information, see
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron,
+ J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
+ and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change
+ are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and
+ BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(),
+ respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant
+ conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div()
+ and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one
+ of the input BIGNUMs. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to
+ remove a conditional branch.
+
+ BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous
+ BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just
+ modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag
+ in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative
+ implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name
+ remains as a deprecated alias.
+
+ Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general
+ RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses
+ constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation.
+ Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias.
+
+ BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that
+ the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the
+ modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to
+ BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now
+ essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually
+ change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows
+ RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to
+ enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
+
+ [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)]
+
+ *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID
+ context matching (which matters if an application uses a single
+ external cache for different purposes). Previously,
+ out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was
+ set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that,
+ with applications using a single external cache for quite
+ different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite
+ restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session
+ in a different context.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that
+ a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
+ authentication-only ciphersuites.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was
+ not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow
+ (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]
+
+ *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and
+ Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of
+ ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a
+ kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't
+ (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't).
+ [Victor Duchovni]
+
+ *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+ (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters):
+ When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to
+ prevent the removal of trailing zero bits to get the proper DER
+ encoding. (By default, crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c assumes the case
+ of a NamedBitList, for which trailing 0 bits need to be removed.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record
+ protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the
+ ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the
+ particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello
+ message has informed the client about his choice.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add RFC 3779 support.
+ [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a
+ static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded.
+ Improve header file function name parsing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) extend SMTP and IMAP protocol emulation in s_client to use EHLO
+ or CAPABILITY handshake as required by RFCs.
+ [Goetz Babin-Ebell]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]
+
+ *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
+ cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940)
+ [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
+ in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
+ (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
+ malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343)
+ [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites
+ match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted
+ as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got
+ the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only
+ have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap.
+ That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as
+ "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites --
+ namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones
+ from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0.
+
+ So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit
+ ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar
+ ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions.
+ Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0
+ ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite.
+
+ Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the
+ 128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now.
+ The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and
+ AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning;
+ however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release
+ (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER
+ definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into
+ multiple values to extend the available space.
+
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006]
+
+ *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+ (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
+ possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
+ undesirable limitations.
+ [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly. Now special
+ treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites
+ cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias.
+ However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for
+ non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension
+ support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation
+ to avoid potential handshake problems.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
+
+ - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
+ - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
+ - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
+
+ The latter two were purportedly from
+ draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
+ appear there.
+
+ Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from
+ draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as
+ unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
+ dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key
+ versions), which is now available for royalty-free use
+ (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html).
+ Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132.
+
+ To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
+ series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
+ is configured with 'enable-camellia'.
+ [NTT]
+
+ *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding
+ bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not
+ necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false
+ positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient
+ code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by
+ now or any which still have the bug do not support compression.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [04 May 2006]
+
+ *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit
+ cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed.
+ [Austin Ziegler <halostatue at gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to
+ draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without
+ TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9
+ branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch).
+ [Douglas Stebila]
+
+ *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support
+ opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use
+ "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32
+ to conform with the standards mentioned here:
+ http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt
+ Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include
+ --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location
+ of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library
+ can't be loaded.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code
+ sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't
+ handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a
+ non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries
+ under VC++ build system.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO.
+ Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]
+
+ *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+ (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
+ countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
+ rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
+ idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
+ for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
+ Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
+
+ *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at
+ runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman.
+ [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add functions for well-known primes.
+ [Nick Mathewson]
+
+ *) Extended Windows CE support.
+ [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during
+ runtime, thus removing the need for a lock.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by
+ attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to
+ smime utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [05 Jul 2005]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
+
+ *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private
+ key into the same file any more.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'.
+ [Stefan <stf at udoma.org]
+
+ *) Removed the macro des_crypt(), as it seems to conflict with some
+ libraries. Use DES_crypt().
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Correct naming of the 'chil' and '4758cca' ENGINEs. This
+ involves renaming the source and generated shared-libs for
+ both. The engines will accept the corrected or legacy ids
+ ('ncipher' and '4758_cca' respectively) when binding. NB,
+ this only applies when building 'shared'.
+ [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen at redhat.com> and Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify
+ PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and
+ use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code:
+ - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after
+ a fixed number of uses (currently 32)
+ - add new function for parameter creation
+ - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the
+ BN_BLINDING parameters
+ - hide BN_BLINDING structure
+ Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve
+ performance when a single RSA object is shared among several
+ threads.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Add support for DTLS.
+ [Nagendra Modadugu <nagendra at cs.stanford.edu> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
+ to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file()
+ [Walter Goulet]
+
+ *) Remove buggy and incompletet DH cert support from
+ ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for
+ the apps/openssl applications.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes
+ -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently
+ DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default.
+ The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx".
+
+ The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless
+ "enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified.
+
+ (IDEA remains enabled despite being patented. This is because IDEA
+ is frequently required for interoperability, and there is no license
+ fee for non-commercial use. As before, "no-idea" can be used to
+ avoid this algorithm.)
+
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add processing of proxy certificates (see RFC 3820). This work was
+ sponsored by KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm) and
+ EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-science in Europe).
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) RC4 performance overhaul on modern architectures/implementations, such
+ as Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) New utility extract-section.pl. This can be used specify an alternative
+ section number in a pod file instead of having to treat each file as
+ a separate case in Makefile. This can be done by adding two lines to the
+ pod file:
+
+ =for comment openssl_section:XXX
+
+ The blank line is mandatory.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New arguments -certform, -keyform and -pass for s_client and s_server
+ to allow alternative format key and certificate files and passphrase
+ sources.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New structure X509_VERIFY_PARAM which combines current verify parameters,
+ update associated structures and add various utility functions.
+
+ Add new policy related verify parameters, include policy checking in
+ standard verify code. Enhance 'smime' application with extra parameters
+ to support policy checking and print out.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a new engine to support VIA PadLock ACE extensions in the VIA C3
+ Nehemiah processors. These extensions support AES encryption in hardware
+ as well as RNG (though RNG support is currently disabled).
+ [Michal Ludvig <michal at logix.cz>, with help from Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Deprecate BN_[get|set]_params() functions (they were ignored internally).
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) New FIPS 180-2 algorithms, SHA-224/-256/-384/-512 are implemented.
+ [Andy Polyakov and a number of other people]
+
+ *) Improved PowerPC platform support. Most notably BIGNUM assembler
+ implementation contributed by IBM.
+ [Suresh Chari, Peter Waltenberg, Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) The new 'RSA_generate_key_ex' function now takes a BIGNUM for the public
+ exponent rather than 'unsigned long'. There is a corresponding change to
+ the new 'rsa_keygen' element of the RSA_METHOD structure.
+ [Jelte Jansen, Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Functionality for creating the initial serial number file is now
+ moved from CA.pl to the 'ca' utility with a new option -create_serial.
+
+ (Before OpenSSL 0.9.7e, CA.pl used to initialize the serial
+ number file to 1, which is bound to cause problems. To avoid
+ the problems while respecting compatibility between different 0.9.7
+ patchlevels, 0.9.7e employed 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in
+ CA.pl for serial number initialization. With the new release 0.9.8,
+ we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Reduced header interdepencies by declaring more opaque objects in
+ ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will
+ give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so
+ this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always,
+ developers should define this symbol when building and using openssl to
+ ensure they track the recommended behaviour, interfaces, [etc], but
+ backwards-compatible behaviour prevails when this isn't defined.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) New function X509_POLICY_NODE_print() which prints out policy nodes.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new EVP function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key and associated functionality.
+ This will generate a random key of the appropriate length based on the
+ cipher context. The EVP_CIPHER can provide its own random key generation
+ routine to support keys of a specific form. This is used in the des and
+ 3des routines to generate a key of the correct parity. Update S/MIME
+ code to use new functions and hence generate correct parity DES keys.
+ Add EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY #define to return an error if the key is not
+ valid (weak or incorrect parity).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a local set of CRLs that can be used by X509_verify_cert() as well
+ as looking them up. This is useful when the verified structure may contain
+ CRLs, for example PKCS#7 signedData. Modify PKCS7_verify() to use any CRLs
+ present unless the new PKCS7_NO_CRL flag is asserted.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extend ASN1 oid configuration module. It now additionally accepts the
+ syntax:
+
+ shortName = some long name, 1.2.3.4
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Reimplemented the BN_CTX implementation. There is now no more static
+ limitation on the number of variables it can handle nor the depth of the
+ "stack" handling for BN_CTX_start()/BN_CTX_end() pairs. The stack
+ information can now expand as required, and rather than having a single
+ static array of bignums, BN_CTX now uses a linked-list of such arrays
+ allowing it to expand on demand whilst maintaining the usefulness of
+ BN_CTX's "bundling".
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Add a missing BN_CTX parameter to the 'rsa_mod_exp' callback in RSA_METHOD
+ to allow all RSA operations to function using a single BN_CTX.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This
+ is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing
+ of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) bn_dup_expand() has been deprecated, it was introduced in 0.9.7 and
+ remained unused and not that useful. A variety of other little bignum
+ tweaks and fixes have also been made continuing on from the audit (see
+ below).
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Constify all or almost all d2i, c2i, s2i and r2i functions, along with
+ associated ASN1, EVP and SSL functions and old ASN1 macros.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) BN_zero() only needs to set 'top' and 'neg' to zero for correct results,
+ and this should never fail. So the return value from the use of
+ BN_set_word() (which can fail due to needless expansion) is now deprecated;
+ if OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined, BN_zero() is a void macro.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
+ initialised value as BN_new().
+ [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) An audit of the BIGNUM code is underway, for which debugging code is
+ enabled when BN_DEBUG is defined. This makes stricter enforcements on what
+ is considered valid when processing BIGNUMs, and causes execution to
+ assert() when a problem is discovered. If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined,
+ further steps are taken to deliberately pollute unused data in BIGNUM
+ structures to try and expose faulty code further on. For now, openssl will
+ (in its default mode of operation) continue to tolerate the inconsistent
+ forms that it has tolerated in the past, but authors and packagers should
+ consider trying openssl and their own applications when compiled with
+ these debugging symbols defined. It will help highlight potential bugs in
+ their own code, and will improve the test coverage for OpenSSL itself. At
+ some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
+ maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
+ in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
+ [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
+ that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
+ initialises it). The presence of this function only made it possible
+ to overwrite an existing structure (and cause memory leaks).
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Because of the callback-based approach for implementing LHASH as a
+ template type, lh_insert() adds opaque objects to hash-tables and
+ lh_doall() or lh_doall_arg() are typically used with a destructor callback
+ to clean up those corresponding objects before destroying the hash table
+ (and losing the object pointers). So some over-zealous constifications in
+ LHASH have been relaxed so that lh_insert() does not take (nor store) the
+ objects as "const" and the lh_doall[_arg] callback wrappers are not
+ prototyped to have "const" restrictions on the object pointers they are
+ given (and so aren't required to cast them away any more).
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) The tmdiff.h API was so ugly and minimal that our own timing utility
+ (speed) prefers to use its own implementation. The two implementations
+ haven't been consolidated as yet (volunteers?) but the tmdiff API has had
+ its object type properly exposed (MS_TM) instead of casting to/from "char
+ *". This may still change yet if someone realises MS_TM and "ms_time_***"
+ aren't necessarily the greatest nomenclatures - but this is what was used
+ internally to the implementation so I've used that for now.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Ensure that deprecated functions do not get compiled when
+ OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined. Some "openssl" subcommands and a few of
+ the self-tests were still using deprecated key-generation functions so
+ these have been updated also.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Reorganise PKCS#7 code to separate the digest location functionality
+ into PKCS7_find_digest(), digest addtion into PKCS7_bio_add_digest().
+ New function PKCS7_set_digest() to set the digest type for PKCS#7
+ digestedData type. Add additional code to correctly generate the
+ digestedData type and add support for this type in PKCS7 initialization
+ functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function PKCS7_set0_type_other() this initializes a PKCS7
+ structure of type "other".
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix prime generation loop in crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl by making
+ sure the loop does correctly stop and breaking ("division by zero")
+ modulus operations are not performed. The (pre-generated) prime
+ table crypto/bn/bn_prime.h was already correct, but it could not be
+ re-generated on some platforms because of the "division by zero"
+ situation in the script.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to
+ draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt: the KDF1 key derivation function with
+ SHA-1 now is only used for "small" curves (where the
+ representation of a field element takes up to 24 bytes); for
+ larger curves, the field element resulting from ECDH is directly
+ used as premaster secret.
+ [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) Add code for kP+lQ timings to crypto/ec/ectest.c, and add SEC2
+ curve secp160r1 to the tests.
+ [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
+ [Götz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell at trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
+ control of the error stack.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add support for STORE in ENGINE.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the STORE type. The intention is to provide a common interface
+ to certificate and key stores, be they simple file-based stores, or
+ HSM-type store, or LDAP stores, or...
+ NOTE: The code is currently UNTESTED and isn't really used anywhere.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add a generic structure called OPENSSL_ITEM. This can be used to
+ pass a list of arguments to any function as well as provide a way
+ for a function to pass data back to the caller.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the functions BUF_strndup() and BUF_memdup(). BUF_strndup()
+ works like BUF_strdup() but can be used to duplicate a portion of
+ a string. The copy gets NUL-terminated. BUF_memdup() duplicates
+ a memory area.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the function sk_find_ex() which works like sk_find(), but will
+ return an index to an element even if an exact match couldn't be
+ found. The index is guaranteed to point at the element where the
+ searched-for key would be inserted to preserve sorting order.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the function OBJ_bsearch_ex() which works like OBJ_bsearch() but
+ takes an extra flags argument for optional functionality. Currently,
+ the following flags are defined:
+
+ OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH
+ This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first
+ element where the comparing function returns a negative or zero
+ number.
+
+ OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH
+ This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first
+ element where the comparing function returns zero. This is useful
+ if there are more than one element where the comparing function
+ returns zero.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make it possible to create self-signed certificates with 'openssl ca'
+ in such a way that the self-signed certificate becomes part of the
+ CA database and uses the same mechanisms for serial number generation
+ as all other certificate signing. The new flag '-selfsign' enables
+ this functionality. Adapt CA.sh and CA.pl.in.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add functionality to check the public key of a certificate request
+ against a given private. This is useful to check that a certificate
+ request can be signed by that key (self-signing).
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
+ subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword
+ 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default
+ if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved
+ with the database itself in a separate index attribute file,
+ named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Generate muti valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for
+ req and dirName.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for nameConstraints certificate extension.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for policyConstraints certificate extension.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for policyMappings certificate extension.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make sure the default DSA_METHOD implementation only uses its
+ dsa_mod_exp() and/or bn_mod_exp() handlers if they are non-NULL,
+ and change its own handlers to be NULL so as to remove unnecessary
+ indirection. This lets alternative implementations fallback to the
+ default implementation more easily.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Support for directoryName in GeneralName related extensions
+ in config files.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make it possible to link applications using Makefile.shared.
+ Make that possible even when linking against static libraries!
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Support for single pass processing for S/MIME signing. This now
+ means that S/MIME signing can be done from a pipe, in addition
+ cleartext signing (multipart/signed type) is effectively streaming
+ and the signed data does not need to be all held in memory.
+
+ This is done with a new flag PKCS7_STREAM. When this flag is set
+ PKCS7_sign() only initializes the PKCS7 structure and the actual signing
+ is done after the data is output (and digests calculated) in
+ SMIME_write_PKCS7().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add full support for -rpath/-R, both in shared libraries and
+ applications, at least on the platforms where it's known how
+ to do it.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) In crypto/ec/ec_mult.c, implement fast point multiplication with
+ precomputation, based on wNAF splitting: EC_GROUP_precompute_mult()
+ will now compute a table of multiples of the generator that
+ makes subsequent invocations of EC_POINTs_mul() or EC_POINT_mul()
+ faster (notably in the case of a single point multiplication,
+ scalar * generator).
+ [Nils Larsch, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) IPv6 support for certificate extensions. The various extensions
+ which use the IP:a.b.c.d can now take IPv6 addresses using the
+ formats of RFC1884 2.2 . IPv6 addresses are now also displayed
+ correctly.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Added an ENGINE that implements RSA by performing private key
+ exponentiations with the GMP library. The conversions to and from
+ GMP's mpz_t format aren't optimised nor are any montgomery forms
+ cached, and on x86 it appears OpenSSL's own performance has caught up.
+ However there are likely to be other architectures where GMP could
+ provide a boost. This ENGINE is not built in by default, but it can be
+ specified at Configure time and should be accompanied by the necessary
+ linker additions, eg;
+ ./config -DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -lgmp
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) "openssl engine" will not display ENGINE/DSO load failure errors when
+ testing availability of engines with "-t" - the old behaviour is
+ produced by increasing the feature's verbosity with "-tt".
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) ECDSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects
+ could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early
+ enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>
+ via PR#459)
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD
+ and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal
+ software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can
+ also be overriden by providing the appropriate method callbacks.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Change the "progress" mechanism used in key-generation and
+ primality testing to functions that take a new BN_GENCB pointer in
+ place of callback/argument pairs. The new API functions have "_ex"
+ postfixes and the older functions are reimplemented as wrappers for
+ the new ones. The OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol can be used to hide
+ declarations of the old functions to help (graceful) attempts to
+ migrate to the new functions. Also, the new key-generation API
+ functions operate on a caller-supplied key-structure and return
+ success/failure rather than returning a key or NULL - this is to
+ help make "keygen" another member function of RSA_METHOD etc.
+
+ Example for using the new callback interface:
+
+ int (*my_callback)(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *cb) = ...;
+ void *my_arg = ...;
+ BN_GENCB my_cb;
+
+ BN_GENCB_set(&my_cb, my_callback, my_arg);
+
+ return BN_is_prime_ex(some_bignum, BN_prime_checks, NULL, &cb);
+ /* For the meaning of a, b in calls to my_callback(), see the
+ * documentation of the function that calls the callback.
+ * cb will point to my_cb; my_arg can be retrieved as cb->arg.
+ * my_callback should return 1 if it wants BN_is_prime_ex()
+ * to continue, or 0 to stop.
+ */
+
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Change the ZLIB compression method to be stateful, and make it
+ available to TLS with the number defined in
+ draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the ASN.1 structures and functions for CertificatePair, which
+ is defined as follows (according to X.509_4thEditionDraftV6.pdf):
+
+ CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE {
+ forward [0] Certificate OPTIONAL,
+ reverse [1] Certificate OPTIONAL,
+ -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- }
+
+ Also implement the PEM functions to read and write certificate
+ pairs, and defined the PEM tag as "CERTIFICATE PAIR".
+
+ This needed to be defined, mostly for the sake of the LDAP
+ attribute crossCertificatePair, but may prove useful elsewhere as
+ well.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make it possible to inhibit symlinking of shared libraries in
+ Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function
+ void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg);
+ and a macro that behave like
+ int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a);
+
+ to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes
+ used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c).
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() will now automatically use this
+ if applicable.
+ [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
+
+ *) Add new lock type (CRYPTO_LOCK_BN).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change the ENGINE framework to automatically load engines
+ dynamically from specific directories unless they could be
+ found to already be built in or loaded. Move all the
+ current engines except for the cryptodev one to a new
+ directory engines/.
+ The engines in engines/ are built as shared libraries if
+ the "shared" options was given to ./Configure or ./config.
+ Otherwise, they are inserted in libcrypto.a.
+ /usr/local/ssl/engines is the default directory for dynamic
+ engines, but that can be overriden at configure time through
+ the usual use of --prefix and/or --openssldir, and at run
+ time with the environment variable OPENSSL_ENGINES.
+ [Geoff Thorpe and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add Makefile.shared, a helper makefile to build shared
+ libraries. Addapt Makefile.org.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add version info to Win32 DLLs.
+ [Peter 'Luna' Runestig" <peter at runestig.com>]
+
+ *) Add new 'medium level' PKCS#12 API. Certificates and keys
+ can be added using this API to created arbitrary PKCS#12
+ files while avoiding the low level API.
+
+ New options to PKCS12_create(), key or cert can be NULL and
+ will then be omitted from the output file. The encryption
+ algorithm NIDs can be set to -1 for no encryption, the mac
+ iteration count can be set to 0 to omit the mac.
+
+ Enhance pkcs12 utility by making the -nokeys and -nocerts
+ options work when creating a PKCS#12 file. New option -nomac
+ to omit the mac, NONE can be set for an encryption algorithm.
+ New code is modified to use the enhanced PKCS12_create()
+ instead of the low level API.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extend ASN1 encoder to support indefinite length constructed
+ encoding. This can output sequences tags and octet strings in
+ this form. Modify pk7_asn1.c to support indefinite length
+ encoding. This is experimental and needs additional code to
+ be useful, such as an ASN1 bio and some enhanced streaming
+ PKCS#7 code.
+
+ Extend template encode functionality so that tagging is passed
+ down to the template encoder.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Let 'openssl req' fail if an argument to '-newkey' is not
+ recognized instead of using RSA as a default.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add support for ECC-based ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt.
+ As these are not official, they are not included in "ALL";
+ the "ECCdraft" ciphersuite group alias can be used to select them.
+ [Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) Add ECDH engine support.
+ [Nils Gura and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) Add ECDH in new directory crypto/ecdh/.
+ [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) Let BN_rand_range() abort with an error after 100 iterations
+ without success (which indicates a broken PRNG).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change BN_mod_sqrt() so that it verifies that the input value
+ is really the square of the return value. (Previously,
+ BN_mod_sqrt would show GIGO behaviour.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add named elliptic curves over binary fields from X9.62, SECG,
+ and WAP/WTLS; add OIDs that were still missing.
+
+ [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+ (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) Extend the EC library for elliptic curves over binary fields
+ (new files ec2_smpl.c, ec2_smpt.c, ec2_mult.c in crypto/ec/).
+ New EC_METHOD:
+
+ EC_GF2m_simple_method
+
+ New API functions:
+
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m
+ EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m
+ EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m
+ EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m
+ EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m
+ EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m
+
+ Point compression for binary fields is disabled by default for
+ patent reasons (compile with OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP defined to
+ enable it).
+
+ As binary polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs, various members
+ of the EC_GROUP and EC_POINT data structures can be shared
+ between the implementations for prime fields and binary fields;
+ the above ..._GF2m functions (except for EX_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m)
+ are essentially identical to their ..._GFp counterparts.
+ (For simplicity, the '..._GFp' prefix has been dropped from
+ various internal method names.)
+
+ An internal 'field_div' method (similar to 'field_mul' and
+ 'field_sqr') has been added; this is used only for binary fields.
+
+ [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+ (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) Optionally dispatch EC_POINT_mul(), EC_POINT_precompute_mult()
+ through methods ('mul', 'precompute_mult').
+
+ The generic implementations (now internally called 'ec_wNAF_mul'
+ and 'ec_wNAF_precomputed_mult') remain the default if these
+ methods are undefined.
+
+ [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+ (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) New function EC_GROUP_get_degree, which is defined through
+ EC_METHOD. For curves over prime fields, this returns the bit
+ length of the modulus.
+
+ [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+ (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) New functions EC_GROUP_dup, EC_POINT_dup.
+ (These simply call ..._new and ..._copy).
+
+ [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+ (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) Add binary polynomial arithmetic software in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c.
+ Polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs (where the sign bit is not
+ used) in the following functions [macros]:
+
+ BN_GF2m_add
+ BN_GF2m_sub [= BN_GF2m_add]
+ BN_GF2m_mod [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_arr]
+ BN_GF2m_mod_mul [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr]
+ BN_GF2m_mod_sqr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr]
+ BN_GF2m_mod_inv
+ BN_GF2m_mod_exp [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr]
+ BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr]
+ BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr]
+ BN_GF2m_cmp [= BN_ucmp]
+
+ (Note that only the 'mod' functions are actually for fields GF(2^m).
+ BN_GF2m_add() is misnomer, but this is for the sake of consistency.)
+
+ For some functions, an the irreducible polynomial defining a
+ field can be given as an 'unsigned int[]' with strictly
+ decreasing elements giving the indices of those bits that are set;
+ i.e., p[] represents the polynomial
+ f(t) = t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k]
+ where
+ p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0.
+ This applies to the following functions:
+
+ BN_GF2m_mod_arr
+ BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr
+ BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr
+ BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_inv]
+ BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_div]
+ BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr
+ BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr
+ BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr
+ BN_GF2m_poly2arr
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly
+
+ Conversion can be performed by the following functions:
+
+ BN_GF2m_poly2arr
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly
+
+ bntest.c has additional tests for binary polynomial arithmetic.
+
+ Two implementations for BN_GF2m_mod_div() are available.
+ The default algorithm simply uses BN_GF2m_mod_inv() and
+ BN_GF2m_mod_mul(). The alternative algorithm is compiled in only
+ if OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV is defined (patent pending; read the
+ copyright notice in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c before enabling it).
+
+ [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila
+ (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
+
+ *) Add new error code 'ERR_R_DISABLED' that can be used when some
+ functionality is disabled at compile-time.
+ [Douglas Stebila <douglas.stebila at sun.com>]
+
+ *) Change default behaviour of 'openssl asn1parse' so that more
+ information is visible when viewing, e.g., a certificate:
+
+ Modify asn1_parse2 (crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c) so that in non-'dump'
+ mode the content of non-printable OCTET STRINGs is output in a
+ style similar to INTEGERs, but with '[HEX DUMP]' prepended to
+ avoid the appearance of a printable string.
+ [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
+
+ *) Add 'asn1_flag' and 'asn1_form' member to EC_GROUP with access
+ functions
+ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag()
+ EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag()
+ EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form()
+ EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form()
+ These control ASN1 encoding details:
+ - Curves (i.e., groups) are encoded explicitly unless asn1_flag
+ has been set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE.
+ - Points are encoded in uncompressed form by default; options for
+ asn1_for are as for point2oct, namely
+ POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
+ POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID
+
+ Also add 'seed' and 'seed_len' members to EC_GROUP with access
+ functions
+ EC_GROUP_set_seed()
+ EC_GROUP_get0_seed()
+ EC_GROUP_get_seed_len()
+ This is used only for ASN1 purposes (so far).
+ [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
+
+ *) Add 'field_type' member to EC_METHOD, which holds the NID
+ of the appropriate field type OID. The new function
+ EC_METHOD_get_field_type() returns this value.
+ [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
+
+ *) Add functions
+ EC_POINT_point2bn()
+ EC_POINT_bn2point()
+ EC_POINT_point2hex()
+ EC_POINT_hex2point()
+ providing useful interfaces to EC_POINT_point2oct() and
+ EC_POINT_oct2point().
+ [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
+
+ *) Change internals of the EC library so that the functions
+ EC_GROUP_set_generator()
+ EC_GROUP_get_generator()
+ EC_GROUP_get_order()
+ EC_GROUP_get_cofactor()
+ are implemented directly in crypto/ec/ec_lib.c and not dispatched
+ to methods, which would lead to unnecessary code duplication when
+ adding different types of curves.
+ [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de> with input by Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Implement compute_wNAF (crypto/ec/ec_mult.c) without BIGNUM
+ arithmetic, and such that modified wNAFs are generated
+ (which avoid length expansion in many cases).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add a function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant() (defined via
+ EC_METHOD) that verifies that the curve discriminant is non-zero.
+
+ Add a function EC_GROUP_check() that makes some sanity tests
+ on a EC_GROUP, its generator and order. This includes
+ EC_GROUP_check_discriminant().
+ [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
+
+ *) Add ECDSA in new directory crypto/ecdsa/.
+
+ Add applications 'openssl ecparam' and 'openssl ecdsa'
+ (these are based on 'openssl dsaparam' and 'openssl dsa').
+
+ ECDSA support is also included in various other files across the
+ library. Most notably,
+ - 'openssl req' now has a '-newkey ecdsa:file' option;
+ - EVP_PKCS82PKEY (crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c) now can handle ECDSA;
+ - X509_PUBKEY_get (crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c) and
+ d2i_PublicKey (crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c) have been modified to make
+ them suitable for ECDSA where domain parameters must be
+ extracted before the specific public key;
+ - ECDSA engine support has been added.
+ [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
+
+ *) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62,
+ SECG, and WAP/WTLS. Each curve can be obtained from the new
+ function
+ EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(),
+ and the list of available named curves can be obtained with
+ EC_get_builtin_curves().
+ Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be
+ accessed via
+ EC_GROUP_set_curve_name()
+ EC_GROUP_get_curve_name()
+ [Nils Larsch <larsch at trustcenter.de, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there
+ was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul()
+ required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition
+ of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and
+ bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(),
+ bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with
+ differing sizes.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7l and 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]
+
+ *) Cleanse PEM buffers before freeing them since they may contain
+ sensitive data.
+ [Benjamin Bennett <ben at psc.edu>]
+
+ *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that
+ a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable
+ authentication-only ciphersuites.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of
+ ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a
+ kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't.
+ [Victor Duchovni]
+
+ *) Expand security boundary to match 1.1.1 module.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove redundant features: hash file source, editing of test vectors
+ modify fipsld to use external fips_premain.c signature.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New perl script mkfipsscr.pl to create shell scripts or batch files to
+ run algorithm test programs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make algorithm test programs more tolerant of whitespace.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record
+ protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the
+ ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the
+ particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello
+ message has informed the client about his choice.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a
+ static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]
+
+ *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
+ cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940)
+ [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
+ in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
+ (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
+ malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343)
+ [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit
+ ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA"
+ will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar
+ ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that
+ "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the
+ SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining
+ changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006]
+
+ *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+ (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
+ *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
+ possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
+ undesirable limitations.
+ [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Disable rogue ciphersuites:
+
+ - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5")
+ - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5")
+ - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5")
+
+ The latter two were purportedly from
+ draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
+ appear there.
+
+ Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from
+ draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as
+ unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
+ dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j [04 May 2006]
+
+ *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS
+ module in FIPS mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make
+ from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the
+ "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++
+ build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]
+
+ *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS.
+ The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not.
+ BEWARE! A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be
+ safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of
+ the difference induced by this change.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]
+
+ *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+ (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
+ countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
+ rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
+ idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
+ for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
+ Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)]
+
+ *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is
+ mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform
+ the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise,
+ the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key
+ after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with
+ biased k.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for
+ RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of
+ squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are
+ independent of the particular secret key. This will mitigate
+ cache-timing and potential related attacks.
+
+ BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation,
+ and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag
+ BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH
+ will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag
+ RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or
+ DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set.
+
+ [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and
+ SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0
+ Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set.
+ (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello
+ message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some
+ clients need.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in
+ a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls
+ to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions
+ instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code
+ structures constant.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 0.9.8.]
+
+ *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because
+ the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another
+ with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++
+ complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included
+ nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up
+ some needed definitions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Undo Cygwin change.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
+ Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
+ they must be explicitely allowed in run-time. See
+ docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]
+
+ *) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating
+ server and client random values. Previously
+ (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - sizeof(time_t)) would be used which would result in
+ less random data when sizeof(time_t) > 4 (some 64 bit platforms).
+
+ This change has negligible security impact because:
+
+ 1. Server and client random values still have 24 bytes of pseudo random
+ data.
+
+ 2. Server and client random values are sent in the clear in the initial
+ handshake.
+
+ 3. The master secret is derived using the premaster secret (48 bytes in
+ size for static RSA ciphersuites) as well as client server and random
+ values.
+
+ The OpenSSL team would like to thank the UK NISCC for bringing this issue
+ to our attention.
+
+ [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
+
+ *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
+ prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
+ [Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014]
+
+ *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development
+ branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate
+ failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs.
+ [Nauticus Networks SSL Team <openssl at nauticusnet.com>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new -passin argument to dgst.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Perform some character comparisons of different types in X509_NAME_cmp:
+ this is needed for some certificates that reencode DNs into UTF8Strings
+ (in violation of RFC3280) and can't or wont issue name rollover
+ certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that
+ the CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct. As a
+ side effect always do the following basic checks on extensions,
+ not just when there's an associated purpose to the check:
+
+ - if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user
+ has chosen to ignore this fault)
+ - if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all)
+ - that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has
+ been given)
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7d and 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]
+
+ *) Avoid a race condition when CRLs are checked in a multi threaded
+ environment. This would happen due to the reordering of the revoked
+ entries during signature checking and serial number lookup. Now the
+ encoding is cached and the serial number sort performed under a lock.
+ Add new STACK function sk_is_sorted().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add Delta CRL to the extension code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Various fixes to s3_pkt.c so alerts are sent properly.
+ [David Holmes <d.holmes at f5.com>]
+
+ *) Reduce the chances of duplicate issuer name and serial numbers (in
+ violation of RFC3280) using the OpenSSL certificate creation utilities.
+ This is done by creating a random 64 bit value for the initial serial
+ number when a serial number file is created or when a self signed
+ certificate is created using 'openssl req -x509'. The initial serial
+ number file is created using 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl
+ rather than being initialized to 1.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]
+
+ *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
+ by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
+ [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
+ (CVE-2004-0112)
+ [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same
+ subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword
+ 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default
+ if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved
+ with the database itself in a separate index attribute file,
+ named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) X509 verify fixes. Disable broken certificate workarounds when
+ X509_V_FLAGS_X509_STRICT is set. Check CRL issuer has cRLSign set if
+ keyUsage extension present. Don't accept CRLs with unhandled critical
+ extensions: since verify currently doesn't process CRL extensions this
+ rejects a CRL with *any* critical extensions. Add new verify error codes
+ for these cases.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) When creating an OCSP nonce use an OCTET STRING inside the extnValue.
+ A clarification of RFC2560 will require the use of OCTET STRINGs and
+ some implementations cannot handle the current raw format. Since OpenSSL
+ copies and compares OCSP nonces as opaque blobs without any attempt at
+ parsing them this should not create any compatibility issues.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New md flag EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE this allows md_data to be reused when
+ calling EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() to avoid calling OPENSSL_malloc(). Without
+ this HMAC (and other) operations are several times slower than OpenSSL
+ < 0.9.7.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Print out GeneralizedTime and UTCTime in ASN1_STRING_print_ex().
+ [Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester at EdelWeb.fr>]
+
+ *) Use the correct content when signing type "other".
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]
+
+ *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
+
+ Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
+ invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
+
+ Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545).
+
+ If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
+ certificate signature with the NULL public key.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -ignore_err option in ocsp application to stop the server
+ exiting on the first error in a request.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate
+ if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0
+ specifications.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional
+ extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0
+ but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification).
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe]
+
+ *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable
+ when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Change AES_cbc_encrypt() so it outputs exact multiple of
+ blocks during encryption.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Various fixes to base64 BIO and non blocking I/O. On write
+ flushes were not handled properly if the BIO retried. On read
+ data was not being buffered properly and had various logic bugs.
+ This also affects blocking I/O when the data being decoded is a
+ certain size.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Various S/MIME bugfixes and compatibility changes:
+ output correct application/pkcs7 MIME type if
+ PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE is set. Tolerate some broken signatures.
+ Output CR+LF for EOL if PKCS7_CRLFEOL is set (this makes opening
+ of files as .eml work). Correctly handle very long lines in MIME
+ parser.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]
+
+ *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
+ Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat
+ a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error
+ in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation
+ to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call
+ RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING.
+ They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases.
+ [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not
+ seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as
+ an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there
+ is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe
+ by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and
+ having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors
+ (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but
+ avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared
+ between threads, blinding will still be very fast).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fixed a typo bug that would cause ENGINE_set_default() to set an
+ ENGINE as defaults for all supported algorithms irrespective of
+ the 'flags' parameter. 'flags' is now honoured, so applications
+ should make sure they are passing it correctly.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Target "mingw" now allows native Windows code to be generated in
+ the Cygwin environment as well as with the MinGW compiler.
+ [Ulf Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]
+
+ *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked
+ via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
+ block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
+ against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
+ between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
+ Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
+ Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)]
+
+ *) Make the no-err option work as intended. The intention with no-err
+ is not to have the whole error stack handling routines removed from
+ libcrypto, it's only intended to remove all the function name and
+ reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not
+ be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway.
+
+ NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have it's
+ own set of error texts inserted. The routines are there, just not
+ used by default when no-err is given.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add support for FreeBSD on IA64.
+ [dirk.meyer at dinoex.sub.org via Richard Levitte, resolves #454]
+
+ *) Adjust DES_cbc_cksum() so it returns the same value as the MIT
+ Kerberos function mit_des_cbc_cksum(). Before this change,
+ the value returned by DES_cbc_cksum() was like the one from
+ mit_des_cbc_cksum(), except the bytes were swapped.
+ [Kevin Greaney <Kevin.Greaney at hp.com> and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Allow an application to disable the automatic SSL chain building.
+ Before this a rather primitive chain build was always performed in
+ ssl3_output_cert_chain(): an application had no way to send the
+ correct chain if the automatic operation produced an incorrect result.
+
+ Now the chain builder is disabled if either:
+
+ 1. Extra certificates are added via SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert().
+
+ 2. The mode flag SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN is set.
+
+ The reasoning behind this is that an application would not want the
+ auto chain building to take place if extra chain certificates are
+ present and it might also want a means of sending no additional
+ certificates (for example the chain has two certificates and the
+ root is omitted).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add the possibility to build without the ENGINE framework.
+ [Steven Reddie <smr at essemer.com.au> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Under Win32 gmtime() can return NULL: check return value in
+ OPENSSL_gmtime(). Add error code for case where gmtime() fails.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) DSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects
+ could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early
+ enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Ivan D Nestlerode <nestler at MIT.EDU>,
+ Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de> via PR#459)
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Another fix for SSLv2 session ID handling: the session ID was incorrectly
+ checked on reconnect on the client side, therefore session resumption
+ could still fail with a "ssl session id is different" error. This
+ behaviour is masked when SSL_OP_ALL is used due to
+ SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG being set.
+ Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday <crispin at flowerday.cx> as
+ followup to PR #377.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) IA-32 assembler support enhancements: unified ELF targets, support
+ for SCO/Caldera platforms, fix for Cygwin shared build.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add support for FreeBSD on sparc64. As a consequence, support for
+ FreeBSD on non-x86 processors is separate from x86 processors on
+ the config script, much like the NetBSD support.
+ [Richard Levitte & Kris Kennaway <kris at obsecurity.org>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.7 [31 Dec 2002]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.6i and later 0.9.6 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 0.9.7.]
+
+ *) Fix session ID handling in SSLv2 client code: the SERVER FINISHED
+ code (06) was taken as the first octet of the session ID and the last
+ octet was ignored consequently. As a result SSLv2 client side session
+ caching could not have worked due to the session ID mismatch between
+ client and server.
+ Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday <crispin at flowerday.cx> as
+ PR #377.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Change the declaration of needed Kerberos libraries to use EX_LIBS
+ instead of the special (and badly supported) LIBKRB5. LIBKRB5 is
+ removed entirely.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) The hw_ncipher.c engine requires dynamic locks. Unfortunately, it
+ seems that in spite of existing for more than a year, many application
+ author have done nothing to provide the necessary callbacks, which
+ means that this particular engine will not work properly anywhere.
+ This is a very unfortunate situation which forces us, in the name
+ of usability, to give the hw_ncipher.c a static lock, which is part
+ of libcrypto.
+ NOTE: This is for the 0.9.7 series ONLY. This hack will never
+ appear in 0.9.8 or later. We EXPECT application authors to have
+ dealt properly with this when 0.9.8 is released (unless we actually
+ make such changes in the libcrypto locking code that changes will
+ have to be made anyway).
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) In asn1_d2i_read_bio() repeatedly call BIO_read() until all content
+ octets have been read, EOF or an error occurs. Without this change
+ some truncated ASN1 structures will not produce an error.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Disable Heimdal support, since it hasn't been fully implemented.
+ Still give the possibility to force the use of Heimdal, but with
+ warnings and a request that patches get sent to openssl-dev.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the VC-CE target, introduce the WINCE sysname, and add
+ INSTALL.WCE and appropriate conditionals to make it build.
+ [Steven Reddie <smr at essemer.com.au> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Change the DLL names for Cygwin to cygcrypto-x.y.z.dll and
+ cygssl-x.y.z.dll, where x, y and z are the major, minor and
+ edit numbers of the version.
+ [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen at redhat.com> and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Introduce safe string copy and catenation functions
+ (BUF_strlcpy() and BUF_strlcat()).
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS) and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Avoid using fixed-size buffers for one-line DNs.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Add BUF_MEM_grow_clean() to avoid information leakage when
+ resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Avoid using fixed size buffers for configuration file location.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Avoid filename truncation for various CA files.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Use sizeof in preference to magic numbers.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Avoid filename truncation in cert requests.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Add assertions to check for (supposedly impossible) buffer
+ overflows.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Don't cache truncated DNS entries in the local cache (this could
+ potentially lead to a spoofing attack).
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Fix various buffers to be large enough for hex/decimal
+ representations in a platform independent manner.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Add CRYPTO_realloc_clean() to avoid information leakage when
+ resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Add BIO_indent() to avoid much slightly worrying code to do
+ indents.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Convert sprintf()/BIO_puts() to BIO_printf().
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) buffer_gets() could terminate with the buffer only half
+ full. Fixed.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Add assertions to prevent user-supplied crypto functions from
+ overflowing internal buffers by having large block sizes, etc.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) New OPENSSL_assert() macro (similar to assert(), but enabled
+ unconditionally).
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Eliminate unused copy of key in RC4.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized buffers for IV in pem.h.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Fix off-by-one error in EGD path.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) If RANDFILE path is too long, ignore instead of truncating.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized X.509 structure
+ CBCParameter.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Eliminate unused and dangerous function knumber().
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Eliminate unused and dangerous structure, KSSL_ERR.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Protect against overlong session ID context length in an encoded
+ session object. Since these are local, this does not appear to be
+ exploitable.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Change from security patch (see 0.9.6e below) that did not affect
+ the 0.9.6 release series:
+
+ Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
+ supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
+ (CVE-2002-0657)
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make -nameopt work fully for req and add -reqopt switch.
+ [Michael Bell <michael.bell at rz.hu-berlin.de>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen <yngve at opera.com>]
+
+ *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms
+ have been removed entirely. This was also the last step to make
+ OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions.
+ [Richard Levitte, Doug Kaufman <dkaufman at rahul.net>]
+
+ *) Add cipher selection rules COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT
+ to allow version independent disabling of normally unselected ciphers,
+ which may be activated as a side-effect of selecting a single cipher.
+
+ (E.g., cipher list string "RSA" enables ciphersuites that are left
+ out of "ALL" because they do not provide symmetric encryption.
+ "RSA:!COMPLEMEMENTOFALL" avoids these unsafe ciphersuites.)
+ [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add appropriate support for separate platform-dependent build
+ directories. The recommended way to make a platform-dependent
+ build directory is the following (tested on Linux), maybe with
+ some local tweaks:
+
+ # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree. In
+ # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE
+ # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory.
+ mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`"
+ cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`"
+ (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f) | while read F; do
+ mkdir -p `dirname $F`
+ ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F
+ done
+
+ To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean"
+ is a good thing. If it isn't successfull, don't worry about it,
+ it probably means the source directory is very clean.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make sure any ENGINE control commands make local copies of string
+ pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
+ the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
+ data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
+ [Götz Babin-Ebell <babinebell at trustcenter.de>]
+
+ *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
+ [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com>]
+
+ *) Add AES modes CFB and OFB to the object database. Correct an
+ error in AES-CFB decryption.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Remove most calls to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() in evp_enc.c, this
+ allows existing EVP_CIPHER_CTX structures to be reused after
+ calling EVP_*Final(). This behaviour is used by encryption
+ BIOs and some applications. This has the side effect that
+ applications must explicitly clean up cipher contexts with
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() or they will leak memory.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Check the values of dna and dnb in bn_mul_recursive before calling
+ bn_mul_comba (a non zero value means the a or b arrays do not contain
+ n2 elements) and fallback to bn_mul_normal if either is not zero.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix escaping of non-ASCII characters when using the -subj option
+ of the "openssl req" command line tool. (Robert Joop <joop at fokus.gmd.de>)
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Make object definitions compliant to LDAP (RFC2256): SN is the short
+ form for "surname", serialNumber has no short form.
+ Use "mail" as the short name for "rfc822Mailbox" according to RFC2798;
+ therefore remove "mail" short name for "internet 7".
+ The OID for unique identifiers in X509 certificates is
+ x500UniqueIdentifier, not uniqueIdentifier.
+ Some more OID additions. (Michael Bell <michael.bell at rz.hu-berlin.de>)
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Add an "init" command to the ENGINE config module and auto initialize
+ ENGINEs. Without any "init" command the ENGINE will be initialized
+ after all ctrl commands have been executed on it. If init=1 the
+ ENGINE is initailized at that point (ctrls before that point are run
+ on the uninitialized ENGINE and after on the initialized one). If
+ init=0 then the ENGINE will not be iniatialized at all.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix the 'app_verify_callback' interface so that the user-defined
+ argument is actually passed to the callback: In the
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() prototype, the callback
+ declaration has been changed from
+ int (*cb)()
+ into
+ int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *);
+ in ssl_verify_cert_chain (ssl/ssl_cert.c), the call
+ i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx)
+ has been changed into
+ i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg).
+
+ To update applications using SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(),
+ a dummy argument can be added to their callback functions.
+ [D. K. Smetters <smetters at parc.xerox.com>]
+
+ *) Added the '4758cca' ENGINE to support IBM 4758 cards.
+ [Maurice Gittens <maurice at gittens.nl>, touchups by Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Add and OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF define which will cause
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() to load the openssl.cnf config file.
+ This allows older applications to transparently support certain
+ OpenSSL features: such as crypto acceleration and dynamic ENGINE loading.
+ Two new functions OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() which will never
+ load the config file and OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() which will
+ always load it have also been added.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add the OFB, CFB and CTR (all with 128 bit feedback) to AES.
+ Adjust NIDs and EVP layer.
+ [Stephen Sprunk <stephen at sprunk.org> and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Config modules support in openssl utility.
+
+ Most commands now load modules from the config file,
+ though in a few (such as version) this isn't done
+ because it couldn't be used for anything.
+
+ In the case of ca and req the config file used is
+ the same as the utility itself: that is the -config
+ command line option can be used to specify an
+ alternative file.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Move default behaviour from OPENSSL_config(). If appname is NULL
+ use "openssl_conf" if filename is NULL use default openssl config file.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add an argument to OPENSSL_config() to allow the use of an alternative
+ config section name. Add a new flag to tolerate a missing config file
+ and move code to CONF_modules_load_file().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption
+ Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep')
+ The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted/corrected
+ to work with the new engine framework.
+ [AEP Inc. and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore
+ Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware')
+ The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted
+ to work with the new engine framework.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Have the CHIL engine fork-safe (as defined by nCipher) and actually
+ make the newer ENGINE framework commands for the CHIL engine work.
+ [Toomas Kiisk <vix at cyber.ee> and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make it possible to produce shared libraries on ReliantUNIX.
+ [Robert Dahlem <Robert.Dahlem at ffm2.siemens.de> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the configuration target debug-linux-ppro.
+ Make 'openssl rsa' use the general key loading routines
+ implemented in apps.c, and make those routines able to
+ handle the key format FORMAT_NETSCAPE and the variant
+ FORMAT_IISSGC.
+ [Toomas Kiisk <vix at cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey().
+ [Toomas Kiisk <vix at cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add -keyform to rsautl, and document -engine.
+ [Richard Levitte, inspired by Toomas Kiisk <vix at cyber.ee>]
+
+ *) Change BIO_new_file (crypto/bio/bss_file.c) to use new
+ BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE error code rather than the generic
+ ERR_R_SYS_LIB error code if fopen() fails with ENOENT.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add new functions
+ ERR_peek_last_error
+ ERR_peek_last_error_line
+ ERR_peek_last_error_line_data.
+ These are similar to
+ ERR_peek_error
+ ERR_peek_error_line
+ ERR_peek_error_line_data,
+ but report on the latest error recorded rather than the first one
+ still in the error queue.
+ [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) default_algorithms option in ENGINE config module. This allows things
+ like:
+ default_algorithms = ALL
+ default_algorithms = RSA, DSA, RAND, CIPHERS, DIGESTS
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Prelminary ENGINE config module.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New experimental application configuration code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change the AES code to follow the same name structure as all other
+ symmetric ciphers, and behave the same way. Move everything to
+ the directory crypto/aes, thereby obsoleting crypto/rijndael.
+ [Stephen Sprunk <stephen at sprunk.org> and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) SECURITY: remove unsafe setjmp/signal interaction from ui_openssl.c.
+ [Ben Laurie and Theo de Raadt]
+
+ *) Add option to output public keys in req command.
+ [Massimiliano Pala madwolf at openca.org]
+
+ *) Use wNAFs in EC_POINTs_mul() for improved efficiency
+ (up to about 10% better than before for P-192 and P-224).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New functions/macros
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cb)
+ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg)
+ SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, cb)
+ SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg)
+
+ to request calling a callback function
+
+ void cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+
+ whenever a protocol message has been completely received
+ (write_p == 0) or sent (write_p == 1). Here 'version' is the
+ protocol version according to which the SSL library interprets
+ the current protocol message (SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, or
+ TLS1_VERSION). 'content_type' is 0 in the case of SSL 2.0, or
+ the content type as defined in the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol
+ specification (change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22)).
+ 'buf' and 'len' point to the actual message, 'ssl' to the
+ SSL object, and 'arg' is the application-defined value set by
+ SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg().
+
+ 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server' have new '-msg' options
+ to enable a callback that displays all protocol messages.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change the shared library support so shared libraries are built as
+ soon as the corresponding static library is finished, and thereby get
+ openssl and the test programs linked against the shared library.
+ This still only happens when the keyword "shard" has been given to
+ the configuration scripts.
+
+ NOTE: shared library support is still an experimental thing, and
+ backward binary compatibility is still not guaranteed.
+ ["Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro at ds2.pg.gda.pl> and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add support for Subject Information Access extension.
+ [Peter Sylvester <Peter.Sylvester at EdelWeb.fr>]
+
+ *) Make BUF_MEM_grow() behaviour more consistent: Initialise to zero
+ additional bytes when new memory had to be allocated, not just
+ when reusing an existing buffer.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New command line and configuration option 'utf8' for the req command.
+ This allows field values to be specified as UTF8 strings.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -multi and -mr options to "openssl speed" - giving multiple parallel
+ runs for the former and machine-readable output for the latter.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add '-noemailDN' option to 'openssl ca'. This prevents inclusion
+ of the e-mail address in the DN (i.e., it will go into a certificate
+ extension only). The new configuration file option 'email_in_dn = no'
+ has the same effect.
+ [Massimiliano Pala madwolf at openca.org]
+
+ *) Change all functions with names starting with des_ to be starting
+ with DES_ instead. Add wrappers that are compatible with libdes,
+ but are named _ossl_old_des_*. Finally, add macros that map the
+ des_* symbols to the corresponding _ossl_old_des_* if libdes
+ compatibility is desired. If OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility is
+ desired, the des_* symbols will be mapped to DES_*, with one
+ exception.
+
+ Since we provide two compatibility mappings, the user needs to
+ define the macro OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY if libdes
+ compatibility is desired. The default (i.e., when that macro
+ isn't defined) is OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility.
+
+ There are also macros that enable and disable the support of old
+ des functions altogether. Those are OPENSSL_ENABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT
+ and OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT. If none or both of those
+ are defined, the default will apply: to support the old des routines.
+
+ In either case, one must include openssl/des.h to get the correct
+ definitions. Do not try to just include openssl/des_old.h, that
+ won't work.
+
+ NOTE: This is a major break of an old API into a new one. Software
+ authors are encouraged to switch to the DES_ style functions. Some
+ time in the future, des_old.h and the libdes compatibility functions
+ will be disable (i.e. OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT will be the
+ default), and then completely removed.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Test for certificates which contain unsupported critical extensions.
+ If such a certificate is found during a verify operation it is
+ rejected by default: this behaviour can be overridden by either
+ handling the new error X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION or
+ by setting the verify flag X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL. A new function
+ X509_supported_extension() has also been added which returns 1 if a
+ particular extension is supported.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify the behaviour of EVP cipher functions in similar way to digests
+ to retain compatibility with existing code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify the behaviour of EVP_DigestInit() and EVP_DigestFinal() to retain
+ compatibility with existing code. In particular the 'ctx' parameter does
+ not have to be to be initialized before the call to EVP_DigestInit() and
+ it is tidied up after a call to EVP_DigestFinal(). New function
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex() which does not tidy up the ctx. Similarly function
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy() changed to not require the destination to be
+ initialized valid and new function EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() added which
+ requires the destination to be valid.
+
+ Modify all the OpenSSL digest calls to use EVP_DigestInit_ex(),
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) and the functions using it
+ so that complete 'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory
+ instead of overwriting 'msg_type' and 'length' with 'body' data.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add an implementation of SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack for Win32.
+ [Massimo Santin via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes
+ reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation
+ (initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations
+ of specific crypto iterfaces. This change also introduces integrated
+ support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs
+ can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD
+ implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README
+ as it couldn't be adequately described here. However, there are a few
+ API changes worth noting - some RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that
+ were changed in the original introduction of ENGINE code have now
+ reverted back - the hooking from this code to ENGINE is now a good
+ deal more passive and at run-time, operations deal directly with
+ RSA_METHODs, DSA_METHODs (etc) as they did before, rather than
+ dereferencing through an ENGINE pointer any more. Also, the ENGINE
+ functions dealing with BN_MOD_EXP[_CRT] handlers have been removed -
+ they were not being used by the framework as there is no concept of a
+ BIGNUM_METHOD and they could not be generalised to the new
+ 'ENGINE_TABLE' mechanism that underlies the new code. Similarly,
+ ENGINE_cpy() has been removed as it cannot be consistently defined in
+ the new code.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Change ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() to allow fractional seconds.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change mkdef.pl to sort symbols that get the same entry number,
+ and make sure the automatically generated functions ERR_load_*
+ become part of libeay.num as well.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) New function SSL_renegotiate_pending(). This returns true once
+ renegotiation has been requested (either SSL_renegotiate() call
+ or HelloRequest/ClientHello receveived from the peer) and becomes
+ false once a handshake has been completed.
+ (For servers, SSL_renegotiate() followed by SSL_do_handshake()
+ sends a HelloRequest, but does not ensure that a handshake takes
+ place. SSL_renegotiate_pending() is useful for checking if the
+ client has followed the request.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New SSL option SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION.
+ By default, clients may request session resumption even during
+ renegotiation (if session ID contexts permit); with this option,
+ session resumption is possible only in the first handshake.
+
+ SSL_OP_ALL is now 0x00000FFFL instead of 0x000FFFFFL. This makes
+ more bits available for options that should not be part of
+ SSL_OP_ALL (such as SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add some demos for certificate and certificate request creation.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make maximum certificate chain size accepted from the peer application
+ settable (SSL*_get/set_max_cert_list()), as proposed by
+ "Douglas E. Engert" <deengert at anl.gov>.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Add support for shared libraries for Unixware-7
+ (Boyd Lynn Gerber <gerberb at zenez.com>).
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Add a "destroy" handler to ENGINEs that allows structural cleanup to
+ be done prior to destruction. Use this to unload error strings from
+ ENGINEs that load their own error strings. NB: This adds two new API
+ functions to "get" and "set" this destroy handler in an ENGINE.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Alter all existing ENGINE implementations (except "openssl" and
+ "openbsd") to dynamically instantiate their own error strings. This
+ makes them more flexible to be built both as statically-linked ENGINEs
+ and self-contained shared-libraries loadable via the "dynamic" ENGINE.
+ Also, add stub code to each that makes building them as self-contained
+ shared-libraries easier (see README.ENGINE).
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Add a "dynamic" ENGINE that provides a mechanism for binding ENGINE
+ implementations into applications that are completely implemented in
+ self-contained shared-libraries. The "dynamic" ENGINE exposes control
+ commands that can be used to configure what shared-library to load and
+ to control aspects of the way it is handled. Also, made an update to
+ the README.ENGINE file that brings its information up-to-date and
+ provides some information and instructions on the "dynamic" ENGINE
+ (ie. how to use it, how to build "dynamic"-loadable ENGINEs, etc).
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Make it possible to unload ranges of ERR strings with a new
+ "ERR_unload_strings" function.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Add a copy() function to EVP_MD.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Make EVP_MD routines take a context pointer instead of just the
+ md_data void pointer.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add flags to EVP_MD and EVP_MD_CTX. EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates
+ that the digest can only process a single chunk of data
+ (typically because it is provided by a piece of
+ hardware). EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the application
+ is only going to provide a single chunk of data, and hence the
+ framework needn't accumulate the data for oneshot drivers.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) As with "ERR", make it possible to replace the underlying "ex_data"
+ functions. This change also alters the storage and management of global
+ ex_data state - it's now all inside ex_data.c and all "class" code (eg.
+ RSA, BIO, SSL_CTX, etc) no longer stores its own STACKS and per-class
+ index counters. The API functions that use this state have been changed
+ to take a "class_index" rather than pointers to the class's local STACK
+ and counter, and there is now an API function to dynamically create new
+ classes. This centralisation allows us to (a) plug a lot of the
+ thread-safety problems that existed, and (b) makes it possible to clean
+ up all allocated state using "CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data()". W.r.t. (b)
+ such data would previously have always leaked in application code and
+ workarounds were in place to make the memory debugging turn a blind eye
+ to it. Application code that doesn't use this new function will still
+ leak as before, but their memory debugging output will announce it now
+ rather than letting it slide.
+
+ Besides the addition of CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), another API change
+ induced by the "ex_data" overhaul is that X509_STORE_CTX_init() now
+ has a return value to indicate success or failure.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Make it possible to replace the underlying "ERR" functions such that the
+ global state (2 LHASH tables and 2 locks) is only used by the "default"
+ implementation. This change also adds two functions to "get" and "set"
+ the implementation prior to it being automatically set the first time
+ any other ERR function takes place. Ie. an application can call "get",
+ pass the return value to a module it has just loaded, and that module
+ can call its own "set" function using that value. This means the
+ module's "ERR" operations will use (and modify) the error state in the
+ application and not in its own statically linked copy of OpenSSL code.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Give DH, DSA, and RSA types their own "**_up_ref()" function to increment
+ reference counts. This performs normal REF_PRINT/REF_CHECK macros on
+ the operation, and provides a more encapsulated way for external code
+ (crypto/evp/ and ssl/) to do this. Also changed the evp and ssl code
+ to use these functions rather than manually incrementing the counts.
+
+ Also rename "DSO_up()" function to more descriptive "DSO_up_ref()".
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Add EVP test program.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add symmetric cipher support to ENGINE. Expect the API to change!
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) New CRL functions: X509_CRL_set_version(), X509_CRL_set_issuer_name()
+ X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(), X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(), X509_CRL_sort(),
+ X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), and X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate().
+ These allow a CRL to be built without having to access X509_CRL fields
+ directly. Modify 'ca' application to use new functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Move SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG out of the SSL_OP_ALL list of recommended
+ bug workarounds. Rollback attack detection is a security feature.
+ The problem will only arise on OpenSSL servers when TLSv1 is not
+ available (sslv3_server_method() or SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1).
+ Software authors not wanting to support TLSv1 will have special reasons
+ for their choice and can explicitly enable this option.
+ [Bodo Moeller, Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Rationalise EVP so it can be extended: don't include a union of
+ cipher/digest structures, add init/cleanup functions for EVP_MD_CTX
+ (similar to those existing for EVP_CIPHER_CTX).
+ Usage example:
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md); /* new function call */
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_sha1());
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, in, len);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, out, NULL);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md); /* new function call */
+
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Make DES key schedule conform to the usual scheme, as well as
+ correcting its structure. This means that calls to DES functions
+ now have to pass a pointer to a des_key_schedule instead of a
+ plain des_key_schedule (which was actually always a pointer
+ anyway): E.g.,
+
+ des_key_schedule ks;
+
+ des_set_key_checked(..., &ks);
+ des_ncbc_encrypt(..., &ks, ...);
+
+ (Note that a later change renames 'des_...' into 'DES_...'.)
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Initial reduction of linker bloat: the use of some functions, such as
+ PEM causes large amounts of unused functions to be linked in due to
+ poor organisation. For example pem_all.c contains every PEM function
+ which has a knock on effect of linking in large amounts of (unused)
+ ASN1 code. Grouping together similar functions and splitting unrelated
+ functions prevents this.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Cleanup of EVP macros.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Change historical references to {NID,SN,LN}_des_ede and ede3 to add the
+ correct _ecb suffix.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add initial OCSP responder support to ocsp application. The
+ revocation information is handled using the text based index
+ use by the ca application. The responder can either handle
+ requests generated internally, supplied in files (for example
+ via a CGI script) or using an internal minimal server.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add configuration choices to get zlib compression for TLS.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Changes to Kerberos SSL for RFC 2712 compliance:
+ 1. Implemented real KerberosWrapper, instead of just using
+ KRB5 AP_REQ message. [Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw at sxw.org.uk>]
+ 2. Implemented optional authenticator field of KerberosWrapper.
+
+ Added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for Kerberos ticket, ap_req,
+ and authenticator structs; see crypto/krb5/.
+
+ Generalized Kerberos calls to support multiple Kerberos libraries.
+ [Vern Staats <staatsvr at asc.hpc.mil>,
+ Jeffrey Altman <jaltman at columbia.edu>
+ via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Cause 'openssl speed' to use fully hard-coded DSA keys as it
+ already does with RSA. testdsa.h now has 'priv_key/pub_key'
+ values for each of the key sizes rather than having just
+ parameters (and 'speed' generating keys each time).
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Speed up EVP routines.
+ Before:
+encrypt
+type 8 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes
+des-cbc 4408.85k 5560.51k 5778.46k 5862.20k 5825.16k
+des-cbc 4389.55k 5571.17k 5792.23k 5846.91k 5832.11k
+des-cbc 4394.32k 5575.92k 5807.44k 5848.37k 5841.30k
+decrypt
+des-cbc 3482.66k 5069.49k 5496.39k 5614.16k 5639.28k
+des-cbc 3480.74k 5068.76k 5510.34k 5609.87k 5635.52k
+des-cbc 3483.72k 5067.62k 5504.60k 5708.01k 5724.80k
+ After:
+encrypt
+des-cbc 4660.16k 5650.19k 5807.19k 5827.13k 5783.32k
+decrypt
+des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Added the OS2-EMX target.
+ ["Brian Havard" <brianh at kheldar.apana.org.au> and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Rewrite apps to use NCONF routines instead of the old CONF. New functions
+ to support NCONF routines in extension code. New function CONF_set_nconf()
+ to allow functions which take an NCONF to also handle the old LHASH
+ structure: this means that the old CONF compatible routines can be
+ retained (in particular wrt extensions) without having to duplicate the
+ code. New function X509V3_add_ext_nconf_sk to add extensions to a stack.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms for inner control
+ and with possibilities to have yes/no kind of prompts.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Change all calls to low level digest routines in the library and
+ applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and
+ don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy().
+ [Verdon Walker <VWalker at novell.com>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add the possibility to control engines through control names but with
+ arbitrary arguments instead of just a string.
+ Change the key loaders to take a UI_METHOD instead of a callback
+ function pointer. NOTE: this breaks binary compatibility with earlier
+ versions of OpenSSL [engine].
+ Adapt the nCipher code for these new conditions and add a card insertion
+ callback.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms to better support
+ dialog box interfaces, application-defined prompts, the possibility
+ to use defaults (for example default passwords from somewhere else)
+ and interrupts/cancellations.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Tidy up PKCS#12 attribute handling. Add support for the CSP name
+ attribute in PKCS#12 files, add new -CSP option to pkcs12 utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix a memory leak in 'sk_dup()' in the case reallocation fails. (Also
+ tidy up some unnecessarily weird code in 'sk_new()').
+ [Geoff, reported by Diego Tartara <dtartara at novamens.com>]
+
+ *) Change the key loading routines for ENGINEs to use the same kind
+ callback (pem_password_cb) as all other routines that need this
+ kind of callback.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Increase ENTROPY_NEEDED to 32 bytes, as Rijndael can operate with
+ 256 bit (=32 byte) keys. Of course seeding with more entropy bytes
+ than this minimum value is recommended.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) New random seeder for OpenVMS, using the system process statistics
+ that are easily reachable.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Windows apparently can't transparently handle global
+ variables defined in DLLs. Initialisations such as:
+
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it = &ASN1_INTEGER_it;
+
+ wont compile. This is used by the any applications that need to
+ declare their own ASN1 modules. This was fixed by adding the option
+ EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN to all Win32 platforms, although this isn't strictly
+ needed for static libraries under Win32.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions X509_PURPOSE_set() and X509_TRUST_set() to handle
+ setting of purpose and trust fields. New X509_STORE trust and
+ purpose functions and tidy up setting in other SSL functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add copies of X509_STORE_CTX fields and callbacks to X509_STORE
+ structure. These are inherited by X509_STORE_CTX when it is
+ initialised. This allows various defaults to be set in the
+ X509_STORE structure (such as flags for CRL checking and custom
+ purpose or trust settings) for functions which only use X509_STORE_CTX
+ internally such as S/MIME.
+
+ Modify X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() so it only sets purposes and
+ trust settings if they are not set in X509_STORE. This allows X509_STORE
+ purposes and trust (in S/MIME for example) to override any set by default.
+
+ Add command line options for CRL checking to smime, s_client and s_server
+ applications.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial CRL based revocation checking. If the CRL checking flag(s)
+ are set then the CRL is looked up in the X509_STORE structure and
+ its validity and signature checked, then if the certificate is found
+ in the CRL the verify fails with a revoked error.
+
+ Various new CRL related callbacks added to X509_STORE_CTX structure.
+
+ Command line options added to 'verify' application to support this.
+
+ This needs some additional work, such as being able to handle multiple
+ CRLs with different times, extension based lookup (rather than just
+ by subject name) and ultimately more complete V2 CRL extension
+ handling.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a general user interface API (crypto/ui/). This is designed
+ to replace things like des_read_password and friends (backward
+ compatibility functions using this new API are provided).
+ The purpose is to remove prompting functions from the DES code
+ section as well as provide for prompting through dialog boxes in
+ a window system and the like.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add "ex_data" support to ENGINE so implementations can add state at a
+ per-structure level rather than having to store it globally.
+ [Geoff]
+
+ *) Make it possible for ENGINE structures to be copied when retrieved by
+ ENGINE_by_id() if the ENGINE specifies a new flag: ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY.
+ This causes the "original" ENGINE structure to act like a template,
+ analogous to the RSA vs. RSA_METHOD type of separation. Because of this
+ operational state can be localised to each ENGINE structure, despite the
+ fact they all share the same "methods". New ENGINE structures returned in
+ this case have no functional references and the return value is the single
+ structural reference. This matches the single structural reference returned
+ by ENGINE_by_id() normally, when it is incremented on the pre-existing
+ ENGINE structure.
+ [Geoff]
+
+ *) Fix ASN1 decoder when decoding type ANY and V_ASN1_OTHER: since this
+ needs to match any other type at all we need to manually clear the
+ tag cache.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Changes to the "openssl engine" utility to include;
+ - verbosity levels ('-v', '-vv', and '-vvv') that provide information
+ about an ENGINE's available control commands.
+ - executing control commands from command line arguments using the
+ '-pre' and '-post' switches. '-post' is only used if '-t' is
+ specified and the ENGINE is successfully initialised. The syntax for
+ the individual commands are colon-separated, for example;
+ openssl engine chil -pre FORK_CHECK:0 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/test.so
+ [Geoff]
+
+ *) New dynamic control command support for ENGINEs. ENGINEs can now
+ declare their own commands (numbers), names (strings), descriptions,
+ and input types for run-time discovery by calling applications. A
+ subset of these commands are implicitly classed as "executable"
+ depending on their input type, and only these can be invoked through
+ the new string-based API function ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). (Eg. this
+ can be based on user input, config files, etc). The distinction is
+ that "executable" commands cannot return anything other than a boolean
+ result and can only support numeric or string input, whereas some
+ discoverable commands may only be for direct use through
+ ENGINE_ctrl(), eg. supporting the exchange of binary data, function
+ pointers, or other custom uses. The "executable" commands are to
+ support parameterisations of ENGINE behaviour that can be
+ unambiguously defined by ENGINEs and used consistently across any
+ OpenSSL-based application. Commands have been added to all the
+ existing hardware-supporting ENGINEs, noticeably "SO_PATH" to allow
+ control over shared-library paths without source code alterations.
+ [Geoff]
+
+ *) Changed all ENGINE implementations to dynamically allocate their
+ ENGINEs rather than declaring them statically. Apart from this being
+ necessary with the removal of the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED distinction,
+ this also allows the implementations to compile without using the
+ internal engine_int.h header.
+ [Geoff]
+
+ *) Minor adjustment to "rand" code. RAND_get_rand_method() now returns a
+ 'const' value. Any code that should be able to modify a RAND_METHOD
+ should already have non-const pointers to it (ie. they should only
+ modify their own ones).
+ [Geoff]
+
+ *) Made a variety of little tweaks to the ENGINE code.
+ - "atalla" and "ubsec" string definitions were moved from header files
+ to C code. "nuron" string definitions were placed in variables
+ rather than hard-coded - allowing parameterisation of these values
+ later on via ctrl() commands.
+ - Removed unused "#if 0"'d code.
+ - Fixed engine list iteration code so it uses ENGINE_free() to release
+ structural references.
+ - Constified the RAND_METHOD element of ENGINE structures.
+ - Constified various get/set functions as appropriate and added
+ missing functions (including a catch-all ENGINE_cpy that duplicates
+ all ENGINE values onto a new ENGINE except reference counts/state).
+ - Removed NULL parameter checks in get/set functions. Setting a method
+ or function to NULL is a way of cancelling out a previously set
+ value. Passing a NULL ENGINE parameter is just plain stupid anyway
+ and doesn't justify the extra error symbols and code.
+ - Deprecate the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED define and move the area for
+ flags from engine_int.h to engine.h.
+ - Changed prototypes for ENGINE handler functions (init(), finish(),
+ ctrl(), key-load functions, etc) to take an (ENGINE*) parameter.
+ [Geoff]
+
+ *) Implement binary inversion algorithm for BN_mod_inverse in addition
+ to the algorithm using long division. The binary algorithm can be
+ used only if the modulus is odd. On 32-bit systems, it is faster
+ only for relatively small moduli (roughly 20-30% for 128-bit moduli,
+ roughly 5-15% for 256-bit moduli), so we use it only for moduli
+ up to 450 bits. In 64-bit environments, the binary algorithm
+ appears to be advantageous for much longer moduli; here we use it
+ for moduli up to 2048 bits.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Rewrite CHOICE field setting in ASN1_item_ex_d2i(). The old code
+ could not support the combine flag in choice fields.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a 'copy_extensions' option to the 'ca' utility. This copies
+ extensions from a certificate request to the certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow multiple 'certopt' and 'nameopt' options to be separated
+ by commas. Add 'namopt' and 'certopt' options to the 'ca' config
+ file: this allows the display of the certificate about to be
+ signed to be customised, to allow certain fields to be included
+ or excluded and extension details. The old system didn't display
+ multicharacter strings properly, omitted fields not in the policy
+ and couldn't display additional details such as extensions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Function EC_POINTs_mul for multiple scalar multiplication
+ of an arbitrary number of elliptic curve points
+ \sum scalars[i]*points[i],
+ optionally including the generator defined for the EC_GROUP:
+ scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i].
+
+ EC_POINT_mul is a simple wrapper function for the typical case
+ that the point list has just one item (besides the optional
+ generator).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) First EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p):
+
+ EC_GFp_simple_method() uses the basic BN_mod_mul and BN_mod_sqr
+ operations and provides various method functions that can also
+ operate with faster implementations of modular arithmetic.
+
+ EC_GFp_mont_method() reuses most functions that are part of
+ EC_GFp_simple_method, but uses Montgomery arithmetic.
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; point addition and point doubling
+ implementation directly derived from source code provided by
+ Lenka Fibikova <fibikova at exp-math.uni-essen.de>]
+
+ *) Framework for elliptic curves (crypto/ec/ec.h, crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h,
+ crypto/ec/ec_lib.c):
+
+ Curves are EC_GROUP objects (with an optional group generator)
+ based on EC_METHODs that are built into the library.
+
+ Points are EC_POINT objects based on EC_GROUP objects.
+
+ Most of the framework would be able to handle curves over arbitrary
+ finite fields, but as there are no obvious types for fields other
+ than GF(p), some functions are limited to that for now.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add the -HTTP option to s_server. It is similar to -WWW, but requires
+ that the file contains a complete HTTP response.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the ec directory to mkdef.pl and mkfiles.pl. In mkdef.pl
+ change the def and num file printf format specifier from "%-40sXXX"
+ to "%-39s XXX". The latter will always guarantee a space after the
+ field while the former will cause them to run together if the field
+ is 40 of more characters long.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Constify the cipher and digest 'method' functions and structures
+ and modify related functions to take constant EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER
+ pointers.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Hide BN_CTX structure details in bn_lcl.h instead of publishing them
+ in <openssl/bn.h>. Also further increase BN_CTX_NUM to 32.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Modify EVP_Digest*() routines so they now return values. Although the
+ internal software routines can never fail additional hardware versions
+ might.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Clean up crypto/err/err.h and change some error codes to avoid conflicts:
+
+ Previously ERR_R_FATAL was too small and coincided with ERR_LIB_PKCS7
+ (= ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB); it is now 64 instead of 32.
+
+ ASN1 error codes
+ ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR
+ ...
+ ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS
+ were 4 .. 9, conflicting with
+ ERR_LIB_RSA (= ERR_R_RSA_LIB)
+ ...
+ ERR_LIB_PEM (= ERR_R_PEM_LIB).
+ They are now 58 .. 63 (i.e., just below ERR_R_FATAL).
+
+ Add new error code 'ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR'.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Don't overuse locks in crypto/err/err.c: For data retrieval, CRYPTO_r_lock
+ suffices.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New option '-subj arg' for 'openssl req' and 'openssl ca'. This
+ sets the subject name for a new request or supersedes the
+ subject name in a given request. Formats that can be parsed are
+ 'CN=Some Name, OU=myOU, C=IT'
+ and
+ 'CN=Some Name/OU=myOU/C=IT'.
+
+ Add options '-batch' and '-verbose' to 'openssl req'.
+ [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at hackmasters.net>]
+
+ *) Introduce the possibility to access global variables through
+ functions on platform were that's the best way to handle exporting
+ global variables in shared libraries. To enable this functionality,
+ one must configure with "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN" or defined the C macro
+ "OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" in crypto/opensslconf.h (the latter
+ is normally done by Configure or something similar).
+
+ To implement a global variable, use the macro OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL
+ in the source file (foo.c) like this:
+
+ OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foo)=1;
+ OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(double,bar);
+
+ To declare a global variable, use the macros OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL
+ and OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF in the header file (foo.h) like this:
+
+ OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foo);
+ #define foo OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foo)
+ OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(double,bar);
+ #define bar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(bar)
+
+ The #defines are very important, and therefore so is including the
+ header file everywhere where the defined globals are used.
+
+ The macro OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION also affects the definition
+ of ASN.1 items, but that structure is a bit different.
+
+ The largest change is in util/mkdef.pl which has been enhanced with
+ better and easier to understand logic to choose which symbols should
+ go into the Windows .def files as well as a number of fixes and code
+ cleanup (among others, algorithm keywords are now sorted
+ lexicographically to avoid constant rewrites).
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) In BN_div() keep a copy of the sign of 'num' before writing the
+ result to 'rm' because if rm==num the value will be overwritten
+ and produce the wrong result if 'num' is negative: this caused
+ problems with BN_mod() and BN_nnmod().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Function OCSP_request_verify(). This checks the signature on an
+ OCSP request and verifies the signer certificate. The signer
+ certificate is just checked for a generic purpose and OCSP request
+ trust settings.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add OCSP_check_validity() function to check the validity of OCSP
+ responses. OCSP responses are prepared in real time and may only
+ be a few seconds old. Simply checking that the current time lies
+ between thisUpdate and nextUpdate max reject otherwise valid responses
+ caused by either OCSP responder or client clock inaccuracy. Instead
+ we allow thisUpdate and nextUpdate to fall within a certain period of
+ the current time. The age of the response can also optionally be
+ checked. Two new options -validity_period and -status_age added to
+ ocsp utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If signature or public key algorithm is unrecognized print out its
+ OID rather that just UNKNOWN.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change OCSP_cert_to_id() to tolerate a NULL subject certificate and
+ OCSP_cert_id_new() a NULL serialNumber. This allows a partial certificate
+ ID to be generated from the issuer certificate alone which can then be
+ passed to OCSP_id_issuer_cmp().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New compilation option ASN1_ITEM_FUNCTIONS. This causes the new
+ ASN1 modules to export functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers
+ instead of the ASN1_ITEM structures themselves. This adds several
+ new macros which allow the underlying ASN1 function/structure to
+ be accessed transparently. As a result code should not use ASN1_ITEM
+ references directly (such as &X509_it) but instead use the relevant
+ macros (such as ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)). This option is to allow
+ use of the new ASN1 code on platforms where exporting structures
+ is problematical (for example in shared libraries) but exporting
+ functions returning pointers to structures is not.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for overriding the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs.
+ These callbacks can be registered either in an SSL_CTX or per SSL.
+ The purpose of this is to allow applications to control, if they wish,
+ the arbitrary values chosen for use as session IDs, particularly as it
+ can be useful for session caching in multiple-server environments. A
+ command-line switch for testing this (and any client code that wishes
+ to use such a feature) has been added to "s_server".
+ [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Modify mkdef.pl to recognise and parse preprocessor conditionals
+ of the form '#if defined(...) || defined(...) || ...' and
+ '#if !defined(...) && !defined(...) && ...'. This also avoids
+ the growing number of special cases it was previously handling.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make all configuration macros available for application by making
+ sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting
+ with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making
+ sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with
+ opensslconf.h.
+ Additionally, it is now possible to define configuration/platform-
+ specific names (called "system identities"). In the C code, these
+ are prefixed with "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_". e_os2.h will create another
+ macro with the name beginning with "OPENSSL_SYS_", which is determined
+ from "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_*" or compiler-specific macros depending on
+ what is available.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) New option -set_serial to 'req' and 'x509' this allows the serial
+ number to use to be specified on the command line. Previously self
+ signed certificates were hard coded with serial number 0 and the
+ CA options of 'x509' had to use a serial number in a file which was
+ auto incremented.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New options to 'ca' utility to support V2 CRL entry extensions.
+ Currently CRL reason, invalidity date and hold instruction are
+ supported. Add new CRL extensions to V3 code and some new objects.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() this is used to
+ disable standard block padding (aka PKCS#5 padding) in the EVP
+ API, which was previously mandatory. This means that the data is
+ not padded in any way and so the total length much be a multiple
+ of the block size, otherwise an error occurs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial (incomplete) OCSP SSL support.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function OCSP_parse_url(). This splits up a URL into its host,
+ port and path components: primarily to parse OCSP URLs. New -url
+ option to ocsp utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New nonce behavior. The return value of OCSP_check_nonce() now
+ reflects the various checks performed. Applications can decide
+ whether to tolerate certain situations such as an absent nonce
+ in a response when one was present in a request: the ocsp application
+ just prints out a warning. New function OCSP_add1_basic_nonce()
+ this is to allow responders to include a nonce in a response even if
+ the request is nonce-less.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Disable stdin buffering in load_cert (apps/apps.c) so that no certs are
+ skipped when using openssl x509 multiple times on a single input file,
+ e.g. "(openssl x509 -out cert1; openssl x509 -out cert2) <certs".
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Make ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string() and ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string()
+ set string type: to handle setting ASN1_TIME structures. Fix ca
+ utility to correctly initialize revocation date of CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE allows the server to override
+ the clients preferred ciphersuites and rather use its own preferences.
+ Should help to work around M$ SGC (Server Gated Cryptography) bug in
+ Internet Explorer by ensuring unchanged hash method during stepup.
+ (Also replaces the broken/deactivated SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST option.)
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Make mkdef.pl recognise all DECLARE_ASN1 macros, change rijndael
+ to aes and add a new 'exist' option to print out symbols that don't
+ appear to exist.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Additional options to ocsp utility to allow flags to be set and
+ additional certificates supplied.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add the option -VAfile to 'openssl ocsp', so the user can give the
+ OCSP client a number of certificate to only verify the response
+ signature against.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Update Rijndael code to version 3.0 and change EVP AES ciphers to
+ handle the new API. Currently only ECB, CBC modes supported. Add new
+ AES OIDs.
+
+ Add TLS AES ciphersuites as described in RFC3268, "Advanced
+ Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
+ Security (TLS)". (In beta versions of OpenSSL 0.9.7, these were
+ not enabled by default and were not part of the "ALL" ciphersuite
+ alias because they were not yet official; they could be
+ explicitly requested by specifying the "AESdraft" ciphersuite
+ group alias. In the final release of OpenSSL 0.9.7, the group
+ alias is called "AES" and is part of "ALL".)
+ [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New function OCSP_copy_nonce() to copy nonce value (if present) from
+ request to response.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Functions for OCSP responders. OCSP_request_onereq_count(),
+ OCSP_request_onereq_get0(), OCSP_onereq_get0_id() and OCSP_id_get0_info()
+ extract information from a certificate request. OCSP_response_create()
+ creates a response and optionally adds a basic response structure.
+ OCSP_basic_add1_status() adds a complete single response to a basic
+ response and returns the OCSP_SINGLERESP structure just added (to allow
+ extensions to be included for example). OCSP_basic_add1_cert() adds a
+ certificate to a basic response and OCSP_basic_sign() signs a basic
+ response with various flags. New helper functions ASN1_TIME_check()
+ (checks validity of ASN1_TIME structure) and ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime()
+ (converts ASN1_TIME to GeneralizedTime).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Various new functions. EVP_Digest() combines EVP_Digest{Init,Update,Final}()
+ in a single operation. X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr() extracts the public_key
+ structure from a certificate. X509_pubkey_digest() digests the public_key
+ contents: this is used in various key identifiers.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make sk_sort() tolerate a NULL argument.
+ [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at comune.modena.it>]
+
+ *) New OCSP verify flag OCSP_TRUSTOTHER. When set the "other" certificates
+ passed by the function are trusted implicitly. If any of them signed the
+ response then it is assumed to be valid and is not verified.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In PKCS7_set_type() initialise content_type in PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT
+ to data. This was previously part of the PKCS7 ASN1 code. This
+ was causing problems with OpenSSL created PKCS#12 and PKCS#7 structures.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette
+ <support at securenetterm.com>]
+
+ *) Add CRYPTO_push_info() and CRYPTO_pop_info() calls to new ASN1
+ routines: without these tracing memory leaks is very painful.
+ Fix leaks in PKCS12 and PKCS7 routines.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make X509_time_adj() cope with the new behaviour of ASN1_TIME_new().
+ Previously it initialised the 'type' argument to V_ASN1_UTCTIME which
+ effectively meant GeneralizedTime would never be used. Now it
+ is initialised to -1 but X509_time_adj() now has to check the value
+ and use ASN1_TIME_set() if the value is not V_ASN1_UTCTIME or
+ V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, without this it always uses GeneralizedTime.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette
+ <support at securenetterm.com>]
+
+ *) Fixes to BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER when bn is zero. This would previously
+ result in a zero length in the ASN1_INTEGER structure which was
+ not consistent with the structure when d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() was used
+ and would cause ASN1_INTEGER_cmp() to fail. Enhance s2i_ASN1_INTEGER()
+ to cope with hex and negative integers. Fix bug in i2a_ASN1_INTEGER()
+ where it did not print out a minus for negative ASN1_INTEGER.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add summary printout to ocsp utility. The various functions which
+ convert status values to strings have been renamed to:
+ OCSP_response_status_str(), OCSP_cert_status_str() and
+ OCSP_crl_reason_str() and are no longer static. New options
+ to verify nonce values and to disable verification. OCSP response
+ printout format cleaned up.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add additional OCSP certificate checks. These are those specified
+ in RFC2560. This consists of two separate checks: the CA of the
+ certificate being checked must either be the OCSP signer certificate
+ or the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate. In the latter case the
+ OCSP signer certificate must contain the OCSP signing extended key
+ usage. This check is performed by attempting to match the OCSP
+ signer or the OCSP signer CA to the issuerNameHash and issuerKeyHash
+ in the OCSP_CERTID structures of the response.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial OCSP certificate verification added to OCSP_basic_verify()
+ and related routines. This uses the standard OpenSSL certificate
+ verify routines to perform initial checks (just CA validity) and
+ to obtain the certificate chain. Then additional checks will be
+ performed on the chain. Currently the root CA is checked to see
+ if it is explicitly trusted for OCSP signing. This is used to set
+ a root CA as a global signing root: that is any certificate that
+ chains to that CA is an acceptable OCSP signing certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New '-extfile ...' option to 'openssl ca' for reading X.509v3
+ extensions from a separate configuration file.
+ As when reading extensions from the main configuration file,
+ the '-extensions ...' option may be used for specifying the
+ section to use.
+ [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at comune.modena.it>]
+
+ *) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or
+ read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output
+ parsed, outputed or printed in text form. Not complete yet:
+ still needs to check the OCSP response validity.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New subcommands for 'openssl ca':
+ 'openssl ca -status <serial>' prints the status of the cert with
+ the given serial number (according to the index file).
+ 'openssl ca -updatedb' updates the expiry status of certificates
+ in the index file.
+ [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at comune.modena.it>]
+
+ *) New '-newreq-nodes' command option to CA.pl. This is like
+ '-newreq', but calls 'openssl req' with the '-nodes' option
+ so that the resulting key is not encrypted.
+ [Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>]
+
+ *) New configuration for the GNU Hurd.
+ [Jonathan Bartlett <johnnyb at wolfram.com> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Initial code to implement OCSP basic response verify. This
+ is currently incomplete. Currently just finds the signer's
+ certificate and verifies the signature on the response.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New SSLeay_version code SSLEAY_DIR to determine the compiled-in
+ value of OPENSSLDIR. This is available via the new '-d' option
+ to 'openssl version', and is also included in 'openssl version -a'.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Allowing defining memory allocation callbacks that will be given
+ file name and line number information in additional arguments
+ (a const char* and an int). The basic functionality remains, as
+ well as the original possibility to just replace malloc(),
+ realloc() and free() by functions that do not know about these
+ additional arguments. To register and find out the current
+ settings for extended allocation functions, the following
+ functions are provided:
+
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions
+ CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_functions
+ CRYPTO_get_mem_ex_functions
+ CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_functions
+
+ These work the same way as CRYPTO_set_mem_functions and friends.
+ CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_functions now writes 0 where such an
+ extended allocation function is enabled.
+ Similarly, CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_ex_functions writes 0 where
+ a conventional allocation function is enabled.
+ [Richard Levitte, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Finish off removing the remaining LHASH function pointer casts.
+ There should no longer be any prototype-casting required when using
+ the LHASH abstraction, and any casts that remain are "bugs". See
+ the callback types and macros at the head of lhash.h for details
+ (and "OBJ_cleanup" in crypto/objects/obj_dat.c as an example).
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Add automatic query of EGD sockets in RAND_poll() for the unix variant.
+ If /dev/[u]random devices are not available or do not return enough
+ entropy, EGD style sockets (served by EGD or PRNGD) will automatically
+ be queried.
+ The locations /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool, and
+ /etc/entropy will be queried once each in this sequence, quering stops
+ when enough entropy was collected without querying more sockets.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Change the Unix RAND_poll() variant to be able to poll several
+ random devices, as specified by DEVRANDOM, until a sufficient amount
+ of data has been collected. We spend at most 10 ms on each file
+ (select timeout) and read in non-blocking mode. DEVRANDOM now
+ defaults to the list "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/srandom"
+ (previously it was just the string "/dev/urandom"), so on typical
+ platforms the 10 ms delay will never occur.
+ Also separate out the Unix variant to its own file, rand_unix.c.
+ For VMS, there's a currently-empty rand_vms.c.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Move OCSP client related routines to ocsp_cl.c. These
+ provide utility functions which an application needing
+ to issue a request to an OCSP responder and analyse the
+ response will typically need: as opposed to those which an
+ OCSP responder itself would need which will be added later.
+
+ OCSP_request_sign() signs an OCSP request with an API similar
+ to PKCS7_sign(). OCSP_response_status() returns status of OCSP
+ response. OCSP_response_get1_basic() extracts basic response
+ from response. OCSP_resp_find_status(): finds and extracts status
+ information from an OCSP_CERTID structure (which will be created
+ when the request structure is built). These are built from lower
+ level functions which work on OCSP_SINGLERESP structures but
+ wont normally be used unless the application wishes to examine
+ extensions in the OCSP response for example.
+
+ Replace nonce routines with a pair of functions.
+ OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce value and optionally
+ generates a random value. OCSP_check_nonce() checks the
+ validity of the nonce in an OCSP response.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change function OCSP_request_add() to OCSP_request_add0_id().
+ This doesn't copy the supplied OCSP_CERTID and avoids the
+ need to free up the newly created id. Change return type
+ to OCSP_ONEREQ to return the internal OCSP_ONEREQ structure.
+ This can then be used to add extensions to the request.
+ Deleted OCSP_request_new(), since most of its functionality
+ is now in OCSP_REQUEST_new() (and the case insensitive name
+ clash) apart from the ability to set the request name which
+ will be added elsewhere.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update OCSP API. Remove obsolete extensions argument from
+ various functions. Extensions are now handled using the new
+ OCSP extension code. New simple OCSP HTTP function which
+ can be used to send requests and parse the response.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix the PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code to work with new ASN1. Two new
+ ASN1_ITEM structures help with sign and verify. PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN
+ uses the special reorder version of SET OF to sort the attributes
+ and reorder them to match the encoded order. This resolves a long
+ standing problem: a verify on a PKCS7 structure just after signing
+ it used to fail because the attribute order did not match the
+ encoded order. PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY does not reorder the attributes:
+ it uses the received order. This is necessary to tolerate some broken
+ software that does not order SET OF. This is handled by encoding
+ as a SEQUENCE OF but using implicit tagging (with UNIVERSAL class)
+ to produce the required SET OF.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Have mk1mf.pl generate the macros OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO and
+ OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL and use them appropriately in the header
+ files to get correct declarations of the ASN.1 item variables.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Rewrite of PKCS#12 code to use new ASN1 functionality. Replace many
+ PKCS#12 macros with real functions. Fix two unrelated ASN1 bugs:
+ asn1_check_tlen() would sometimes attempt to use 'ctx' when it was
+ NULL and ASN1_TYPE was not dereferenced properly in asn1_ex_c2i().
+ New ASN1 macro: DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM() which just declares the relevant
+ ASN1_ITEM and no wrapper functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions or ASN1_item_d2i_fp() and ASN1_item_d2i_bio(). These
+ replace the old function pointer based I/O routines. Change most of
+ the *_d2i_bio() and *_d2i_fp() functions to use these.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor
+ lines, recognice more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make
+ it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) New ASN1 functions to handle dup, sign, verify, digest, pack and
+ unpack operations in terms of ASN1_ITEM. Modify existing wrappers
+ to use new functions. Add NO_ASN1_OLD which can be set to remove
+ some old style ASN1 functions: this can be used to determine if old
+ code will still work when these eventually go away.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New extension functions for OCSP structures, these follow the
+ same conventions as certificates and CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function X509V3_add1_i2d(). This automatically encodes and
+ adds an extension. Its behaviour can be customised with various
+ flags to append, replace or delete. Various wrappers added for
+ certifcates and CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix to avoid calling the underlying ASN1 print routine when
+ an extension cannot be parsed. Correct a typo in the
+ OCSP_SERVICELOC extension. Tidy up print OCSP format.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make mkdef.pl parse some of the ASN1 macros and add apropriate
+ entries for variables.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functionality to apps/openssl.c for detecting locking
+ problems: As the program is single-threaded, all we have
+ to do is register a locking callback using an array for
+ storing which locks are currently held by the program.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Use a lock around the call to CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() in
+ SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_idx(), which is used in
+ ssl_verify_cert_chain() and thus can be called at any time
+ during TLS/SSL handshakes so that thread-safety is essential.
+ Unfortunately, the ex_data design is not at all suited
+ for multi-threaded use, so it probably should be abolished.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Added Broadcom "ubsec" ENGINE to OpenSSL.
+ [Broadcom, tweaked and integrated by Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Move common extension printing code to new function
+ X509V3_print_extensions(). Reorganise OCSP print routines and
+ implement some needed OCSP ASN1 functions. Add OCSP extensions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function X509_signature_print() to remove duplication in some
+ print routines.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a special meaning when SET OF and SEQUENCE OF flags are both
+ set (this was treated exactly the same as SET OF previously). This
+ is used to reorder the STACK representing the structure to match the
+ encoding. This will be used to get round a problem where a PKCS7
+ structure which was signed could not be verified because the STACK
+ order did not reflect the encoded order.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Reimplement the OCSP ASN1 module using the new code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update the X509V3 code to permit the use of an ASN1_ITEM structure
+ for its ASN1 operations. The old style function pointers still exist
+ for now but they will eventually go away.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Merge in replacement ASN1 code from the ASN1 branch. This almost
+ completely replaces the old ASN1 functionality with a table driven
+ encoder and decoder which interprets an ASN1_ITEM structure describing
+ the ASN1 module. Compatibility with the existing ASN1 API (i2d,d2i) is
+ largely maintained. Almost all of the old asn1_mac.h macro based ASN1
+ has also been converted to the new form.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change BN_mod_exp_recp so that negative moduli are tolerated
+ (the sign is ignored). Similarly, ignore the sign in BN_MONT_CTX_set
+ so that BN_mod_exp_mont and BN_mod_exp_mont_word work
+ for negative moduli.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix BN_uadd and BN_usub: Always return non-negative results instead
+ of not touching the result's sign bit.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) BN_div bugfix: If the result is 0, the sign (res->neg) must not be
+ set.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Changed the LHASH code to use prototypes for callbacks, and created
+ macros to declare and implement thin (optionally static) functions
+ that provide type-safety and avoid function pointer casting for the
+ type-specific callbacks.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Added Kerberos Cipher Suites to be used with TLS, as written in
+ RFC 2712.
+ [Veers Staats <staatsvr at asc.hpc.mil>,
+ Jeffrey Altman <jaltman at columbia.edu>, via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Reformat the FAQ so the different questions and answers can be divided
+ in sections depending on the subject.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Have the zlib compression code load ZLIB.DLL dynamically under
+ Windows.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) New function BN_mod_sqrt for computing square roots modulo a prime
+ (using the probabilistic Tonelli-Shanks algorithm unless
+ p == 3 (mod 4) or p == 5 (mod 8), which are cases that can
+ be handled deterministically).
+ [Lenka Fibikova <fibikova at exp-math.uni-essen.de>, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Make BN_mod_inverse faster by explicitly handling small quotients
+ in the Euclid loop. (Speed gain about 20% for small moduli [256 or
+ 512 bits], about 30% for larger ones [1024 or 2048 bits].)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New function BN_kronecker.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix BN_gcd so that it works on negative inputs; the result is
+ positive unless both parameters are zero.
+ Previously something reasonably close to an infinite loop was
+ possible because numbers could be growing instead of shrinking
+ in the implementation of Euclid's algorithm.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix BN_is_word() and BN_is_one() macros to take into account the
+ sign of the number in question.
+
+ Fix BN_is_word(a,w) to work correctly for w == 0.
+
+ The old BN_is_word(a,w) macro is now called BN_abs_is_word(a,w)
+ because its test if the absolute value of 'a' equals 'w'.
+ Note that BN_abs_is_word does *not* handle w == 0 reliably;
+ it exists mostly for use in the implementations of BN_is_zero(),
+ BN_is_one(), and BN_is_word().
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New function BN_swap.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Use BN_nnmod instead of BN_mod in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c so that
+ the exponentiation functions are more likely to produce reasonable
+ results on negative inputs.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change BN_mod_mul so that the result is always non-negative.
+ Previously, it could be negative if one of the factors was negative;
+ I don't think anyone really wanted that behaviour.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Move BN_mod_... functions into new file crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
+ (except for exponentiation, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c,
+ and BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_recp.c)
+ and add new functions:
+
+ BN_nnmod
+ BN_mod_sqr
+ BN_mod_add
+ BN_mod_add_quick
+ BN_mod_sub
+ BN_mod_sub_quick
+ BN_mod_lshift1
+ BN_mod_lshift1_quick
+ BN_mod_lshift
+ BN_mod_lshift_quick
+
+ These functions always generate non-negative results.
+
+ BN_nnmod otherwise is like BN_mod (if BN_mod computes a remainder r
+ such that |m| < r < 0, BN_nnmod will output rem + |m| instead).
+
+ BN_mod_XXX_quick(r, a, [b,] m) generates the same result as
+ BN_mod_XXX(r, a, [b,] m, ctx), but requires that a [and b]
+ be reduced modulo m.
+ [Lenka Fibikova <fibikova at exp-math.uni-essen.de>, Bodo Moeller]
+
+#if 0
+ The following entry accidentily appeared in the CHANGES file
+ distributed with OpenSSL 0.9.7. The modifications described in
+ it do *not* apply to OpenSSL 0.9.7.
+
+ *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there
+ was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul()
+ required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition
+ of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and
+ bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(),
+ bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with
+ differing sizes.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+#endif
+
+ *) In 'openssl passwd', verify passwords read from the terminal
+ unless the '-salt' option is used (which usually means that
+ verification would just waste user's time since the resulting
+ hash is going to be compared with some given password hash)
+ or the new '-noverify' option is used.
+
+ This is an incompatible change, but it does not affect
+ non-interactive use of 'openssl passwd' (passwords on the command
+ line, '-stdin' option, '-in ...' option) and thus should not
+ cause any problems.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Remove all references to RSAref, since there's no more need for it.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make DSO load along a path given through an environment variable
+ (SHLIB_PATH) with shl_load().
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Constify the ENGINE code as a result of BIGNUM constification.
+ Also constify the RSA code and most things related to it. In a
+ few places, most notable in the depth of the ASN.1 code, ugly
+ casts back to non-const were required (to be solved at a later
+ time)
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make it so the openssl application has all engines loaded by default.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Constify the BIGNUM routines a little more.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the following functions:
+
+ ENGINE_load_cswift()
+ ENGINE_load_chil()
+ ENGINE_load_atalla()
+ ENGINE_load_nuron()
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines()
+
+ That way, an application can itself choose if external engines that
+ are built-in in OpenSSL shall ever be used or not. The benefit is
+ that applications won't have to be linked with libdl or other dso
+ libraries unless it's really needed.
+
+ Changed 'openssl engine' to load all engines on demand.
+ Changed the engine header files to avoid the duplication of some
+ declarations (they differed!).
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) 'openssl engine' can now list capabilities.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Better error reporting in 'openssl engine'.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Never call load_dh_param(NULL) in s_server.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add engine application. It can currently list engines by name and
+ identity, and test if they are actually available.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Improve RPM specification file by forcing symbolic linking and making
+ sure the installed documentation is also owned by root.root.
+ [Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>]
+
+ *) Give the OpenSSL applications more possibilities to make use of
+ keys (public as well as private) handled by engines.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add OCSP code that comes from CertCo.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add VMS support for the Rijndael code.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Added untested support for Nuron crypto accelerator.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add support for external cryptographic devices. This code was
+ previously distributed separately as the "engine" branch.
+ [Geoff Thorpe, Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Rework the filename-translation in the DSO code. It is now possible to
+ have far greater control over how a "name" is turned into a filename
+ depending on the operating environment and any oddities about the
+ different shared library filenames on each system.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Support threads on FreeBSD-elf in Configure.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix for SHA1 assembly problem with MASM: it produces
+ warnings about corrupt line number information when assembling
+ with debugging information. This is caused by the overlapping
+ of two sections.
+ [Bernd Matthes <mainbug at celocom.de>, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) NCONF changes.
+ NCONF_get_number() has no error checking at all. As a replacement,
+ NCONF_get_number_e() is defined (_e for "error checking") and is
+ promoted strongly. The old NCONF_get_number is kept around for
+ binary backward compatibility.
+ Make it possible for methods to load from something other than a BIO,
+ by providing a function pointer that is given a name instead of a BIO.
+ For example, this could be used to load configuration data from an
+ LDAP server.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix for non blocking accept BIOs. Added new I/O special reason
+ BIO_RR_ACCEPT to cover this case. Previously use of accept BIOs
+ with non blocking I/O was not possible because no retry code was
+ implemented. Also added new SSL code SSL_WANT_ACCEPT to cover
+ this case.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Added the beginnings of Rijndael support.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fix for bug in DirectoryString mask setting. Add support for
+ X509_NAME_print_ex() in 'req' and X509_print_ex() function
+ to allow certificate printing to more controllable, additional
+ 'certopt' option to 'x509' to allow new printing options to be
+ set.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004]
+
+ *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
+ by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
+ [Joe Orton, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003]
+
+ *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
+
+ Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
+ certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]
+
+ *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
+
+ Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
+ invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
+
+ If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
+ certificate signature with the NULL public key.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate
+ if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0
+ specifications.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional
+ extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0
+ but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification).
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe]
+
+ *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable
+ when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]
+
+ *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
+ Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat
+ a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error
+ in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation
+ to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call
+ RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING.
+ They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases.
+ [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not
+ seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as
+ an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there
+ is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe
+ by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and
+ having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors
+ (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but
+ avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared
+ between threads, blinding will still be very fast).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]
+
+ *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked
+ via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
+ block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
+ against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
+ between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
+
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
+ Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
+ Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]
+
+ *) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of
+ memory from it's contents. This is done with a counter that will
+ place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve
+ two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing
+ compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can
+ be read through on certain media, for example a swap space on disk.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Bugfix: client side session caching did not work with external caching,
+ because the session->cipher setting was not restored when reloading
+ from the external cache. This problem was masked, when
+ SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) was set.
+ (Found by Steve Haslam <steve at araqnid.ddts.net>.)
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Fix client_certificate (ssl/s2_clnt.c): The permissible total
+ length of the REQUEST-CERTIFICATE message is 18 .. 34, not 17 .. 33.
+ [Zeev Lieber <zeev-l at yahoo.com>]
+
+ *) Undo an undocumented change introduced in 0.9.6e which caused
+ repeated calls to OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() and
+ OpenSSL_add_all_digests() to be ignored, even after calling
+ EVP_cleanup().
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Change the default configuration reader to deal with last line not
+ being properly terminated.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Change X509_NAME_cmp() so it applies the special rules on handling
+ DN values that are of type PrintableString, as well as RDNs of type
+ emailAddress where the value has the type ia5String.
+ [stefank at valicert.com via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add a SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag to take over half
+ the job SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP was inconsistently
+ doing, define a new flag (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL) to be
+ the bitwise-OR of the two for use by the majority of applications
+ wanting this behaviour, and update the docs. The documented
+ behaviour and actual behaviour were inconsistent and had been
+ changing anyway, so this is more a bug-fix than a behavioural
+ change.
+ [Geoff Thorpe, diagnosed by Nadav Har'El]
+
+ *) Don't impose a 16-byte length minimum on session IDs in ssl/s3_clnt.c
+ (the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifications allow any length up to 32 bytes).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix initialization code race conditions in
+ SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method(), SSLv23_server_method(),
+ SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_client_method(), SSLv2_server_method(),
+ SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_client_method(), SSLv3_server_method(),
+ TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_client_method(), TLSv1_server_method(),
+ ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(),
+ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char().
+ [Patrick McCormick <patrick at tellme.com>, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after
+ the cached sessions are flushed, as the remove_cb() might use ex_data
+ contents. Bug found by Sam Varshavchik <mrsam at courier-mta.com>
+ (see [openssl.org #212]).
+ [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Fix typo in OBJ_txt2obj which incorrectly passed the content
+ length, instead of the encoding length to d2i_ASN1_OBJECT.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6f and 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]
+
+ *) [In 0.9.6g-engine release:]
+ Fix crypto/engine/vendor_defns/cswift.h for WIN32 (use '_stdcall').
+ [Lynn Gazis <lgazis at rainbow.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]
+
+ *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX
+ and get fix the header length calculation.
+ [Florian Weimer <Weimer at CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>,
+ Alon Kantor <alonk at checkpoint.com> (and others),
+ Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer
+ overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the
+ assertions could call abort()).
+ [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]
+
+ *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
+ the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
+ negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
+ supplied buffer.
+ [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav at mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim at ntlp.com>]
+
+ *) Fix cipher selection routines: ciphers without encryption had no flags
+ for the cipher strength set and where therefore not handled correctly
+ by the selection routines (PR #130).
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Fix EVP_dsa_sha macro.
+ [Nils Larsch]
+
+ *) New option
+ SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
+ for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure
+ that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d.
+
+ As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some
+ broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL.
+ SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL
+ implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and
+ 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many
+ applications.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Changes in security patch:
+
+ Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced
+ Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory,
+ Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number
+ F30602-01-2-0537.
+
+ *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
+ the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
+ negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
+ supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659)
+ [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav at mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim at ntlp.com>]
+
+ *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
+ happen in practice.
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
+ too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655)
+ [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm at aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
+
+ *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
+ supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656)
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
+ supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656)
+ [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]
+
+ *) Fix crypto/asn1/a_sign.c so that 'parameters' is omitted (not
+ encoded as NULL) with id-dsa-with-sha1.
+ [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>; problem pointed out by Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Check various X509_...() return values in apps/req.c.
+ [Nils Larsch <nla at trustcenter.de>]
+
+ *) Fix BASE64 decode (EVP_DecodeUpdate) for data with CR/LF ended lines:
+ an end-of-file condition would erronously be flagged, when the CRLF
+ was just at the end of a processed block. The bug was discovered when
+ processing data through a buffering memory BIO handing the data to a
+ BASE64-decoding BIO. Bug fund and patch submitted by Pavel Tsekov
+ <ptsekov at syntrex.com> and Nedelcho Stanev.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found
+ in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment
+ before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs
+ with data potentially chosen by the attacker.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix length checks in ssl3_get_client_hello().
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) TLS/SSL library bugfix: use s->s3->in_read_app_data differently
+ to prevent ssl3_read_internal() from incorrectly assuming that
+ ssl3_read_bytes() found application data while handshake
+ processing was enabled when in fact s->s3->in_read_app_data was
+ merely automatically cleared during the initial handshake.
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+ *) Fix object definitions for Private and Enterprise: they were not
+ recognized in their shortname (=lowercase) representation. Extend
+ obj_dat.pl to issue an error when using undefined keywords instead
+ of silently ignoring the problem (Svenning Sorensen
+ <sss at sss.dnsalias.net>).
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Fix DH_generate_parameters() so that it works for 'non-standard'
+ generators, i.e. generators other than 2 and 5. (Previously, the
+ code did not properly initialise the 'add' and 'rem' values to
+ BN_generate_prime().)
+
+ In the new general case, we do not insist that 'generator' is
+ actually a primitive root: This requirement is rather pointless;
+ a generator of the order-q subgroup is just as good, if not
+ better.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Map new X509 verification errors to alerts. Discovered and submitted by
+ Tom Wu <tom at arcot.com>.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Fix ssl3_pending() (ssl/s3_lib.c) to prevent SSL_pending() from
+ returning non-zero before the data has been completely received
+ when using non-blocking I/O.
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by John Hughes]
+
+ *) Some of the ciphers missed the strength entry (SSL_LOW etc).
+ [Ben Laurie, Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Fix bug in SSL_clear(): bad sessions were not removed (found by
+ Yoram Zahavi <YoramZ at gilian.com>).
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Add information about CygWin 1.3 and on, and preserve proper
+ configuration for the versions before that.
+ [Corinna Vinschen <vinschen at redhat.com> and Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make removal from session cache (SSL_CTX_remove_session()) more robust:
+ check whether we deal with a copy of a session and do not delete from
+ the cache in this case. Problem reported by "Izhar Shoshani Levi"
+ <izhar at checkpoint.com>.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Do not store session data into the internal session cache, if it
+ is never intended to be looked up (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP
+ flag is set). Proposed by Aslam <aslam at funk.com>.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Have ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit() really clear a bit when the requested
+ value is 0.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:]
+ Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey().
+ [Toomas Kiisk <vix at cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x.
+ [Neale Ferguson <Neale.Ferguson at SoftwareAG-USA.com> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of
+ ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag
+ variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been
+ received. As the flag value will be lost between multiple
+ invocations of ssl3_accept when using non-blocking I/O, the
+ function may not be aware that a handshake has actually taken
+ place, thus preventing a new session from being added to the
+ session cache.
+
+ To avoid this problem, we now set s->new_session to 2 instead of
+ using a local variable.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Bugfix: Return -1 from ssl3_get_server_done (ssl3/s3_clnt.c)
+ if the SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH error is detected.
+ [Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New 'shared_ldflag' column in Configure platform table.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix EVP_CIPHER_mode macro.
+ ["Dan S. Camper" <dan at bti.net>]
+
+ *) Fix ssl3_read_bytes (ssl/s3_pkt.c): To ignore messages of unknown
+ type, we must throw them away by setting rr->length to 0.
+ [D P Chang <dpc at qualys.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6b and 0.9.6c [21 dec 2001]
+
+ *) Fix BN_rand_range bug pointed out by Dominikus Scherkl
+ <Dominikus.Scherkl at biodata.com>. (The previous implementation
+ worked incorrectly for those cases where range = 10..._2 and
+ 3*range is two bits longer than range.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Only add signing time to PKCS7 structures if it is not already
+ present.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix crypto/objects/objects.h: "ld-ce" should be "id-ce",
+ OBJ_ld_ce should be OBJ_id_ce.
+ Also some ip-pda OIDs in crypto/objects/objects.txt were
+ incorrect (cf. RFC 3039).
+ [Matt Cooper, Frederic Giudicelli, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Release CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK when CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid()
+ returns early because it has nothing to do.
+ [Andy Schneider <andy.schneider at bjss.co.uk>]
+
+ *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
+ Fix mutex callback return values in crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c.
+ [Andy Schneider <andy.schneider at bjss.co.uk>]
+
+ *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
+ Add support for Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver technology.
+ (Use engine 'keyclient')
+ [Cryptographic Appliances and Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Add a configuration entry for OS/390 Unix. The C compiler 'c89'
+ is called via tools/c89.sh because arguments have to be
+ rearranged (all '-L' options must appear before the first object
+ modules).
+ [Richard Shapiro <rshapiro at abinitio.com>]
+
+ *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
+ Add support for Broadcom crypto accelerator cards, backported
+ from 0.9.7.
+ [Broadcom, Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin at redhat.com>, Mark Cox]
+
+ *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
+ Add support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from
+ Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware')
+ [Baltimore Technologies and Mark Cox]
+
+ *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:]
+ Add support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated
+ Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep')
+ [AEP Inc. and Mark Cox]
+
+ *) Add a configuration entry for gcc on UnixWare.
+ [Gary Benson <gbenson at redhat.com>]
+
+ *) Change ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s2_srvr.c so that received handshake
+ messages are stored in a single piece (fixed-length part and
+ variable-length part combined) and fix various bugs found on the way.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Disable caching in BIO_gethostbyname(), directly use gethostbyname()
+ instead. BIO_gethostbyname() does not know what timeouts are
+ appropriate, so entries would stay in cache even when they have
+ become invalid.
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Rich Salz <rsalz at zolera.com>
+
+ *) Change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) behaviour when
+ faced with a pathologically small ClientHello fragment that does
+ not contain client_version: Instead of aborting with an error,
+ simply choose the highest available protocol version (i.e.,
+ TLS 1.0 unless it is disabled). In practice, ClientHello
+ messages are never sent like this, but this change gives us
+ strictly correct behaviour at least for TLS.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix SSL handshake functions and SSL_clear() such that SSL_clear()
+ never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within
+ one of the SSL handshake functions.
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Niko Baric]
+
+ *) In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert
+ (sent using the client's version number) if client_version is
+ smaller than the protocol version in use. Also change
+ ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0 if
+ the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then
+ the client will at least see that alert.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) to handle message fragmentation
+ correctly.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Avoid infinite loop in ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) if a
+ client receives HelloRequest while in a handshake.
+ [Bodo Moeller; bug noticed by Andy Schneider <andy.schneider at bjss.co.uk>]
+
+ *) Bugfix in ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c): Case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
+ should end in 'break', not 'goto end' which circuments various
+ cleanups done in state SSL_ST_OK. But session related stuff
+ must be disabled for SSL_ST_OK in the case that we just sent a
+ HelloRequest.
+
+ Also avoid some overhead by not calling ssl_init_wbio_buffer()
+ before just sending a HelloRequest.
+ [Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla <ekr at rtfm.com>]
+
+ *) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't
+ reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC
+ verification error occured. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts
+ are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information
+ may leak via logfiles.)
+
+ Similar changes are not required for the SSL 2.0 implementation
+ because the number of padding bytes is sent in clear for SSL 2.0,
+ and the extra bytes are just ignored. However ssl/s2_pkt.c
+ failed to verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in
+ the legal range.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add OpenUNIX-8 support including shared libraries
+ (Boyd Lynn Gerber <gerberb at zenez.com>).
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Improve RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() check again to avoid
+ 'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf.
+ James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper). Note that the
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use
+ encoding parameters and hence was not vulnerable.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) BN_sqr() bug fix.
+ [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis at cavium.com>]
+
+ *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
+ so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
+ followed by modular reduction.
+ [Bodo Moeller; pointed out by Adam Young <AYoung1 at NCSUS.JNJ.COM>]
+
+ *) Add BN_pseudo_rand_range() with obvious functionality: BN_rand_range()
+ equivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand().
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) s3_srvr.c: allow sending of large client certificate lists (> 16 kB).
+ This function was broken, as the check for a new client hello message
+ to handle SGC did not allow these large messages.
+ (Tracked down by "Douglas E. Engert" <deengert at anl.gov>.)
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Add alert descriptions for TLSv1 to SSL_alert_desc_string[_long]().
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Fix buggy behaviour of BIO_get_num_renegotiates() and BIO_ctrl()
+ for BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE ("Stephen Hinton" <shinton at netopia.com>).
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Rework the configuration and shared library support for Tru64 Unix.
+ The configuration part makes use of modern compiler features and
+ still retains old compiler behavior for those that run older versions
+ of the OS. The shared library support part includes a variant that
+ uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the special
+ configuration target "alpha-cc-rpath", which will never be selected
+ automatically.
+ [Tim Mooney <mooney at dogbert.cc.ndsu.NoDak.edu> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) In ssl3_get_key_exchange (ssl/s3_clnt.c), call ssl3_get_message()
+ with the same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request().
+ Otherwise, if no ServerKeyExchange message occurs, CertificateRequest
+ messages might inadvertently be reject as too long.
+ [Petr Lampa <lampa at fee.vutbr.cz>]
+
+ *) Enhanced support for IA-64 Unix platforms (well, Linux and HP-UX).
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set
+ specificly for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being
+ used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was
+ ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of
+ the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced
+ to allow the necessary settings.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Initialize static variable in crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c and crypto/dh/dh_lib.c
+ explicitly to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be
+ done automatically (in contradiction to the requirements of the C
+ standard). This made problems when used from OpenSSH.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) In OpenSSL 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b, crypto/dh/dh_key.c ignored
+ dh->length and always used
+
+ BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->p).
+
+ BN_rand_range() is not necessary for Diffie-Hellman, and this
+ specific range makes Diffie-Hellman unnecessarily inefficient if
+ dh->length (recommended exponent length) is much smaller than the
+ length of dh->p. We could use BN_rand_range() if the order of
+ the subgroup was stored in the DH structure, but we only have
+ dh->length.
+
+ So switch back to
+
+ BN_rand(priv_key, l, ...)
+
+ where 'l' is dh->length if this is defined, or BN_num_bits(dh->p)-1
+ otherwise.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In
+
+ RSA_eay_public_encrypt
+ RSA_eay_private_decrypt
+ RSA_eay_private_encrypt (signing)
+ RSA_eay_public_decrypt (signature verification)
+
+ (default implementations for RSA_public_encrypt,
+ RSA_private_decrypt, RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt),
+ always reject numbers >= n.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, use a new short-time lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2
+ to synchronize access to 'locking_thread'. This is necessary on
+ systems where access to 'locking_thread' (an 'unsigned long'
+ variable) is not atomic.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, set 'locking_thread' to current thread's ID
+ *before* setting the 'crypto_lock_rand' flag. The previous code had
+ a race condition if 0 is a valid thread ID.
+ [Travis Vitek <vitek at roguewave.com>]
+
+ *) Add support for shared libraries under Irix.
+ [Albert Chin-A-Young <china at thewrittenword.com>]
+
+ *) Add configuration option to build on Linux on both big-endian and
+ little-endian MIPS.
+ [Ralf Baechle <ralf at uni-koblenz.de>]
+
+ *) Add the possibility to create shared libraries on HP-UX.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]
+
+ *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c)
+ to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by
+ Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen at nokia.com>:
+ PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of
+ one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on
+ 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests
+ to traverse all of 'state'.
+
+ 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md')
+ during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous
+ 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output.
+
+ 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash
+ independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested.
+
+ The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid
+ Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred
+ to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the
+ half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always
+ assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second
+ measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never
+ mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically
+ further strengthens the PRNG.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) When only the key is given to "enc", the IV is undefined. Print out
+ an error message in this case.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Handle special case when X509_NAME is empty in X509 printing routines.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In dsa_do_verify (crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c), verify that r and s are
+ positive and less than q.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Don't change *pointer in CRYPTO_add_lock() is add_lock_callback is
+ used: it isn't thread safe and the add_lock_callback should handle
+ that itself.
+ [Paul Rose <Paul.Rose at bridge.com>]
+
+ *) Verify that incoming data obeys the block size in
+ ssl3_enc (ssl/s3_enc.c) and tls1_enc (ssl/t1_enc.c).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix OAEP check.
+ [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
+
+ *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
+ RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
+ when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client
+ hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against
+ SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking
+ means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is
+ around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98
+ paper.)
+
+ Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a
+ random 'decryption result') did not work properly because
+ ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would
+ detect the supposedly ignored error.
+
+ Both problems are now fixed.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In crypto/bio/bf_buff.c, increase DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE to 4096
+ (previously it was 1024).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for compatibility mode trust settings: ignore trust settings
+ unless some valid trust or reject settings are present.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix for blowfish EVP: its a variable length cipher.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix various bugs related to DSA S/MIME verification. Handle missing
+ parameters in DSA public key structures and return an error in the
+ DSA routines if parameters are absent.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In versions up to 0.9.6, RAND_file_name() resorted to file ".rnd"
+ in the current directory if neither $RANDFILE nor $HOME was set.
+ RAND_file_name() in 0.9.6a returned NULL in this case. This has
+ caused some confusion to Windows users who haven't defined $HOME.
+ Thus RAND_file_name() is changed again: e_os.h can define a
+ DEFAULT_HOME, which will be used if $HOME is not set.
+ For Windows, we use "C:"; on other platforms, we still require
+ environment variables.
+
+ *) Move 'if (!initialized) RAND_poll()' into regions protected by
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND. This is not strictly necessary, but avoids
+ having multiple threads call RAND_poll() concurrently.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, replace 'add_do_not_lock' flag by a
+ combination of a flag and a thread ID variable.
+ Otherwise while one thread is in ssleay_rand_bytes (which sets the
+ flag), *other* threads can enter ssleay_add_bytes without obeying
+ the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegally release the lock
+ that they do not hold after the first thread unsets add_do_not_lock).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change bctest again: '-x' expressions are not available in all
+ versions of 'test'.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]
+
+ *) Fix a couple of memory leaks in PKCS7_dataDecode()
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Heyun Zheng <hzheng at atdsprint.com>]
+
+ *) Change Configure and Makefiles to provide EXE_EXT, which will contain
+ the default extension for executables, if any. Also, make the perl
+ scripts that use symlink() to test if it really exists and use "cp"
+ if it doesn't. All this made OpenSSL compilable and installable in
+ CygWin.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix for asn1_GetSequence() for indefinite length constructed data.
+ If SEQUENCE is length is indefinite just set c->slen to the total
+ amount of data available.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by shige at FreeBSD.org]
+ [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
+
+ *) Change bctest to avoid here-documents inside command substitution
+ (workaround for FreeBSD /bin/sh bug).
+ For compatibility with Ultrix, avoid shell functions (introduced
+ in the bctest version that searches along $PATH).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes
+ with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris
+ and UnixWare.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Check the result of RSA-CRT (see D. Boneh, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton:
+ On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic
+ Computations, J. Cryptology 14 (2001) 2, 101-119,
+ http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz).
+ [Ulf Moeller]
+
+ *) MIPS assembler BIGNUM division bug fix.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Disabled incorrect Alpha assembler code.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix PKCS#7 decode routines so they correctly update the length
+ after reading an EOC for the EXPLICIT tag.
+ [Steve Henson]
+ [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
+
+ *) Fix bug in PKCS#12 key generation routines. This was triggered
+ if a 3DES key was generated with a 0 initial byte. Include
+ PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN compilation option to retain the old
+ (but broken) behaviour.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Enhance bctest to search for a working bc along $PATH and print
+ it when found.
+ [Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net> via Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix memory leaks in err.c: free err_data string if necessary;
+ don't write to the wrong index in ERR_set_error_data.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Implement ssl23_peek (analogous to ssl23_read), which previously
+ did not exist.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Replace rdtsc with _emit statements for VC++ version 5.
+ [Jeremy Cooper <jeremy at baymoo.org>]
+
+ *) Make it possible to reuse SSLv2 sessions.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) In copy_email() check for >= 0 as a return value for
+ X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() since 0 is a valid index.
+ [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at opensca.org>]
+
+ *) Avoid coredump with unsupported or invalid public keys by checking if
+ X509_get_pubkey() fails in PKCS7_verify(). Fix memory leak when
+ PKCS7_verify() fails with non detached data.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid.
+ New function OPENSSL_issetugid().
+ [Ulf Moeller]
+
+ *) Avoid false positives in memory leak detection code (crypto/mem_dbg.c)
+ due to incorrect handling of multi-threading:
+
+ 1. Fix timing glitch in the MemCheck_off() portion of CRYPTO_mem_ctrl().
+
+ 2. Fix logical glitch in is_MemCheck_on() aka CRYPTO_is_mem_check_on().
+
+ 3. Count how many times MemCheck_off() has been called so that
+ nested use can be treated correctly. This also avoids
+ inband-signalling in the previous code (which relied on the
+ assumption that thread ID 0 is impossible).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add "-rand" option also to s_client and s_server.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Fix CPU detection on Irix 6.x.
+ [Kurt Hockenbury <khockenb at stevens-tech.edu> and
+ "Bruce W. Forsberg" <bruce.forsberg at baesystems.com>]
+
+ *) Fix X509_NAME bug which produced incorrect encoding if X509_NAME
+ was empty.
+ [Steve Henson]
+ [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
+
+ *) Use the cached encoding of an X509_NAME structure rather than
+ copying it. This is apparently the reason for the libsafe "errors"
+ but the code is actually correct.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent
+ Bleichenbacher's DSA attack.
+ Extend BN_[pseudo_]rand: As before, top=1 forces the highest two bits
+ to be set and top=0 forces the highest bit to be set; top=-1 is new
+ and leaves the highest bit random.
+ [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In the NCONF_...-based implementations for CONF_... queries
+ (crypto/conf/conf_lib.c), if the input LHASH is NULL, avoid using
+ a temporary CONF structure with the data component set to NULL
+ (which gives segmentation faults in lh_retrieve).
+ Instead, use NULL for the CONF pointer in CONF_get_string and
+ CONF_get_number (which may use environment variables) and directly
+ return NULL from CONF_get_section.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix potential buffer overrun for EBCDIC.
+ [Ulf Moeller]
+
+ *) Tolerate nonRepudiation as being valid for S/MIME signing and certSign
+ keyUsage if basicConstraints absent for a CA.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make SMIME_write_PKCS7() write mail header values with a format that
+ is more generally accepted (no spaces before the semicolon), since
+ some programs can't parse those values properly otherwise. Also make
+ sure BIO's that break lines after each write do not create invalid
+ headers.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Make the CRL encoding routines work with empty SEQUENCE OF. The
+ macros previously used would not encode an empty SEQUENCE OF
+ and break the signature.
+ [Steve Henson]
+ [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.]
+
+ *) Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in
+ DH ciphersuites.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add some EVP_add_digest_alias registrations (as found in
+ OpenSSL_add_all_digests()) to SSL_library_init()
+ aka OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(). This provides improved
+ compatibility with peers using X.509 certificates
+ with unconventional AlgorithmIdentifier OIDs.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for Irix with NO_ASM.
+ ["Bruce W. Forsberg" <bruce.forsberg at baesystems.com>]
+
+ *) ./config script fixes.
+ [Ulf Moeller, Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix 'openssl passwd -1'.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change PKCS12_key_gen_asc() so it can cope with non null
+ terminated strings whose length is passed in the passlen
+ parameter, for example from PEM callbacks. This was done
+ by adding an extra length parameter to asc2uni().
+ [Steve Henson, reported by <oddissey at samsung.co.kr>]
+
+ *) Fix C code generated by 'openssl dsaparam -C': If a BN_bin2bn
+ call failed, free the DSA structure.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix to uni2asc() to cope with zero length Unicode strings.
+ These are present in some PKCS#12 files.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Increase s2->wbuf allocation by one byte in ssl2_new (ssl/s2_lib.c).
+ Otherwise do_ssl_write (ssl/s2_pkt.c) will write beyond buffer limits
+ when writing a 32767 byte record.
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Eric Day <eday at concentric.net>]
+
+ *) In RSA_eay_public_{en,ed}crypt and RSA_eay_mod_exp (rsa_eay.c),
+ obtain lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA before setting rsa->_method_mod_{n,p,q}.
+
+ (RSA objects have a reference count access to which is protected
+ by CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA [see rsa_lib.c, s3_srvr.c, ssl_cert.c, ssl_rsa.c],
+ so they are meant to be shared between threads.)
+ [Bodo Moeller, Geoff Thorpe; original patch submitted by
+ "Reddie, Steven" <Steven.Reddie at ca.com>]
+
+ *) Fix a deadlock in CRYPTO_mem_leaks().
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Use better test patterns in bntest.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add a 'bctest' script that checks for some known 'bc' bugs
+ so that 'make test' does not abort just because 'bc' is broken.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to
+ avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side
+ always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original
+ result of the server certificate verification.)
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Fix ssl3_pending: If the record in s->s3->rrec is not of type
+ SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, return 0.
+ Similarly, change ssl2_pending to return 0 if SSL_in_init(s) is true.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix SSL_peek:
+ Both ssl2_peek and ssl3_peek, which were totally broken in earlier
+ releases, have been re-implemented by renaming the previous
+ implementations of ssl2_read and ssl3_read to ssl2_read_internal
+ and ssl3_read_internal, respectively, and adding 'peek' parameters
+ to them. The new ssl[23]_{read,peek} functions are calls to
+ ssl[23]_read_internal with the 'peek' flag set appropriately.
+ A 'peek' parameter has also been added to ssl3_read_bytes, which
+ does the actual work for ssl3_read_internal.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Initialise "ex_data" member of RSA/DSA/DH structures prior to calling
+ the method-specific "init()" handler. Also clean up ex_data after
+ calling the method-specific "finish()" handler. Previously, this was
+ happening the other way round.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Increase BN_CTX_NUM (the number of BIGNUMs in a BN_CTX) to 16.
+ The previous value, 12, was not always sufficient for BN_mod_exp().
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with
+ the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the
+ shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should
+ be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix typo in get_cert_by_subject() in by_dir.c
+ [Jean-Marc Desperrier <jean-marc.desperrier at certplus.com>]
+
+ *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries:
+
+ - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and
+ if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0
+ to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for
+ that.
+
+ - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible.
+
+ - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries.
+
+ - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the
+ static ones.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Fix SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead macro to actually use its argument.
+
+ Copy SSL_CTX's read_ahead flag to SSL object directly in SSL_new
+ and not in SSL_clear because the latter is also used by the
+ accept/connect functions; previously, the settings made by
+ SSL_set_read_ahead would be lost during the handshake.
+ [Bodo Moeller; problems reported by Anders Gertz <gertz at epact.se>]
+
+ *) Correct util/mkdef.pl to be selective about disabled algorithms.
+ Previously, it would create entries for disableed algorithms no
+ matter what.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Added several new manual pages for SSL_* function.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.5a and 0.9.6 [24 Sep 2000]
+
+ *) In ssl23_get_client_hello, generate an error message when faced
+ with an initial SSL 3.0/TLS record that is too small to contain the
+ first two bytes of the ClientHello message, i.e. client_version.
+ (Note that this is a pathologic case that probably has never happened
+ in real life.) The previous approach was to use the version number
+ from the record header as a substitute; but our protocol choice
+ should not depend on that one because it is not authenticated
+ by the Finished messages.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) More robust randomness gathering functions for Windows.
+ [Jeffrey Altman <jaltman at columbia.edu>]
+
+ *) For compatibility reasons if the flag X509_V_FLAG_ISSUER_CHECK is
+ not set then we don't setup the error code for issuer check errors
+ to avoid possibly overwriting other errors which the callback does
+ handle. If an application does set the flag then we assume it knows
+ what it is doing and can handle the new informational codes
+ appropriately.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix for a nasty bug in ASN1_TYPE handling. ASN1_TYPE is used for
+ a general "ANY" type, as such it should be able to decode anything
+ including tagged types. However it didn't check the class so it would
+ wrongly interpret tagged types in the same way as their universal
+ counterpart and unknown types were just rejected. Changed so that the
+ tagged and unknown types are handled in the same way as a SEQUENCE:
+ that is the encoding is stored intact. There is also a new type
+ "V_ASN1_OTHER" which is used when the class is not universal, in this
+ case we have no idea what the actual type is so we just lump them all
+ together.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) On VMS, stdout may very well lead to a file that is written to
+ in a record-oriented fashion. That means that every write() will
+ write a separate record, which will be read separately by the
+ programs trying to read from it. This can be very confusing.
+
+ The solution is to put a BIO filter in the way that will buffer
+ text until a linefeed is reached, and then write everything a
+ line at a time, so every record written will be an actual line,
+ not chunks of lines and not (usually doesn't happen, but I've
+ seen it once) several lines in one record. BIO_f_linebuffer() is
+ the answer.
+
+ Currently, it's a VMS-only method, because that's where it has
+ been tested well enough.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Remove 'optimized' squaring variant in BN_mod_mul_montgomery,
+ it can return incorrect results.
+ (Note: The buggy variant was not enabled in OpenSSL 0.9.5a,
+ but it was in 0.9.6-beta[12].)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Disable the check for content being present when verifying detached
+ signatures in pk7_smime.c. Some versions of Netscape (wrongly)
+ include zero length content when signing messages.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
+ BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
+ [Bodo Möller]
+
+ *) Add DSO method for VMS.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
+ wrong sign.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
+ packages. The default package contains applications, application
+ documentation and run-time libraries. The devel package contains
+ include files, static libraries and function documentation. The
+ doc package contains the contents of the doc directory. The original
+ openssl.spec was provided by Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add a large number of documentation files for many SSL routines.
+ [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke at aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>]
+
+ *) Add a configuration entry for Sony News 4.
+ [NAKAJI Hiroyuki <nakaji at tutrp.tut.ac.jp>]
+
+ *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
+ random number < q in the DSA library.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default
+ behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
+ the underlying transport is blocking) if a handshake took place.
+ (The default behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client
+ and s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read;
+ but for applications that know in advance when to expect data, it
+ just makes things more complicated.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add RAND_egd_bytes(), which gives control over the number of bytes read
+ from EGD.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add a few more EBCDIC conditionals that make `req' and `x509'
+ work better on such systems.
+ [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>]
+
+ *) Add two demo programs for PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create().
+ Update PKCS12_parse() so it copies the friendlyName and the
+ keyid to the certificates aux info.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix bug in PKCS7_verify() which caused an infinite loop
+ if there was more than one signature.
+ [Sven Uszpelkat <su at celocom.de>]
+
+ *) Major change in util/mkdef.pl to include extra information
+ about each symbol, as well as presentig variables as well
+ as functions. This change means that there's n more need
+ to rebuild the .num files when some algorithms are excluded.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Allow the verify time to be set by an application,
+ rather than always using the current time.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate
+ verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a
+ number of criteria: subject name, authority key id
+ and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates
+ by the same criteria. The main comparison function is
+ X509_check_issued() which performs these checks.
+
+ Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this
+ without completely rewriting the lookup code.
+
+ Authority and subject key identifier are now cached.
+
+ The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced
+ by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an
+ LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with
+ the same hash value.
+
+ As a result various functions (which were all internal
+ use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE
+ structure. This will break anything that messed round
+ with X509_STORE internally.
+
+ The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an
+ exact match, rather than just subject name.
+
+ The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval
+ of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however
+ this can be worked round by performing a lookup first
+ (which will fill the cache with candidate certificates)
+ and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably
+ the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP
+ entirely (maybe later...).
+
+ The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably.
+
+ All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer()
+ callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it
+ can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way
+ to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this
+ work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques
+ in future. A very simple version which uses a simple
+ STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided
+ using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack().
+
+ The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents
+ in the X509_STORE_CTX structure.
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used
+ to customise the verify behaviour.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new PKCS#7 signing option PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP which
+ excludes S/MIME capabilities.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) When a certificate request is read in keep a copy of the
+ original encoding of the signed data and use it when outputing
+ again. Signatures then use the original encoding rather than
+ a decoded, encoded version which may cause problems if the
+ request is improperly encoded.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) For consistency with other BIO_puts implementations, call
+ buffer_write(b, ...) directly in buffer_puts instead of calling
+ BIO_write(b, ...).
+
+ In BIO_puts, increment b->num_write as in BIO_write.
+ [Peter.Sylvester at EdelWeb.fr]
+
+ *) Fix BN_mul_word for the case where the word is 0. (We have to use
+ BN_zero, we may not return a BIGNUM with an array consisting of
+ words set to zero.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Avoid calling abort() from within the library when problems are
+ detected, except if preprocessor symbols have been defined
+ (such as REF_CHECK, BN_DEBUG etc.).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New openssl application 'rsautl'. This utility can be
+ used for low level RSA operations. DER public key
+ BIO/fp routines also added.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New Configure entry and patches for compiling on QNX 4.
+ [Andreas Schneider <andreas at ds3.etech.fh-hamburg.de>]
+
+ *) A demo state-machine implementation was sponsored by
+ Nuron (http://www.nuron.com/) and is now available in
+ demos/state_machine.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) New options added to the 'dgst' utility for signature
+ generation and verification.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Unrecognized PKCS#7 content types are now handled via a
+ catch all ASN1_TYPE structure. This allows unsupported
+ types to be stored as a "blob" and an application can
+ encode and decode it manually.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix various signed/unsigned issues to make a_strex.c
+ compile under VC++.
+ [Oscar Jacobsson <oscar.jacobsson at celocom.com>]
+
+ *) ASN1 fixes. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was not returning the correct
+ length if passed a buffer. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN failed
+ if passed a NULL BN and its argument was negative.
+ [Steve Henson, pointed out by Sven Heiberg <sven at tartu.cyber.ee>]
+
+ *) Modification to PKCS#7 encoding routines to output definite
+ length encoding. Since currently the whole structures are in
+ memory there's not real point in using indefinite length
+ constructed encoding. However if OpenSSL is compiled with
+ the flag PKCS7_INDEFINITE_ENCODING the old form is used.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Added BIO_vprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf().
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Added more prefixes to parse for in the the strings written
+ through a logging bio, to cover all the levels that are available
+ through syslog. The prefixes are now:
+
+ PANIC, EMERG, EMR => LOG_EMERG
+ ALERT, ALR => LOG_ALERT
+ CRIT, CRI => LOG_CRIT
+ ERROR, ERR => LOG_ERR
+ WARNING, WARN, WAR => LOG_WARNING
+ NOTICE, NOTE, NOT => LOG_NOTICE
+ INFO, INF => LOG_INFO
+ DEBUG, DBG => LOG_DEBUG
+
+ and as before, if none of those prefixes are present at the
+ beginning of the string, LOG_ERR is chosen.
+
+ On Win32, the LOG_* levels are mapped according to this:
+
+ LOG_EMERG, LOG_ALERT, LOG_CRIT, LOG_ERR => EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE
+ LOG_WARNING => EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE
+ LOG_NOTICE, LOG_INFO, LOG_DEBUG => EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE
+
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Made it possible to reconfigure with just the configuration
+ argument "reconf" or "reconfigure". The command line arguments
+ are stored in Makefile.ssl in the variable CONFIGURE_ARGS,
+ and are retrieved from there when reconfiguring.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) MD4 implemented.
+ [Assar Westerlund <assar at sics.se>, Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add the arguments -CAfile and -CApath to the pkcs12 utility.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) The obj_dat.pl script was messing up the sorting of object
+ names. The reason was that it compared the quoted version
+ of strings as a result "OCSP" > "OCSP Signing" because
+ " > SPACE. Changed script to store unquoted versions of
+ names and add quotes on output. It was also omitting some
+ names from the lookup table if they were given a default
+ value (that is if SN is missing it is given the same
+ value as LN and vice versa), these are now added on the
+ grounds that if an object has a name we should be able to
+ look it up. Finally added warning output when duplicate
+ short or long names are found.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Changes needed for Tandem NSK.
+ [Scott Uroff <scott at xypro.com>]
+
+ *) Fix SSL 2.0 rollback checking: Due to an off-by-one error in
+ RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(), special padding was never detected
+ and thus the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 countermeasure against protocol
+ version rollback attacks was not effective.
+
+ In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding
+ (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the
+ client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if
+ SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Make it possible to get hexdumps of unprintable data with 'openssl
+ asn1parse'. By implication, the functions ASN1_parse_dump() and
+ BIO_dump_indent() are added.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) New functions ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex()
+ these print out strings and name structures based on various
+ flags including RFC2253 support and proper handling of
+ multibyte characters. Added options to the 'x509' utility
+ to allow the various flags to be set.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Various fixes to use ASN1_TIME instead of ASN1_UTCTIME.
+ Also change the functions X509_cmp_current_time() and
+ X509_gmtime_adj() work with an ASN1_TIME structure,
+ this will enable certificates using GeneralizedTime in validity
+ dates to be checked.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make the NEG_PUBKEY_BUG code (which tolerates invalid
+ negative public key encodings) on by default,
+ NO_NEG_PUBKEY_BUG can be set to disable it.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() which acts on ASN1_OBJECT
+ content octets. An i2c_ASN1_OBJECT is unnecessary because
+ the encoding can be trivially obtained from the structure.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) crypto/err.c locking bugfix: Use write locks (CRYPTO_w_[un]lock),
+ not read locks (CRYPTO_r_[un]lock).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) A first attempt at creating official support for shared
+ libraries through configuration. I've kept it so the
+ default is static libraries only, and the OpenSSL programs
+ are always statically linked for now, but there are
+ preparations for dynamic linking in place.
+ This has been tested on Linux and Tru64.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
+ Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
+ Random Numbers.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
+ DSA key.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New options to smime application. -inform and -outform
+ allow alternative formats for the S/MIME message including
+ PEM and DER. The -content option allows the content to be
+ specified separately. This should allow things like Netscape
+ form signing output easier to verify.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix the ASN1 encoding of tags using the 'long form'.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ASN1 functions, i2c_* and c2i_* for INTEGER and BIT
+ STRING types. These convert content octets to and from the
+ underlying type. The actual tag and length octets are
+ already assumed to have been read in and checked. These
+ are needed because all other string types have virtually
+ identical handling apart from the tag. By having versions
+ of the ASN1 functions that just operate on content octets
+ IMPLICIT tagging can be handled properly. It also allows
+ the ASN1_ENUMERATED code to be cut down because ASN1_ENUMERATED
+ and ASN1_INTEGER are identical apart from the tag.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change the handling of OID objects as follows:
+
+ - New object identifiers are inserted in objects.txt, following
+ the syntax given in objects.README.
+ - objects.pl is used to process obj_mac.num and create a new
+ obj_mac.h.
+ - obj_dat.pl is used to create a new obj_dat.h, using the data in
+ obj_mac.h.
+
+ This is currently kind of a hack, and the perl code in objects.pl
+ isn't very elegant, but it works as I intended. The simplest way
+ to check that it worked correctly is to look in obj_dat.h and
+ check the array nid_objs and make sure the objects haven't moved
+ around (this is important!). Additions are OK, as well as
+ consistent name changes.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add BSD-style MD5-based passwords to 'openssl passwd' (option '-1').
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Addition of the command line parameter '-rand file' to 'openssl req'.
+ The given file adds to whatever has already been seeded into the
+ random pool through the RANDFILE configuration file option or
+ environment variable, or the default random state file.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) mkstack.pl now sorts each macro group into lexical order.
+ Previously the output order depended on the order the files
+ appeared in the directory, resulting in needless rewriting
+ of safestack.h .
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Patches to make OpenSSL compile under Win32 again. Mostly
+ work arounds for the VC++ problem that it treats func() as
+ func(void). Also stripped out the parts of mkdef.pl that
+ added extra typesafe functions: these no longer exist.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Reorganisation of the stack code. The macros are now all
+ collected in safestack.h . Each macro is defined in terms of
+ a "stack macro" of the form SKM_<name>(type, a, b). The
+ DEBUG_SAFESTACK is now handled in terms of function casts,
+ this has the advantage of retaining type safety without the
+ use of additional functions. If DEBUG_SAFESTACK is not defined
+ then the non typesafe macros are used instead. Also modified the
+ mkstack.pl script to handle the new form. Needs testing to see
+ if which (if any) compilers it chokes and maybe make DEBUG_SAFESTACK
+ the default if no major problems. Similar behaviour for ASN1_SET_OF
+ and PKCS12_STACK_OF.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) When some versions of IIS use the 'NET' form of private key the
+ key derivation algorithm is different. Normally MD5(password) is
+ used as a 128 bit RC4 key. In the modified case
+ MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT") is used insted. Added some
+ new functions i2d_RSA_NET(), d2i_RSA_NET() etc which are the same
+ as the old Netscape_RSA functions except they have an additional
+ 'sgckey' parameter which uses the modified algorithm. Also added
+ an -sgckey command line option to the rsa utility. Thanks to
+ Adrian Peck <bertie at ncipher.com> for posting details of the modified
+ algorithm to openssl-dev.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The evp_local.h macros were using 'c.##kname' which resulted in
+ invalid expansion on some systems (SCO 5.0.5 for example).
+ Corrected to 'c.kname'.
+ [Phillip Porch <root at theporch.com>]
+
+ *) New X509_get1_email() and X509_REQ_get1_email() functions that return
+ a STACK of email addresses from a certificate or request, these look
+ in the subject name and the subject alternative name extensions and
+ omit any duplicate addresses.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Re-implement BN_mod_exp2_mont using independent (and larger) windows.
+ This makes DSA verification about 2 % faster.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Increase maximum window size in BN_mod_exp_... to 6 bits instead of 5
+ (meaning that now 2^5 values will be precomputed, which is only 4 KB
+ plus overhead for 1024 bit moduli).
+ This makes exponentiations about 0.5 % faster for 1024 bit
+ exponents (as measured by "openssl speed rsa2048").
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Rename memory handling macros to avoid conflicts with other
+ software:
+ Malloc => OPENSSL_malloc
+ Malloc_locked => OPENSSL_malloc_locked
+ Realloc => OPENSSL_realloc
+ Free => OPENSSL_free
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) New function BN_mod_exp_mont_word for small bases (roughly 15%
+ faster than BN_mod_exp_mont, i.e. 7% for a full DH exchange).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) CygWin32 support.
+ [John Jarvie <jjarvie at newsguy.com>]
+
+ *) The type-safe stack code has been rejigged. It is now only compiled
+ in when OpenSSL is configured with the DEBUG_SAFESTACK option and
+ by default all type-specific stack functions are "#define"d back to
+ standard stack functions. This results in more streamlined output
+ but retains the type-safety checking possibilities of the original
+ approach.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) The STACK code has been cleaned up, and certain type declarations
+ that didn't make a lot of sense have been brought in line. This has
+ also involved a cleanup of sorts in safestack.h to more correctly
+ map type-safe stack functions onto their plain stack counterparts.
+ This work has also resulted in a variety of "const"ifications of
+ lots of the code, especially "_cmp" operations which should normally
+ be prototyped with "const" parameters anyway.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) When generating bytes for the first time in md_rand.c, 'stir the pool'
+ by seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes (with zero entropy count).
+ (The PRNG state consists of two parts, the large pool 'state' and 'md',
+ where all of 'md' is used each time the PRNG is used, but 'state'
+ is used only indexed by a cyclic counter. As entropy may not be
+ well distributed from the beginning, 'md' is important as a
+ chaining variable. However, the output function chains only half
+ of 'md', i.e. 80 bits. ssleay_rand_add, on the other hand, chains
+ all of 'md', and seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes will result
+ in all of 'state' being rewritten, with the new values depending
+ on virtually all of 'md'. This overcomes the 80 bit limitation.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s3_clnt.c, call ERR_clear_error() when
+ the handshake is continued after ssl_verify_cert_chain();
+ otherwise, if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is set, remaining error codes
+ can lead to 'unexplainable' connection aborts later.
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem tracked down by Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Major EVP API cipher revision.
+ Add hooks for extra EVP features. This allows various cipher
+ parameters to be set in the EVP interface. Support added for variable
+ key length ciphers via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function and
+ setting of RC2 and RC5 parameters.
+
+ Modify EVP_OpenInit() and EVP_SealInit() to cope with variable key length
+ ciphers.
+
+ Remove lots of duplicated code from the EVP library. For example *every*
+ cipher init() function handles the 'iv' in the same way according to the
+ cipher mode. They also all do nothing if the 'key' parameter is NULL and
+ for CFB and OFB modes they zero ctx->num.
+
+ New functionality allows removal of S/MIME code RC2 hack.
+
+ Most of the routines have the same form and so can be declared in terms
+ of macros.
+
+ By shifting this to the top level EVP_CipherInit() it can be removed from
+ all individual ciphers. If the cipher wants to handle IVs or keys
+ differently it can set the EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV or EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT
+ flags.
+
+ Change lots of functions like EVP_EncryptUpdate() to now return a
+ value: although software versions of the algorithms cannot fail
+ any installed hardware versions can.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG: In ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, if
+ this option is set, tolerate broken clients that send the negotiated
+ protocol version number instead of the requested protocol version
+ number.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Call dh_tmp_cb (set by ..._TMP_DH_CB) with correct 'is_export' flag;
+ i.e. non-zero for export ciphersuites, zero otherwise.
+ Previous versions had this flag inverted, inconsistent with
+ rsa_tmp_cb (..._TMP_RSA_CB).
+ [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Amit Chopra]
+
+ *) Add missing DSA library text string. Work around for some IIS
+ key files with invalid SEQUENCE encoding.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a document (doc/standards.txt) that list all kinds of standards
+ and so on that are implemented in OpenSSL.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Enhance c_rehash script. Old version would mishandle certificates
+ with the same subject name hash and wouldn't handle CRLs at all.
+ Added -fingerprint option to crl utility, to support new c_rehash
+ features.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
+ rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
+ but no ssl client purpose.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Rene Grosser <grosser at hisolutions.com>]
+
+ *) Make PKCS#12 code work with no password. The PKCS#12 spec
+ is a little unclear about how a blank password is handled.
+ Since the password in encoded as a BMPString with terminating
+ double NULL a zero length password would end up as just the
+ double NULL. However no password at all is different and is
+ handled differently in the PKCS#12 key generation code. NS
+ treats a blank password as zero length. MSIE treats it as no
+ password on export: but it will try both on import. We now do
+ the same: PKCS12_parse() tries zero length and no password if
+ the password is set to "" or NULL (NULL is now a valid password:
+ it wasn't before) as does the pkcs12 application.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Bugfixes in apps/x509.c: Avoid a memory leak; and don't use
+ perror when PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ fails, the error message must
+ be obtained from the error queue.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Avoid 'thread_hash' memory leak in crypto/err/err.c by freeing
+ it in ERR_remove_state if appropriate, and change ERR_get_state
+ accordingly to avoid race conditions (this is necessary because
+ thread_hash is no longer constant once set).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
+ RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
+ Previously this was only set during a call to RSA_new()
+ or RSA_new_method(NULL) meaning it was possible for
+ RSA_get_default_method() to return NULL.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) Added native name translation to the existing DSO code
+ that will convert (if the flag to do so is set) filenames
+ that are sufficiently small and have no path information
+ into a canonical native form. Eg. "blah" converted to
+ "libblah.so" or "blah.dll" etc.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+ *) New function ERR_error_string_n(e, buf, len) which is like
+ ERR_error_string(e, buf), but writes at most 'len' bytes
+ including the 0 terminator. For ERR_error_string_n, 'buf'
+ may not be NULL.
+ [Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) CONF library reworked to become more general. A new CONF
+ configuration file reader "class" is implemented as well as a
+ new functions (NCONF_*, for "New CONF") to handle it. The now
+ old CONF_* functions are still there, but are reimplemented to
+ work in terms of the new functions. Also, a set of functions
+ to handle the internal storage of the configuration data is
+ provided to make it easier to write new configuration file
+ reader "classes" (I can definitely see something reading a
+ configuration file in XML format, for example), called _CONF_*,
+ or "the configuration storage API"...
+
+ The new configuration file reading functions are:
+
+ NCONF_new, NCONF_free, NCONF_load, NCONF_load_fp, NCONF_load_bio,
+ NCONF_get_section, NCONF_get_string, NCONF_get_numbre
+
+ NCONF_default, NCONF_WIN32
+
+ NCONF_dump_fp, NCONF_dump_bio
+
+ NCONF_default and NCONF_WIN32 are method (or "class") choosers,
+ NCONF_new creates a new CONF object. This works in the same way
+ as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface.
+ NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file,
+ which is useful for debugging. All other functions take the same
+ arguments as the old CONF_* functions wth the exception of the
+ first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'.
+
+ To make it easer to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions,
+ the function CONF_set_default_method is provided.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add '-tls1' option to 'openssl ciphers', which was already
+ mentioned in the documentation but had not been implemented.
+ (This option is not yet really useful because even the additional
+ experimental TLS 1.0 ciphers are currently treated as SSL 3.0 ciphers.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Initial DSO code added into libcrypto for letting OpenSSL (and
+ OpenSSL-based applications) load shared libraries and bind to
+ them in a portable way.
+ [Geoff Thorpe, with contributions from Richard Levitte]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.5 and 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]
+
+ *) Make sure _lrotl and _lrotr are only used with MSVC.
+
+ *) Use lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND correctly in ssleay_rand_status
+ (the default implementation of RAND_status).
+
+ *) Rename openssl x509 option '-crlext', which was added in 0.9.5,
+ to '-clrext' (= clear extensions), as intended and documented.
+ [Bodo Moeller; inconsistency pointed out by Michael Attili
+ <attili at amaxo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix for HMAC. It wasn't zeroing the rest of the block if the key length
+ was larger than the MD block size.
+ [Steve Henson, pointed out by Yost William <YostW at tce.com>]
+
+ *) Modernise PKCS12_parse() so it uses STACK_OF(X509) for its ca argument
+ fix a leak when the ca argument was passed as NULL. Stop X509_PUBKEY_set()
+ using the passed key: if the passed key was a private key the result
+ of X509_print(), for example, would be to print out all the private key
+ components.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
+ [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
+ the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow at DEMENTIA.ORG>]
+
+ *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
+ discouraged.
+ [Steve Henson, pointed out by Brian Korver <briank at cs.stanford.edu>]
+
+ *) For easily testing in shell scripts whether some command
+ 'openssl XXX' exists, the new pseudo-command 'openssl no-XXX'
+ returns with exit code 0 iff no command of the given name is available.
+ 'no-XXX' is printed in this case, 'XXX' otherwise. In both cases,
+ the output goes to stdout and nothing is printed to stderr.
+ Additional arguments are always ignored.
+
+ Since for each cipher there is a command of the same name,
+ the 'no-cipher' compilation switches can be tested this way.
+
+ ('openssl no-XXX' is not able to detect pseudo-commands such
+ as 'quit', 'list-XXX-commands', or 'no-XXX' itself.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Update test suite so that 'make test' succeeds in 'no-rsa' configuration.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) For SSL_[CTX_]set_tmp_dh, don't create a DH key if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+ is set; it will be thrown away anyway because each handshake creates
+ its own key.
+ ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition
+ to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the
+ 'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meanining
+ you effectivly got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and
+ 'Q' and 'R' lose their special meanings (quit/renegotiate).
+ This is part of what -quiet does; unlike -quiet, -ign_eof
+ does not suppress any output.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add compatibility options to the purpose and trust code. The
+ purpose X509_PURPOSE_ANY is "any purpose" which automatically
+ accepts a certificate or CA, this was the previous behaviour,
+ with all the associated security issues.
+
+ X509_TRUST_COMPAT is the old trust behaviour: only and
+ automatically trust self signed roots in certificate store. A
+ new trust setting X509_TRUST_DEFAULT is used to specify that
+ a purpose has no associated trust setting and it should instead
+ use the value in the default purpose.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix the PKCS#8 DSA private key code so it decodes keys again
+ and fix a memory leak.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In util/mkerr.pl (which implements 'make errors'), preserve
+ reason strings from the previous version of the .c file, as
+ the default to have only downcase letters (and digits) in
+ automatically generated reasons codes is not always appropriate.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In ERR_load_ERR_strings(), build an ERR_LIB_SYS error reason table
+ using strerror. Previously, ERR_reason_error_string() returned
+ library names as reason strings for SYSerr; but SYSerr is a special
+ case where small numbers are errno values, not library numbers.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add '-dsaparam' option to 'openssl dhparam' application. This
+ converts DSA parameters into DH parameters. (When creating parameters,
+ DSA_generate_parameters is used.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Include 'length' (recommended exponent length) in C code generated
+ by 'openssl dhparam -C'.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) The second argument to set_label in perlasm was already being used
+ so couldn't be used as a "file scope" flag. Moved to third argument
+ which was free.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In PEM_ASN1_write_bio and some other functions, use RAND_pseudo_bytes
+ instead of RAND_bytes for encryption IVs and salts.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Include RAND_status() into RAND_METHOD instead of implementing
+ it only for md_rand.c Otherwise replacing the PRNG by calling
+ RAND_set_rand_method would be impossible.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Don't let DSA_generate_key() enter an infinite loop if the random
+ number generation fails.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New 'rand' application for creating pseudo-random output.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Added configuration support for Linux/IA64
+ [Rolf Haberrecker <rolf at suse.de>]
+
+ *) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
+ [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke at aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
+
+ *) Shared library support for Solaris gcc.
+ [Lutz Behnke <behnke at trustcenter.de>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5 [28 Feb 2000]
+
+ *) PKCS7_encrypt() was adding text MIME headers twice because they
+ were added manually and by SMIME_crlf_copy().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) In bntest.c don't call BN_rand with zero bits argument.
+ [Steve Henson, pointed out by Andrew W. Gray <agray at iconsinc.com>]
+
+ *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
+ case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
+ assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
+ to 1 it signals that the assembler should use a symbol whose
+ scope is the entire file, not just the current function. This
+ is needed with MASM which uses the format label:: for this scope.
+ [Steve Henson, pointed out by Peter Runestig <peter at runestig.com>]
+
+ *) Change the ASN1 types so they are typedefs by default. Before
+ almost all types were #define'd to ASN1_STRING which was causing
+ STACK_OF() problems: you couldn't declare STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING)
+ for example.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change names of new functions to the new get1/get0 naming
+ convention: After 'get1', the caller owns a reference count
+ and has to call ..._free; 'get0' returns a pointer to some
+ data structure without incrementing reference counters.
+ (Some of the existing 'get' functions increment a reference
+ counter, some don't.)
+ Similarly, 'set1' and 'add1' functions increase reference
+ counters or duplicate objects.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow for the possibility of temp RSA key generation failure:
+ the code used to assume it always worked and crashed on failure.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
+ [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
+ pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33 at cornell.edu>]
+
+ *) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>. New functions
+ RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application,
+ the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
+ or -rand.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
+ Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove the SSL_ALLOW_ADH compile option and set the default cipher
+ list to exclude them. This means that no special compilation option
+ is needed to use anonymous DH: it just needs to be included in the
+ cipher list.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change the EVP_MD_CTX_type macro so its meaning consistent with
+ EVP_MD_type. The old functionality is available in a new macro called
+ EVP_MD_md(). Change code that uses it and update docs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) ..._ctrl functions now have corresponding ..._callback_ctrl functions
+ where the 'void *' argument is replaced by a function pointer argument.
+ Previously 'void *' was abused to point to functions, which works on
+ many platforms, but is not correct. As these functions are usually
+ called by macros defined in OpenSSL header files, most source code
+ should work without changes.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) <openssl/opensslconf.h> (which is created by Configure) now contains
+ sections with information on -D... compiler switches used for
+ compiling the library so that applications can see them. To enable
+ one of these sections, a pre-processor symbol OPENSSL_..._DEFINES
+ must be defined. E.g.,
+ #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
+ #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+ defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
+ [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller]
+
+ *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
+ record layer.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change the 'other' type in certificate aux info to a STACK_OF
+ X509_ALGOR. Although not an AlgorithmIdentifier as such it has
+ the required ASN1 format: arbitrary types determined by an OID.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add some PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW() functions and a command line
+ argument to 'req'. This is not because the function is newer or
+ better than others it just uses the work 'NEW' in the certificate
+ request header lines. Some software needs this.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Reorganise password command line arguments: now passwords can be
+ obtained from various sources. Delete the PEM_cb function and make
+ it the default behaviour: i.e. if the callback is NULL and the
+ usrdata argument is not NULL interpret it as a null terminated pass
+ phrase. If usrdata and the callback are NULL then the pass phrase
+ is prompted for as usual.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for the Compaq Atalla crypto accelerator. If it is installed,
+ the support is automatically enabled. The resulting binaries will
+ autodetect the card and use it if present.
+ [Ben Laurie and Compaq Inc.]
+
+ *) Work around for Netscape hang bug. This sends certificate request
+ and server done in one record. Since this is perfectly legal in the
+ SSL/TLS protocol it isn't a "bug" option and is on by default. See
+ the bugs/SSLv3 entry for more info.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) HP-UX tune-up: new unified configs, HP C compiler bug workaround.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add -rand argument to smime and pkcs12 applications and read/write
+ of seed file.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New 'passwd' tool for crypt(3) and apr1 password hashes.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add command line password options to the remaining applications.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
+ bits.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
+ equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
+ options to produce them.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
+ get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
+ for p == 0.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
+ include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
+ was that statically linked binaries could for example just call
+ SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() to just add ciphers to the table and not
+ link with digests. This never worked becayse SSLeay_add_all_digests()
+ and SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() were in the same source file so calling
+ one would link with the other. They are now in separate source files.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a new -notext option to 'ca' and a -pubkey option to 'spkac'.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Use a less unusual form of the Miller-Rabin primality test (it used
+ a binary algorithm for exponentiation integrated into the Miller-Rabin
+ loop, our standard modexp algorithms are faster).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Support for the EBCDIC character set completed.
+ [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at Mch.SNI.De>]
+
+ *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
+ use void * instead of char * in lhash.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
+ (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
+ this the server could overwrite ephemeral keys that the client
+ has already seen).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Turn DSA_is_prime into a macro that calls BN_is_prime,
+ using 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test.
+
+ DSA_generate_parameters now uses BN_is_prime_fasttest (with 50
+ iterations of the Rabin-Miller test as required by the appendix
+ to FIPS PUB 186[-1]) instead of DSA_is_prime.
+ As BN_is_prime_fasttest includes trial division, DSA parameter
+ generation becomes much faster.
+
+ This implies a change for the callback functions in DSA_is_prime
+ and DSA_generate_parameters: The callback function is called once
+ for each positive witness in the Rabin-Miller test, not just
+ occasionally in the inner loop; and the parameters to the
+ callback function now provide an iteration count for the outer
+ loop rather than for the current invocation of the inner loop.
+ DSA_generate_parameters additionally can call the callback
+ function with an 'iteration count' of -1, meaning that a
+ candidate has passed the trial division test (when q is generated
+ from an application-provided seed, trial division is skipped).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New function BN_is_prime_fasttest that optionally does trial
+ division before starting the Rabin-Miller test and has
+ an additional BN_CTX * argument (whereas BN_is_prime always
+ has to allocate at least one BN_CTX).
+ 'callback(1, -1, cb_arg)' is called when a number has passed the
+ trial division stage.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for bug in CRL encoding. The validity dates weren't being handled
+ as ASN1_TIME.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New -pkcs12 option to CA.pl script to write out a PKCS#12 file.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
+ bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
+ SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
+ the comments.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
+ made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
+ SSL2 clients in multiple threads.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
+ by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
+ to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
+ [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
+
+ *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
+ used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
+ BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
+ BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
+ Rabin-Miller iterations.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
+ DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
+ (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
+ "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
+ (instead of parameters) in future.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make the ciphers, s_server and s_client programs check the return values
+ when a new cipher list is set.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Enhance the SSL/TLS cipher mechanism to correctly handle the TLS 56bit
+ ciphers. Before when the 56bit ciphers were enabled the sorting was
+ wrong.
+
+ The syntax for the cipher sorting has been extended to support sorting by
+ cipher-strength (using the strength_bits hard coded in the tables).
+ The new command is "@STRENGTH" (see also doc/apps/ciphers.pod).
+
+ Fix a bug in the cipher-command parser: when supplying a cipher command
+ string with an "undefined" symbol (neither command nor alphanumeric
+ [A-Za-z0-9], ssl_set_cipher_list used to hang in an endless loop. Now
+ an error is flagged.
+
+ Due to the strength-sorting extension, the code of the
+ ssl_create_cipher_list() function was completely rearranged. I hope that
+ the readability was also increased :-)
+ [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke at aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>]
+
+ *) Minor change to 'x509' utility. The -CAcreateserial option now uses 1
+ for the first serial number and places 2 in the serial number file. This
+ avoids problems when the root CA is created with serial number zero and
+ the first user certificate has the same issuer name and serial number
+ as the root CA.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities, change the 'req' program so it uses
+ the new code. Add documentation for this stuff.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities. These have been renamed from
+ X509_*() to X509at_*() on the grounds that they don't handle X509
+ structures and behave in an analagous way to the X509v3 functions:
+ they shouldn't be called directly but wrapper functions should be used
+ instead.
+
+ So we also now have some wrapper functions that call the X509at functions
+ when passed certificate requests. (TO DO: similar things can be done with
+ PKCS#7 signed and unsigned attributes, PKCS#12 attributes and a few other
+ things. Some of these need some d2i or i2d and print functionality
+ because they handle more complex structures.)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
+ as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
+ NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c.
+ [Kris Kennaway <kris at hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
+ has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
+ (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). Also an error is recorded on the thread's
+ error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is
+ guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
+ RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
+ (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
+ 3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
+ instead of only 2 for all lengths; see BN_prime_checks_for_size definition
+ in crypto/bn/bn_prime.c for the complete table). This guarantees a
+ false-positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Rewrite ssl3_read_n (ssl/s3_pkt.c) avoiding a couple of bugs.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New function X509_CTX_rget_chain() (renamed to X509_CTX_get1_chain
+ in the 0.9.5 release), this returns the chain
+ from an X509_CTX structure with a dup of the stack and all
+ the X509 reference counts upped: so the stack will exist
+ after X509_CTX_cleanup() has been called. Modify pkcs12.c
+ to use this.
+
+ Also make SSL_SESSION_print() print out the verify return
+ code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add manpage for the pkcs12 command. Also change the default
+ behaviour so MAC iteration counts are used unless the new
+ -nomaciter option is used. This improves file security and
+ only older versions of MSIE (4.0 for example) need it.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword,
+ unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
+ draft PKCS#9 v2.0 but are compatible with v1.2 provided no
+ international characters are used.
+
+ More changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE code: allow the setting of types
+ based on strings. Remove the 'loc' parameter when adding
+ attributes because these will be a SET OF encoding which is sorted
+ in ASN1 order.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial changes to the 'req' utility to allow request generation
+ automation. This will allow an application to just generate a template
+ file containing all the field values and have req construct the
+ request.
+
+ Initial support for X509_ATTRIBUTE handling. Stacks of these are
+ used all over the place including certificate requests and PKCS#7
+ structures. They are currently handled manually where necessary with
+ some primitive wrappers for PKCS#7. The new functions behave in a
+ manner analogous to the X509 extension functions: they allow
+ attributes to be looked up by NID and added.
+
+ Later something similar to the X509V3 code would be desirable to
+ automatically handle the encoding, decoding and printing of the
+ more complex types. The string types like challengePassword can
+ be handled by the string table functions.
+
+ Also modified the multi byte string table handling. Now there is
+ a 'global mask' which masks out certain types. The table itself
+ can use the flag STABLE_NO_MASK to ignore the mask setting: this
+ is useful when for example there is only one permissible type
+ (as in countryName) and using the mask might result in no valid
+ types at all.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Clean up 'Finished' handling, and add functions SSL_get_finished and
+ SSL_get_peer_finished to allow applications to obtain the latest
+ Finished messages sent to the peer or expected from the peer,
+ respectively. (SSL_get_peer_finished is usually the Finished message
+ actually received from the peer, otherwise the protocol will be aborted.)
+
+ As the Finished message are message digests of the complete handshake
+ (with a total of 192 bits for TLS 1.0 and more for SSL 3.0), they can
+ be used for external authentication procedures when the authentication
+ provided by SSL/TLS is not desired or is not enough.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Enhanced support for Alpha Linux is added. Now ./config checks if
+ the host supports BWX extension and if Compaq C is present on the
+ $PATH. Just exploiting of the BWX extension results in 20-30%
+ performance kick for some algorithms, e.g. DES and RC4 to mention
+ a couple. Compaq C in turn generates ~20% faster code for MD5 and
+ SHA1.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add support for MS "fast SGC". This is arguably a violation of the
+ SSL3/TLS protocol. Netscape SGC does two handshakes: the first with
+ weak crypto and after checking the certificate is SGC a second one
+ with strong crypto. MS SGC stops the first handshake after receiving
+ the server certificate message and sends a second client hello. Since
+ a server will typically do all the time consuming operations before
+ expecting any further messages from the client (server key exchange
+ is the most expensive) there is little difference between the two.
+
+ To get OpenSSL to support MS SGC we have to permit a second client
+ hello message after we have sent server done. In addition we have to
+ reset the MAC if we do get this second client hello.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a function 'd2i_AutoPrivateKey()' this will automatically decide
+ if a DER encoded private key is RSA or DSA traditional format. Changed
+ d2i_PrivateKey_bio() to use it. This is only needed for the "traditional"
+ format DER encoded private key. Newer code should use PKCS#8 format which
+ has the key type encoded in the ASN1 structure. Added DER private key
+ support to pkcs8 application.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) SSL 3/TLS 1 servers now don't request certificates when an anonymous
+ ciphersuites has been selected (as required by the SSL 3/TLS 1
+ specifications). Exception: When SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
+ is set, we interpret this as a request to violate the specification
+ (the worst that can happen is a handshake failure, and 'correct'
+ behaviour would result in a handshake failure anyway).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In SSL_CTX_add_session, take into account that there might be multiple
+ SSL_SESSION structures with the same session ID (e.g. when two threads
+ concurrently obtain them from an external cache).
+ The internal cache can handle only one SSL_SESSION with a given ID,
+ so if there's a conflict, we now throw out the old one to achieve
+ consistency.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add OIDs for idea and blowfish in CBC mode. This will allow both
+ to be used in PKCS#5 v2.0 and S/MIME. Also add checking to
+ some routines that use cipher OIDs: some ciphers do not have OIDs
+ defined and so they cannot be used for S/MIME and PKCS#5 v2.0 for
+ example.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Simplify the trust setting structure and code. Now we just have
+ two sequences of OIDs for trusted and rejected settings. These will
+ typically have values the same as the extended key usage extension
+ and any application specific purposes.
+
+ The trust checking code now has a default behaviour: it will just
+ check for an object with the same NID as the passed id. Functions can
+ be provided to override either the default behaviour or the behaviour
+ for a given id. SSL client, server and email already have functions
+ in place for compatibility: they check the NID and also return "trusted"
+ if the certificate is self signed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add d2i,i2d bio/fp functions for PrivateKey: these convert the
+ traditional format into an EVP_PKEY structure.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a password callback function PEM_cb() which either prompts for
+ a password if usr_data is NULL or otherwise assumes it is a null
+ terminated password. Allow passwords to be passed on command line
+ environment or config files in a few more utilities.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a bunch of DER and PEM functions to handle PKCS#8 format private
+ keys. Add some short names for PKCS#8 PBE algorithms and allow them
+ to be specified on the command line for the pkcs8 and pkcs12 utilities.
+ Update documentation.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for ASN1 "NULL" type. This could be handled before by using
+ ASN1_TYPE but there wasn't any function that would try to read a NULL
+ and produce an error if it couldn't. For compatibility we also have
+ ASN1_NULL_new() and ASN1_NULL_free() functions but these are faked and
+ don't allocate anything because they don't need to.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial support for MacOS is now provided. Examine INSTALL.MacOS
+ for details.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Roy Woods <roy at centicsystems.ca>]
+
+ *) Rebuild of the memory allocation routines used by OpenSSL code and
+ possibly others as well. The purpose is to make an interface that
+ provide hooks so anyone can build a separate set of allocation and
+ deallocation routines to be used by OpenSSL, for example memory
+ pool implementations, or something else, which was previously hard
+ since Malloc(), Realloc() and Free() were defined as macros having
+ the values malloc, realloc and free, respectively (except for Win32
+ compilations). The same is provided for memory debugging code.
+ OpenSSL already comes with functionality to find memory leaks, but
+ this gives people a chance to debug other memory problems.
+
+ With these changes, a new set of functions and macros have appeared:
+
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() [F]
+ CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions() [F]
+ CRYPTO_dbg_set_options() [F]
+ CRYPTO_dbg_get_options() [F]
+ CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() [M]
+
+ The memory debug functions are NULL by default, unless the library
+ is compiled with CRYPTO_MDEBUG or friends is defined. If someone
+ wants to debug memory anyway, CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() (which
+ gives the standard debugging functions that come with OpenSSL) or
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() (tells OpenSSL to use functions
+ provided by the library user) must be used. When the standard
+ debugging functions are used, CRYPTO_dbg_set_options can be used to
+ request additional information:
+ CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CYRPTO_MDEBUG_xxx) corresponds to setting
+ the CRYPTO_MDEBUG_xxx macro when compiling the library.
+
+ Also, things like CRYPTO_set_mem_functions will always give the
+ expected result (the new set of functions is used for allocation
+ and deallocation) at all times, regardless of platform and compiler
+ options.
+
+ To finish it up, some functions that were never use in any other
+ way than through macros have a new API and new semantic:
+
+ CRYPTO_dbg_malloc()
+ CRYPTO_dbg_realloc()
+ CRYPTO_dbg_free()
+
+ All macros of value have retained their old syntax.
+ [Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Some S/MIME fixes. The OID for SMIMECapabilities was wrong, the
+ ordering of SMIMECapabilities wasn't in "strength order" and there
+ was a missing NULL in the AlgorithmIdentifier for the SHA1 signature
+ algorithm.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Some ASN1 types with illegal zero length encoding (INTEGER,
+ ENUMERATED and OBJECT IDENTIFIER) choked the ASN1 routines.
+ [Frans Heymans <fheymans at isaserver.be>, modified by Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Merge in my S/MIME library for OpenSSL. This provides a simple
+ S/MIME API on top of the PKCS#7 code, a MIME parser (with enough
+ functionality to handle multipart/signed properly) and a utility
+ called 'smime' to call all this stuff. This is based on code I
+ originally wrote for Celo who have kindly allowed it to be
+ included in OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add variants des_set_key_checked and des_set_key_unchecked of
+ des_set_key (aka des_key_sched). Global variable des_check_key
+ decides which of these is called by des_set_key; this way
+ des_check_key behaves as it always did, but applications and
+ the library itself, which was buggy for des_check_key == 1,
+ have a cleaner way to pick the version they need.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New function PKCS12_newpass() which changes the password of a
+ PKCS12 structure.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify X509_TRUST and X509_PURPOSE so it also uses a static and
+ dynamic mix. In both cases the ids can be used as an index into the
+ table. Also modified the X509_TRUST_add() and X509_PURPOSE_add()
+ functions so they accept a list of the field values and the
+ application doesn't need to directly manipulate the X509_TRUST
+ structure.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify the ASN1_STRING_TABLE stuff so it also uses bsearch and doesn't
+ need initialising.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify the way the V3 extension code looks up extensions. This now
+ works in a similar way to the object code: we have some "standard"
+ extensions in a static table which is searched with OBJ_bsearch()
+ and the application can add dynamic ones if needed. The file
+ crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h now has the info: this file needs to be
+ updated whenever a new extension is added to the core code and kept
+ in ext_nid order. There is a simple program 'tabtest.c' which checks
+ this. New extensions are not added too often so this file can readily
+ be maintained manually.
+
+ There are two big advantages in doing things this way. The extensions
+ can be looked up immediately and no longer need to be "added" using
+ X509V3_add_standard_extensions(): this function now does nothing.
+ [Side note: I get *lots* of email saying the extension code doesn't
+ work because people forget to call this function]
+ Also no dynamic allocation is done unless new extensions are added:
+ so if we don't add custom extensions there is no need to call
+ X509V3_EXT_cleanup().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify enc utility's salting as follows: make salting the default. Add a
+ magic header, so unsalted files fail gracefully instead of just decrypting
+ to garbage. This is because not salting is a big security hole, so people
+ should be discouraged from doing it.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fixes and enhancements to the 'x509' utility. It allowed a message
+ digest to be passed on the command line but it only used this
+ parameter when signing a certificate. Modified so all relevant
+ operations are affected by the digest parameter including the
+ -fingerprint and -x509toreq options. Also -x509toreq choked if a
+ DSA key was used because it didn't fix the digest.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial certificate chain verify code. Currently tests the untrusted
+ certificates for consistency with the verify purpose (which is set
+ when the X509_STORE_CTX structure is set up) and checks the pathlength.
+
+ There is a NO_CHAIN_VERIFY compilation option to keep the old behaviour:
+ this is because it will reject chains with invalid extensions whereas
+ every previous version of OpenSSL and SSLeay made no checks at all.
+
+ Trust code: checks the root CA for the relevant trust settings. Trust
+ settings have an initial value consistent with the verify purpose: e.g.
+ if the verify purpose is for SSL client use it expects the CA to be
+ trusted for SSL client use. However the default value can be changed to
+ permit custom trust settings: one example of this would be to only trust
+ certificates from a specific "secure" set of CAs.
+
+ Also added X509_STORE_CTX_new() and X509_STORE_CTX_free() functions
+ which should be used for version portability: especially since the
+ verify structure is likely to change more often now.
+
+ SSL integration. Add purpose and trust to SSL_CTX and SSL and functions
+ to set them. If not set then assume SSL clients will verify SSL servers
+ and vice versa.
+
+ Two new options to the verify program: -untrusted allows a set of
+ untrusted certificates to be passed in and -purpose which sets the
+ intended purpose of the certificate. If a purpose is set then the
+ new chain verify code is used to check extension consistency.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for the authority information access extension.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify RSA and DSA PEM read routines to transparently handle
+ PKCS#8 format private keys. New *_PUBKEY_* functions that handle
+ public keys in a format compatible with certificate
+ SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures. Unfortunately there were already
+ functions called *_PublicKey_* which used various odd formats so
+ these are retained for compatibility: however the DSA variants were
+ never in a public release so they have been deleted. Changed dsa/rsa
+ utilities to handle the new format: note no releases ever handled public
+ keys so we should be OK.
+
+ The primary motivation for this change is to avoid the same fiasco
+ that dogs private keys: there are several incompatible private key
+ formats some of which are standard and some OpenSSL specific and
+ require various evil hacks to allow partial transparent handling and
+ even then it doesn't work with DER formats. Given the option anything
+ other than PKCS#8 should be dumped: but the other formats have to
+ stay in the name of compatibility.
+
+ With public keys and the benefit of hindsight one standard format
+ is used which works with EVP_PKEY, RSA or DSA structures: though
+ it clearly returns an error if you try to read the wrong kind of key.
+
+ Added a -pubkey option to the 'x509' utility to output the public key.
+ Also rename the EVP_PKEY_get_*() to EVP_PKEY_rget_*()
+ (renamed to EVP_PKEY_get1_*() in the OpenSSL 0.9.5 release) and add
+ EVP_PKEY_rset_*() functions (renamed to EVP_PKEY_set1_*())
+ that do the same as the EVP_PKEY_assign_*() except they up the
+ reference count of the added key (they don't "swallow" the
+ supplied key).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes to crypto/x509/by_file.c the code to read in certificates and
+ CRLs would fail if the file contained no certificates or no CRLs:
+ added a new function to read in both types and return the number
+ read: this means that if none are read it will be an error. The
+ DER versions of the certificate and CRL reader would always fail
+ because it isn't possible to mix certificates and CRLs in DER format
+ without choking one or the other routine. Changed this to just read
+ a certificate: this is the best we can do. Also modified the code
+ in apps/verify.c to take notice of return codes: it was previously
+ attempting to read in certificates from NULL pointers and ignoring
+ any errors: this is one reason why the cert and CRL reader seemed
+ to work. It doesn't check return codes from the default certificate
+ routines: these may well fail if the certificates aren't installed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Code to support otherName option in GeneralName.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) First update to verify code. Change the verify utility
+ so it warns if it is passed a self signed certificate:
+ for consistency with the normal behaviour. X509_verify
+ has been modified to it will now verify a self signed
+ certificate if *exactly* the same certificate appears
+ in the store: it was previously impossible to trust a
+ single self signed certificate. This means that:
+ openssl verify ss.pem
+ now gives a warning about a self signed certificate but
+ openssl verify -CAfile ss.pem ss.pem
+ is OK.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) For servers, store verify_result in SSL_SESSION data structure
+ (and add it to external session representation).
+ This is needed when client certificate verifications fails,
+ but an application-provided verification callback (set by
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback) allows accepting the session
+ anyway (i.e. leaves x509_store_ctx->error != X509_V_OK
+ but returns 1): When the session is reused, we have to set
+ ssl->verify_result to the appropriate error code to avoid
+ security holes.
+ [Bodo Moeller, problem pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke]
+
+ *) Fix a bug in the new PKCS#7 code: it didn't consider the
+ case in PKCS7_dataInit() where the signed PKCS7 structure
+ didn't contain any existing data because it was being created.
+ [Po-Cheng Chen <pocheng at nst.com.tw>, slightly modified by Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a salt to the key derivation routines in enc.c. This
+ forms the first 8 bytes of the encrypted file. Also add a
+ -S option to allow a salt to be input on the command line.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function X509_cmp(). Oddly enough there wasn't a function
+ to compare two certificates. We do this by working out the SHA1
+ hash and comparing that. X509_cmp() will be needed by the trust
+ code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) SSL_get1_session() is like SSL_get_session(), but increments
+ the reference count in the SSL_SESSION returned.
+ [Geoff Thorpe <geoff at eu.c2.net>]
+
+ *) Fix for 'req': it was adding a null to request attributes.
+ Also change the X509_LOOKUP and X509_INFO code to handle
+ certificate auxiliary information.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for 40 and 64 bit RC2 and RC4 algorithms: document
+ the 'enc' command.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add the possibility to add extra information to the memory leak
+ detecting output, to form tracebacks, showing from where each
+ allocation was originated: CRYPTO_push_info("constant string") adds
+ the string plus current file name and line number to a per-thread
+ stack, CRYPTO_pop_info() does the obvious, CRYPTO_remove_all_info()
+ is like calling CYRPTO_pop_info() until the stack is empty.
+ Also updated memory leak detection code to be multi-thread-safe.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+ *) Add options -text and -noout to pkcs7 utility and delete the
+ encryption options which never did anything. Update docs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add options to some of the utilities to allow the pass phrase
+ to be included on either the command line (not recommended on
+ OSes like Unix) or read from the environment. Update the
+ manpages and fix a few bugs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a few manpages for some of the openssl commands.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix the -revoke option in ca. It was freeing up memory twice,
+ leaking and not finding already revoked certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extensive changes to support certificate auxiliary information.
+ This involves the use of X509_CERT_AUX structure and X509_AUX
+ functions. An X509_AUX function such as PEM_read_X509_AUX()
+ can still read in a certificate file in the usual way but it
+ will also read in any additional "auxiliary information". By
+ doing things this way a fair degree of compatibility can be
+ retained: existing certificates can have this information added
+ using the new 'x509' options.
+
+ Current auxiliary information includes an "alias" and some trust
+ settings. The trust settings will ultimately be used in enhanced
+ certificate chain verification routines: currently a certificate
+ can only be trusted if it is self signed and then it is trusted
+ for all purposes.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix assembler for Alpha (tested only on DEC OSF not Linux or *BSD).
+ The problem was that one of the replacement routines had not been working
+ since SSLeay releases. For now the offending routine has been replaced
+ with non-optimised assembler. Even so, this now gives around 95%
+ performance improvement for 1024 bit RSA signs.
+ [Mark Cox]
+
+ *) Hack to fix PKCS#7 decryption when used with some unorthodox RC2
+ handling. Most clients have the effective key size in bits equal to
+ the key length in bits: so a 40 bit RC2 key uses a 40 bit (5 byte) key.
+ A few however don't do this and instead use the size of the decrypted key
+ to determine the RC2 key length and the AlgorithmIdentifier to determine
+ the effective key length. In this case the effective key length can still
+ be 40 bits but the key length can be 168 bits for example. This is fixed
+ by manually forcing an RC2 key into the EVP_PKEY structure because the
+ EVP code can't currently handle unusual RC2 key sizes: it always assumes
+ the key length and effective key length are equal.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a bunch of functions that should simplify the creation of
+ X509_NAME structures. Now you should be able to do:
+ X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Steve", -1, -1, 0);
+ and have it automatically work out the correct field type and fill in
+ the structures. The more adventurous can try:
+ X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, field, MBSTRING_UTF8, str, -1, -1, 0);
+ and it will (hopefully) work out the correct multibyte encoding.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change the 'req' utility to use the new field handling and multibyte
+ copy routines. Before the DN field creation was handled in an ad hoc
+ way in req, ca, and x509 which was rather broken and didn't support
+ BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. Since some software doesn't implement
+ BMPStrings or UTF8Strings yet, they can be enabled using the config file
+ using the dirstring_type option. See the new comment in the default
+ openssl.cnf for more info.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make crypto/rand/md_rand.c more robust:
+ - Assure unique random numbers after fork().
+ - Make sure that concurrent threads access the global counter and
+ md serializably so that we never lose entropy in them
+ or use exactly the same state in multiple threads.
+ Access to the large state is not always serializable because
+ the additional locking could be a performance killer, and
+ md should be large enough anyway.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New file apps/app_rand.c with commonly needed functionality
+ for handling the random seed file.
+
+ Use the random seed file in some applications that previously did not:
+ ca,
+ dsaparam -genkey (which also ignored its '-rand' option),
+ s_client,
+ s_server,
+ x509 (when signing).
+ Except on systems with /dev/urandom, it is crucial to have a random
+ seed file at least for key creation, DSA signing, and for DH exchanges;
+ for RSA signatures we could do without one.
+
+ gendh and gendsa (unlike genrsa) used to read only the first byte
+ of each file listed in the '-rand' option. The function as previously
+ found in genrsa is now in app_rand.c and is used by all programs
+ that support '-rand'.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) In RAND_write_file, use mode 0600 for creating files;
+ don't just chmod when it may be too late.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Report an error from X509_STORE_load_locations
+ when X509_LOOKUP_load_file or X509_LOOKUP_add_dir failed.
+ [Bill Perry]
+
+ *) New function ASN1_mbstring_copy() this copies a string in either
+ ASCII, Unicode, Universal (4 bytes per character) or UTF8 format
+ into an ASN1_STRING type. A mask of permissible types is passed
+ and it chooses the "minimal" type to use or an error if not type
+ is suitable.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add function equivalents to the various macros in asn1.h. The old
+ macros are retained with an M_ prefix. Code inside the library can
+ use the M_ macros. External code (including the openssl utility)
+ should *NOT* in order to be "shared library friendly".
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add various functions that can check a certificate's extensions
+ to see if it usable for various purposes such as SSL client,
+ server or S/MIME and CAs of these types. This is currently
+ VERY EXPERIMENTAL but will ultimately be used for certificate chain
+ verification. Also added a -purpose flag to x509 utility to
+ print out all the purposes.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a CRYPTO_EX_DATA to X509 certificate structure and associated
+ functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New X509V3_{X509,CRL,REVOKED}_get_d2i() functions. These will search
+ for, obtain and decode and extension and obtain its critical flag.
+ This allows all the necessary extension code to be handled in a
+ single function call.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) RC4 tune-up featuring 30-40% performance improvement on most RISC
+ platforms. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) New -noout option to asn1parse. This causes no output to be produced
+ its main use is when combined with -strparse and -out to extract data
+ from a file (which may not be in ASN.1 format).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix for pkcs12 program. It was hashing an invalid certificate pointer
+ when producing the local key id.
+ [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
+
+ *) New option -dhparam in s_server. This allows a DH parameter file to be
+ stated explicitly. If it is not stated then it tries the first server
+ certificate file. The previous behaviour hard coded the filename
+ "server.pem".
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -pubin and -pubout options to the rsa and dsa commands. These allow
+ a public key to be input or output. For example:
+ openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
+ Also added necessary DSA public key functions to handle this.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix so PKCS7_dataVerify() doesn't crash if no certificates are contained
+ in the message. This was handled by allowing
+ X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial() to tolerate a NULL passed to it.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Sampo Kellomaki <sampo at mail.neuronio.pt>]
+
+ *) Fix for bug in d2i_ASN1_bytes(): other ASN1 functions add an extra null
+ to the end of the strings whereas this didn't. This would cause problems
+ if strings read with d2i_ASN1_bytes() were later modified.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+ *) Fix for base64 decode bug. When a base64 bio reads only one line of
+ data and it contains EOF it will end up returning an error. This is
+ caused by input 46 bytes long. The cause is due to the way base64
+ BIOs find the start of base64 encoded data. They do this by trying a
+ trial decode on each line until they find one that works. When they
+ do a flag is set and it starts again knowing it can pass all the
+ data directly through the decoder. Unfortunately it doesn't reset
+ the context it uses. This means that if EOF is reached an attempt
+ is made to pass two EOFs through the context and this causes the
+ resulting error. This can also cause other problems as well. As is
+ usual with these problems it takes *ages* to find and the fix is
+ trivial: move one line.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by ian at uns.ns.ac.yu (Ivan Nejgebauer) ]
+
+ *) Ugly workaround to get s_client and s_server working under Windows. The
+ old code wouldn't work because it needed to select() on sockets and the
+ tty (for keypresses and to see if data could be written). Win32 only
+ supports select() on sockets so we select() with a 1s timeout on the
+ sockets and then see if any characters are waiting to be read, if none
+ are present then we retry, we also assume we can always write data to
+ the tty. This isn't nice because the code then blocks until we've
+ received a complete line of data and it is effectively polling the
+ keyboard at 1s intervals: however it's quite a bit better than not
+ working at all :-) A dedicated Windows application might handle this
+ with an event loop for example.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Enhance RSA_METHOD structure. Now there are two extra methods, rsa_sign
+ and rsa_verify. When the RSA_FLAGS_SIGN_VER option is set these functions
+ will be called when RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are used. This is useful
+ if rsa_pub_dec() and rsa_priv_enc() equivalents are not available.
+ For this to work properly RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt()
+ should *not* be used: RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() must be used instead.
+ This necessitated the support of an extra signature type NID_md5_sha1
+ for SSL signatures and modifications to the SSL library to use it instead
+ of calling RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new -verify -CAfile and -CApath options to the crl program, these
+ will lookup a CRL issuers certificate and verify the signature in a
+ similar way to the verify program. Tidy up the crl program so it
+ no longer accesses structures directly. Make the ASN1 CRL parsing a bit
+ less strict. It will now permit CRL extensions even if it is not
+ a V2 CRL: this will allow it to tolerate some broken CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialize all non-automatic variables each time one of the openssl
+ sub-programs is started (this is necessary as they may be started
+ multiple times from the "OpenSSL>" prompt).
+ [Lennart Bang, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Preliminary compilation option RSA_NULL which disables RSA crypto without
+ removing all other RSA functionality (this is what NO_RSA does). This
+ is so (for example) those in the US can disable those operations covered
+ by the RSA patent while allowing storage and parsing of RSA keys and RSA
+ key generation.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Non-copying interface to BIO pairs.
+ (still largely untested)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New function ANS1_tag2str() to convert an ASN1 tag to a descriptive
+ ASCII string. This was handled independently in various places before.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions UTF8_getc() and UTF8_putc() that parse and generate
+ UTF8 strings a character at a time.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Use client_version from client hello to select the protocol
+ (s23_srvr.c) and for RSA client key exchange verification
+ (s3_srvr.c), as required by the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 specifications.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add various utility functions to handle SPKACs, these were previously
+ handled by poking round in the structure internals. Added new function
+ NETSCAPE_SPKI_print() to print out SPKAC and a new utility 'spkac' to
+ print, verify and generate SPKACs. Based on an original idea from
+ Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at comune.modena.it> but extensively modified.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) RIPEMD160 is operational on all platforms and is back in 'make test'.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Allow the config file extension section to be overwritten on the
+ command line. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala
+ <madwolf at comune.modena.it>. The new option is called -extensions
+ and can be applied to ca, req and x509. Also -reqexts to override
+ the request extensions in req and -crlexts to override the crl extensions
+ in ca.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new feature to the SPKAC handling in ca. Now you can include
+ the same field multiple times by preceding it by "XXXX." for example:
+ 1.OU="Unit name 1"
+ 2.OU="Unit name 2"
+ this is the same syntax as used in the req config file.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow certificate extensions to be added to certificate requests. These
+ are specified in a 'req_extensions' option of the req section of the
+ config file. They can be printed out with the -text option to req but
+ are otherwise ignored at present.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix a horrible bug in enc_read() in crypto/evp/bio_enc.c: if the first
+ data read consists of only the final block it would not decrypted because
+ EVP_CipherUpdate() would correctly report zero bytes had been decrypted.
+ A misplaced 'break' also meant the decrypted final block might not be
+ copied until the next read.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial support for DH_METHOD. Again based on RSA_METHOD. Also added
+ a few extra parameters to the DH structure: these will be useful if
+ for example we want the value of 'q' or implement X9.42 DH.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial support for DSA_METHOD. This is based on the RSA_METHOD and
+ provides hooks that allow the default DSA functions or functions on a
+ "per key" basis to be replaced. This allows hardware acceleration and
+ hardware key storage to be handled without major modification to the
+ library. Also added low level modexp hooks and CRYPTO_EX structure and
+ associated functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a new flag to memory BIOs, BIO_FLAG_MEM_RDONLY. This marks the BIO
+ as "read only": it can't be written to and the buffer it points to will
+ not be freed. Reading from a read only BIO is much more efficient than
+ a normal memory BIO. This was added because there are several times when
+ an area of memory needs to be read from a BIO. The previous method was
+ to create a memory BIO and write the data to it, this results in two
+ copies of the data and an O(n^2) reading algorithm. There is a new
+ function BIO_new_mem_buf() which creates a read only memory BIO from
+ an area of memory. Also modified the PKCS#7 routines to use read only
+ memory BIOs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in
+ state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of
+ a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read,
+ but a retry condition occured while trying to read the rest.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as
+ NID_pkcs7_encrypted by default: this was wrong since this should almost
+ always be NID_pkcs7_data. Also modified the PKCS7_set_type() to handle
+ the encrypted data type: this is a more sensible place to put it and it
+ allows the PKCS#12 code to be tidied up that duplicated this
+ functionality.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Changed obj_dat.pl script so it takes its input and output files on
+ the command line. This should avoid shell escape redirection problems
+ under Win32.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initial support for certificate extension requests, these are included
+ in things like Xenroll certificate requests. Included functions to allow
+ extensions to be obtained and added.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) -crlf option to s_client and s_server for sending newlines as
+ CRLF (as required by many protocols).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.3a and 0.9.4 [09 Aug 1999]
+
+ *) Install libRSAglue.a when OpenSSL is built with RSAref.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) A few more ``#ifndef NO_FP_API / #endif'' pairs for consistency.
+ [Andrija Antonijevic <TheAntony2 at bigfoot.com>]
+
+ *) Fix -startdate and -enddate (which was missing) arguments to 'ca'
+ program.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function DSA_dup_DH, which duplicates DSA parameters/keys as
+ DH parameters/keys (q is lost during that conversion, but the resulting
+ DH parameters contain its length).
+
+ For 1024-bit p, DSA_generate_parameters followed by DSA_dup_DH is
+ much faster than DH_generate_parameters (which creates parameters
+ where p = 2*q + 1), and also the smaller q makes DH computations
+ much more efficient (160-bit exponentiation instead of 1024-bit
+ exponentiation); so this provides a convenient way to support DHE
+ ciphersuites in SSL/TLS servers (see ssl/ssltest.c). It is of
+ utter importance to use
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ or
+ SSL_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ when such DH parameters are used, because otherwise small subgroup
+ attacks may become possible!
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Avoid memory leak in i2d_DHparams.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Allow the -k option to be used more than once in the enc program:
+ this allows the same encrypted message to be read by multiple recipients.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, no_name), this converts
+ an ASN1_OBJECT to a text string. If the "no_name" parameter is set then
+ it will always use the numerical form of the OID, even if it has a short
+ or long name.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Added an extra RSA flag: RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY. Previously the rsa_mod_exp
+ method only got called if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp components were present,
+ otherwise bn_mod_exp was called. In the case of hardware keys for example
+ no private key components need be present and it might store extra data
+ in the RSA structure, which cannot be accessed from bn_mod_exp.
+ By setting RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY rsa_mod_exp will always be called for
+ private key operations.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Added support for SPARC Linux.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) pem_password_cb function type incompatibly changed from
+ typedef int pem_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag);
+ to
+ ....(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata);
+ so that applications can pass data to their callbacks:
+ The PEM[_ASN1]_{read,write}... functions and macros now take an
+ additional void * argument, which is just handed through whenever
+ the password callback is called.
+ [Damien Miller <dmiller at ilogic.com.au>; tiny changes by Bodo Moeller]
+
+ New function SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata.
+
+ Compatibility note: As many C implementations push function arguments
+ onto the stack in reverse order, the new library version is likely to
+ interoperate with programs that have been compiled with the old
+ pem_password_cb definition (PEM_whatever takes some data that
+ happens to be on the stack as its last argument, and the callback
+ just ignores this garbage); but there is no guarantee whatsoever that
+ this will work.
+
+ *) The -DPLATFORM="\"$(PLATFORM)\"" definition and the similar -DCFLAGS=...
+ (both in crypto/Makefile.ssl for use by crypto/cversion.c) caused
+ problems not only on Windows, but also on some Unix platforms.
+ To avoid problematic command lines, these definitions are now in an
+ auto-generated file crypto/buildinf.h (created by crypto/Makefile.ssl
+ for standard "make" builds, by util/mk1mf.pl for "mk1mf" builds).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) MIPS III/IV assembler module is reimplemented.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
+ delete an unused file.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
+ since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
+ This is currently experimental but it seems to work OK and pass all
+ the tests. Check out INSTALL.W32 for info.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix memory leaks in s3_clnt.c: All non-anonymous SSL3/TLS1 connections
+ without temporary keys kept an extra copy of the server key,
+ and connections with temporary keys did not free everything in case
+ of an error.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New function RSA_check_key and new openssl rsa option -check
+ for verifying the consistency of RSA keys.
+ [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Various changes to make Win32 compile work:
+ 1. Casts to avoid "loss of data" warnings in p5_crpt2.c
+ 2. Change unsigned int to int in b_dump.c to avoid "signed/unsigned
+ comparison" warnings.
+ 3. Add sk_<TYPE>_sort to DEF file generator and do make update.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a debugging option to PKCS#5 v2 key generation function: when
+ you #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 passwords, salts, iteration counts and
+ derived keys are printed to stderr.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Copy the flags in ASN1_STRING_dup().
+ [Roman E. Pavlov <pre at mo.msk.ru>]
+
+ *) The x509 application mishandled signing requests containing DSA
+ keys when the signing key was also DSA and the parameters didn't match.
+
+ It was supposed to omit the parameters when they matched the signing key:
+ the verifying software was then supposed to automatically use the CA's
+ parameters if they were absent from the end user certificate.
+
+ Omitting parameters is no longer recommended. The test was also
+ the wrong way round! This was probably due to unusual behaviour in
+ EVP_cmp_parameters() which returns 1 if the parameters match.
+ This meant that parameters were omitted when they *didn't* match and
+ the certificate was useless. Certificates signed with 'ca' didn't have
+ this bug.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Doug Erickson <Doug.Erickson at Part.NET>]
+
+ *) Memory leak checking (-DCRYPTO_MDEBUG) had some problems.
+ The interface is as follows:
+ Applications can use
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) aka MemCheck_start(),
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) aka MemCheck_stop();
+ "off" is now the default.
+ The library internally uses
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE) aka MemCheck_off(),
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE) aka MemCheck_on()
+ to disable memory-checking temporarily.
+
+ Some inconsistent states that previously were possible (and were
+ even the default) are now avoided.
+
+ -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME is new and additionally stores the current time
+ with each memory chunk allocated; this is occasionally more helpful
+ than just having a counter.
+
+ -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_THREAD is also new and adds the thread ID.
+
+ -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL enables all of the above, plus any future
+ extensions.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Introduce "mode" for SSL structures (with defaults in SSL_CTX),
+ which largely parallels "options", but is for changing API behaviour,
+ whereas "options" are about protocol behaviour.
+ Initial "mode" flags are:
+
+ SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE Allow SSL_write to report success when
+ a single record has been written.
+ SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER Don't insist that SSL_write
+ retries use the same buffer location.
+ (But all of the contents must be
+ copied!)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Bugfix: SSL_set_options ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_options
+ worked.
+
+ *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
+ [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling at tislabs.com>]
+
+ *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
+ RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
+ to mess around with the internals of an RSA structure.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix memory leaks in DSA_do_sign and DSA_is_prime.
+ Also really enable memory leak checks in openssl.c and in some
+ test programs.
+ [Chad C. Mulligan, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix a bug in d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() which can mess
+ up the length of negative integers. This has now been simplified to just
+ store the length when it is first determined and use it later, rather
+ than trying to keep track of where data is copied and updating it to
+ point to the end.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Brien Wheeler
+ <bwheeler at authentica-security.com>]
+
+ *) Add a new function PKCS7_signatureVerify. This allows the verification
+ of a PKCS#7 signature but with the signing certificate passed to the
+ function itself. This contrasts with PKCS7_dataVerify which assumes the
+ certificate is present in the PKCS#7 structure. This isn't always the
+ case: certificates can be omitted from a PKCS#7 structure and be
+ distributed by "out of band" means (such as a certificate database).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Complete the PEM_* macros with DECLARE_PEM versions to replace the
+ function prototypes in pem.h, also change util/mkdef.pl to add the
+ necessary function names.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) mk1mf.pl (used by Windows builds) did not properly read the
+ options set by Configure in the top level Makefile, and Configure
+ was not even able to write more than one option correctly.
+ Fixed, now "no-idea no-rc5 -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG" etc. works as intended.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New functions CONF_load_bio() and CONF_load_fp() to allow a config
+ file to be loaded from a BIO or FILE pointer. The BIO version will
+ for example allow memory BIOs to contain config info.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function "CRYPTO_num_locks" that returns CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS.
+ Whoever hopes to achieve shared-library compatibility across versions
+ must use this, not the compile-time macro.
+ (Exercise 0.9.4: Which is the minimum library version required by
+ such programs?)
+ Note: All this applies only to multi-threaded programs, others don't
+ need locks.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add missing case to s3_clnt.c state machine -- one of the new SSL tests
+ through a BIO pair triggered the default case, i.e.
+ SSLerr(...,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New "BIO pair" concept (crypto/bio/bss_bio.c) so that applications
+ can use the SSL library even if none of the specific BIOs is
+ appropriate.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix a bug in i2d_DSAPublicKey() which meant it returned the wrong value
+ for the encoded length.
+ [Jeon KyoungHo <khjeon at sds.samsung.co.kr>]
+
+ *) Add initial documentation of the X509V3 functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a new pair of functions PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() and
+ PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() that are equivalent to
+ PEM_write_PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() but use the more
+ secure PKCS#8 private key format with a high iteration count.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix determination of Perl interpreter: A perl or perl5
+ _directory_ in $PATH was also accepted as the interpreter.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Fix demos/sign/sign.c: well there wasn't anything strictly speaking
+ wrong with it but it was very old and did things like calling
+ PEM_ASN1_read() directly and used MD5 for the hash not to mention some
+ unusual formatting.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix demos/selfsign.c: it used obsolete and deleted functions, changed
+ to use the new extension code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement the PEM_read/PEM_write functions in crypto/pem/pem_all.c
+ with macros. This should make it easier to change their form, add extra
+ arguments etc. Fix a few PEM prototypes which didn't have cipher as a
+ constant.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add to configuration table a new entry that can specify an alternative
+ name for unistd.h (for pre-POSIX systems); we need this for NeXTstep,
+ according to Mark Crispin <MRC at Panda.COM>.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+#if 0
+ *) DES CBC did not update the IV. Weird.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+#else
+ des_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV, but des_ncbc_encrypt does.
+ Changing the behaviour of the former might break existing programs --
+ where IV updating is needed, des_ncbc_encrypt can be used.
+#endif
+
+ *) When bntest is run from "make test" it drives bc to check its
+ calculations, as well as internally checking them. If an internal check
+ fails, it needs to cause bc to give a non-zero result or make test carries
+ on without noticing the failure. Fixed.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) DES library cleanups.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
+ used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
+ ciphers. NOTE: although the key derivation function has been verified
+ against some published test vectors it has not been extensively tested
+ yet. Added a -v2 "cipher" option to pkcs8 application to allow the use
+ of v2.0.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Instead of "mkdir -p", which is not fully portable, use new
+ Perl script "util/mkdir-p.pl".
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Rewrite the way password based encryption (PBE) is handled. It used to
+ assume that the ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier parameter was a PBEParameter
+ structure. This was true for the PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 PBE algorithms
+ but doesn't apply to PKCS#5 v2.0 where it can be something else. Now
+ the 'parameter' field of the AlgorithmIdentifier is passed to the
+ underlying key generation function so it must do its own ASN1 parsing.
+ This has also changed the EVP_PBE_CipherInit() function which now has a
+ 'parameter' argument instead of literal salt and iteration count values
+ and the function EVP_PBE_ALGOR_CipherInit() has been deleted.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for PKCS#5 v1.5 compatible password based encryption algorithms
+ and PKCS#8 functionality. New 'pkcs8' application linked to openssl.
+ Needed to change the PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY value which was just "PRIVATE
+ KEY" because this clashed with PKCS#8 unencrypted string. Since this
+ value was just used as a "magic string" and not used directly its
+ value doesn't matter.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Introduce some semblance of const correctness to BN. Shame C doesn't
+ support mutable.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) "linux-sparc64" configuration (ultrapenguin).
+ [Ray Miller <ray.miller at oucs.ox.ac.uk>]
+ "linux-sparc" configuration.
+ [Christian Forster <fo at hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]
+
+ *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
+ File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
+ [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>]
+
+ *) Support BS2000/OSD-POSIX.
+ [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>]
+
+ *) Make callbacks for key generation use void * instead of char *.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Make S/MIME samples compile (not yet tested).
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Additional typesafe stacks.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) New configuration variants "bsdi-elf-gcc" (BSD/OS 4.x).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+
+ Changes between 0.9.3 and 0.9.3a [29 May 1999]
+
+ *) New configuration variant "sco5-gcc".
+
+ *) Updated some demos.
+ [Sean O Riordain, Wade Scholine]
+
+ *) Add missing BIO_free at exit of pkcs12 application.
+ [Wu Zhigang]
+
+ *) Fix memory leak in conf.c.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Updates for Win32 to assembler version of MD5.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Set #! path to perl in apps/der_chop to where we found it
+ instead of using a fixed path.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) SHA library changes for irix64-mips4-cc.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Improvements for VMS support.
+ [Richard Levitte]
+
+
+ Changes between 0.9.2b and 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]
+
+ *) Bignum library bug fix. IRIX 6 passes "make test" now!
+ This also avoids the problems with SC4.2 and unpatched SC5.
+ [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+ *) New functions sk_num, sk_value and sk_set to replace the previous macros.
+ These are required because of the typesafe stack would otherwise break
+ existing code. If old code used a structure member which used to be STACK
+ and is now STACK_OF (for example cert in a PKCS7_SIGNED structure) with
+ sk_num or sk_value it would produce an error because the num, data members
+ are not present in STACK_OF. Now it just produces a warning. sk_set
+ replaces the old method of assigning a value to sk_value
+ (e.g. sk_value(x, i) = y) which the library used in a few cases. Any code
+ that does this will no longer work (and should use sk_set instead) but
+ this could be regarded as a "questionable" behaviour anyway.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix most of the other PKCS#7 bugs. The "experimental" code can now
+ correctly handle encrypted S/MIME data.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change type of various DES function arguments from des_cblock
+ (which means, in function argument declarations, pointer to char)
+ to des_cblock * (meaning pointer to array with 8 char elements),
+ which allows the compiler to do more typechecking; it was like
+ that back in SSLeay, but with lots of ugly casts.
+
+ Introduce new type const_des_cblock.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Reorganise the PKCS#7 library and get rid of some of the more obvious
+ problems: find RecipientInfo structure that matches recipient certificate
+ and initialise the ASN1 structures properly based on passed cipher.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Belatedly make the BN tests actually check the results.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fix the encoding and decoding of negative ASN1 INTEGERS and conversion
+ to and from BNs: it was completely broken. New compilation option
+ NEG_PUBKEY_BUG to allow for some broken certificates that encode public
+ key elements as negative integers.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Reorganize and speed up MD5.
+ [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+ *) VMS support.
+ [Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org>]
+
+ *) New option -out to asn1parse to allow the parsed structure to be
+ output to a file. This is most useful when combined with the -strparse
+ option to examine the output of things like OCTET STRINGS.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make SSL library a little more fool-proof by not requiring any longer
+ that SSL_set_{accept,connect}_state be called before
+ SSL_{accept,connect} may be used (SSL_set_..._state is omitted
+ in many applications because usually everything *appeared* to work as
+ intended anyway -- now it really works as intended).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
+ -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
+ -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs -Winline'' with EGCS 1.1.2+
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Various fixes to the EVP and PKCS#7 code. It may now be able to
+ handle PKCS#7 enveloped data properly.
+ [Sebastian Akerman <sak at parallelconsulting.com>, modified by Steve]
+
+ *) Create a duplicate of the SSL_CTX's CERT in SSL_new instead of
+ copying pointers. The cert_st handling is changed by this in
+ various ways (and thus what used to be known as ctx->default_cert
+ is now called ctx->cert, since we don't resort to s->ctx->[default_]cert
+ any longer when s->cert does not give us what we need).
+ ssl_cert_instantiate becomes obsolete by this change.
+ As soon as we've got the new code right (possibly it already is?),
+ we have solved a couple of bugs of the earlier code where s->cert
+ was used as if it could not have been shared with other SSL structures.
+
+ Note that using the SSL API in certain dirty ways now will result
+ in different behaviour than observed with earlier library versions:
+ Changing settings for an SSL_CTX *ctx after having done s = SSL_new(ctx)
+ does not influence s as it used to.
+
+ In order to clean up things more thoroughly, inside SSL_SESSION
+ we don't use CERT any longer, but a new structure SESS_CERT
+ that holds per-session data (if available); currently, this is
+ the peer's certificate chain and, for clients, the server's certificate
+ and temporary key. CERT holds only those values that can have
+ meaningful defaults in an SSL_CTX.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New function X509V3_EXT_i2d() to create an X509_EXTENSION structure
+ from the internal representation. Various PKCS#7 fixes: remove some
+ evil casts and set the enc_dig_alg field properly based on the signing
+ key type.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow PKCS#12 password to be set from the command line or the
+ environment. Let 'ca' get its config file name from the environment
+ variables "OPENSSL_CONF" or "SSLEAY_CONF" (for consistency with 'req'
+ and 'x509').
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Allow certificate policies extension to use an IA5STRING for the
+ organization field. This is contrary to the PKIX definition but
+ VeriSign uses it and IE5 only recognises this form. Document 'x509'
+ extension option.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add PEDANTIC compiler flag to allow compilation with gcc -pedantic,
+ without disallowing inline assembler and the like for non-pedantic builds.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Support Borland C++ builder.
+ [Janez Jere <jj at void.si>, modified by Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Support Mingw32.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
+ [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+ *) Sparc v8plus assembler for the bignum library.
+ [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+ *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Update HPUX configuration.
+ [Anonymous]
+
+ *) Add missing sk_<type>_unshift() function to safestack.h
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) New function SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file that sets the
+ "extra_cert"s in addition to the certificate. (This makes sense
+ only for "PEM" format files, as chains as a whole are not
+ DER-encoded.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Support verify_depth from the SSL API.
+ x509_vfy.c had what can be considered an off-by-one-error:
+ Its depth (which was not part of the external interface)
+ was actually counting the number of certificates in a chain;
+ now it really counts the depth.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Bugfix in crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c: The SSLerr macro was used
+ instead of X509err, which often resulted in confusing error
+ messages since the error codes are not globally unique
+ (e.g. an alleged error in ssl3_accept when a certificate
+ didn't match the private key).
+
+ *) New function SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context that allows to set a default
+ value (so that you don't need SSL_set_session_id_context for each
+ connection using the SSL_CTX).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) OAEP decoding bug fix.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
+ David Harris.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New Configure options "threads" and "no-threads". For systems
+ where the proper compiler options are known (currently Solaris
+ and Linux), "threads" is the default.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New script util/mklink.pl as a faster substitute for util/mklink.sh.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Install various scripts to $(OPENSSLDIR)/misc, not to
+ $(INSTALLTOP)/bin -- they shouldn't clutter directories
+ such as /usr/local/bin.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) "make linux-shared" to build shared libraries.
+ [Niels Poppe <niels at netbox.org>]
+
+ *) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
+ extension adding in x509 utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
+ prototypes.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
+ by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
+ header rewriting and C source file generation. It should be much better
+ than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to
+ read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions
+ aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of
+ translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code imbedded
+ in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which
+ have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all
+ on one line (which resulted in some large lines...).
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Change #include filenames from <foo.h> to <openssl/foo.h>.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Change behaviour of ssl2_read when facing length-0 packets: Don't return
+ 0 (which usually indicates a closed connection), but continue reading.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix some race conditions.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add support for CRL distribution points extension. Add Certificate
+ Policies and CRL distribution points documentation.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
+ 8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
+ between OpenSSL and Baltimore C/SSL 2.0 and J/SSL 2.0.
+ [Merlin Hughes <merlin at baltimore.ie>]
+
+ *) Fix lots of warnings.
+ [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
+
+ *) In add_cert_dir() in crypto/x509/by_dir.c, break out of the loop if
+ the directory spec didn't end with a LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR.
+ [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
+
+ *) Fix problems with sizeof(long) == 8.
+ [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+ *) Change functions to ANSI C.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Fix typos in error codes.
+ [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
+ [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
+
+ *) Support for Certificate Policies extension: both print and set.
+ Various additions to support the r2i method this uses.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A lot of constification, and fix a bug in X509_NAME_oneline() that could
+ return a const string when you are expecting an allocated buffer.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add support for ASN1 types UTF8String and VISIBLESTRING, also the CHOICE
+ types DirectoryString and DisplayText.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add code to allow r2i extensions to access the configuration database,
+ add an LHASH database driver and add several ctx helper functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix an evil bug in bn_expand2() which caused various BN functions to
+ fail when they extended the size of a BIGNUM.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Various utility functions to handle SXNet extension. Modify mkdef.pl to
+ support typesafe stack.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix typo in SSL_[gs]et_options().
+ [Nils Frostberg <nils at medcom.se>]
+
+ *) Delete various functions and files that belonged to the (now obsolete)
+ old X509V3 handling code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New Configure option "rsaref".
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Introduce type-safe ASN.1 SETs.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Convert various additional casted stacks to type-safe STACK_OF() variants.
+ [Ben Laurie, Ralf S. Engelschall, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Introduce type-safe STACKs. This will almost certainly break lots of code
+ that links with OpenSSL (well at least cause lots of warnings), but fear
+ not: the conversion is trivial, and it eliminates loads of evil casts. A
+ few STACKed things have been converted already. Feel free to convert more.
+ In the fullness of time, I'll do away with the STACK type altogether.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add `openssl ca -revoke <certfile>' facility which revokes a certificate
+ specified in <certfile> by updating the entry in the index.txt file.
+ This way one no longer has to edit the index.txt file manually for
+ revoking a certificate. The -revoke option does the gory details now.
+ [Massimiliano Pala <madwolf at openca.org>, Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Fix `openssl crl -noout -text' combination where `-noout' killed the
+ `-text' option at all and this way the `-noout -text' combination was
+ inconsistent in `openssl crl' with the friends in `openssl x509|rsa|dsa'.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Make sure a corresponding plain text error message exists for the
+ X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED/23 error number which can occur when a
+ verify callback function determined that a certificate was revoked.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Bugfix: In test/testenc, don't test "openssl <cipher>" for
+ ciphers that were excluded, e.g. by -DNO_IDEA. Also, test
+ all available cipers including rc5, which was forgotten until now.
+ In order to let the testing shell script know which algorithms
+ are available, a new (up to now undocumented) command
+ "openssl list-cipher-commands" is used.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Bugfix: s_client occasionally would sleep in select() when
+ it should have checked SSL_pending() first.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
+ the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Tweaks to Configure
+ [Niels Poppe <niels at netbox.org>]
+
+ *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 ASN1 PBES2 structures. No other support,
+ yet...
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
+ The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
+ [Ulf Möller]
+
+ *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
+ SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
+ same as SSL2_VERSION anyway.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) New "-showcerts" option for s_client.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Still more PKCS#12 integration. Add pkcs12 application to openssl
+ application. Various cleanups and fixes.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) More PKCS#12 integration. Add new pkcs12 directory with Makefile.ssl and
+ modify error routines to work internally. Add error codes and PBE init
+ to library startup routines.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Further PKCS#12 integration. Added password based encryption, PKCS#8 and
+ packing functions to asn1 and evp. Changed function names and error
+ codes along the way.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) PKCS12 integration: and so it begins... First of several patches to
+ slowly integrate PKCS#12 functionality into OpenSSL. Add PKCS#12
+ objects to objects.h
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a new 'indent' option to some X509V3 extension code. Initial ASN1
+ and display support for Thawte strong extranet extension.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add LinuxPPC support.
+ [Jeff Dubrule <igor at pobox.org>]
+
+ *) Get rid of redundant BN file bn_mulw.c, and rename bn_div64 to
+ bn_div_words in alpha.s.
+ [Hannes Reinecke <H.Reinecke at hw.ac.uk> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Make sure the RSA OAEP test is skipped under -DRSAref because
+ OAEP isn't supported when OpenSSL is built with RSAref.
+ [Ulf Moeller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+
+ *) Move definitions of IS_SET/IS_SEQUENCE inside crypto/asn1/asn1.h
+ so they no longer are missing under -DNOPROTO.
+ [Soren S. Jorvang <soren at t.dk>]
+
+
+ Changes between 0.9.1c and 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]
+
+ *) Make SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() work in servers. Unfortunately, it still
+ doesn't work when the session is reused. Coming soon!
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fix a security hole, that allows sessions to be reused in the wrong
+ context thus bypassing client cert protection! All software that uses
+ client certs and session caches in multiple contexts NEEDS PATCHING to
+ allow session reuse! A fuller solution is in the works.
+ [Ben Laurie, problem pointed out by Holger Reif, Bodo Moeller (and ???)]
+
+ *) Some more source tree cleanups (removed obsolete files
+ crypto/bf/asm/bf586.pl, test/test.txt and crypto/sha/asm/f.s; changed
+ permission on "config" script to be executable) and a fix for the INSTALL
+ document.
+ [Ulf Moeller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+
+ *) Remove some legacy and erroneous uses of malloc, free instead of
+ Malloc, Free.
+ [Lennart Bang <lob at netstream.se>, with minor changes by Steve]
+
+ *) Make rsa_oaep_test return non-zero on error.
+ [Ulf Moeller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+
+ *) Add support for native Solaris shared libraries. Configure
+ solaris-sparc-sc4-pic, make, then run shlib/solaris-sc4.sh. It'd be nice
+ if someone would make that last step automatic.
+ [Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe at AdNovum.CH>]
+
+ *) ctx_size was not built with the right compiler during "make links". Fixed.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Change the meaning of 'ALL' in the cipher list. It now means "everything
+ except NULL ciphers". This means the default cipher list will no longer
+ enable NULL ciphers. They need to be specifically enabled e.g. with
+ the string "DEFAULT:eNULL".
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix to RSA private encryption routines: if p < q then it would
+ occasionally produce an invalid result. This will only happen with
+ externally generated keys because OpenSSL (and SSLeay) ensure p > q.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Be less restrictive and allow also `perl util/perlpath.pl
+ /path/to/bin/perl' in addition to `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin',
+ because this way one can also use an interpreter named `perl5' (which is
+ usually the name of Perl 5.xxx on platforms where an Perl 4.x is still
+ installed as `perl').
+ [Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe at adnovum.ch>]
+
+ *) Let util/clean-depend.pl work also with older Perl 5.00x versions.
+ [Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe at adnovum.ch>]
+
+ *) Fix Makefile.org so CC,CFLAG etc are passed to 'make links' add
+ advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparision
+ to fc.exe (thanks to Ulrich Kroener <kroneru at yahoo.com> for the
+ suggestion). Fix misplaced ASNI prototypes and declarations in evp.h
+ and crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) DES quad checksum was broken on big-endian architectures. Fixed.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Comment out two functions in bio.h that aren't implemented. Fix up the
+ Win32 test batch file so it (might) work again. The Win32 test batch file
+ is horrible: I feel ill....
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Move various #ifdefs around so NO_SYSLOG, NO_DIRENT etc are now selected
+ in e_os.h. Audit of header files to check ANSI and non ANSI
+ sections: 10 functions were absent from non ANSI section and not exported
+ from Windows DLLs. Fixed up libeay.num for new functions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make `openssl version' output lines consistent.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Fix Win32 symbol export lists for BIO functions: Added
+ BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_get_ex_num, BIO_get_ex_data and BIO_set_ex_data
+ to ms/libeay{16,32}.def.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Second round of fixing the OpenSSL perl/ stuff. It now at least compiled
+ fine under Unix and passes some trivial tests I've now added. But the
+ whole stuff is horribly incomplete, so a README.1ST with a disclaimer was
+ added to make sure no one expects that this stuff really works in the
+ OpenSSL 0.9.2 release. Additionally I've started to clean the XS sources
+ up and fixed a few little bugs and inconsistencies in OpenSSL.{pm,xs} and
+ openssl_bio.xs.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Fix the generation of two part addresses in perl.
+ [Kenji Miyake <kenji at miyake.org>, integrated by Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add config entry for Linux on MIPS.
+ [John Tobey <jtobey at channel1.com>]
+
+ *) Make links whenever Configure is run, unless we are on Windoze.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Permit extensions to be added to CRLs using crl_section in openssl.cnf.
+ Currently only issuerAltName and AuthorityKeyIdentifier make any sense
+ in CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and
+ other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the
+ Configure script everytime: One now can use ``perl Configure
+ <id>:<details>'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended
+ to them (seperated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static
+ pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key <id> with value
+ <details> and ``perl Configure <id>'' is called. So, when you want to
+ perform a quick test-compile under FreeBSD 3.1 with pgcc and without
+ assembler stuff you can use ``perl Configure "FreeBSD-elf:pgcc:-O6:::"''
+ now, which overrides the FreeBSD-elf entry on-the-fly.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Disable new TLS1 ciphersuites by default: they aren't official yet.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Allow DSO flags like -fpic, -fPIC, -KPIC etc. to be specified
+ on the `perl Configure ...' command line. This way one can compile
+ OpenSSL libraries with Position Independent Code (PIC) which is needed
+ for linking it into DSOs.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Remarkably, export ciphers were totally broken and no-one had noticed!
+ Fixed.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Cleaned up the LICENSE document: The official contact for any license
+ questions now is the OpenSSL core team under openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ And add a paragraph about the dual-license situation to make sure people
+ recognize that _BOTH_ the OpenSSL license _AND_ the SSLeay license apply
+ to the OpenSSL toolkit.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) General source tree makefile cleanups: Made `making xxx in yyy...'
+ display consistent in the source tree and replaced `/bin/rm' by `rm'.
+ Additonally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary
+ semicolons, subsequent redundant removes, inline point.sh into mklink.sh
+ to speed processing and no longer clutter the display with confusing
+ stuff. Instead only the actually done links are displayed.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Permit null encryption ciphersuites, used for authentication only. It used
+ to be necessary to set the preprocessor define SSL_ALLOW_ENULL to do this.
+ It is now necessary to set SSL_FORBID_ENULL to prevent the use of null
+ encryption.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add a bunch of fixes to the PKCS#7 stuff. It used to sometimes reorder
+ signed attributes when verifying signatures (this would break them),
+ the detached data encoding was wrong and public keys obtained using
+ X509_get_pubkey() weren't freed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add text documentation for the BUFFER functions. Also added a work around
+ to a Win95 console bug. This was triggered by the password read stuff: the
+ last character typed gets carried over to the next fread(). If you were
+ generating a new cert request using 'req' for example then the last
+ character of the passphrase would be CR which would then enter the first
+ field as blank.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Added the new `Includes OpenSSL Cryptography Software' button as
+ doc/openssl_button.{gif,html} which is similar in style to the old SSLeay
+ button and can be used by applications based on OpenSSL to show the
+ relationship to the OpenSSL project.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Remove confusing variables in function signatures in files
+ ssl/ssl_lib.c and ssl/ssl.h.
+ [Lennart Bong <lob at kulthea.stacken.kth.se>]
+
+ *) Don't install bss_file.c under PREFIX/include/
+ [Lennart Bong <lob at kulthea.stacken.kth.se>]
+
+ *) Get the Win32 compile working again. Modify mkdef.pl so it can handle
+ functions that return function pointers and has support for NT specific
+ stuff. Fix mk1mf.pl and VC-32.pl to support NT differences also. Various
+ #ifdef WIN32 and WINNTs sprinkled about the place and some changes from
+ unsigned to signed types: this was killing the Win32 compile.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new certificate file to stack functions,
+ SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() and
+ SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(). These largely supplant
+ SSL_load_client_CA_file(), and can be used to add multiple certs easily
+ to a stack (usually this is then handed to SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list()).
+ This means that Apache-SSL and similar packages don't have to mess around
+ to add as many CAs as they want to the preferred list.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Experiment with doxygen documentation. Currently only partially applied to
+ ssl/ssl_lib.c.
+ See http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html, and run doxygen with
+ openssl.doxy as the configuration file.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Get rid of remaining C++-style comments which strict C compilers hate.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall, pointed out by Carlos Amengual]
+
+ *) Changed BN_RECURSION in bn_mont.c to BN_RECURSION_MONT so it is not
+ compiled in by default: it has problems with large keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add a bunch of SSL_xxx() functions for configuring the temporary RSA and
+ DH private keys and/or callback functions which directly correspond to
+ their SSL_CTX_xxx() counterparts but work on a per-connection basis. This
+ is needed for applications which have to configure certificates on a
+ per-connection basis (e.g. Apache+mod_ssl) instead of a per-context basis
+ (e.g. s_server).
+ For the RSA certificate situation is makes no difference, but
+ for the DSA certificate situation this fixes the "no shared cipher"
+ problem where the OpenSSL cipher selection procedure failed because the
+ temporary keys were not overtaken from the context and the API provided
+ no way to reconfigure them.
+ The new functions now let applications reconfigure the stuff and they
+ are in detail: SSL_need_tmp_RSA, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_dh,
+ SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback. Additionally a new
+ non-public-API function ssl_cert_instantiate() is used as a helper
+ function and also to reduce code redundancy inside ssl_rsa.c.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Move s_server -dcert and -dkey options out of the undocumented feature
+ area because they are useful for the DSA situation and should be
+ recognized by the users.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Fix the cipher decision scheme for export ciphers: the export bits are
+ *not* within SSL_MKEY_MASK or SSL_AUTH_MASK, they are within
+ SSL_EXP_MASK. So, the original variable has to be used instead of the
+ already masked variable.
+ [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
+
+ *) Fix 'port' variable from `int' to `unsigned int' in crypto/bio/b_sock.c
+ [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
+
+ *) Change type of another md_len variable in pk7_doit.c:PKCS7_dataFinal()
+ from `int' to `unsigned int' because it's a length and initialized by
+ EVP_DigestFinal() which expects an `unsigned int *'.
+ [Richard Levitte <levitte at stacken.kth.se>]
+
+ *) Don't hard-code path to Perl interpreter on shebang line of Configure
+ script. Instead use the usual Shell->Perl transition trick.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Make `openssl x509 -noout -modulus' functional also for DSA certificates
+ (in addition to RSA certificates) to match the behaviour of `openssl dsa
+ -noout -modulus' as it's already the case for `openssl rsa -noout
+ -modulus'. For RSA the -modulus is the real "modulus" while for DSA
+ currently the public key is printed (a decision which was already done by
+ `openssl dsa -modulus' in the past) which serves a similar purpose.
+ Additionally the NO_RSA no longer completely removes the whole -modulus
+ option; it now only avoids using the RSA stuff. Same applies to NO_DSA
+ now, too.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Add Arne Ansper's reliable BIO - this is an encrypted, block-digested
+ BIO. See the source (crypto/evp/bio_ok.c) for more info.
+ [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+ *) Dump the old yucky req code that tried (and failed) to allow raw OIDs
+ to be added. Now both 'req' and 'ca' can use new objects defined in the
+ config file.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add cool BIO that does syslog (or event log on NT).
+ [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>, integrated by Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add support for new TLS ciphersuites, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
+ TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 and
+ TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, as specified in "56-bit Export Cipher
+ Suites For TLS", draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-00.txt.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add preliminary config info for new extension code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make RSA_NO_PADDING really use no padding.
+ [Ulf Moeller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+
+ *) Generate errors when private/public key check is done.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Overhaul for 'crl' utility. New function X509_CRL_print. Partial support
+ for some CRL extensions and new objects added.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Really fix the ASN1 IMPLICIT bug this time... Partial support for private
+ key usage extension and fuller support for authority key id.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add OAEP encryption for the OpenSSL crypto library. OAEP is the improved
+ padding method for RSA, which is recommended for new applications in PKCS
+ #1 v2.0 (RFC 2437, October 1998).
+ OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) has better theoretical
+ foundations than the ad-hoc padding used in PKCS #1 v1.5. It is secure
+ against Bleichbacher's attack on RSA.
+ [Ulf Moeller <ulf at fitug.de>, reformatted, corrected and integrated by
+ Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Updates to the new SSL compression code
+ [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
+
+ *) Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
+ via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
+ (because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
+ is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
+ [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
+
+ *) Run extensive memory leak checks on SSL apps. Fixed *lots* of memory
+ leaks in ssl/ relating to new X509_get_pubkey() behaviour. Also fixes
+ in apps/ and an unrelated leak in crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for RAW extensions where an arbitrary extension can be
+ created by including its DER encoding. See apps/openssl.cnf for
+ an example.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make sure latest Perl versions don't interpret some generated C array
+ code as Perl array code in the crypto/err/err_genc.pl script.
+ [Lars Weber <3weber at informatik.uni-hamburg.de>]
+
+ *) Modify ms/do_ms.bat to not generate assembly language makefiles since
+ not many people have the assembler. Various Win32 compilation fixes and
+ update to the INSTALL.W32 file with (hopefully) more accurate Win32
+ build instructions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify configure script 'Configure' to automatically create crypto/date.h
+ file under Win32 and also build pem.h from pem.org. New script
+ util/mkfiles.pl to create the MINFO file on environments that can't do a
+ 'make files': perl util/mkfiles.pl >MINFO should work.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Major rework of DES function declarations, in the pursuit of correctness
+ and purity. As a result, many evil casts evaporated, and some weirdness,
+ too. You may find this causes warnings in your code. Zapping your evil
+ casts will probably fix them. Mostly.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fix for a typo in asn1.h. Bug fix to object creation script
+ obj_dat.pl. It considered a zero in an object definition to mean
+ "end of object": none of the objects in objects.h have any zeros
+ so it wasn't spotted.
+ [Steve Henson, reported by Erwann ABALEA <eabalea at certplus.com>]
+
+ *) Add support for Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output Feedback
+ Masking (CBCM). In the absence of test vectors, the best I have been able
+ to do is check that the decrypt undoes the encrypt, so far. Send me test
+ vectors if you have them.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Correct calculation of key length for export ciphers (too much space was
+ allocated for null ciphers). This has not been tested!
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Modifications to the mkdef.pl for Win32 DEF file creation. The usage
+ message is now correct (it understands "crypto" and "ssl" on its
+ command line). There is also now an "update" option. This will update
+ the util/ssleay.num and util/libeay.num files with any new functions.
+ If you do a:
+ perl util/mkdef.pl crypto ssl update
+ it will update them.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Overhauled the Perl interface (perl/*):
+ - ported BN stuff to OpenSSL's different BN library
+ - made the perl/ source tree CVS-aware
+ - renamed the package from SSLeay to OpenSSL (the files still contain
+ their history because I've copied them in the repository)
+ - removed obsolete files (the test scripts will be replaced
+ by better Test::Harness variants in the future)
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) First cut for a very conservative source tree cleanup:
+ 1. merge various obsolete readme texts into doc/ssleay.txt
+ where we collect the old documents and readme texts.
+ 2. remove the first part of files where I'm already sure that we no
+ longer need them because of three reasons: either they are just temporary
+ files which were left by Eric or they are preserved original files where
+ I've verified that the diff is also available in the CVS via "cvs diff
+ -rSSLeay_0_8_1b" or they were renamed (as it was definitely the case for
+ the crypto/md/ stuff).
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) More extension code. Incomplete support for subject and issuer alt
+ name, issuer and authority key id. Change the i2v function parameters
+ and add an extra 'crl' parameter in the X509V3_CTX structure: guess
+ what that's for :-) Fix to ASN1 macro which messed up
+ IMPLICIT tag and add f_enum.c which adds a2i, i2a for ENUMERATED.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Preliminary support for ENUMERATED type. This is largely copied from the
+ INTEGER code.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new function, EVP_MD_CTX_copy() to replace frequent use of memcpy.
+ [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
+
+ *) Make sure `make rehash' target really finds the `openssl' program.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall, Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe at adnovum.ch>]
+
+ *) Squeeze another 7% of speed out of MD5 assembler, at least on a P2. I'd
+ like to hear about it if this slows down other processors.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Add CygWin32 platform information to Configure script.
+ [Alan Batie <batie at aahz.jf.intel.com>]
+
+ *) Fixed ms/32all.bat script: `no_asm' -> `no-asm'
+ [Rainer W. Gerling <gerling at mpg-gv.mpg.de>]
+
+ *) New program nseq to manipulate netscape certificate sequences
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify crl2pkcs7 so it supports multiple -certfile arguments. Fix a
+ few typos.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes to BN code. Previously the default was to define BN_RECURSION
+ but the BN code had some problems that would cause failures when
+ doing certificate verification and some other functions.
+ [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
+
+ *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add several PKIX and private extended key usage OIDs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify the 'ca' program to handle the new extension code. Modify
+ openssl.cnf for new extension format, add comments.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) More X509 V3 changes. Fix typo in v3_bitstr.c. Add support to 'req'
+ and add a sample to openssl.cnf so req -x509 now adds appropriate
+ CA extensions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Continued X509 V3 changes. Add to other makefiles, integrate with the
+ error code, add initial support to X509_print() and x509 application.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Takes a deep breath and start addding X509 V3 extension support code. Add
+ files in crypto/x509v3. Move original stuff to crypto/x509v3/old. All this
+ stuff is currently isolated and isn't even compiled yet.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Continuing patches for GeneralizedTime. Fix up certificate and CRL
+ ASN1 to use ASN1_TIME and modify print routines to use ASN1_TIME_print.
+ Removed the versions check from X509 routines when loading extensions:
+ this allows certain broken certificates that don't set the version
+ properly to be processed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Deal with irritating shit to do with dependencies, in YAAHW (Yet Another
+ Ad Hoc Way) - Makefile.ssls now all contain local dependencies, which
+ can still be regenerated with "make depend".
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Spelling mistake in C version of CAST-128.
+ [Ben Laurie, reported by Jeremy Hylton <jeremy at cnri.reston.va.us>]
+
+ *) Changes to the error generation code. The perl script err-code.pl
+ now reads in the old error codes and retains the old numbers, only
+ adding new ones if necessary. It also only changes the .err files if new
+ codes are added. The makefiles have been modified to only insert errors
+ when needed (to avoid needlessly modifying header files). This is done
+ by only inserting errors if the .err file is newer than the auto generated
+ C file. To rebuild all the error codes from scratch (the old behaviour)
+ either modify crypto/Makefile.ssl to pass the -regen flag to err_code.pl
+ or delete all the .err files.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) CAST-128 was incorrectly implemented for short keys. The C version has
+ been fixed, but is untested. The assembler versions are also fixed, but
+ new assembler HAS NOT BEEN GENERATED FOR WIN32 - the Makefile needs fixing
+ to regenerate it if needed.
+ [Ben Laurie, reported (with fix for C version) by Jun-ichiro itojun
+ Hagino <itojun at kame.net>]
+
+ *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
+ [Ulf Möller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+
+ *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
+ functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
+ GeneralizedTime. ASN1_TIME is the proper type used in certificates et
+ al: it's just almost always a UTCTime. Note this patch adds new error
+ codes so do a "make errors" if there are problems.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
+ [Ulf Möller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+
+ *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
+ [Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
+
+ *) Generate an error if given an empty string as a cert directory. Also
+ generate an error if handed NULL (previously returned 0 to indicate an
+ error, but didn't set one).
+ [Ben Laurie, reported by Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
+
+ *) Add prototypes to SSL methods. Make SSL_write's buffer const, at last.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fix the dummy function BN_ref_mod_exp() in rsaref.c to have the correct
+ parameters. This was causing a warning which killed off the Win32 compile.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove C++ style comments from crypto/bn/bn_local.h.
+ [Neil Costigan <neil.costigan at celocom.com>]
+
+ *) The function OBJ_txt2nid was broken. It was supposed to return a nid
+ based on a text string, looking up short and long names and finally
+ "dot" format. The "dot" format stuff didn't work. Added new function
+ OBJ_txt2obj to do the same but return an ASN1_OBJECT and rewrote
+ OBJ_txt2nid to use it. OBJ_txt2obj can also return objects even if the
+ OID is not part of the table.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add prototypes to X509 lookup/verify methods, fixing a bug in
+ X509_LOOKUP_by_alias().
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Sort openssl functions by name.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Get the gendsa program working (hopefully) and add it to app list. Remove
+ encryption from sample DSA keys (in case anyone is interested the password
+ was "1234").
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make _all_ *_free functions accept a NULL pointer.
+ [Frans Heymans <fheymans at isaserver.be>]
+
+ *) If a DH key is generated in s3_srvr.c, don't blow it by trying to use
+ NULL pointers.
+ [Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
+
+ *) s_server should send the CAfile as acceptable CAs, not its own cert.
+ [Bodo Moeller <3moeller at informatik.uni-hamburg.de>]
+
+ *) Don't blow it for numeric -newkey arguments to apps/req.
+ [Bodo Moeller <3moeller at informatik.uni-hamburg.de>]
+
+ *) Temp key "for export" tests were wrong in s3_srvr.c.
+ [Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
+
+ *) Add prototype for temp key callback functions
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_{rsa,dh}_callback().
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Make DH_free() tolerate being passed a NULL pointer (like RSA_free() and
+ DSA_free()). Make X509_PUBKEY_set() check for errors in d2i_PublicKey().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) X509_name_add_entry() freed the wrong thing after an error.
+ [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+ *) rsa_eay.c would attempt to free a NULL context.
+ [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+ *) BIO_s_socket() had a broken should_retry() on Windoze.
+ [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+ *) BIO_f_buffer() didn't pass on BIO_CTRL_FLUSH.
+ [Arne Ansper <arne at ats.cyber.ee>]
+
+ *) Make sure the already existing X509_STORE->depth variable is initialized
+ in X509_STORE_new(), but document the fact that this variable is still
+ unused in the certificate verification process.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Fix the various library and apps files to free up pkeys obtained from
+ X509_PUBKEY_get() et al. Also allow x509.c to handle netscape extensions.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix reference counting in X509_PUBKEY_get(). This makes
+ demos/maurice/example2.c work, amongst others, probably.
+ [Steve Henson and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) First cut of a cleanup for apps/. First the `ssleay' program is now named
+ `openssl' and second, the shortcut symlinks for the `openssl <command>'
+ are no longer created. This way we have a single and consistent command
+ line interface `openssl <command>', similar to `cvs <command>'.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall, Paul Sutton and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) ca.c: move test for DSA keys inside #ifndef NO_DSA. Make pubkey
+ BIT STRING wrapper always have zero unused bits.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add CA.pl, perl version of CA.sh, add extended key usage OID.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make the top-level INSTALL documentation easier to understand.
+ [Paul Sutton]
+
+ *) Makefiles updated to exit if an error occurs in a sub-directory
+ make (including if user presses ^C) [Paul Sutton]
+
+ *) Make Montgomery context stuff explicit in RSA data structure.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fix build order of pem and err to allow for generated pem.h.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fix renumbering bug in X509_NAME_delete_entry().
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Enhanced the err-ins.pl script so it makes the error library number
+ global and can add a library name. This is needed for external ASN1 and
+ other error libraries.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixed sk_insert which never worked properly.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix ASN1 macros so they can handle indefinite length construted
+ EXPLICIT tags. Some non standard certificates use these: they can now
+ be read in.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Merged the various old/obsolete SSLeay documentation files (doc/xxx.doc)
+ into a single doc/ssleay.txt bundle. This way the information is still
+ preserved but no longer messes up this directory. Now it's new room for
+ the new set of documenation files.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) SETs were incorrectly DER encoded. This was a major pain, because they
+ shared code with SEQUENCEs, which aren't coded the same. This means that
+ almost everything to do with SETs or SEQUENCEs has either changed name or
+ number of arguments.
+ [Ben Laurie, based on a partial fix by GP Jayan <gp at nsj.co.jp>]
+
+ *) Fix test data to work with the above.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
+ was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
+ [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+
+ *) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Fix various bugs in Configure. This affects the following platforms:
+ nextstep
+ ncr-scde
+ unixware-2.0
+ unixware-2.0-pentium
+ sco5-cc.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Eliminate generated files from CVS. Reorder tests to regenerate files
+ before they are needed.
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Generate Makefile.ssl from Makefile.org (to keep CVS happy).
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+
+ Changes between 0.9.1b and 0.9.1c [23-Dec-1998]
+
+ *) Added OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to crypto/crypto.h and
+ changed SSLeay to OpenSSL in version strings.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Some fixups to the top-level documents.
+ [Paul Sutton]
+
+ *) Fixed the nasty bug where rsaref.h was not found under compile-time
+ because the symlink to include/ was missing.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Incorporated the popular no-RSA/DSA-only patches
+ which allow to compile a RSA-free SSLeay.
+ [Andrew Cooke / Interrader Ldt., Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Fixed nasty rehash problem under `make -f Makefile.ssl links'
+ when "ssleay" is still not found.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Added more platforms to Configure: Cray T3E, HPUX 11,
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall, Beckmann <beckman at acl.lanl.gov>]
+
+ *) Updated the README file.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Added various .cvsignore files in the CVS repository subdirs
+ to make a "cvs update" really silent.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Recompiled the error-definition header files and added
+ missing symbols to the Win32 linker tables.
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Cleaned up the top-level documents;
+ o new files: CHANGES and LICENSE
+ o merged VERSION, HISTORY* and README* files a CHANGES.SSLeay
+ o merged COPYRIGHT into LICENSE
+ o removed obsolete TODO file
+ o renamed MICROSOFT to INSTALL.W32
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Removed dummy files from the 0.9.1b source tree:
+ crypto/asn1/x crypto/bio/cd crypto/bio/fg crypto/bio/grep crypto/bio/vi
+ crypto/bn/asm/......add.c crypto/bn/asm/a.out crypto/dsa/f crypto/md5/f
+ crypto/pem/gmon.out crypto/perlasm/f crypto/pkcs7/build crypto/rsa/f
+ crypto/sha/asm/f crypto/threads/f ms/zzz ssl/f ssl/f.mak test/f
+ util/f.mak util/pl/f util/pl/f.mak crypto/bf/bf_locl.old apps/f
+ [Ralf S. Engelschall]
+
+ *) Added various platform portability fixes.
+ [Mark J. Cox]
+
+ *) The Genesis of the OpenSSL rpject:
+ We start with the latest (unreleased) SSLeay version 0.9.1b which Eric A.
+ Young and Tim J. Hudson created while they were working for C2Net until
+ summer 1998.
+ [The OpenSSL Project]
+
+
+ Changes between 0.9.0b and 0.9.1b [not released]
+
+ *) Updated a few CA certificates under certs/
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Changed some BIGNUM api stuff.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Various platform ports: OpenBSD, Ultrix, IRIX 64bit, NetBSD,
+ DGUX x86, Linux Alpha, etc.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) New COMP library [crypto/comp/] for SSL Record Layer Compression:
+ RLE (dummy implemented) and ZLIB (really implemented when ZLIB is
+ available).
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Add -strparse option to asn1pars program which parses nested
+ binary structures
+ [Dr Stephen Henson <shenson at bigfoot.com>]
+
+ *) Added "oid_file" to ssleay.cnf for "ca" and "req" programs.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) DSA fix for "ca" program.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added "-genkey" option to "dsaparam" program.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added RIPE MD160 (rmd160) message digest.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added -a (all) option to "ssleay version" command.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added PLATFORM define which is the id given to Configure.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added MemCheck_XXXX functions to crypto/mem.c for memory checking.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Extended the ASN.1 parser routines.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Extended BIO routines to support REUSEADDR, seek, tell, etc.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added a BN_CTX to the BN library.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Fixed the weak key values in DES library
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Changed API in EVP library for cipher aliases.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added support for RC2/64bit cipher.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Converted the lhash library to the crypto/mem.c functions.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added more recognized ASN.1 object ids.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added more RSA padding checks for SSL/TLS.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added BIO proxy/filter functionality.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added extra_certs to SSL_CTX which can be used
+ send extra CA certificates to the client in the CA cert chain sending
+ process. It can be configured with SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert().
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Now Fortezza is denied in the authentication phase because
+ this is key exchange mechanism is not supported by SSLeay at all.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Additional PKCS1 checks.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Support the string "TLSv1" for all TLS v1 ciphers.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Added function SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() which gives the
+ ex_data index of the SSL context in the X509_STORE_CTX ex_data.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Fixed a few memory leaks.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) Fixed various code and comment typos.
+ [Eric A. Young]
+
+ *) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0
+ bytes sent in the client random.
+ [Edward Bishop <ebishop at spyglass.com>]
+
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CONTRIBUTING (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/CONTRIBUTING)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CONTRIBUTING (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/CONTRIBUTING 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
+----------------------------
+
+Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
+http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
+would like to submit a patch, send it to rt at openssl.org with
+the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
+textual explanation of what your patch does.
+
+You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+mail to rt at openssl.org with a brief description and a link to the PR so
+that we can more easily keep track of it.
+
+If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
+OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
+Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
+reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
+
+Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
+current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
+(see https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without
+warnings using the --strict-warnings flag. OpenSSL compiles on many varied
+platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
+
+Our preferred format for patch files is "git format-patch" output. For example
+to provide a patch file containing the last commit in your local git repository
+use the following command:
+
+# git format-patch --stdout HEAD^ >mydiffs.patch
+
+Another method of creating an acceptable patch file without using git is as
+follows:
+
+# cd openssl-work
+# [your changes]
+# ./Configure dist; make clean
+# cd ..
+# diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Configure
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/Configure 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Configure 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2188 +0,0 @@
-:
-eval 'exec perl -S $0 ${1+"$@"}'
- if $running_under_some_shell;
-##
-## Configure -- OpenSSL source tree configuration script
-##
-
-require 5.000;
-use strict;
-
-# see INSTALL for instructions.
-
-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-
-# Options:
-#
-# --openssldir install OpenSSL in OPENSSLDIR (Default: DIR/ssl if the
-# --prefix option is given; /usr/local/ssl otherwise)
-# --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories
-# (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory)
-#
-# --install_prefix Additional prefix for package builders (empty by
-# default). This needn't be set in advance, you can
-# just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
-#
-# --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected
-# to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in
-# include/. A value is required.
-# --with-krb5-lib Declare where the Kerberos 5 libraries live. A value is
-# required.
-# (Default: KRB5_DIR/lib)
-# --with-krb5-include Declare where the Kerberos 5 header files live. A
-# value is required.
-# (Default: KRB5_DIR/include)
-# --with-krb5-flavor Declare what flavor of Kerberos 5 is used. Currently
-# supported values are "MIT" and "Heimdal". A value is required.
-#
-# --test-sanity Make a number of sanity checks on the data in this file.
-# This is a debugging tool for OpenSSL developers.
-#
-# --cross-compile-prefix Add specified prefix to binutils components.
-#
-# no-hw-xxx do not compile support for specific crypto hardware.
-# Generic OpenSSL-style methods relating to this support
-# are always compiled but return NULL if the hardware
-# support isn't compiled.
-# no-hw do not compile support for any crypto hardware.
-# [no-]threads [don't] try to create a library that is suitable for
-# multithreaded applications (default is "threads" if we
-# know how to do it)
-# [no-]shared [don't] try to create shared libraries when supported.
-# no-asm do not use assembler
-# no-dso do not compile in any native shared-library methods. This
-# will ensure that all methods just return NULL.
-# no-krb5 do not compile in any KRB5 library or code.
-# [no-]zlib [don't] compile support for zlib compression.
-# zlib-dynamic Like "zlib", but the zlib library is expected to be a shared
-# library and will be loaded in run-time by the OpenSSL library.
-# sctp include SCTP support
-# 386 generate 80386 code
-# no-sse2 disables IA-32 SSE2 code, above option implies no-sse2
-# no-<cipher> build without specified algorithm (rsa, idea, rc5, ...)
-# -<xxx> +<xxx> compiler options are passed through
-#
-# DEBUG_SAFESTACK use type-safe stacks to enforce type-safety on stack items
-# provided to stack calls. Generates unique stack functions for
-# each possible stack type.
-# DES_PTR use pointer lookup vs arrays in the DES in crypto/des/des_locl.h
-# DES_RISC1 use different DES_ENCRYPT macro that helps reduce register
-# dependancies but needs to more registers, good for RISC CPU's
-# DES_RISC2 A different RISC variant.
-# DES_UNROLL unroll the inner DES loop, sometimes helps, somtimes hinders.
-# DES_INT use 'int' instead of 'long' for DES_LONG in crypto/des/des.h
-# This is used on the DEC Alpha where long is 8 bytes
-# and int is 4
-# BN_LLONG use the type 'long long' in crypto/bn/bn.h
-# MD2_CHAR use 'char' instead of 'int' for MD2_INT in crypto/md2/md2.h
-# MD2_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for MD2_INT in crypto/md2/md2.h
-# IDEA_SHORT use 'short' instead of 'int' for IDEA_INT in crypto/idea/idea.h
-# IDEA_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for IDEA_INT in crypto/idea/idea.h
-# RC2_SHORT use 'short' instead of 'int' for RC2_INT in crypto/rc2/rc2.h
-# RC2_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for RC2_INT in crypto/rc2/rc2.h
-# RC4_CHAR use 'char' instead of 'int' for RC4_INT in crypto/rc4/rc4.h
-# RC4_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for RC4_INT in crypto/rc4/rc4.h
-# RC4_INDEX define RC4_INDEX in crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h. This turns on
-# array lookups instead of pointer use.
-# RC4_CHUNK enables code that handles data aligned at long (natural CPU
-# word) boundary.
-# RC4_CHUNK_LL enables code that handles data aligned at long long boundary
-# (intended for 64-bit CPUs running 32-bit OS).
-# BF_PTR use 'pointer arithmatic' for Blowfish (unsafe on Alpha).
-# BF_PTR2 intel specific version (generic version is more efficient).
-#
-# Following are set automatically by this script
-#
-# MD5_ASM use some extra md5 assember,
-# SHA1_ASM use some extra sha1 assember, must define L_ENDIAN for x86
-# RMD160_ASM use some extra ripemd160 assember,
-# SHA256_ASM sha256_block is implemented in assembler
-# SHA512_ASM sha512_block is implemented in assembler
-# AES_ASM ASE_[en|de]crypt is implemented in assembler
-
-# Minimum warning options... any contributions to OpenSSL should at least get
-# past these.
-
-my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED";
-
-my $strict_warnings = 0;
-
-my $x86_gcc_des="DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL";
-
-# MD2_CHAR slags pentium pros
-my $x86_gcc_opts="RC4_INDEX MD2_INT";
-
-# MODIFY THESE PARAMETERS IF YOU ARE GOING TO USE THE 'util/speed.sh SCRIPT
-# Don't worry about these normally
-
-my $tcc="cc";
-my $tflags="-fast -Xa";
-my $tbn_mul="";
-my $tlib="-lnsl -lsocket";
-#$bits1="SIXTEEN_BIT ";
-#$bits2="THIRTY_TWO_BIT ";
-my $bits1="THIRTY_TWO_BIT ";
-my $bits2="SIXTY_FOUR_BIT ";
-
-my $x86_asm="x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o x86-gf2m.o:des-586.o crypt586.o:aes-586.o vpaes-x86.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o:cmll-x86.o:ghash-x86.o:";
-
-my $x86_elf_asm="$x86_asm:elf";
-
-my $x86_64_asm="x86_64cpuid.o:x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-mont5.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o::aes-x86_64.o vpaes-x86_64.o bsaes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o aesni-sha1-x86_64.o::md5-x86_64.o:sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o::rc4-x86_64.o rc4-md5-x86_64.o:::wp-x86_64.o:cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o:ghash-x86_64.o:";
-my $ia64_asm="ia64cpuid.o:bn-ia64.o ia64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o::rc4-ia64.o rc4_skey.o:::::ghash-ia64.o::void";
-my $sparcv9_asm="sparcv9cap.o sparccpuid.o:bn-sparcv9.o sparcv9-mont.o sparcv9a-mont.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-sparcv9.o:::sha1-sparcv9.o sha256-sparcv9.o sha512-sparcv9.o:::::::ghash-sparcv9.o::void";
-my $sparcv8_asm=":sparcv8.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:::::::::::::void";
-my $alpha_asm="alphacpuid.o:bn_asm.o alpha-mont.o:::::sha1-alpha.o:::::::ghash-alpha.o::void";
-my $mips32_asm=":bn-mips.o::aes_cbc.o aes-mips.o:::sha1-mips.o sha256-mips.o::::::::";
-my $mips64_asm=":bn-mips.o mips-mont.o::aes_cbc.o aes-mips.o:::sha1-mips.o sha256-mips.o sha512-mips.o::::::::";
-my $s390x_asm="s390xcap.o s390xcpuid.o:bn-s390x.o s390x-mont.o s390x-gf2m.o::aes-s390x.o aes-ctr.o aes-xts.o:::sha1-s390x.o sha256-s390x.o sha512-s390x.o::rc4-s390x.o:::::ghash-s390x.o:";
-my $armv4_asm="armcap.o armv4cpuid.o:bn_asm.o armv4-mont.o armv4-gf2m.o::aes_cbc.o aes-armv4.o:::sha1-armv4-large.o sha256-armv4.o sha512-armv4.o:::::::ghash-armv4.o::void";
-my $parisc11_asm="pariscid.o:bn_asm.o parisc-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-parisc.o:::sha1-parisc.o sha256-parisc.o sha512-parisc.o::rc4-parisc.o:::::ghash-parisc.o::32";
-my $parisc20_asm="pariscid.o:pa-risc2W.o parisc-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-parisc.o:::sha1-parisc.o sha256-parisc.o sha512-parisc.o::rc4-parisc.o:::::ghash-parisc.o::64";
-my $ppc32_asm="ppccpuid.o ppccap.o:bn-ppc.o ppc-mont.o ppc64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ppc.o:::sha1-ppc.o sha256-ppc.o::::::::";
-my $ppc64_asm="ppccpuid.o ppccap.o:bn-ppc.o ppc-mont.o ppc64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ppc.o:::sha1-ppc.o sha256-ppc.o sha512-ppc.o::::::::";
-my $no_asm=":::::::::::::::void";
-
-# As for $BSDthreads. Idea is to maintain "collective" set of flags,
-# which would cover all BSD flavors. -pthread applies to them all,
-# but is treated differently. OpenBSD expands is as -D_POSIX_THREAD
-# -lc_r, which is sufficient. FreeBSD 4.x expands it as -lc_r,
-# which has to be accompanied by explicit -D_THREAD_SAFE and
-# sometimes -D_REENTRANT. FreeBSD 5.x expands it as -lc_r, which
-# seems to be sufficient?
-my $BSDthreads="-pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT";
-
-#config-string $cc : $cflags : $unistd : $thread_cflag : $sys_id : $lflags : $bn_ops : $cpuid_obj : $bn_obj : $des_obj : $aes_obj : $bf_obj : $md5_obj : $sha1_obj : $cast_obj : $rc4_obj : $rmd160_obj : $rc5_obj : $wp_obj : $cmll_obj : $modes_obj : $engines_obj : $dso_scheme : $shared_target : $shared_cflag : $shared_ldflag : $shared_extension : $ranlib : $arflags : $multilib
-
-my %table=(
-# File 'TABLE' (created by 'make TABLE') contains the data from this list,
-# formatted for better readability.
-
-
-#"b", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits1}:${tbn_mul}::",
-#"bl-4c-2c", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits1}BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR MD2_CHAR:${tbn_mul}::",
-#"bl-4c-ri", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits1}BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_INDEX:${tbn_mul}::",
-#"b2-is-ri-dp", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits2}IDEA_SHORT RC4_INDEX DES_PTR:${tbn_mul}::",
-
-# Our development configs
-"purify", "purify gcc:-g -DPURIFY -Wall::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl::::",
-"debug", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -ggdb -g2 -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror::(unknown)::-lefence::::",
-"debug-ben", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -O2 -pipe::(unknown):::::",
-"debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
-"debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
-"debug-ben-debug", "gcc44:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
-"debug-ben-debug-64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-ben-macos", "cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -arch i386 -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::-Wl,-search_paths_first::::",
-"debug-ben-macos-gcc46", "gcc-mp-4.6:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wconversion -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
-"debug-ben-darwin64","cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
-"debug-ben-no-opt", "gcc: -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -Werror -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -Wall -g3::(unknown)::::::",
-"debug-ben-strict", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
-"debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
-"debug-bodo", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"debug-ulf", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:win32:cygwin-shared:::.dll",
-"debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-geoff32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-geoff64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
-"debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
-"debug-linux-elf","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lefence -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-elf-noefence","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-ia32-aes", "gcc:-DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o:des-586.o crypt586.o:aes_x86core.o aes_cbc.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o::ghash-x86.o::elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-generic32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-generic64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-linux-x86_64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"dist", "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::",
-
-# Basic configs that should work on any (32 and less bit) box
-"gcc", "gcc:-O3::(unknown):::BN_LLONG:::",
-"cc", "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::",
-
-####VOS Configurations
-"vos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
-"debug-vos-gcc","gcc:-O0 -g -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
-
-#### Solaris x86 with GNU C setups
-# -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM switches off inline assembler. We have to do it
-# here because whenever GNU C instantiates an assembler template it
-# surrounds it with #APP #NO_APP comment pair which (at least Solaris
-# 7_x86) /usr/ccs/bin/as fails to assemble with "Illegal mnemonic"
-# error message.
-"solaris-x86-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=pentium -Wall -DL_ENDIAN -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-# -shared -static-libgcc might appear controversial, but modules taken
-# from static libgcc do not have relocations and linking them into our
-# shared objects doesn't have any negative side-effects. On the contrary,
-# doing so makes it possible to use gcc shared build with Sun C. Given
-# that gcc generates faster code [thanks to inline assembler], I would
-# actually recommend to consider using gcc shared build even with vendor
-# compiler:-)
-# <appro at fy.chalmers.se>
-"solaris64-x86_64-gcc","gcc:-m64 -O3 -Wall -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-m64 -shared -static-libgcc:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
-
-#### Solaris x86 with Sun C setups
-"solaris-x86-cc","cc:-fast -O -Xa::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"solaris64-x86_64-cc","cc:-fast -xarch=amd64 -xstrconst -Xa -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=amd64 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
-
-#### SPARC Solaris with GNU C setups
-"solaris-sparcv7-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-# -m32 should be safe to add as long as driver recognizes -mcpu=ultrasparc
-"solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"solaris64-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-m64 -shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
-####
-"debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mcpu=v8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -O -g -mcpu=ultrasparc -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wno-long-long -D__EXTENSIONS__ -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-
-#### SPARC Solaris with Sun C setups
-# SC4.0 doesn't pass 'make test', upgrade to SC5.0 or SC4.2.
-# SC4.2 is ok, better than gcc even on bn as long as you tell it -xarch=v8
-# SC5.0 note: Compiler common patch 107357-01 or later is required!
-"solaris-sparcv7-cc","cc:-xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-xarch=v8 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"solaris64-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v9 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
-####
-"debug-solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xarch=v8 -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-
-#### SunOS configs, assuming sparc for the gcc one.
-#"sunos-cc", "cc:-O4 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST::(unknown):SUNOS::DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}::",
-"sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mcpu=v8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::",
-
-#### IRIX 5.x configs
-# -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate.
-"irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"irix-cc", "cc:-O2 -use_readonly_const -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-#### IRIX 6.x configs
-# Only N32 and N64 ABIs are supported. If you need O32 ABI build, invoke
-# './Configure irix-cc -o32' manually.
-"irix-mips3-gcc","gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
-"irix-mips3-cc", "cc:-n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::DES_PTR RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
-# N64 ABI builds.
-"irix64-mips4-gcc","gcc:-mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"irix64-mips4-cc", "cc:-64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-
-#### Unified HP-UX ANSI C configs.
-# Special notes:
-# - Originally we were optimizing at +O4 level. It should be noted
-# that the only difference between +O3 and +O4 is global inter-
-# procedural analysis. As it has to be performed during the link
-# stage the compiler leaves behind certain pseudo-code in lib*.a
-# which might be release or even patch level specific. Generating
-# the machine code for and analyzing the *whole* program appears
-# to be *extremely* memory demanding while the performance gain is
-# actually questionable. The situation is intensified by the default
-# HP-UX data set size limit (infamous 'maxdsiz' tunable) of 64MB
-# which is way too low for +O4. In other words, doesn't +O3 make
-# more sense?
-# - Keep in mind that the HP compiler by default generates code
-# suitable for execution on the host you're currently compiling at.
-# If the toolkit is ment to be used on various PA-RISC processors
-# consider './config +DAportable'.
-# - +DD64 is chosen in favour of +DA2.0W because it's meant to be
-# compatible with *future* releases.
-# - If you run ./Configure hpux-parisc-[g]cc manually don't forget to
-# pass -D_REENTRANT on HP-UX 10 and later.
-# - -DMD32_XARRAY triggers workaround for compiler bug we ran into in
-# 32-bit message digests. (For the moment of this writing) HP C
-# doesn't seem to "digest" too many local variables (they make "him"
-# chew forever:-). For more details look-up MD32_XARRAY comment in
-# crypto/sha/sha_lcl.h.
-# <appro at fy.chalmers.se>
-#
-# Since there is mention of this in shlib/hpux10-cc.sh
-"hpux-parisc-cc-o4","cc:-Ae +O4 +ESlit -z -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"hpux-parisc-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"hpux-parisc1_1-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${parisc11_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa1.1",
-"hpux-parisc2-gcc","gcc:-march=2.0 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-Wl,+s -ldld:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:".eval{my $asm=$parisc20_asm;$asm=~s/2W\./2\./;$asm=~s/:64/:32/;$asm}.":dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_32",
-"hpux64-parisc2-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT::pa-risc2W.o::::::::::::::void:dlfcn:hpux-shared:-fpic:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_64",
-
-# More attempts at unified 10.X and 11.X targets for HP C compiler.
-#
-# Chris Ruemmler <ruemmler at cup.hp.com>
-# Kevin Steves <ks at hp.se>
-"hpux-parisc-cc","cc:+O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"hpux-parisc1_1-cc","cc:+DA1.1 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${parisc11_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa1.1",
-"hpux-parisc2-cc","cc:+DA2.0 +DS2.0 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY -D_REENTRANT::::-Wl,+s -ldld:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:".eval{my $asm=$parisc20_asm;$asm=~s/2W\./2\./;$asm=~s/:64/:32/;$asm}.":dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_32",
-"hpux64-parisc2-cc","cc:+DD64 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${parisc20_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:+Z:+DD64 -b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_64",
-
-# HP/UX IA-64 targets
-"hpux-ia64-cc","cc:-Ae +DD32 +O2 +Olit=all -z -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:+Z:+DD32 -b:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux32",
-# Frank Geurts <frank.geurts at nl.abnamro.com> has patiently assisted with
-# with debugging of the following config.
-"hpux64-ia64-cc","cc:-Ae +DD64 +O3 +Olit=all -z -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:+Z:+DD64 -b:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux64",
-# GCC builds...
-"hpux-ia64-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:-fpic:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux32",
-"hpux64-ia64-gcc","gcc:-mlp64 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:-fpic:-mlp64 -shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux64",
-
-# Legacy HPUX 9.X configs...
-"hpux-cc", "cc:-DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY -Ae +ESlit +O2 -z::(unknown)::-Wl,+s -ldld:DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"hpux-gcc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -O3::(unknown)::-Wl,+s -ldld:DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-
-#### HP MPE/iX http://jazz.external.hp.com/src/openssl/
-"MPE/iX-gcc", "gcc:-D_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -O3 -D_POSIX_SOURCE -D_SOCKET_SOURCE -I/SYSLOG/PUB::(unknown):MPE:-L/SYSLOG/PUB -lsyslog -lsocket -lcurses:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:::",
-
-# DEC Alpha OSF/1/Tru64 targets.
-#
-# "What's in a name? That which we call a rose
-# By any other word would smell as sweet."
-#
-# - William Shakespeare, "Romeo & Juliet", Act II, scene II.
-#
-# For gcc, the following gave a %50 speedup on a 164 over the 'DES_INT' version
-#
-"osf1-alpha-gcc", "gcc:-O3::(unknown):::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:alpha-osf1-shared:::.so",
-"osf1-alpha-cc", "cc:-std1 -tune host -O4 -readonly_strings::(unknown):::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:alpha-osf1-shared:::.so",
-"tru64-alpha-cc", "cc:-std1 -tune host -fast -readonly_strings::-pthread:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:alpha-osf1-shared::-msym:.so",
-
-####
-#### Variety of LINUX:-)
-####
-# *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to
-# throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate...
-"linux-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-# It's believed that majority of ARM toolchains predefine appropriate -march.
-# If you compiler does not, do complement config command line with one!
-"linux-armv4", "gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-#### IA-32 targets...
-"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
-####
-"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-#### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
-# "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see
-# /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of
-# general purpose registers not only upon 32-bit process context
-# switch, but even on asynchronous signal delivery to such process.
-# This makes it possible to deploy 64-bit instructions even in legacy
-# application context and achieve better [or should we say adequate]
-# performance. The build is binary compatible with linux-generic32,
-# and the idea is to be able to install the resulting libcrypto.so
-# alongside generic one, e.g. as /lib/highgprs/libcrypto.so.x.y, for
-# ldconfig and run-time linker to autodiscover. Unfortunately it
-# doesn't work just yet, because of couple of bugs in glibc
-# sysdeps/s390/dl-procinfo.c affecting ldconfig and ld.so.1...
-"linux32-s390x", "gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/highgprs",
-#### SPARC Linux setups
-# Ray Miller <ray.miller at computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
-# assisted with debugging of following two configs.
-"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-# it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, but
-# -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what.
-"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-# GCC 3.1 is a requirement
-"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
-#### Alpha Linux with GNU C and Compaq C setups
-# Special notes:
-# - linux-alpha+bwx-gcc is ment to be used from ./config only. If you
-# ought to run './Configure linux-alpha+bwx-gcc' manually, do
-# complement the command line with -mcpu=ev56, -mcpu=ev6 or whatever
-# which is appropriate.
-# - If you use ccc keep in mind that -fast implies -arch host and the
-# compiler is free to issue instructions which gonna make elder CPU
-# choke. If you wish to build "blended" toolkit, add -arch generic
-# *after* -fast and invoke './Configure linux-alpha-ccc' manually.
-#
-# <appro at fy.chalmers.se>
-#
-"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
-"linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
-
-# Android: linux-* but without pointers to headers and libs.
-"android","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"android-x86","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:".eval{my $asm=${x86_elf_asm};$asm=~s/:elf/:android/;$asm}.":dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"android-armv7","gcc:-march=armv7-a -mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-
-#### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!]
-"BSD-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-
-"BSD-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-# -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it
-# simply *happens* to work around a compiler bug in gcc 3.3.3,
-# triggered by RIPEMD160 code.
-"BSD-sparc64", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"BSD-x86_64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-
-"bsdi-elf-gcc", "gcc:-DPERL5 -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown)::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-
-"nextstep", "cc:-O -Wall:<libc.h>:(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::",
-"nextstep3.3", "cc:-O3 -Wall:<libc.h>:(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::",
-
-# NCR MP-RAS UNIX ver 02.03.01
-"ncr-scde","cc:-O6 -Xa -Hoff=BEHAVED -686 -Hwide -Hiw::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl -lc89:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::",
-
-# QNX
-"qnx4", "cc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::(unknown):::${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:",
-"QNX6", "gcc:::::-lsocket::${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"QNX6-i386", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::::-lsocket:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-
-# BeOS
-"beos-x86-r5", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:BEOS:-lbe -lnet:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:beos:beos-shared:-fPIC -DPIC:-shared:.so",
-"beos-x86-bone", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:BEOS:-lbe -lbind -lsocket:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:beos:beos-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so",
-
-#### SCO/Caldera targets.
-#
-# Originally we had like unixware-*, unixware-*-pentium, unixware-*-p6, etc.
-# Now we only have blended unixware-* as it's the only one used by ./config.
-# If you want to optimize for particular microarchitecture, bypass ./config
-# and './Configure unixware-7 -Kpentium_pro' or whatever appropriate.
-# Note that not all targets include assembler support. Mostly because of
-# lack of motivation to support out-of-date platforms with out-of-date
-# compiler drivers and assemblers. Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net> has
-# patiently assisted to debug most of it.
-#
-# UnixWare 2.0x fails destest with -O.
-"unixware-2.0","cc:-DFILIO_H -DNO_STRINGS_H::-Kthread::-lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lx:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::",
-"unixware-2.1","cc:-O -DFILIO_H::-Kthread::-lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lx:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::",
-"unixware-7","cc:-O -DFILIO_H -Kalloca::-Kthread::-lsocket -lnsl:BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX ${x86_gcc_des}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:svr5-shared:-Kpic::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"unixware-7-gcc","gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DFILIO_H -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:gnu-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-# SCO 5 - Ben Laurie <ben at algroup.co.uk> says the -O breaks the SCO cc.
-"sco5-cc", "cc:-belf::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:svr3-shared:-Kpic::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"sco5-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:svr3-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-
-#### IBM's AIX.
-"aix3-cc", "cc:-O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384::(unknown):AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:::",
-"aix-gcc", "gcc:-O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X32",
-"aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64",
-# Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE
-# at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage!
-"aix-cc", "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
-"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
-
-#
-# Cray T90 and similar (SDSC)
-# It's Big-endian, but the algorithms work properly when B_ENDIAN is NOT
-# defined. The T90 ints and longs are 8 bytes long, and apparently the
-# B_ENDIAN code assumes 4 byte ints. Fortunately, the non-B_ENDIAN and
-# non L_ENDIAN code aligns the bytes in each word correctly.
-#
-# The BIT_FIELD_LIMITS define is to avoid two fatal compiler errors:
-#'Taking the address of a bit field is not allowed. '
-#'An expression with bit field exists as the operand of "sizeof" '
-# (written by Wayne Schroeder <schroede at SDSC.EDU>)
-#
-# j90 is considered the base machine type for unicos machines,
-# so this configuration is now called "cray-j90" ...
-"cray-j90", "cc: -DBIT_FIELD_LIMITS -DTERMIOS::(unknown):CRAY::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG DES_INT:::",
-
-#
-# Cray T3E (Research Center Juelich, beckman at acl.lanl.gov)
-#
-# The BIT_FIELD_LIMITS define was written for the C90 (it seems). I added
-# another use. Basically, the problem is that the T3E uses some bit fields
-# for some st_addr stuff, and then sizeof and address-of fails
-# I could not use the ams/alpha.o option because the Cray assembler, 'cam'
-# did not like it.
-"cray-t3e", "cc: -DBIT_FIELD_LIMITS -DTERMIOS::(unknown):CRAY::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:::",
-
-# DGUX, 88100.
-"dgux-R3-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer::(unknown):::RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL:::",
-"dgux-R4-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer::(unknown)::-lnsl -lsocket:RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL:::",
-"dgux-R4-x86-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown)::-lnsl -lsocket:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
-
-# Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400
-# NOTE: The CDS++ Compiler up to V2.0Bsomething has the IRIX_CC_BUG optimizer problem. Better use -g */
-"ReliantUNIX","cc:-KPIC -g -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::-Kthread:SNI:-lsocket -lnsl -lc -L/usr/ucblib -lucb:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:reliantunix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"SINIX","cc:-O::(unknown):SNI:-lsocket -lnsl -lc -L/usr/ucblib -lucb:RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR:::",
-"SINIX-N","/usr/ucb/cc:-O2 -misaligned::(unknown)::-lucb:RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR:::",
-
-# SIEMENS BS2000/OSD: an EBCDIC-based mainframe
-"BS2000-OSD","c89:-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::",
-
-# OS/390 Unix an EBCDIC-based Unix system on IBM mainframe
-# You need to compile using the c89.sh wrapper in the tools directory, because the
-# IBM compiler does not like the -L switch after any object modules.
-#
-"OS390-Unix","c89.sh:-O -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC -DNO_SYS_PARAM_H -D_ALL_SOURCE::(unknown):::THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::",
-
-# Visual C targets
-#
-# Win64 targets, WIN64I denotes IA-64 and WIN64A - AMD64
-"VC-WIN64I","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64I::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:ia64cpuid.o:ia64.o ia64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o:::::::ghash-ia64.o::ias:win32",
-"VC-WIN64A","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64A::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/x86_64-gcc\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":auto:win32",
-"debug-VC-WIN64I","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64I::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:ia64cpuid.o:ia64.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o:::::::ghash-ia64.o::ias:win32",
-"debug-VC-WIN64A","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64A::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/x86_64-gcc\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":auto:win32",
-# x86 Win32 target defaults to ANSI API, if you want UNICODE, complement
-# 'perl Configure VC-WIN32' with '-DUNICODE -D_UNICODE'
-"VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
-# Unified CE target
-"debug-VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
-"VC-CE","cl::::WINCE::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32",
-
-# Borland C++ 4.5
-"BC-32","bcc32::::WIN32::BN_LLONG DES_PTR RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:${no_asm}:win32",
-
-# MinGW
-"mingw", "gcc:-mno-cygwin -DL_ENDIAN -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::-D_MT:MINGW32:-lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts} EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:${x86_asm}:coff:win32:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL -DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK:-mno-cygwin:.dll.a",
-# As for OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK. Applink makes it possible to use .dll
-# compiled with one compiler with application compiled with another
-# compiler. It's possible to engage Applink support in mingw64 build,
-# but it's not done, because till mingw64 supports structured exception
-# handling, one can't seriously consider its binaries for using with
-# non-mingw64 run-time environment. And as mingw64 is always consistent
-# with itself, Applink is never engaged and can as well be omitted.
-"mingw64", "gcc:-mno-cygwin -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE::-D_MT:MINGW64:-lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:${x86_64_asm}:mingw64:win32:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-mno-cygwin:.dll.a",
-
-# UWIN
-"UWIN", "cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -O -Wall:::UWIN::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32",
-
-# Cygwin
-"Cygwin-pre1.3", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -m486 -Wall::(unknown):CYGWIN32::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32",
-"Cygwin", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall:::CYGWIN32::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:coff:dlfcn:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-shared:.dll.a",
-"debug-Cygwin", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:dlfcn:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-shared:.dll.a",
-
-# NetWare from David Ward (dsward at novell.com)
-# requires either MetroWerks NLM development tools, or gcc / nlmconv
-# NetWare defaults socket bio to WinSock sockets. However,
-# the builds can be configured to use BSD sockets instead.
-# netware-clib => legacy CLib c-runtime support
-"netware-clib", "mwccnlm::::::${x86_gcc_opts}::",
-"netware-clib-bsdsock", "mwccnlm::::::${x86_gcc_opts}::",
-"netware-clib-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/nwsdk/include/nlm -I/ndk/ws295sdk/include -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_CLIB -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -O2 -Wall:::::${x86_gcc_opts}::",
-"netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/nwsdk/include/nlm -DNETWARE_BSDSOCK -DNETDB_USE_INTERNET -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_CLIB -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -O2 -Wall:::::${x86_gcc_opts}::",
-# netware-libc => LibC/NKS support
-"netware-libc", "mwccnlm::::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::",
-"netware-libc-bsdsock", "mwccnlm::::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::",
-"netware-libc-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/libc/include -I/ndk/libc/include/winsock -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_LIBC -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall:::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::",
-"netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/libc/include -DNETWARE_BSDSOCK -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_LIBC -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall:::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::",
-
-# DJGPP
-"DJGPP", "gcc:-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIO -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall:::MSDOS:-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:",
-
-# Ultrix from Bernhard Simon <simon at zid.tuwien.ac.at>
-"ultrix-cc","cc:-std1 -O -Olimit 2500 -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::::::",
-"ultrix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG::::",
-# K&R C is no longer supported; you need gcc on old Ultrix installations
-##"ultrix","cc:-O2 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::::::",
-
-##### MacOS X (a.k.a. Rhapsody or Darwin) setup
-"rhapsody-ppc-cc","cc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):MACOSX_RHAPSODY::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}::",
-"darwin-ppc-cc","cc:-arch ppc -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -Wa,-force_cpusubtype_ALL::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc32_asm}:osx32:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch ppc -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
-"darwin64-ppc-cc","cc:-arch ppc64 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc64_asm}:osx64:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch ppc64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
-"darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:".eval{my $asm=$x86_asm;$asm=~s/cast\-586\.o//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
-"debug-darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -g3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
-"darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
-"debug-darwin-ppc-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DB_ENDIAN -g -Wall -O::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc32_asm}:osx32:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
-# iPhoneOS/iOS
-"iphoneos-cross","llvm-gcc:-O3 -isysroot \$(CROSS_TOP)/SDKs/\$(CROSS_SDK) -fomit-frame-pointer -fno-common::-D_REENTRANT:iOS:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
-
-##### A/UX
-"aux3-gcc","gcc:-O2 -DTERMIO::(unknown):AUX:-lbsd:RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:::",
-
-##### Sony NEWS-OS 4.x
-"newsos4-gcc","gcc:-O -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):NEWS4:-lmld -liberty:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::::",
-
-##### GNU Hurd
-"hurd-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC",
-
-##### OS/2 EMX
-"OS2-EMX", "gcc::::::::",
-
-##### VxWorks for various targets
-"vxworks-ppc60x","ccppc:-D_REENTRANT -mrtp -mhard-float -mstrict-align -fno-implicit-fp -DPPC32_fp60x -O2 -fstrength-reduce -fno-builtin -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -DCPU=PPC32 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h/wrn/coreip:::VXWORKS:-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/ppc/PPC32/common:::::",
-"vxworks-ppcgen","ccppc:-D_REENTRANT -mrtp -msoft-float -mstrict-align -O1 -fno-builtin -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -DCPU=PPC32 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h/wrn/coreip:::VXWORKS:-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/ppc/PPC32/sfcommon:::::",
-"vxworks-ppc405","ccppc:-g -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC405 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h:::VXWORKS:-r:::::",
-"vxworks-ppc750","ccppc:-ansi -nostdinc -DPPC750 -D_REENTRANT -fvolatile -fno-builtin -fno-for-scope -fsigned-char -Wall -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC604 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h \$(DEBUG_FLAG):::VXWORKS:-r:::::",
-"vxworks-ppc750-debug","ccppc:-ansi -nostdinc -DPPC750 -D_REENTRANT -fvolatile -fno-builtin -fno-for-scope -fsigned-char -Wall -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC604 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG -g:::VXWORKS:-r:::::",
-"vxworks-ppc860","ccppc:-nostdinc -msoft-float -DCPU=PPC860 -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h:::VXWORKS:-r:::::",
-"vxworks-simlinux","ccpentium:-B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DL_ENDIAN -DCPU=SIMLINUX -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK:::VXWORKS:-r::${no_asm}::::::ranlibpentium:",
-"vxworks-mips","ccmips:-mrtp -mips2 -O -G 0 -B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DCPU=MIPS32 -msoft-float -mno-branch-likely -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip::-D_REENTRANT:VXWORKS:-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/mips/MIPSI32/sfcommon::${mips32_asm}:o32::::::ranlibmips:",
-
-##### Compaq Non-Stop Kernel (Tandem)
-"tandem-c89","c89:-Ww -D__TANDEM -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1 -D_TANDEM_SOURCE -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::THIRTY_TWO_BIT:::",
-
-# uClinux
-"uClinux-dist","$ENV{'CC'}:\$(CFLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::\$(LDFLAGS) \$(LDLIBS):BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:$ENV{'LIBSSL_dlfcn'}:linux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):$ENV{'RANLIB'}::",
-"uClinux-dist64","$ENV{'CC'}:\$(CFLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::\$(LDFLAGS) \$(LDLIBS):SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${no_asm}:$ENV{'LIBSSL_dlfcn'}:linux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):$ENV{'RANLIB'}::",
-
-);
-
-my @MK1MF_Builds=qw(VC-WIN64I VC-WIN64A
- debug-VC-WIN64I debug-VC-WIN64A
- VC-NT VC-CE VC-WIN32 debug-VC-WIN32
- BC-32
- netware-clib netware-clib-bsdsock
- netware-libc netware-libc-bsdsock);
-
-my $idx = 0;
-my $idx_cc = $idx++;
-my $idx_cflags = $idx++;
-my $idx_unistd = $idx++;
-my $idx_thread_cflag = $idx++;
-my $idx_sys_id = $idx++;
-my $idx_lflags = $idx++;
-my $idx_bn_ops = $idx++;
-my $idx_cpuid_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_bn_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_des_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_aes_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_bf_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_md5_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_sha1_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_cast_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_rc4_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_rmd160_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_rc5_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_wp_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_cmll_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_modes_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_engines_obj = $idx++;
-my $idx_perlasm_scheme = $idx++;
-my $idx_dso_scheme = $idx++;
-my $idx_shared_target = $idx++;
-my $idx_shared_cflag = $idx++;
-my $idx_shared_ldflag = $idx++;
-my $idx_shared_extension = $idx++;
-my $idx_ranlib = $idx++;
-my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
-my $idx_multilib = $idx++;
-
-my $prefix="";
-my $libdir="";
-my $openssldir="";
-my $exe_ext="";
-my $install_prefix= "$ENV{'INSTALL_PREFIX'}";
-my $cross_compile_prefix="";
-my $fipsdir="/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0";
-my $fipslibdir="";
-my $baseaddr="0xFB00000";
-my $no_threads=0;
-my $threads=0;
-my $no_shared=0; # but "no-shared" is default
-my $zlib=1; # but "no-zlib" is default
-my $no_krb5=0; # but "no-krb5" is implied unless "--with-krb5-..." is used
-my $no_rfc3779=1; # but "no-rfc3779" is default
-my $no_asm=0;
-my $no_dso=0;
-my $no_gmp=0;
-my @skip=();
-my $Makefile="Makefile";
-my $des_locl="crypto/des/des_locl.h";
-my $des ="crypto/des/des.h";
-my $bn ="crypto/bn/bn.h";
-my $md2 ="crypto/md2/md2.h";
-my $rc4 ="crypto/rc4/rc4.h";
-my $rc4_locl="crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h";
-my $idea ="crypto/idea/idea.h";
-my $rc2 ="crypto/rc2/rc2.h";
-my $bf ="crypto/bf/bf_locl.h";
-my $bn_asm ="bn_asm.o";
-my $des_enc="des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o";
-my $aes_enc="aes_core.o aes_cbc.o";
-my $bf_enc ="bf_enc.o";
-my $cast_enc="c_enc.o";
-my $rc4_enc="rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o";
-my $rc5_enc="rc5_enc.o";
-my $md5_obj="";
-my $sha1_obj="";
-my $rmd160_obj="";
-my $cmll_enc="camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o";
-my $processor="";
-my $default_ranlib;
-my $perl;
-my $fips=0;
-
-if (exists $ENV{FIPSDIR})
- {
- $fipsdir = $ENV{FIPSDIR};
- $fipsdir =~ s/\/$//;
- }
-
-# All of the following is disabled by default (RC5 was enabled before 0.9.8):
-
-my %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment" [or special keyword "experimental"]
- "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => "default",
- "gmp" => "default",
- "jpake" => "experimental",
- "md2" => "default",
- "rc5" => "default",
- "rfc3779" => "default",
- "sctp" => "default",
- "shared" => "default",
- "store" => "experimental",
- "unit-test" => "default",
- "zlib" => "default",
- "zlib-dynamic" => "default"
- );
-my @experimental = ();
-
-# This is what $depflags will look like with the above defaults
-# (we need this to see if we should advise the user to run "make depend"):
-my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST";
-
-# Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults.
-# To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo" (unless it's experimental).
-# For symmetry, "disable-foo" is a synonym for "no-foo".
-
-# For features called "experimental" here, a more explicit "experimental-foo" is needed to enable.
-# We will collect such requests in @experimental.
-# To avoid accidental use of experimental features, applications will have to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_FOO.
-
-
-my $no_sse2=0;
-
-&usage if ($#ARGV < 0);
-
-my $flags;
-my $depflags;
-my $openssl_experimental_defines;
-my $openssl_algorithm_defines;
-my $openssl_thread_defines;
-my $openssl_sys_defines="";
-my $openssl_other_defines;
-my $libs;
-my $libkrb5="";
-my $target;
-my $options;
-my $symlink;
-my $make_depend=0;
-my %withargs=();
-
-my @argvcopy=@ARGV;
-my $argvstring="";
-my $argv_unprocessed=1;
-
-while($argv_unprocessed)
- {
- $flags="";
- $depflags="";
- $openssl_experimental_defines="";
- $openssl_algorithm_defines="";
- $openssl_thread_defines="";
- $openssl_sys_defines="";
- $openssl_other_defines="";
- $libs="";
- $target="";
- $options="";
- $symlink=1;
-
- $argv_unprocessed=0;
- $argvstring=join(' ', at argvcopy);
-
-PROCESS_ARGS:
- foreach (@argvcopy)
- {
- s /^-no-/no-/; # some people just can't read the instructions
-
- # rewrite some options in "enable-..." form
- s /^-?-?shared$/enable-shared/;
- s /^sctp$/enable-sctp/;
- s /^threads$/enable-threads/;
- s /^zlib$/enable-zlib/;
- s /^zlib-dynamic$/enable-zlib-dynamic/;
-
- if (/^no-(.+)$/ || /^disable-(.+)$/)
- {
- if (!($disabled{$1} eq "experimental"))
- {
- if ($1 eq "ssl")
- {
- $disabled{"ssl2"} = "option(ssl)";
- $disabled{"ssl3"} = "option(ssl)";
- }
- elsif ($1 eq "tls")
- {
- $disabled{"tls1"} = "option(tls)"
- }
- elsif ($1 eq "ssl3-method")
- {
- $disabled{"ssl3-method"} = "option(ssl)";
- $disabled{"ssl3"} = "option(ssl)";
- }
- else
- {
- $disabled{$1} = "option";
- }
- }
- }
- elsif (/^enable-(.+)$/ || /^experimental-(.+)$/)
- {
- my $algo = $1;
- if ($disabled{$algo} eq "experimental")
- {
- die "You are requesting an experimental feature; please say 'experimental-$algo' if you are sure\n"
- unless (/^experimental-/);
- push @experimental, $algo;
- }
- delete $disabled{$algo};
-
- $threads = 1 if ($algo eq "threads");
- }
- elsif (/^--test-sanity$/)
- {
- exit(&test_sanity());
- }
- elsif (/^--strict-warnings/)
- {
- $strict_warnings = 1;
- }
- elsif (/^reconfigure/ || /^reconf/)
- {
- if (open(IN,"<$Makefile"))
- {
- while (<IN>)
- {
- chomp;
- if (/^CONFIGURE_ARGS=(.*)/)
- {
- $argvstring=$1;
- @argvcopy=split(' ',$argvstring);
- die "Incorrect data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n"
- if (grep(/^reconf/, at argvcopy));
- print "Reconfiguring with: $argvstring\n";
- $argv_unprocessed=1;
- close(IN);
- last PROCESS_ARGS;
- }
- }
- close(IN);
- }
- die "Insufficient data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n";
- }
- elsif (/^386$/)
- { $processor=386; }
- elsif (/^fips$/)
- {
- $fips=1;
- }
- elsif (/^rsaref$/)
- {
- # No RSAref support any more since it's not needed.
- # The check for the option is there so scripts aren't
- # broken
- }
- elsif (/^[-+]/)
- {
- if (/^-[lL](.*)$/ or /^-Wl,/)
- {
- $libs.=$_." ";
- }
- elsif (/^-[^-]/ or /^\+/)
- {
- $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei;
- $flags.=$_." ";
- }
- elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
- {
- $prefix=$1;
- }
- elsif (/^--libdir=(.*)$/)
- {
- $libdir=$1;
- }
- elsif (/^--openssldir=(.*)$/)
- {
- $openssldir=$1;
- }
- elsif (/^--install.prefix=(.*)$/)
- {
- $install_prefix=$1;
- }
- elsif (/^--with-krb5-(dir|lib|include|flavor)=(.*)$/)
- {
- $withargs{"krb5-".$1}=$2;
- }
- elsif (/^--with-zlib-lib=(.*)$/)
- {
- $withargs{"zlib-lib"}=$1;
- }
- elsif (/^--with-zlib-include=(.*)$/)
- {
- $withargs{"zlib-include"}="-I$1";
- }
- elsif (/^--with-fipsdir=(.*)$/)
- {
- $fipsdir="$1";
- }
- elsif (/^--with-fipslibdir=(.*)$/)
- {
- $fipslibdir="$1";
- }
- elsif (/^--with-baseaddr=(.*)$/)
- {
- $baseaddr="$1";
- }
- elsif (/^--cross-compile-prefix=(.*)$/)
- {
- $cross_compile_prefix=$1;
- }
- else
- {
- print STDERR $usage;
- exit(1);
- }
- }
- elsif ($_ =~ /^([^:]+):(.+)$/)
- {
- eval "\$table{\$1} = \"$2\""; # allow $xxx constructs in the string
- $target=$1;
- }
- else
- {
- die "target already defined - $target (offending arg: $_)\n" if ($target ne "");
- $target=$_;
- }
-
- unless ($_ eq $target || /^no-/ || /^disable-/)
- {
- # "no-..." follows later after implied disactivations
- # have been derived. (Don't take this too seroiusly,
- # we really only write OPTIONS to the Makefile out of
- # nostalgia.)
-
- if ($options eq "")
- { $options = $_; }
- else
- { $options .= " ".$_; }
- }
- }
- }
-
-
-
-if ($processor eq "386")
- {
- $disabled{"sse2"} = "forced";
- }
-
-if (!defined($withargs{"krb5-flavor"}) || $withargs{"krb5-flavor"} eq "")
- {
- $disabled{"krb5"} = "krb5-flavor not specified";
- }
-
-if (!defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"}))
- {
- # "zlib-dynamic" was specifically enabled, so enable "zlib"
- delete $disabled{"zlib"};
- }
-
-if (defined($disabled{"rijndael"}))
- {
- $disabled{"aes"} = "forced";
- }
-if (defined($disabled{"des"}))
- {
- $disabled{"mdc2"} = "forced";
- }
-if (defined($disabled{"ec"}))
- {
- $disabled{"ecdsa"} = "forced";
- $disabled{"ecdh"} = "forced";
- }
-
-# SSL 2.0 requires MD5 and RSA
-if (defined($disabled{"md5"}) || defined($disabled{"rsa"}))
- {
- $disabled{"ssl2"} = "forced";
- }
-
-if ($fips && $fipslibdir eq "")
- {
- $fipslibdir = $fipsdir . "/lib/";
- }
-
-# RSAX ENGINE sets default non-FIPS RSA method.
-if ($fips)
- {
- $disabled{"rsax"} = "forced";
- }
-
-# SSL 3.0 and TLS requires MD5 and SHA and either RSA or DSA+DH
-if (defined($disabled{"md5"}) || defined($disabled{"sha"})
- || (defined($disabled{"rsa"})
- && (defined($disabled{"dsa"}) || defined($disabled{"dh"}))))
- {
- $disabled{"ssl3"} = "forced";
- $disabled{"tls1"} = "forced";
- }
-
-if (defined($disabled{"tls1"}))
- {
- $disabled{"tlsext"} = "forced";
- }
-
-if (defined($disabled{"ec"}) || defined($disabled{"dsa"})
- || defined($disabled{"dh"}))
- {
- $disabled{"gost"} = "forced";
- }
-
-# SRP and HEARTBEATS require TLSEXT
-if (defined($disabled{"tlsext"}))
- {
- $disabled{"srp"} = "forced";
- $disabled{"heartbeats"} = "forced";
- }
-
-if ($target eq "TABLE") {
- foreach $target (sort keys %table) {
- print_table_entry($target);
- }
- exit 0;
-}
-
-if ($target eq "LIST") {
- foreach (sort keys %table) {
- print;
- print "\n";
- }
- exit 0;
-}
-
-if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
- $target = "Cygwin".$1;
-}
-
-print "Configuring for $target\n";
-
-&usage if (!defined($table{$target}));
-
-
-foreach (sort (keys %disabled))
- {
- $options .= " no-$_";
-
- printf " no-%-12s %-10s", $_, "[$disabled{$_}]";
-
- if (/^dso$/)
- { $no_dso = 1; }
- elsif (/^threads$/)
- { $no_threads = 1; }
- elsif (/^shared$/)
- { $no_shared = 1; }
- elsif (/^zlib$/)
- { $zlib = 0; }
- elsif (/^static-engine$/)
- { }
- elsif (/^zlib-dynamic$/)
- { }
- elsif (/^symlinks$/)
- { $symlink = 0; }
- elsif (/^sse2$/)
- { $no_sse2 = 1; }
- else
- {
- my ($ALGO, $algo);
- ($ALGO = $algo = $_) =~ tr/[\-a-z]/[_A-Z]/;
-
- if (/^asm$/ || /^err$/ || /^hw$/ || /^hw-/)
- {
- $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO\n";
- print " OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO";
-
- if (/^err$/) { $flags .= "-DOPENSSL_NO_ERR "; }
- elsif (/^asm$/) { $no_asm = 1; }
- }
- else
- {
- $openssl_algorithm_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO\n";
- print " OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO";
-
- if (/^krb5$/)
- { $no_krb5 = 1; }
- else
- {
- push @skip, $algo;
- # fix-up crypto/directory name(s)
- @skip[$#skip]="whrlpool" if $algo eq "whirlpool";
- print " (skip dir)";
-
- $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_$ALGO";
- }
- }
- }
-
- print "\n";
- }
-
-my $exp_cflags = "";
-foreach (sort @experimental)
- {
- my $ALGO;
- ($ALGO = $_) =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/;
-
- # opensslconf.h will set OPENSSL_NO_... unless OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_... is defined
- $openssl_experimental_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO\n";
- $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO";
- }
-
-my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/, at MK1MF_Builds;
-
-$exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/);
-$exe_ext=".nlm" if ($target =~ /netware/);
-$exe_ext=".pm" if ($target =~ /vos/);
-$openssldir="/usr/local/ssl" if ($openssldir eq "" and $prefix eq "");
-$prefix=$openssldir if $prefix eq "";
-
-$default_ranlib= &which("ranlib") or $default_ranlib="true";
-$perl=$ENV{'PERL'} or $perl=&which("perl5") or $perl=&which("perl")
- or $perl="perl";
-my $make = $ENV{'MAKE'} || "make";
-
-$cross_compile_prefix=$ENV{'CROSS_COMPILE'} if $cross_compile_prefix eq "";
-
-chop $openssldir if $openssldir =~ /\/$/;
-chop $prefix if $prefix =~ /.\/$/;
-
-$openssldir=$prefix . "/ssl" if $openssldir eq "";
-$openssldir=$prefix . "/" . $openssldir if $openssldir !~ /(^\/|^[a-zA-Z]:[\\\/])/;
-
-
-print "IsMK1MF=$IsMK1MF\n";
-
-my @fields = split(/\s*:\s*/,$table{$target} . ":" x 30 , -1);
-my $cc = $fields[$idx_cc];
-# Allow environment CC to override compiler...
-if($ENV{CC}) {
- $cc = $ENV{CC};
-}
-my $cflags = $fields[$idx_cflags];
-my $unistd = $fields[$idx_unistd];
-my $thread_cflag = $fields[$idx_thread_cflag];
-my $sys_id = $fields[$idx_sys_id];
-my $lflags = $fields[$idx_lflags];
-my $bn_ops = $fields[$idx_bn_ops];
-my $cpuid_obj = $fields[$idx_cpuid_obj];
-my $bn_obj = $fields[$idx_bn_obj];
-my $des_obj = $fields[$idx_des_obj];
-my $aes_obj = $fields[$idx_aes_obj];
-my $bf_obj = $fields[$idx_bf_obj];
-my $md5_obj = $fields[$idx_md5_obj];
-my $sha1_obj = $fields[$idx_sha1_obj];
-my $cast_obj = $fields[$idx_cast_obj];
-my $rc4_obj = $fields[$idx_rc4_obj];
-my $rmd160_obj = $fields[$idx_rmd160_obj];
-my $rc5_obj = $fields[$idx_rc5_obj];
-my $wp_obj = $fields[$idx_wp_obj];
-my $cmll_obj = $fields[$idx_cmll_obj];
-my $modes_obj = $fields[$idx_modes_obj];
-my $engines_obj = $fields[$idx_engines_obj];
-my $perlasm_scheme = $fields[$idx_perlasm_scheme];
-my $dso_scheme = $fields[$idx_dso_scheme];
-my $shared_target = $fields[$idx_shared_target];
-my $shared_cflag = $fields[$idx_shared_cflag];
-my $shared_ldflag = $fields[$idx_shared_ldflag];
-my $shared_extension = $fields[$idx_shared_extension];
-my $ranlib = $ENV{'RANLIB'} || $fields[$idx_ranlib];
-my $ar = $ENV{'AR'} || "ar";
-my $arflags = $fields[$idx_arflags];
-my $multilib = $fields[$idx_multilib];
-
-# if $prefix/lib$multilib is not an existing directory, then
-# assume that it's not searched by linker automatically, in
-# which case adding $multilib suffix causes more grief than
-# we're ready to tolerate, so don't...
-$multilib="" if !-d "$prefix/lib$multilib";
-
-$libdir="lib$multilib" if $libdir eq "";
-
-$cflags = "$cflags$exp_cflags";
-
-# '%' in $lflags is used to split flags to "pre-" and post-flags
-my ($prelflags,$postlflags)=split('%',$lflags);
-if (defined($postlflags)) { $lflags=$postlflags; }
-else { $lflags=$prelflags; undef $prelflags; }
-
-if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$cc --target-help 2>&1` !~ m/\-mno\-cygwin/m)
- {
- $cflags =~ s/\-mno\-cygwin\s*//;
- $shared_ldflag =~ s/\-mno\-cygwin\s*//;
- }
-
-my $no_shared_warn=0;
-my $no_user_cflags=0;
-
-if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
-else { $no_user_cflags=1; }
-
-# Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
-# the script "config" or manually.
-if (!$no_krb5)
- {
- my ($lresolv, $lpath, $lext);
- if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^[Hh]eimdal$/)
- {
- die "Sorry, Heimdal is currently not supported\n";
- }
- ##### HACK to force use of Heimdal.
- ##### WARNING: Since we don't really have adequate support for Heimdal,
- ##### using this will break the build. You'll have to make
- ##### changes to the source, and if you do, please send
- ##### patches to openssl-dev at openssl.org
- if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^force-[Hh]eimdal$/)
- {
- warn "Heimdal isn't really supported. Your build WILL break\n";
- warn "If you fix the problems, please send a patch to openssl-dev\@openssl.org\n";
- $withargs{"krb5-dir"} = "/usr/heimdal"
- if $withargs{"krb5-dir"} eq "";
- $withargs{"krb5-lib"} = "-L".$withargs{"krb5-dir"}.
- "/lib -lgssapi -lkrb5 -lcom_err"
- if $withargs{"krb5-lib"} eq "" && !$IsMK1MF;
- $cflags="-DKRB5_HEIMDAL $cflags";
- }
- if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^[Mm][Ii][Tt]/)
- {
- $withargs{"krb5-dir"} = "/usr/kerberos"
- if $withargs{"krb5-dir"} eq "";
- $withargs{"krb5-lib"} = "-L".$withargs{"krb5-dir"}.
- "/lib -lgssapi_krb5 -lkrb5 -lcom_err -lk5crypto"
- if $withargs{"krb5-lib"} eq "" && !$IsMK1MF;
- $cflags="-DKRB5_MIT $cflags";
- $withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ s/^[Mm][Ii][Tt][._-]*//;
- if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^1[._-]*[01]/)
- {
- $cflags="-DKRB5_MIT_OLD11 $cflags";
- }
- }
- LRESOLV:
- foreach $lpath ("/lib", "/usr/lib")
- {
- foreach $lext ("a", "so")
- {
- $lresolv = "$lpath/libresolv.$lext";
- last LRESOLV if (-r "$lresolv");
- $lresolv = "";
- }
- }
- $withargs{"krb5-lib"} .= " -lresolv"
- if ("$lresolv" ne "");
- $withargs{"krb5-include"} = "-I".$withargs{"krb5-dir"}."/include"
- if $withargs{"krb5-include"} eq "" &&
- $withargs{"krb5-dir"} ne "";
- }
-
-# The DSO code currently always implements all functions so that no
-# applications will have to worry about that from a compilation point
-# of view. However, the "method"s may return zero unless that platform
-# has support compiled in for them. Currently each method is enabled
-# by a define "DSO_<name>" ... we translate the "dso_scheme" config
-# string entry into using the following logic;
-my $dso_cflags;
-if (!$no_dso && $dso_scheme ne "")
- {
- $dso_scheme =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/;
- if ($dso_scheme eq "DLFCN")
- {
- $dso_cflags = "-DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H";
- }
- elsif ($dso_scheme eq "DLFCN_NO_H")
- {
- $dso_cflags = "-DDSO_DLFCN";
- }
- else
- {
- $dso_cflags = "-DDSO_$dso_scheme";
- }
- $cflags = "$dso_cflags $cflags";
- }
-
-my $thread_cflags;
-my $thread_defines;
-if ($thread_cflag ne "(unknown)" && !$no_threads)
- {
- # If we know how to do it, support threads by default.
- $threads = 1;
- }
-if ($thread_cflag eq "(unknown)" && $threads)
- {
- # If the user asked for "threads", [s]he is also expected to
- # provide any system-dependent compiler options that are
- # necessary.
- if ($no_user_cflags)
- {
- print "You asked for multi-threading support, but didn't\n";
- print "provide any system-specific compiler options\n";
- exit(1);
- }
- $thread_cflags="-DOPENSSL_THREADS $cflags" ;
- $thread_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_THREADS\n";
- }
-else
- {
- $thread_cflags="-DOPENSSL_THREADS $thread_cflag $cflags";
- $thread_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_THREADS\n";
-# my $def;
-# foreach $def (split ' ',$thread_cflag)
-# {
-# if ($def =~ s/^-D// && $def !~ /^_/)
-# {
-# $thread_defines .= "#define $def\n";
-# }
-# }
- }
-
-$lflags="$libs$lflags" if ($libs ne "");
-
-if ($no_asm)
- {
- $cpuid_obj=$bn_obj=
- $des_obj=$aes_obj=$bf_obj=$cast_obj=$rc4_obj=$rc5_obj=$cmll_obj=
- $modes_obj=$sha1_obj=$md5_obj=$rmd160_obj=$wp_obj=$engines_obj="";
- }
-
-if (!$no_shared)
- {
- $cast_obj=""; # CAST assembler is not PIC
- }
-
-if ($threads)
- {
- $cflags=$thread_cflags;
- $openssl_thread_defines .= $thread_defines;
- }
-
-if ($zlib)
- {
- $cflags = "-DZLIB $cflags";
- if (defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"}))
- {
- if (defined($withargs{"zlib-lib"}))
- {
- $lflags = "$lflags -L" . $withargs{"zlib-lib"} . " -lz";
- }
- else
- {
- $lflags = "$lflags -lz";
- }
- }
- else
- {
- $cflags = "-DZLIB_SHARED $cflags";
- }
- }
-
-# You will find shlib_mark1 and shlib_mark2 explained in Makefile.org
-my $shared_mark = "";
-if ($shared_target eq "")
- {
- $no_shared_warn = 1 if !$no_shared;
- $no_shared = 1;
- }
-if (!$no_shared)
- {
- if ($shared_cflag ne "")
- {
- $cflags = "$shared_cflag -DOPENSSL_PIC $cflags";
- }
- }
-
-if (!$IsMK1MF)
- {
- # add {no-}static-engine to options to allow mkdef.pl to work without extra arguments
- if ($no_shared)
- {
- $openssl_other_defines.="#define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE\n";
- $options.=" static-engine";
- }
- else
- {
- $openssl_other_defines.="#define OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE\n";
- $options.=" no-static-engine";
- }
- }
-
-$cpuid_obj.=" uplink.o uplink-x86.o" if ($cflags =~ /\-DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK/);
-
-#
-# Platform fix-ups
-#
-if ($target =~ /\-icc$/) # Intel C compiler
- {
- my $iccver=0;
- if (open(FD,"$cc -V 2>&1 |"))
- {
- while(<FD>) { $iccver=$1 if (/Version ([0-9]+)\./); }
- close(FD);
- }
- if ($iccver>=8)
- {
- # Eliminate unnecessary dependency from libirc.a. This is
- # essential for shared library support, as otherwise
- # apps/openssl can end up in endless loop upon startup...
- $cflags.=" -Dmemcpy=__builtin_memcpy -Dmemset=__builtin_memset";
- }
- if ($iccver>=9)
- {
- $cflags.=" -i-static";
- $cflags=~s/\-no_cpprt/-no-cpprt/;
- }
- if ($iccver>=10)
- {
- $cflags=~s/\-i\-static/-static-intel/;
- }
- }
-
-# Unlike other OSes (like Solaris, Linux, Tru64, IRIX) BSD run-time
-# linkers (tested OpenBSD, NetBSD and FreeBSD) "demand" RPATH set on
-# .so objects. Apparently application RPATH is not global and does
-# not apply to .so linked with other .so. Problem manifests itself
-# when libssl.so fails to load libcrypto.so. One can argue that we
-# should engrave this into Makefile.shared rules or into BSD-* config
-# lines above. Meanwhile let's try to be cautious and pass -rpath to
-# linker only when --prefix is not /usr.
-if ($target =~ /^BSD\-/)
- {
- $shared_ldflag.=" -Wl,-rpath,\$(LIBRPATH)" if ($prefix !~ m|^/usr[/]*$|);
- }
-
-if ($sys_id ne "")
- {
- #$cflags="-DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_$sys_id $cflags";
- $openssl_sys_defines="#define OPENSSL_SYSNAME_$sys_id\n";
- }
-
-if ($ranlib eq "")
- {
- $ranlib = $default_ranlib;
- }
-
-#my ($bn1)=split(/\s+/,$bn_obj);
-#$bn1 = "" unless defined $bn1;
-#$bn1=$bn_asm unless ($bn1 =~ /\.o$/);
-#$bn_obj="$bn1";
-
-$cpuid_obj="" if ($processor eq "386");
-
-$bn_obj = $bn_asm unless $bn_obj ne "";
-# bn-586 is the only one implementing bn_*_part_words
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS" if ($bn_obj =~ /bn-586/);
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2" if (!$no_sse2 && $bn_obj =~ /86/);
-
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT" if ($bn_obj =~ /-mont/);
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5" if ($bn_obj =~ /-mont5/);
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m" if ($bn_obj =~ /-gf2m/);
-
-if ($fips)
- {
- $openssl_other_defines.="#define OPENSSL_FIPS\n";
- $cflags .= " -I\$(FIPSDIR)/include";
- }
-
-$cpuid_obj="mem_clr.o" unless ($cpuid_obj =~ /\.o$/);
-$des_obj=$des_enc unless ($des_obj =~ /\.o$/);
-$bf_obj=$bf_enc unless ($bf_obj =~ /\.o$/);
-$cast_obj=$cast_enc unless ($cast_obj =~ /\.o$/);
-$rc4_obj=$rc4_enc unless ($rc4_obj =~ /\.o$/);
-$rc5_obj=$rc5_enc unless ($rc5_obj =~ /\.o$/);
-if ($sha1_obj =~ /\.o$/)
- {
-# $sha1_obj=$sha1_enc;
- $cflags.=" -DSHA1_ASM" if ($sha1_obj =~ /sx86/ || $sha1_obj =~ /sha1/);
- $cflags.=" -DSHA256_ASM" if ($sha1_obj =~ /sha256/);
- $cflags.=" -DSHA512_ASM" if ($sha1_obj =~ /sha512/);
- if ($sha1_obj =~ /sse2/)
- { if ($no_sse2)
- { $sha1_obj =~ s/\S*sse2\S+//; }
- elsif ($cflags !~ /OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/)
- { $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2"; }
- }
- }
-if ($md5_obj =~ /\.o$/)
- {
-# $md5_obj=$md5_enc;
- $cflags.=" -DMD5_ASM";
- }
-if ($rmd160_obj =~ /\.o$/)
- {
-# $rmd160_obj=$rmd160_enc;
- $cflags.=" -DRMD160_ASM";
- }
-if ($aes_obj =~ /\.o$/)
- {
- $cflags.=" -DAES_ASM";
- # aes-ctr.o is not a real file, only indication that assembler
- # module implements AES_ctr32_encrypt...
- $cflags.=" -DAES_CTR_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ s/\s*aes\-ctr\.o//);
- # aes-xts.o indicates presense of AES_xts_[en|de]crypt...
- $cflags.=" -DAES_XTS_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ s/\s*aes\-xts\.o//);
- $aes_obj =~ s/\s*(vpaes|aesni)\-x86\.o//g if ($no_sse2);
- $cflags.=" -DVPAES_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ m/vpaes/);
- $cflags.=" -DBSAES_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ m/bsaes/);
- }
-else {
- $aes_obj=$aes_enc;
- }
-$wp_obj="" if ($wp_obj =~ /mmx/ && $processor eq "386");
-if ($wp_obj =~ /\.o$/ && !$disabled{"whirlpool"})
- {
- $cflags.=" -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM";
- }
-else {
- $wp_obj="wp_block.o";
- }
-$cmll_obj=$cmll_enc unless ($cmll_obj =~ /.o$/);
-if ($modes_obj =~ /ghash/)
- {
- $cflags.=" -DGHASH_ASM";
- }
-
-# "Stringify" the C flags string. This permits it to be made part of a string
-# and works as well on command lines.
-$cflags =~ s/([\\\"])/\\\1/g;
-
-my $version = "unknown";
-my $version_num = "unknown";
-my $major = "unknown";
-my $minor = "unknown";
-my $shlib_version_number = "unknown";
-my $shlib_version_history = "unknown";
-my $shlib_major = "unknown";
-my $shlib_minor = "unknown";
-
-open(IN,'<crypto/opensslv.h') || die "unable to read opensslv.h:$!\n";
-while (<IN>)
- {
- $version=$1 if /OPENSSL.VERSION.TEXT.*OpenSSL (\S+) /;
- $version_num=$1 if /OPENSSL.VERSION.NUMBER.*0x(\S+)/;
- $shlib_version_number=$1 if /SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER *"([^"]+)"/;
- $shlib_version_history=$1 if /SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY *"([^"]*)"/;
- }
-close(IN);
-if ($shlib_version_history ne "") { $shlib_version_history .= ":"; }
-
-if ($version =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
- {
- $major=$1;
- $minor=$2;
- }
-
-if ($shlib_version_number =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
- {
- $shlib_major=$1;
- $shlib_minor=$2;
- }
-
-if ($strict_warnings)
- {
- my $wopt;
- die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc" unless ($cc =~ /gcc$/);
- foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
- {
- $cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
- }
- }
-
-open(IN,'<Makefile.org') || die "unable to read Makefile.org:$!\n";
-unlink("$Makefile.new") || die "unable to remove old $Makefile.new:$!\n" if -e "$Makefile.new";
-open(OUT,">$Makefile.new") || die "unable to create $Makefile.new:$!\n";
-print OUT "### Generated automatically from Makefile.org by Configure.\n\n";
-my $sdirs=0;
-while (<IN>)
- {
- chomp;
- $sdirs = 1 if /^SDIRS=/;
- if ($sdirs) {
- my $dir;
- foreach $dir (@skip) {
- s/(\s)$dir /$1/;
- s/\s$dir$//;
- }
- }
- $sdirs = 0 unless /\\$/;
- s/engines // if (/^DIRS=/ && $disabled{"engine"});
- s/ccgost// if (/^ENGDIRS=/ && $disabled{"gost"});
- s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
- s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
- s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
- s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
- s/^SHLIB_MINOR=.*/SHLIB_MINOR=$shlib_minor/;
- s/^SHLIB_EXT=.*/SHLIB_EXT=$shared_extension/;
- s/^INSTALLTOP=.*$/INSTALLTOP=$prefix/;
- s/^MULTILIB=.*$/MULTILIB=$multilib/;
- s/^OPENSSLDIR=.*$/OPENSSLDIR=$openssldir/;
- s/^LIBDIR=.*$/LIBDIR=$libdir/;
- s/^INSTALL_PREFIX=.*$/INSTALL_PREFIX=$install_prefix/;
- s/^PLATFORM=.*$/PLATFORM=$target/;
- s/^OPTIONS=.*$/OPTIONS=$options/;
- s/^CONFIGURE_ARGS=.*$/CONFIGURE_ARGS=$argvstring/;
- if ($cross_compile_prefix)
- {
- s/^CC=.*$/CROSS_COMPILE= $cross_compile_prefix\nCC= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/;
- s/^AR=\s*/AR= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
- s/^NM=\s*/NM= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
- s/^RANLIB=\s*/RANLIB= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
- s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/ if $cc eq "gcc";
- }
- else {
- s/^CC=.*$/CC= $cc/;
- s/^AR=\s*ar/AR= $ar/;
- s/^RANLIB=.*/RANLIB= $ranlib/;
- s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $cc eq "gcc";
- }
- s/^CFLAG=.*$/CFLAG= $cflags/;
- s/^DEPFLAG=.*$/DEPFLAG=$depflags/;
- s/^PEX_LIBS=.*$/PEX_LIBS= $prelflags/;
- s/^EX_LIBS=.*$/EX_LIBS= $lflags/;
- s/^EXE_EXT=.*$/EXE_EXT= $exe_ext/;
- s/^CPUID_OBJ=.*$/CPUID_OBJ= $cpuid_obj/;
- s/^BN_ASM=.*$/BN_ASM= $bn_obj/;
- s/^DES_ENC=.*$/DES_ENC= $des_obj/;
- s/^AES_ENC=.*$/AES_ENC= $aes_obj/;
- s/^BF_ENC=.*$/BF_ENC= $bf_obj/;
- s/^CAST_ENC=.*$/CAST_ENC= $cast_obj/;
- s/^RC4_ENC=.*$/RC4_ENC= $rc4_obj/;
- s/^RC5_ENC=.*$/RC5_ENC= $rc5_obj/;
- s/^MD5_ASM_OBJ=.*$/MD5_ASM_OBJ= $md5_obj/;
- s/^SHA1_ASM_OBJ=.*$/SHA1_ASM_OBJ= $sha1_obj/;
- s/^RMD160_ASM_OBJ=.*$/RMD160_ASM_OBJ= $rmd160_obj/;
- s/^WP_ASM_OBJ=.*$/WP_ASM_OBJ= $wp_obj/;
- s/^CMLL_ENC=.*$/CMLL_ENC= $cmll_obj/;
- s/^MODES_ASM_OBJ.=*$/MODES_ASM_OBJ= $modes_obj/;
- s/^ENGINES_ASM_OBJ.=*$/ENGINES_ASM_OBJ= $engines_obj/;
- s/^PERLASM_SCHEME=.*$/PERLASM_SCHEME= $perlasm_scheme/;
- s/^PROCESSOR=.*/PROCESSOR= $processor/;
- s/^ARFLAGS=.*/ARFLAGS= $arflags/;
- s/^PERL=.*/PERL= $perl/;
- s/^KRB5_INCLUDES=.*/KRB5_INCLUDES=$withargs{"krb5-include"}/;
- s/^LIBKRB5=.*/LIBKRB5=$withargs{"krb5-lib"}/;
- s/^LIBZLIB=.*/LIBZLIB=$withargs{"zlib-lib"}/;
- s/^ZLIB_INCLUDE=.*/ZLIB_INCLUDE=$withargs{"zlib-include"}/;
-
- s/^FIPSDIR=.*/FIPSDIR=$fipsdir/;
- s/^FIPSLIBDIR=.*/FIPSLIBDIR=$fipslibdir/;
- s/^FIPSCANLIB=.*/FIPSCANLIB=libcrypto/ if $fips;
- s/^BASEADDR=.*/BASEADDR=$baseaddr/;
-
- s/^SHLIB_TARGET=.*/SHLIB_TARGET=$shared_target/;
- s/^SHLIB_MARK=.*/SHLIB_MARK=$shared_mark/;
- s/^SHARED_LIBS=.*/SHARED_LIBS=\$(SHARED_CRYPTO) \$(SHARED_SSL)/ if (!$no_shared);
- if ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.s([ol])\.[^\.]*$/)
- {
- my $sotmp = $1;
- s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.s$sotmp/;
- }
- elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.[^\.]*\.dylib$/)
- {
- s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.dylib/;
- }
- elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.s([ol])\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*$/)
- {
- my $sotmp = $1;
- s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.s$sotmp.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR) .s$sotmp/;
- }
- elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*\.dylib$/)
- {
- s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).dylib .dylib/;
- }
- s/^SHARED_LDFLAGS=.*/SHARED_LDFLAGS=$shared_ldflag/;
- print OUT $_."\n";
- }
-close(IN);
-close(OUT);
-rename($Makefile,"$Makefile.bak") || die "unable to rename $Makefile\n" if -e $Makefile;
-rename("$Makefile.new",$Makefile) || die "unable to rename $Makefile.new\n";
-
-print "CC =$cc\n";
-print "CFLAG =$cflags\n";
-print "EX_LIBS =$lflags\n";
-print "CPUID_OBJ =$cpuid_obj\n";
-print "BN_ASM =$bn_obj\n";
-print "DES_ENC =$des_obj\n";
-print "AES_ENC =$aes_obj\n";
-print "BF_ENC =$bf_obj\n";
-print "CAST_ENC =$cast_obj\n";
-print "RC4_ENC =$rc4_obj\n";
-print "RC5_ENC =$rc5_obj\n";
-print "MD5_OBJ_ASM =$md5_obj\n";
-print "SHA1_OBJ_ASM =$sha1_obj\n";
-print "RMD160_OBJ_ASM=$rmd160_obj\n";
-print "CMLL_ENC =$cmll_obj\n";
-print "MODES_OBJ =$modes_obj\n";
-print "ENGINES_OBJ =$engines_obj\n";
-print "PROCESSOR =$processor\n";
-print "RANLIB =$ranlib\n";
-print "ARFLAGS =$arflags\n";
-print "PERL =$perl\n";
-print "KRB5_INCLUDES =",$withargs{"krb5-include"},"\n"
- if $withargs{"krb5-include"} ne "";
-
-my $des_ptr=0;
-my $des_risc1=0;
-my $des_risc2=0;
-my $des_unroll=0;
-my $bn_ll=0;
-my $def_int=2;
-my $rc4_int=$def_int;
-my $md2_int=$def_int;
-my $idea_int=$def_int;
-my $rc2_int=$def_int;
-my $rc4_idx=0;
-my $rc4_chunk=0;
-my $bf_ptr=0;
-my @type=("char","short","int","long");
-my ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,1,0,0);
-my $export_var_as_fn=0;
-
-my $des_int;
-
-foreach (sort split(/\s+/,$bn_ops))
- {
- $des_ptr=1 if /DES_PTR/;
- $des_risc1=1 if /DES_RISC1/;
- $des_risc2=1 if /DES_RISC2/;
- $des_unroll=1 if /DES_UNROLL/;
- $des_int=1 if /DES_INT/;
- $bn_ll=1 if /BN_LLONG/;
- $rc4_int=0 if /RC4_CHAR/;
- $rc4_int=3 if /RC4_LONG/;
- $rc4_idx=1 if /RC4_INDEX/;
- $rc4_chunk=1 if /RC4_CHUNK/;
- $rc4_chunk=2 if /RC4_CHUNK_LL/;
- $md2_int=0 if /MD2_CHAR/;
- $md2_int=3 if /MD2_LONG/;
- $idea_int=1 if /IDEA_SHORT/;
- $idea_int=3 if /IDEA_LONG/;
- $rc2_int=1 if /RC2_SHORT/;
- $rc2_int=3 if /RC2_LONG/;
- $bf_ptr=1 if $_ eq "BF_PTR";
- $bf_ptr=2 if $_ eq "BF_PTR2";
- ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,1,0,0,0) if /SIXTY_FOUR_BIT/;
- ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(1,0,0,0,0) if /SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG/;
- ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,1,0,0) if /THIRTY_TWO_BIT/;
- ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,0,1,0) if /SIXTEEN_BIT/;
- ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,0,0,1) if /EIGHT_BIT/;
- $export_var_as_fn=1 if /EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN/;
- }
-
-open(IN,'<crypto/opensslconf.h.in') || die "unable to read crypto/opensslconf.h.in:$!\n";
-unlink("crypto/opensslconf.h.new") || die "unable to remove old crypto/opensslconf.h.new:$!\n" if -e "crypto/opensslconf.h.new";
-open(OUT,'>crypto/opensslconf.h.new') || die "unable to create crypto/opensslconf.h.new:$!\n";
-print OUT "/* opensslconf.h */\n";
-print OUT "/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */\n\n";
-
-print OUT "#ifdef __cplusplus\n";
-print OUT "extern \"C\" {\n";
-print OUT "#endif\n";
-print OUT "/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */\n";
-my $openssl_algorithm_defines_trans = $openssl_algorithm_defines;
-$openssl_experimental_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+OPENSSL_NO_(.*)/#ifndef OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$1\n# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_$1\n# define OPENSSL_NO_$1\n# endif\n#endif/mg;
-$openssl_algorithm_defines_trans =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+OPENSSL_(.*)/# if defined(OPENSSL_$1) \&\& !defined($1)\n# define $1\n# endif/mg;
-$openssl_algorithm_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg;
-$openssl_algorithm_defines = " /* no ciphers excluded */\n" if $openssl_algorithm_defines eq "";
-$openssl_thread_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg;
-$openssl_sys_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg;
-$openssl_other_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg;
-print OUT $openssl_sys_defines;
-print OUT "#ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND\n\n";
-print OUT $openssl_experimental_defines;
-print OUT "\n";
-print OUT $openssl_algorithm_defines;
-print OUT "\n#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */\n\n";
-print OUT $openssl_thread_defines;
-print OUT $openssl_other_defines,"\n";
-
-print OUT "/* The OPENSSL_NO_* macros are also defined as NO_* if the application\n";
-print OUT " asks for it. This is a transient feature that is provided for those\n";
-print OUT " who haven't had the time to do the appropriate changes in their\n";
-print OUT " applications. */\n";
-print OUT "#ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES\n";
-print OUT $openssl_algorithm_defines_trans;
-print OUT "#endif\n\n";
-
-print OUT "#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ\n\n" if ($cpuid_obj ne "mem_clr.o");
-
-while (<IN>)
- {
- if (/^#define\s+OPENSSLDIR/)
- {
- my $foo = $openssldir;
- $foo =~ s/\\/\\\\/g;
- print OUT "#define OPENSSLDIR \"$foo\"\n";
- }
- elsif (/^#define\s+ENGINESDIR/)
- {
- my $foo = "$prefix/$libdir/engines";
- $foo =~ s/\\/\\\\/g;
- print OUT "#define ENGINESDIR \"$foo\"\n";
- }
- elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION/)
- { printf OUT "#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION\n"
- if $export_var_as_fn;
- printf OUT "#%s OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION\n",
- ($export_var_as_fn)?"define":"undef"; }
- elsif (/^#define\s+OPENSSL_UNISTD/)
- {
- $unistd = "<unistd.h>" if $unistd eq "";
- print OUT "#define OPENSSL_UNISTD $unistd\n";
- }
- elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG/)
- { printf OUT "#%s SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG\n",($b64l)?"define":"undef"; }
- elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+SIXTY_FOUR_BIT/)
- { printf OUT "#%s SIXTY_FOUR_BIT\n",($b64)?"define":"undef"; }
- elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+THIRTY_TWO_BIT/)
- { printf OUT "#%s THIRTY_TWO_BIT\n",($b32)?"define":"undef"; }
- elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+SIXTEEN_BIT/)
- { printf OUT "#%s SIXTEEN_BIT\n",($b16)?"define":"undef"; }
- elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+EIGHT_BIT/)
- { printf OUT "#%s EIGHT_BIT\n",($b8)?"define":"undef"; }
- elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+BN_LLONG\s*$/)
- { printf OUT "#%s BN_LLONG\n",($bn_ll)?"define":"undef"; }
- elsif (/^\#define\s+DES_LONG\s+.*/)
- { printf OUT "#define DES_LONG unsigned %s\n",
- ($des_int)?'int':'long'; }
- elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_PTR/)
- { printf OUT "#%s DES_PTR\n",($des_ptr)?'define':'undef'; }
- elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_RISC1/)
- { printf OUT "#%s DES_RISC1\n",($des_risc1)?'define':'undef'; }
- elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_RISC2/)
- { printf OUT "#%s DES_RISC2\n",($des_risc2)?'define':'undef'; }
- elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_UNROLL/)
- { printf OUT "#%s DES_UNROLL\n",($des_unroll)?'define':'undef'; }
- elsif (/^#define\s+RC4_INT\s/)
- { printf OUT "#define RC4_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$rc4_int]; }
- elsif (/^#undef\s+RC4_CHUNK/)
- {
- printf OUT "#undef RC4_CHUNK\n" if $rc4_chunk==0;
- printf OUT "#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long\n" if $rc4_chunk==1;
- printf OUT "#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long long\n" if $rc4_chunk==2;
- }
- elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+RC4_INDEX/)
- { printf OUT "#%s RC4_INDEX\n",($rc4_idx)?"define":"undef"; }
- elsif (/^#(define|undef)\s+I386_ONLY/)
- { printf OUT "#%s I386_ONLY\n", ($processor eq "386")?
- "define":"undef"; }
- elsif (/^#define\s+MD2_INT\s/)
- { printf OUT "#define MD2_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$md2_int]; }
- elsif (/^#define\s+IDEA_INT\s/)
- {printf OUT "#define IDEA_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$idea_int];}
- elsif (/^#define\s+RC2_INT\s/)
- {printf OUT "#define RC2_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$rc2_int];}
- elsif (/^#(define|undef)\s+BF_PTR/)
- {
- printf OUT "#undef BF_PTR\n" if $bf_ptr == 0;
- printf OUT "#define BF_PTR\n" if $bf_ptr == 1;
- printf OUT "#define BF_PTR2\n" if $bf_ptr == 2;
- }
- else
- { print OUT $_; }
- }
-close(IN);
-print OUT "#ifdef __cplusplus\n";
-print OUT "}\n";
-print OUT "#endif\n";
-close(OUT);
-rename("crypto/opensslconf.h","crypto/opensslconf.h.bak") || die "unable to rename crypto/opensslconf.h\n" if -e "crypto/opensslconf.h";
-rename("crypto/opensslconf.h.new","crypto/opensslconf.h") || die "unable to rename crypto/opensslconf.h.new\n";
-
-
-# Fix the date
-
-print "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG mode\n" if $b64l;
-print "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT mode\n" if $b64;
-print "THIRTY_TWO_BIT mode\n" if $b32;
-print "SIXTEEN_BIT mode\n" if $b16;
-print "EIGHT_BIT mode\n" if $b8;
-print "DES_PTR used\n" if $des_ptr;
-print "DES_RISC1 used\n" if $des_risc1;
-print "DES_RISC2 used\n" if $des_risc2;
-print "DES_UNROLL used\n" if $des_unroll;
-print "DES_INT used\n" if $des_int;
-print "BN_LLONG mode\n" if $bn_ll;
-print "RC4 uses u$type[$rc4_int]\n" if $rc4_int != $def_int;
-print "RC4_INDEX mode\n" if $rc4_idx;
-print "RC4_CHUNK is undefined\n" if $rc4_chunk==0;
-print "RC4_CHUNK is unsigned long\n" if $rc4_chunk==1;
-print "RC4_CHUNK is unsigned long long\n" if $rc4_chunk==2;
-print "MD2 uses u$type[$md2_int]\n" if $md2_int != $def_int;
-print "IDEA uses u$type[$idea_int]\n" if $idea_int != $def_int;
-print "RC2 uses u$type[$rc2_int]\n" if $rc2_int != $def_int;
-print "BF_PTR used\n" if $bf_ptr == 1;
-print "BF_PTR2 used\n" if $bf_ptr == 2;
-
-if($IsMK1MF) {
- open (OUT,">crypto/buildinf.h") || die "Can't open buildinf.h";
- printf OUT <<EOF;
-#ifndef MK1MF_BUILD
- /* auto-generated by Configure for crypto/cversion.c:
- * for Unix builds, crypto/Makefile.ssl generates functional definitions;
- * Windows builds (and other mk1mf builds) compile cversion.c with
- * -DMK1MF_BUILD and use definitions added to this file by util/mk1mf.pl. */
- #error "Windows builds (PLATFORM=$target) use mk1mf.pl-created Makefiles"
-#endif
-EOF
- close(OUT);
-} else {
- my $make_command = "$make PERL=\'$perl\'";
- my $make_targets = "";
- $make_targets .= " links" if $symlink;
- $make_targets .= " depend" if $depflags ne $default_depflags && $make_depend;
- $make_targets .= " gentests" if $symlink;
- (system $make_command.$make_targets) == 0 or exit $?
- if $make_targets ne "";
- if ( $perl =~ m@^/@) {
- &dofile("tools/c_rehash",$perl,'^#!/', '#!%s','^my \$dir;$', 'my $dir = "' . $openssldir . '";', '^my \$prefix;$', 'my $prefix = "' . $prefix . '";');
- &dofile("apps/CA.pl",$perl,'^#!/', '#!%s');
- } else {
- # No path for Perl known ...
- &dofile("tools/c_rehash",'/usr/local/bin/perl','^#!/', '#!%s','^my \$dir;$', 'my $dir = "' . $openssldir . '";', '^my \$prefix;$', 'my $prefix = "' . $prefix . '";');
- &dofile("apps/CA.pl",'/usr/local/bin/perl','^#!/', '#!%s');
- }
- if ($depflags ne $default_depflags && !$make_depend) {
- print <<EOF;
-
-Since you've disabled or enabled at least one algorithm, you need to do
-the following before building:
-
- make depend
-EOF
- }
-}
-
-# create the ms/version32.rc file if needed
-if ($IsMK1MF && ($target !~ /^netware/)) {
- my ($v1, $v2, $v3, $v4);
- if ($version_num =~ /(^[0-9a-f]{1})([0-9a-f]{2})([0-9a-f]{2})([0-9a-f]{2})/i) {
- $v1=hex $1;
- $v2=hex $2;
- $v3=hex $3;
- $v4=hex $4;
- }
- open (OUT,">ms/version32.rc") || die "Can't open ms/version32.rc";
- print OUT <<EOF;
-#include <winver.h>
-
-LANGUAGE 0x09,0x01
-
-1 VERSIONINFO
- FILEVERSION $v1,$v2,$v3,$v4
- PRODUCTVERSION $v1,$v2,$v3,$v4
- FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
-#ifdef _DEBUG
- FILEFLAGS 0x01L
-#else
- FILEFLAGS 0x00L
-#endif
- FILEOS VOS__WINDOWS32
- FILETYPE VFT_DLL
- FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
-BEGIN
- BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
- BEGIN
- BLOCK "040904b0"
- BEGIN
- // Required:
- VALUE "CompanyName", "The OpenSSL Project, http://www.openssl.org/\\0"
- VALUE "FileDescription", "OpenSSL Shared Library\\0"
- VALUE "FileVersion", "$version\\0"
-#if defined(CRYPTO)
- VALUE "InternalName", "libeay32\\0"
- VALUE "OriginalFilename", "libeay32.dll\\0"
-#elif defined(SSL)
- VALUE "InternalName", "ssleay32\\0"
- VALUE "OriginalFilename", "ssleay32.dll\\0"
-#endif
- VALUE "ProductName", "The OpenSSL Toolkit\\0"
- VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0"
- // Optional:
- //VALUE "Comments", "\\0"
- VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright \xA9 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright \xA9 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
- //VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0"
- //VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0"
- //VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0"
- END
- END
- BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
- BEGIN
- VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 0x4b0
- END
-END
-EOF
- close(OUT);
- }
-
-print <<EOF;
-
-Configured for $target.
-EOF
-
-print <<\EOF if (!$no_threads && !$threads);
-
-The library could not be configured for supporting multi-threaded
-applications as the compiler options required on this system are not known.
-See file INSTALL for details if you need multi-threading.
-EOF
-
-print <<\EOF if ($no_shared_warn);
-
-You gave the option 'shared'. Normally, that would give you shared libraries.
-Unfortunately, the OpenSSL configuration doesn't include shared library support
-for this platform yet, so it will pretend you gave the option 'no-shared'. If
-you can inform the developpers (openssl-dev\@openssl.org) how to support shared
-libraries on this platform, they will at least look at it and try their best
-(but please first make sure you have tried with a current version of OpenSSL).
-EOF
-
-exit(0);
-
-sub usage
- {
- print STDERR $usage;
- print STDERR "\npick os/compiler from:\n";
- my $j=0;
- my $i;
- my $k=0;
- foreach $i (sort keys %table)
- {
- next if $i =~ /^debug/;
- $k += length($i) + 1;
- if ($k > 78)
- {
- print STDERR "\n";
- $k=length($i);
- }
- print STDERR $i . " ";
- }
- foreach $i (sort keys %table)
- {
- next if $i !~ /^debug/;
- $k += length($i) + 1;
- if ($k > 78)
- {
- print STDERR "\n";
- $k=length($i);
- }
- print STDERR $i . " ";
- }
- print STDERR "\n\nNOTE: If in doubt, on Unix-ish systems use './config'.\n";
- exit(1);
- }
-
-sub which
- {
- my($name)=@_;
- my $path;
- foreach $path (split /:/, $ENV{PATH})
- {
- if (-f "$path/$name$exe_ext" and -x _)
- {
- return "$path/$name$exe_ext" unless ($name eq "perl" and
- system("$path/$name$exe_ext -e " . '\'exit($]<5.0);\''));
- }
- }
- }
-
-sub dofile
- {
- my $f; my $p; my %m; my @a; my $k; my $ff;
- ($f,$p,%m)=@_;
-
- open(IN,"<$f.in") || open(IN,"<$f") || die "unable to open $f:$!\n";
- @a=<IN>;
- close(IN);
- foreach $k (keys %m)
- {
- grep(/$k/ && ($_=sprintf($m{$k}."\n",$p)), at a);
- }
- open(OUT,">$f.new") || die "unable to open $f.new:$!\n";
- print OUT @a;
- close(OUT);
- rename($f,"$f.bak") || die "unable to rename $f\n" if -e $f;
- rename("$f.new",$f) || die "unable to rename $f.new\n";
- }
-
-sub print_table_entry
- {
- my $target = shift;
-
- (my $cc,my $cflags,my $unistd,my $thread_cflag,my $sys_id,my $lflags,
- my $bn_ops,my $cpuid_obj,my $bn_obj,my $des_obj,my $aes_obj, my $bf_obj,
- my $md5_obj,my $sha1_obj,my $cast_obj,my $rc4_obj,my $rmd160_obj,
- my $rc5_obj,my $wp_obj,my $cmll_obj,my $modes_obj, my $engines_obj,
- my $perlasm_scheme,my $dso_scheme,my $shared_target,my $shared_cflag,
- my $shared_ldflag,my $shared_extension,my $ranlib,my $arflags,my $multilib)=
- split(/\s*:\s*/,$table{$target} . ":" x 30 , -1);
-
- print <<EOF
-
-*** $target
-\$cc = $cc
-\$cflags = $cflags
-\$unistd = $unistd
-\$thread_cflag = $thread_cflag
-\$sys_id = $sys_id
-\$lflags = $lflags
-\$bn_ops = $bn_ops
-\$cpuid_obj = $cpuid_obj
-\$bn_obj = $bn_obj
-\$des_obj = $des_obj
-\$aes_obj = $aes_obj
-\$bf_obj = $bf_obj
-\$md5_obj = $md5_obj
-\$sha1_obj = $sha1_obj
-\$cast_obj = $cast_obj
-\$rc4_obj = $rc4_obj
-\$rmd160_obj = $rmd160_obj
-\$rc5_obj = $rc5_obj
-\$wp_obj = $wp_obj
-\$cmll_obj = $cmll_obj
-\$modes_obj = $modes_obj
-\$engines_obj = $engines_obj
-\$perlasm_scheme = $perlasm_scheme
-\$dso_scheme = $dso_scheme
-\$shared_target= $shared_target
-\$shared_cflag = $shared_cflag
-\$shared_ldflag = $shared_ldflag
-\$shared_extension = $shared_extension
-\$ranlib = $ranlib
-\$arflags = $arflags
-\$multilib = $multilib
-EOF
- }
-
-sub test_sanity
- {
- my $errorcnt = 0;
-
- print STDERR "=" x 70, "\n";
- print STDERR "=== SANITY TESTING!\n";
- print STDERR "=== No configuration will be done, all other arguments will be ignored!\n";
- print STDERR "=" x 70, "\n";
-
- foreach $target (sort keys %table)
- {
- @fields = split(/\s*:\s*/,$table{$target} . ":" x 30 , -1);
-
- if ($fields[$idx_dso_scheme-1] =~ /^(beos|dl|dlfcn|win32|vms)$/)
- {
- $errorcnt++;
- print STDERR "SANITY ERROR: '$target' has the dso_scheme [$idx_dso_scheme] values\n";
- print STDERR " in the previous field\n";
- }
- elsif ($fields[$idx_dso_scheme+1] =~ /^(beos|dl|dlfcn|win32|vms)$/)
- {
- $errorcnt++;
- print STDERR "SANITY ERROR: '$target' has the dso_scheme [$idx_dso_scheme] values\n";
- print STDERR " in the following field\n";
- }
- elsif ($fields[$idx_dso_scheme] !~ /^(beos|dl|dlfcn|win32|vms|)$/)
- {
- $errorcnt++;
- print STDERR "SANITY ERROR: '$target' has the dso_scheme [$idx_dso_scheme] field = ",$fields[$idx_dso_scheme],"\n";
- print STDERR " valid values are 'beos', 'dl', 'dlfcn', 'win32' and 'vms'\n";
- }
- }
- print STDERR "No sanity errors detected!\n" if $errorcnt == 0;
- return $errorcnt;
- }
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Configure (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/Configure)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Configure (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Configure 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2201 @@
+:
+eval 'exec perl -S $0 ${1+"$@"}'
+ if $running_under_some_shell;
+##
+## Configure -- OpenSSL source tree configuration script
+##
+
+require 5.000;
+use strict;
+
+# see INSTALL for instructions.
+
+my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
+
+# Options:
+#
+# --openssldir install OpenSSL in OPENSSLDIR (Default: DIR/ssl if the
+# --prefix option is given; /usr/local/ssl otherwise)
+# --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories
+# (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory)
+#
+# --install_prefix Additional prefix for package builders (empty by
+# default). This needn't be set in advance, you can
+# just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
+#
+# --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected
+# to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in
+# include/. A value is required.
+# --with-krb5-lib Declare where the Kerberos 5 libraries live. A value is
+# required.
+# (Default: KRB5_DIR/lib)
+# --with-krb5-include Declare where the Kerberos 5 header files live. A
+# value is required.
+# (Default: KRB5_DIR/include)
+# --with-krb5-flavor Declare what flavor of Kerberos 5 is used. Currently
+# supported values are "MIT" and "Heimdal". A value is required.
+#
+# --test-sanity Make a number of sanity checks on the data in this file.
+# This is a debugging tool for OpenSSL developers.
+#
+# --cross-compile-prefix Add specified prefix to binutils components.
+#
+# no-hw-xxx do not compile support for specific crypto hardware.
+# Generic OpenSSL-style methods relating to this support
+# are always compiled but return NULL if the hardware
+# support isn't compiled.
+# no-hw do not compile support for any crypto hardware.
+# [no-]threads [don't] try to create a library that is suitable for
+# multithreaded applications (default is "threads" if we
+# know how to do it)
+# [no-]shared [don't] try to create shared libraries when supported.
+# no-asm do not use assembler
+# no-dso do not compile in any native shared-library methods. This
+# will ensure that all methods just return NULL.
+# no-krb5 do not compile in any KRB5 library or code.
+# [no-]zlib [don't] compile support for zlib compression.
+# zlib-dynamic Like "zlib", but the zlib library is expected to be a shared
+# library and will be loaded in run-time by the OpenSSL library.
+# sctp include SCTP support
+# 386 generate 80386 code
+# no-sse2 disables IA-32 SSE2 code, above option implies no-sse2
+# no-<cipher> build without specified algorithm (rsa, idea, rc5, ...)
+# -<xxx> +<xxx> compiler options are passed through
+#
+# DEBUG_SAFESTACK use type-safe stacks to enforce type-safety on stack items
+# provided to stack calls. Generates unique stack functions for
+# each possible stack type.
+# DES_PTR use pointer lookup vs arrays in the DES in crypto/des/des_locl.h
+# DES_RISC1 use different DES_ENCRYPT macro that helps reduce register
+# dependancies but needs to more registers, good for RISC CPU's
+# DES_RISC2 A different RISC variant.
+# DES_UNROLL unroll the inner DES loop, sometimes helps, somtimes hinders.
+# DES_INT use 'int' instead of 'long' for DES_LONG in crypto/des/des.h
+# This is used on the DEC Alpha where long is 8 bytes
+# and int is 4
+# BN_LLONG use the type 'long long' in crypto/bn/bn.h
+# MD2_CHAR use 'char' instead of 'int' for MD2_INT in crypto/md2/md2.h
+# MD2_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for MD2_INT in crypto/md2/md2.h
+# IDEA_SHORT use 'short' instead of 'int' for IDEA_INT in crypto/idea/idea.h
+# IDEA_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for IDEA_INT in crypto/idea/idea.h
+# RC2_SHORT use 'short' instead of 'int' for RC2_INT in crypto/rc2/rc2.h
+# RC2_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for RC2_INT in crypto/rc2/rc2.h
+# RC4_CHAR use 'char' instead of 'int' for RC4_INT in crypto/rc4/rc4.h
+# RC4_LONG use 'long' instead of 'int' for RC4_INT in crypto/rc4/rc4.h
+# RC4_INDEX define RC4_INDEX in crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h. This turns on
+# array lookups instead of pointer use.
+# RC4_CHUNK enables code that handles data aligned at long (natural CPU
+# word) boundary.
+# RC4_CHUNK_LL enables code that handles data aligned at long long boundary
+# (intended for 64-bit CPUs running 32-bit OS).
+# BF_PTR use 'pointer arithmatic' for Blowfish (unsafe on Alpha).
+# BF_PTR2 intel specific version (generic version is more efficient).
+#
+# Following are set automatically by this script
+#
+# MD5_ASM use some extra md5 assember,
+# SHA1_ASM use some extra sha1 assember, must define L_ENDIAN for x86
+# RMD160_ASM use some extra ripemd160 assember,
+# SHA256_ASM sha256_block is implemented in assembler
+# SHA512_ASM sha512_block is implemented in assembler
+# AES_ASM ASE_[en|de]crypt is implemented in assembler
+
+# Minimum warning options... any contributions to OpenSSL should at least get
+# past these.
+
+my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED";
+
+my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
+
+my $strict_warnings = 0;
+
+my $x86_gcc_des="DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL";
+
+# MD2_CHAR slags pentium pros
+my $x86_gcc_opts="RC4_INDEX MD2_INT";
+
+# MODIFY THESE PARAMETERS IF YOU ARE GOING TO USE THE 'util/speed.sh SCRIPT
+# Don't worry about these normally
+
+my $tcc="cc";
+my $tflags="-fast -Xa";
+my $tbn_mul="";
+my $tlib="-lnsl -lsocket";
+#$bits1="SIXTEEN_BIT ";
+#$bits2="THIRTY_TWO_BIT ";
+my $bits1="THIRTY_TWO_BIT ";
+my $bits2="SIXTY_FOUR_BIT ";
+
+my $x86_asm="x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o x86-gf2m.o:des-586.o crypt586.o:aes-586.o vpaes-x86.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o:cmll-x86.o:ghash-x86.o:";
+
+my $x86_elf_asm="$x86_asm:elf";
+
+my $x86_64_asm="x86_64cpuid.o:x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-mont5.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o::aes-x86_64.o vpaes-x86_64.o bsaes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o aesni-sha1-x86_64.o::md5-x86_64.o:sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o::rc4-x86_64.o rc4-md5-x86_64.o:::wp-x86_64.o:cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o:ghash-x86_64.o:";
+my $ia64_asm="ia64cpuid.o:bn-ia64.o ia64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o::rc4-ia64.o rc4_skey.o:::::ghash-ia64.o::void";
+my $sparcv9_asm="sparcv9cap.o sparccpuid.o:bn-sparcv9.o sparcv9-mont.o sparcv9a-mont.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-sparcv9.o:::sha1-sparcv9.o sha256-sparcv9.o sha512-sparcv9.o:::::::ghash-sparcv9.o::void";
+my $sparcv8_asm=":sparcv8.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:::::::::::::void";
+my $alpha_asm="alphacpuid.o:bn_asm.o alpha-mont.o:::::sha1-alpha.o:::::::ghash-alpha.o::void";
+my $mips32_asm=":bn-mips.o::aes_cbc.o aes-mips.o:::sha1-mips.o sha256-mips.o::::::::";
+my $mips64_asm=":bn-mips.o mips-mont.o::aes_cbc.o aes-mips.o:::sha1-mips.o sha256-mips.o sha512-mips.o::::::::";
+my $s390x_asm="s390xcap.o s390xcpuid.o:bn-s390x.o s390x-mont.o s390x-gf2m.o::aes-s390x.o aes-ctr.o aes-xts.o:::sha1-s390x.o sha256-s390x.o sha512-s390x.o::rc4-s390x.o:::::ghash-s390x.o:";
+my $armv4_asm="armcap.o armv4cpuid.o:bn_asm.o armv4-mont.o armv4-gf2m.o::aes_cbc.o aes-armv4.o:::sha1-armv4-large.o sha256-armv4.o sha512-armv4.o:::::::ghash-armv4.o::void";
+my $parisc11_asm="pariscid.o:bn_asm.o parisc-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-parisc.o:::sha1-parisc.o sha256-parisc.o sha512-parisc.o::rc4-parisc.o:::::ghash-parisc.o::32";
+my $parisc20_asm="pariscid.o:pa-risc2W.o parisc-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-parisc.o:::sha1-parisc.o sha256-parisc.o sha512-parisc.o::rc4-parisc.o:::::ghash-parisc.o::64";
+my $ppc32_asm="ppccpuid.o ppccap.o:bn-ppc.o ppc-mont.o ppc64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ppc.o:::sha1-ppc.o sha256-ppc.o::::::::";
+my $ppc64_asm="ppccpuid.o ppccap.o:bn-ppc.o ppc-mont.o ppc64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ppc.o:::sha1-ppc.o sha256-ppc.o sha512-ppc.o::::::::";
+my $no_asm=":::::::::::::::void";
+
+# As for $BSDthreads. Idea is to maintain "collective" set of flags,
+# which would cover all BSD flavors. -pthread applies to them all,
+# but is treated differently. OpenBSD expands is as -D_POSIX_THREAD
+# -lc_r, which is sufficient. FreeBSD 4.x expands it as -lc_r,
+# which has to be accompanied by explicit -D_THREAD_SAFE and
+# sometimes -D_REENTRANT. FreeBSD 5.x expands it as -lc_r, which
+# seems to be sufficient?
+my $BSDthreads="-pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT";
+
+#config-string $cc : $cflags : $unistd : $thread_cflag : $sys_id : $lflags : $bn_ops : $cpuid_obj : $bn_obj : $des_obj : $aes_obj : $bf_obj : $md5_obj : $sha1_obj : $cast_obj : $rc4_obj : $rmd160_obj : $rc5_obj : $wp_obj : $cmll_obj : $modes_obj : $engines_obj : $dso_scheme : $shared_target : $shared_cflag : $shared_ldflag : $shared_extension : $ranlib : $arflags : $multilib
+
+my %table=(
+# File 'TABLE' (created by 'make TABLE') contains the data from this list,
+# formatted for better readability.
+
+
+#"b", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits1}:${tbn_mul}::",
+#"bl-4c-2c", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits1}BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR MD2_CHAR:${tbn_mul}::",
+#"bl-4c-ri", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits1}BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_INDEX:${tbn_mul}::",
+#"b2-is-ri-dp", "${tcc}:${tflags}::${tlib}:${bits2}IDEA_SHORT RC4_INDEX DES_PTR:${tbn_mul}::",
+
+# Our development configs
+"purify", "purify gcc:-g -DPURIFY -Wall::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl::::",
+"debug", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -ggdb -g2 -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror::(unknown)::-lefence::::",
+"debug-ben", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -O2 -pipe::(unknown):::::",
+"debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
+"debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
+"debug-ben-debug", "gcc44:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-ben-debug-64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-ben-macos", "cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -arch i386 -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::-Wl,-search_paths_first::::",
+"debug-ben-macos-gcc46", "gcc-mp-4.6:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wconversion -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-ben-darwin64","cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+"debug-ben-no-opt", "gcc: -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -Werror -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -Wall -g3::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-ben-strict", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
+"debug-bodo", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"debug-ulf", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:win32:cygwin-shared:::.dll",
+"debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-geoff32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-geoff64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
+"debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
+"debug-linux-elf","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lefence -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-linux-elf-noefence","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-linux-ia32-aes", "gcc:-DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o:des-586.o crypt586.o:aes_x86core.o aes_cbc.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o::ghash-x86.o::elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-linux-generic32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-linux-generic64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-linux-x86_64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"debug-linux-x86_64-clang","clang: -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"dist", "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::",
+
+# Basic configs that should work on any (32 and less bit) box
+"gcc", "gcc:-O3::(unknown):::BN_LLONG:::",
+"cc", "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::",
+
+####VOS Configurations
+"vos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
+"debug-vos-gcc","gcc:-O0 -g -Wall -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_VOS -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200112L -D_BSD -D_VOS_EXTENDED_NAMES -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG::(unknown):VOS:-Wl,-map:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:::::.so:",
+
+#### Solaris x86 with GNU C setups
+# -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM switches off inline assembler. We have to do it
+# here because whenever GNU C instantiates an assembler template it
+# surrounds it with #APP #NO_APP comment pair which (at least Solaris
+# 7_x86) /usr/ccs/bin/as fails to assemble with "Illegal mnemonic"
+# error message.
+"solaris-x86-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=pentium -Wall -DL_ENDIAN -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+# -shared -static-libgcc might appear controversial, but modules taken
+# from static libgcc do not have relocations and linking them into our
+# shared objects doesn't have any negative side-effects. On the contrary,
+# doing so makes it possible to use gcc shared build with Sun C. Given
+# that gcc generates faster code [thanks to inline assembler], I would
+# actually recommend to consider using gcc shared build even with vendor
+# compiler:-)
+# <appro at fy.chalmers.se>
+"solaris64-x86_64-gcc","gcc:-m64 -O3 -Wall -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-m64 -shared -static-libgcc:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
+
+#### Solaris x86 with Sun C setups
+"solaris-x86-cc","cc:-fast -O -Xa::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"solaris64-x86_64-cc","cc:-fast -xarch=amd64 -xstrconst -Xa -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=amd64 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
+
+#### SPARC Solaris with GNU C setups
+"solaris-sparcv7-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+# -m32 should be safe to add as long as driver recognizes -mcpu=ultrasparc
+"solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"solaris64-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-m64 -shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
+####
+"debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mcpu=v8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -O -g -mcpu=ultrasparc -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wno-long-long -D__EXTENSIONS__ -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
+#### SPARC Solaris with Sun C setups
+# SC4.0 doesn't pass 'make test', upgrade to SC5.0 or SC4.2.
+# SC4.2 is ok, better than gcc even on bn as long as you tell it -xarch=v8
+# SC5.0 note: Compiler common patch 107357-01 or later is required!
+"solaris-sparcv7-cc","cc:-xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-xarch=v8 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"solaris64-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v9 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
+####
+"debug-solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xarch=v8 -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
+#### SunOS configs, assuming sparc for the gcc one.
+#"sunos-cc", "cc:-O4 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST::(unknown):SUNOS::DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}::",
+"sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mcpu=v8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::",
+
+#### IRIX 5.x configs
+# -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate.
+"irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"irix-cc", "cc:-O2 -use_readonly_const -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+#### IRIX 6.x configs
+# Only N32 and N64 ABIs are supported. If you need O32 ABI build, invoke
+# './Configure irix-cc -o32' manually.
+"irix-mips3-gcc","gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
+"irix-mips3-cc", "cc:-n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::DES_PTR RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
+# N64 ABI builds.
+"irix64-mips4-gcc","gcc:-mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"irix64-mips4-cc", "cc:-64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+
+#### Unified HP-UX ANSI C configs.
+# Special notes:
+# - Originally we were optimizing at +O4 level. It should be noted
+# that the only difference between +O3 and +O4 is global inter-
+# procedural analysis. As it has to be performed during the link
+# stage the compiler leaves behind certain pseudo-code in lib*.a
+# which might be release or even patch level specific. Generating
+# the machine code for and analyzing the *whole* program appears
+# to be *extremely* memory demanding while the performance gain is
+# actually questionable. The situation is intensified by the default
+# HP-UX data set size limit (infamous 'maxdsiz' tunable) of 64MB
+# which is way too low for +O4. In other words, doesn't +O3 make
+# more sense?
+# - Keep in mind that the HP compiler by default generates code
+# suitable for execution on the host you're currently compiling at.
+# If the toolkit is ment to be used on various PA-RISC processors
+# consider './config +DAportable'.
+# - +DD64 is chosen in favour of +DA2.0W because it's meant to be
+# compatible with *future* releases.
+# - If you run ./Configure hpux-parisc-[g]cc manually don't forget to
+# pass -D_REENTRANT on HP-UX 10 and later.
+# - -DMD32_XARRAY triggers workaround for compiler bug we ran into in
+# 32-bit message digests. (For the moment of this writing) HP C
+# doesn't seem to "digest" too many local variables (they make "him"
+# chew forever:-). For more details look-up MD32_XARRAY comment in
+# crypto/sha/sha_lcl.h.
+# <appro at fy.chalmers.se>
+#
+# Since there is mention of this in shlib/hpux10-cc.sh
+"hpux-parisc-cc-o4","cc:-Ae +O4 +ESlit -z -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"hpux-parisc-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"hpux-parisc1_1-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${parisc11_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa1.1",
+"hpux-parisc2-gcc","gcc:-march=2.0 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-Wl,+s -ldld:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:".eval{my $asm=$parisc20_asm;$asm=~s/2W\./2\./;$asm=~s/:64/:32/;$asm}.":dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_32",
+"hpux64-parisc2-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT::pa-risc2W.o::::::::::::::void:dlfcn:hpux-shared:-fpic:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_64",
+
+# More attempts at unified 10.X and 11.X targets for HP C compiler.
+#
+# Chris Ruemmler <ruemmler at cup.hp.com>
+# Kevin Steves <ks at hp.se>
+"hpux-parisc-cc","cc:+O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"hpux-parisc1_1-cc","cc:+DA1.1 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${parisc11_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa1.1",
+"hpux-parisc2-cc","cc:+DA2.0 +DS2.0 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY -D_REENTRANT::::-Wl,+s -ldld:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:".eval{my $asm=$parisc20_asm;$asm=~s/2W\./2\./;$asm=~s/:64/:32/;$asm}.":dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_32",
+"hpux64-parisc2-cc","cc:+DD64 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${parisc20_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:+Z:+DD64 -b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_64",
+
+# HP/UX IA-64 targets
+"hpux-ia64-cc","cc:-Ae +DD32 +O2 +Olit=all -z -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:+Z:+DD32 -b:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux32",
+# Frank Geurts <frank.geurts at nl.abnamro.com> has patiently assisted with
+# with debugging of the following config.
+"hpux64-ia64-cc","cc:-Ae +DD64 +O3 +Olit=all -z -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:+Z:+DD64 -b:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux64",
+# GCC builds...
+"hpux-ia64-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:-fpic:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux32",
+"hpux64-ia64-gcc","gcc:-mlp64 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:-fpic:-mlp64 -shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/hpux64",
+
+# Legacy HPUX 9.X configs...
+"hpux-cc", "cc:-DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY -Ae +ESlit +O2 -z::(unknown)::-Wl,+s -ldld:DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"hpux-gcc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -O3::(unknown)::-Wl,+s -ldld:DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
+#### HP MPE/iX http://jazz.external.hp.com/src/openssl/
+"MPE/iX-gcc", "gcc:-D_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -O3 -D_POSIX_SOURCE -D_SOCKET_SOURCE -I/SYSLOG/PUB::(unknown):MPE:-L/SYSLOG/PUB -lsyslog -lsocket -lcurses:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:::",
+
+# DEC Alpha OSF/1/Tru64 targets.
+#
+# "What's in a name? That which we call a rose
+# By any other word would smell as sweet."
+#
+# - William Shakespeare, "Romeo & Juliet", Act II, scene II.
+#
+# For gcc, the following gave a %50 speedup on a 164 over the 'DES_INT' version
+#
+"osf1-alpha-gcc", "gcc:-O3::(unknown):::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:alpha-osf1-shared:::.so",
+"osf1-alpha-cc", "cc:-std1 -tune host -O4 -readonly_strings::(unknown):::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:alpha-osf1-shared:::.so",
+"tru64-alpha-cc", "cc:-std1 -tune host -fast -readonly_strings::-pthread:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:alpha-osf1-shared::-msym:.so",
+
+####
+#### Variety of LINUX:-)
+####
+# *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to
+# throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate...
+"linux-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+# It's believed that majority of ARM toolchains predefine appropriate -march.
+# If you compiler does not, do complement config command line with one!
+"linux-armv4", "gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+#### IA-32 targets...
+"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
+####
+"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux-x86_64-clang","clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+#### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
+# "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see
+# /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of
+# general purpose registers not only upon 32-bit process context
+# switch, but even on asynchronous signal delivery to such process.
+# This makes it possible to deploy 64-bit instructions even in legacy
+# application context and achieve better [or should we say adequate]
+# performance. The build is binary compatible with linux-generic32,
+# and the idea is to be able to install the resulting libcrypto.so
+# alongside generic one, e.g. as /lib/highgprs/libcrypto.so.x.y, for
+# ldconfig and run-time linker to autodiscover. Unfortunately it
+# doesn't work just yet, because of couple of bugs in glibc
+# sysdeps/s390/dl-procinfo.c affecting ldconfig and ld.so.1...
+"linux32-s390x", "gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/highgprs",
+#### SPARC Linux setups
+# Ray Miller <ray.miller at computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
+# assisted with debugging of following two configs.
+"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+# it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, but
+# -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what.
+"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+# GCC 3.1 is a requirement
+"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+#### Alpha Linux with GNU C and Compaq C setups
+# Special notes:
+# - linux-alpha+bwx-gcc is ment to be used from ./config only. If you
+# ought to run './Configure linux-alpha+bwx-gcc' manually, do
+# complement the command line with -mcpu=ev56, -mcpu=ev6 or whatever
+# which is appropriate.
+# - If you use ccc keep in mind that -fast implies -arch host and the
+# compiler is free to issue instructions which gonna make elder CPU
+# choke. If you wish to build "blended" toolkit, add -arch generic
+# *after* -fast and invoke './Configure linux-alpha-ccc' manually.
+#
+# <appro at fy.chalmers.se>
+#
+"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
+"linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
+
+# Android: linux-* but without pointers to headers and libs.
+"android","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"android-x86","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:".eval{my $asm=${x86_elf_asm};$asm=~s/:elf/:android/;$asm}.":dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"android-armv7","gcc:-march=armv7-a -mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
+#### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!]
+"BSD-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
+"BSD-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+# -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it
+# simply *happens* to work around a compiler bug in gcc 3.3.3,
+# triggered by RIPEMD160 code.
+"BSD-sparc64", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"BSD-x86_64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
+"bsdi-elf-gcc", "gcc:-DPERL5 -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown)::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
+"nextstep", "cc:-O -Wall:<libc.h>:(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::",
+"nextstep3.3", "cc:-O3 -Wall:<libc.h>:(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::",
+
+# NCR MP-RAS UNIX ver 02.03.01
+"ncr-scde","cc:-O6 -Xa -Hoff=BEHAVED -686 -Hwide -Hiw::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl -lc89:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::",
+
+# QNX
+"qnx4", "cc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::(unknown):::${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:",
+"QNX6", "gcc:::::-lsocket::${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"QNX6-i386", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::::-lsocket:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
+# BeOS
+"beos-x86-r5", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:BEOS:-lbe -lnet:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:beos:beos-shared:-fPIC -DPIC:-shared:.so",
+"beos-x86-bone", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:BEOS:-lbe -lbind -lsocket:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:beos:beos-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so",
+
+#### SCO/Caldera targets.
+#
+# Originally we had like unixware-*, unixware-*-pentium, unixware-*-p6, etc.
+# Now we only have blended unixware-* as it's the only one used by ./config.
+# If you want to optimize for particular microarchitecture, bypass ./config
+# and './Configure unixware-7 -Kpentium_pro' or whatever appropriate.
+# Note that not all targets include assembler support. Mostly because of
+# lack of motivation to support out-of-date platforms with out-of-date
+# compiler drivers and assemblers. Tim Rice <tim at multitalents.net> has
+# patiently assisted to debug most of it.
+#
+# UnixWare 2.0x fails destest with -O.
+"unixware-2.0","cc:-DFILIO_H -DNO_STRINGS_H::-Kthread::-lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lx:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::",
+"unixware-2.1","cc:-O -DFILIO_H::-Kthread::-lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lx:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:::",
+"unixware-7","cc:-O -DFILIO_H -Kalloca::-Kthread::-lsocket -lnsl:BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX ${x86_gcc_des}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:svr5-shared:-Kpic::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"unixware-7-gcc","gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DFILIO_H -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:gnu-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+# SCO 5 - Ben Laurie <ben at algroup.co.uk> says the -O breaks the SCO cc.
+"sco5-cc", "cc:-belf::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:svr3-shared:-Kpic::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"sco5-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:svr3-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
+#### IBM's AIX.
+"aix3-cc", "cc:-O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384::(unknown):AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:::",
+"aix-gcc", "gcc:-O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X32",
+"aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64",
+# Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE
+# at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage!
+"aix-cc", "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
+"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
+
+#
+# Cray T90 and similar (SDSC)
+# It's Big-endian, but the algorithms work properly when B_ENDIAN is NOT
+# defined. The T90 ints and longs are 8 bytes long, and apparently the
+# B_ENDIAN code assumes 4 byte ints. Fortunately, the non-B_ENDIAN and
+# non L_ENDIAN code aligns the bytes in each word correctly.
+#
+# The BIT_FIELD_LIMITS define is to avoid two fatal compiler errors:
+#'Taking the address of a bit field is not allowed. '
+#'An expression with bit field exists as the operand of "sizeof" '
+# (written by Wayne Schroeder <schroede at SDSC.EDU>)
+#
+# j90 is considered the base machine type for unicos machines,
+# so this configuration is now called "cray-j90" ...
+"cray-j90", "cc: -DBIT_FIELD_LIMITS -DTERMIOS::(unknown):CRAY::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG DES_INT:::",
+
+#
+# Cray T3E (Research Center Juelich, beckman at acl.lanl.gov)
+#
+# The BIT_FIELD_LIMITS define was written for the C90 (it seems). I added
+# another use. Basically, the problem is that the T3E uses some bit fields
+# for some st_addr stuff, and then sizeof and address-of fails
+# I could not use the ams/alpha.o option because the Cray assembler, 'cam'
+# did not like it.
+"cray-t3e", "cc: -DBIT_FIELD_LIMITS -DTERMIOS::(unknown):CRAY::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:::",
+
+# DGUX, 88100.
+"dgux-R3-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer::(unknown):::RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL:::",
+"dgux-R4-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer::(unknown)::-lnsl -lsocket:RC4_INDEX DES_UNROLL:::",
+"dgux-R4-x86-gcc", "gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown)::-lnsl -lsocket:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
+
+# Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400
+# NOTE: The CDS++ Compiler up to V2.0Bsomething has the IRIX_CC_BUG optimizer problem. Better use -g */
+"ReliantUNIX","cc:-KPIC -g -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::-Kthread:SNI:-lsocket -lnsl -lc -L/usr/ucblib -lucb:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:reliantunix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"SINIX","cc:-O::(unknown):SNI:-lsocket -lnsl -lc -L/usr/ucblib -lucb:RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR:::",
+"SINIX-N","/usr/ucb/cc:-O2 -misaligned::(unknown)::-lucb:RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR:::",
+
+# SIEMENS BS2000/OSD: an EBCDIC-based mainframe
+"BS2000-OSD","c89:-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::",
+
+# OS/390 Unix an EBCDIC-based Unix system on IBM mainframe
+# You need to compile using the c89.sh wrapper in the tools directory, because the
+# IBM compiler does not like the -L switch after any object modules.
+#
+"OS390-Unix","c89.sh:-O -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC -DNO_SYS_PARAM_H -D_ALL_SOURCE::(unknown):::THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::",
+
+# Visual C targets
+#
+# Win64 targets, WIN64I denotes IA-64 and WIN64A - AMD64
+"VC-WIN64I","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64I::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:ia64cpuid.o:ia64.o ia64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o:::::::ghash-ia64.o::ias:win32",
+"VC-WIN64A","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64A::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/x86_64-gcc\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":auto:win32",
+"debug-VC-WIN64I","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64I::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:ia64cpuid.o:ia64.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o:::::::ghash-ia64.o::ias:win32",
+"debug-VC-WIN64A","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64A::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/x86_64-gcc\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":auto:win32",
+# x86 Win32 target defaults to ANSI API, if you want UNICODE, complement
+# 'perl Configure VC-WIN32' with '-DUNICODE -D_UNICODE'
+"VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
+# Unified CE target
+"debug-VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
+"VC-CE","cl::::WINCE::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32",
+
+# Borland C++ 4.5
+"BC-32","bcc32::::WIN32::BN_LLONG DES_PTR RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:${no_asm}:win32",
+
+# MinGW
+"mingw", "gcc:-mno-cygwin -DL_ENDIAN -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::-D_MT:MINGW32:-lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts} EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:${x86_asm}:coff:win32:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL -DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK:-mno-cygwin:.dll.a",
+# As for OPENSSL_USE_APPLINK. Applink makes it possible to use .dll
+# compiled with one compiler with application compiled with another
+# compiler. It's possible to engage Applink support in mingw64 build,
+# but it's not done, because till mingw64 supports structured exception
+# handling, one can't seriously consider its binaries for using with
+# non-mingw64 run-time environment. And as mingw64 is always consistent
+# with itself, Applink is never engaged and can as well be omitted.
+"mingw64", "gcc:-mno-cygwin -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE::-D_MT:MINGW64:-lws2_32 -lgdi32 -lcrypt32:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:${x86_64_asm}:mingw64:win32:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-mno-cygwin:.dll.a",
+
+# UWIN
+"UWIN", "cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -O -Wall:::UWIN::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32",
+
+# Cygwin
+"Cygwin-pre1.3", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -m486 -Wall::(unknown):CYGWIN32::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32",
+"Cygwin", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall:::CYGWIN32::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:coff:dlfcn:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-shared:.dll.a",
+"debug-Cygwin", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:dlfcn:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-shared:.dll.a",
+
+# NetWare from David Ward (dsward at novell.com)
+# requires either MetroWerks NLM development tools, or gcc / nlmconv
+# NetWare defaults socket bio to WinSock sockets. However,
+# the builds can be configured to use BSD sockets instead.
+# netware-clib => legacy CLib c-runtime support
+"netware-clib", "mwccnlm::::::${x86_gcc_opts}::",
+"netware-clib-bsdsock", "mwccnlm::::::${x86_gcc_opts}::",
+"netware-clib-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/nwsdk/include/nlm -I/ndk/ws295sdk/include -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_CLIB -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -O2 -Wall:::::${x86_gcc_opts}::",
+"netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/nwsdk/include/nlm -DNETWARE_BSDSOCK -DNETDB_USE_INTERNET -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_CLIB -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -O2 -Wall:::::${x86_gcc_opts}::",
+# netware-libc => LibC/NKS support
+"netware-libc", "mwccnlm::::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::",
+"netware-libc-bsdsock", "mwccnlm::::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::",
+"netware-libc-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/libc/include -I/ndk/libc/include/winsock -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_LIBC -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall:::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::",
+"netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/libc/include -DNETWARE_BSDSOCK -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_LIBC -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall:::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::",
+
+# DJGPP
+"DJGPP", "gcc:-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIO -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall:::MSDOS:-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:",
+
+# Ultrix from Bernhard Simon <simon at zid.tuwien.ac.at>
+"ultrix-cc","cc:-std1 -O -Olimit 2500 -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::::::",
+"ultrix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG::::",
+# K&R C is no longer supported; you need gcc on old Ultrix installations
+##"ultrix","cc:-O2 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::::::",
+
+##### MacOS X (a.k.a. Rhapsody or Darwin) setup
+"rhapsody-ppc-cc","cc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):MACOSX_RHAPSODY::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}::",
+"darwin-ppc-cc","cc:-arch ppc -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -Wa,-force_cpusubtype_ALL::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc32_asm}:osx32:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch ppc -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+"darwin64-ppc-cc","cc:-arch ppc64 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc64_asm}:osx64:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch ppc64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+"darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:".eval{my $asm=$x86_asm;$asm=~s/cast\-586\.o//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+"debug-darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -g3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+"darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+"debug-darwin-ppc-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DB_ENDIAN -g -Wall -O::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc32_asm}:osx32:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+# iPhoneOS/iOS
+"iphoneos-cross","llvm-gcc:-O3 -isysroot \$(CROSS_TOP)/SDKs/\$(CROSS_SDK) -fomit-frame-pointer -fno-common::-D_REENTRANT:iOS:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
+
+##### A/UX
+"aux3-gcc","gcc:-O2 -DTERMIO::(unknown):AUX:-lbsd:RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:::",
+
+##### Sony NEWS-OS 4.x
+"newsos4-gcc","gcc:-O -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):NEWS4:-lmld -liberty:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::::",
+
+##### GNU Hurd
+"hurd-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC",
+
+##### OS/2 EMX
+"OS2-EMX", "gcc::::::::",
+
+##### VxWorks for various targets
+"vxworks-ppc60x","ccppc:-D_REENTRANT -mrtp -mhard-float -mstrict-align -fno-implicit-fp -DPPC32_fp60x -O2 -fstrength-reduce -fno-builtin -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -DCPU=PPC32 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h/wrn/coreip:::VXWORKS:-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/ppc/PPC32/common:::::",
+"vxworks-ppcgen","ccppc:-D_REENTRANT -mrtp -msoft-float -mstrict-align -O1 -fno-builtin -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -DCPU=PPC32 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h/wrn/coreip:::VXWORKS:-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/ppc/PPC32/sfcommon:::::",
+"vxworks-ppc405","ccppc:-g -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC405 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h:::VXWORKS:-r:::::",
+"vxworks-ppc750","ccppc:-ansi -nostdinc -DPPC750 -D_REENTRANT -fvolatile -fno-builtin -fno-for-scope -fsigned-char -Wall -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC604 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h \$(DEBUG_FLAG):::VXWORKS:-r:::::",
+"vxworks-ppc750-debug","ccppc:-ansi -nostdinc -DPPC750 -D_REENTRANT -fvolatile -fno-builtin -fno-for-scope -fsigned-char -Wall -msoft-float -mlongcall -DCPU=PPC604 -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG -g:::VXWORKS:-r:::::",
+"vxworks-ppc860","ccppc:-nostdinc -msoft-float -DCPU=PPC860 -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h:::VXWORKS:-r:::::",
+"vxworks-simlinux","ccpentium:-B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DL_ENDIAN -DCPU=SIMLINUX -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK:::VXWORKS:-r::${no_asm}::::::ranlibpentium:",
+"vxworks-mips","ccmips:-mrtp -mips2 -O -G 0 -B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DCPU=MIPS32 -msoft-float -mno-branch-likely -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip::-D_REENTRANT:VXWORKS:-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/mips/MIPSI32/sfcommon::${mips32_asm}:o32::::::ranlibmips:",
+
+##### Compaq Non-Stop Kernel (Tandem)
+"tandem-c89","c89:-Ww -D__TANDEM -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1 -D_TANDEM_SOURCE -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::THIRTY_TWO_BIT:::",
+
+# uClinux
+"uClinux-dist","$ENV{'CC'}:\$(CFLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::\$(LDFLAGS) \$(LDLIBS):BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:$ENV{'LIBSSL_dlfcn'}:linux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):$ENV{'RANLIB'}::",
+"uClinux-dist64","$ENV{'CC'}:\$(CFLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::\$(LDFLAGS) \$(LDLIBS):SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${no_asm}:$ENV{'LIBSSL_dlfcn'}:linux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):$ENV{'RANLIB'}::",
+
+);
+
+my @MK1MF_Builds=qw(VC-WIN64I VC-WIN64A
+ debug-VC-WIN64I debug-VC-WIN64A
+ VC-NT VC-CE VC-WIN32 debug-VC-WIN32
+ BC-32
+ netware-clib netware-clib-bsdsock
+ netware-libc netware-libc-bsdsock);
+
+my $idx = 0;
+my $idx_cc = $idx++;
+my $idx_cflags = $idx++;
+my $idx_unistd = $idx++;
+my $idx_thread_cflag = $idx++;
+my $idx_sys_id = $idx++;
+my $idx_lflags = $idx++;
+my $idx_bn_ops = $idx++;
+my $idx_cpuid_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_bn_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_des_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_aes_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_bf_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_md5_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_sha1_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_cast_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_rc4_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_rmd160_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_rc5_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_wp_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_cmll_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_modes_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_engines_obj = $idx++;
+my $idx_perlasm_scheme = $idx++;
+my $idx_dso_scheme = $idx++;
+my $idx_shared_target = $idx++;
+my $idx_shared_cflag = $idx++;
+my $idx_shared_ldflag = $idx++;
+my $idx_shared_extension = $idx++;
+my $idx_ranlib = $idx++;
+my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
+my $idx_multilib = $idx++;
+
+my $prefix="";
+my $libdir="";
+my $openssldir="";
+my $exe_ext="";
+my $install_prefix= "$ENV{'INSTALL_PREFIX'}";
+my $cross_compile_prefix="";
+my $fipsdir="/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0";
+my $fipslibdir="";
+my $baseaddr="0xFB00000";
+my $no_threads=0;
+my $threads=0;
+my $no_shared=0; # but "no-shared" is default
+my $zlib=1; # but "no-zlib" is default
+my $no_krb5=0; # but "no-krb5" is implied unless "--with-krb5-..." is used
+my $no_rfc3779=1; # but "no-rfc3779" is default
+my $no_asm=0;
+my $no_dso=0;
+my $no_gmp=0;
+my @skip=();
+my $Makefile="Makefile";
+my $des_locl="crypto/des/des_locl.h";
+my $des ="crypto/des/des.h";
+my $bn ="crypto/bn/bn.h";
+my $md2 ="crypto/md2/md2.h";
+my $rc4 ="crypto/rc4/rc4.h";
+my $rc4_locl="crypto/rc4/rc4_locl.h";
+my $idea ="crypto/idea/idea.h";
+my $rc2 ="crypto/rc2/rc2.h";
+my $bf ="crypto/bf/bf_locl.h";
+my $bn_asm ="bn_asm.o";
+my $des_enc="des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o";
+my $aes_enc="aes_core.o aes_cbc.o";
+my $bf_enc ="bf_enc.o";
+my $cast_enc="c_enc.o";
+my $rc4_enc="rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o";
+my $rc5_enc="rc5_enc.o";
+my $md5_obj="";
+my $sha1_obj="";
+my $rmd160_obj="";
+my $cmll_enc="camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o";
+my $processor="";
+my $default_ranlib;
+my $perl;
+my $fips=0;
+
+if (exists $ENV{FIPSDIR})
+ {
+ $fipsdir = $ENV{FIPSDIR};
+ $fipsdir =~ s/\/$//;
+ }
+
+# All of the following is disabled by default (RC5 was enabled before 0.9.8):
+
+my %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment" [or special keyword "experimental"]
+ "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => "default",
+ "gmp" => "default",
+ "jpake" => "experimental",
+ "md2" => "default",
+ "rc5" => "default",
+ "rfc3779" => "default",
+ "sctp" => "default",
+ "shared" => "default",
+ "store" => "experimental",
+ "unit-test" => "default",
+ "zlib" => "default",
+ "zlib-dynamic" => "default"
+ );
+my @experimental = ();
+
+# This is what $depflags will look like with the above defaults
+# (we need this to see if we should advise the user to run "make depend"):
+my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST";
+
+# Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults.
+# To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo" (unless it's experimental).
+# For symmetry, "disable-foo" is a synonym for "no-foo".
+
+# For features called "experimental" here, a more explicit "experimental-foo" is needed to enable.
+# We will collect such requests in @experimental.
+# To avoid accidental use of experimental features, applications will have to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_FOO.
+
+
+my $no_sse2=0;
+
+&usage if ($#ARGV < 0);
+
+my $flags;
+my $depflags;
+my $openssl_experimental_defines;
+my $openssl_algorithm_defines;
+my $openssl_thread_defines;
+my $openssl_sys_defines="";
+my $openssl_other_defines;
+my $libs;
+my $libkrb5="";
+my $target;
+my $options;
+my $symlink;
+my $make_depend=0;
+my %withargs=();
+
+my @argvcopy=@ARGV;
+my $argvstring="";
+my $argv_unprocessed=1;
+
+while($argv_unprocessed)
+ {
+ $flags="";
+ $depflags="";
+ $openssl_experimental_defines="";
+ $openssl_algorithm_defines="";
+ $openssl_thread_defines="";
+ $openssl_sys_defines="";
+ $openssl_other_defines="";
+ $libs="";
+ $target="";
+ $options="";
+ $symlink=1;
+
+ $argv_unprocessed=0;
+ $argvstring=join(' ', at argvcopy);
+
+PROCESS_ARGS:
+ foreach (@argvcopy)
+ {
+ s /^-no-/no-/; # some people just can't read the instructions
+
+ # rewrite some options in "enable-..." form
+ s /^-?-?shared$/enable-shared/;
+ s /^sctp$/enable-sctp/;
+ s /^threads$/enable-threads/;
+ s /^zlib$/enable-zlib/;
+ s /^zlib-dynamic$/enable-zlib-dynamic/;
+
+ if (/^no-(.+)$/ || /^disable-(.+)$/)
+ {
+ if (!($disabled{$1} eq "experimental"))
+ {
+ if ($1 eq "ssl")
+ {
+ $disabled{"ssl2"} = "option(ssl)";
+ $disabled{"ssl3"} = "option(ssl)";
+ }
+ elsif ($1 eq "tls")
+ {
+ $disabled{"tls1"} = "option(tls)"
+ }
+ elsif ($1 eq "ssl3-method")
+ {
+ $disabled{"ssl3-method"} = "option(ssl)";
+ $disabled{"ssl3"} = "option(ssl)";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $disabled{$1} = "option";
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ elsif (/^enable-(.+)$/ || /^experimental-(.+)$/)
+ {
+ my $algo = $1;
+ if ($disabled{$algo} eq "experimental")
+ {
+ die "You are requesting an experimental feature; please say 'experimental-$algo' if you are sure\n"
+ unless (/^experimental-/);
+ push @experimental, $algo;
+ }
+ delete $disabled{$algo};
+
+ $threads = 1 if ($algo eq "threads");
+ }
+ elsif (/^--test-sanity$/)
+ {
+ exit(&test_sanity());
+ }
+ elsif (/^--strict-warnings/)
+ {
+ $strict_warnings = 1;
+ }
+ elsif (/^reconfigure/ || /^reconf/)
+ {
+ if (open(IN,"<$Makefile"))
+ {
+ while (<IN>)
+ {
+ chomp;
+ if (/^CONFIGURE_ARGS=(.*)/)
+ {
+ $argvstring=$1;
+ @argvcopy=split(' ',$argvstring);
+ die "Incorrect data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n"
+ if (grep(/^reconf/, at argvcopy));
+ print "Reconfiguring with: $argvstring\n";
+ $argv_unprocessed=1;
+ close(IN);
+ last PROCESS_ARGS;
+ }
+ }
+ close(IN);
+ }
+ die "Insufficient data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n";
+ }
+ elsif (/^386$/)
+ { $processor=386; }
+ elsif (/^fips$/)
+ {
+ $fips=1;
+ }
+ elsif (/^rsaref$/)
+ {
+ # No RSAref support any more since it's not needed.
+ # The check for the option is there so scripts aren't
+ # broken
+ }
+ elsif (/^[-+]/)
+ {
+ if (/^-[lL](.*)$/ or /^-Wl,/)
+ {
+ $libs.=$_." ";
+ }
+ elsif (/^-[^-]/ or /^\+/)
+ {
+ $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei;
+ $flags.=$_." ";
+ }
+ elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $prefix=$1;
+ }
+ elsif (/^--libdir=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $libdir=$1;
+ }
+ elsif (/^--openssldir=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $openssldir=$1;
+ }
+ elsif (/^--install.prefix=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $install_prefix=$1;
+ }
+ elsif (/^--with-krb5-(dir|lib|include|flavor)=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $withargs{"krb5-".$1}=$2;
+ }
+ elsif (/^--with-zlib-lib=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $withargs{"zlib-lib"}=$1;
+ }
+ elsif (/^--with-zlib-include=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $withargs{"zlib-include"}="-I$1";
+ }
+ elsif (/^--with-fipsdir=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $fipsdir="$1";
+ }
+ elsif (/^--with-fipslibdir=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $fipslibdir="$1";
+ }
+ elsif (/^--with-baseaddr=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $baseaddr="$1";
+ }
+ elsif (/^--cross-compile-prefix=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ $cross_compile_prefix=$1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ print STDERR $usage;
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /^([^:]+):(.+)$/)
+ {
+ eval "\$table{\$1} = \"$2\""; # allow $xxx constructs in the string
+ $target=$1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ die "target already defined - $target (offending arg: $_)\n" if ($target ne "");
+ $target=$_;
+ }
+
+ unless ($_ eq $target || /^no-/ || /^disable-/)
+ {
+ # "no-..." follows later after implied disactivations
+ # have been derived. (Don't take this too seroiusly,
+ # we really only write OPTIONS to the Makefile out of
+ # nostalgia.)
+
+ if ($options eq "")
+ { $options = $_; }
+ else
+ { $options .= " ".$_; }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
+
+if ($processor eq "386")
+ {
+ $disabled{"sse2"} = "forced";
+ }
+
+if (!defined($withargs{"krb5-flavor"}) || $withargs{"krb5-flavor"} eq "")
+ {
+ $disabled{"krb5"} = "krb5-flavor not specified";
+ }
+
+if (!defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"}))
+ {
+ # "zlib-dynamic" was specifically enabled, so enable "zlib"
+ delete $disabled{"zlib"};
+ }
+
+if (defined($disabled{"rijndael"}))
+ {
+ $disabled{"aes"} = "forced";
+ }
+if (defined($disabled{"des"}))
+ {
+ $disabled{"mdc2"} = "forced";
+ }
+if (defined($disabled{"ec"}))
+ {
+ $disabled{"ecdsa"} = "forced";
+ $disabled{"ecdh"} = "forced";
+ }
+
+# SSL 2.0 requires MD5 and RSA
+if (defined($disabled{"md5"}) || defined($disabled{"rsa"}))
+ {
+ $disabled{"ssl2"} = "forced";
+ }
+
+if ($fips && $fipslibdir eq "")
+ {
+ $fipslibdir = $fipsdir . "/lib/";
+ }
+
+# RSAX ENGINE sets default non-FIPS RSA method.
+if ($fips)
+ {
+ $disabled{"rsax"} = "forced";
+ }
+
+# SSL 3.0 and TLS requires MD5 and SHA and either RSA or DSA+DH
+if (defined($disabled{"md5"}) || defined($disabled{"sha"})
+ || (defined($disabled{"rsa"})
+ && (defined($disabled{"dsa"}) || defined($disabled{"dh"}))))
+ {
+ $disabled{"ssl3"} = "forced";
+ $disabled{"tls1"} = "forced";
+ }
+
+if (defined($disabled{"tls1"}))
+ {
+ $disabled{"tlsext"} = "forced";
+ }
+
+if (defined($disabled{"ec"}) || defined($disabled{"dsa"})
+ || defined($disabled{"dh"}))
+ {
+ $disabled{"gost"} = "forced";
+ }
+
+# SRP and HEARTBEATS require TLSEXT
+if (defined($disabled{"tlsext"}))
+ {
+ $disabled{"srp"} = "forced";
+ $disabled{"heartbeats"} = "forced";
+ }
+
+if ($target eq "TABLE") {
+ foreach $target (sort keys %table) {
+ print_table_entry($target);
+ }
+ exit 0;
+}
+
+if ($target eq "LIST") {
+ foreach (sort keys %table) {
+ print;
+ print "\n";
+ }
+ exit 0;
+}
+
+if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
+ $target = "Cygwin".$1;
+}
+
+print "Configuring for $target\n";
+
+&usage if (!defined($table{$target}));
+
+
+foreach (sort (keys %disabled))
+ {
+ $options .= " no-$_";
+
+ printf " no-%-12s %-10s", $_, "[$disabled{$_}]";
+
+ if (/^dso$/)
+ { $no_dso = 1; }
+ elsif (/^threads$/)
+ { $no_threads = 1; }
+ elsif (/^shared$/)
+ { $no_shared = 1; }
+ elsif (/^zlib$/)
+ { $zlib = 0; }
+ elsif (/^static-engine$/)
+ { }
+ elsif (/^zlib-dynamic$/)
+ { }
+ elsif (/^symlinks$/)
+ { $symlink = 0; }
+ elsif (/^sse2$/)
+ { $no_sse2 = 1; }
+ else
+ {
+ my ($ALGO, $algo);
+ ($ALGO = $algo = $_) =~ tr/[\-a-z]/[_A-Z]/;
+
+ if (/^asm$/ || /^err$/ || /^hw$/ || /^hw-/)
+ {
+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO\n";
+ print " OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO";
+
+ if (/^err$/) { $flags .= "-DOPENSSL_NO_ERR "; }
+ elsif (/^asm$/) { $no_asm = 1; }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $openssl_algorithm_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO\n";
+ print " OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO";
+
+ if (/^krb5$/)
+ { $no_krb5 = 1; }
+ else
+ {
+ push @skip, $algo;
+ # fix-up crypto/directory name(s)
+ @skip[$#skip]="whrlpool" if $algo eq "whirlpool";
+ print " (skip dir)";
+
+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_$ALGO";
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ print "\n";
+ }
+
+my $exp_cflags = "";
+foreach (sort @experimental)
+ {
+ my $ALGO;
+ ($ALGO = $_) =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/;
+
+ # opensslconf.h will set OPENSSL_NO_... unless OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_... is defined
+ $openssl_experimental_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_$ALGO\n";
+ $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO";
+ }
+
+my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/, at MK1MF_Builds;
+
+$exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/);
+$exe_ext=".nlm" if ($target =~ /netware/);
+$exe_ext=".pm" if ($target =~ /vos/);
+$openssldir="/usr/local/ssl" if ($openssldir eq "" and $prefix eq "");
+$prefix=$openssldir if $prefix eq "";
+
+$default_ranlib= &which("ranlib") or $default_ranlib="true";
+$perl=$ENV{'PERL'} or $perl=&which("perl5") or $perl=&which("perl")
+ or $perl="perl";
+my $make = $ENV{'MAKE'} || "make";
+
+$cross_compile_prefix=$ENV{'CROSS_COMPILE'} if $cross_compile_prefix eq "";
+
+chop $openssldir if $openssldir =~ /\/$/;
+chop $prefix if $prefix =~ /.\/$/;
+
+$openssldir=$prefix . "/ssl" if $openssldir eq "";
+$openssldir=$prefix . "/" . $openssldir if $openssldir !~ /(^\/|^[a-zA-Z]:[\\\/])/;
+
+
+print "IsMK1MF=$IsMK1MF\n";
+
+my @fields = split(/\s*:\s*/,$table{$target} . ":" x 30 , -1);
+my $cc = $fields[$idx_cc];
+# Allow environment CC to override compiler...
+if($ENV{CC}) {
+ $cc = $ENV{CC};
+}
+my $cflags = $fields[$idx_cflags];
+my $unistd = $fields[$idx_unistd];
+my $thread_cflag = $fields[$idx_thread_cflag];
+my $sys_id = $fields[$idx_sys_id];
+my $lflags = $fields[$idx_lflags];
+my $bn_ops = $fields[$idx_bn_ops];
+my $cpuid_obj = $fields[$idx_cpuid_obj];
+my $bn_obj = $fields[$idx_bn_obj];
+my $des_obj = $fields[$idx_des_obj];
+my $aes_obj = $fields[$idx_aes_obj];
+my $bf_obj = $fields[$idx_bf_obj];
+my $md5_obj = $fields[$idx_md5_obj];
+my $sha1_obj = $fields[$idx_sha1_obj];
+my $cast_obj = $fields[$idx_cast_obj];
+my $rc4_obj = $fields[$idx_rc4_obj];
+my $rmd160_obj = $fields[$idx_rmd160_obj];
+my $rc5_obj = $fields[$idx_rc5_obj];
+my $wp_obj = $fields[$idx_wp_obj];
+my $cmll_obj = $fields[$idx_cmll_obj];
+my $modes_obj = $fields[$idx_modes_obj];
+my $engines_obj = $fields[$idx_engines_obj];
+my $perlasm_scheme = $fields[$idx_perlasm_scheme];
+my $dso_scheme = $fields[$idx_dso_scheme];
+my $shared_target = $fields[$idx_shared_target];
+my $shared_cflag = $fields[$idx_shared_cflag];
+my $shared_ldflag = $fields[$idx_shared_ldflag];
+my $shared_extension = $fields[$idx_shared_extension];
+my $ranlib = $ENV{'RANLIB'} || $fields[$idx_ranlib];
+my $ar = $ENV{'AR'} || "ar";
+my $arflags = $fields[$idx_arflags];
+my $multilib = $fields[$idx_multilib];
+
+# if $prefix/lib$multilib is not an existing directory, then
+# assume that it's not searched by linker automatically, in
+# which case adding $multilib suffix causes more grief than
+# we're ready to tolerate, so don't...
+$multilib="" if !-d "$prefix/lib$multilib";
+
+$libdir="lib$multilib" if $libdir eq "";
+
+$cflags = "$cflags$exp_cflags";
+
+# '%' in $lflags is used to split flags to "pre-" and post-flags
+my ($prelflags,$postlflags)=split('%',$lflags);
+if (defined($postlflags)) { $lflags=$postlflags; }
+else { $lflags=$prelflags; undef $prelflags; }
+
+if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$cc --target-help 2>&1` !~ m/\-mno\-cygwin/m)
+ {
+ $cflags =~ s/\-mno\-cygwin\s*//;
+ $shared_ldflag =~ s/\-mno\-cygwin\s*//;
+ }
+
+my $no_shared_warn=0;
+my $no_user_cflags=0;
+
+if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
+else { $no_user_cflags=1; }
+
+# Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
+# the script "config" or manually.
+if (!$no_krb5)
+ {
+ my ($lresolv, $lpath, $lext);
+ if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^[Hh]eimdal$/)
+ {
+ die "Sorry, Heimdal is currently not supported\n";
+ }
+ ##### HACK to force use of Heimdal.
+ ##### WARNING: Since we don't really have adequate support for Heimdal,
+ ##### using this will break the build. You'll have to make
+ ##### changes to the source, and if you do, please send
+ ##### patches to openssl-dev at openssl.org
+ if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^force-[Hh]eimdal$/)
+ {
+ warn "Heimdal isn't really supported. Your build WILL break\n";
+ warn "If you fix the problems, please send a patch to openssl-dev\@openssl.org\n";
+ $withargs{"krb5-dir"} = "/usr/heimdal"
+ if $withargs{"krb5-dir"} eq "";
+ $withargs{"krb5-lib"} = "-L".$withargs{"krb5-dir"}.
+ "/lib -lgssapi -lkrb5 -lcom_err"
+ if $withargs{"krb5-lib"} eq "" && !$IsMK1MF;
+ $cflags="-DKRB5_HEIMDAL $cflags";
+ }
+ if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^[Mm][Ii][Tt]/)
+ {
+ $withargs{"krb5-dir"} = "/usr/kerberos"
+ if $withargs{"krb5-dir"} eq "";
+ $withargs{"krb5-lib"} = "-L".$withargs{"krb5-dir"}.
+ "/lib -lgssapi_krb5 -lkrb5 -lcom_err -lk5crypto"
+ if $withargs{"krb5-lib"} eq "" && !$IsMK1MF;
+ $cflags="-DKRB5_MIT $cflags";
+ $withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ s/^[Mm][Ii][Tt][._-]*//;
+ if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^1[._-]*[01]/)
+ {
+ $cflags="-DKRB5_MIT_OLD11 $cflags";
+ }
+ }
+ LRESOLV:
+ foreach $lpath ("/lib", "/usr/lib")
+ {
+ foreach $lext ("a", "so")
+ {
+ $lresolv = "$lpath/libresolv.$lext";
+ last LRESOLV if (-r "$lresolv");
+ $lresolv = "";
+ }
+ }
+ $withargs{"krb5-lib"} .= " -lresolv"
+ if ("$lresolv" ne "");
+ $withargs{"krb5-include"} = "-I".$withargs{"krb5-dir"}."/include"
+ if $withargs{"krb5-include"} eq "" &&
+ $withargs{"krb5-dir"} ne "";
+ }
+
+# The DSO code currently always implements all functions so that no
+# applications will have to worry about that from a compilation point
+# of view. However, the "method"s may return zero unless that platform
+# has support compiled in for them. Currently each method is enabled
+# by a define "DSO_<name>" ... we translate the "dso_scheme" config
+# string entry into using the following logic;
+my $dso_cflags;
+if (!$no_dso && $dso_scheme ne "")
+ {
+ $dso_scheme =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/;
+ if ($dso_scheme eq "DLFCN")
+ {
+ $dso_cflags = "-DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H";
+ }
+ elsif ($dso_scheme eq "DLFCN_NO_H")
+ {
+ $dso_cflags = "-DDSO_DLFCN";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $dso_cflags = "-DDSO_$dso_scheme";
+ }
+ $cflags = "$dso_cflags $cflags";
+ }
+
+my $thread_cflags;
+my $thread_defines;
+if ($thread_cflag ne "(unknown)" && !$no_threads)
+ {
+ # If we know how to do it, support threads by default.
+ $threads = 1;
+ }
+if ($thread_cflag eq "(unknown)" && $threads)
+ {
+ # If the user asked for "threads", [s]he is also expected to
+ # provide any system-dependent compiler options that are
+ # necessary.
+ if ($no_user_cflags)
+ {
+ print "You asked for multi-threading support, but didn't\n";
+ print "provide any system-specific compiler options\n";
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ $thread_cflags="-DOPENSSL_THREADS $cflags" ;
+ $thread_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_THREADS\n";
+ }
+else
+ {
+ $thread_cflags="-DOPENSSL_THREADS $thread_cflag $cflags";
+ $thread_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_THREADS\n";
+# my $def;
+# foreach $def (split ' ',$thread_cflag)
+# {
+# if ($def =~ s/^-D// && $def !~ /^_/)
+# {
+# $thread_defines .= "#define $def\n";
+# }
+# }
+ }
+
+$lflags="$libs$lflags" if ($libs ne "");
+
+if ($no_asm)
+ {
+ $cpuid_obj=$bn_obj=
+ $des_obj=$aes_obj=$bf_obj=$cast_obj=$rc4_obj=$rc5_obj=$cmll_obj=
+ $modes_obj=$sha1_obj=$md5_obj=$rmd160_obj=$wp_obj=$engines_obj="";
+ }
+
+if (!$no_shared)
+ {
+ $cast_obj=""; # CAST assembler is not PIC
+ }
+
+if ($threads)
+ {
+ $cflags=$thread_cflags;
+ $openssl_thread_defines .= $thread_defines;
+ }
+
+if ($zlib)
+ {
+ $cflags = "-DZLIB $cflags";
+ if (defined($disabled{"zlib-dynamic"}))
+ {
+ if (defined($withargs{"zlib-lib"}))
+ {
+ $lflags = "$lflags -L" . $withargs{"zlib-lib"} . " -lz";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $lflags = "$lflags -lz";
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $cflags = "-DZLIB_SHARED $cflags";
+ }
+ }
+
+# You will find shlib_mark1 and shlib_mark2 explained in Makefile.org
+my $shared_mark = "";
+if ($shared_target eq "")
+ {
+ $no_shared_warn = 1 if !$no_shared;
+ $no_shared = 1;
+ }
+if (!$no_shared)
+ {
+ if ($shared_cflag ne "")
+ {
+ $cflags = "$shared_cflag -DOPENSSL_PIC $cflags";
+ }
+ }
+
+if (!$IsMK1MF)
+ {
+ # add {no-}static-engine to options to allow mkdef.pl to work without extra arguments
+ if ($no_shared)
+ {
+ $openssl_other_defines.="#define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE\n";
+ $options.=" static-engine";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $openssl_other_defines.="#define OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE\n";
+ $options.=" no-static-engine";
+ }
+ }
+
+$cpuid_obj.=" uplink.o uplink-x86.o" if ($cflags =~ /\-DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK/);
+
+#
+# Platform fix-ups
+#
+if ($target =~ /\-icc$/) # Intel C compiler
+ {
+ my $iccver=0;
+ if (open(FD,"$cc -V 2>&1 |"))
+ {
+ while(<FD>) { $iccver=$1 if (/Version ([0-9]+)\./); }
+ close(FD);
+ }
+ if ($iccver>=8)
+ {
+ # Eliminate unnecessary dependency from libirc.a. This is
+ # essential for shared library support, as otherwise
+ # apps/openssl can end up in endless loop upon startup...
+ $cflags.=" -Dmemcpy=__builtin_memcpy -Dmemset=__builtin_memset";
+ }
+ if ($iccver>=9)
+ {
+ $cflags.=" -i-static";
+ $cflags=~s/\-no_cpprt/-no-cpprt/;
+ }
+ if ($iccver>=10)
+ {
+ $cflags=~s/\-i\-static/-static-intel/;
+ }
+ }
+
+# Unlike other OSes (like Solaris, Linux, Tru64, IRIX) BSD run-time
+# linkers (tested OpenBSD, NetBSD and FreeBSD) "demand" RPATH set on
+# .so objects. Apparently application RPATH is not global and does
+# not apply to .so linked with other .so. Problem manifests itself
+# when libssl.so fails to load libcrypto.so. One can argue that we
+# should engrave this into Makefile.shared rules or into BSD-* config
+# lines above. Meanwhile let's try to be cautious and pass -rpath to
+# linker only when --prefix is not /usr.
+if ($target =~ /^BSD\-/)
+ {
+ $shared_ldflag.=" -Wl,-rpath,\$(LIBRPATH)" if ($prefix !~ m|^/usr[/]*$|);
+ }
+
+if ($sys_id ne "")
+ {
+ #$cflags="-DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_$sys_id $cflags";
+ $openssl_sys_defines="#define OPENSSL_SYSNAME_$sys_id\n";
+ }
+
+if ($ranlib eq "")
+ {
+ $ranlib = $default_ranlib;
+ }
+
+#my ($bn1)=split(/\s+/,$bn_obj);
+#$bn1 = "" unless defined $bn1;
+#$bn1=$bn_asm unless ($bn1 =~ /\.o$/);
+#$bn_obj="$bn1";
+
+$cpuid_obj="" if ($processor eq "386");
+
+$bn_obj = $bn_asm unless $bn_obj ne "";
+# bn-586 is the only one implementing bn_*_part_words
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS" if ($bn_obj =~ /bn-586/);
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2" if (!$no_sse2 && $bn_obj =~ /86/);
+
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT" if ($bn_obj =~ /-mont/);
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5" if ($bn_obj =~ /-mont5/);
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m" if ($bn_obj =~ /-gf2m/);
+
+if ($fips)
+ {
+ $openssl_other_defines.="#define OPENSSL_FIPS\n";
+ $cflags .= " -I\$(FIPSDIR)/include";
+ }
+
+$cpuid_obj="mem_clr.o" unless ($cpuid_obj =~ /\.o$/);
+$des_obj=$des_enc unless ($des_obj =~ /\.o$/);
+$bf_obj=$bf_enc unless ($bf_obj =~ /\.o$/);
+$cast_obj=$cast_enc unless ($cast_obj =~ /\.o$/);
+$rc4_obj=$rc4_enc unless ($rc4_obj =~ /\.o$/);
+$rc5_obj=$rc5_enc unless ($rc5_obj =~ /\.o$/);
+if ($sha1_obj =~ /\.o$/)
+ {
+# $sha1_obj=$sha1_enc;
+ $cflags.=" -DSHA1_ASM" if ($sha1_obj =~ /sx86/ || $sha1_obj =~ /sha1/);
+ $cflags.=" -DSHA256_ASM" if ($sha1_obj =~ /sha256/);
+ $cflags.=" -DSHA512_ASM" if ($sha1_obj =~ /sha512/);
+ if ($sha1_obj =~ /sse2/)
+ { if ($no_sse2)
+ { $sha1_obj =~ s/\S*sse2\S+//; }
+ elsif ($cflags !~ /OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/)
+ { $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2"; }
+ }
+ }
+if ($md5_obj =~ /\.o$/)
+ {
+# $md5_obj=$md5_enc;
+ $cflags.=" -DMD5_ASM";
+ }
+if ($rmd160_obj =~ /\.o$/)
+ {
+# $rmd160_obj=$rmd160_enc;
+ $cflags.=" -DRMD160_ASM";
+ }
+if ($aes_obj =~ /\.o$/)
+ {
+ $cflags.=" -DAES_ASM";
+ # aes-ctr.o is not a real file, only indication that assembler
+ # module implements AES_ctr32_encrypt...
+ $cflags.=" -DAES_CTR_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ s/\s*aes\-ctr\.o//);
+ # aes-xts.o indicates presense of AES_xts_[en|de]crypt...
+ $cflags.=" -DAES_XTS_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ s/\s*aes\-xts\.o//);
+ $aes_obj =~ s/\s*(vpaes|aesni)\-x86\.o//g if ($no_sse2);
+ $cflags.=" -DVPAES_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ m/vpaes/);
+ $cflags.=" -DBSAES_ASM" if ($aes_obj =~ m/bsaes/);
+ }
+else {
+ $aes_obj=$aes_enc;
+ }
+$wp_obj="" if ($wp_obj =~ /mmx/ && $processor eq "386");
+if ($wp_obj =~ /\.o$/ && !$disabled{"whirlpool"})
+ {
+ $cflags.=" -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM";
+ }
+else {
+ $wp_obj="wp_block.o";
+ }
+$cmll_obj=$cmll_enc unless ($cmll_obj =~ /.o$/);
+if ($modes_obj =~ /ghash/)
+ {
+ $cflags.=" -DGHASH_ASM";
+ }
+
+# "Stringify" the C flags string. This permits it to be made part of a string
+# and works as well on command lines.
+$cflags =~ s/([\\\"])/\\\1/g;
+
+my $version = "unknown";
+my $version_num = "unknown";
+my $major = "unknown";
+my $minor = "unknown";
+my $shlib_version_number = "unknown";
+my $shlib_version_history = "unknown";
+my $shlib_major = "unknown";
+my $shlib_minor = "unknown";
+
+open(IN,'<crypto/opensslv.h') || die "unable to read opensslv.h:$!\n";
+while (<IN>)
+ {
+ $version=$1 if /OPENSSL.VERSION.TEXT.*OpenSSL (\S+) /;
+ $version_num=$1 if /OPENSSL.VERSION.NUMBER.*0x(\S+)/;
+ $shlib_version_number=$1 if /SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER *"([^"]+)"/;
+ $shlib_version_history=$1 if /SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY *"([^"]*)"/;
+ }
+close(IN);
+if ($shlib_version_history ne "") { $shlib_version_history .= ":"; }
+
+if ($version =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
+ {
+ $major=$1;
+ $minor=$2;
+ }
+
+if ($shlib_version_number =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
+ {
+ $shlib_major=$1;
+ $shlib_minor=$2;
+ }
+
+if ($strict_warnings)
+ {
+ my $ecc = $cc;
+ $ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
+ my $wopt;
+ die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($ecc =~ /gcc$/ or $ecc =~ /clang$/);
+ foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
+ {
+ $cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
+ }
+ if ($ecc eq "clang")
+ {
+ foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn)
+ {
+ $cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+open(IN,'<Makefile.org') || die "unable to read Makefile.org:$!\n";
+unlink("$Makefile.new") || die "unable to remove old $Makefile.new:$!\n" if -e "$Makefile.new";
+open(OUT,">$Makefile.new") || die "unable to create $Makefile.new:$!\n";
+print OUT "### Generated automatically from Makefile.org by Configure.\n\n";
+my $sdirs=0;
+while (<IN>)
+ {
+ chomp;
+ $sdirs = 1 if /^SDIRS=/;
+ if ($sdirs) {
+ my $dir;
+ foreach $dir (@skip) {
+ s/(\s)$dir /$1/;
+ s/\s$dir$//;
+ }
+ }
+ $sdirs = 0 unless /\\$/;
+ s/engines // if (/^DIRS=/ && $disabled{"engine"});
+ s/ccgost// if (/^ENGDIRS=/ && $disabled{"gost"});
+ s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
+ s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
+ s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
+ s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
+ s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
+ s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
+ s/^SHLIB_MINOR=.*/SHLIB_MINOR=$shlib_minor/;
+ s/^SHLIB_EXT=.*/SHLIB_EXT=$shared_extension/;
+ s/^INSTALLTOP=.*$/INSTALLTOP=$prefix/;
+ s/^MULTILIB=.*$/MULTILIB=$multilib/;
+ s/^OPENSSLDIR=.*$/OPENSSLDIR=$openssldir/;
+ s/^LIBDIR=.*$/LIBDIR=$libdir/;
+ s/^INSTALL_PREFIX=.*$/INSTALL_PREFIX=$install_prefix/;
+ s/^PLATFORM=.*$/PLATFORM=$target/;
+ s/^OPTIONS=.*$/OPTIONS=$options/;
+ s/^CONFIGURE_ARGS=.*$/CONFIGURE_ARGS=$argvstring/;
+ if ($cross_compile_prefix)
+ {
+ s/^CC=.*$/CROSS_COMPILE= $cross_compile_prefix\nCC= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/;
+ s/^AR=\s*/AR= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
+ s/^NM=\s*/NM= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
+ s/^RANLIB=\s*/RANLIB= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)/;
+ s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= \$\(CROSS_COMPILE\)$cc/ if $cc eq "gcc";
+ }
+ else {
+ s/^CC=.*$/CC= $cc/;
+ s/^AR=\s*ar/AR= $ar/;
+ s/^RANLIB=.*/RANLIB= $ranlib/;
+ s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $cc eq "gcc";
+ }
+ s/^CFLAG=.*$/CFLAG= $cflags/;
+ s/^DEPFLAG=.*$/DEPFLAG=$depflags/;
+ s/^PEX_LIBS=.*$/PEX_LIBS= $prelflags/;
+ s/^EX_LIBS=.*$/EX_LIBS= $lflags/;
+ s/^EXE_EXT=.*$/EXE_EXT= $exe_ext/;
+ s/^CPUID_OBJ=.*$/CPUID_OBJ= $cpuid_obj/;
+ s/^BN_ASM=.*$/BN_ASM= $bn_obj/;
+ s/^DES_ENC=.*$/DES_ENC= $des_obj/;
+ s/^AES_ENC=.*$/AES_ENC= $aes_obj/;
+ s/^BF_ENC=.*$/BF_ENC= $bf_obj/;
+ s/^CAST_ENC=.*$/CAST_ENC= $cast_obj/;
+ s/^RC4_ENC=.*$/RC4_ENC= $rc4_obj/;
+ s/^RC5_ENC=.*$/RC5_ENC= $rc5_obj/;
+ s/^MD5_ASM_OBJ=.*$/MD5_ASM_OBJ= $md5_obj/;
+ s/^SHA1_ASM_OBJ=.*$/SHA1_ASM_OBJ= $sha1_obj/;
+ s/^RMD160_ASM_OBJ=.*$/RMD160_ASM_OBJ= $rmd160_obj/;
+ s/^WP_ASM_OBJ=.*$/WP_ASM_OBJ= $wp_obj/;
+ s/^CMLL_ENC=.*$/CMLL_ENC= $cmll_obj/;
+ s/^MODES_ASM_OBJ.=*$/MODES_ASM_OBJ= $modes_obj/;
+ s/^ENGINES_ASM_OBJ.=*$/ENGINES_ASM_OBJ= $engines_obj/;
+ s/^PERLASM_SCHEME=.*$/PERLASM_SCHEME= $perlasm_scheme/;
+ s/^PROCESSOR=.*/PROCESSOR= $processor/;
+ s/^ARFLAGS=.*/ARFLAGS= $arflags/;
+ s/^PERL=.*/PERL= $perl/;
+ s/^KRB5_INCLUDES=.*/KRB5_INCLUDES=$withargs{"krb5-include"}/;
+ s/^LIBKRB5=.*/LIBKRB5=$withargs{"krb5-lib"}/;
+ s/^LIBZLIB=.*/LIBZLIB=$withargs{"zlib-lib"}/;
+ s/^ZLIB_INCLUDE=.*/ZLIB_INCLUDE=$withargs{"zlib-include"}/;
+
+ s/^FIPSDIR=.*/FIPSDIR=$fipsdir/;
+ s/^FIPSLIBDIR=.*/FIPSLIBDIR=$fipslibdir/;
+ s/^FIPSCANLIB=.*/FIPSCANLIB=libcrypto/ if $fips;
+ s/^BASEADDR=.*/BASEADDR=$baseaddr/;
+
+ s/^SHLIB_TARGET=.*/SHLIB_TARGET=$shared_target/;
+ s/^SHLIB_MARK=.*/SHLIB_MARK=$shared_mark/;
+ s/^SHARED_LIBS=.*/SHARED_LIBS=\$(SHARED_CRYPTO) \$(SHARED_SSL)/ if (!$no_shared);
+ if ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.s([ol])\.[^\.]*$/)
+ {
+ my $sotmp = $1;
+ s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.s$sotmp/;
+ }
+ elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.[^\.]*\.dylib$/)
+ {
+ s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.dylib/;
+ }
+ elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.s([ol])\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*$/)
+ {
+ my $sotmp = $1;
+ s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.s$sotmp.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR) .s$sotmp/;
+ }
+ elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*\.dylib$/)
+ {
+ s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).dylib .dylib/;
+ }
+ s/^SHARED_LDFLAGS=.*/SHARED_LDFLAGS=$shared_ldflag/;
+ print OUT $_."\n";
+ }
+close(IN);
+close(OUT);
+rename($Makefile,"$Makefile.bak") || die "unable to rename $Makefile\n" if -e $Makefile;
+rename("$Makefile.new",$Makefile) || die "unable to rename $Makefile.new\n";
+
+print "CC =$cc\n";
+print "CFLAG =$cflags\n";
+print "EX_LIBS =$lflags\n";
+print "CPUID_OBJ =$cpuid_obj\n";
+print "BN_ASM =$bn_obj\n";
+print "DES_ENC =$des_obj\n";
+print "AES_ENC =$aes_obj\n";
+print "BF_ENC =$bf_obj\n";
+print "CAST_ENC =$cast_obj\n";
+print "RC4_ENC =$rc4_obj\n";
+print "RC5_ENC =$rc5_obj\n";
+print "MD5_OBJ_ASM =$md5_obj\n";
+print "SHA1_OBJ_ASM =$sha1_obj\n";
+print "RMD160_OBJ_ASM=$rmd160_obj\n";
+print "CMLL_ENC =$cmll_obj\n";
+print "MODES_OBJ =$modes_obj\n";
+print "ENGINES_OBJ =$engines_obj\n";
+print "PROCESSOR =$processor\n";
+print "RANLIB =$ranlib\n";
+print "ARFLAGS =$arflags\n";
+print "PERL =$perl\n";
+print "KRB5_INCLUDES =",$withargs{"krb5-include"},"\n"
+ if $withargs{"krb5-include"} ne "";
+
+my $des_ptr=0;
+my $des_risc1=0;
+my $des_risc2=0;
+my $des_unroll=0;
+my $bn_ll=0;
+my $def_int=2;
+my $rc4_int=$def_int;
+my $md2_int=$def_int;
+my $idea_int=$def_int;
+my $rc2_int=$def_int;
+my $rc4_idx=0;
+my $rc4_chunk=0;
+my $bf_ptr=0;
+my @type=("char","short","int","long");
+my ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,1,0,0);
+my $export_var_as_fn=0;
+
+my $des_int;
+
+foreach (sort split(/\s+/,$bn_ops))
+ {
+ $des_ptr=1 if /DES_PTR/;
+ $des_risc1=1 if /DES_RISC1/;
+ $des_risc2=1 if /DES_RISC2/;
+ $des_unroll=1 if /DES_UNROLL/;
+ $des_int=1 if /DES_INT/;
+ $bn_ll=1 if /BN_LLONG/;
+ $rc4_int=0 if /RC4_CHAR/;
+ $rc4_int=3 if /RC4_LONG/;
+ $rc4_idx=1 if /RC4_INDEX/;
+ $rc4_chunk=1 if /RC4_CHUNK/;
+ $rc4_chunk=2 if /RC4_CHUNK_LL/;
+ $md2_int=0 if /MD2_CHAR/;
+ $md2_int=3 if /MD2_LONG/;
+ $idea_int=1 if /IDEA_SHORT/;
+ $idea_int=3 if /IDEA_LONG/;
+ $rc2_int=1 if /RC2_SHORT/;
+ $rc2_int=3 if /RC2_LONG/;
+ $bf_ptr=1 if $_ eq "BF_PTR";
+ $bf_ptr=2 if $_ eq "BF_PTR2";
+ ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,1,0,0,0) if /SIXTY_FOUR_BIT/;
+ ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(1,0,0,0,0) if /SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG/;
+ ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,1,0,0) if /THIRTY_TWO_BIT/;
+ ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,0,1,0) if /SIXTEEN_BIT/;
+ ($b64l,$b64,$b32,$b16,$b8)=(0,0,0,0,1) if /EIGHT_BIT/;
+ $export_var_as_fn=1 if /EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN/;
+ }
+
+open(IN,'<crypto/opensslconf.h.in') || die "unable to read crypto/opensslconf.h.in:$!\n";
+unlink("crypto/opensslconf.h.new") || die "unable to remove old crypto/opensslconf.h.new:$!\n" if -e "crypto/opensslconf.h.new";
+open(OUT,'>crypto/opensslconf.h.new') || die "unable to create crypto/opensslconf.h.new:$!\n";
+print OUT "/* opensslconf.h */\n";
+print OUT "/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */\n\n";
+
+print OUT "#ifdef __cplusplus\n";
+print OUT "extern \"C\" {\n";
+print OUT "#endif\n";
+print OUT "/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */\n";
+my $openssl_algorithm_defines_trans = $openssl_algorithm_defines;
+$openssl_experimental_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+OPENSSL_NO_(.*)/#ifndef OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$1\n# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_$1\n# define OPENSSL_NO_$1\n# endif\n#endif/mg;
+$openssl_algorithm_defines_trans =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+OPENSSL_(.*)/# if defined(OPENSSL_$1) \&\& !defined($1)\n# define $1\n# endif/mg;
+$openssl_algorithm_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg;
+$openssl_algorithm_defines = " /* no ciphers excluded */\n" if $openssl_algorithm_defines eq "";
+$openssl_thread_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg;
+$openssl_sys_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg;
+$openssl_other_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+(.*)/#ifndef $1\n# define $1\n#endif/mg;
+print OUT $openssl_sys_defines;
+print OUT "#ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND\n\n";
+print OUT $openssl_experimental_defines;
+print OUT "\n";
+print OUT $openssl_algorithm_defines;
+print OUT "\n#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */\n\n";
+print OUT $openssl_thread_defines;
+print OUT $openssl_other_defines,"\n";
+
+print OUT "/* The OPENSSL_NO_* macros are also defined as NO_* if the application\n";
+print OUT " asks for it. This is a transient feature that is provided for those\n";
+print OUT " who haven't had the time to do the appropriate changes in their\n";
+print OUT " applications. */\n";
+print OUT "#ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES\n";
+print OUT $openssl_algorithm_defines_trans;
+print OUT "#endif\n\n";
+
+print OUT "#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ\n\n" if ($cpuid_obj ne "mem_clr.o");
+
+while (<IN>)
+ {
+ if (/^#define\s+OPENSSLDIR/)
+ {
+ my $foo = $openssldir;
+ $foo =~ s/\\/\\\\/g;
+ print OUT "#define OPENSSLDIR \"$foo\"\n";
+ }
+ elsif (/^#define\s+ENGINESDIR/)
+ {
+ my $foo = "$prefix/$libdir/engines";
+ $foo =~ s/\\/\\\\/g;
+ print OUT "#define ENGINESDIR \"$foo\"\n";
+ }
+ elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION/)
+ { printf OUT "#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION\n"
+ if $export_var_as_fn;
+ printf OUT "#%s OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION\n",
+ ($export_var_as_fn)?"define":"undef"; }
+ elsif (/^#define\s+OPENSSL_UNISTD/)
+ {
+ $unistd = "<unistd.h>" if $unistd eq "";
+ print OUT "#define OPENSSL_UNISTD $unistd\n";
+ }
+ elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG\n",($b64l)?"define":"undef"; }
+ elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+SIXTY_FOUR_BIT/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s SIXTY_FOUR_BIT\n",($b64)?"define":"undef"; }
+ elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+THIRTY_TWO_BIT/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s THIRTY_TWO_BIT\n",($b32)?"define":"undef"; }
+ elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+SIXTEEN_BIT/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s SIXTEEN_BIT\n",($b16)?"define":"undef"; }
+ elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+EIGHT_BIT/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s EIGHT_BIT\n",($b8)?"define":"undef"; }
+ elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+BN_LLONG\s*$/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s BN_LLONG\n",($bn_ll)?"define":"undef"; }
+ elsif (/^\#define\s+DES_LONG\s+.*/)
+ { printf OUT "#define DES_LONG unsigned %s\n",
+ ($des_int)?'int':'long'; }
+ elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_PTR/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s DES_PTR\n",($des_ptr)?'define':'undef'; }
+ elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_RISC1/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s DES_RISC1\n",($des_risc1)?'define':'undef'; }
+ elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_RISC2/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s DES_RISC2\n",($des_risc2)?'define':'undef'; }
+ elsif (/^\#(define|undef)\s+DES_UNROLL/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s DES_UNROLL\n",($des_unroll)?'define':'undef'; }
+ elsif (/^#define\s+RC4_INT\s/)
+ { printf OUT "#define RC4_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$rc4_int]; }
+ elsif (/^#undef\s+RC4_CHUNK/)
+ {
+ printf OUT "#undef RC4_CHUNK\n" if $rc4_chunk==0;
+ printf OUT "#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long\n" if $rc4_chunk==1;
+ printf OUT "#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long long\n" if $rc4_chunk==2;
+ }
+ elsif (/^#((define)|(undef))\s+RC4_INDEX/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s RC4_INDEX\n",($rc4_idx)?"define":"undef"; }
+ elsif (/^#(define|undef)\s+I386_ONLY/)
+ { printf OUT "#%s I386_ONLY\n", ($processor eq "386")?
+ "define":"undef"; }
+ elsif (/^#define\s+MD2_INT\s/)
+ { printf OUT "#define MD2_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$md2_int]; }
+ elsif (/^#define\s+IDEA_INT\s/)
+ {printf OUT "#define IDEA_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$idea_int];}
+ elsif (/^#define\s+RC2_INT\s/)
+ {printf OUT "#define RC2_INT unsigned %s\n",$type[$rc2_int];}
+ elsif (/^#(define|undef)\s+BF_PTR/)
+ {
+ printf OUT "#undef BF_PTR\n" if $bf_ptr == 0;
+ printf OUT "#define BF_PTR\n" if $bf_ptr == 1;
+ printf OUT "#define BF_PTR2\n" if $bf_ptr == 2;
+ }
+ else
+ { print OUT $_; }
+ }
+close(IN);
+print OUT "#ifdef __cplusplus\n";
+print OUT "}\n";
+print OUT "#endif\n";
+close(OUT);
+rename("crypto/opensslconf.h","crypto/opensslconf.h.bak") || die "unable to rename crypto/opensslconf.h\n" if -e "crypto/opensslconf.h";
+rename("crypto/opensslconf.h.new","crypto/opensslconf.h") || die "unable to rename crypto/opensslconf.h.new\n";
+
+
+# Fix the date
+
+print "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG mode\n" if $b64l;
+print "SIXTY_FOUR_BIT mode\n" if $b64;
+print "THIRTY_TWO_BIT mode\n" if $b32;
+print "SIXTEEN_BIT mode\n" if $b16;
+print "EIGHT_BIT mode\n" if $b8;
+print "DES_PTR used\n" if $des_ptr;
+print "DES_RISC1 used\n" if $des_risc1;
+print "DES_RISC2 used\n" if $des_risc2;
+print "DES_UNROLL used\n" if $des_unroll;
+print "DES_INT used\n" if $des_int;
+print "BN_LLONG mode\n" if $bn_ll;
+print "RC4 uses u$type[$rc4_int]\n" if $rc4_int != $def_int;
+print "RC4_INDEX mode\n" if $rc4_idx;
+print "RC4_CHUNK is undefined\n" if $rc4_chunk==0;
+print "RC4_CHUNK is unsigned long\n" if $rc4_chunk==1;
+print "RC4_CHUNK is unsigned long long\n" if $rc4_chunk==2;
+print "MD2 uses u$type[$md2_int]\n" if $md2_int != $def_int;
+print "IDEA uses u$type[$idea_int]\n" if $idea_int != $def_int;
+print "RC2 uses u$type[$rc2_int]\n" if $rc2_int != $def_int;
+print "BF_PTR used\n" if $bf_ptr == 1;
+print "BF_PTR2 used\n" if $bf_ptr == 2;
+
+if($IsMK1MF) {
+ open (OUT,">crypto/buildinf.h") || die "Can't open buildinf.h";
+ printf OUT <<EOF;
+#ifndef MK1MF_BUILD
+ /* auto-generated by Configure for crypto/cversion.c:
+ * for Unix builds, crypto/Makefile.ssl generates functional definitions;
+ * Windows builds (and other mk1mf builds) compile cversion.c with
+ * -DMK1MF_BUILD and use definitions added to this file by util/mk1mf.pl. */
+ #error "Windows builds (PLATFORM=$target) use mk1mf.pl-created Makefiles"
+#endif
+EOF
+ close(OUT);
+} else {
+ my $make_command = "$make PERL=\'$perl\'";
+ my $make_targets = "";
+ $make_targets .= " links" if $symlink;
+ $make_targets .= " depend" if $depflags ne $default_depflags && $make_depend;
+ $make_targets .= " gentests" if $symlink;
+ (system $make_command.$make_targets) == 0 or exit $?
+ if $make_targets ne "";
+ if ( $perl =~ m@^/@) {
+ &dofile("tools/c_rehash",$perl,'^#!/', '#!%s','^my \$dir;$', 'my $dir = "' . $openssldir . '";', '^my \$prefix;$', 'my $prefix = "' . $prefix . '";');
+ &dofile("apps/CA.pl",$perl,'^#!/', '#!%s');
+ } else {
+ # No path for Perl known ...
+ &dofile("tools/c_rehash",'/usr/local/bin/perl','^#!/', '#!%s','^my \$dir;$', 'my $dir = "' . $openssldir . '";', '^my \$prefix;$', 'my $prefix = "' . $prefix . '";');
+ &dofile("apps/CA.pl",'/usr/local/bin/perl','^#!/', '#!%s');
+ }
+ if ($depflags ne $default_depflags && !$make_depend) {
+ print <<EOF;
+
+Since you've disabled or enabled at least one algorithm, you need to do
+the following before building:
+
+ make depend
+EOF
+ }
+}
+
+# create the ms/version32.rc file if needed
+if ($IsMK1MF && ($target !~ /^netware/)) {
+ my ($v1, $v2, $v3, $v4);
+ if ($version_num =~ /(^[0-9a-f]{1})([0-9a-f]{2})([0-9a-f]{2})([0-9a-f]{2})/i) {
+ $v1=hex $1;
+ $v2=hex $2;
+ $v3=hex $3;
+ $v4=hex $4;
+ }
+ open (OUT,">ms/version32.rc") || die "Can't open ms/version32.rc";
+ print OUT <<EOF;
+#include <winver.h>
+
+LANGUAGE 0x09,0x01
+
+1 VERSIONINFO
+ FILEVERSION $v1,$v2,$v3,$v4
+ PRODUCTVERSION $v1,$v2,$v3,$v4
+ FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
+#ifdef _DEBUG
+ FILEFLAGS 0x01L
+#else
+ FILEFLAGS 0x00L
+#endif
+ FILEOS VOS__WINDOWS32
+ FILETYPE VFT_DLL
+ FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
+BEGIN
+ BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
+ BEGIN
+ BLOCK "040904b0"
+ BEGIN
+ // Required:
+ VALUE "CompanyName", "The OpenSSL Project, http://www.openssl.org/\\0"
+ VALUE "FileDescription", "OpenSSL Shared Library\\0"
+ VALUE "FileVersion", "$version\\0"
+#if defined(CRYPTO)
+ VALUE "InternalName", "libeay32\\0"
+ VALUE "OriginalFilename", "libeay32.dll\\0"
+#elif defined(SSL)
+ VALUE "InternalName", "ssleay32\\0"
+ VALUE "OriginalFilename", "ssleay32.dll\\0"
+#endif
+ VALUE "ProductName", "The OpenSSL Toolkit\\0"
+ VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0"
+ // Optional:
+ //VALUE "Comments", "\\0"
+ VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright \xA9 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright \xA9 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
+ //VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0"
+ //VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0"
+ //VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0"
+ END
+ END
+ BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
+ BEGIN
+ VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 0x4b0
+ END
+END
+EOF
+ close(OUT);
+ }
+
+print <<EOF;
+
+Configured for $target.
+EOF
+
+print <<\EOF if (!$no_threads && !$threads);
+
+The library could not be configured for supporting multi-threaded
+applications as the compiler options required on this system are not known.
+See file INSTALL for details if you need multi-threading.
+EOF
+
+print <<\EOF if ($no_shared_warn);
+
+You gave the option 'shared'. Normally, that would give you shared libraries.
+Unfortunately, the OpenSSL configuration doesn't include shared library support
+for this platform yet, so it will pretend you gave the option 'no-shared'. If
+you can inform the developpers (openssl-dev\@openssl.org) how to support shared
+libraries on this platform, they will at least look at it and try their best
+(but please first make sure you have tried with a current version of OpenSSL).
+EOF
+
+exit(0);
+
+sub usage
+ {
+ print STDERR $usage;
+ print STDERR "\npick os/compiler from:\n";
+ my $j=0;
+ my $i;
+ my $k=0;
+ foreach $i (sort keys %table)
+ {
+ next if $i =~ /^debug/;
+ $k += length($i) + 1;
+ if ($k > 78)
+ {
+ print STDERR "\n";
+ $k=length($i);
+ }
+ print STDERR $i . " ";
+ }
+ foreach $i (sort keys %table)
+ {
+ next if $i !~ /^debug/;
+ $k += length($i) + 1;
+ if ($k > 78)
+ {
+ print STDERR "\n";
+ $k=length($i);
+ }
+ print STDERR $i . " ";
+ }
+ print STDERR "\n\nNOTE: If in doubt, on Unix-ish systems use './config'.\n";
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+sub which
+ {
+ my($name)=@_;
+ my $path;
+ foreach $path (split /:/, $ENV{PATH})
+ {
+ if (-f "$path/$name$exe_ext" and -x _)
+ {
+ return "$path/$name$exe_ext" unless ($name eq "perl" and
+ system("$path/$name$exe_ext -e " . '\'exit($]<5.0);\''));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+sub dofile
+ {
+ my $f; my $p; my %m; my @a; my $k; my $ff;
+ ($f,$p,%m)=@_;
+
+ open(IN,"<$f.in") || open(IN,"<$f") || die "unable to open $f:$!\n";
+ @a=<IN>;
+ close(IN);
+ foreach $k (keys %m)
+ {
+ grep(/$k/ && ($_=sprintf($m{$k}."\n",$p)), at a);
+ }
+ open(OUT,">$f.new") || die "unable to open $f.new:$!\n";
+ print OUT @a;
+ close(OUT);
+ rename($f,"$f.bak") || die "unable to rename $f\n" if -e $f;
+ rename("$f.new",$f) || die "unable to rename $f.new\n";
+ }
+
+sub print_table_entry
+ {
+ my $target = shift;
+
+ (my $cc,my $cflags,my $unistd,my $thread_cflag,my $sys_id,my $lflags,
+ my $bn_ops,my $cpuid_obj,my $bn_obj,my $des_obj,my $aes_obj, my $bf_obj,
+ my $md5_obj,my $sha1_obj,my $cast_obj,my $rc4_obj,my $rmd160_obj,
+ my $rc5_obj,my $wp_obj,my $cmll_obj,my $modes_obj, my $engines_obj,
+ my $perlasm_scheme,my $dso_scheme,my $shared_target,my $shared_cflag,
+ my $shared_ldflag,my $shared_extension,my $ranlib,my $arflags,my $multilib)=
+ split(/\s*:\s*/,$table{$target} . ":" x 30 , -1);
+
+ print <<EOF
+
+*** $target
+\$cc = $cc
+\$cflags = $cflags
+\$unistd = $unistd
+\$thread_cflag = $thread_cflag
+\$sys_id = $sys_id
+\$lflags = $lflags
+\$bn_ops = $bn_ops
+\$cpuid_obj = $cpuid_obj
+\$bn_obj = $bn_obj
+\$des_obj = $des_obj
+\$aes_obj = $aes_obj
+\$bf_obj = $bf_obj
+\$md5_obj = $md5_obj
+\$sha1_obj = $sha1_obj
+\$cast_obj = $cast_obj
+\$rc4_obj = $rc4_obj
+\$rmd160_obj = $rmd160_obj
+\$rc5_obj = $rc5_obj
+\$wp_obj = $wp_obj
+\$cmll_obj = $cmll_obj
+\$modes_obj = $modes_obj
+\$engines_obj = $engines_obj
+\$perlasm_scheme = $perlasm_scheme
+\$dso_scheme = $dso_scheme
+\$shared_target= $shared_target
+\$shared_cflag = $shared_cflag
+\$shared_ldflag = $shared_ldflag
+\$shared_extension = $shared_extension
+\$ranlib = $ranlib
+\$arflags = $arflags
+\$multilib = $multilib
+EOF
+ }
+
+sub test_sanity
+ {
+ my $errorcnt = 0;
+
+ print STDERR "=" x 70, "\n";
+ print STDERR "=== SANITY TESTING!\n";
+ print STDERR "=== No configuration will be done, all other arguments will be ignored!\n";
+ print STDERR "=" x 70, "\n";
+
+ foreach $target (sort keys %table)
+ {
+ @fields = split(/\s*:\s*/,$table{$target} . ":" x 30 , -1);
+
+ if ($fields[$idx_dso_scheme-1] =~ /^(beos|dl|dlfcn|win32|vms)$/)
+ {
+ $errorcnt++;
+ print STDERR "SANITY ERROR: '$target' has the dso_scheme [$idx_dso_scheme] values\n";
+ print STDERR " in the previous field\n";
+ }
+ elsif ($fields[$idx_dso_scheme+1] =~ /^(beos|dl|dlfcn|win32|vms)$/)
+ {
+ $errorcnt++;
+ print STDERR "SANITY ERROR: '$target' has the dso_scheme [$idx_dso_scheme] values\n";
+ print STDERR " in the following field\n";
+ }
+ elsif ($fields[$idx_dso_scheme] !~ /^(beos|dl|dlfcn|win32|vms|)$/)
+ {
+ $errorcnt++;
+ print STDERR "SANITY ERROR: '$target' has the dso_scheme [$idx_dso_scheme] field = ",$fields[$idx_dso_scheme],"\n";
+ print STDERR " valid values are 'beos', 'dl', 'dlfcn', 'win32' and 'vms'\n";
+ }
+ }
+ print STDERR "No sanity errors detected!\n" if $errorcnt == 0;
+ return $errorcnt;
+ }
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/FAQ
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/FAQ 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/FAQ 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1039 +0,0 @@
-OpenSSL - Frequently Asked Questions
---------------------------------------
-
-[MISC] Miscellaneous questions
-
-* Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
-* Where is the documentation?
-* How can I contact the OpenSSL developers?
-* Where can I get a compiled version of OpenSSL?
-* Why aren't tools like 'autoconf' and 'libtool' used?
-* What is an 'engine' version?
-* How do I check the authenticity of the OpenSSL distribution?
-* How does the versioning scheme work?
-
-[LEGAL] Legal questions
-
-* Do I need patent licenses to use OpenSSL?
-* Can I use OpenSSL with GPL software?
-
-[USER] Questions on using the OpenSSL applications
-
-* Why do I get a "PRNG not seeded" error message?
-* Why do I get an "unable to write 'random state'" error message?
-* How do I create certificates or certificate requests?
-* Why can't I create certificate requests?
-* Why does <SSL program> fail with a certificate verify error?
-* Why can I only use weak ciphers when I connect to a server using OpenSSL?
-* How can I create DSA certificates?
-* Why can't I make an SSL connection using a DSA certificate?
-* How can I remove the passphrase on a private key?
-* Why can't I use OpenSSL certificates with SSL client authentication?
-* Why does my browser give a warning about a mismatched hostname?
-* How do I install a CA certificate into a browser?
-* Why is OpenSSL x509 DN output not conformant to RFC2253?
-* What is a "128 bit certificate"? Can I create one with OpenSSL?
-* Why does OpenSSL set the authority key identifier extension incorrectly?
-* How can I set up a bundle of commercial root CA certificates?
-
-[BUILD] Questions about building and testing OpenSSL
-
-* Why does the linker complain about undefined symbols?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: command not found"?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: 1 no implemented"?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: stack empty"?
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on Alpha Tru64 Unix?
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail with "ar: command not found"?
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on Win32 with VC++?
-* What is special about OpenSSL on Redhat?
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on MacOS X?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail on MacOS X?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail in BN_sqr test [on a 64-bit platform]?
-* Why does OpenBSD-i386 build fail on des-586.s with "Unimplemented segment type"?
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail in sha512t on x86 CPU?
-* Why does compiler fail to compile sha512.c?
-* Test suite still fails, what to do?
-* I think I've found a bug, what should I do?
-* I'm SURE I've found a bug, how do I report it?
-* I've found a security issue, how do I report it?
-
-[PROG] Questions about programming with OpenSSL
-
-* Is OpenSSL thread-safe?
-* I've compiled a program under Windows and it crashes: why?
-* How do I read or write a DER encoded buffer using the ASN1 functions?
-* OpenSSL uses DER but I need BER format: does OpenSSL support BER?
-* I've tried using <M_some_evil_pkcs12_macro> and I get errors why?
-* I've called <some function> and it fails, why?
-* I just get a load of numbers for the error output, what do they mean?
-* Why do I get errors about unknown algorithms?
-* Why can't the OpenSSH configure script detect OpenSSL?
-* Can I use OpenSSL's SSL library with non-blocking I/O?
-* Why doesn't my server application receive a client certificate?
-* Why does compilation fail due to an undefined symbol NID_uniqueIdentifier?
-* I think I've detected a memory leak, is this a bug?
-* Why does Valgrind complain about the use of uninitialized data?
-* Why doesn't a memory BIO work when a file does?
-* Where are the declarations and implementations of d2i_X509() etc?
-
-===============================================================================
-
-[MISC] ========================================================================
-
-* Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
-
-The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.1e was released on Feb 11th, 2013.
-
-In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
-snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
-ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous Git access.
-
-
-* Where is the documentation?
-
-OpenSSL is a library that provides cryptographic functionality to
-applications such as secure web servers. Be sure to read the
-documentation of the application you want to use. The INSTALL file
-explains how to install this library.
-
-OpenSSL includes a command line utility that can be used to perform a
-variety of cryptographic functions. It is described in the openssl(1)
-manpage. Documentation for developers is currently being written. Many
-manual pages are available; overviews over libcrypto and
-libssl are given in the crypto(3) and ssl(3) manpages.
-
-The OpenSSL manpages are installed in /usr/local/ssl/man/ (or a
-different directory if you specified one as described in INSTALL).
-In addition, you can read the most current versions at
-<URL: http://www.openssl.org/docs/>. Note that the online documents refer
-to the very latest development versions of OpenSSL and may include features
-not present in released versions. If in doubt refer to the documentation
-that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. The pod format
-documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs
-directory.
-
-There is some documentation about certificate extensions and PKCS#12
-in doc/openssl.txt
-
-The original SSLeay documentation is included in OpenSSL as
-doc/ssleay.txt. It may be useful when none of the other resources
-help, but please note that it reflects the obsolete version SSLeay
-0.6.6.
-
-
-* How can I contact the OpenSSL developers?
-
-The README file describes how to submit bug reports and patches to
-OpenSSL. Information on the OpenSSL mailing lists is available from
-<URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-
-
-* Where can I get a compiled version of OpenSSL?
-
-You can finder pointers to binary distributions in
-<URL: http://www.openssl.org/related/binaries.html> .
-
-Some applications that use OpenSSL are distributed in binary form.
-When using such an application, you don't need to install OpenSSL
-yourself; the application will include the required parts (e.g. DLLs).
-
-If you want to build OpenSSL on a Windows system and you don't have
-a C compiler, read the "Mingw32" section of INSTALL.W32 for information
-on how to obtain and install the free GNU C compiler.
-
-A number of Linux and *BSD distributions include OpenSSL.
-
-
-* Why aren't tools like 'autoconf' and 'libtool' used?
-
-autoconf will probably be used in future OpenSSL versions. If it was
-less Unix-centric, it might have been used much earlier.
-
-* What is an 'engine' version?
-
-With version 0.9.6 OpenSSL was extended to interface to external crypto
-hardware. This was realized in a special release '0.9.6-engine'. With
-version 0.9.7 the changes were merged into the main development line,
-so that the special release is no longer necessary.
-
-* How do I check the authenticity of the OpenSSL distribution?
-
-We provide MD5 digests and ASC signatures of each tarball.
-Use MD5 to check that a tarball from a mirror site is identical:
-
- md5sum TARBALL | awk '{print $1;}' | cmp - TARBALL.md5
-
-You can check authenticity using pgp or gpg. You need the OpenSSL team
-member public key used to sign it (download it from a key server, see a
-list of keys at <URL: http://www.openssl.org/about/>). Then
-just do:
-
- pgp TARBALL.asc
-
-* How does the versioning scheme work?
-
-After the release of OpenSSL 1.0.0 the versioning scheme changed. Letter
-releases (e.g. 1.0.1a) can only contain bug and security fixes and no
-new features. Minor releases change the last number (e.g. 1.0.2) and
-can contain new features that retain binary compatibility. Changes to
-the middle number are considered major releases and neither source nor
-binary compatibility is guaranteed.
-
-Therefore the answer to the common question "when will feature X be
-backported to OpenSSL 1.0.0/0.9.8?" is "never" but it could appear
-in the next minor release.
-
-[LEGAL] =======================================================================
-
-* Do I need patent licenses to use OpenSSL?
-
-The patents section of the README file lists patents that may apply to
-you if you want to use OpenSSL. For information on intellectual
-property rights, please consult a lawyer. The OpenSSL team does not
-offer legal advice.
-
-You can configure OpenSSL so as not to use IDEA, MDC2 and RC5 by using
- ./config no-idea no-mdc2 no-rc5
-
-
-* Can I use OpenSSL with GPL software?
-
-On many systems including the major Linux and BSD distributions, yes (the
-GPL does not place restrictions on using libraries that are part of the
-normal operating system distribution).
-
-On other systems, the situation is less clear. Some GPL software copyright
-holders claim that you infringe on their rights if you use OpenSSL with
-their software on operating systems that don't normally include OpenSSL.
-
-If you develop open source software that uses OpenSSL, you may find it
-useful to choose an other license than the GPL, or state explicitly that
-"This program is released under the GPL with the additional exemption that
-compiling, linking, and/or using OpenSSL is allowed." If you are using
-GPL software developed by others, you may want to ask the copyright holder
-for permission to use their software with OpenSSL.
-
-
-[USER] ========================================================================
-
-* Why do I get a "PRNG not seeded" error message?
-
-Cryptographic software needs a source of unpredictable data to work
-correctly. Many open source operating systems provide a "randomness
-device" (/dev/urandom or /dev/random) that serves this purpose.
-All OpenSSL versions try to use /dev/urandom by default; starting with
-version 0.9.7, OpenSSL also tries /dev/random if /dev/urandom is not
-available.
-
-On other systems, applications have to call the RAND_add() or
-RAND_seed() function with appropriate data before generating keys or
-performing public key encryption. (These functions initialize the
-pseudo-random number generator, PRNG.) Some broken applications do
-not do this. As of version 0.9.5, the OpenSSL functions that need
-randomness report an error if the random number generator has not been
-seeded with at least 128 bits of randomness. If this error occurs and
-is not discussed in the documentation of the application you are
-using, please contact the author of that application; it is likely
-that it never worked correctly. OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later make the
-error visible by refusing to perform potentially insecure encryption.
-
-If you are using Solaris 8, you can add /dev/urandom and /dev/random
-devices by installing patch 112438 (Sparc) or 112439 (x86), which are
-available via the Patchfinder at <URL: http://sunsolve.sun.com>
-(Solaris 9 includes these devices by default). For /dev/random support
-for earlier Solaris versions, see Sun's statement at
-<URL: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsrdb/27606&zone_32=SUNWski>
-(the SUNWski package is available in patch 105710).
-
-On systems without /dev/urandom and /dev/random, it is a good idea to
-use the Entropy Gathering Demon (EGD); see the RAND_egd() manpage for
-details. Starting with version 0.9.7, OpenSSL will automatically look
-for an EGD socket at /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool and
-/etc/entropy.
-
-Most components of the openssl command line utility automatically try
-to seed the random number generator from a file. The name of the
-default seeding file is determined as follows: If environment variable
-RANDFILE is set, then it names the seeding file. Otherwise if
-environment variable HOME is set, then the seeding file is $HOME/.rnd.
-If neither RANDFILE nor HOME is set, versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6 will
-use file .rnd in the current directory while OpenSSL 0.9.6a uses no
-default seeding file at all. OpenSSL 0.9.6b and later will behave
-similarly to 0.9.6a, but will use a default of "C:\" for HOME on
-Windows systems if the environment variable has not been set.
-
-If the default seeding file does not exist or is too short, the "PRNG
-not seeded" error message may occur.
-
-The openssl command line utility will write back a new state to the
-default seeding file (and create this file if necessary) unless
-there was no sufficient seeding.
-
-Pointing $RANDFILE to an Entropy Gathering Daemon socket does not work.
-Use the "-rand" option of the OpenSSL command line tools instead.
-The $RANDFILE environment variable and $HOME/.rnd are only used by the
-OpenSSL command line tools. Applications using the OpenSSL library
-provide their own configuration options to specify the entropy source,
-please check out the documentation coming the with application.
-
-
-* Why do I get an "unable to write 'random state'" error message?
-
-
-Sometimes the openssl command line utility does not abort with
-a "PRNG not seeded" error message, but complains that it is
-"unable to write 'random state'". This message refers to the
-default seeding file (see previous answer). A possible reason
-is that no default filename is known because neither RANDFILE
-nor HOME is set. (Versions up to 0.9.6 used file ".rnd" in the
-current directory in this case, but this has changed with 0.9.6a.)
-
-
-* How do I create certificates or certificate requests?
-
-Check out the CA.pl(1) manual page. This provides a simple wrapper round
-the 'req', 'verify', 'ca' and 'pkcs12' utilities. For finer control check
-out the manual pages for the individual utilities and the certificate
-extensions documentation (in ca(1), req(1), x509v3_config(5) )
-
-
-* Why can't I create certificate requests?
-
-You typically get the error:
-
- unable to find 'distinguished_name' in config
- problems making Certificate Request
-
-This is because it can't find the configuration file. Check out the
-DIAGNOSTICS section of req(1) for more information.
-
-
-* Why does <SSL program> fail with a certificate verify error?
-
-This problem is usually indicated by log messages saying something like
-"unable to get local issuer certificate" or "self signed certificate".
-When a certificate is verified its root CA must be "trusted" by OpenSSL
-this typically means that the CA certificate must be placed in a directory
-or file and the relevant program configured to read it. The OpenSSL program
-'verify' behaves in a similar way and issues similar error messages: check
-the verify(1) program manual page for more information.
-
-
-* Why can I only use weak ciphers when I connect to a server using OpenSSL?
-
-This is almost certainly because you are using an old "export grade" browser
-which only supports weak encryption. Upgrade your browser to support 128 bit
-ciphers.
-
-
-* How can I create DSA certificates?
-
-Check the CA.pl(1) manual page for a DSA certificate example.
-
-
-* Why can't I make an SSL connection to a server using a DSA certificate?
-
-Typically you'll see a message saying there are no shared ciphers when
-the same setup works fine with an RSA certificate. There are two possible
-causes. The client may not support connections to DSA servers most web
-browsers (including Netscape and MSIE) only support connections to servers
-supporting RSA cipher suites. The other cause is that a set of DH parameters
-has not been supplied to the server. DH parameters can be created with the
-dhparam(1) command and loaded using the SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() for example:
-check the source to s_server in apps/s_server.c for an example.
-
-
-* How can I remove the passphrase on a private key?
-
-Firstly you should be really *really* sure you want to do this. Leaving
-a private key unencrypted is a major security risk. If you decide that
-you do have to do this check the EXAMPLES sections of the rsa(1) and
-dsa(1) manual pages.
-
-
-* Why can't I use OpenSSL certificates with SSL client authentication?
-
-What will typically happen is that when a server requests authentication
-it will either not include your certificate or tell you that you have
-no client certificates (Netscape) or present you with an empty list box
-(MSIE). The reason for this is that when a server requests a client
-certificate it includes a list of CAs names which it will accept. Browsers
-will only let you select certificates from the list on the grounds that
-there is little point presenting a certificate which the server will
-reject.
-
-The solution is to add the relevant CA certificate to your servers "trusted
-CA list". How you do this depends on the server software in uses. You can
-print out the servers list of acceptable CAs using the OpenSSL s_client tool:
-
-openssl s_client -connect www.some.host:443 -prexit
-
-If your server only requests certificates on certain URLs then you may need
-to manually issue an HTTP GET command to get the list when s_client connects:
-
-GET /some/page/needing/a/certificate.html
-
-If your CA does not appear in the list then this confirms the problem.
-
-
-* Why does my browser give a warning about a mismatched hostname?
-
-Browsers expect the server's hostname to match the value in the commonName
-(CN) field of the certificate. If it does not then you get a warning.
-
-
-* How do I install a CA certificate into a browser?
-
-The usual way is to send the DER encoded certificate to the browser as
-MIME type application/x-x509-ca-cert, for example by clicking on an appropriate
-link. On MSIE certain extensions such as .der or .cacert may also work, or you
-can import the certificate using the certificate import wizard.
-
-You can convert a certificate to DER form using the command:
-
-openssl x509 -in ca.pem -outform DER -out ca.der
-
-Occasionally someone suggests using a command such as:
-
-openssl pkcs12 -export -out cacert.p12 -in cacert.pem -inkey cakey.pem
-
-DO NOT DO THIS! This command will give away your CAs private key and
-reduces its security to zero: allowing anyone to forge certificates in
-whatever name they choose.
-
-* Why is OpenSSL x509 DN output not conformant to RFC2253?
-
-The ways to print out the oneline format of the DN (Distinguished Name) have
-been extended in version 0.9.7 of OpenSSL. Using the new X509_NAME_print_ex()
-interface, the "-nameopt" option could be introduded. See the manual
-page of the "openssl x509" commandline tool for details. The old behaviour
-has however been left as default for the sake of compatibility.
-
-* What is a "128 bit certificate"? Can I create one with OpenSSL?
-
-The term "128 bit certificate" is a highly misleading marketing term. It does
-*not* refer to the size of the public key in the certificate! A certificate
-containing a 128 bit RSA key would have negligible security.
-
-There were various other names such as "magic certificates", "SGC
-certificates", "step up certificates" etc.
-
-You can't generally create such a certificate using OpenSSL but there is no
-need to any more. Nowadays web browsers using unrestricted strong encryption
-are generally available.
-
-When there were tight restrictions on the export of strong encryption
-software from the US only weak encryption algorithms could be freely exported
-(initially 40 bit and then 56 bit). It was widely recognised that this was
-inadequate. A relaxation of the rules allowed the use of strong encryption but
-only to an authorised server.
-
-Two slighly different techniques were developed to support this, one used by
-Netscape was called "step up", the other used by MSIE was called "Server Gated
-Cryptography" (SGC). When a browser initially connected to a server it would
-check to see if the certificate contained certain extensions and was issued by
-an authorised authority. If these test succeeded it would reconnect using
-strong encryption.
-
-Only certain (initially one) certificate authorities could issue the
-certificates and they generally cost more than ordinary certificates.
-
-Although OpenSSL can create certificates containing the appropriate extensions
-the certificate would not come from a permitted authority and so would not
-be recognized.
-
-The export laws were later changed to allow almost unrestricted use of strong
-encryption so these certificates are now obsolete.
-
-
-* Why does OpenSSL set the authority key identifier (AKID) extension incorrectly?
-
-It doesn't: this extension is often the cause of confusion.
-
-Consider a certificate chain A->B->C so that A signs B and B signs C. Suppose
-certificate C contains AKID.
-
-The purpose of this extension is to identify the authority certificate B. This
-can be done either by including the subject key identifier of B or its issuer
-name and serial number.
-
-In this latter case because it is identifying certifcate B it must contain the
-issuer name and serial number of B.
-
-It is often wrongly assumed that it should contain the subject name of B. If it
-did this would be redundant information because it would duplicate the issuer
-name of C.
-
-
-* How can I set up a bundle of commercial root CA certificates?
-
-The OpenSSL software is shipped without any root CA certificate as the
-OpenSSL project does not have any policy on including or excluding
-any specific CA and does not intend to set up such a policy. Deciding
-about which CAs to support is up to application developers or
-administrators.
-
-Other projects do have other policies so you can for example extract the CA
-bundle used by Mozilla and/or modssl as described in this article:
-
- <URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/modssl-users@modssl.org/msg16980.html>
-
-
-[BUILD] =======================================================================
-
-* Why does the linker complain about undefined symbols?
-
-Maybe the compilation was interrupted, and make doesn't notice that
-something is missing. Run "make clean; make".
-
-If you used ./Configure instead of ./config, make sure that you
-selected the right target. File formats may differ slightly between
-OS versions (for example sparcv8/sparcv9, or a.out/elf).
-
-In case you get errors about the following symbols, use the config
-option "no-asm", as described in INSTALL:
-
- BF_cbc_encrypt, BF_decrypt, BF_encrypt, CAST_cbc_encrypt,
- CAST_decrypt, CAST_encrypt, RC4, RC5_32_cbc_encrypt, RC5_32_decrypt,
- RC5_32_encrypt, bn_add_words, bn_div_words, bn_mul_add_words,
- bn_mul_comba4, bn_mul_comba8, bn_mul_words, bn_sqr_comba4,
- bn_sqr_comba8, bn_sqr_words, bn_sub_words, des_decrypt3,
- des_ede3_cbc_encrypt, des_encrypt, des_encrypt2, des_encrypt3,
- des_ncbc_encrypt, md5_block_asm_host_order, sha1_block_asm_data_order
-
-If none of these helps, you may want to try using the current snapshot.
-If the problem persists, please submit a bug report.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: command not found"?
-
-You didn't install "bc", the Unix calculator. If you want to run the
-tests, get GNU bc from ftp://ftp.gnu.org or from your OS distributor.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: 1 no implemented"?
-
-On some SCO installations or versions, bc has a bug that gets triggered
-when you run the test suite (using "make test"). The message returned is
-"bc: 1 not implemented".
-
-The best way to deal with this is to find another implementation of bc
-and compile/install it. GNU bc (see <URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html>
-for download instructions) can be safely used, for example.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test fail with "bc: stack empty"?
-
-On some DG/ux versions, bc seems to have a too small stack for calculations
-that the OpenSSL bntest throws at it. This gets triggered when you run the
-test suite (using "make test"). The message returned is "bc: stack empty".
-
-The best way to deal with this is to find another implementation of bc
-and compile/install it. GNU bc (see <URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html>
-for download instructions) can be safely used, for example.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on Alpha Tru64 Unix?
-
-On some Alpha installations running Tru64 Unix and Compaq C, the compilation
-of crypto/sha/sha_dgst.c fails with the message 'Fatal: Insufficient virtual
-memory to continue compilation.' As far as the tests have shown, this may be
-a compiler bug. What happens is that it eats up a lot of resident memory
-to build something, probably a table. The problem is clearly in the
-optimization code, because if one eliminates optimization completely (-O0),
-the compilation goes through (and the compiler consumes about 2MB of resident
-memory instead of 240MB or whatever one's limit is currently).
-
-There are three options to solve this problem:
-
-1. set your current data segment size soft limit higher. Experience shows
-that about 241000 kbytes seems to be enough on an AlphaServer DS10. You do
-this with the command 'ulimit -Sd nnnnnn', where 'nnnnnn' is the number of
-kbytes to set the limit to.
-
-2. If you have a hard limit that is lower than what you need and you can't
-get it changed, you can compile all of OpenSSL with -O0 as optimization
-level. This is however not a very nice thing to do for those who expect to
-get the best result from OpenSSL. A bit more complicated solution is the
-following:
-
------ snip:start -----
- make DIRS=crypto SDIRS=sha "`grep '^CFLAG=' Makefile.ssl | \
- sed -e 's/ -O[0-9] / -O0 /'`"
- rm `ls crypto/*.o crypto/sha/*.o | grep -v 'sha_dgst\.o'`
- make
------ snip:end -----
-
-This will only compile sha_dgst.c with -O0, the rest with the optimization
-level chosen by the configuration process. When the above is done, do the
-test and installation and you're set.
-
-3. Reconfigure the toolkit with no-sha0 option to leave out SHA0. It
-should not be used and is not used in SSL/TLS nor any other recognized
-protocol in either case.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail with "ar: command not found"?
-
-Getting this message is quite usual on Solaris 2, because Sun has hidden
-away 'ar' and other development commands in directories that aren't in
-$PATH by default. One of those directories is '/usr/ccs/bin'. The
-quickest way to fix this is to do the following (it assumes you use sh
-or any sh-compatible shell):
-
------ snip:start -----
- PATH=${PATH}:/usr/ccs/bin; export PATH
------ snip:end -----
-
-and then redo the compilation. What you should really do is make sure
-'/usr/ccs/bin' is permanently in your $PATH, for example through your
-'.profile' (again, assuming you use a sh-compatible shell).
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on Win32 with VC++?
-
-Sometimes, you may get reports from VC++ command line (cl) that it
-can't find standard include files like stdio.h and other weirdnesses.
-One possible cause is that the environment isn't correctly set up.
-To solve that problem for VC++ versions up to 6, one should run
-VCVARS32.BAT which is found in the 'bin' subdirectory of the VC++
-installation directory (somewhere under 'Program Files'). For VC++
-version 7 (and up?), which is also called VS.NET, the file is called
-VSVARS32.BAT instead.
-This needs to be done prior to running NMAKE, and the changes are only
-valid for the current DOS session.
-
-
-* What is special about OpenSSL on Redhat?
-
-Red Hat Linux (release 7.0 and later) include a preinstalled limited
-version of OpenSSL. For patent reasons, support for IDEA, RC5 and MDC2
-is disabled in this version. The same may apply to other Linux distributions.
-Users may therefore wish to install more or all of the features left out.
-
-To do this you MUST ensure that you do not overwrite the openssl that is in
-/usr/bin on your Red Hat machine. Several packages depend on this file,
-including sendmail and ssh. /usr/local/bin is a good alternative choice. The
-libraries that come with Red Hat 7.0 onwards have different names and so are
-not affected. (eg For Red Hat 7.2 they are /lib/libssl.so.0.9.6b and
-/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.6b with symlinks /lib/libssl.so.2 and
-/lib/libcrypto.so.2 respectively).
-
-Please note that we have been advised by Red Hat attempting to recompile the
-openssl rpm with all the cryptography enabled will not work. All other
-packages depend on the original Red Hat supplied openssl package. It is also
-worth noting that due to the way Red Hat supplies its packages, updates to
-openssl on each distribution never change the package version, only the
-build number. For example, on Red Hat 7.1, the latest openssl package has
-version number 0.9.6 and build number 9 even though it contains all the
-relevant updates in packages up to and including 0.9.6b.
-
-A possible way around this is to persuade Red Hat to produce a non-US
-version of Red Hat Linux.
-
-FYI: Patent numbers and expiry dates of US patents:
-MDC-2: 4,908,861 13/03/2007
-IDEA: 5,214,703 25/05/2010
-RC5: 5,724,428 03/03/2015
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on MacOS X?
-
-If the failure happens when trying to build the "openssl" binary, with
-a large number of undefined symbols, it's very probable that you have
-OpenSSL 0.9.6b delivered with the operating system (you can find out by
-running '/usr/bin/openssl version') and that you were trying to build
-OpenSSL 0.9.7 or newer. The problem is that the loader ('ld') in
-MacOS X has a misfeature that's quite difficult to go around.
-Look in the file PROBLEMS for a more detailed explanation and for possible
-solutions.
-
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail on MacOS X?
-
-If the failure happens when running 'make test' and the RC4 test fails,
-it's very probable that you have OpenSSL 0.9.6b delivered with the
-operating system (you can find out by running '/usr/bin/openssl version')
-and that you were trying to build OpenSSL 0.9.6d. The problem is that
-the loader ('ld') in MacOS X has a misfeature that's quite difficult to
-go around and has linked the programs "openssl" and the test programs
-with /usr/lib/libcrypto.dylib and /usr/lib/libssl.dylib instead of the
-libraries you just built.
-Look in the file PROBLEMS for a more detailed explanation and for possible
-solutions.
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail in BN_sqr test [on a 64-bit platform]?
-
-Failure in BN_sqr test is most likely caused by a failure to configure the
-toolkit for current platform or lack of support for the platform in question.
-Run './config -t' and './apps/openssl version -p'. Do these platform
-identifiers match? If they don't, then you most likely failed to run
-./config and you're hereby advised to do so before filing a bug report.
-If ./config itself fails to run, then it's most likely problem with your
-local environment and you should turn to your system administrator (or
-similar). If identifiers match (and/or no alternative identifier is
-suggested by ./config script), then the platform is unsupported. There might
-or might not be a workaround. Most notably on SPARC64 platforms with GNU
-C compiler you should be able to produce a working build by running
-'./config -m32'. I understand that -m32 might not be what you want/need,
-but the build should be operational. For further details turn to
-<openssl-dev at openssl.org>.
-
-* Why does OpenBSD-i386 build fail on des-586.s with "Unimplemented segment type"?
-
-As of 0.9.7 assembler routines were overhauled for position independence
-of the machine code, which is essential for shared library support. For
-some reason OpenBSD is equipped with an out-of-date GNU assembler which
-finds the new code offensive. To work around the problem, configure with
-no-asm (and sacrifice a great deal of performance) or patch your assembler
-according to <URL: http://www.openssl.org/~appro/gas-1.92.3.OpenBSD.patch>.
-For your convenience a pre-compiled replacement binary is provided at
-<URL: http://www.openssl.org/~appro/gas-1.92.3.static.aout.bin>.
-Reportedly elder *BSD a.out platforms also suffer from this problem and
-remedy should be same. Provided binary is statically linked and should be
-working across wider range of *BSD branches, not just OpenBSD.
-
-* Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail in sha512t on x86 CPU?
-
-If the test program in question fails withs SIGILL, Illegal Instruction
-exception, then you more than likely to run SSE2-capable CPU, such as
-Intel P4, under control of kernel which does not support SSE2
-instruction extentions. See accompanying INSTALL file and
-OPENSSL_ia32cap(3) documentation page for further information.
-
-* Why does compiler fail to compile sha512.c?
-
-OpenSSL SHA-512 implementation depends on compiler support for 64-bit
-integer type. Few elder compilers [ULTRIX cc, SCO compiler to mention a
-couple] lack support for this and therefore are incapable of compiling
-the module in question. The recommendation is to disable SHA-512 by
-adding no-sha512 to ./config [or ./Configure] command line. Another
-possible alternative might be to switch to GCC.
-
-* Test suite still fails, what to do?
-
-Another common reason for failure to complete some particular test is
-simply bad code generated by a buggy component in toolchain or deficiency
-in run-time environment. There are few cases documented in PROBLEMS file,
-consult it for possible workaround before you beat the drum. Even if you
-don't find solution or even mention there, do reserve for possibility of
-a compiler bug. Compiler bugs might appear in rather bizarre ways, they
-never make sense, and tend to emerge when you least expect them. In order
-to identify one, drop optimization level, e.g. by editing CFLAG line in
-top-level Makefile, recompile and re-run the test.
-
-* I think I've found a bug, what should I do?
-
-If you are a new user then it is quite likely you haven't found a bug and
-something is happening you aren't familiar with. Check this FAQ, the associated
-documentation and the mailing lists for similar queries. If you are still
-unsure whether it is a bug or not submit a query to the openssl-users mailing
-list.
-
-
-* I'm SURE I've found a bug, how do I report it?
-
-Bug reports with no security implications should be sent to the request
-tracker. This can be done by mailing the report to <rt at openssl.org> (or its
-alias <openssl-bugs at openssl.org>), please note that messages sent to the
-request tracker also appear in the public openssl-dev mailing list.
-
-The report should be in plain text. Any patches should be sent as
-plain text attachments because some mailers corrupt patches sent inline.
-If your issue affects multiple versions of OpenSSL check any patches apply
-cleanly and, if possible include patches to each affected version.
-
-The report should be given a meaningful subject line briefly summarising the
-issue. Just "bug in OpenSSL" or "bug in OpenSSL 0.9.8n" is not very helpful.
-
-By sending reports to the request tracker the bug can then be given a priority
-and assigned to the appropriate maintainer. The history of discussions can be
-accessed and if the issue has been addressed or a reason why not. If patches
-are only sent to openssl-dev they can be mislaid if a team member has to
-wade through months of old messages to review the discussion.
-
-See also <URL: http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html>
-
-
-* I've found a security issue, how do I report it?
-
-If you think your bug has security implications then please send it to
-openssl-security at openssl.org if you don't get a prompt reply at least
-acknowledging receipt then resend or mail it directly to one of the
-more active team members (e.g. Steve).
-
-Note that bugs only present in the openssl utility are not in general
-considered to be security issues.
-
-[PROG] ========================================================================
-
-* Is OpenSSL thread-safe?
-
-Yes (with limitations: an SSL connection may not concurrently be used
-by multiple threads). On Windows and many Unix systems, OpenSSL
-automatically uses the multi-threaded versions of the standard
-libraries. If your platform is not one of these, consult the INSTALL
-file.
-
-Multi-threaded applications must provide two callback functions to
-OpenSSL by calling CRYPTO_set_locking_callback() and
-CRYPTO_set_id_callback(), for all versions of OpenSSL up to and
-including 0.9.8[abc...]. As of version 1.0.0, CRYPTO_set_id_callback()
-and associated APIs are deprecated by CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback()
-and friends. This is described in the threads(3) manpage.
-
-* I've compiled a program under Windows and it crashes: why?
-
-This is usually because you've missed the comment in INSTALL.W32.
-Your application must link against the same version of the Win32
-C-Runtime against which your openssl libraries were linked. The
-default version for OpenSSL is /MD - "Multithreaded DLL".
-
-If you are using Microsoft Visual C++'s IDE (Visual Studio), in
-many cases, your new project most likely defaulted to "Debug
-Singlethreaded" - /ML. This is NOT interchangeable with /MD and your
-program will crash, typically on the first BIO related read or write
-operation.
-
-For each of the six possible link stage configurations within Win32,
-your application must link against the same by which OpenSSL was
-built. If you are using MS Visual C++ (Studio) this can be changed
-by:
-
- 1. Select Settings... from the Project Menu.
- 2. Select the C/C++ Tab.
- 3. Select "Code Generation from the "Category" drop down list box
- 4. Select the Appropriate library (see table below) from the "Use
- run-time library" drop down list box. Perform this step for both
- your debug and release versions of your application (look at the
- top left of the settings panel to change between the two)
-
- Single Threaded /ML - MS VC++ often defaults to
- this for the release
- version of a new project.
- Debug Single Threaded /MLd - MS VC++ often defaults to
- this for the debug version
- of a new project.
- Multithreaded /MT
- Debug Multithreaded /MTd
- Multithreaded DLL /MD - OpenSSL defaults to this.
- Debug Multithreaded DLL /MDd
-
-Note that debug and release libraries are NOT interchangeable. If you
-built OpenSSL with /MD your application must use /MD and cannot use /MDd.
-
-As per 0.9.8 the above limitation is eliminated for .DLLs. OpenSSL
-.DLLs compiled with some specific run-time option [we insist on the
-default /MD] can be deployed with application compiled with different
-option or even different compiler. But there is a catch! Instead of
-re-compiling OpenSSL toolkit, as you would have to with prior versions,
-you have to compile small C snippet with compiler and/or options of
-your choice. The snippet gets installed as
-<install-root>/include/openssl/applink.c and should be either added to
-your application project or simply #include-d in one [and only one]
-of your application source files. Failure to link this shim module
-into your application manifests itself as fatal "no OPENSSL_Applink"
-run-time error. An explicit reminder is due that in this situation
-[mixing compiler options] it is as important to add CRYPTO_malloc_init
-prior first call to OpenSSL.
-
-* How do I read or write a DER encoded buffer using the ASN1 functions?
-
-You have two options. You can either use a memory BIO in conjunction
-with the i2d_*_bio() or d2i_*_bio() functions or you can use the
-i2d_*(), d2i_*() functions directly. Since these are often the
-cause of grief here are some code fragments using PKCS7 as an example:
-
- unsigned char *buf, *p;
- int len;
-
- len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); /* or Malloc, error checking omitted */
- p = buf;
- i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
-
-At this point buf contains the len bytes of the DER encoding of
-p7.
-
-The opposite assumes we already have len bytes in buf:
-
- unsigned char *p;
- p = buf;
- p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, len);
-
-At this point p7 contains a valid PKCS7 structure of NULL if an error
-occurred. If an error occurred ERR_print_errors(bio) should give more
-information.
-
-The reason for the temporary variable 'p' is that the ASN1 functions
-increment the passed pointer so it is ready to read or write the next
-structure. This is often a cause of problems: without the temporary
-variable the buffer pointer is changed to point just after the data
-that has been read or written. This may well be uninitialized data
-and attempts to free the buffer will have unpredictable results
-because it no longer points to the same address.
-
-
-* OpenSSL uses DER but I need BER format: does OpenSSL support BER?
-
-The short answer is yes, because DER is a special case of BER and OpenSSL
-ASN1 decoders can process BER.
-
-The longer answer is that ASN1 structures can be encoded in a number of
-different ways. One set of ways is the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) with various
-permissible encodings. A restriction of BER is the Distinguished Encoding
-Rules (DER): these uniquely specify how a given structure is encoded.
-
-Therefore, because DER is a special case of BER, DER is an acceptable encoding
-for BER.
-
-
-* I've tried using <M_some_evil_pkcs12_macro> and I get errors why?
-
-This usually happens when you try compiling something using the PKCS#12
-macros with a C++ compiler. There is hardly ever any need to use the
-PKCS#12 macros in a program, it is much easier to parse and create
-PKCS#12 files using the PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create() functions
-documented in doc/openssl.txt and with examples in demos/pkcs12. The
-'pkcs12' application has to use the macros because it prints out
-debugging information.
-
-
-* I've called <some function> and it fails, why?
-
-Before submitting a report or asking in one of the mailing lists, you
-should try to determine the cause. In particular, you should call
-ERR_print_errors() or ERR_print_errors_fp() after the failed call
-and see if the message helps. Note that the problem may occur earlier
-than you think -- you should check for errors after every call where
-it is possible, otherwise the actual problem may be hidden because
-some OpenSSL functions clear the error state.
-
-
-* I just get a load of numbers for the error output, what do they mean?
-
-The actual format is described in the ERR_print_errors() manual page.
-You should call the function ERR_load_crypto_strings() before hand and
-the message will be output in text form. If you can't do this (for example
-it is a pre-compiled binary) you can use the errstr utility on the error
-code itself (the hex digits after the second colon).
-
-
-* Why do I get errors about unknown algorithms?
-
-The cause is forgetting to load OpenSSL's table of algorithms with
-OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(). See the manual page for more information. This
-can cause several problems such as being unable to read in an encrypted
-PEM file, unable to decrypt a PKCS#12 file or signature failure when
-verifying certificates.
-
-* Why can't the OpenSSH configure script detect OpenSSL?
-
-Several reasons for problems with the automatic detection exist.
-OpenSSH requires at least version 0.9.5a of the OpenSSL libraries.
-Sometimes the distribution has installed an older version in the system
-locations that is detected instead of a new one installed. The OpenSSL
-library might have been compiled for another CPU or another mode (32/64 bits).
-Permissions might be wrong.
-
-The general answer is to check the config.log file generated when running
-the OpenSSH configure script. It should contain the detailed information
-on why the OpenSSL library was not detected or considered incompatible.
-
-
-* Can I use OpenSSL's SSL library with non-blocking I/O?
-
-Yes; make sure to read the SSL_get_error(3) manual page!
-
-A pitfall to avoid: Don't assume that SSL_read() will just read from
-the underlying transport or that SSL_write() will just write to it --
-it is also possible that SSL_write() cannot do any useful work until
-there is data to read, or that SSL_read() cannot do anything until it
-is possible to send data. One reason for this is that the peer may
-request a new TLS/SSL handshake at any time during the protocol,
-requiring a bi-directional message exchange; both SSL_read() and
-SSL_write() will try to continue any pending handshake.
-
-
-* Why doesn't my server application receive a client certificate?
-
-Due to the TLS protocol definition, a client will only send a certificate,
-if explicitly asked by the server. Use the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag of the
-SSL_CTX_set_verify() function to enable the use of client certificates.
-
-
-* Why does compilation fail due to an undefined symbol NID_uniqueIdentifier?
-
-For OpenSSL 0.9.7 the OID table was extended and corrected. In earlier
-versions, uniqueIdentifier was incorrectly used for X.509 certificates.
-The correct name according to RFC2256 (LDAP) is x500UniqueIdentifier.
-Change your code to use the new name when compiling against OpenSSL 0.9.7.
-
-
-* I think I've detected a memory leak, is this a bug?
-
-In most cases the cause of an apparent memory leak is an OpenSSL internal table
-that is allocated when an application starts up. Since such tables do not grow
-in size over time they are harmless.
-
-These internal tables can be freed up when an application closes using various
-functions. Currently these include following:
-
-Thread-local cleanup functions:
-
- ERR_remove_state()
-
-Application-global cleanup functions that are aware of usage (and therefore
-thread-safe):
-
- ENGINE_cleanup() and CONF_modules_unload()
-
-"Brutal" (thread-unsafe) Application-global cleanup functions:
-
- ERR_free_strings(), EVP_cleanup() and CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data().
-
-
-* Why does Valgrind complain about the use of uninitialized data?
-
-When OpenSSL's PRNG routines are called to generate random numbers the supplied
-buffer contents are mixed into the entropy pool: so it technically does not
-matter whether the buffer is initialized at this point or not. Valgrind (and
-other test tools) will complain about this. When using Valgrind, make sure the
-OpenSSL library has been compiled with the PURIFY macro defined (-DPURIFY)
-to get rid of these warnings.
-
-
-* Why doesn't a memory BIO work when a file does?
-
-This can occur in several cases for example reading an S/MIME email message.
-The reason is that a memory BIO can do one of two things when all the data
-has been read from it.
-
-The default behaviour is to indicate that no more data is available and that
-the call should be retried, this is to allow the application to fill up the BIO
-again if necessary.
-
-Alternatively it can indicate that no more data is available and that EOF has
-been reached.
-
-If a memory BIO is to behave in the same way as a file this second behaviour
-is needed. This must be done by calling:
-
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
-
-See the manual pages for more details.
-
-
-* Where are the declarations and implementations of d2i_X509() etc?
-
-These are defined and implemented by macros of the form:
-
-
- DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509) and IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
-
-The implementation passes an ASN1 "template" defining the structure into an
-ASN1 interpreter using generalised functions such as ASN1_item_d2i().
-
-
-===============================================================================
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/FAQ (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/FAQ)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/FAQ (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/FAQ 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+The FAQ is now maintained on the web:
+ https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/Makefile 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,676 +0,0 @@
-### Generated automatically from Makefile.org by Configure.
-
-##
-## Makefile for OpenSSL
-##
-
-VERSION=1.0.1o
-MAJOR=1
-MINOR=0.1
-SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
-SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=
-SHLIB_MAJOR=1
-SHLIB_MINOR=0.0
-SHLIB_EXT=
-PLATFORM=dist
-OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-store no-unit-test no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
-CONFIGURE_ARGS=dist
-SHLIB_TARGET=
-
-# HERE indicates where this Makefile lives. This can be used to indicate
-# where sub-Makefiles are expected to be. Currently has very limited usage,
-# and should probably not be bothered with at all.
-HERE=.
-
-# INSTALL_PREFIX is for package builders so that they can configure
-# for, say, /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/.
-# Normally it is left empty.
-INSTALL_PREFIX=
-INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
-
-# Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
-OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
-
-# NO_IDEA - Define to build without the IDEA algorithm
-# NO_RC4 - Define to build without the RC4 algorithm
-# NO_RC2 - Define to build without the RC2 algorithm
-# THREADS - Define when building with threads, you will probably also need any
-# system defines as well, i.e. _REENTERANT for Solaris 2.[34]
-# TERMIO - Define the termio terminal subsystem, needed if sgtty is missing.
-# TERMIOS - Define the termios terminal subsystem, Silicon Graphics.
-# LONGCRYPT - Define to use HPUX 10.x's long password modification to crypt(3).
-# DEVRANDOM - Give this the value of the 'random device' if your OS supports
-# one. 32 bytes will be read from this when the random
-# number generator is initalised.
-# SSL_FORBID_ENULL - define if you want the server to be not able to use the
-# NULL encryption ciphers.
-#
-# LOCK_DEBUG - turns on lots of lock debug output :-)
-# REF_CHECK - turn on some xyz_free() assertions.
-# REF_PRINT - prints some stuff on structure free.
-# CRYPTO_MDEBUG - turns on my 'memory leak' detecting stuff
-# MFUNC - Make all Malloc/Free/Realloc calls call
-# CRYPTO_malloc/CRYPTO_free/CRYPTO_realloc which can be setup to
-# call application defined callbacks via CRYPTO_set_mem_functions()
-# MD5_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for MD5
-# SHA1_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for SHA1
-# RMD160_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for RIPEMD160
-# Do not define B_ENDIAN or L_ENDIAN if 'unsigned long' == 8. It must
-# equal 4.
-# PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests.
-
-CC= cc
-CFLAG= -O
-DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
-PEX_LIBS=
-EX_LIBS=
-EXE_EXT=
-ARFLAGS=
-AR= ar $(ARFLAGS) r
-RANLIB= /usr/bin/ranlib
-NM= nm
-PERL= /usr/bin/perl
-TAR= tar
-TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
-MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend
-LIBDIR=lib
-
-# We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in
-# order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture
-# dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC
-# gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus
-# and pass it down to assembler.
-AS=$(CC) -c
-ASFLAG=$(CFLAG)
-
-# For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support
-# the 80386.
-PROCESSOR=
-
-# CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets
-CPUID_OBJ= mem_clr.o
-BN_ASM= bn_asm.o
-DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o
-AES_ENC= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o
-BF_ENC= bf_enc.o
-CAST_ENC= c_enc.o
-RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o
-RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o
-MD5_ASM_OBJ=
-SHA1_ASM_OBJ=
-RMD160_ASM_OBJ=
-WP_ASM_OBJ= wp_block.o
-CMLL_ENC= camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o
-MODES_ASM_OBJ=
-ENGINES_ASM_OBJ=
-PERLASM_SCHEME=
-
-# KRB5 stuff
-KRB5_INCLUDES=
-LIBKRB5=
-
-# Zlib stuff
-ZLIB_INCLUDE=
-LIBZLIB=
-
-# TOP level FIPS install directory.
-FIPSDIR=/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0
-
-# This is the location of fipscanister.o and friends.
-# The FIPS module build will place it $(INSTALLTOP)/lib
-# but since $(INSTALLTOP) can only take the default value
-# when the module is built it will be in /usr/local/ssl/lib
-# $(INSTALLTOP) for this build may be different so hard
-# code the path.
-
-FIPSLIBDIR=
-
-# The location of the library which contains fipscanister.o
-# normally it will be libcrypto unless fipsdso is set in which
-# case it will be libfips. If not compiling in FIPS mode at all
-# this is empty making it a useful test for a FIPS compile.
-
-FIPSCANLIB=
-
-# Shared library base address. Currently only used on Windows.
-#
-
-BASEADDR=0xFB00000
-
-DIRS= crypto ssl engines apps test tools
-ENGDIRS= ccgost
-SHLIBDIRS= crypto ssl
-
-# dirs in crypto to build
-SDIRS= \
- objects \
- md4 md5 sha mdc2 hmac ripemd whrlpool \
- des aes rc2 rc4 idea bf cast camellia seed modes \
- bn ec rsa dsa ecdsa dh ecdh dso engine \
- buffer bio stack lhash rand err \
- evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5 \
- cms pqueue ts srp cmac
-# keep in mind that the above list is adjusted by ./Configure
-# according to no-xxx arguments...
-
-# tests to perform. "alltests" is a special word indicating that all tests
-# should be performed.
-TESTS = alltests
-
-MAKEFILE= Makefile
-
-MANDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/man
-MAN1=1
-MAN3=3
-MANSUFFIX=
-HTMLSUFFIX=html
-HTMLDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/html
-SHELL=/bin/sh
-
-TOP= .
-ONEDIRS=out tmp
-EDIRS= times doc bugs util include certs ms shlib mt demos perl sf dep VMS
-WDIRS= windows
-LIBS= libcrypto.a libssl.a
-SHARED_CRYPTO=libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
-SHARED_SSL=libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
-SHARED_LIBS=
-SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=
-SHARED_LDFLAGS=
-
-GENERAL= Makefile
-BASENAME= openssl
-NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
-TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
-WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
-EXHEADER= e_os2.h
-HEADER= e_os.h
-
-all: Makefile build_all
-
-# as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower
-# Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn
-# shell, which [annoyingly enough] terminates unset with error if VAR
-# is not present:-( TOP= && unset TOP is tribute to HP-UX /bin/sh,
-# which terminates unset with error if no variable was present:-(
-CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
- $${INCLUDE+INCLUDE} $${INCLUDES+INCLUDES} \
- $${DIR+DIR} $${DIRS+DIRS} $${SRC+SRC} \
- $${LIBSRC+LIBSRC} $${LIBOBJ+LIBOBJ} $${ALL+ALL} \
- $${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER} \
- $${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS} \
- $${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS} \
- $${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} $${SCRIPTS+SCRIPTS} \
- $${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
- $${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
-
-BUILDENV= PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
- CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \
- AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \
- AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \
- CROSS_COMPILE='$(CROSS_COMPILE)' \
- PERL='$(PERL)' ENGDIRS='$(ENGDIRS)' \
- SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' LIBRPATH='$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)' \
- INSTALL_PREFIX='$(INSTALL_PREFIX)' \
- INSTALLTOP='$(INSTALLTOP)' OPENSSLDIR='$(OPENSSLDIR)' \
- LIBDIR='$(LIBDIR)' \
- MAKEDEPEND='$$$${TOP}/util/domd $$$${TOP} -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
- DEPFLAG='-DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED $(DEPFLAG)' \
- MAKEDEPPROG='$(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
- SHARED_LDFLAGS='$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)' \
- KRB5_INCLUDES='$(KRB5_INCLUDES)' LIBKRB5='$(LIBKRB5)' \
- ZLIB_INCLUDE='$(ZLIB_INCLUDE)' LIBZLIB='$(LIBZLIB)' \
- EXE_EXT='$(EXE_EXT)' SHARED_LIBS='$(SHARED_LIBS)' \
- SHLIB_EXT='$(SHLIB_EXT)' SHLIB_TARGET='$(SHLIB_TARGET)' \
- PEX_LIBS='$(PEX_LIBS)' EX_LIBS='$(EX_LIBS)' \
- CPUID_OBJ='$(CPUID_OBJ)' \
- BN_ASM='$(BN_ASM)' DES_ENC='$(DES_ENC)' \
- AES_ENC='$(AES_ENC)' CMLL_ENC='$(CMLL_ENC)' \
- BF_ENC='$(BF_ENC)' CAST_ENC='$(CAST_ENC)' \
- RC4_ENC='$(RC4_ENC)' RC5_ENC='$(RC5_ENC)' \
- SHA1_ASM_OBJ='$(SHA1_ASM_OBJ)' \
- MD5_ASM_OBJ='$(MD5_ASM_OBJ)' \
- RMD160_ASM_OBJ='$(RMD160_ASM_OBJ)' \
- WP_ASM_OBJ='$(WP_ASM_OBJ)' \
- MODES_ASM_OBJ='$(MODES_ASM_OBJ)' \
- ENGINES_ASM_OBJ='$(ENGINES_ASM_OBJ)' \
- PERLASM_SCHEME='$(PERLASM_SCHEME)' \
- FIPSLIBDIR='${FIPSLIBDIR}' \
- FIPSDIR='${FIPSDIR}' \
- FIPSCANLIB="$${FIPSCANLIB:-$(FIPSCANLIB)}" \
- THIS=$${THIS:-$@} MAKEFILE=Makefile MAKEOVERRIDES=
-# MAKEOVERRIDES= effectively "equalizes" GNU-ish and SysV-ish make flavors,
-# which in turn eliminates ambiguities in variable treatment with -e.
-
-# BUILD_CMD is a generic macro to build a given target in a given
-# subdirectory. The target must be given through the shell variable
-# `target' and the subdirectory to build in must be given through `dir'.
-# This macro shouldn't be used directly, use RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD or
-# BUILD_ONE_CMD instead.
-#
-# BUILD_ONE_CMD is a macro to build a given target in a given
-# subdirectory if that subdirectory is part of $(DIRS). It requires
-# exactly the same shell variables as BUILD_CMD.
-#
-# RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD is a macro to build a given target in all
-# subdirectories defined in $(DIRS). It requires that the target
-# is given through the shell variable `target'.
-BUILD_CMD= if [ -d "$$dir" ]; then \
- ( cd $$dir && echo "making $$target in $$dir..." && \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. DIR=$$dir $$target \
- ) || exit 1; \
- fi
-RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD=for dir in $(DIRS); do $(BUILD_CMD); done
-BUILD_ONE_CMD=\
- if expr " $(DIRS) " : ".* $$dir " >/dev/null 2>&1; then \
- $(BUILD_CMD); \
- fi
-
-reflect:
- @[ -n "$(THIS)" ] && $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) $(THIS) -e $(BUILDENV)
-
-sub_all: build_all
-build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools
-
-build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
-
-build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc
-build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc
-
-build_crypto:
- @dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_ssl:
- @dir=ssl; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_engines:
- @dir=engines; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_apps:
- @dir=apps; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_tests:
- @dir=test; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_tools:
- @dir=tools; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-
-all_testapps: build_libs build_testapps
-build_testapps:
- @dir=crypto; target=testapps; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-
-fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT): libcrypto.a
- [ -z "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] || $(CC) $(CFLAG) -Iinclude \
- -DFINGERPRINT_PREMAIN_DSO_LOAD -o $@ \
- $(FIPSLIBDIR)fips_premain.c $(FIPSLIBDIR)fipscanister.o \
- libcrypto.a $(EX_LIBS)
-
-libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
- @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
- if [ "$(FIPSCANLIB)" = "libcrypto" ]; then \
- FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO=libcrypto.a ; \
- FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
- export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
- fi; \
- $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \
- (touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \
- else \
- echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
- exit 1; \
- fi
-
-libssl$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) libssl.a
- @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
- $(MAKE) SHLIBDIRS=ssl SHLIBDEPS='-lcrypto' build-shared; \
- else \
- echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
- exit 1; \
- fi
-
-clean-shared:
- @set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
- if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)" ]; then \
- tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)"; \
- for j in $${tmp:-x}; do \
- ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$$j ); \
- done; \
- fi; \
- ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) ); \
- if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" ]; then \
- ( set -x; rm -f cyg$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT).a ); \
- fi; \
- done
-
-link-shared:
- @ set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
- $(MAKE) -f $(HERE)/Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
- LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
- LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
- symlink.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
- libs="$$libs -l$$i"; \
- done
-
-build-shared: do_$(SHLIB_TARGET) link-shared
-
-do_$(SHLIB_TARGET):
- @ set -e; libs='-L. $(SHLIBDEPS)'; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
- if [ "$$i" = "ssl" -a -n "$(LIBKRB5)" ]; then \
- libs="$(LIBKRB5) $$libs"; \
- fi; \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
- LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
- LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
- LIBDEPS="$$libs $(EX_LIBS)" \
- link_a.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
- libs="-l$$i $$libs"; \
- done
-
-libcrypto.pc: Makefile
- @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
- echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
- echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
- echo ''; \
- echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libcrypto'; \
- echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \
- echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
- echo 'Requires: '; \
- echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \
- echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
- echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libcrypto.pc
-
-libssl.pc: Makefile
- @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
- echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
- echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
- echo ''; \
- echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
- echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \
- echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
- echo 'Requires: '; \
- echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
- echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
- echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libssl.pc
-
-openssl.pc: Makefile
- @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
- echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
- echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
- echo ''; \
- echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
- echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \
- echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
- echo 'Requires: '; \
- echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
- echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
- echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > openssl.pc
-
-Makefile: Makefile.org Configure config
- @echo "Makefile is older than Makefile.org, Configure or config."
- @echo "Reconfigure the source tree (via './config' or 'perl Configure'), please."
- @false
-
-libclean:
- rm -f *.map *.so *.so.* *.dylib *.dll engines/*.so engines/*.dll engines/*.dylib *.a engines/*.a */lib */*/lib
-
-clean: libclean
- rm -f shlib/*.o *.o core a.out fluff rehash.time testlog make.log cctest cctest.c
- @set -e; target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
- rm -f $(LIBS)
- rm -f openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc
- rm -f speed.* .pure
- rm -f $(TARFILE)
- @set -e; for i in $(ONEDIRS) ;\
- do \
- rm -fr $$i/*; \
- done
-
-makefile.one: files
- $(PERL) util/mk1mf.pl >makefile.one; \
- sh util/do_ms.sh
-
-files:
- $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile > $(TOP)/MINFO
- @set -e; target=files; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-links:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl include/openssl
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
- @set -e; target=links; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-gentests:
- @(cd test && echo "generating dummy tests (if needed)..." && \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on generate );
-
-dclean:
- rm -rf *.bak include/openssl certs/.0
- @set -e; target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-rehash: rehash.time
-rehash.time: certs apps
- @if [ -z "$(CROSS_COMPILE)" ]; then \
- (OPENSSL="`pwd`/util/opensslwrap.sh"; \
- [ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
- OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
- export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
- $(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
- touch rehash.time; \
- else :; fi
-
-test: tests
-
-tests: rehash
- @(cd test && echo "testing..." && \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on OPENSSL_CONF=../apps/openssl.cnf tests );
- OPENSSL_CONF=apps/openssl.cnf util/opensslwrap.sh version -a
-
-report:
- @$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
-
-update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
- @set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-depend:
- @set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-lint:
- @set -e; target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-tags:
- rm -f TAGS
- find . -name '[^.]*.[ch]' | xargs etags -a
-
-errors:
- $(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c
- $(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write
- (cd engines; $(MAKE) PERL=$(PERL) errors)
-
-stacks:
- $(PERL) util/mkstack.pl -write
-
-util/libeay.num::
- $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl crypto update
-
-util/ssleay.num::
- $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
-
-TABLE: Configure
- (echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
- $(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
-
-# Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
-# pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
-# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
-# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
-# tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
- find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
- find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
- find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
- find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
- $(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
- tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
- --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
- --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
- gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
-
-tar-snap:
- @$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
- `find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
- tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
- --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
- --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
-
-dist:
- $(PERL) Configure dist
- @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
- @$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
- @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
-
-dist_pem_h:
- (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
-
-install: all install_docs install_sw
-
-install_sw:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/engines \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/certs \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/private
- @set -e; headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist;\
- do \
- (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
- done;
- @set -e; target=install; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
- @set -e; liblist="$(LIBS)"; for i in $$liblist ;\
- do \
- if [ -f "$$i" ]; then \
- ( echo installing $$i; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- $(RANLIB) $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i ); \
- fi; \
- done;
- @set -e; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
- tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS)"; \
- for i in $${tmp:-x}; \
- do \
- if [ -f "$$i" -o -f "$$i.a" ]; then \
- ( echo installing $$i; \
- if [ "$(PLATFORM)" != "Cygwin" ]; then \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- chmod 555 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
- else \
- c=`echo $$i | sed 's/^lib\(.*\)\.dll\.a/cyg\1-$(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER).dll/'`; \
- cp $$c $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
- chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
- fi ); \
- if expr $(PLATFORM) : 'mingw' > /dev/null; then \
- ( case $$i in \
- *crypto*) i=libeay32.dll;; \
- *ssl*) i=ssleay32.dll;; \
- esac; \
- echo installing $$i; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
- chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i ); \
- fi; \
- fi; \
- done; \
- ( here="`pwd`"; \
- cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR); \
- $(MAKE) -f $$here/Makefile HERE="$$here" link-shared ); \
- if [ "$(INSTALLTOP)" != "/usr" ]; then \
- echo 'OpenSSL shared libraries have been installed in:'; \
- echo ' $(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo ''; \
- sed -e '1,/^$$/d' doc/openssl-shared.txt; \
- fi; \
- fi
- cp libcrypto.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
- cp libssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
- cp openssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
-
-install_html_docs:
- here="`pwd`"; \
- for subdir in apps crypto ssl; do \
- mkdir -p $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
- for i in doc/$$subdir/*.pod; do \
- fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
- echo "installing html/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX)"; \
- cat $$i \
- | sed -r 's/L<([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?\|([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?>/L<\1|\3>/g' \
- | pod2html --podroot=doc --htmlroot=.. --podpath=apps:crypto:ssl \
- | sed -r 's/<!DOCTYPE.*//g' \
- > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
- $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
- grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$" | \
- (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
- while read n; do \
- PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX) "$$n".$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
- done); \
- done; \
- done
-
-install_docs:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man1 \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man3 \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man5 \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man7
- @pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \
- here="`pwd`"; \
- filecase=; \
- if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "DJGPP" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "mingw" ]; then \
- filecase=-i; \
- fi; \
- set -e; for i in doc/apps/*.pod; do \
- fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
- sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 1 < $$i`; \
- echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
- (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
- sh -c "$$pod2man \
- --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
- --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
- > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
- (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
- (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
- (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
- while read n; do \
- PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- done); \
- done; \
- set -e; for i in doc/crypto/*.pod doc/ssl/*.pod; do \
- fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
- sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 3 < $$i`; \
- echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
- (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
- sh -c "$$pod2man \
- --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
- --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
- > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
- (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
- (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
- (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
- while read n; do \
- PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- done); \
- done
-
-# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/Makefile)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,680 @@
+### Generated automatically from Makefile.org by Configure.
+
+##
+## Makefile for OpenSSL
+##
+
+VERSION=1.0.1q
+MAJOR=1
+MINOR=0.1
+SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
+SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=
+SHLIB_MAJOR=1
+SHLIB_MINOR=0.0
+SHLIB_EXT=
+PLATFORM=dist
+OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-store no-unit-test no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
+CONFIGURE_ARGS=dist
+SHLIB_TARGET=
+
+# HERE indicates where this Makefile lives. This can be used to indicate
+# where sub-Makefiles are expected to be. Currently has very limited usage,
+# and should probably not be bothered with at all.
+HERE=.
+
+# INSTALL_PREFIX is for package builders so that they can configure
+# for, say, /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/.
+# Normally it is left empty.
+INSTALL_PREFIX=
+INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
+
+# Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
+OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
+
+# NO_IDEA - Define to build without the IDEA algorithm
+# NO_RC4 - Define to build without the RC4 algorithm
+# NO_RC2 - Define to build without the RC2 algorithm
+# THREADS - Define when building with threads, you will probably also need any
+# system defines as well, i.e. _REENTERANT for Solaris 2.[34]
+# TERMIO - Define the termio terminal subsystem, needed if sgtty is missing.
+# TERMIOS - Define the termios terminal subsystem, Silicon Graphics.
+# LONGCRYPT - Define to use HPUX 10.x's long password modification to crypt(3).
+# DEVRANDOM - Give this the value of the 'random device' if your OS supports
+# one. 32 bytes will be read from this when the random
+# number generator is initalised.
+# SSL_FORBID_ENULL - define if you want the server to be not able to use the
+# NULL encryption ciphers.
+#
+# LOCK_DEBUG - turns on lots of lock debug output :-)
+# REF_CHECK - turn on some xyz_free() assertions.
+# REF_PRINT - prints some stuff on structure free.
+# CRYPTO_MDEBUG - turns on my 'memory leak' detecting stuff
+# MFUNC - Make all Malloc/Free/Realloc calls call
+# CRYPTO_malloc/CRYPTO_free/CRYPTO_realloc which can be setup to
+# call application defined callbacks via CRYPTO_set_mem_functions()
+# MD5_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for MD5
+# SHA1_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for SHA1
+# RMD160_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for RIPEMD160
+# Do not define B_ENDIAN or L_ENDIAN if 'unsigned long' == 8. It must
+# equal 4.
+# PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests.
+
+CC= cc
+CFLAG= -O
+DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+PEX_LIBS=
+EX_LIBS=
+EXE_EXT=
+ARFLAGS=
+AR= ar $(ARFLAGS) r
+RANLIB= /usr/bin/ranlib
+NM= nm
+PERL= /usr/bin/perl
+TAR= tar
+TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
+MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend
+LIBDIR=lib
+
+# We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in
+# order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture
+# dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC
+# gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus
+# and pass it down to assembler.
+AS=$(CC) -c
+ASFLAG=$(CFLAG)
+
+# For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support
+# the 80386.
+PROCESSOR=
+
+# CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets
+CPUID_OBJ= mem_clr.o
+BN_ASM= bn_asm.o
+DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o
+AES_ENC= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o
+BF_ENC= bf_enc.o
+CAST_ENC= c_enc.o
+RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o
+RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o
+MD5_ASM_OBJ=
+SHA1_ASM_OBJ=
+RMD160_ASM_OBJ=
+WP_ASM_OBJ= wp_block.o
+CMLL_ENC= camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o
+MODES_ASM_OBJ=
+ENGINES_ASM_OBJ=
+PERLASM_SCHEME=
+
+# KRB5 stuff
+KRB5_INCLUDES=
+LIBKRB5=
+
+# Zlib stuff
+ZLIB_INCLUDE=
+LIBZLIB=
+
+# TOP level FIPS install directory.
+FIPSDIR=/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0
+
+# This is the location of fipscanister.o and friends.
+# The FIPS module build will place it $(INSTALLTOP)/lib
+# but since $(INSTALLTOP) can only take the default value
+# when the module is built it will be in /usr/local/ssl/lib
+# $(INSTALLTOP) for this build may be different so hard
+# code the path.
+
+FIPSLIBDIR=
+
+# The location of the library which contains fipscanister.o
+# normally it will be libcrypto unless fipsdso is set in which
+# case it will be libfips. If not compiling in FIPS mode at all
+# this is empty making it a useful test for a FIPS compile.
+
+FIPSCANLIB=
+
+# Shared library base address. Currently only used on Windows.
+#
+
+BASEADDR=0xFB00000
+
+DIRS= crypto ssl engines apps test tools
+ENGDIRS= ccgost
+SHLIBDIRS= crypto ssl
+
+# dirs in crypto to build
+SDIRS= \
+ objects \
+ md4 md5 sha mdc2 hmac ripemd whrlpool \
+ des aes rc2 rc4 idea bf cast camellia seed modes \
+ bn ec rsa dsa ecdsa dh ecdh dso engine \
+ buffer bio stack lhash rand err \
+ evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5 \
+ cms pqueue ts srp cmac
+# keep in mind that the above list is adjusted by ./Configure
+# according to no-xxx arguments...
+
+# tests to perform. "alltests" is a special word indicating that all tests
+# should be performed.
+TESTS = alltests
+
+MAKEFILE= Makefile
+
+MANDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/man
+MAN1=1
+MAN3=3
+MANSUFFIX=
+HTMLSUFFIX=html
+HTMLDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/html
+SHELL=/bin/sh
+
+TOP= .
+ONEDIRS=out tmp
+EDIRS= times doc bugs util include certs ms shlib mt demos perl sf dep VMS
+WDIRS= windows
+LIBS= libcrypto.a libssl.a
+SHARED_CRYPTO=libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
+SHARED_SSL=libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
+SHARED_LIBS=
+SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=
+SHARED_LDFLAGS=
+
+GENERAL= Makefile
+BASENAME= openssl
+NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
+TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
+WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
+EXHEADER= e_os2.h
+HEADER= e_os.h
+
+all: Makefile build_all
+
+# as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower
+# Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn
+# shell, which [annoyingly enough] terminates unset with error if VAR
+# is not present:-( TOP= && unset TOP is tribute to HP-UX /bin/sh,
+# which terminates unset with error if no variable was present:-(
+CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
+ $${INCLUDE+INCLUDE} $${INCLUDES+INCLUDES} \
+ $${DIR+DIR} $${DIRS+DIRS} $${SRC+SRC} \
+ $${LIBSRC+LIBSRC} $${LIBOBJ+LIBOBJ} $${ALL+ALL} \
+ $${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER} \
+ $${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS} \
+ $${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS} \
+ $${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} $${SCRIPTS+SCRIPTS} \
+ $${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
+ $${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
+
+BUILDENV= PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
+ CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \
+ AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \
+ AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \
+ CROSS_COMPILE='$(CROSS_COMPILE)' \
+ PERL='$(PERL)' ENGDIRS='$(ENGDIRS)' \
+ SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' LIBRPATH='$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)' \
+ INSTALL_PREFIX='$(INSTALL_PREFIX)' \
+ INSTALLTOP='$(INSTALLTOP)' OPENSSLDIR='$(OPENSSLDIR)' \
+ LIBDIR='$(LIBDIR)' \
+ MAKEDEPEND='$$$${TOP}/util/domd $$$${TOP} -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
+ DEPFLAG='-DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED $(DEPFLAG)' \
+ MAKEDEPPROG='$(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
+ SHARED_LDFLAGS='$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)' \
+ KRB5_INCLUDES='$(KRB5_INCLUDES)' LIBKRB5='$(LIBKRB5)' \
+ ZLIB_INCLUDE='$(ZLIB_INCLUDE)' LIBZLIB='$(LIBZLIB)' \
+ EXE_EXT='$(EXE_EXT)' SHARED_LIBS='$(SHARED_LIBS)' \
+ SHLIB_EXT='$(SHLIB_EXT)' SHLIB_TARGET='$(SHLIB_TARGET)' \
+ PEX_LIBS='$(PEX_LIBS)' EX_LIBS='$(EX_LIBS)' \
+ CPUID_OBJ='$(CPUID_OBJ)' \
+ BN_ASM='$(BN_ASM)' DES_ENC='$(DES_ENC)' \
+ AES_ENC='$(AES_ENC)' CMLL_ENC='$(CMLL_ENC)' \
+ BF_ENC='$(BF_ENC)' CAST_ENC='$(CAST_ENC)' \
+ RC4_ENC='$(RC4_ENC)' RC5_ENC='$(RC5_ENC)' \
+ SHA1_ASM_OBJ='$(SHA1_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ MD5_ASM_OBJ='$(MD5_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ RMD160_ASM_OBJ='$(RMD160_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ WP_ASM_OBJ='$(WP_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ MODES_ASM_OBJ='$(MODES_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ ENGINES_ASM_OBJ='$(ENGINES_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ PERLASM_SCHEME='$(PERLASM_SCHEME)' \
+ FIPSLIBDIR='${FIPSLIBDIR}' \
+ FIPSDIR='${FIPSDIR}' \
+ FIPSCANLIB="$${FIPSCANLIB:-$(FIPSCANLIB)}" \
+ THIS=$${THIS:-$@} MAKEFILE=Makefile MAKEOVERRIDES=
+# MAKEOVERRIDES= effectively "equalizes" GNU-ish and SysV-ish make flavors,
+# which in turn eliminates ambiguities in variable treatment with -e.
+
+# BUILD_CMD is a generic macro to build a given target in a given
+# subdirectory. The target must be given through the shell variable
+# `target' and the subdirectory to build in must be given through `dir'.
+# This macro shouldn't be used directly, use RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD or
+# BUILD_ONE_CMD instead.
+#
+# BUILD_ONE_CMD is a macro to build a given target in a given
+# subdirectory if that subdirectory is part of $(DIRS). It requires
+# exactly the same shell variables as BUILD_CMD.
+#
+# RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD is a macro to build a given target in all
+# subdirectories defined in $(DIRS). It requires that the target
+# is given through the shell variable `target'.
+BUILD_CMD= if [ -d "$$dir" ]; then \
+ ( cd $$dir && echo "making $$target in $$dir..." && \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. DIR=$$dir $$target \
+ ) || exit 1; \
+ fi
+RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD=for dir in $(DIRS); do $(BUILD_CMD); done
+BUILD_ONE_CMD=\
+ if expr " $(DIRS) " : ".* $$dir " >/dev/null 2>&1; then \
+ $(BUILD_CMD); \
+ fi
+
+reflect:
+ @[ -n "$(THIS)" ] && $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) $(THIS) -e $(BUILDENV)
+
+sub_all: build_all
+
+build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools
+
+build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
+
+build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc
+build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc
+
+build_crypto:
+ @dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_ssl: build_crypto
+ @dir=ssl; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_engines: build_crypto
+ @dir=engines; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_apps: build_libs
+ @dir=apps; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_tests: build_libs
+ @dir=test; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_tools: build_libs
+ @dir=tools; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+
+all_testapps: build_libs build_testapps
+build_testapps:
+ @dir=crypto; target=testapps; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+
+fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT): libcrypto.a
+ [ -z "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] || $(CC) $(CFLAG) -Iinclude \
+ -DFINGERPRINT_PREMAIN_DSO_LOAD -o $@ \
+ $(FIPSLIBDIR)fips_premain.c $(FIPSLIBDIR)fipscanister.o \
+ libcrypto.a $(EX_LIBS)
+
+libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
+ @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
+ if [ "$(FIPSCANLIB)" = "libcrypto" ]; then \
+ FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO=libcrypto.a ; \
+ FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
+ export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
+ fi; \
+ $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \
+ (touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \
+ else \
+ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
+ exit 1; \
+ fi
+
+libssl$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) libssl.a
+ @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
+ $(MAKE) SHLIBDIRS=ssl SHLIBDEPS='-lcrypto' build-shared; \
+ else \
+ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
+ exit 1; \
+ fi
+
+clean-shared:
+ @set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
+ if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)" ]; then \
+ tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)"; \
+ for j in $${tmp:-x}; do \
+ ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$$j ); \
+ done; \
+ fi; \
+ ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) ); \
+ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" ]; then \
+ ( set -x; rm -f cyg$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT).a ); \
+ fi; \
+ done
+
+link-shared:
+ @ set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
+ $(MAKE) -f $(HERE)/Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
+ LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
+ LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
+ symlink.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
+ libs="$$libs -l$$i"; \
+ done
+
+build-shared: do_$(SHLIB_TARGET) link-shared
+
+do_$(SHLIB_TARGET):
+ @ set -e; libs='-L. $(SHLIBDEPS)'; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
+ if [ "$$i" = "ssl" -a -n "$(LIBKRB5)" ]; then \
+ libs="$(LIBKRB5) $$libs"; \
+ fi; \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
+ LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
+ LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
+ LIBDEPS="$$libs $(EX_LIBS)" \
+ link_a.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
+ libs="-l$$i $$libs"; \
+ done
+
+libcrypto.pc: Makefile
+ @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \
+ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+ echo 'Requires: '; \
+ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libcrypto.pc
+
+libssl.pc: Makefile
+ @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
+ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \
+ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+ echo 'Requires: '; \
+ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libssl.pc
+
+openssl.pc: Makefile
+ @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
+ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \
+ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+ echo 'Requires: '; \
+ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > openssl.pc
+
+Makefile: Makefile.org Configure config
+ @echo "Makefile is older than Makefile.org, Configure or config."
+ @echo "Reconfigure the source tree (via './config' or 'perl Configure'), please."
+ @false
+
+libclean:
+ rm -f *.map *.so *.so.* *.dylib *.dll engines/*.so engines/*.dll engines/*.dylib *.a engines/*.a */lib */*/lib
+
+clean: libclean
+ rm -f shlib/*.o *.o core a.out fluff rehash.time testlog make.log cctest cctest.c
+ @set -e; target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+ rm -f $(LIBS)
+ rm -f openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc
+ rm -f speed.* .pure
+ rm -f $(TARFILE)
+ @set -e; for i in $(ONEDIRS) ;\
+ do \
+ rm -fr $$i/*; \
+ done
+
+makefile.one: files
+ $(PERL) util/mk1mf.pl >makefile.one; \
+ sh util/do_ms.sh
+
+files:
+ $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile > $(TOP)/MINFO
+ @set -e; target=files; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+links:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl include/openssl
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
+ @set -e; target=links; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+gentests:
+ @(cd test && echo "generating dummy tests (if needed)..." && \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on generate );
+
+dclean:
+ rm -rf *.bak include/openssl certs/.0
+ @set -e; target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+rehash: rehash.time
+rehash.time: certs apps
+ @if [ -z "$(CROSS_COMPILE)" ]; then \
+ (OPENSSL="`pwd`/util/opensslwrap.sh"; \
+ [ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
+ OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
+ export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
+ $(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
+ touch rehash.time; \
+ else :; fi
+
+test: tests
+
+tests: rehash
+ @(cd test && echo "testing..." && \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on OPENSSL_CONF=../apps/openssl.cnf tests );
+ OPENSSL_CONF=apps/openssl.cnf util/opensslwrap.sh version -a
+
+report:
+ @$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
+
+update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
+ @set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+depend:
+ @set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+lint:
+ @set -e; target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+tags:
+ rm -f TAGS
+ find . -name '[^.]*.[ch]' | xargs etags -a
+
+errors:
+ $(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c
+ $(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write
+ (cd engines; $(MAKE) PERL=$(PERL) errors)
+
+stacks:
+ $(PERL) util/mkstack.pl -write
+
+util/libeay.num::
+ $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl crypto update
+
+util/ssleay.num::
+ $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
+
+TABLE: Configure
+ (echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
+ $(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
+
+# Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
+# pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
+# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
+# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
+# tar does not support the --files-from option.
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+ --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
+ --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+ -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+ find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+ \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
+ \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+ | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
+ find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
+ find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
+ find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
+
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
+
+dist:
+ $(PERL) Configure dist
+ @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
+ @$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
+ @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
+
+dist_pem_h:
+ (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
+
+install: all install_docs install_sw
+
+install_sw:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/engines \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/certs \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/private
+ @set -e; headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist;\
+ do \
+ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
+ done;
+ @set -e; target=install; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+ @set -e; liblist="$(LIBS)"; for i in $$liblist ;\
+ do \
+ if [ -f "$$i" ]; then \
+ ( echo installing $$i; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ $(RANLIB) $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i ); \
+ fi; \
+ done;
+ @set -e; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
+ tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS)"; \
+ for i in $${tmp:-x}; \
+ do \
+ if [ -f "$$i" -o -f "$$i.a" ]; then \
+ ( echo installing $$i; \
+ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" != "Cygwin" ]; then \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 555 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
+ else \
+ c=`echo $$i | sed 's/^lib\(.*\)\.dll\.a/cyg\1-$(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER).dll/'`; \
+ cp $$c $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
+ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
+ fi ); \
+ if expr $(PLATFORM) : 'mingw' > /dev/null; then \
+ ( case $$i in \
+ *crypto*) i=libeay32.dll;; \
+ *ssl*) i=ssleay32.dll;; \
+ esac; \
+ echo installing $$i; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i ); \
+ fi; \
+ fi; \
+ done; \
+ ( here="`pwd`"; \
+ cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR); \
+ $(MAKE) -f $$here/Makefile HERE="$$here" link-shared ); \
+ if [ "$(INSTALLTOP)" != "/usr" ]; then \
+ echo 'OpenSSL shared libraries have been installed in:'; \
+ echo ' $(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ sed -e '1,/^$$/d' doc/openssl-shared.txt; \
+ fi; \
+ fi
+ cp libcrypto.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
+ cp libssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
+ cp openssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
+
+install_html_docs:
+ here="`pwd`"; \
+ for subdir in apps crypto ssl; do \
+ mkdir -p $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
+ for i in doc/$$subdir/*.pod; do \
+ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
+ echo "installing html/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX)"; \
+ cat $$i \
+ | sed -r 's/L<([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?\|([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?>/L<\1|\3>/g' \
+ | pod2html --podroot=doc --htmlroot=.. --podpath=apps:crypto:ssl \
+ | sed -r 's/<!DOCTYPE.*//g' \
+ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
+ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
+ grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$" | \
+ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
+ while read n; do \
+ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX) "$$n".$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
+ done); \
+ done; \
+ done
+
+install_docs:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man1 \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man3 \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man5 \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man7
+ @pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \
+ here="`pwd`"; \
+ filecase=; \
+ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "DJGPP" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "mingw" ]; then \
+ filecase=-i; \
+ fi; \
+ set -e; for i in doc/apps/*.pod; do \
+ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
+ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 1 < $$i`; \
+ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
+ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
+ sh -c "$$pod2man \
+ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
+ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
+ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
+ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
+ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
+ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
+ while read n; do \
+ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ done); \
+ done; \
+ set -e; for i in doc/crypto/*.pod doc/ssl/*.pod; do \
+ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
+ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 3 < $$i`; \
+ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
+ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
+ sh -c "$$pod2man \
+ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
+ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
+ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
+ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
+ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
+ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
+ while read n; do \
+ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ done); \
+ done
+
+# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.bak
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/Makefile.bak 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.bak 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,676 +0,0 @@
-### Generated automatically from Makefile.org by Configure.
-
-##
-## Makefile for OpenSSL
-##
-
-VERSION=1.0.1o-dev
-MAJOR=1
-MINOR=0.1
-SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
-SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=
-SHLIB_MAJOR=1
-SHLIB_MINOR=0.0
-SHLIB_EXT=
-PLATFORM=gcc
-OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-store no-unit-test no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
-CONFIGURE_ARGS=gcc
-SHLIB_TARGET=
-
-# HERE indicates where this Makefile lives. This can be used to indicate
-# where sub-Makefiles are expected to be. Currently has very limited usage,
-# and should probably not be bothered with at all.
-HERE=.
-
-# INSTALL_PREFIX is for package builders so that they can configure
-# for, say, /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/.
-# Normally it is left empty.
-INSTALL_PREFIX=
-INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
-
-# Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
-OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
-
-# NO_IDEA - Define to build without the IDEA algorithm
-# NO_RC4 - Define to build without the RC4 algorithm
-# NO_RC2 - Define to build without the RC2 algorithm
-# THREADS - Define when building with threads, you will probably also need any
-# system defines as well, i.e. _REENTERANT for Solaris 2.[34]
-# TERMIO - Define the termio terminal subsystem, needed if sgtty is missing.
-# TERMIOS - Define the termios terminal subsystem, Silicon Graphics.
-# LONGCRYPT - Define to use HPUX 10.x's long password modification to crypt(3).
-# DEVRANDOM - Give this the value of the 'random device' if your OS supports
-# one. 32 bytes will be read from this when the random
-# number generator is initalised.
-# SSL_FORBID_ENULL - define if you want the server to be not able to use the
-# NULL encryption ciphers.
-#
-# LOCK_DEBUG - turns on lots of lock debug output :-)
-# REF_CHECK - turn on some xyz_free() assertions.
-# REF_PRINT - prints some stuff on structure free.
-# CRYPTO_MDEBUG - turns on my 'memory leak' detecting stuff
-# MFUNC - Make all Malloc/Free/Realloc calls call
-# CRYPTO_malloc/CRYPTO_free/CRYPTO_realloc which can be setup to
-# call application defined callbacks via CRYPTO_set_mem_functions()
-# MD5_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for MD5
-# SHA1_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for SHA1
-# RMD160_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for RIPEMD160
-# Do not define B_ENDIAN or L_ENDIAN if 'unsigned long' == 8. It must
-# equal 4.
-# PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests.
-
-CC= gcc
-CFLAG= -O3
-DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
-PEX_LIBS=
-EX_LIBS=
-EXE_EXT=
-ARFLAGS=
-AR= ar $(ARFLAGS) r
-RANLIB= /usr/bin/ranlib
-NM= nm
-PERL= /usr/bin/perl
-TAR= tar
-TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
-MAKEDEPPROG= gcc
-LIBDIR=lib
-
-# We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in
-# order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture
-# dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC
-# gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus
-# and pass it down to assembler.
-AS=$(CC) -c
-ASFLAG=$(CFLAG)
-
-# For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support
-# the 80386.
-PROCESSOR=
-
-# CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets
-CPUID_OBJ= mem_clr.o
-BN_ASM= bn_asm.o
-DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o
-AES_ENC= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o
-BF_ENC= bf_enc.o
-CAST_ENC= c_enc.o
-RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o
-RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o
-MD5_ASM_OBJ=
-SHA1_ASM_OBJ=
-RMD160_ASM_OBJ=
-WP_ASM_OBJ= wp_block.o
-CMLL_ENC= camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o
-MODES_ASM_OBJ=
-ENGINES_ASM_OBJ=
-PERLASM_SCHEME=
-
-# KRB5 stuff
-KRB5_INCLUDES=
-LIBKRB5=
-
-# Zlib stuff
-ZLIB_INCLUDE=
-LIBZLIB=
-
-# TOP level FIPS install directory.
-FIPSDIR=/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0
-
-# This is the location of fipscanister.o and friends.
-# The FIPS module build will place it $(INSTALLTOP)/lib
-# but since $(INSTALLTOP) can only take the default value
-# when the module is built it will be in /usr/local/ssl/lib
-# $(INSTALLTOP) for this build may be different so hard
-# code the path.
-
-FIPSLIBDIR=
-
-# The location of the library which contains fipscanister.o
-# normally it will be libcrypto unless fipsdso is set in which
-# case it will be libfips. If not compiling in FIPS mode at all
-# this is empty making it a useful test for a FIPS compile.
-
-FIPSCANLIB=
-
-# Shared library base address. Currently only used on Windows.
-#
-
-BASEADDR=0xFB00000
-
-DIRS= crypto ssl engines apps test tools
-ENGDIRS= ccgost
-SHLIBDIRS= crypto ssl
-
-# dirs in crypto to build
-SDIRS= \
- objects \
- md4 md5 sha mdc2 hmac ripemd whrlpool \
- des aes rc2 rc4 idea bf cast camellia seed modes \
- bn ec rsa dsa ecdsa dh ecdh dso engine \
- buffer bio stack lhash rand err \
- evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5 \
- cms pqueue ts srp cmac
-# keep in mind that the above list is adjusted by ./Configure
-# according to no-xxx arguments...
-
-# tests to perform. "alltests" is a special word indicating that all tests
-# should be performed.
-TESTS = alltests
-
-MAKEFILE= Makefile
-
-MANDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/man
-MAN1=1
-MAN3=3
-MANSUFFIX=
-HTMLSUFFIX=html
-HTMLDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/html
-SHELL=/bin/sh
-
-TOP= .
-ONEDIRS=out tmp
-EDIRS= times doc bugs util include certs ms shlib mt demos perl sf dep VMS
-WDIRS= windows
-LIBS= libcrypto.a libssl.a
-SHARED_CRYPTO=libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
-SHARED_SSL=libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
-SHARED_LIBS=
-SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=
-SHARED_LDFLAGS=
-
-GENERAL= Makefile
-BASENAME= openssl
-NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
-TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
-WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
-EXHEADER= e_os2.h
-HEADER= e_os.h
-
-all: Makefile build_all
-
-# as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower
-# Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn
-# shell, which [annoyingly enough] terminates unset with error if VAR
-# is not present:-( TOP= && unset TOP is tribute to HP-UX /bin/sh,
-# which terminates unset with error if no variable was present:-(
-CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
- $${INCLUDE+INCLUDE} $${INCLUDES+INCLUDES} \
- $${DIR+DIR} $${DIRS+DIRS} $${SRC+SRC} \
- $${LIBSRC+LIBSRC} $${LIBOBJ+LIBOBJ} $${ALL+ALL} \
- $${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER} \
- $${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS} \
- $${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS} \
- $${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} $${SCRIPTS+SCRIPTS} \
- $${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
- $${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
-
-BUILDENV= PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
- CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \
- AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \
- AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \
- CROSS_COMPILE='$(CROSS_COMPILE)' \
- PERL='$(PERL)' ENGDIRS='$(ENGDIRS)' \
- SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' LIBRPATH='$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)' \
- INSTALL_PREFIX='$(INSTALL_PREFIX)' \
- INSTALLTOP='$(INSTALLTOP)' OPENSSLDIR='$(OPENSSLDIR)' \
- LIBDIR='$(LIBDIR)' \
- MAKEDEPEND='$$$${TOP}/util/domd $$$${TOP} -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
- DEPFLAG='-DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED $(DEPFLAG)' \
- MAKEDEPPROG='$(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
- SHARED_LDFLAGS='$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)' \
- KRB5_INCLUDES='$(KRB5_INCLUDES)' LIBKRB5='$(LIBKRB5)' \
- ZLIB_INCLUDE='$(ZLIB_INCLUDE)' LIBZLIB='$(LIBZLIB)' \
- EXE_EXT='$(EXE_EXT)' SHARED_LIBS='$(SHARED_LIBS)' \
- SHLIB_EXT='$(SHLIB_EXT)' SHLIB_TARGET='$(SHLIB_TARGET)' \
- PEX_LIBS='$(PEX_LIBS)' EX_LIBS='$(EX_LIBS)' \
- CPUID_OBJ='$(CPUID_OBJ)' \
- BN_ASM='$(BN_ASM)' DES_ENC='$(DES_ENC)' \
- AES_ENC='$(AES_ENC)' CMLL_ENC='$(CMLL_ENC)' \
- BF_ENC='$(BF_ENC)' CAST_ENC='$(CAST_ENC)' \
- RC4_ENC='$(RC4_ENC)' RC5_ENC='$(RC5_ENC)' \
- SHA1_ASM_OBJ='$(SHA1_ASM_OBJ)' \
- MD5_ASM_OBJ='$(MD5_ASM_OBJ)' \
- RMD160_ASM_OBJ='$(RMD160_ASM_OBJ)' \
- WP_ASM_OBJ='$(WP_ASM_OBJ)' \
- MODES_ASM_OBJ='$(MODES_ASM_OBJ)' \
- ENGINES_ASM_OBJ='$(ENGINES_ASM_OBJ)' \
- PERLASM_SCHEME='$(PERLASM_SCHEME)' \
- FIPSLIBDIR='${FIPSLIBDIR}' \
- FIPSDIR='${FIPSDIR}' \
- FIPSCANLIB="$${FIPSCANLIB:-$(FIPSCANLIB)}" \
- THIS=$${THIS:-$@} MAKEFILE=Makefile MAKEOVERRIDES=
-# MAKEOVERRIDES= effectively "equalizes" GNU-ish and SysV-ish make flavors,
-# which in turn eliminates ambiguities in variable treatment with -e.
-
-# BUILD_CMD is a generic macro to build a given target in a given
-# subdirectory. The target must be given through the shell variable
-# `target' and the subdirectory to build in must be given through `dir'.
-# This macro shouldn't be used directly, use RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD or
-# BUILD_ONE_CMD instead.
-#
-# BUILD_ONE_CMD is a macro to build a given target in a given
-# subdirectory if that subdirectory is part of $(DIRS). It requires
-# exactly the same shell variables as BUILD_CMD.
-#
-# RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD is a macro to build a given target in all
-# subdirectories defined in $(DIRS). It requires that the target
-# is given through the shell variable `target'.
-BUILD_CMD= if [ -d "$$dir" ]; then \
- ( cd $$dir && echo "making $$target in $$dir..." && \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. DIR=$$dir $$target \
- ) || exit 1; \
- fi
-RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD=for dir in $(DIRS); do $(BUILD_CMD); done
-BUILD_ONE_CMD=\
- if expr " $(DIRS) " : ".* $$dir " >/dev/null 2>&1; then \
- $(BUILD_CMD); \
- fi
-
-reflect:
- @[ -n "$(THIS)" ] && $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) $(THIS) -e $(BUILDENV)
-
-sub_all: build_all
-build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools
-
-build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
-
-build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc
-build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc
-
-build_crypto:
- @dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_ssl:
- @dir=ssl; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_engines:
- @dir=engines; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_apps:
- @dir=apps; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_tests:
- @dir=test; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_tools:
- @dir=tools; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-
-all_testapps: build_libs build_testapps
-build_testapps:
- @dir=crypto; target=testapps; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-
-fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT): libcrypto.a
- [ -z "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] || $(CC) $(CFLAG) -Iinclude \
- -DFINGERPRINT_PREMAIN_DSO_LOAD -o $@ \
- $(FIPSLIBDIR)fips_premain.c $(FIPSLIBDIR)fipscanister.o \
- libcrypto.a $(EX_LIBS)
-
-libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
- @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
- if [ "$(FIPSCANLIB)" = "libcrypto" ]; then \
- FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO=libcrypto.a ; \
- FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
- export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
- fi; \
- $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \
- (touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \
- else \
- echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
- exit 1; \
- fi
-
-libssl$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) libssl.a
- @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
- $(MAKE) SHLIBDIRS=ssl SHLIBDEPS='-lcrypto' build-shared; \
- else \
- echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
- exit 1; \
- fi
-
-clean-shared:
- @set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
- if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)" ]; then \
- tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)"; \
- for j in $${tmp:-x}; do \
- ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$$j ); \
- done; \
- fi; \
- ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) ); \
- if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" ]; then \
- ( set -x; rm -f cyg$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT).a ); \
- fi; \
- done
-
-link-shared:
- @ set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
- $(MAKE) -f $(HERE)/Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
- LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
- LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
- symlink.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
- libs="$$libs -l$$i"; \
- done
-
-build-shared: do_$(SHLIB_TARGET) link-shared
-
-do_$(SHLIB_TARGET):
- @ set -e; libs='-L. $(SHLIBDEPS)'; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
- if [ "$$i" = "ssl" -a -n "$(LIBKRB5)" ]; then \
- libs="$(LIBKRB5) $$libs"; \
- fi; \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
- LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
- LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
- LIBDEPS="$$libs $(EX_LIBS)" \
- link_a.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
- libs="-l$$i $$libs"; \
- done
-
-libcrypto.pc: Makefile
- @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
- echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
- echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
- echo ''; \
- echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libcrypto'; \
- echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \
- echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
- echo 'Requires: '; \
- echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \
- echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
- echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libcrypto.pc
-
-libssl.pc: Makefile
- @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
- echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
- echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
- echo ''; \
- echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
- echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \
- echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
- echo 'Requires: '; \
- echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
- echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
- echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libssl.pc
-
-openssl.pc: Makefile
- @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
- echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
- echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
- echo ''; \
- echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
- echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \
- echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
- echo 'Requires: '; \
- echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
- echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
- echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > openssl.pc
-
-Makefile: Makefile.org Configure config
- @echo "Makefile is older than Makefile.org, Configure or config."
- @echo "Reconfigure the source tree (via './config' or 'perl Configure'), please."
- @false
-
-libclean:
- rm -f *.map *.so *.so.* *.dylib *.dll engines/*.so engines/*.dll engines/*.dylib *.a engines/*.a */lib */*/lib
-
-clean: libclean
- rm -f shlib/*.o *.o core a.out fluff rehash.time testlog make.log cctest cctest.c
- @set -e; target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
- rm -f $(LIBS)
- rm -f openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc
- rm -f speed.* .pure
- rm -f $(TARFILE)
- @set -e; for i in $(ONEDIRS) ;\
- do \
- rm -fr $$i/*; \
- done
-
-makefile.one: files
- $(PERL) util/mk1mf.pl >makefile.one; \
- sh util/do_ms.sh
-
-files:
- $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile > $(TOP)/MINFO
- @set -e; target=files; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-links:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl include/openssl
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
- @set -e; target=links; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-gentests:
- @(cd test && echo "generating dummy tests (if needed)..." && \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on generate );
-
-dclean:
- rm -rf *.bak include/openssl certs/.0
- @set -e; target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-rehash: rehash.time
-rehash.time: certs apps
- @if [ -z "$(CROSS_COMPILE)" ]; then \
- (OPENSSL="`pwd`/util/opensslwrap.sh"; \
- [ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
- OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
- export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
- $(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
- touch rehash.time; \
- else :; fi
-
-test: tests
-
-tests: rehash
- @(cd test && echo "testing..." && \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on OPENSSL_CONF=../apps/openssl.cnf tests );
- OPENSSL_CONF=apps/openssl.cnf util/opensslwrap.sh version -a
-
-report:
- @$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
-
-update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
- @set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-depend:
- @set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-lint:
- @set -e; target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-tags:
- rm -f TAGS
- find . -name '[^.]*.[ch]' | xargs etags -a
-
-errors:
- $(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c
- $(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write
- (cd engines; $(MAKE) PERL=$(PERL) errors)
-
-stacks:
- $(PERL) util/mkstack.pl -write
-
-util/libeay.num::
- $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl crypto update
-
-util/ssleay.num::
- $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
-
-TABLE: Configure
- (echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
- $(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
-
-# Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
-# pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
-# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
-# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
-# tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
- find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
- find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
- find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
- find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
- $(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
- tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
- --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
- --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
- gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
-
-tar-snap:
- @$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
- `find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
- tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
- --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
- --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
-
-dist:
- $(PERL) Configure dist
- @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
- @$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
- @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
-
-dist_pem_h:
- (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
-
-install: all install_docs install_sw
-
-install_sw:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/engines \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/certs \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/private
- @set -e; headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist;\
- do \
- (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
- done;
- @set -e; target=install; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
- @set -e; liblist="$(LIBS)"; for i in $$liblist ;\
- do \
- if [ -f "$$i" ]; then \
- ( echo installing $$i; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- $(RANLIB) $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i ); \
- fi; \
- done;
- @set -e; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
- tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS)"; \
- for i in $${tmp:-x}; \
- do \
- if [ -f "$$i" -o -f "$$i.a" ]; then \
- ( echo installing $$i; \
- if [ "$(PLATFORM)" != "Cygwin" ]; then \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- chmod 555 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
- else \
- c=`echo $$i | sed 's/^lib\(.*\)\.dll\.a/cyg\1-$(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER).dll/'`; \
- cp $$c $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
- chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
- fi ); \
- if expr $(PLATFORM) : 'mingw' > /dev/null; then \
- ( case $$i in \
- *crypto*) i=libeay32.dll;; \
- *ssl*) i=ssleay32.dll;; \
- esac; \
- echo installing $$i; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
- chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i ); \
- fi; \
- fi; \
- done; \
- ( here="`pwd`"; \
- cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR); \
- $(MAKE) -f $$here/Makefile HERE="$$here" link-shared ); \
- if [ "$(INSTALLTOP)" != "/usr" ]; then \
- echo 'OpenSSL shared libraries have been installed in:'; \
- echo ' $(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo ''; \
- sed -e '1,/^$$/d' doc/openssl-shared.txt; \
- fi; \
- fi
- cp libcrypto.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
- cp libssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
- cp openssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
-
-install_html_docs:
- here="`pwd`"; \
- for subdir in apps crypto ssl; do \
- mkdir -p $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
- for i in doc/$$subdir/*.pod; do \
- fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
- echo "installing html/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX)"; \
- cat $$i \
- | sed -r 's/L<([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?\|([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?>/L<\1|\3>/g' \
- | pod2html --podroot=doc --htmlroot=.. --podpath=apps:crypto:ssl \
- | sed -r 's/<!DOCTYPE.*//g' \
- > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
- $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
- grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$" | \
- (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
- while read n; do \
- PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX) "$$n".$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
- done); \
- done; \
- done
-
-install_docs:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man1 \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man3 \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man5 \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man7
- @pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \
- here="`pwd`"; \
- filecase=; \
- if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "DJGPP" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "mingw" ]; then \
- filecase=-i; \
- fi; \
- set -e; for i in doc/apps/*.pod; do \
- fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
- sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 1 < $$i`; \
- echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
- (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
- sh -c "$$pod2man \
- --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
- --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
- > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
- (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
- (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
- (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
- while read n; do \
- PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- done); \
- done; \
- set -e; for i in doc/crypto/*.pod doc/ssl/*.pod; do \
- fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
- sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 3 < $$i`; \
- echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
- (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
- sh -c "$$pod2man \
- --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
- --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
- > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
- (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
- (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
- (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
- while read n; do \
- PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- done); \
- done
-
-# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.bak (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/Makefile.bak)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.bak (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.bak 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,680 @@
+### Generated automatically from Makefile.org by Configure.
+
+##
+## Makefile for OpenSSL
+##
+
+VERSION=1.0.1q-dev
+MAJOR=1
+MINOR=0.1
+SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
+SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=
+SHLIB_MAJOR=1
+SHLIB_MINOR=0.0
+SHLIB_EXT=
+PLATFORM=gcc
+OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-store no-unit-test no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
+CONFIGURE_ARGS=gcc
+SHLIB_TARGET=
+
+# HERE indicates where this Makefile lives. This can be used to indicate
+# where sub-Makefiles are expected to be. Currently has very limited usage,
+# and should probably not be bothered with at all.
+HERE=.
+
+# INSTALL_PREFIX is for package builders so that they can configure
+# for, say, /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/.
+# Normally it is left empty.
+INSTALL_PREFIX=
+INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
+
+# Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
+OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
+
+# NO_IDEA - Define to build without the IDEA algorithm
+# NO_RC4 - Define to build without the RC4 algorithm
+# NO_RC2 - Define to build without the RC2 algorithm
+# THREADS - Define when building with threads, you will probably also need any
+# system defines as well, i.e. _REENTERANT for Solaris 2.[34]
+# TERMIO - Define the termio terminal subsystem, needed if sgtty is missing.
+# TERMIOS - Define the termios terminal subsystem, Silicon Graphics.
+# LONGCRYPT - Define to use HPUX 10.x's long password modification to crypt(3).
+# DEVRANDOM - Give this the value of the 'random device' if your OS supports
+# one. 32 bytes will be read from this when the random
+# number generator is initalised.
+# SSL_FORBID_ENULL - define if you want the server to be not able to use the
+# NULL encryption ciphers.
+#
+# LOCK_DEBUG - turns on lots of lock debug output :-)
+# REF_CHECK - turn on some xyz_free() assertions.
+# REF_PRINT - prints some stuff on structure free.
+# CRYPTO_MDEBUG - turns on my 'memory leak' detecting stuff
+# MFUNC - Make all Malloc/Free/Realloc calls call
+# CRYPTO_malloc/CRYPTO_free/CRYPTO_realloc which can be setup to
+# call application defined callbacks via CRYPTO_set_mem_functions()
+# MD5_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for MD5
+# SHA1_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for SHA1
+# RMD160_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for RIPEMD160
+# Do not define B_ENDIAN or L_ENDIAN if 'unsigned long' == 8. It must
+# equal 4.
+# PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests.
+
+CC= gcc
+CFLAG= -O3
+DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+PEX_LIBS=
+EX_LIBS=
+EXE_EXT=
+ARFLAGS=
+AR= ar $(ARFLAGS) r
+RANLIB= /usr/bin/ranlib
+NM= nm
+PERL= /usr/bin/perl
+TAR= tar
+TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
+MAKEDEPPROG= gcc
+LIBDIR=lib
+
+# We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in
+# order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture
+# dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC
+# gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus
+# and pass it down to assembler.
+AS=$(CC) -c
+ASFLAG=$(CFLAG)
+
+# For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support
+# the 80386.
+PROCESSOR=
+
+# CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets
+CPUID_OBJ= mem_clr.o
+BN_ASM= bn_asm.o
+DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o
+AES_ENC= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o
+BF_ENC= bf_enc.o
+CAST_ENC= c_enc.o
+RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o
+RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o
+MD5_ASM_OBJ=
+SHA1_ASM_OBJ=
+RMD160_ASM_OBJ=
+WP_ASM_OBJ= wp_block.o
+CMLL_ENC= camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o
+MODES_ASM_OBJ=
+ENGINES_ASM_OBJ=
+PERLASM_SCHEME=
+
+# KRB5 stuff
+KRB5_INCLUDES=
+LIBKRB5=
+
+# Zlib stuff
+ZLIB_INCLUDE=
+LIBZLIB=
+
+# TOP level FIPS install directory.
+FIPSDIR=/usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0
+
+# This is the location of fipscanister.o and friends.
+# The FIPS module build will place it $(INSTALLTOP)/lib
+# but since $(INSTALLTOP) can only take the default value
+# when the module is built it will be in /usr/local/ssl/lib
+# $(INSTALLTOP) for this build may be different so hard
+# code the path.
+
+FIPSLIBDIR=
+
+# The location of the library which contains fipscanister.o
+# normally it will be libcrypto unless fipsdso is set in which
+# case it will be libfips. If not compiling in FIPS mode at all
+# this is empty making it a useful test for a FIPS compile.
+
+FIPSCANLIB=
+
+# Shared library base address. Currently only used on Windows.
+#
+
+BASEADDR=0xFB00000
+
+DIRS= crypto ssl engines apps test tools
+ENGDIRS= ccgost
+SHLIBDIRS= crypto ssl
+
+# dirs in crypto to build
+SDIRS= \
+ objects \
+ md4 md5 sha mdc2 hmac ripemd whrlpool \
+ des aes rc2 rc4 idea bf cast camellia seed modes \
+ bn ec rsa dsa ecdsa dh ecdh dso engine \
+ buffer bio stack lhash rand err \
+ evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5 \
+ cms pqueue ts srp cmac
+# keep in mind that the above list is adjusted by ./Configure
+# according to no-xxx arguments...
+
+# tests to perform. "alltests" is a special word indicating that all tests
+# should be performed.
+TESTS = alltests
+
+MAKEFILE= Makefile
+
+MANDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/man
+MAN1=1
+MAN3=3
+MANSUFFIX=
+HTMLSUFFIX=html
+HTMLDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/html
+SHELL=/bin/sh
+
+TOP= .
+ONEDIRS=out tmp
+EDIRS= times doc bugs util include certs ms shlib mt demos perl sf dep VMS
+WDIRS= windows
+LIBS= libcrypto.a libssl.a
+SHARED_CRYPTO=libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
+SHARED_SSL=libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
+SHARED_LIBS=
+SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=
+SHARED_LDFLAGS=
+
+GENERAL= Makefile
+BASENAME= openssl
+NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
+TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
+WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
+EXHEADER= e_os2.h
+HEADER= e_os.h
+
+all: Makefile build_all
+
+# as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower
+# Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn
+# shell, which [annoyingly enough] terminates unset with error if VAR
+# is not present:-( TOP= && unset TOP is tribute to HP-UX /bin/sh,
+# which terminates unset with error if no variable was present:-(
+CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
+ $${INCLUDE+INCLUDE} $${INCLUDES+INCLUDES} \
+ $${DIR+DIR} $${DIRS+DIRS} $${SRC+SRC} \
+ $${LIBSRC+LIBSRC} $${LIBOBJ+LIBOBJ} $${ALL+ALL} \
+ $${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER} \
+ $${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS} \
+ $${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS} \
+ $${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} $${SCRIPTS+SCRIPTS} \
+ $${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
+ $${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
+
+BUILDENV= PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
+ CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \
+ AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \
+ AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \
+ CROSS_COMPILE='$(CROSS_COMPILE)' \
+ PERL='$(PERL)' ENGDIRS='$(ENGDIRS)' \
+ SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' LIBRPATH='$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)' \
+ INSTALL_PREFIX='$(INSTALL_PREFIX)' \
+ INSTALLTOP='$(INSTALLTOP)' OPENSSLDIR='$(OPENSSLDIR)' \
+ LIBDIR='$(LIBDIR)' \
+ MAKEDEPEND='$$$${TOP}/util/domd $$$${TOP} -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
+ DEPFLAG='-DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED $(DEPFLAG)' \
+ MAKEDEPPROG='$(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
+ SHARED_LDFLAGS='$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)' \
+ KRB5_INCLUDES='$(KRB5_INCLUDES)' LIBKRB5='$(LIBKRB5)' \
+ ZLIB_INCLUDE='$(ZLIB_INCLUDE)' LIBZLIB='$(LIBZLIB)' \
+ EXE_EXT='$(EXE_EXT)' SHARED_LIBS='$(SHARED_LIBS)' \
+ SHLIB_EXT='$(SHLIB_EXT)' SHLIB_TARGET='$(SHLIB_TARGET)' \
+ PEX_LIBS='$(PEX_LIBS)' EX_LIBS='$(EX_LIBS)' \
+ CPUID_OBJ='$(CPUID_OBJ)' \
+ BN_ASM='$(BN_ASM)' DES_ENC='$(DES_ENC)' \
+ AES_ENC='$(AES_ENC)' CMLL_ENC='$(CMLL_ENC)' \
+ BF_ENC='$(BF_ENC)' CAST_ENC='$(CAST_ENC)' \
+ RC4_ENC='$(RC4_ENC)' RC5_ENC='$(RC5_ENC)' \
+ SHA1_ASM_OBJ='$(SHA1_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ MD5_ASM_OBJ='$(MD5_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ RMD160_ASM_OBJ='$(RMD160_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ WP_ASM_OBJ='$(WP_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ MODES_ASM_OBJ='$(MODES_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ ENGINES_ASM_OBJ='$(ENGINES_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ PERLASM_SCHEME='$(PERLASM_SCHEME)' \
+ FIPSLIBDIR='${FIPSLIBDIR}' \
+ FIPSDIR='${FIPSDIR}' \
+ FIPSCANLIB="$${FIPSCANLIB:-$(FIPSCANLIB)}" \
+ THIS=$${THIS:-$@} MAKEFILE=Makefile MAKEOVERRIDES=
+# MAKEOVERRIDES= effectively "equalizes" GNU-ish and SysV-ish make flavors,
+# which in turn eliminates ambiguities in variable treatment with -e.
+
+# BUILD_CMD is a generic macro to build a given target in a given
+# subdirectory. The target must be given through the shell variable
+# `target' and the subdirectory to build in must be given through `dir'.
+# This macro shouldn't be used directly, use RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD or
+# BUILD_ONE_CMD instead.
+#
+# BUILD_ONE_CMD is a macro to build a given target in a given
+# subdirectory if that subdirectory is part of $(DIRS). It requires
+# exactly the same shell variables as BUILD_CMD.
+#
+# RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD is a macro to build a given target in all
+# subdirectories defined in $(DIRS). It requires that the target
+# is given through the shell variable `target'.
+BUILD_CMD= if [ -d "$$dir" ]; then \
+ ( cd $$dir && echo "making $$target in $$dir..." && \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. DIR=$$dir $$target \
+ ) || exit 1; \
+ fi
+RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD=for dir in $(DIRS); do $(BUILD_CMD); done
+BUILD_ONE_CMD=\
+ if expr " $(DIRS) " : ".* $$dir " >/dev/null 2>&1; then \
+ $(BUILD_CMD); \
+ fi
+
+reflect:
+ @[ -n "$(THIS)" ] && $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) $(THIS) -e $(BUILDENV)
+
+sub_all: build_all
+
+build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools
+
+build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
+
+build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc
+build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc
+
+build_crypto:
+ @dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_ssl: build_crypto
+ @dir=ssl; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_engines: build_crypto
+ @dir=engines; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_apps: build_libs
+ @dir=apps; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_tests: build_libs
+ @dir=test; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_tools: build_libs
+ @dir=tools; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+
+all_testapps: build_libs build_testapps
+build_testapps:
+ @dir=crypto; target=testapps; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+
+fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT): libcrypto.a
+ [ -z "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] || $(CC) $(CFLAG) -Iinclude \
+ -DFINGERPRINT_PREMAIN_DSO_LOAD -o $@ \
+ $(FIPSLIBDIR)fips_premain.c $(FIPSLIBDIR)fipscanister.o \
+ libcrypto.a $(EX_LIBS)
+
+libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
+ @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
+ if [ "$(FIPSCANLIB)" = "libcrypto" ]; then \
+ FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO=libcrypto.a ; \
+ FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
+ export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
+ fi; \
+ $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \
+ (touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \
+ else \
+ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
+ exit 1; \
+ fi
+
+libssl$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) libssl.a
+ @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
+ $(MAKE) SHLIBDIRS=ssl SHLIBDEPS='-lcrypto' build-shared; \
+ else \
+ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
+ exit 1; \
+ fi
+
+clean-shared:
+ @set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
+ if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)" ]; then \
+ tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)"; \
+ for j in $${tmp:-x}; do \
+ ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$$j ); \
+ done; \
+ fi; \
+ ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) ); \
+ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" ]; then \
+ ( set -x; rm -f cyg$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT).a ); \
+ fi; \
+ done
+
+link-shared:
+ @ set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
+ $(MAKE) -f $(HERE)/Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
+ LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
+ LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
+ symlink.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
+ libs="$$libs -l$$i"; \
+ done
+
+build-shared: do_$(SHLIB_TARGET) link-shared
+
+do_$(SHLIB_TARGET):
+ @ set -e; libs='-L. $(SHLIBDEPS)'; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
+ if [ "$$i" = "ssl" -a -n "$(LIBKRB5)" ]; then \
+ libs="$(LIBKRB5) $$libs"; \
+ fi; \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
+ LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
+ LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
+ LIBDEPS="$$libs $(EX_LIBS)" \
+ link_a.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
+ libs="-l$$i $$libs"; \
+ done
+
+libcrypto.pc: Makefile
+ @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \
+ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+ echo 'Requires: '; \
+ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libcrypto.pc
+
+libssl.pc: Makefile
+ @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
+ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \
+ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+ echo 'Requires: '; \
+ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libssl.pc
+
+openssl.pc: Makefile
+ @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
+ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \
+ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+ echo 'Requires: '; \
+ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > openssl.pc
+
+Makefile: Makefile.org Configure config
+ @echo "Makefile is older than Makefile.org, Configure or config."
+ @echo "Reconfigure the source tree (via './config' or 'perl Configure'), please."
+ @false
+
+libclean:
+ rm -f *.map *.so *.so.* *.dylib *.dll engines/*.so engines/*.dll engines/*.dylib *.a engines/*.a */lib */*/lib
+
+clean: libclean
+ rm -f shlib/*.o *.o core a.out fluff rehash.time testlog make.log cctest cctest.c
+ @set -e; target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+ rm -f $(LIBS)
+ rm -f openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc
+ rm -f speed.* .pure
+ rm -f $(TARFILE)
+ @set -e; for i in $(ONEDIRS) ;\
+ do \
+ rm -fr $$i/*; \
+ done
+
+makefile.one: files
+ $(PERL) util/mk1mf.pl >makefile.one; \
+ sh util/do_ms.sh
+
+files:
+ $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile > $(TOP)/MINFO
+ @set -e; target=files; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+links:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl include/openssl
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
+ @set -e; target=links; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+gentests:
+ @(cd test && echo "generating dummy tests (if needed)..." && \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on generate );
+
+dclean:
+ rm -rf *.bak include/openssl certs/.0
+ @set -e; target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+rehash: rehash.time
+rehash.time: certs apps
+ @if [ -z "$(CROSS_COMPILE)" ]; then \
+ (OPENSSL="`pwd`/util/opensslwrap.sh"; \
+ [ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
+ OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
+ export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
+ $(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
+ touch rehash.time; \
+ else :; fi
+
+test: tests
+
+tests: rehash
+ @(cd test && echo "testing..." && \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on OPENSSL_CONF=../apps/openssl.cnf tests );
+ OPENSSL_CONF=apps/openssl.cnf util/opensslwrap.sh version -a
+
+report:
+ @$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
+
+update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
+ @set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+depend:
+ @set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+lint:
+ @set -e; target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+tags:
+ rm -f TAGS
+ find . -name '[^.]*.[ch]' | xargs etags -a
+
+errors:
+ $(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c
+ $(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write
+ (cd engines; $(MAKE) PERL=$(PERL) errors)
+
+stacks:
+ $(PERL) util/mkstack.pl -write
+
+util/libeay.num::
+ $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl crypto update
+
+util/ssleay.num::
+ $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
+
+TABLE: Configure
+ (echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
+ $(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
+
+# Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
+# pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
+# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
+# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
+# tar does not support the --files-from option.
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+ --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
+ --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+ -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+ find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+ \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
+ \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+ | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
+ find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
+ find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
+ find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
+
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
+
+dist:
+ $(PERL) Configure dist
+ @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
+ @$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
+ @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
+
+dist_pem_h:
+ (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
+
+install: all install_docs install_sw
+
+install_sw:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/engines \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/certs \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/private
+ @set -e; headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist;\
+ do \
+ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
+ done;
+ @set -e; target=install; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+ @set -e; liblist="$(LIBS)"; for i in $$liblist ;\
+ do \
+ if [ -f "$$i" ]; then \
+ ( echo installing $$i; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ $(RANLIB) $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i ); \
+ fi; \
+ done;
+ @set -e; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
+ tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS)"; \
+ for i in $${tmp:-x}; \
+ do \
+ if [ -f "$$i" -o -f "$$i.a" ]; then \
+ ( echo installing $$i; \
+ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" != "Cygwin" ]; then \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 555 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
+ else \
+ c=`echo $$i | sed 's/^lib\(.*\)\.dll\.a/cyg\1-$(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER).dll/'`; \
+ cp $$c $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
+ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
+ fi ); \
+ if expr $(PLATFORM) : 'mingw' > /dev/null; then \
+ ( case $$i in \
+ *crypto*) i=libeay32.dll;; \
+ *ssl*) i=ssleay32.dll;; \
+ esac; \
+ echo installing $$i; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i ); \
+ fi; \
+ fi; \
+ done; \
+ ( here="`pwd`"; \
+ cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR); \
+ $(MAKE) -f $$here/Makefile HERE="$$here" link-shared ); \
+ if [ "$(INSTALLTOP)" != "/usr" ]; then \
+ echo 'OpenSSL shared libraries have been installed in:'; \
+ echo ' $(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ sed -e '1,/^$$/d' doc/openssl-shared.txt; \
+ fi; \
+ fi
+ cp libcrypto.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
+ cp libssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
+ cp openssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
+
+install_html_docs:
+ here="`pwd`"; \
+ for subdir in apps crypto ssl; do \
+ mkdir -p $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
+ for i in doc/$$subdir/*.pod; do \
+ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
+ echo "installing html/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX)"; \
+ cat $$i \
+ | sed -r 's/L<([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?\|([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?>/L<\1|\3>/g' \
+ | pod2html --podroot=doc --htmlroot=.. --podpath=apps:crypto:ssl \
+ | sed -r 's/<!DOCTYPE.*//g' \
+ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
+ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
+ grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$" | \
+ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
+ while read n; do \
+ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX) "$$n".$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
+ done); \
+ done; \
+ done
+
+install_docs:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man1 \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man3 \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man5 \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man7
+ @pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \
+ here="`pwd`"; \
+ filecase=; \
+ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "DJGPP" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "mingw" ]; then \
+ filecase=-i; \
+ fi; \
+ set -e; for i in doc/apps/*.pod; do \
+ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
+ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 1 < $$i`; \
+ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
+ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
+ sh -c "$$pod2man \
+ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
+ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
+ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
+ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
+ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
+ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
+ while read n; do \
+ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ done); \
+ done; \
+ set -e; for i in doc/crypto/*.pod doc/ssl/*.pod; do \
+ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
+ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 3 < $$i`; \
+ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
+ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
+ sh -c "$$pod2man \
+ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
+ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
+ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
+ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
+ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
+ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
+ while read n; do \
+ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ done); \
+ done
+
+# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.org
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/Makefile.org 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.org 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,674 +0,0 @@
-##
-## Makefile for OpenSSL
-##
-
-VERSION=
-MAJOR=
-MINOR=
-SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=
-SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=
-SHLIB_MAJOR=
-SHLIB_MINOR=
-SHLIB_EXT=
-PLATFORM=dist
-OPTIONS=
-CONFIGURE_ARGS=
-SHLIB_TARGET=
-
-# HERE indicates where this Makefile lives. This can be used to indicate
-# where sub-Makefiles are expected to be. Currently has very limited usage,
-# and should probably not be bothered with at all.
-HERE=.
-
-# INSTALL_PREFIX is for package builders so that they can configure
-# for, say, /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/.
-# Normally it is left empty.
-INSTALL_PREFIX=
-INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
-
-# Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
-OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
-
-# NO_IDEA - Define to build without the IDEA algorithm
-# NO_RC4 - Define to build without the RC4 algorithm
-# NO_RC2 - Define to build without the RC2 algorithm
-# THREADS - Define when building with threads, you will probably also need any
-# system defines as well, i.e. _REENTERANT for Solaris 2.[34]
-# TERMIO - Define the termio terminal subsystem, needed if sgtty is missing.
-# TERMIOS - Define the termios terminal subsystem, Silicon Graphics.
-# LONGCRYPT - Define to use HPUX 10.x's long password modification to crypt(3).
-# DEVRANDOM - Give this the value of the 'random device' if your OS supports
-# one. 32 bytes will be read from this when the random
-# number generator is initalised.
-# SSL_FORBID_ENULL - define if you want the server to be not able to use the
-# NULL encryption ciphers.
-#
-# LOCK_DEBUG - turns on lots of lock debug output :-)
-# REF_CHECK - turn on some xyz_free() assertions.
-# REF_PRINT - prints some stuff on structure free.
-# CRYPTO_MDEBUG - turns on my 'memory leak' detecting stuff
-# MFUNC - Make all Malloc/Free/Realloc calls call
-# CRYPTO_malloc/CRYPTO_free/CRYPTO_realloc which can be setup to
-# call application defined callbacks via CRYPTO_set_mem_functions()
-# MD5_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for MD5
-# SHA1_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for SHA1
-# RMD160_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for RIPEMD160
-# Do not define B_ENDIAN or L_ENDIAN if 'unsigned long' == 8. It must
-# equal 4.
-# PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests.
-
-CC= cc
-CFLAG= -O
-DEPFLAG=
-PEX_LIBS=
-EX_LIBS=
-EXE_EXT=
-ARFLAGS=
-AR=ar $(ARFLAGS) r
-RANLIB= ranlib
-NM= nm
-PERL= perl
-TAR= tar
-TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
-MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend
-LIBDIR=lib
-
-# We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in
-# order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture
-# dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC
-# gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus
-# and pass it down to assembler.
-AS=$(CC) -c
-ASFLAG=$(CFLAG)
-
-# For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support
-# the 80386.
-PROCESSOR=
-
-# CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets
-CPUID_OBJ=
-BN_ASM= bn_asm.o
-DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o
-AES_ENC= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o
-BF_ENC= bf_enc.o
-CAST_ENC= c_enc.o
-RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o
-RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o
-MD5_ASM_OBJ=
-SHA1_ASM_OBJ=
-RMD160_ASM_OBJ=
-WP_ASM_OBJ=
-CMLL_ENC=
-MODES_ASM_OBJ=
-ENGINES_ASM_OBJ=
-PERLASM_SCHEME=
-
-# KRB5 stuff
-KRB5_INCLUDES=
-LIBKRB5=
-
-# Zlib stuff
-ZLIB_INCLUDE=
-LIBZLIB=
-
-# TOP level FIPS install directory.
-FIPSDIR=
-
-# This is the location of fipscanister.o and friends.
-# The FIPS module build will place it $(INSTALLTOP)/lib
-# but since $(INSTALLTOP) can only take the default value
-# when the module is built it will be in /usr/local/ssl/lib
-# $(INSTALLTOP) for this build may be different so hard
-# code the path.
-
-FIPSLIBDIR=
-
-# The location of the library which contains fipscanister.o
-# normally it will be libcrypto unless fipsdso is set in which
-# case it will be libfips. If not compiling in FIPS mode at all
-# this is empty making it a useful test for a FIPS compile.
-
-FIPSCANLIB=
-
-# Shared library base address. Currently only used on Windows.
-#
-
-BASEADDR=
-
-DIRS= crypto ssl engines apps test tools
-ENGDIRS= ccgost
-SHLIBDIRS= crypto ssl
-
-# dirs in crypto to build
-SDIRS= \
- objects \
- md2 md4 md5 sha mdc2 hmac ripemd whrlpool \
- des aes rc2 rc4 rc5 idea bf cast camellia seed modes \
- bn ec rsa dsa ecdsa dh ecdh dso engine \
- buffer bio stack lhash rand err \
- evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5 \
- cms pqueue ts jpake srp store cmac
-# keep in mind that the above list is adjusted by ./Configure
-# according to no-xxx arguments...
-
-# tests to perform. "alltests" is a special word indicating that all tests
-# should be performed.
-TESTS = alltests
-
-MAKEFILE= Makefile
-
-MANDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/man
-MAN1=1
-MAN3=3
-MANSUFFIX=
-HTMLSUFFIX=html
-HTMLDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/html
-SHELL=/bin/sh
-
-TOP= .
-ONEDIRS=out tmp
-EDIRS= times doc bugs util include certs ms shlib mt demos perl sf dep VMS
-WDIRS= windows
-LIBS= libcrypto.a libssl.a
-SHARED_CRYPTO=libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
-SHARED_SSL=libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
-SHARED_LIBS=
-SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=
-SHARED_LDFLAGS=
-
-GENERAL= Makefile
-BASENAME= openssl
-NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
-TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
-WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
-EXHEADER= e_os2.h
-HEADER= e_os.h
-
-all: Makefile build_all
-
-# as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower
-# Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn
-# shell, which [annoyingly enough] terminates unset with error if VAR
-# is not present:-( TOP= && unset TOP is tribute to HP-UX /bin/sh,
-# which terminates unset with error if no variable was present:-(
-CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
- $${INCLUDE+INCLUDE} $${INCLUDES+INCLUDES} \
- $${DIR+DIR} $${DIRS+DIRS} $${SRC+SRC} \
- $${LIBSRC+LIBSRC} $${LIBOBJ+LIBOBJ} $${ALL+ALL} \
- $${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER} \
- $${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS} \
- $${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS} \
- $${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} $${SCRIPTS+SCRIPTS} \
- $${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
- $${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
-
-BUILDENV= PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
- CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \
- AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \
- AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \
- CROSS_COMPILE='$(CROSS_COMPILE)' \
- PERL='$(PERL)' ENGDIRS='$(ENGDIRS)' \
- SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' LIBRPATH='$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)' \
- INSTALL_PREFIX='$(INSTALL_PREFIX)' \
- INSTALLTOP='$(INSTALLTOP)' OPENSSLDIR='$(OPENSSLDIR)' \
- LIBDIR='$(LIBDIR)' \
- MAKEDEPEND='$$$${TOP}/util/domd $$$${TOP} -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
- DEPFLAG='-DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED $(DEPFLAG)' \
- MAKEDEPPROG='$(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
- SHARED_LDFLAGS='$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)' \
- KRB5_INCLUDES='$(KRB5_INCLUDES)' LIBKRB5='$(LIBKRB5)' \
- ZLIB_INCLUDE='$(ZLIB_INCLUDE)' LIBZLIB='$(LIBZLIB)' \
- EXE_EXT='$(EXE_EXT)' SHARED_LIBS='$(SHARED_LIBS)' \
- SHLIB_EXT='$(SHLIB_EXT)' SHLIB_TARGET='$(SHLIB_TARGET)' \
- PEX_LIBS='$(PEX_LIBS)' EX_LIBS='$(EX_LIBS)' \
- CPUID_OBJ='$(CPUID_OBJ)' \
- BN_ASM='$(BN_ASM)' DES_ENC='$(DES_ENC)' \
- AES_ENC='$(AES_ENC)' CMLL_ENC='$(CMLL_ENC)' \
- BF_ENC='$(BF_ENC)' CAST_ENC='$(CAST_ENC)' \
- RC4_ENC='$(RC4_ENC)' RC5_ENC='$(RC5_ENC)' \
- SHA1_ASM_OBJ='$(SHA1_ASM_OBJ)' \
- MD5_ASM_OBJ='$(MD5_ASM_OBJ)' \
- RMD160_ASM_OBJ='$(RMD160_ASM_OBJ)' \
- WP_ASM_OBJ='$(WP_ASM_OBJ)' \
- MODES_ASM_OBJ='$(MODES_ASM_OBJ)' \
- ENGINES_ASM_OBJ='$(ENGINES_ASM_OBJ)' \
- PERLASM_SCHEME='$(PERLASM_SCHEME)' \
- FIPSLIBDIR='${FIPSLIBDIR}' \
- FIPSDIR='${FIPSDIR}' \
- FIPSCANLIB="$${FIPSCANLIB:-$(FIPSCANLIB)}" \
- THIS=$${THIS:-$@} MAKEFILE=Makefile MAKEOVERRIDES=
-# MAKEOVERRIDES= effectively "equalizes" GNU-ish and SysV-ish make flavors,
-# which in turn eliminates ambiguities in variable treatment with -e.
-
-# BUILD_CMD is a generic macro to build a given target in a given
-# subdirectory. The target must be given through the shell variable
-# `target' and the subdirectory to build in must be given through `dir'.
-# This macro shouldn't be used directly, use RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD or
-# BUILD_ONE_CMD instead.
-#
-# BUILD_ONE_CMD is a macro to build a given target in a given
-# subdirectory if that subdirectory is part of $(DIRS). It requires
-# exactly the same shell variables as BUILD_CMD.
-#
-# RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD is a macro to build a given target in all
-# subdirectories defined in $(DIRS). It requires that the target
-# is given through the shell variable `target'.
-BUILD_CMD= if [ -d "$$dir" ]; then \
- ( cd $$dir && echo "making $$target in $$dir..." && \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. DIR=$$dir $$target \
- ) || exit 1; \
- fi
-RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD=for dir in $(DIRS); do $(BUILD_CMD); done
-BUILD_ONE_CMD=\
- if expr " $(DIRS) " : ".* $$dir " >/dev/null 2>&1; then \
- $(BUILD_CMD); \
- fi
-
-reflect:
- @[ -n "$(THIS)" ] && $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) $(THIS) -e $(BUILDENV)
-
-sub_all: build_all
-build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools
-
-build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
-
-build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc
-build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc
-
-build_crypto:
- @dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_ssl:
- @dir=ssl; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_engines:
- @dir=engines; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_apps:
- @dir=apps; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_tests:
- @dir=test; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_tools:
- @dir=tools; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-
-all_testapps: build_libs build_testapps
-build_testapps:
- @dir=crypto; target=testapps; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-
-fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT): libcrypto.a
- [ -z "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] || $(CC) $(CFLAG) -Iinclude \
- -DFINGERPRINT_PREMAIN_DSO_LOAD -o $@ \
- $(FIPSLIBDIR)fips_premain.c $(FIPSLIBDIR)fipscanister.o \
- libcrypto.a $(EX_LIBS)
-
-libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
- @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
- if [ "$(FIPSCANLIB)" = "libcrypto" ]; then \
- FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO=libcrypto.a ; \
- FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
- export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
- fi; \
- $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \
- (touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \
- else \
- echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
- exit 1; \
- fi
-
-libssl$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) libssl.a
- @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
- $(MAKE) SHLIBDIRS=ssl SHLIBDEPS='-lcrypto' build-shared; \
- else \
- echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
- exit 1; \
- fi
-
-clean-shared:
- @set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
- if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)" ]; then \
- tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)"; \
- for j in $${tmp:-x}; do \
- ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$$j ); \
- done; \
- fi; \
- ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) ); \
- if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" ]; then \
- ( set -x; rm -f cyg$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT).a ); \
- fi; \
- done
-
-link-shared:
- @ set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
- $(MAKE) -f $(HERE)/Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
- LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
- LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
- symlink.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
- libs="$$libs -l$$i"; \
- done
-
-build-shared: do_$(SHLIB_TARGET) link-shared
-
-do_$(SHLIB_TARGET):
- @ set -e; libs='-L. $(SHLIBDEPS)'; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
- if [ "$$i" = "ssl" -a -n "$(LIBKRB5)" ]; then \
- libs="$(LIBKRB5) $$libs"; \
- fi; \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
- LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
- LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
- LIBDEPS="$$libs $(EX_LIBS)" \
- link_a.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
- libs="-l$$i $$libs"; \
- done
-
-libcrypto.pc: Makefile
- @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
- echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
- echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
- echo ''; \
- echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libcrypto'; \
- echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \
- echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
- echo 'Requires: '; \
- echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \
- echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
- echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libcrypto.pc
-
-libssl.pc: Makefile
- @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
- echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
- echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
- echo ''; \
- echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
- echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \
- echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
- echo 'Requires: '; \
- echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
- echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
- echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libssl.pc
-
-openssl.pc: Makefile
- @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
- echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
- echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
- echo ''; \
- echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
- echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \
- echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
- echo 'Requires: '; \
- echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
- echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
- echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > openssl.pc
-
-Makefile: Makefile.org Configure config
- @echo "Makefile is older than Makefile.org, Configure or config."
- @echo "Reconfigure the source tree (via './config' or 'perl Configure'), please."
- @false
-
-libclean:
- rm -f *.map *.so *.so.* *.dylib *.dll engines/*.so engines/*.dll engines/*.dylib *.a engines/*.a */lib */*/lib
-
-clean: libclean
- rm -f shlib/*.o *.o core a.out fluff rehash.time testlog make.log cctest cctest.c
- @set -e; target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
- rm -f $(LIBS)
- rm -f openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc
- rm -f speed.* .pure
- rm -f $(TARFILE)
- @set -e; for i in $(ONEDIRS) ;\
- do \
- rm -fr $$i/*; \
- done
-
-makefile.one: files
- $(PERL) util/mk1mf.pl >makefile.one; \
- sh util/do_ms.sh
-
-files:
- $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile > $(TOP)/MINFO
- @set -e; target=files; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-links:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl include/openssl
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
- @set -e; target=links; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-gentests:
- @(cd test && echo "generating dummy tests (if needed)..." && \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on generate );
-
-dclean:
- rm -rf *.bak include/openssl certs/.0
- @set -e; target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-rehash: rehash.time
-rehash.time: certs apps
- @if [ -z "$(CROSS_COMPILE)" ]; then \
- (OPENSSL="`pwd`/util/opensslwrap.sh"; \
- [ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
- OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
- export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
- $(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
- touch rehash.time; \
- else :; fi
-
-test: tests
-
-tests: rehash
- @(cd test && echo "testing..." && \
- $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on OPENSSL_CONF=../apps/openssl.cnf tests );
- OPENSSL_CONF=apps/openssl.cnf util/opensslwrap.sh version -a
-
-report:
- @$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
-
-update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
- @set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-depend:
- @set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-lint:
- @set -e; target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
-
-tags:
- rm -f TAGS
- find . -name '[^.]*.[ch]' | xargs etags -a
-
-errors:
- $(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c
- $(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write
- (cd engines; $(MAKE) PERL=$(PERL) errors)
-
-stacks:
- $(PERL) util/mkstack.pl -write
-
-util/libeay.num::
- $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl crypto update
-
-util/ssleay.num::
- $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
-
-TABLE: Configure
- (echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
- $(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
-
-# Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
-# pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
-# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
-# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
-# tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
- find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
- find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
- find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
- find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
- $(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
- tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
- --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
- --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
- gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
-
-tar-snap:
- @$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
- `find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
- tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
- --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
- --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
-
-dist:
- $(PERL) Configure dist
- @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
- @$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
- @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
-
-dist_pem_h:
- (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
-
-install: all install_docs install_sw
-
-install_sw:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/engines \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/certs \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/private
- @set -e; headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist;\
- do \
- (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
- done;
- @set -e; target=install; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
- @set -e; liblist="$(LIBS)"; for i in $$liblist ;\
- do \
- if [ -f "$$i" ]; then \
- ( echo installing $$i; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- $(RANLIB) $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i ); \
- fi; \
- done;
- @set -e; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
- tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS)"; \
- for i in $${tmp:-x}; \
- do \
- if [ -f "$$i" -o -f "$$i.a" ]; then \
- ( echo installing $$i; \
- if [ "$(PLATFORM)" != "Cygwin" ]; then \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- chmod 555 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
- else \
- c=`echo $$i | sed 's/^lib\(.*\)\.dll\.a/cyg\1-$(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER).dll/'`; \
- cp $$c $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
- chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
- fi ); \
- if expr $(PLATFORM) : 'mingw' > /dev/null; then \
- ( case $$i in \
- *crypto*) i=libeay32.dll;; \
- *ssl*) i=ssleay32.dll;; \
- esac; \
- echo installing $$i; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
- chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i ); \
- fi; \
- fi; \
- done; \
- ( here="`pwd`"; \
- cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR); \
- $(MAKE) -f $$here/Makefile HERE="$$here" link-shared ); \
- if [ "$(INSTALLTOP)" != "/usr" ]; then \
- echo 'OpenSSL shared libraries have been installed in:'; \
- echo ' $(INSTALLTOP)'; \
- echo ''; \
- sed -e '1,/^$$/d' doc/openssl-shared.txt; \
- fi; \
- fi
- cp libcrypto.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
- cp libssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
- cp openssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
-
-install_html_docs:
- here="`pwd`"; \
- for subdir in apps crypto ssl; do \
- mkdir -p $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
- for i in doc/$$subdir/*.pod; do \
- fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
- echo "installing html/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX)"; \
- cat $$i \
- | sed -r 's/L<([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?\|([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?>/L<\1|\3>/g' \
- | pod2html --podroot=doc --htmlroot=.. --podpath=apps:crypto:ssl \
- | sed -r 's/<!DOCTYPE.*//g' \
- > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
- $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
- grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$" | \
- (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
- while read n; do \
- PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX) "$$n".$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
- done); \
- done; \
- done
-
-install_docs:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man1 \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man3 \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man5 \
- $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man7
- @pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \
- here="`pwd`"; \
- filecase=; \
- if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "DJGPP" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "mingw" ]; then \
- filecase=-i; \
- fi; \
- set -e; for i in doc/apps/*.pod; do \
- fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
- sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 1 < $$i`; \
- echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
- (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
- sh -c "$$pod2man \
- --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
- --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
- > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
- (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
- (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
- (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
- while read n; do \
- PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- done); \
- done; \
- set -e; for i in doc/crypto/*.pod doc/ssl/*.pod; do \
- fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
- sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 3 < $$i`; \
- echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
- (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
- sh -c "$$pod2man \
- --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
- --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
- > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
- (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
- (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
- (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
- while read n; do \
- PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
- done); \
- done
-
-# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.org (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/Makefile.org)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.org (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/Makefile.org 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
+##
+## Makefile for OpenSSL
+##
+
+VERSION=
+MAJOR=
+MINOR=
+SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=
+SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=
+SHLIB_MAJOR=
+SHLIB_MINOR=
+SHLIB_EXT=
+PLATFORM=dist
+OPTIONS=
+CONFIGURE_ARGS=
+SHLIB_TARGET=
+
+# HERE indicates where this Makefile lives. This can be used to indicate
+# where sub-Makefiles are expected to be. Currently has very limited usage,
+# and should probably not be bothered with at all.
+HERE=.
+
+# INSTALL_PREFIX is for package builders so that they can configure
+# for, say, /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/.
+# Normally it is left empty.
+INSTALL_PREFIX=
+INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
+
+# Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
+OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
+
+# NO_IDEA - Define to build without the IDEA algorithm
+# NO_RC4 - Define to build without the RC4 algorithm
+# NO_RC2 - Define to build without the RC2 algorithm
+# THREADS - Define when building with threads, you will probably also need any
+# system defines as well, i.e. _REENTERANT for Solaris 2.[34]
+# TERMIO - Define the termio terminal subsystem, needed if sgtty is missing.
+# TERMIOS - Define the termios terminal subsystem, Silicon Graphics.
+# LONGCRYPT - Define to use HPUX 10.x's long password modification to crypt(3).
+# DEVRANDOM - Give this the value of the 'random device' if your OS supports
+# one. 32 bytes will be read from this when the random
+# number generator is initalised.
+# SSL_FORBID_ENULL - define if you want the server to be not able to use the
+# NULL encryption ciphers.
+#
+# LOCK_DEBUG - turns on lots of lock debug output :-)
+# REF_CHECK - turn on some xyz_free() assertions.
+# REF_PRINT - prints some stuff on structure free.
+# CRYPTO_MDEBUG - turns on my 'memory leak' detecting stuff
+# MFUNC - Make all Malloc/Free/Realloc calls call
+# CRYPTO_malloc/CRYPTO_free/CRYPTO_realloc which can be setup to
+# call application defined callbacks via CRYPTO_set_mem_functions()
+# MD5_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for MD5
+# SHA1_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for SHA1
+# RMD160_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for RIPEMD160
+# Do not define B_ENDIAN or L_ENDIAN if 'unsigned long' == 8. It must
+# equal 4.
+# PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests.
+
+CC= cc
+CFLAG= -O
+DEPFLAG=
+PEX_LIBS=
+EX_LIBS=
+EXE_EXT=
+ARFLAGS=
+AR=ar $(ARFLAGS) r
+RANLIB= ranlib
+NM= nm
+PERL= perl
+TAR= tar
+TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
+MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend
+LIBDIR=lib
+
+# We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in
+# order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture
+# dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC
+# gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus
+# and pass it down to assembler.
+AS=$(CC) -c
+ASFLAG=$(CFLAG)
+
+# For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support
+# the 80386.
+PROCESSOR=
+
+# CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets
+CPUID_OBJ=
+BN_ASM= bn_asm.o
+DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o
+AES_ENC= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o
+BF_ENC= bf_enc.o
+CAST_ENC= c_enc.o
+RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o
+RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o
+MD5_ASM_OBJ=
+SHA1_ASM_OBJ=
+RMD160_ASM_OBJ=
+WP_ASM_OBJ=
+CMLL_ENC=
+MODES_ASM_OBJ=
+ENGINES_ASM_OBJ=
+PERLASM_SCHEME=
+
+# KRB5 stuff
+KRB5_INCLUDES=
+LIBKRB5=
+
+# Zlib stuff
+ZLIB_INCLUDE=
+LIBZLIB=
+
+# TOP level FIPS install directory.
+FIPSDIR=
+
+# This is the location of fipscanister.o and friends.
+# The FIPS module build will place it $(INSTALLTOP)/lib
+# but since $(INSTALLTOP) can only take the default value
+# when the module is built it will be in /usr/local/ssl/lib
+# $(INSTALLTOP) for this build may be different so hard
+# code the path.
+
+FIPSLIBDIR=
+
+# The location of the library which contains fipscanister.o
+# normally it will be libcrypto unless fipsdso is set in which
+# case it will be libfips. If not compiling in FIPS mode at all
+# this is empty making it a useful test for a FIPS compile.
+
+FIPSCANLIB=
+
+# Shared library base address. Currently only used on Windows.
+#
+
+BASEADDR=
+
+DIRS= crypto ssl engines apps test tools
+ENGDIRS= ccgost
+SHLIBDIRS= crypto ssl
+
+# dirs in crypto to build
+SDIRS= \
+ objects \
+ md2 md4 md5 sha mdc2 hmac ripemd whrlpool \
+ des aes rc2 rc4 rc5 idea bf cast camellia seed modes \
+ bn ec rsa dsa ecdsa dh ecdh dso engine \
+ buffer bio stack lhash rand err \
+ evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5 \
+ cms pqueue ts jpake srp store cmac
+# keep in mind that the above list is adjusted by ./Configure
+# according to no-xxx arguments...
+
+# tests to perform. "alltests" is a special word indicating that all tests
+# should be performed.
+TESTS = alltests
+
+MAKEFILE= Makefile
+
+MANDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/man
+MAN1=1
+MAN3=3
+MANSUFFIX=
+HTMLSUFFIX=html
+HTMLDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/html
+SHELL=/bin/sh
+
+TOP= .
+ONEDIRS=out tmp
+EDIRS= times doc bugs util include certs ms shlib mt demos perl sf dep VMS
+WDIRS= windows
+LIBS= libcrypto.a libssl.a
+SHARED_CRYPTO=libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
+SHARED_SSL=libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
+SHARED_LIBS=
+SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=
+SHARED_LDFLAGS=
+
+GENERAL= Makefile
+BASENAME= openssl
+NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
+TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
+WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
+EXHEADER= e_os2.h
+HEADER= e_os.h
+
+all: Makefile build_all
+
+# as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower
+# Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn
+# shell, which [annoyingly enough] terminates unset with error if VAR
+# is not present:-( TOP= && unset TOP is tribute to HP-UX /bin/sh,
+# which terminates unset with error if no variable was present:-(
+CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
+ $${INCLUDE+INCLUDE} $${INCLUDES+INCLUDES} \
+ $${DIR+DIR} $${DIRS+DIRS} $${SRC+SRC} \
+ $${LIBSRC+LIBSRC} $${LIBOBJ+LIBOBJ} $${ALL+ALL} \
+ $${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER} \
+ $${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS} \
+ $${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS} \
+ $${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} $${SCRIPTS+SCRIPTS} \
+ $${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
+ $${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
+
+BUILDENV= PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
+ CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \
+ AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \
+ AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \
+ CROSS_COMPILE='$(CROSS_COMPILE)' \
+ PERL='$(PERL)' ENGDIRS='$(ENGDIRS)' \
+ SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' LIBRPATH='$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)' \
+ INSTALL_PREFIX='$(INSTALL_PREFIX)' \
+ INSTALLTOP='$(INSTALLTOP)' OPENSSLDIR='$(OPENSSLDIR)' \
+ LIBDIR='$(LIBDIR)' \
+ MAKEDEPEND='$$$${TOP}/util/domd $$$${TOP} -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
+ DEPFLAG='-DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED $(DEPFLAG)' \
+ MAKEDEPPROG='$(MAKEDEPPROG)' \
+ SHARED_LDFLAGS='$(SHARED_LDFLAGS)' \
+ KRB5_INCLUDES='$(KRB5_INCLUDES)' LIBKRB5='$(LIBKRB5)' \
+ ZLIB_INCLUDE='$(ZLIB_INCLUDE)' LIBZLIB='$(LIBZLIB)' \
+ EXE_EXT='$(EXE_EXT)' SHARED_LIBS='$(SHARED_LIBS)' \
+ SHLIB_EXT='$(SHLIB_EXT)' SHLIB_TARGET='$(SHLIB_TARGET)' \
+ PEX_LIBS='$(PEX_LIBS)' EX_LIBS='$(EX_LIBS)' \
+ CPUID_OBJ='$(CPUID_OBJ)' \
+ BN_ASM='$(BN_ASM)' DES_ENC='$(DES_ENC)' \
+ AES_ENC='$(AES_ENC)' CMLL_ENC='$(CMLL_ENC)' \
+ BF_ENC='$(BF_ENC)' CAST_ENC='$(CAST_ENC)' \
+ RC4_ENC='$(RC4_ENC)' RC5_ENC='$(RC5_ENC)' \
+ SHA1_ASM_OBJ='$(SHA1_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ MD5_ASM_OBJ='$(MD5_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ RMD160_ASM_OBJ='$(RMD160_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ WP_ASM_OBJ='$(WP_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ MODES_ASM_OBJ='$(MODES_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ ENGINES_ASM_OBJ='$(ENGINES_ASM_OBJ)' \
+ PERLASM_SCHEME='$(PERLASM_SCHEME)' \
+ FIPSLIBDIR='${FIPSLIBDIR}' \
+ FIPSDIR='${FIPSDIR}' \
+ FIPSCANLIB="$${FIPSCANLIB:-$(FIPSCANLIB)}" \
+ THIS=$${THIS:-$@} MAKEFILE=Makefile MAKEOVERRIDES=
+# MAKEOVERRIDES= effectively "equalizes" GNU-ish and SysV-ish make flavors,
+# which in turn eliminates ambiguities in variable treatment with -e.
+
+# BUILD_CMD is a generic macro to build a given target in a given
+# subdirectory. The target must be given through the shell variable
+# `target' and the subdirectory to build in must be given through `dir'.
+# This macro shouldn't be used directly, use RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD or
+# BUILD_ONE_CMD instead.
+#
+# BUILD_ONE_CMD is a macro to build a given target in a given
+# subdirectory if that subdirectory is part of $(DIRS). It requires
+# exactly the same shell variables as BUILD_CMD.
+#
+# RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD is a macro to build a given target in all
+# subdirectories defined in $(DIRS). It requires that the target
+# is given through the shell variable `target'.
+BUILD_CMD= if [ -d "$$dir" ]; then \
+ ( cd $$dir && echo "making $$target in $$dir..." && \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. DIR=$$dir $$target \
+ ) || exit 1; \
+ fi
+RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD=for dir in $(DIRS); do $(BUILD_CMD); done
+BUILD_ONE_CMD=\
+ if expr " $(DIRS) " : ".* $$dir " >/dev/null 2>&1; then \
+ $(BUILD_CMD); \
+ fi
+
+reflect:
+ @[ -n "$(THIS)" ] && $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) $(THIS) -e $(BUILDENV)
+
+sub_all: build_all
+
+build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools
+
+build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
+
+build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc
+build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc
+
+build_crypto:
+ @dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_ssl: build_crypto
+ @dir=ssl; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_engines: build_crypto
+ @dir=engines; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_apps: build_libs
+ @dir=apps; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_tests: build_libs
+ @dir=test; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+build_tools: build_libs
+ @dir=tools; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+
+all_testapps: build_libs build_testapps
+build_testapps:
+ @dir=crypto; target=testapps; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
+
+fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT): libcrypto.a
+ [ -z "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] || $(CC) $(CFLAG) -Iinclude \
+ -DFINGERPRINT_PREMAIN_DSO_LOAD -o $@ \
+ $(FIPSLIBDIR)fips_premain.c $(FIPSLIBDIR)fipscanister.o \
+ libcrypto.a $(EX_LIBS)
+
+libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
+ @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
+ if [ "$(FIPSCANLIB)" = "libcrypto" ]; then \
+ FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO=libcrypto.a ; \
+ FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
+ export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
+ fi; \
+ $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \
+ (touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \
+ else \
+ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
+ exit 1; \
+ fi
+
+libssl$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) libssl.a
+ @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \
+ $(MAKE) SHLIBDIRS=ssl SHLIBDEPS='-lcrypto' build-shared; \
+ else \
+ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
+ exit 1; \
+ fi
+
+clean-shared:
+ @set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
+ if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)" ]; then \
+ tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)"; \
+ for j in $${tmp:-x}; do \
+ ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$$j ); \
+ done; \
+ fi; \
+ ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) ); \
+ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" ]; then \
+ ( set -x; rm -f cyg$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT).a ); \
+ fi; \
+ done
+
+link-shared:
+ @ set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
+ $(MAKE) -f $(HERE)/Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
+ LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
+ LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
+ symlink.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
+ libs="$$libs -l$$i"; \
+ done
+
+build-shared: do_$(SHLIB_TARGET) link-shared
+
+do_$(SHLIB_TARGET):
+ @ set -e; libs='-L. $(SHLIBDEPS)'; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \
+ if [ "$$i" = "ssl" -a -n "$(LIBKRB5)" ]; then \
+ libs="$(LIBKRB5) $$libs"; \
+ fi; \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
+ LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR) \
+ LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";$(SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY)" \
+ LIBDEPS="$$libs $(EX_LIBS)" \
+ link_a.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
+ libs="-l$$i $$libs"; \
+ done
+
+libcrypto.pc: Makefile
+ @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \
+ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+ echo 'Requires: '; \
+ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libcrypto.pc
+
+libssl.pc: Makefile
+ @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
+ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \
+ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+ echo 'Requires: '; \
+ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libssl.pc
+
+openssl.pc: Makefile
+ @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \
+ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \
+ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \
+ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \
+ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
+ echo 'Requires: '; \
+ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
+ echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > openssl.pc
+
+Makefile: Makefile.org Configure config
+ @echo "Makefile is older than Makefile.org, Configure or config."
+ @echo "Reconfigure the source tree (via './config' or 'perl Configure'), please."
+ @false
+
+libclean:
+ rm -f *.map *.so *.so.* *.dylib *.dll engines/*.so engines/*.dll engines/*.dylib *.a engines/*.a */lib */*/lib
+
+clean: libclean
+ rm -f shlib/*.o *.o core a.out fluff rehash.time testlog make.log cctest cctest.c
+ @set -e; target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+ rm -f $(LIBS)
+ rm -f openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc
+ rm -f speed.* .pure
+ rm -f $(TARFILE)
+ @set -e; for i in $(ONEDIRS) ;\
+ do \
+ rm -fr $$i/*; \
+ done
+
+makefile.one: files
+ $(PERL) util/mk1mf.pl >makefile.one; \
+ sh util/do_ms.sh
+
+files:
+ $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile > $(TOP)/MINFO
+ @set -e; target=files; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+links:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl include/openssl
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
+ @set -e; target=links; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+gentests:
+ @(cd test && echo "generating dummy tests (if needed)..." && \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on generate );
+
+dclean:
+ rm -rf *.bak include/openssl certs/.0
+ @set -e; target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+rehash: rehash.time
+rehash.time: certs apps
+ @if [ -z "$(CROSS_COMPILE)" ]; then \
+ (OPENSSL="`pwd`/util/opensslwrap.sh"; \
+ [ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
+ OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
+ export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
+ $(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
+ touch rehash.time; \
+ else :; fi
+
+test: tests
+
+tests: rehash
+ @(cd test && echo "testing..." && \
+ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. TESTS='$(TESTS)' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on OPENSSL_CONF=../apps/openssl.cnf tests );
+ OPENSSL_CONF=apps/openssl.cnf util/opensslwrap.sh version -a
+
+report:
+ @$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
+
+update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
+ @set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+depend:
+ @set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+lint:
+ @set -e; target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
+tags:
+ rm -f TAGS
+ find . -name '[^.]*.[ch]' | xargs etags -a
+
+errors:
+ $(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c
+ $(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write
+ (cd engines; $(MAKE) PERL=$(PERL) errors)
+
+stacks:
+ $(PERL) util/mkstack.pl -write
+
+util/libeay.num::
+ $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl crypto update
+
+util/ssleay.num::
+ $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
+
+TABLE: Configure
+ (echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
+ $(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
+
+# Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
+# pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
+# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
+# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
+# tar does not support the --files-from option.
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+ --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
+ --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+ -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+ find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+ \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
+ \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+ | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
+ find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
+ find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
+ find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
+
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
+
+dist:
+ $(PERL) Configure dist
+ @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
+ @$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
+ @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
+
+dist_pem_h:
+ (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
+
+install: all install_docs install_sw
+
+install_sw:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/engines \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/certs \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/private
+ @set -e; headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist;\
+ do \
+ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
+ done;
+ @set -e; target=install; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+ @set -e; liblist="$(LIBS)"; for i in $$liblist ;\
+ do \
+ if [ -f "$$i" ]; then \
+ ( echo installing $$i; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ $(RANLIB) $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i ); \
+ fi; \
+ done;
+ @set -e; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
+ tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS)"; \
+ for i in $${tmp:-x}; \
+ do \
+ if [ -f "$$i" -o -f "$$i.a" ]; then \
+ ( echo installing $$i; \
+ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" != "Cygwin" ]; then \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 555 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
+ else \
+ c=`echo $$i | sed 's/^lib\(.*\)\.dll\.a/cyg\1-$(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER).dll/'`; \
+ cp $$c $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
+ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
+ fi ); \
+ if expr $(PLATFORM) : 'mingw' > /dev/null; then \
+ ( case $$i in \
+ *crypto*) i=libeay32.dll;; \
+ *ssl*) i=ssleay32.dll;; \
+ esac; \
+ echo installing $$i; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i ); \
+ fi; \
+ fi; \
+ done; \
+ ( here="`pwd`"; \
+ cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR); \
+ $(MAKE) -f $$here/Makefile HERE="$$here" link-shared ); \
+ if [ "$(INSTALLTOP)" != "/usr" ]; then \
+ echo 'OpenSSL shared libraries have been installed in:'; \
+ echo ' $(INSTALLTOP)'; \
+ echo ''; \
+ sed -e '1,/^$$/d' doc/openssl-shared.txt; \
+ fi; \
+ fi
+ cp libcrypto.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc
+ cp libssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc
+ cp openssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
+
+install_html_docs:
+ here="`pwd`"; \
+ for subdir in apps crypto ssl; do \
+ mkdir -p $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
+ for i in doc/$$subdir/*.pod; do \
+ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
+ echo "installing html/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX)"; \
+ cat $$i \
+ | sed -r 's/L<([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?\|([^)]*)(\([0-9]\))?>/L<\1|\3>/g' \
+ | pod2html --podroot=doc --htmlroot=.. --podpath=apps:crypto:ssl \
+ | sed -r 's/<!DOCTYPE.*//g' \
+ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir/$$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
+ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
+ grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$" | \
+ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(HTMLDIR)/$$subdir; \
+ while read n; do \
+ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$(HTMLSUFFIX) "$$n".$(HTMLSUFFIX); \
+ done); \
+ done; \
+ done
+
+install_docs:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man1 \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man3 \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man5 \
+ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man7
+ @pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \
+ here="`pwd`"; \
+ filecase=; \
+ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "DJGPP" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "mingw" ]; then \
+ filecase=-i; \
+ fi; \
+ set -e; for i in doc/apps/*.pod; do \
+ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
+ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 1 < $$i`; \
+ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
+ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
+ sh -c "$$pod2man \
+ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
+ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
+ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
+ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
+ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
+ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
+ while read n; do \
+ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ done); \
+ done; \
+ set -e; for i in doc/crypto/*.pod doc/ssl/*.pod; do \
+ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
+ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 3 < $$i`; \
+ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \
+ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \
+ sh -c "$$pod2man \
+ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \
+ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \
+ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \
+ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \
+ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \
+ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \
+ while read n; do \
+ PLATFORM=$(PLATFORM) $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \
+ done); \
+ done
+
+# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/NEWS
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/NEWS 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/NEWS 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,713 +0,0 @@
-
- NEWS
- ====
-
- This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
- release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1n and OpenSSL 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
-
- o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1m and OpenSSL 1.0.1n [11 Jun 2015]
-
- o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)
- o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789)
- o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790)
- o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792)
- o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791)
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.1m [19 Mar 2015]
-
- o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286)
- o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287)
- o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289)
- o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293)
- o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209)
- o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288)
- o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1k and OpenSSL 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015]
-
- o Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1j and OpenSSL 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
-
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3571
- o Fix for CVE-2015-0206
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3569
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3572
- o Fix for CVE-2015-0204
- o Fix for CVE-2015-0205
- o Fix for CVE-2014-8275
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3570
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1i and OpenSSL 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
-
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3513
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3567
- o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability)
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3568
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
-
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3512
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3511
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3510
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3507
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3506
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3505
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3509
- o Fix for CVE-2014-5139
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3508
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
-
- o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
- o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
- o Fix for CVE-2014-0198
- o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
- o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
- o Fix for CVE-2010-5298
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
-
- o Fix for CVE-2014-0160
- o Add TLS padding extension workaround for broken servers.
- o Fix for CVE-2014-0076
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
-
- o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values
- o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353
- o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449
- o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]:
-
- o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]:
-
- o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version.
- o Include the fips configuration module.
- o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
- o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
- o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]:
-
- o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
- o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]:
-
- o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms.
- o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode.
- o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]:
-
- o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
- o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos.
- o Fix SEGV in AES code.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]:
-
- o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support.
- o SCTP support.
- o RFC 5705 TLS key material exporter.
- o RFC 5764 DTLS-SRTP negotiation.
- o Next Protocol Negotiation.
- o PSS signatures in certificates, requests and CRLs.
- o Support for password based recipient info for CMS.
- o Support TLS v1.2 and TLS v1.1.
- o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
- o SRP support.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]:
-
- o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
- o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
- o Various DTLS fixes.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]:
-
- o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]:
-
- o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
- o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
- o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
- o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027
- o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]:
-
- o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207
- o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210
- o Protection against EC timing attacks.
- o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms.
- o Various DTLS fixes.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]:
-
- o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]:
-
- o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
- o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
- o Fix mishandling of absent EC point format extension.
- o Fix various platform compilation issues.
- o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]:
-
- o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
- o Fix for CVE-2010-2939
- o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]:
-
- o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633.
- o GOST MAC and CFB fixes.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]:
-
- o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests.
- o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs.
- o Change default private key format to PKCS#8.
- o CMS support: able to process all examples in RFC4134
- o Streaming ASN1 encode support for PKCS#7 and CMS.
- o Multiple signer and signer add support for PKCS#7 and CMS.
- o ASN1 printing support.
- o Whirlpool hash algorithm added.
- o RFC3161 time stamp support.
- o New generalised public key API supporting ENGINE based algorithms.
- o New generalised public key API utilities.
- o New ENGINE supporting GOST algorithms.
- o SSL/TLS GOST ciphersuite support.
- o PKCS#7 and CMS GOST support.
- o RFC4279 PSK ciphersuite support.
- o Supported points format extension for ECC ciphersuites.
- o ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types.
- o dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256 signature types.
- o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
- o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
-
- o CFB cipher definition fixes.
- o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]:
-
- o Cipher definition fixes.
- o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions.
- o Remove MD2 from algorithm tables.
- o SPKAC handling fixes.
- o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension.
- o Compression memory leak fixed.
- o Compression session resumption fixed.
- o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes.
- o Many fixes to DTLS handling.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]:
-
- o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]:
-
- o Fix various build issues.
- o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789)
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]:
-
- o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077)
- o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]:
-
- o CryptoAPI ENGINE support.
- o Various precautionary measures.
- o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation.
- o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]:
-
- o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8.
- o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]:
-
- o Add gcc 4.2 support.
- o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization
- for VC++ build.
- o Support for RFC4507bis and server name extensions if explicitly
- selected at compile time.
- o DTLS improvements.
- o RFC4507bis support.
- o TLS Extensions support.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]:
-
- o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
- o RFC3779 support.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]:
-
- o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940)
- o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
- o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]:
-
- o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
- o New cipher Camellia
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]:
-
- o Cipher string fixes.
- o Fixes for VC++ 2005.
- o Updated ECC cipher suite support.
- o New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free().
- o Zlib compression usage fixes.
- o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32.
- o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]:
-
- o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
- o Extended Windows CE support
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]:
-
- o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to
- make operations more streamlined and less contradictory. This
- is the result of a major audit of the BIGNUM library.
- o Addition of BIGNUM functions for fields GF(2^m) and NIST
- curves, to support the Elliptic Crypto functions.
- o Major work on Elliptic Crypto; ECDH and ECDSA added, including
- the use through EVP, X509 and ENGINE.
- o New ASN.1 mini-compiler that's usable through the OpenSSL
- configuration file.
- o Added support for ASN.1 indefinite length constructed encoding.
- o New PKCS#12 'medium level' API to manipulate PKCS#12 files.
- o Complete rework of shared library construction and linking
- programs with shared or static libraries, through a separate
- Makefile.shared.
- o Rework of the passing of parameters from one Makefile to another.
- o Changed ENGINE framework to load dynamic engine modules
- automatically from specifically given directories.
- o New structure and ASN.1 functions for CertificatePair.
- o Changed the ZLIB compression method to be stateful.
- o Changed the key-generation and primality testing "progress"
- mechanism to take a structure that contains the ticker
- function and an argument.
- o New engine module: GMP (performs private key exponentiation).
- o New engine module: VIA PadLOck ACE extension in VIA C3
- Nehemiah processors.
- o Added support for IPv6 addresses in certificate extensions.
- See RFC 1884, section 2.2.
- o Added support for certificate policy mappings, policy
- constraints and name constraints.
- o Added support for multi-valued AVAs in the OpenSSL
- configuration file.
- o Added support for multiple certificates with the same subject
- in the 'openssl ca' index file.
- o Make it possible to create self-signed certificates using
- 'openssl ca -selfsign'.
- o Make it possible to generate a serial number file with
- 'openssl ca -create_serial'.
- o New binary search functions with extended functionality.
- o New BUF functions.
- o New STORE structure and library to provide an interface to all
- sorts of data repositories. Supports storage of public and
- private keys, certificates, CRLs, numbers and arbitrary blobs.
- This library is unfortunately unfinished and unused withing
- OpenSSL.
- o New control functions for the error stack.
- o Changed the PKCS#7 library to support one-pass S/MIME
- processing.
- o Added the possibility to compile without old deprecated
- functionality with the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED macro or the
- 'no-deprecated' argument to the config and Configure scripts.
- o Constification of all ASN.1 conversion functions, and other
- affected functions.
- o Improved platform support for PowerPC.
- o New FIPS 180-2 algorithms (SHA-224, -256, -384 and -512).
- o New X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure to support parametrisation
- of X.509 path validation.
- o Major overhaul of RC4 performance on Intel P4, IA-64 and
- AMD64.
- o Changed the Configure script to have some algorithms disabled
- by default. Those can be explicitely enabled with the new
- argument form 'enable-xxx'.
- o Change the default digest in 'openssl' commands from MD5 to
- SHA-1.
- o Added support for DTLS.
- o New BIGNUM blinding.
- o Added support for the RSA-PSS encryption scheme
- o Added support for the RSA X.931 padding.
- o Added support for BSD sockets on NetWare.
- o Added support for files larger than 2GB.
- o Added initial support for Win64.
- o Added alternate pkg-config files.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]:
-
- o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
- o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]:
-
- o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940)
- o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]:
-
- o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]:
-
- o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
- o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]:
-
- o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]:
-
- o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969
- o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing
- o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]:
-
- o More compilation issues fixed.
- o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API.
- o Enhanced or corrected configuration for Solaris64, Mingw and Cygwin.
- o Enhanced x86_64 assembler BIGNUM module.
- o More constification.
- o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820).
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]:
-
- o Several compilation issues fixed.
- o Many memory allocation failure checks added.
- o Improved comparison of X509 Name type.
- o Mandatory basic checks on certificates.
- o Performance improvements.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]:
-
- o Fix race condition in CRL checking code.
- o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]:
-
- o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug
- o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec()
- o Allow multiple active certificates with same subject in CA index
- o Multiple X509 verification fixes
- o Speed up HMAC and other operations
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]:
-
- o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
- o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility.
- o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code.
- o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]:
-
- o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
- Bleichbacher's attack
- o Security: make RSA blinding default.
- o Configuration: Irix fixes, AIX fixes, better mingw support.
- o Support for new platforms: linux-ia64-ecc.
- o Build: shared library support fixes.
- o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly.
- o Documentation: fixes and additions.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]:
-
- o Security: Important security related bugfixes.
- o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos.
- o Can be built without the ENGINE framework.
- o IA32 assembler enhancements.
- o Support for new platforms: FreeBSD/IA64 and FreeBSD/Sparc64.
- o Configuration: the no-err option now works properly.
- o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building.
- o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]:
-
- o New library section OCSP.
- o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code.
- o CRL checking in verify code and openssl utility.
- o Extension copying in 'ca' utility.
- o Flexible display options in 'ca' utility.
- o Provisional support for international characters with UTF8.
- o Support for external crypto devices ('engine') is no longer
- a separate distribution.
- o New elliptic curve library section.
- o New AES (Rijndael) library section.
- o Support for new platforms: Windows CE, Tandem OSS, A/UX, AIX 64-bit,
- Linux x86_64, Linux 64-bit on Sparc v9
- o Extended support for some platforms: VxWorks
- o Enhanced support for shared libraries.
- o Now only builds PIC code when shared library support is requested.
- o Support for pkg-config.
- o Lots of new manuals.
- o Makes symbolic links to or copies of manuals to cover all described
- functions.
- o Change DES API to clean up the namespace (some applications link also
- against libdes providing similar functions having the same name).
- Provide macros for backward compatibility (will be removed in the
- future).
- o Unify handling of cryptographic algorithms (software and engine)
- to be available via EVP routines for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers.
- o NCONF: new configuration handling routines.
- o Change API to use more 'const' modifiers to improve error checking
- and help optimizers.
- o Finally remove references to RSAref.
- o Reworked parts of the BIGNUM code.
- o Support for new engines: Broadcom ubsec, Accelerated Encryption
- Processing, IBM 4758.
- o A few new engines added in the demos area.
- o Extended and corrected OID (object identifier) table.
- o PRNG: query at more locations for a random device, automatic query for
- EGD style random sources at several locations.
- o SSL/TLS: allow optional cipher choice according to server's preference.
- o SSL/TLS: allow server to explicitly set new session ids.
- o SSL/TLS: support Kerberos cipher suites (RFC2712).
- Only supports MIT Kerberos for now.
- o SSL/TLS: allow more precise control of renegotiations and sessions.
- o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages.
- o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268).
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]:
-
- o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
- o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]:
-
- o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
- Bleichbacher's attack
- o Security: make RSA blinding default.
- o Build: shared library support fixes.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]:
-
- o Important security related bugfixes.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]:
-
- o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX.
- o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes.
- o Better handling of SSL session caching.
- o Better comparison of distinguished names.
- o Better handling of shared libraries in a mixed GNU/non-GNU environment.
- o Support assembler code with Borland C.
- o Fixes for length problems.
- o Fixes for uninitialised variables.
- o Fixes for memory leaks, some unusual crashes and some race conditions.
- o Fixes for smaller building problems.
- o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]:
-
- o Important building fixes on Unix.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]:
-
- o Various important bugfixes.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]:
-
- o Important security related bugfixes.
- o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]:
-
- o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
- o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]:
-
- o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
- o BIGNUM library fixes.
- o RSA OAEP and random number generation fixes.
- o Object identifiers corrected and added.
- o Add assembler BN routines for IA64.
- o Add support for OS/390 Unix, UnixWare with gcc, OpenUNIX 8,
- MIPS Linux; shared library support for Irix, HP-UX.
- o Add crypto accelerator support for AEP, Baltimore SureWare,
- Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver
- [in 0.9.6c-engine release].
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]:
-
- o Security fix: PRNG improvements.
- o Security fix: RSA OAEP check.
- o Security fix: Reinsert and fix countermeasure to Bleichbacher's
- attack.
- o MIPS bug fix in BIGNUM.
- o Bug fix in "openssl enc".
- o Bug fix in X.509 printing routine.
- o Bug fix in DSA verification routine and DSA S/MIME verification.
- o Bug fix to make PRNG thread-safe.
- o Bug fix in RAND_file_name().
- o Bug fix in compatibility mode trust settings.
- o Bug fix in blowfish EVP.
- o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter.
- o Compatibility fixes in some scripts.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]:
-
- o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using
- environment variables when running as root.
- o Security fix: check the result of RSA-CRT to reduce the
- possibility of deducing the private key from an incorrectly
- calculated signature.
- o Security fix: prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack.
- o Security fix: Zero the premaster secret after deriving the
- master secret in DH ciphersuites.
- o Reimplement SSL_peek(), which had various problems.
- o Compatibility fix: the function des_encrypt() renamed to
- des_encrypt1() to avoid clashes with some Unixen libc.
- o Bug fixes for Win32, HP/UX and Irix.
- o Bug fixes in BIGNUM, SSL, PKCS#7, PKCS#12, X.509, CONF and
- memory checking routines.
- o Bug fixes for RSA operations in threaded environments.
- o Bug fixes in misc. openssl applications.
- o Remove a few potential memory leaks.
- o Add tighter checks of BIGNUM routines.
- o Shared library support has been reworked for generality.
- o More documentation.
- o New function BN_rand_range().
- o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]:
-
- o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries.
- o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers.
- o New sign and verify options to 'dgst' application.
- o Support for DER and PEM encoded messages in 'smime' application.
- o New 'rsautl' application, low level RSA utility.
- o MD4 now included.
- o Bugfix for SSL rollback padding check.
- o Support for external crypto devices [1].
- o Enhanced EVP interface.
-
- [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate
- distribution. See the file README.ENGINE.
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]:
-
- o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8
- o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc
- o Support of Linux/IA64
- o Assembler support for Mingw32
- o New 'rand' application
- o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]:
-
- o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command
- o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application
- o Automation of 'req' application
- o Fixes to make s_client, s_server work under Windows
- o Support for multiple fieldnames in SPKACs
- o New SPKAC command line utilty and associated library functions
- o Options to allow passwords to be obtained from various sources
- o New public key PEM format and options to handle it
- o Many other fixes and enhancements to command line utilities
- o Usable certificate chain verification
- o Certificate purpose checking
- o Certificate trust settings
- o Support of authority information access extension
- o Extensions in certificate requests
- o Simplified X509 name and attribute routines
- o Initial (incomplete) support for international character sets
- o New DH_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and enhanced RSA_METHOD
- o Read only memory BIOs and simplified creation function
- o TLS/SSL protocol bugfixes: Accept TLS 'client hello' in SSL 3.0
- record; allow fragmentation and interleaving of handshake and other
- data
- o TLS/SSL code now "tolerates" MS SGC
- o Work around for Netscape client certificate hang bug
- o RSA_NULL option that removes RSA patent code but keeps other
- RSA functionality
- o Memory leak detection now allows applications to add extra information
- via a per-thread stack
- o PRNG robustness improved
- o EGD support
- o BIGNUM library bug fixes
- o Faster DSA parameter generation
- o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux
- o Experimental MacOS support
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]:
-
- o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used
- by several software packages and are more secure than the standard
- form
- o PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation
- o Password callbacks have a new void * argument for application data
- o Avoid various memory leaks
- o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O
- must be handled by the application (BIO pair)
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]:
- o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism
- o RSA OEAP related fixes
- o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate
- o Source cleanups: const correctness, type-safe stacks and ASN.1 SETs
- o Source tree cleanups: removed lots of obsolete files
- o Thawte SXNet, certificate policies and CRL distribution points
- extension support
- o Preliminary (experimental) S/MIME support
- o Support for ASN.1 UTF8String and VisibleString
- o Full integration of PKCS#12 code
- o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions
- o Option to disable selected ciphers
-
- Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]:
- o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption
- o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case
- o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers"
- o Support for Triple-DES CBCM cipher
- o Support of Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) for RSA
- o First support for new TLSv1 ciphers
- o Added a few new BIOs (syslog BIO, reliable BIO)
- o Extended support for DSA certificate/keys.
- o Extended support for Certificate Signing Requests (CSR)
- o Initial support for X.509v3 extensions
- o Extended support for compression inside the SSL record layer
- o Overhauled Win32 builds
- o Cleanups and fixes to the Big Number (BN) library
- o Support for ASN.1 GeneralizedTime
- o Splitted ASN.1 SETs from SEQUENCEs
- o ASN1 and PEM support for Netscape Certificate Sequences
- o Overhauled Perl interface
- o Lots of source tree cleanups.
- o Lots of memory leak fixes.
- o Lots of bug fixes.
-
- Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]:
- o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches
- o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer
- o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality
- o Extended Big Number (BN) library
- o Added RIPE MD160 message digest
- o Addeed support for RC2/64bit cipher
- o Extended ASN.1 parser routines
- o Adjustations of the source tree for CVS
- o Support for various new platforms
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/NEWS (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/NEWS)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/NEWS (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/NEWS 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,726 @@
+
+ NEWS
+ ====
+
+ This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
+ release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1p and OpenSSL 1.0.1q [3 Dec 2015]
+
+ o Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194)
+ o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195)
+ o Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs
+ o In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+ return an error
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1o and OpenSSL 1.0.1p [9 Jul 2015]
+
+ o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
+ o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196)
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1n and OpenSSL 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
+
+ o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1m and OpenSSL 1.0.1n [11 Jun 2015]
+
+ o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)
+ o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789)
+ o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790)
+ o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792)
+ o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791)
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.1m [19 Mar 2015]
+
+ o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286)
+ o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287)
+ o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289)
+ o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293)
+ o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209)
+ o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288)
+ o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1k and OpenSSL 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015]
+
+ o Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1j and OpenSSL 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
+
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3571
+ o Fix for CVE-2015-0206
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3569
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3572
+ o Fix for CVE-2015-0204
+ o Fix for CVE-2015-0205
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-8275
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3570
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1i and OpenSSL 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
+
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3513
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3567
+ o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability)
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3568
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3512
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3511
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3510
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3507
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3506
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3505
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3509
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-5139
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3508
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-0198
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
+ o Fix for CVE-2010-5298
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-0160
+ o Add TLS padding extension workaround for broken servers.
+ o Fix for CVE-2014-0076
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+ o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values
+ o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353
+ o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449
+ o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]:
+
+ o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]:
+
+ o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version.
+ o Include the fips configuration module.
+ o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+ o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+ o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]:
+
+ o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
+ o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]:
+
+ o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms.
+ o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode.
+ o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]:
+
+ o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+ o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos.
+ o Fix SEGV in AES code.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]:
+
+ o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support.
+ o SCTP support.
+ o RFC 5705 TLS key material exporter.
+ o RFC 5764 DTLS-SRTP negotiation.
+ o Next Protocol Negotiation.
+ o PSS signatures in certificates, requests and CRLs.
+ o Support for password based recipient info for CMS.
+ o Support TLS v1.2 and TLS v1.1.
+ o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
+ o SRP support.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]:
+
+ o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
+ o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
+ o Various DTLS fixes.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]:
+
+ o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]:
+
+ o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
+ o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
+ o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
+ o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027
+ o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]:
+
+ o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207
+ o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210
+ o Protection against EC timing attacks.
+ o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms.
+ o Various DTLS fixes.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]:
+
+ o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]:
+
+ o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
+ o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
+ o Fix mishandling of absent EC point format extension.
+ o Fix various platform compilation issues.
+ o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]:
+
+ o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
+ o Fix for CVE-2010-2939
+ o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]:
+
+ o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633.
+ o GOST MAC and CFB fixes.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]:
+
+ o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests.
+ o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs.
+ o Change default private key format to PKCS#8.
+ o CMS support: able to process all examples in RFC4134
+ o Streaming ASN1 encode support for PKCS#7 and CMS.
+ o Multiple signer and signer add support for PKCS#7 and CMS.
+ o ASN1 printing support.
+ o Whirlpool hash algorithm added.
+ o RFC3161 time stamp support.
+ o New generalised public key API supporting ENGINE based algorithms.
+ o New generalised public key API utilities.
+ o New ENGINE supporting GOST algorithms.
+ o SSL/TLS GOST ciphersuite support.
+ o PKCS#7 and CMS GOST support.
+ o RFC4279 PSK ciphersuite support.
+ o Supported points format extension for ECC ciphersuites.
+ o ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types.
+ o dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256 signature types.
+ o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
+ o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
+
+ o CFB cipher definition fixes.
+ o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]:
+
+ o Cipher definition fixes.
+ o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions.
+ o Remove MD2 from algorithm tables.
+ o SPKAC handling fixes.
+ o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension.
+ o Compression memory leak fixed.
+ o Compression session resumption fixed.
+ o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes.
+ o Many fixes to DTLS handling.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]:
+
+ o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]:
+
+ o Fix various build issues.
+ o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789)
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]:
+
+ o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077)
+ o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]:
+
+ o CryptoAPI ENGINE support.
+ o Various precautionary measures.
+ o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation.
+ o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]:
+
+ o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8.
+ o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]:
+
+ o Add gcc 4.2 support.
+ o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization
+ for VC++ build.
+ o Support for RFC4507bis and server name extensions if explicitly
+ selected at compile time.
+ o DTLS improvements.
+ o RFC4507bis support.
+ o TLS Extensions support.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]:
+
+ o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
+ o RFC3779 support.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]:
+
+ o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940)
+ o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
+ o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]:
+
+ o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
+ o New cipher Camellia
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]:
+
+ o Cipher string fixes.
+ o Fixes for VC++ 2005.
+ o Updated ECC cipher suite support.
+ o New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free().
+ o Zlib compression usage fixes.
+ o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32.
+ o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]:
+
+ o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
+ o Extended Windows CE support
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]:
+
+ o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to
+ make operations more streamlined and less contradictory. This
+ is the result of a major audit of the BIGNUM library.
+ o Addition of BIGNUM functions for fields GF(2^m) and NIST
+ curves, to support the Elliptic Crypto functions.
+ o Major work on Elliptic Crypto; ECDH and ECDSA added, including
+ the use through EVP, X509 and ENGINE.
+ o New ASN.1 mini-compiler that's usable through the OpenSSL
+ configuration file.
+ o Added support for ASN.1 indefinite length constructed encoding.
+ o New PKCS#12 'medium level' API to manipulate PKCS#12 files.
+ o Complete rework of shared library construction and linking
+ programs with shared or static libraries, through a separate
+ Makefile.shared.
+ o Rework of the passing of parameters from one Makefile to another.
+ o Changed ENGINE framework to load dynamic engine modules
+ automatically from specifically given directories.
+ o New structure and ASN.1 functions for CertificatePair.
+ o Changed the ZLIB compression method to be stateful.
+ o Changed the key-generation and primality testing "progress"
+ mechanism to take a structure that contains the ticker
+ function and an argument.
+ o New engine module: GMP (performs private key exponentiation).
+ o New engine module: VIA PadLOck ACE extension in VIA C3
+ Nehemiah processors.
+ o Added support for IPv6 addresses in certificate extensions.
+ See RFC 1884, section 2.2.
+ o Added support for certificate policy mappings, policy
+ constraints and name constraints.
+ o Added support for multi-valued AVAs in the OpenSSL
+ configuration file.
+ o Added support for multiple certificates with the same subject
+ in the 'openssl ca' index file.
+ o Make it possible to create self-signed certificates using
+ 'openssl ca -selfsign'.
+ o Make it possible to generate a serial number file with
+ 'openssl ca -create_serial'.
+ o New binary search functions with extended functionality.
+ o New BUF functions.
+ o New STORE structure and library to provide an interface to all
+ sorts of data repositories. Supports storage of public and
+ private keys, certificates, CRLs, numbers and arbitrary blobs.
+ This library is unfortunately unfinished and unused withing
+ OpenSSL.
+ o New control functions for the error stack.
+ o Changed the PKCS#7 library to support one-pass S/MIME
+ processing.
+ o Added the possibility to compile without old deprecated
+ functionality with the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED macro or the
+ 'no-deprecated' argument to the config and Configure scripts.
+ o Constification of all ASN.1 conversion functions, and other
+ affected functions.
+ o Improved platform support for PowerPC.
+ o New FIPS 180-2 algorithms (SHA-224, -256, -384 and -512).
+ o New X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure to support parametrisation
+ of X.509 path validation.
+ o Major overhaul of RC4 performance on Intel P4, IA-64 and
+ AMD64.
+ o Changed the Configure script to have some algorithms disabled
+ by default. Those can be explicitely enabled with the new
+ argument form 'enable-xxx'.
+ o Change the default digest in 'openssl' commands from MD5 to
+ SHA-1.
+ o Added support for DTLS.
+ o New BIGNUM blinding.
+ o Added support for the RSA-PSS encryption scheme
+ o Added support for the RSA X.931 padding.
+ o Added support for BSD sockets on NetWare.
+ o Added support for files larger than 2GB.
+ o Added initial support for Win64.
+ o Added alternate pkg-config files.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]:
+
+ o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
+ o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]:
+
+ o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940)
+ o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]:
+
+ o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]:
+
+ o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
+ o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]:
+
+ o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]:
+
+ o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969
+ o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing
+ o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]:
+
+ o More compilation issues fixed.
+ o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API.
+ o Enhanced or corrected configuration for Solaris64, Mingw and Cygwin.
+ o Enhanced x86_64 assembler BIGNUM module.
+ o More constification.
+ o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820).
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]:
+
+ o Several compilation issues fixed.
+ o Many memory allocation failure checks added.
+ o Improved comparison of X509 Name type.
+ o Mandatory basic checks on certificates.
+ o Performance improvements.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]:
+
+ o Fix race condition in CRL checking code.
+ o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]:
+
+ o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug
+ o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec()
+ o Allow multiple active certificates with same subject in CA index
+ o Multiple X509 verification fixes
+ o Speed up HMAC and other operations
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]:
+
+ o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
+ o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility.
+ o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code.
+ o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]:
+
+ o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
+ Bleichbacher's attack
+ o Security: make RSA blinding default.
+ o Configuration: Irix fixes, AIX fixes, better mingw support.
+ o Support for new platforms: linux-ia64-ecc.
+ o Build: shared library support fixes.
+ o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly.
+ o Documentation: fixes and additions.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]:
+
+ o Security: Important security related bugfixes.
+ o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos.
+ o Can be built without the ENGINE framework.
+ o IA32 assembler enhancements.
+ o Support for new platforms: FreeBSD/IA64 and FreeBSD/Sparc64.
+ o Configuration: the no-err option now works properly.
+ o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building.
+ o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]:
+
+ o New library section OCSP.
+ o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code.
+ o CRL checking in verify code and openssl utility.
+ o Extension copying in 'ca' utility.
+ o Flexible display options in 'ca' utility.
+ o Provisional support for international characters with UTF8.
+ o Support for external crypto devices ('engine') is no longer
+ a separate distribution.
+ o New elliptic curve library section.
+ o New AES (Rijndael) library section.
+ o Support for new platforms: Windows CE, Tandem OSS, A/UX, AIX 64-bit,
+ Linux x86_64, Linux 64-bit on Sparc v9
+ o Extended support for some platforms: VxWorks
+ o Enhanced support for shared libraries.
+ o Now only builds PIC code when shared library support is requested.
+ o Support for pkg-config.
+ o Lots of new manuals.
+ o Makes symbolic links to or copies of manuals to cover all described
+ functions.
+ o Change DES API to clean up the namespace (some applications link also
+ against libdes providing similar functions having the same name).
+ Provide macros for backward compatibility (will be removed in the
+ future).
+ o Unify handling of cryptographic algorithms (software and engine)
+ to be available via EVP routines for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers.
+ o NCONF: new configuration handling routines.
+ o Change API to use more 'const' modifiers to improve error checking
+ and help optimizers.
+ o Finally remove references to RSAref.
+ o Reworked parts of the BIGNUM code.
+ o Support for new engines: Broadcom ubsec, Accelerated Encryption
+ Processing, IBM 4758.
+ o A few new engines added in the demos area.
+ o Extended and corrected OID (object identifier) table.
+ o PRNG: query at more locations for a random device, automatic query for
+ EGD style random sources at several locations.
+ o SSL/TLS: allow optional cipher choice according to server's preference.
+ o SSL/TLS: allow server to explicitly set new session ids.
+ o SSL/TLS: support Kerberos cipher suites (RFC2712).
+ Only supports MIT Kerberos for now.
+ o SSL/TLS: allow more precise control of renegotiations and sessions.
+ o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages.
+ o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268).
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]:
+
+ o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
+ o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]:
+
+ o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
+ Bleichbacher's attack
+ o Security: make RSA blinding default.
+ o Build: shared library support fixes.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]:
+
+ o Important security related bugfixes.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]:
+
+ o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX.
+ o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes.
+ o Better handling of SSL session caching.
+ o Better comparison of distinguished names.
+ o Better handling of shared libraries in a mixed GNU/non-GNU environment.
+ o Support assembler code with Borland C.
+ o Fixes for length problems.
+ o Fixes for uninitialised variables.
+ o Fixes for memory leaks, some unusual crashes and some race conditions.
+ o Fixes for smaller building problems.
+ o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]:
+
+ o Important building fixes on Unix.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]:
+
+ o Various important bugfixes.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]:
+
+ o Important security related bugfixes.
+ o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]:
+
+ o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
+ o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]:
+
+ o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
+ o BIGNUM library fixes.
+ o RSA OAEP and random number generation fixes.
+ o Object identifiers corrected and added.
+ o Add assembler BN routines for IA64.
+ o Add support for OS/390 Unix, UnixWare with gcc, OpenUNIX 8,
+ MIPS Linux; shared library support for Irix, HP-UX.
+ o Add crypto accelerator support for AEP, Baltimore SureWare,
+ Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver
+ [in 0.9.6c-engine release].
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]:
+
+ o Security fix: PRNG improvements.
+ o Security fix: RSA OAEP check.
+ o Security fix: Reinsert and fix countermeasure to Bleichbacher's
+ attack.
+ o MIPS bug fix in BIGNUM.
+ o Bug fix in "openssl enc".
+ o Bug fix in X.509 printing routine.
+ o Bug fix in DSA verification routine and DSA S/MIME verification.
+ o Bug fix to make PRNG thread-safe.
+ o Bug fix in RAND_file_name().
+ o Bug fix in compatibility mode trust settings.
+ o Bug fix in blowfish EVP.
+ o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter.
+ o Compatibility fixes in some scripts.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]:
+
+ o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using
+ environment variables when running as root.
+ o Security fix: check the result of RSA-CRT to reduce the
+ possibility of deducing the private key from an incorrectly
+ calculated signature.
+ o Security fix: prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack.
+ o Security fix: Zero the premaster secret after deriving the
+ master secret in DH ciphersuites.
+ o Reimplement SSL_peek(), which had various problems.
+ o Compatibility fix: the function des_encrypt() renamed to
+ des_encrypt1() to avoid clashes with some Unixen libc.
+ o Bug fixes for Win32, HP/UX and Irix.
+ o Bug fixes in BIGNUM, SSL, PKCS#7, PKCS#12, X.509, CONF and
+ memory checking routines.
+ o Bug fixes for RSA operations in threaded environments.
+ o Bug fixes in misc. openssl applications.
+ o Remove a few potential memory leaks.
+ o Add tighter checks of BIGNUM routines.
+ o Shared library support has been reworked for generality.
+ o More documentation.
+ o New function BN_rand_range().
+ o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]:
+
+ o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries.
+ o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers.
+ o New sign and verify options to 'dgst' application.
+ o Support for DER and PEM encoded messages in 'smime' application.
+ o New 'rsautl' application, low level RSA utility.
+ o MD4 now included.
+ o Bugfix for SSL rollback padding check.
+ o Support for external crypto devices [1].
+ o Enhanced EVP interface.
+
+ [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate
+ distribution. See the file README.ENGINE.
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]:
+
+ o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8
+ o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc
+ o Support of Linux/IA64
+ o Assembler support for Mingw32
+ o New 'rand' application
+ o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]:
+
+ o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command
+ o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application
+ o Automation of 'req' application
+ o Fixes to make s_client, s_server work under Windows
+ o Support for multiple fieldnames in SPKACs
+ o New SPKAC command line utilty and associated library functions
+ o Options to allow passwords to be obtained from various sources
+ o New public key PEM format and options to handle it
+ o Many other fixes and enhancements to command line utilities
+ o Usable certificate chain verification
+ o Certificate purpose checking
+ o Certificate trust settings
+ o Support of authority information access extension
+ o Extensions in certificate requests
+ o Simplified X509 name and attribute routines
+ o Initial (incomplete) support for international character sets
+ o New DH_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and enhanced RSA_METHOD
+ o Read only memory BIOs and simplified creation function
+ o TLS/SSL protocol bugfixes: Accept TLS 'client hello' in SSL 3.0
+ record; allow fragmentation and interleaving of handshake and other
+ data
+ o TLS/SSL code now "tolerates" MS SGC
+ o Work around for Netscape client certificate hang bug
+ o RSA_NULL option that removes RSA patent code but keeps other
+ RSA functionality
+ o Memory leak detection now allows applications to add extra information
+ via a per-thread stack
+ o PRNG robustness improved
+ o EGD support
+ o BIGNUM library bug fixes
+ o Faster DSA parameter generation
+ o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux
+ o Experimental MacOS support
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]:
+
+ o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used
+ by several software packages and are more secure than the standard
+ form
+ o PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation
+ o Password callbacks have a new void * argument for application data
+ o Avoid various memory leaks
+ o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O
+ must be handled by the application (BIO pair)
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]:
+ o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism
+ o RSA OEAP related fixes
+ o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate
+ o Source cleanups: const correctness, type-safe stacks and ASN.1 SETs
+ o Source tree cleanups: removed lots of obsolete files
+ o Thawte SXNet, certificate policies and CRL distribution points
+ extension support
+ o Preliminary (experimental) S/MIME support
+ o Support for ASN.1 UTF8String and VisibleString
+ o Full integration of PKCS#12 code
+ o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions
+ o Option to disable selected ciphers
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]:
+ o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption
+ o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case
+ o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers"
+ o Support for Triple-DES CBCM cipher
+ o Support of Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) for RSA
+ o First support for new TLSv1 ciphers
+ o Added a few new BIOs (syslog BIO, reliable BIO)
+ o Extended support for DSA certificate/keys.
+ o Extended support for Certificate Signing Requests (CSR)
+ o Initial support for X.509v3 extensions
+ o Extended support for compression inside the SSL record layer
+ o Overhauled Win32 builds
+ o Cleanups and fixes to the Big Number (BN) library
+ o Support for ASN.1 GeneralizedTime
+ o Splitted ASN.1 SETs from SEQUENCEs
+ o ASN1 and PEM support for Netscape Certificate Sequences
+ o Overhauled Perl interface
+ o Lots of source tree cleanups.
+ o Lots of memory leak fixes.
+ o Lots of bug fixes.
+
+ Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]:
+ o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches
+ o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer
+ o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality
+ o Extended Big Number (BN) library
+ o Added RIPE MD160 message digest
+ o Addeed support for RC2/64bit cipher
+ o Extended ASN.1 parser routines
+ o Adjustations of the source tree for CVS
+ o Support for various new platforms
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/README
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/README 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/README 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
-
- OpenSSL 1.0.1o 12 Jun 2015
-
- Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
- Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
- All rights reserved.
-
- DESCRIPTION
- -----------
-
- The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
- commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
- protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
- The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
- Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its
- related documentation.
-
- OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A. Young
- and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the
- OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license) situation, which basically means
- that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial
- purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses.
-
- OVERVIEW
- --------
-
- The OpenSSL toolkit includes:
-
- libssl.a:
- Implementation of SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1 and the required code to support
- both SSLv2, SSLv3 and TLSv1 in the one server and client.
-
- libcrypto.a:
- General encryption and X.509 v1/v3 stuff needed by SSL/TLS but not
- actually logically part of it. It includes routines for the following:
-
- Ciphers
- libdes - EAY's libdes DES encryption package which was floating
- around the net for a few years, and was then relicensed by
- him as part of SSLeay. It includes 15 'modes/variations'
- of DES (1, 2 and 3 key versions of ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb;
- pcbc and a more general form of cfb and ofb) including desx
- in cbc mode, a fast crypt(3), and routines to read
- passwords from the keyboard.
- RC4 encryption,
- RC2 encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
- Blowfish encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
- IDEA encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
-
- Digests
- MD5 and MD2 message digest algorithms, fast implementations,
- SHA (SHA-0) and SHA-1 message digest algorithms,
- MDC2 message digest. A DES based hash that is popular on smart cards.
-
- Public Key
- RSA encryption/decryption/generation.
- There is no limit on the number of bits.
- DSA encryption/decryption/generation.
- There is no limit on the number of bits.
- Diffie-Hellman key-exchange/key generation.
- There is no limit on the number of bits.
-
- X.509v3 certificates
- X509 encoding/decoding into/from binary ASN1 and a PEM
- based ASCII-binary encoding which supports encryption with a
- private key. Program to generate RSA and DSA certificate
- requests and to generate RSA and DSA certificates.
-
- Systems
- The normal digital envelope routines and base64 encoding. Higher
- level access to ciphers and digests by name. New ciphers can be
- loaded at run time. The BIO io system which is a simple non-blocking
- IO abstraction. Current methods supported are file descriptors,
- sockets, socket accept, socket connect, memory buffer, buffering, SSL
- client/server, file pointer, encryption, digest, non-blocking testing
- and null.
-
- Data structures
- A dynamically growing hashing system
- A simple stack.
- A Configuration loader that uses a format similar to MS .ini files.
-
- openssl:
- A command line tool that can be used for:
- Creation of RSA, DH and DSA key parameters
- Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
- Calculation of Message Digests
- Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers
- SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests
- Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
-
-
- PATENTS
- -------
-
- Various companies hold various patents for various algorithms in various
- locations around the world. _YOU_ are responsible for ensuring that your use
- of any algorithms is legal by checking if there are any patents in your
- country. The file contains some of the patents that we know about or are
- rumored to exist. This is not a definitive list.
-
- RSA Security holds software patents on the RC5 algorithm. If you
- intend to use this cipher, you must contact RSA Security for
- licensing conditions. Their web page is http://www.rsasecurity.com/.
-
- RC4 is a trademark of RSA Security, so use of this label should perhaps
- only be used with RSA Security's permission.
-
- The IDEA algorithm is patented by Ascom in Austria, France, Germany, Italy,
- Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the USA. They
- should be contacted if that algorithm is to be used; their web page is
- http://www.ascom.ch/.
-
- NTT and Mitsubishi have patents and pending patents on the Camellia
- algorithm, but allow use at no charge without requiring an explicit
- licensing agreement: http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html
-
- INSTALLATION
- ------------
-
- To install this package under a Unix derivative, read the INSTALL file. For
- a Win32 platform, read the INSTALL.W32 file. For OpenVMS systems, read
- INSTALL.VMS.
-
- Read the documentation in the doc/ directory. It is quite rough, but it
- lists the functions; you will probably have to look at the code to work out
- how to use them. Look at the example programs.
-
- PROBLEMS
- --------
-
- For some platforms, there are some known problems that may affect the user
- or application author. We try to collect those in doc/PROBLEMS, with current
- thoughts on how they should be solved in a future of OpenSSL.
-
- SUPPORT
- -------
-
- See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details of how to obtain
- commercial technical support.
-
- If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps
- first:
-
- - Download the current snapshot from ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/
- to see if the problem has already been addressed
- - Remove ASM versions of libraries
- - Remove compiler optimisation flags
-
- If you wish to report a bug then please include the following information in
- any bug report:
-
- - On Unix systems:
- Self-test report generated by 'make report'
- - On other systems:
- OpenSSL version: output of 'openssl version -a'
- OS Name, Version, Hardware platform
- Compiler Details (name, version)
- - Application Details (name, version)
- - Problem Description (steps that will reproduce the problem, if known)
- - Stack Traceback (if the application dumps core)
-
- Report the bug to the OpenSSL project via the Request Tracker
- (http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html) by mail to:
-
- openssl-bugs at openssl.org
-
- Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
- or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
- does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
-
- Note that mail to openssl-bugs at openssl.org is recorded in the publicly
- readable request tracker database and is forwarded to a public
- mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to openssl-security at openssl.org
- (PGP key available from the key servers).
-
- HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
- ----------------------------
-
- Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
- http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
- would like to submit a patch, send it to openssl-bugs at openssl.org with
- the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
- textual explanation of what your patch does.
-
- If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
- OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
- Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
- reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
-
- Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
- OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
- can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
- compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
- features.
-
- Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
- if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt at bis.doc.gov
- (formerly BXA) with a copy to the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator;
- please take some time to look at
- http://www.bis.doc.gov/Encryption/PubAvailEncSourceCodeNofify.html [sic]
- and
- http://w3.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740.pdf (EAR Section 740.13(e))
- for the details. If "your encryption source code is too large to serve as
- an email attachment", they are glad to receive it by fax instead; hope you
- have a cheap long-distance plan.
-
- Our preferred format for changes is "diff -u" output. You might
- generate it like this:
-
- # cd openssl-work
- # [your changes]
- # ./Configure dist; make clean
- # cd ..
- # diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/README (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/README)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/README (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/README 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1q 3 Dec 2015
+
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
+ All rights reserved.
+
+ DESCRIPTION
+ -----------
+
+ The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
+ commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
+ Secure Sockets Layer (SSLv3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols as
+ well as a full-strength general purpose cryptograpic library. The project is
+ managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to
+ communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related
+ documentation.
+
+ OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young
+ and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the
+ OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to
+ get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you
+ fulfill the conditions of both licenses.
+
+ OVERVIEW
+ --------
+
+ The OpenSSL toolkit includes:
+
+ libssl.a:
+ Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS.
+
+ libcrypto.a:
+ Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but
+ not logically part of it.
+
+ openssl:
+ A command line tool that can be used for:
+ Creation of key parameters
+ Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
+ Calculation of message digests
+ Encryption and decryption
+ SSL/TLS client and server tests
+ Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
+ And more...
+
+ INSTALLATION
+ ------------
+
+ See the appropriate file:
+ INSTALL Linux, Unix, etc.
+ INSTALL.DJGPP DOS platform with DJGPP
+ INSTALL.NW Netware
+ INSTALL.OS2 OS/2
+ INSTALL.VMS VMS
+ INSTALL.W32 Windows (32bit)
+ INSTALL.W64 Windows (64bit)
+ INSTALL.WCE Windows CE
+
+ SUPPORT
+ -------
+
+ See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain
+ commercial technical support.
+
+ If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps
+ first:
+
+ - Download the current snapshot from ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/
+ to see if the problem has already been addressed
+ - Remove ASM versions of libraries
+ - Remove compiler optimisation flags
+
+ If you wish to report a bug then please include the following information in
+ any bug report:
+
+ - On Unix systems:
+ Self-test report generated by 'make report'
+ - On other systems:
+ OpenSSL version: output of 'openssl version -a'
+ OS Name, Version, Hardware platform
+ Compiler Details (name, version)
+ - Application Details (name, version)
+ - Problem Description (steps that will reproduce the problem, if known)
+ - Stack Traceback (if the application dumps core)
+
+ Email the report to:
+
+ rt at openssl.org
+
+ In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
+ take a day for the ticket to show up. (We also scan posts to make sure
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
+ this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
+ https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
+ the public openssl-dev mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to
+ openssl-security at openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
+
+ Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
+ Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
+ is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+
+ You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+ mail to rt at openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
+ keep track of it.
+
+ HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
+ ----------------------------
+
+ See CONTRIBUTING
+
+ LEGALITIES
+ ----------
+
+ A number of nations, in particular the U.S., restrict the use or export
+ of cryptography. If you are potentially subject to such restrictions
+ you should seek competent professional legal advice before attempting to
+ develop or distribute cryptographic code.
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/Makefile
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/Makefile 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/Makefile 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1059 +0,0 @@
-#
-# apps/Makefile
-#
-
-DIR= apps
-TOP= ..
-CC= cc
-INCLUDES= -I$(TOP) -I../include $(KRB5_INCLUDES)
-CFLAG= -g -static
-MAKEFILE= Makefile
-PERL= perl
-RM= rm -f
-# KRB5 stuff
-KRB5_INCLUDES=
-LIBKRB5=
-
-PEX_LIBS=
-EX_LIBS=
-EXE_EXT=
-
-SHLIB_TARGET=
-
-CFLAGS= -DMONOLITH $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
-
-GENERAL=Makefile makeapps.com install.com
-
-DLIBCRYPTO=../libcrypto.a
-DLIBSSL=../libssl.a
-LIBCRYPTO=-L.. -lcrypto
-LIBSSL=-L.. -lssl
-
-PROGRAM= openssl
-
-SCRIPTS=CA.sh CA.pl tsget
-
-EXE= $(PROGRAM)$(EXE_EXT)
-
-E_EXE= verify asn1pars req dgst dh dhparam enc passwd gendh errstr \
- ca crl rsa rsautl dsa dsaparam ec ecparam \
- x509 genrsa gendsa genpkey s_server s_client speed \
- s_time version pkcs7 cms crl2pkcs7 sess_id ciphers nseq pkcs12 \
- pkcs8 pkey pkeyparam pkeyutl spkac smime rand engine ocsp prime ts srp
-
-PROGS= $(PROGRAM).c
-
-A_OBJ=apps.o
-A_SRC=apps.c
-S_OBJ= s_cb.o s_socket.o
-S_SRC= s_cb.c s_socket.c
-RAND_OBJ=app_rand.o
-RAND_SRC=app_rand.c
-
-E_OBJ= verify.o asn1pars.o req.o dgst.o dh.o dhparam.o enc.o passwd.o gendh.o errstr.o \
- ca.o pkcs7.o crl2p7.o crl.o \
- rsa.o rsautl.o dsa.o dsaparam.o ec.o ecparam.o \
- x509.o genrsa.o gendsa.o genpkey.o s_server.o s_client.o speed.o \
- s_time.o $(A_OBJ) $(S_OBJ) $(RAND_OBJ) version.o sess_id.o \
- ciphers.o nseq.o pkcs12.o pkcs8.o pkey.o pkeyparam.o pkeyutl.o \
- spkac.o smime.o cms.o rand.o engine.o ocsp.o prime.o ts.o srp.o
-
-E_SRC= verify.c asn1pars.c req.c dgst.c dh.c enc.c passwd.c gendh.c errstr.c ca.c \
- pkcs7.c crl2p7.c crl.c \
- rsa.c rsautl.c dsa.c dsaparam.c ec.c ecparam.c \
- x509.c genrsa.c gendsa.c genpkey.c s_server.c s_client.c speed.c \
- s_time.c $(A_SRC) $(S_SRC) $(RAND_SRC) version.c sess_id.c \
- ciphers.c nseq.c pkcs12.c pkcs8.c pkey.c pkeyparam.c pkeyutl.c \
- spkac.c smime.c cms.c rand.c engine.c ocsp.c prime.c ts.c srp.c
-
-SRC=$(E_SRC)
-
-EXHEADER=
-HEADER= apps.h progs.h s_apps.h \
- testdsa.h testrsa.h \
- $(EXHEADER)
-
-ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
-
-top:
- @(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=$(DIR) all)
-
-all: exe
-
-exe: $(EXE)
-
-req: sreq.o $(A_OBJ) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- shlib_target=; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
- shlib_target="$(SHLIB_TARGET)"; \
- fi; \
- $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile.shared -e \
- APPNAME=req OBJECTS="sreq.o $(A_OBJ) $(RAND_OBJ)" \
- LIBDEPS="$(PEX_LIBS) $(LIBCRYPTO) $(EX_LIBS)" \
- link_app.$${shlib_target}
-
-sreq.o: req.c
- $(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) -o sreq.o req.c
-
-openssl-vms.cnf: openssl.cnf
- $(PERL) $(TOP)/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < openssl.cnf > openssl-vms.cnf
-
-files:
- $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
-
-install:
- @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
- @set -e; for i in $(EXE); \
- do \
- (echo installing $$i; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
- chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i ); \
- done;
- @set -e; for i in $(SCRIPTS); \
- do \
- (echo installing $$i; \
- cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$i.new; \
- chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$i.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$i ); \
- done
- @cp openssl.cnf $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new; \
- mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf
-
-tags:
- ctags $(SRC)
-
-tests:
-
-links:
-
-lint:
- lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
-
-update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
-
-depend: local_depend
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
-local_depend:
- @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
-
-dclean:
- $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
- mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
- rm -f CA.pl
-
-clean:
- rm -f *.o *.obj *.dll lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff $(EXE)
- rm -f req
-
-$(DLIBSSL):
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libssl)
-
-$(DLIBCRYPTO):
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libcrypto)
-
-$(EXE): progs.h $(E_OBJ) $(PROGRAM).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(DLIBSSL)
- $(RM) $(EXE)
- shlib_target=; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
- shlib_target="$(SHLIB_TARGET)"; \
- elif [ -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ]; then \
- FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; export CC FIPSLD_CC; \
- fi; \
- LIBRARIES="$(LIBSSL) $(LIBKRB5) $(LIBCRYPTO)" ; \
- $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile.shared -e \
- APPNAME=$(EXE) OBJECTS="$(PROGRAM).o $(E_OBJ)" \
- LIBDEPS="$(PEX_LIBS) $$LIBRARIES $(EX_LIBS)" \
- link_app.$${shlib_target}
- @(cd ..; $(MAKE) rehash)
-
-progs.h: progs.pl
- $(PERL) progs.pl $(E_EXE) >progs.h
- $(RM) $(PROGRAM).o
-
-# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
-
-app_rand.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h
-app_rand.o: app_rand.c apps.h
-apps.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs12.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-apps.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.c apps.h
-asn1pars.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
-asn1pars.o: asn1pars.c
-ca.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-ca.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h ca.c
-ciphers.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h ciphers.c
-cms.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/cms.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-cms.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h cms.c
-crl.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-crl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h crl.c
-crl2p7.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
-crl2p7.o: crl2p7.c
-dgst.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-dgst.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h dgst.c
-dh.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-dh.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h dh.c
-dsa.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
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-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-dsa.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h dsa.c
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-dsaparam.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-dsaparam.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
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-dsaparam.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-dsaparam.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-dsaparam.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-dsaparam.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
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-dsaparam.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-dsaparam.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
-dsaparam.o: dsaparam.c
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-ec.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
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-ec.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ec.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h ec.c
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-ecparam.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
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-ecparam.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-ecparam.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h ecparam.c
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-enc.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-enc.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-enc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-enc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-enc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-enc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
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-enc.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-enc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h enc.c
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-engine.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
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-engine.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
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-engine.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-engine.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h engine.c
-errstr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-errstr.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h errstr.c
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-gendh.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
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-gendh.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
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-gendh.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
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-gendh.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-gendh.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
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-genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
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-genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
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-genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
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-genrsa.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
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-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
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-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
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-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
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-nseq.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
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-nseq.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h nseq.c
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-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
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-pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h pkcs8.c
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-pkey.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
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-pkey.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-pkey.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-pkey.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-pkey.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
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-pkey.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-pkey.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-pkey.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-pkey.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-pkey.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h pkey.c
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-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
-pkeyparam.o: pkeyparam.c
-pkeyutl.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
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-rand.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
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-s_client.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-s_client.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
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-speed.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-speed.o: ../include/openssl/seed.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-speed.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-speed.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/ui.h
-speed.o: ../include/openssl/ui_compat.h ../include/openssl/whrlpool.h
-speed.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-speed.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h speed.c testdsa.h testrsa.h
-spkac.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-spkac.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
-spkac.o: spkac.c
-srp.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srp.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-srp.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h srp.c
-ts.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/ts.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ts.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h ts.c
-verify.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-verify.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
-verify.o: verify.c
-version.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/blowfish.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/des.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/des_old.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/idea.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/rc4.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-version.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h version.c
-x509.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-x509.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h x509.c
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/Makefile (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/Makefile)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/Makefile (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/Makefile 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1059 @@
+#
+# apps/Makefile
+#
+
+DIR= apps
+TOP= ..
+CC= cc
+INCLUDES= -I$(TOP) -I../include $(KRB5_INCLUDES)
+CFLAG= -g -static
+MAKEFILE= Makefile
+PERL= perl
+RM= rm -f
+# KRB5 stuff
+KRB5_INCLUDES=
+LIBKRB5=
+
+PEX_LIBS=
+EX_LIBS=
+EXE_EXT=
+
+SHLIB_TARGET=
+
+CFLAGS= -DMONOLITH $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
+
+GENERAL=Makefile makeapps.com install.com
+
+DLIBCRYPTO=../libcrypto.a
+DLIBSSL=../libssl.a
+LIBCRYPTO=-L.. -lcrypto
+LIBSSL=-L.. -lssl
+
+PROGRAM= openssl
+
+SCRIPTS=CA.sh CA.pl tsget
+
+EXE= $(PROGRAM)$(EXE_EXT)
+
+E_EXE= verify asn1pars req dgst dh dhparam enc passwd gendh errstr \
+ ca crl rsa rsautl dsa dsaparam ec ecparam \
+ x509 genrsa gendsa genpkey s_server s_client speed \
+ s_time version pkcs7 cms crl2pkcs7 sess_id ciphers nseq pkcs12 \
+ pkcs8 pkey pkeyparam pkeyutl spkac smime rand engine ocsp prime ts srp
+
+PROGS= $(PROGRAM).c
+
+A_OBJ=apps.o
+A_SRC=apps.c
+S_OBJ= s_cb.o s_socket.o
+S_SRC= s_cb.c s_socket.c
+RAND_OBJ=app_rand.o
+RAND_SRC=app_rand.c
+
+E_OBJ= verify.o asn1pars.o req.o dgst.o dh.o dhparam.o enc.o passwd.o gendh.o errstr.o \
+ ca.o pkcs7.o crl2p7.o crl.o \
+ rsa.o rsautl.o dsa.o dsaparam.o ec.o ecparam.o \
+ x509.o genrsa.o gendsa.o genpkey.o s_server.o s_client.o speed.o \
+ s_time.o $(A_OBJ) $(S_OBJ) $(RAND_OBJ) version.o sess_id.o \
+ ciphers.o nseq.o pkcs12.o pkcs8.o pkey.o pkeyparam.o pkeyutl.o \
+ spkac.o smime.o cms.o rand.o engine.o ocsp.o prime.o ts.o srp.o
+
+E_SRC= verify.c asn1pars.c req.c dgst.c dh.c enc.c passwd.c gendh.c errstr.c ca.c \
+ pkcs7.c crl2p7.c crl.c \
+ rsa.c rsautl.c dsa.c dsaparam.c ec.c ecparam.c \
+ x509.c genrsa.c gendsa.c genpkey.c s_server.c s_client.c speed.c \
+ s_time.c $(A_SRC) $(S_SRC) $(RAND_SRC) version.c sess_id.c \
+ ciphers.c nseq.c pkcs12.c pkcs8.c pkey.c pkeyparam.c pkeyutl.c \
+ spkac.c smime.c cms.c rand.c engine.c ocsp.c prime.c ts.c srp.c
+
+SRC=$(E_SRC)
+
+EXHEADER=
+HEADER= apps.h progs.h s_apps.h \
+ testdsa.h testrsa.h \
+ $(EXHEADER)
+
+ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
+
+top:
+ @(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=$(DIR) all)
+
+all: exe
+
+exe: $(EXE)
+
+req: sreq.o $(A_OBJ) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ shlib_target=; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
+ shlib_target="$(SHLIB_TARGET)"; \
+ fi; \
+ $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile.shared -e \
+ APPNAME=req OBJECTS="sreq.o $(A_OBJ) $(RAND_OBJ)" \
+ LIBDEPS="$(PEX_LIBS) $(LIBCRYPTO) $(EX_LIBS)" \
+ link_app.$${shlib_target}
+
+sreq.o: req.c
+ $(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) -o sreq.o req.c
+
+openssl-vms.cnf: openssl.cnf
+ $(PERL) $(TOP)/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < openssl.cnf > openssl-vms.cnf
+
+files:
+ $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
+
+install:
+ @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
+ @set -e; for i in $(EXE); \
+ do \
+ (echo installing $$i; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$i ); \
+ done;
+ @set -e; for i in $(SCRIPTS); \
+ do \
+ (echo installing $$i; \
+ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$i.new; \
+ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$i.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc/$$i ); \
+ done
+ @cp openssl.cnf $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new; \
+ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/openssl.cnf
+
+tags:
+ ctags $(SRC)
+
+tests:
+
+links:
+
+lint:
+ lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+
+update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
+
+depend: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
+
+dclean:
+ $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
+ mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
+ rm -f CA.pl
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.o *.obj *.dll lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff $(EXE)
+ rm -f req
+
+$(DLIBSSL):
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libssl)
+
+$(DLIBCRYPTO):
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libcrypto)
+
+$(EXE): progs.h $(E_OBJ) $(PROGRAM).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(DLIBSSL)
+ $(RM) $(EXE)
+ shlib_target=; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
+ shlib_target="$(SHLIB_TARGET)"; \
+ elif [ -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ]; then \
+ FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; export CC FIPSLD_CC; \
+ fi; \
+ LIBRARIES="$(LIBSSL) $(LIBKRB5) $(LIBCRYPTO)" ; \
+ $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile.shared -e \
+ APPNAME=$(EXE) OBJECTS="$(PROGRAM).o $(E_OBJ)" \
+ LIBDEPS="$(PEX_LIBS) $$LIBRARIES $(EX_LIBS)" \
+ link_app.$${shlib_target}
+ @(cd ..; $(MAKE) rehash)
+
+progs.h: progs.pl
+ $(PERL) progs.pl $(E_EXE) >progs.h
+ $(RM) $(PROGRAM).o
+
+# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
+
+app_rand.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+app_rand.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h
+app_rand.o: app_rand.c apps.h
+apps.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs12.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+apps.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.c apps.h
+asn1pars.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+asn1pars.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+asn1pars.o: asn1pars.c
+ca.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+ca.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h ca.c
+ciphers.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+ciphers.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h ciphers.c
+cms.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/cms.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+cms.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h cms.c
+crl.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+crl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+crl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
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+crl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
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+crl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
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+crl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h crl.c
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+crl2p7.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+crl2p7.o: crl2p7.c
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+dgst.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h dgst.c
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+enc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h enc.c
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+engine.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
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+engine.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+engine.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h engine.c
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+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
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+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
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+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
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+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
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+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+errstr.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h errstr.c
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+gendh.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+gendh.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+gendh.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
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+gendh.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
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+gendh.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+gendh.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+gendh.o: gendh.c
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+gendsa.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+gendsa.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
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+gendsa.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
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+gendsa.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
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+genpkey.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+genpkey.o: genpkey.c
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+genrsa.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
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+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+openssl.o: openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
+passwd.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/des.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/des_old.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/ui.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/ui_compat.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+passwd.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+passwd.o: passwd.c
+pkcs12.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs12.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+pkcs12.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h pkcs12.c
+pkcs7.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+pkcs7.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+pkcs7.o: pkcs7.c
+pkcs8.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs12.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+pkcs8.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h pkcs8.c
+pkey.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+pkey.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h pkey.c
+pkeyparam.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+pkeyparam.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+pkeyparam.o: pkeyparam.c
+pkeyutl.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+pkeyutl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+pkeyutl.o: pkeyutl.c
+prime.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+prime.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+prime.o: prime.c
+rand.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+rand.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h rand.c
+req.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+req.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h req.c
+rsa.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+rsa.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h rsa.c
+rsautl.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+rsautl.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h rsautl.c
+s_cb.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+s_cb.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+s_cb.o: s_apps.h s_cb.c
+s_client.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
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+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
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+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+s_client.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+s_client.o: s_apps.h s_client.c timeouts.h
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+s_server.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+s_server.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
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+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+s_time.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h s_apps.h s_time.c
+sess_id.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+sess_id.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h sess_id.c
+smime.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+smime.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+smime.o: smime.c
+speed.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/aes.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/blowfish.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/camellia.h ../include/openssl/cast.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/des.h ../include/openssl/des_old.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/idea.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md4.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/mdc2.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/modes.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rc2.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/rc4.h ../include/openssl/ripemd.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/seed.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/ui.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/ui_compat.h ../include/openssl/whrlpool.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+speed.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h speed.c testdsa.h testrsa.h
+spkac.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+spkac.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+spkac.o: spkac.c
+srp.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srp.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+srp.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h srp.c
+ts.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/ocsp.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/ts.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+ts.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h ts.c
+verify.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+verify.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+verify.o: verify.c
+version.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/blowfish.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/des.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/des_old.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/idea.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/rc4.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+version.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h version.c
+x509.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+x509.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h x509.c
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/apps.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/apps.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/apps.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2977 +0,0 @@
-/* apps/apps.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
-/*
- * On VMS, you need to define this to get the declaration of fileno(). The
- * value 2 is to make sure no function defined in POSIX-2 is left undefined.
- */
-# define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2
-#endif
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
-# include <strings.h>
-#endif
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-#include <openssl/ui.h>
-#include <openssl/safestack.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
-# include <openssl/jpake.h>
-#endif
-
-#define NON_MAIN
-#include "apps.h"
-#undef NON_MAIN
-
-#ifdef _WIN32
-static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to);
-# define rename(from,to) WIN32_rename((from),(to))
-#endif
-
-typedef struct {
- const char *name;
- unsigned long flag;
- unsigned long mask;
-} NAME_EX_TBL;
-
-static UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL;
-
-static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
- const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl);
-static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
- const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl);
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
-/* Looks like this stuff is worth moving into separate function */
-static EVP_PKEY *load_netscape_key(BIO *err, BIO *key, const char *file,
- const char *key_descrip, int format);
-#endif
-
-int app_init(long mesgwin);
-#ifdef undef /* never finished - probably never will be
- * :-) */
-int args_from_file(char *file, int *argc, char **argv[])
-{
- FILE *fp;
- int num, i;
- unsigned int len;
- static char *buf = NULL;
- static char **arg = NULL;
- char *p;
-
- fp = fopen(file, "r");
- if (fp == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- if (fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_END) == 0)
- len = ftell(fp), rewind(fp);
- else
- len = -1;
- if (len <= 0) {
- fclose(fp);
- return (0);
- }
-
- *argc = 0;
- *argv = NULL;
-
- if (buf != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
- if (buf == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- len = fread(buf, 1, len, fp);
- if (len <= 1)
- return (0);
- buf[len] = '\0';
-
- i = 0;
- for (p = buf; *p; p++)
- if (*p == '\n')
- i++;
- if (arg != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(arg);
- arg = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (i * 2));
-
- *argv = arg;
- num = 0;
- p = buf;
- for (;;) {
- if (!*p)
- break;
- if (*p == '#') { /* comment line */
- while (*p && (*p != '\n'))
- p++;
- continue;
- }
- /* else we have a line */
- *(arg++) = p;
- num++;
- while (*p && ((*p != ' ') && (*p != '\t') && (*p != '\n')))
- p++;
- if (!*p)
- break;
- if (*p == '\n') {
- *(p++) = '\0';
- continue;
- }
- /* else it is a tab or space */
- p++;
- while (*p && ((*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t') || (*p == '\n')))
- p++;
- if (!*p)
- break;
- if (*p == '\n') {
- p++;
- continue;
- }
- *(arg++) = p++;
- num++;
- while (*p && (*p != '\n'))
- p++;
- if (!*p)
- break;
- /* else *p == '\n' */
- *(p++) = '\0';
- }
- *argc = num;
- return (1);
-}
-#endif
-
-int str2fmt(char *s)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return FORMAT_UNDEF;
- if ((*s == 'D') || (*s == 'd'))
- return (FORMAT_ASN1);
- else if ((*s == 'T') || (*s == 't'))
- return (FORMAT_TEXT);
- else if ((*s == 'N') || (*s == 'n'))
- return (FORMAT_NETSCAPE);
- else if ((*s == 'S') || (*s == 's'))
- return (FORMAT_SMIME);
- else if ((*s == 'M') || (*s == 'm'))
- return (FORMAT_MSBLOB);
- else if ((*s == '1')
- || (strcmp(s, "PKCS12") == 0) || (strcmp(s, "pkcs12") == 0)
- || (strcmp(s, "P12") == 0) || (strcmp(s, "p12") == 0))
- return (FORMAT_PKCS12);
- else if ((*s == 'E') || (*s == 'e'))
- return (FORMAT_ENGINE);
- else if ((*s == 'P') || (*s == 'p')) {
- if (s[1] == 'V' || s[1] == 'v')
- return FORMAT_PVK;
- else
- return (FORMAT_PEM);
- } else
- return (FORMAT_UNDEF);
-}
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-void program_name(char *in, char *out, int size)
-{
- int i, n;
- char *p = NULL;
-
- n = strlen(in);
- /* find the last '/', '\' or ':' */
- for (i = n - 1; i > 0; i--) {
- if ((in[i] == '/') || (in[i] == '\\') || (in[i] == ':')) {
- p = &(in[i + 1]);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (p == NULL)
- p = in;
- n = strlen(p);
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
- /* strip off trailing .nlm if present. */
- if ((n > 4) && (p[n - 4] == '.') &&
- ((p[n - 3] == 'n') || (p[n - 3] == 'N')) &&
- ((p[n - 2] == 'l') || (p[n - 2] == 'L')) &&
- ((p[n - 1] == 'm') || (p[n - 1] == 'M')))
- n -= 4;
-# else
- /* strip off trailing .exe if present. */
- if ((n > 4) && (p[n - 4] == '.') &&
- ((p[n - 3] == 'e') || (p[n - 3] == 'E')) &&
- ((p[n - 2] == 'x') || (p[n - 2] == 'X')) &&
- ((p[n - 1] == 'e') || (p[n - 1] == 'E')))
- n -= 4;
-# endif
-
- if (n > size - 1)
- n = size - 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- if ((p[i] >= 'A') && (p[i] <= 'Z'))
- out[i] = p[i] - 'A' + 'a';
- else
- out[i] = p[i];
- }
- out[n] = '\0';
-}
-#else
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-void program_name(char *in, char *out, int size)
-{
- char *p = in, *q;
- char *chars = ":]>";
-
- while (*chars != '\0') {
- q = strrchr(p, *chars);
- if (q > p)
- p = q + 1;
- chars++;
- }
-
- q = strrchr(p, '.');
- if (q == NULL)
- q = p + strlen(p);
- strncpy(out, p, size - 1);
- if (q - p >= size) {
- out[size - 1] = '\0';
- } else {
- out[q - p] = '\0';
- }
-}
-# else
-void program_name(char *in, char *out, int size)
-{
- char *p;
-
- p = strrchr(in, '/');
- if (p != NULL)
- p++;
- else
- p = in;
- BUF_strlcpy(out, p, size);
-}
-# endif
-#endif
-
-int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf, int *argc, char **argv[])
-{
- int num, i;
- char *p;
-
- *argc = 0;
- *argv = NULL;
-
- i = 0;
- if (arg->count == 0) {
- arg->count = 20;
- arg->data = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * arg->count);
- if (arg->data == NULL)
- return 0;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < arg->count; i++)
- arg->data[i] = NULL;
-
- num = 0;
- p = buf;
- for (;;) {
- /* first scan over white space */
- if (!*p)
- break;
- while (*p && ((*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t') || (*p == '\n')))
- p++;
- if (!*p)
- break;
-
- /* The start of something good :-) */
- if (num >= arg->count) {
- char **tmp_p;
- int tlen = arg->count + 20;
- tmp_p = (char **)OPENSSL_realloc(arg->data,
- sizeof(char *) * tlen);
- if (tmp_p == NULL)
- return 0;
- arg->data = tmp_p;
- arg->count = tlen;
- /* initialize newly allocated data */
- for (i = num; i < arg->count; i++)
- arg->data[i] = NULL;
- }
- arg->data[num++] = p;
-
- /* now look for the end of this */
- if ((*p == '\'') || (*p == '\"')) { /* scan for closing quote */
- i = *(p++);
- arg->data[num - 1]++; /* jump over quote */
- while (*p && (*p != i))
- p++;
- *p = '\0';
- } else {
- while (*p && ((*p != ' ') && (*p != '\t') && (*p != '\n')))
- p++;
-
- if (*p == '\0')
- p--;
- else
- *p = '\0';
- }
- p++;
- }
- *argc = num;
- *argv = arg->data;
- return (1);
-}
-
-#ifndef APP_INIT
-int app_init(long mesgwin)
-{
- return (1);
-}
-#endif
-
-int dump_cert_text(BIO *out, X509 *x)
-{
- char *p;
-
- p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), NULL, 0);
- BIO_puts(out, "subject=");
- BIO_puts(out, p);
- OPENSSL_free(p);
-
- p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), NULL, 0);
- BIO_puts(out, "\nissuer=");
- BIO_puts(out, p);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- OPENSSL_free(p);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int ui_open(UI *ui)
-{
- return UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL())(ui);
-}
-
-static int ui_read(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
-{
- if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD
- && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) {
- switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
- case UIT_PROMPT:
- case UIT_VERIFY:
- {
- const char *password =
- ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password;
- if (password && password[0] != '\0') {
- UI_set_result(ui, uis, password);
- return 1;
- }
- }
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
- return UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL())(ui, uis);
-}
-
-static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
-{
- if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD
- && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) {
- switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
- case UIT_PROMPT:
- case UIT_VERIFY:
- {
- const char *password =
- ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password;
- if (password && password[0] != '\0')
- return 1;
- }
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
- return UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL())(ui, uis);
-}
-
-static int ui_close(UI *ui)
-{
- return UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL())(ui);
-}
-
-int setup_ui_method(void)
-{
- ui_method = UI_create_method("OpenSSL application user interface");
- UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open);
- UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ui_read);
- UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write);
- UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close);
- return 0;
-}
-
-void destroy_ui_method(void)
-{
- if (ui_method) {
- UI_destroy_method(ui_method);
- ui_method = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
-{
- UI *ui = NULL;
- int res = 0;
- const char *prompt_info = NULL;
- const char *password = NULL;
- PW_CB_DATA *cb_data = (PW_CB_DATA *)cb_tmp;
-
- if (cb_data) {
- if (cb_data->password)
- password = cb_data->password;
- if (cb_data->prompt_info)
- prompt_info = cb_data->prompt_info;
- }
-
- if (password) {
- res = strlen(password);
- if (res > bufsiz)
- res = bufsiz;
- memcpy(buf, password, res);
- return res;
- }
-
- ui = UI_new_method(ui_method);
- if (ui) {
- int ok = 0;
- char *buff = NULL;
- int ui_flags = 0;
- char *prompt = NULL;
-
- prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info);
- if (!prompt) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
- UI_free(ui);
- return 0;
- }
-
- ui_flags |= UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD;
- UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0);
-
- if (ok >= 0)
- ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buf,
- PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1);
- if (ok >= 0 && verify) {
- buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
- if (!buff) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
- UI_free(ui);
- OPENSSL_free(prompt);
- return 0;
- }
- ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buff,
- PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1, buf);
- }
- if (ok >= 0)
- do {
- ok = UI_process(ui);
- }
- while (ok < 0 && UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE, 0, 0, 0));
-
- if (buff) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, (unsigned int)bufsiz);
- OPENSSL_free(buff);
- }
-
- if (ok >= 0)
- res = strlen(buf);
- if (ok == -1) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "User interface error\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz);
- res = 0;
- }
- if (ok == -2) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "aborted!\n");
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz);
- res = 0;
- }
- UI_free(ui);
- OPENSSL_free(prompt);
- }
- return res;
-}
-
-static char *app_get_pass(BIO *err, char *arg, int keepbio);
-
-int app_passwd(BIO *err, char *arg1, char *arg2, char **pass1, char **pass2)
-{
- int same;
- if (!arg2 || !arg1 || strcmp(arg1, arg2))
- same = 0;
- else
- same = 1;
- if (arg1) {
- *pass1 = app_get_pass(err, arg1, same);
- if (!*pass1)
- return 0;
- } else if (pass1)
- *pass1 = NULL;
- if (arg2) {
- *pass2 = app_get_pass(err, arg2, same ? 2 : 0);
- if (!*pass2)
- return 0;
- } else if (pass2)
- *pass2 = NULL;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static char *app_get_pass(BIO *err, char *arg, int keepbio)
-{
- char *tmp, tpass[APP_PASS_LEN];
- static BIO *pwdbio = NULL;
- int i;
- if (!strncmp(arg, "pass:", 5))
- return BUF_strdup(arg + 5);
- if (!strncmp(arg, "env:", 4)) {
- tmp = getenv(arg + 4);
- if (!tmp) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Can't read environment variable %s\n", arg + 4);
- return NULL;
- }
- return BUF_strdup(tmp);
- }
- if (!keepbio || !pwdbio) {
- if (!strncmp(arg, "file:", 5)) {
- pwdbio = BIO_new_file(arg + 5, "r");
- if (!pwdbio) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Can't open file %s\n", arg + 5);
- return NULL;
- }
-#if !defined(_WIN32)
- /*
- * Under _WIN32, which covers even Win64 and CE, file
- * descriptors referenced by BIO_s_fd are not inherited
- * by child process and therefore below is not an option.
- * It could have been an option if bss_fd.c was operating
- * on real Windows descriptors, such as those obtained
- * with CreateFile.
- */
- } else if (!strncmp(arg, "fd:", 3)) {
- BIO *btmp;
- i = atoi(arg + 3);
- if (i >= 0)
- pwdbio = BIO_new_fd(i, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- if ((i < 0) || !pwdbio) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Can't access file descriptor %s\n", arg + 3);
- return NULL;
- }
- /*
- * Can't do BIO_gets on an fd BIO so add a buffering BIO
- */
- btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- pwdbio = BIO_push(btmp, pwdbio);
-#endif
- } else if (!strcmp(arg, "stdin")) {
- pwdbio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- if (!pwdbio) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Can't open BIO for stdin\n");
- return NULL;
- }
- } else {
- BIO_printf(err, "Invalid password argument \"%s\"\n", arg);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
- i = BIO_gets(pwdbio, tpass, APP_PASS_LEN);
- if (keepbio != 1) {
- BIO_free_all(pwdbio);
- pwdbio = NULL;
- }
- if (i <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Error reading password from BIO\n");
- return NULL;
- }
- tmp = strchr(tpass, '\n');
- if (tmp)
- *tmp = 0;
- return BUF_strdup(tpass);
-}
-
-int add_oid_section(BIO *err, CONF *conf)
-{
- char *p;
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp;
- CONF_VALUE *cnf;
- int i;
- if (!(p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_section"))) {
- ERR_clear_error();
- return 1;
- }
- if (!(sktmp = NCONF_get_section(conf, p))) {
- BIO_printf(err, "problem loading oid section %s\n", p);
- return 0;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) {
- cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i);
- if (OBJ_create(cnf->value, cnf->name, cnf->name) == NID_undef) {
- BIO_printf(err, "problem creating object %s=%s\n",
- cnf->name, cnf->value);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int load_pkcs12(BIO *err, BIO *in, const char *desc,
- pem_password_cb *pem_cb, void *cb_data,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
-{
- const char *pass;
- char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE];
- int len, ret = 0;
- PKCS12 *p12;
- p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL);
- if (p12 == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Error loading PKCS12 file for %s\n", desc);
- goto die;
- }
- /* See if an empty password will do */
- if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0) || PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0))
- pass = "";
- else {
- if (!pem_cb)
- pem_cb = (pem_password_cb *)password_callback;
- len = pem_cb(tpass, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, cb_data);
- if (len < 0) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Passpharse callback error for %s\n", desc);
- goto die;
- }
- if (len < PEM_BUFSIZE)
- tpass[len] = 0;
- if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, tpass, len)) {
- BIO_printf(err,
- "Mac verify error (wrong password?) in PKCS12 file for %s\n",
- desc);
- goto die;
- }
- pass = tpass;
- }
- ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, pkey, cert, ca);
- die:
- if (p12)
- PKCS12_free(p12);
- return ret;
-}
-
-X509 *load_cert(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
- const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *cert_descrip)
-{
- X509 *x = NULL;
- BIO *cert;
-
- if ((cert = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (file == NULL) {
-#ifdef _IONBF
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
- setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
-# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */
-#endif
- BIO_set_fp(cert, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- } else {
- if (BIO_read_filename(cert, file) <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", cert_descrip, file);
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (format == FORMAT_ASN1)
- x = d2i_X509_bio(cert, NULL);
- else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE) {
- NETSCAPE_X509 *nx;
- nx = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_X509), cert, NULL);
- if (nx == NULL)
- goto end;
-
- if ((strncmp(NETSCAPE_CERT_HDR, (char *)nx->header->data,
- nx->header->length) != 0)) {
- NETSCAPE_X509_free(nx);
- BIO_printf(err, "Error reading header on certificate\n");
- goto end;
- }
- x = nx->cert;
- nx->cert = NULL;
- NETSCAPE_X509_free(nx);
- } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM)
- x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(cert, NULL,
- (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, NULL);
- else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) {
- if (!load_pkcs12(err, cert, cert_descrip, NULL, NULL, NULL, &x, NULL))
- goto end;
- } else {
- BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", cert_descrip);
- goto end;
- }
- end:
- if (x == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(err, "unable to load certificate\n");
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- }
- if (cert != NULL)
- BIO_free(cert);
- return (x);
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *load_key(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
- const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip)
-{
- BIO *key = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
-
- cb_data.password = pass;
- cb_data.prompt_info = file;
-
- if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) {
- BIO_printf(err, "no keyfile specified\n");
- goto end;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) {
- if (!e)
- BIO_printf(err, "no engine specified\n");
- else {
- pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data);
- if (!pkey) {
- BIO_printf(err, "cannot load %s from engine\n", key_descrip);
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- }
- }
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
- key = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- if (key == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- goto end;
- }
- if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) {
-#ifdef _IONBF
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
- setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
-# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */
-#endif
- BIO_set_fp(key, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- } else if (BIO_read_filename(key, file) <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", key_descrip, file);
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- goto end;
- }
- if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) {
- pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(key, NULL);
- } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) {
- pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(key, NULL,
- (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
- &cb_data);
- }
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
- else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE || format == FORMAT_IISSGC)
- pkey = load_netscape_key(err, key, file, key_descrip, format);
-#endif
- else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) {
- if (!load_pkcs12(err, key, key_descrip,
- (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data,
- &pkey, NULL, NULL))
- goto end;
- }
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined (OPENSSL_NO_RC4)
- else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB)
- pkey = b2i_PrivateKey_bio(key);
- else if (format == FORMAT_PVK)
- pkey = b2i_PVK_bio(key, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
- &cb_data);
-#endif
- else {
- BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for key file\n");
- goto end;
- }
- end:
- if (key != NULL)
- BIO_free(key);
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip);
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- }
- return (pkey);
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
- const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip)
-{
- BIO *key = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
-
- cb_data.password = pass;
- cb_data.prompt_info = file;
-
- if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) {
- BIO_printf(err, "no keyfile specified\n");
- goto end;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) {
- if (!e)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "no engine specified\n");
- else
- pkey = ENGINE_load_public_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data);
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
- key = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- if (key == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- goto end;
- }
- if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) {
-#ifdef _IONBF
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
- setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
-# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */
-#endif
- BIO_set_fp(key, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- } else if (BIO_read_filename(key, file) <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", key_descrip, file);
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- goto end;
- }
- if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) {
- pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_bio(key, NULL);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- else if (format == FORMAT_ASN1RSA) {
- RSA *rsa;
- rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(key, NULL);
- if (rsa) {
- pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (pkey)
- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- } else
- pkey = NULL;
- } else if (format == FORMAT_PEMRSA) {
- RSA *rsa;
- rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(key, NULL,
- (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
- &cb_data);
- if (rsa) {
- pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (pkey)
- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- } else
- pkey = NULL;
- }
-#endif
- else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) {
- pkey = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(key, NULL,
- (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
- &cb_data);
- }
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
- else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE || format == FORMAT_IISSGC)
- pkey = load_netscape_key(err, key, file, key_descrip, format);
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
- else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB)
- pkey = b2i_PublicKey_bio(key);
-#endif
- else {
- BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for key file\n");
- goto end;
- }
- end:
- if (key != NULL)
- BIO_free(key);
- if (pkey == NULL)
- BIO_printf(err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip);
- return (pkey);
-}
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
-static EVP_PKEY *load_netscape_key(BIO *err, BIO *key, const char *file,
- const char *key_descrip, int format)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- RSA *rsa;
- const unsigned char *p;
- int size, i;
-
- buf = BUF_MEM_new();
- pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
- size = 0;
- if (buf == NULL || pkey == NULL)
- goto error;
- for (;;) {
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, size + 1024 * 10))
- goto error;
- i = BIO_read(key, &(buf->data[size]), 1024 * 10);
- size += i;
- if (i == 0)
- break;
- if (i < 0) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Error reading %s %s", key_descrip, file);
- goto error;
- }
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
- rsa = d2i_RSA_NET(NULL, &p, (long)size, NULL,
- (format == FORMAT_IISSGC ? 1 : 0));
- if (rsa == NULL)
- goto error;
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
- return pkey;
- error:
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return NULL;
-}
-#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 */
-
-static int load_certs_crls(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
- const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc,
- STACK_OF(X509) **pcerts,
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **pcrls)
-{
- int i;
- BIO *bio;
- STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *xis = NULL;
- X509_INFO *xi;
- PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
- int rv = 0;
-
- cb_data.password = pass;
- cb_data.prompt_info = file;
-
- if (format != FORMAT_PEM) {
- BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", desc);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (file == NULL)
- bio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- else
- bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r");
-
- if (bio == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", desc, file ? file : "stdin");
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- return 0;
- }
-
- xis = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio, NULL,
- (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
- &cb_data);
-
- BIO_free(bio);
-
- if (pcerts) {
- *pcerts = sk_X509_new_null();
- if (!*pcerts)
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (pcrls) {
- *pcrls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
- if (!*pcrls)
- goto end;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(xis); i++) {
- xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(xis, i);
- if (xi->x509 && pcerts) {
- if (!sk_X509_push(*pcerts, xi->x509))
- goto end;
- xi->x509 = NULL;
- }
- if (xi->crl && pcrls) {
- if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*pcrls, xi->crl))
- goto end;
- xi->crl = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- if (pcerts && sk_X509_num(*pcerts) > 0)
- rv = 1;
-
- if (pcrls && sk_X509_CRL_num(*pcrls) > 0)
- rv = 1;
-
- end:
-
- if (xis)
- sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(xis, X509_INFO_free);
-
- if (rv == 0) {
- if (pcerts) {
- sk_X509_pop_free(*pcerts, X509_free);
- *pcerts = NULL;
- }
- if (pcrls) {
- sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(*pcrls, X509_CRL_free);
- *pcrls = NULL;
- }
- BIO_printf(err, "unable to load %s\n",
- pcerts ? "certificates" : "CRLs");
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- }
- return rv;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
- const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc)
-{
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
- if (!load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, &certs, NULL))
- return NULL;
- return certs;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *load_crls(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
- const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc)
-{
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
- if (!load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, NULL, &crls))
- return NULL;
- return crls;
-}
-
-#define X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK (0xfL << 16)
-/* Return error for unknown extensions */
-#define X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT 0
-/* Print error for unknown extensions */
-#define X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN (1L << 16)
-/* ASN1 parse unknown extensions */
-#define X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN (2L << 16)
-/* BIO_dump unknown extensions */
-#define X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN (3L << 16)
-
-#define X509_FLAG_CA (X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER | X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY | \
- X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER | X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION)
-
-int set_cert_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
-{
- static const NAME_EX_TBL cert_tbl[] = {
- {"compatible", X509_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffl},
- {"ca_default", X509_FLAG_CA, 0xffffffffl},
- {"no_header", X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER, 0},
- {"no_version", X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION, 0},
- {"no_serial", X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL, 0},
- {"no_signame", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME, 0},
- {"no_validity", X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY, 0},
- {"no_subject", X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT, 0},
- {"no_issuer", X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER, 0},
- {"no_pubkey", X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY, 0},
- {"no_extensions", X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS, 0},
- {"no_sigdump", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP, 0},
- {"no_aux", X509_FLAG_NO_AUX, 0},
- {"no_attributes", X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES, 0},
- {"ext_default", X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
- {"ext_error", X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
- {"ext_parse", X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
- {"ext_dump", X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
- {NULL, 0, 0}
- };
- return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, cert_tbl);
-}
-
-int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
-{
- static const NAME_EX_TBL ex_tbl[] = {
- {"esc_2253", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253, 0},
- {"esc_ctrl", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL, 0},
- {"esc_msb", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB, 0},
- {"use_quote", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE, 0},
- {"utf8", ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT, 0},
- {"ignore_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE, 0},
- {"show_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE, 0},
- {"dump_all", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL, 0},
- {"dump_nostr", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN, 0},
- {"dump_der", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER, 0},
- {"compat", XN_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffL},
- {"sep_comma_plus", XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
- {"sep_comma_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
- {"sep_semi_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
- {"sep_multiline", XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
- {"dn_rev", XN_FLAG_DN_REV, 0},
- {"nofname", XN_FLAG_FN_NONE, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
- {"sname", XN_FLAG_FN_SN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
- {"lname", XN_FLAG_FN_LN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
- {"align", XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN, 0},
- {"oid", XN_FLAG_FN_OID, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
- {"space_eq", XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ, 0},
- {"dump_unknown", XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, 0},
- {"RFC2253", XN_FLAG_RFC2253, 0xffffffffL},
- {"oneline", XN_FLAG_ONELINE, 0xffffffffL},
- {"multiline", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
- {"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
- {NULL, 0, 0}
- };
- return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl);
-}
-
-int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg)
-{
- if (!strcasecmp(arg, "none"))
- *copy_type = EXT_COPY_NONE;
- else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "copy"))
- *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ADD;
- else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "copyall"))
- *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ALL;
- else
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-int copy_extensions(X509 *x, X509_REQ *req, int copy_type)
-{
- STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = NULL;
- X509_EXTENSION *ext, *tmpext;
- ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
- int i, idx, ret = 0;
- if (!x || !req || (copy_type == EXT_COPY_NONE))
- return 1;
- exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(req);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
- ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
- obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
- idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1);
- /* Does extension exist? */
- if (idx != -1) {
- /* If normal copy don't override existing extension */
- if (copy_type == EXT_COPY_ADD)
- continue;
- /* Delete all extensions of same type */
- do {
- tmpext = X509_get_ext(x, idx);
- X509_delete_ext(x, idx);
- X509_EXTENSION_free(tmpext);
- idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1);
- } while (idx != -1);
- }
- if (!X509_add_ext(x, ext, -1))
- goto end;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- end:
-
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
- const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl)
-{
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals;
- CONF_VALUE *val;
- int i, ret = 1;
- if (!arg)
- return 0;
- vals = X509V3_parse_list(arg);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) {
- val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i);
- if (!set_table_opts(flags, val->name, in_tbl))
- ret = 0;
- }
- sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
- const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl)
-{
- char c;
- const NAME_EX_TBL *ptbl;
- c = arg[0];
-
- if (c == '-') {
- c = 0;
- arg++;
- } else if (c == '+') {
- c = 1;
- arg++;
- } else
- c = 1;
-
- for (ptbl = in_tbl; ptbl->name; ptbl++) {
- if (!strcasecmp(arg, ptbl->name)) {
- *flags &= ~ptbl->mask;
- if (c)
- *flags |= ptbl->flag;
- else
- *flags &= ~ptbl->flag;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-void print_name(BIO *out, const char *title, X509_NAME *nm,
- unsigned long lflags)
-{
- char *buf;
- char mline = 0;
- int indent = 0;
-
- if (title)
- BIO_puts(out, title);
- if ((lflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) {
- mline = 1;
- indent = 4;
- }
- if (lflags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) {
- buf = X509_NAME_oneline(nm, 0, 0);
- BIO_puts(out, buf);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- } else {
- if (mline)
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- X509_NAME_print_ex(out, nm, indent, lflags);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- }
-}
-
-X509_STORE *setup_verify(BIO *bp, char *CAfile, char *CApath)
-{
- X509_STORE *store;
- X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
- if (!(store = X509_STORE_new()))
- goto end;
- lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
- if (lookup == NULL)
- goto end;
- if (CAfile) {
- if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, CAfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
- BIO_printf(bp, "Error loading file %s\n", CAfile);
- goto end;
- }
- } else
- X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
-
- lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
- if (lookup == NULL)
- goto end;
- if (CApath) {
- if (!X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
- BIO_printf(bp, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath);
- goto end;
- }
- } else
- X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
-
- ERR_clear_error();
- return store;
- end:
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-/* Try to load an engine in a shareable library */
-static ENGINE *try_load_engine(BIO *err, const char *engine, int debug)
-{
- ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
- if (e) {
- if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "SO_PATH", engine, 0)
- || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) {
- ENGINE_free(e);
- e = NULL;
- }
- }
- return e;
-}
-
-ENGINE *setup_engine(BIO *err, const char *engine, int debug)
-{
- ENGINE *e = NULL;
-
- if (engine) {
- if (strcmp(engine, "auto") == 0) {
- BIO_printf(err, "enabling auto ENGINE support\n");
- ENGINE_register_all_complete();
- return NULL;
- }
- if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(engine)) == NULL
- && (e = try_load_engine(err, engine, debug)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(err, "invalid engine \"%s\"\n", engine);
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (debug) {
- ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM, 0, err, 0);
- }
- ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "SET_USER_INTERFACE", 0, ui_method, 0, 1);
- if (!ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL)) {
- BIO_printf(err, "can't use that engine\n");
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- ENGINE_free(e);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- BIO_printf(err, "engine \"%s\" set.\n", ENGINE_get_id(e));
-
- /* Free our "structural" reference. */
- ENGINE_free(e);
- }
- return e;
-}
-#endif
-
-int load_config(BIO *err, CONF *cnf)
-{
- static int load_config_called = 0;
- if (load_config_called)
- return 1;
- load_config_called = 1;
- if (!cnf)
- cnf = config;
- if (!cnf)
- return 1;
-
- OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
-
- if (CONF_modules_load(cnf, NULL, 0) <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Error configuring OpenSSL\n");
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-char *make_config_name()
-{
- const char *t = X509_get_default_cert_area();
- size_t len;
- char *p;
-
- len = strlen(t) + strlen(OPENSSL_CONF) + 2;
- p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (p == NULL)
- return NULL;
- BUF_strlcpy(p, t, len);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- BUF_strlcat(p, "/", len);
-#endif
- BUF_strlcat(p, OPENSSL_CONF, len);
-
- return p;
-}
-
-static unsigned long index_serial_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a)
-{
- const char *n;
-
- n = a[DB_serial];
- while (*n == '0')
- n++;
- return (lh_strhash(n));
-}
-
-static int index_serial_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a,
- const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b)
-{
- const char *aa, *bb;
-
- for (aa = a[DB_serial]; *aa == '0'; aa++) ;
- for (bb = b[DB_serial]; *bb == '0'; bb++) ;
- return (strcmp(aa, bb));
-}
-
-static int index_name_qual(char **a)
-{
- return (a[0][0] == 'V');
-}
-
-static unsigned long index_name_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a)
-{
- return (lh_strhash(a[DB_name]));
-}
-
-int index_name_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b)
-{
- return (strcmp(a[DB_name], b[DB_name]));
-}
-
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
-#undef BSIZE
-#define BSIZE 256
-BIGNUM *load_serial(char *serialfile, int create, ASN1_INTEGER **retai)
-{
- BIO *in = NULL;
- BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
- MS_STATIC char buf[1024];
- ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL;
-
- ai = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
- if (ai == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, serialfile) <= 0) {
- if (!create) {
- perror(serialfile);
- goto err;
- } else {
- ret = BN_new();
- if (ret == NULL || !rand_serial(ret, ai))
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
- }
- } else {
- if (!a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(in, ai, buf, 1024)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load number from %s\n",
- serialfile);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ai, NULL);
- if (ret == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "error converting number from bin to BIGNUM\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (ret && retai) {
- *retai = ai;
- ai = NULL;
- }
- err:
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- if (ai != NULL)
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int save_serial(char *serialfile, char *suffix, BIGNUM *serial,
- ASN1_INTEGER **retai)
-{
- char buf[1][BSIZE];
- BIO *out = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
- ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL;
- int j;
-
- if (suffix == NULL)
- j = strlen(serialfile);
- else
- j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(suffix) + 1;
- if (j >= BSIZE) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (suffix == NULL)
- BUF_strlcpy(buf[0], serialfile, BSIZE);
- else {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", serialfile, suffix);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", serialfile, suffix);
-#endif
- }
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: writing \"%s\"\n", buf[0]);
-#endif
- out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- if (out == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- if (BIO_write_filename(out, buf[0]) <= 0) {
- perror(serialfile);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((ai = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error converting serial to ASN.1 format\n");
- goto err;
- }
- i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, ai);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- ret = 1;
- if (retai) {
- *retai = ai;
- ai = NULL;
- }
- err:
- if (out != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(out);
- if (ai != NULL)
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int rotate_serial(char *serialfile, char *new_suffix, char *old_suffix)
-{
- char buf[5][BSIZE];
- int i, j;
-
- i = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(old_suffix);
- j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(new_suffix);
- if (i > j)
- j = i;
- if (j + 1 >= BSIZE) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
- goto err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", serialfile, new_suffix);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", serialfile, new_suffix);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.%s", serialfile, old_suffix);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-%s", serialfile, old_suffix);
-#endif
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n",
- serialfile, buf[1]);
-#endif
- if (rename(serialfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT
-#ifdef ENOTDIR
- && errno != ENOTDIR
-#endif
- ) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "unable to rename %s to %s\n", serialfile, buf[1]);
- perror("reason");
- goto err;
- }
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n",
- buf[0], serialfile);
-#endif
- if (rename(buf[0], serialfile) < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], serialfile);
- perror("reason");
- rename(buf[1], serialfile);
- goto err;
- }
- return 1;
- err:
- return 0;
-}
-
-int rand_serial(BIGNUM *b, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
-{
- BIGNUM *btmp;
- int ret = 0;
- if (b)
- btmp = b;
- else
- btmp = BN_new();
-
- if (!btmp)
- return 0;
-
- if (!BN_pseudo_rand(btmp, SERIAL_RAND_BITS, 0, 0))
- goto error;
- if (ai && !BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(btmp, ai))
- goto error;
-
- ret = 1;
-
- error:
-
- if (!b)
- BN_free(btmp);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-CA_DB *load_index(char *dbfile, DB_ATTR *db_attr)
-{
- CA_DB *retdb = NULL;
- TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
- BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- CONF *dbattr_conf = NULL;
- char buf[1][BSIZE];
- long errorline = -1;
-
- if (in == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, dbfile) <= 0) {
- perror(dbfile);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", dbfile);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.attr", dbfile);
-#else
- BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-attr", dbfile);
-#endif
- dbattr_conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
- if (NCONF_load(dbattr_conf, buf[0], &errorline) <= 0) {
- if (errorline > 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "error on line %ld of db attribute file '%s'\n",
- errorline, buf[0]);
- goto err;
- } else {
- NCONF_free(dbattr_conf);
- dbattr_conf = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- if ((retdb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CA_DB))) == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- retdb->db = tmpdb;
- tmpdb = NULL;
- if (db_attr)
- retdb->attributes = *db_attr;
- else {
- retdb->attributes.unique_subject = 1;
- }
-
- if (dbattr_conf) {
- char *p = NCONF_get_string(dbattr_conf, NULL, "unique_subject");
- if (p) {
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "DEBUG[load_index]: unique_subject = \"%s\"\n", p);
-#endif
- retdb->attributes.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1);
- }
- }
-
- err:
- if (dbattr_conf)
- NCONF_free(dbattr_conf);
- if (tmpdb)
- TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
- if (in)
- BIO_free_all(in);
- return retdb;
-}
-
-int index_index(CA_DB *db)
-{
- if (!TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_serial, NULL,
- LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial),
- LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "error creating serial number index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n",
- db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (db->attributes.unique_subject
- && !TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_name, index_name_qual,
- LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name),
- LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error creating name index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n",
- db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-int save_index(const char *dbfile, const char *suffix, CA_DB *db)
-{
- char buf[3][BSIZE];
- BIO *out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- int j;
-
- if (out == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
-
- j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(suffix);
- if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
- goto err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s.attr", dbfile);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s-attr", dbfile);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, suffix);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, suffix);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", dbfile, suffix);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", dbfile, suffix);
-#endif
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: writing \"%s\"\n", buf[0]);
-#endif
- if (BIO_write_filename(out, buf[0]) <= 0) {
- perror(dbfile);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", dbfile);
- goto err;
- }
- j = TXT_DB_write(out, db->db);
- if (j <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- BIO_free(out);
-
- out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: writing \"%s\"\n", buf[1]);
-#endif
- if (BIO_write_filename(out, buf[1]) <= 0) {
- perror(buf[2]);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", buf[2]);
- goto err;
- }
- BIO_printf(out, "unique_subject = %s\n",
- db->attributes.unique_subject ? "yes" : "no");
- BIO_free(out);
-
- return 1;
- err:
- return 0;
-}
-
-int rotate_index(const char *dbfile, const char *new_suffix,
- const char *old_suffix)
-{
- char buf[5][BSIZE];
- int i, j;
-
- i = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(old_suffix);
- j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(new_suffix);
- if (i > j)
- j = i;
- if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
- goto err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof buf[4], "%s.attr", dbfile);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof buf[4], "%s-attr", dbfile);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof buf[3], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
-#else
- j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof buf[3], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
-#endif
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", dbfile, buf[1]);
-#endif
- if (rename(dbfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT
-#ifdef ENOTDIR
- && errno != ENOTDIR
-#endif
- ) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", dbfile, buf[1]);
- perror("reason");
- goto err;
- }
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", buf[0], dbfile);
-#endif
- if (rename(buf[0], dbfile) < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], dbfile);
- perror("reason");
- rename(buf[1], dbfile);
- goto err;
- }
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", buf[4], buf[3]);
-#endif
- if (rename(buf[4], buf[3]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT
-#ifdef ENOTDIR
- && errno != ENOTDIR
-#endif
- ) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[4], buf[3]);
- perror("reason");
- rename(dbfile, buf[0]);
- rename(buf[1], dbfile);
- goto err;
- }
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", buf[2], buf[4]);
-#endif
- if (rename(buf[2], buf[4]) < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[2], buf[4]);
- perror("reason");
- rename(buf[3], buf[4]);
- rename(dbfile, buf[0]);
- rename(buf[1], dbfile);
- goto err;
- }
- return 1;
- err:
- return 0;
-}
-
-void free_index(CA_DB *db)
-{
- if (db) {
- if (db->db)
- TXT_DB_free(db->db);
- OPENSSL_free(db);
- }
-}
-
-int parse_yesno(const char *str, int def)
-{
- int ret = def;
- if (str) {
- switch (*str) {
- case 'f': /* false */
- case 'F': /* FALSE */
- case 'n': /* no */
- case 'N': /* NO */
- case '0': /* 0 */
- ret = 0;
- break;
- case 't': /* true */
- case 'T': /* TRUE */
- case 'y': /* yes */
- case 'Y': /* YES */
- case '1': /* 1 */
- ret = 1;
- break;
- default:
- ret = def;
- break;
- }
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * subject is expected to be in the format /type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...
- * where characters may be escaped by \
- */
-X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
-{
- size_t buflen = strlen(subject) + 1; /* to copy the types and values
- * into. due to escaping, the copy
- * can only become shorter */
- char *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen);
- size_t max_ne = buflen / 2 + 1; /* maximum number of name elements */
- char **ne_types = OPENSSL_malloc(max_ne * sizeof(char *));
- char **ne_values = OPENSSL_malloc(max_ne * sizeof(char *));
- int *mval = OPENSSL_malloc(max_ne * sizeof(int));
-
- char *sp = subject, *bp = buf;
- int i, ne_num = 0;
-
- X509_NAME *n = NULL;
- int nid;
-
- if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values || !mval) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n");
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (*subject != '/') {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject does not start with '/'.\n");
- goto error;
- }
- sp++; /* skip leading / */
-
- /* no multivalued RDN by default */
- mval[ne_num] = 0;
-
- while (*sp) {
- /* collect type */
- ne_types[ne_num] = bp;
- while (*sp) {
- if (*sp == '\\') { /* is there anything to escape in the
- * type...? */
- if (*++sp)
- *bp++ = *sp++;
- else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "escape character at end of string\n");
- goto error;
- }
- } else if (*sp == '=') {
- sp++;
- *bp++ = '\0';
- break;
- } else
- *bp++ = *sp++;
- }
- if (!*sp) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "end of string encountered while processing type of subject name element #%d\n",
- ne_num);
- goto error;
- }
- ne_values[ne_num] = bp;
- while (*sp) {
- if (*sp == '\\') {
- if (*++sp)
- *bp++ = *sp++;
- else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "escape character at end of string\n");
- goto error;
- }
- } else if (*sp == '/') {
- sp++;
- /* no multivalued RDN by default */
- mval[ne_num + 1] = 0;
- break;
- } else if (*sp == '+' && multirdn) {
- /*
- * a not escaped + signals a mutlivalued RDN
- */
- sp++;
- mval[ne_num + 1] = -1;
- break;
- } else
- *bp++ = *sp++;
- }
- *bp++ = '\0';
- ne_num++;
- }
-
- if (!(n = X509_NAME_new()))
- goto error;
-
- for (i = 0; i < ne_num; i++) {
- if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(ne_types[i])) == NID_undef) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Subject Attribute %s has no known NID, skipped\n",
- ne_types[i]);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (!*ne_values[i]) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "No value provided for Subject Attribute %s, skipped\n",
- ne_types[i]);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID
- (n, nid, chtype, (unsigned char *)ne_values[i], -1, -1, mval[i]))
- goto error;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
- OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- OPENSSL_free(mval);
- return n;
-
- error:
- X509_NAME_free(n);
- if (ne_values)
- OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
- if (ne_types)
- OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
- if (mval)
- OPENSSL_free(mval);
- if (buf)
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
- int *badarg, BIO *err, X509_VERIFY_PARAM **pm)
-{
- ASN1_OBJECT *otmp = NULL;
- unsigned long flags = 0;
- int i;
- int purpose = 0, depth = -1;
- char **oldargs = *pargs;
- char *arg = **pargs, *argn = (*pargs)[1];
- time_t at_time = 0;
- if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy")) {
- if (!argn)
- *badarg = 1;
- else {
- otmp = OBJ_txt2obj(argn, 0);
- if (!otmp) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Invalid Policy \"%s\"\n", argn);
- *badarg = 1;
- }
- }
- (*pargs)++;
- } else if (strcmp(arg, "-purpose") == 0) {
- X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
- if (!argn)
- *badarg = 1;
- else {
- i = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(argn);
- if (i < 0) {
- BIO_printf(err, "unrecognized purpose\n");
- *badarg = 1;
- } else {
- xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
- purpose = X509_PURPOSE_get_id(xptmp);
- }
- }
- (*pargs)++;
- } else if (strcmp(arg, "-verify_depth") == 0) {
- if (!argn)
- *badarg = 1;
- else {
- depth = atoi(argn);
- if (depth < 0) {
- BIO_printf(err, "invalid depth\n");
- *badarg = 1;
- }
- }
- (*pargs)++;
- } else if (strcmp(arg, "-attime") == 0) {
- if (!argn)
- *badarg = 1;
- else {
- long timestamp;
- /*
- * interpret the -attime argument as seconds since Epoch
- */
- if (sscanf(argn, "%li", ×tamp) != 1) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing timestamp %s\n", argn);
- *badarg = 1;
- }
- /* on some platforms time_t may be a float */
- at_time = (time_t)timestamp;
- }
- (*pargs)++;
- } else if (!strcmp(arg, "-ignore_critical"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-issuer_checks"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-crl_check"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-crl_check_all"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy_check"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-explicit_policy"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-inhibit_any"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-inhibit_map"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-x509_strict"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-extended_crl"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-use_deltas"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy_print"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
- else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains"))
- flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS;
- else
- return 0;
-
- if (*badarg) {
- if (*pm)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(*pm);
- *pm = NULL;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!*pm && !(*pm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new())) {
- *badarg = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (otmp)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(*pm, otmp);
- if (flags)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(*pm, flags);
-
- if (purpose)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(*pm, purpose);
-
- if (depth >= 0)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(*pm, depth);
-
- if (at_time)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(*pm, at_time);
-
- end:
-
- (*pargs)++;
-
- if (pargc)
- *pargc -= *pargs - oldargs;
-
- return 1;
-
-}
-
-/*
- * Read whole contents of a BIO into an allocated memory buffer and return
- * it.
- */
-
-int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in)
-{
- BIO *mem;
- int len, ret;
- unsigned char tbuf[1024];
- mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- if (!mem)
- return -1;
- for (;;) {
- if ((maxlen != -1) && maxlen < 1024)
- len = maxlen;
- else
- len = 1024;
- len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, len);
- if (len <= 0)
- break;
- if (BIO_write(mem, tbuf, len) != len) {
- BIO_free(mem);
- return -1;
- }
- maxlen -= len;
-
- if (maxlen == 0)
- break;
- }
- ret = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **)out);
- BIO_set_flags(mem, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
- BIO_free(mem);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *value)
-{
- int rv;
- char *stmp, *vtmp = NULL;
- stmp = BUF_strdup(value);
- if (!stmp)
- return -1;
- vtmp = strchr(stmp, ':');
- if (vtmp) {
- *vtmp = 0;
- vtmp++;
- }
- rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ctx, stmp, vtmp);
- OPENSSL_free(stmp);
- return rv;
-}
-
-static void nodes_print(BIO *out, const char *name,
- STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes)
-{
- X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
- int i;
- BIO_printf(out, "%s Policies:", name);
- if (nodes) {
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) {
- node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
- X509_POLICY_NODE_print(out, node, 2);
- }
- } else
- BIO_puts(out, " <empty>\n");
-}
-
-void policies_print(BIO *out, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
- int explicit_policy;
- int free_out = 0;
- if (out == NULL) {
- out = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- free_out = 1;
- }
- tree = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(ctx);
- explicit_policy = X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(ctx);
-
- BIO_printf(out, "Require explicit Policy: %s\n",
- explicit_policy ? "True" : "False");
-
- nodes_print(out, "Authority", X509_policy_tree_get0_policies(tree));
- nodes_print(out, "User", X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree));
- if (free_out)
- BIO_free(out);
-}
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
-
-static JPAKE_CTX *jpake_init(const char *us, const char *them,
- const char *secret)
-{
- BIGNUM *p = NULL;
- BIGNUM *g = NULL;
- BIGNUM *q = NULL;
- BIGNUM *bnsecret = BN_new();
- JPAKE_CTX *ctx;
-
- /* Use a safe prime for p (that we found earlier) */
- BN_hex2bn(&p,
- "F9E5B365665EA7A05A9C534502780FEE6F1AB5BD4F49947FD036DBD7E905269AF46EF28B0FC07487EE4F5D20FB3C0AF8E700F3A2FA3414970CBED44FEDFF80CE78D800F184BB82435D137AADA2C6C16523247930A63B85661D1FC817A51ACD96168E95898A1F83A79FFB529368AA7833ABD1B0C3AEDDB14D2E1A2F71D99F763F");
- g = BN_new();
- BN_set_word(g, 2);
- q = BN_new();
- BN_rshift1(q, p);
-
- BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char *)secret, strlen(secret), bnsecret);
-
- ctx = JPAKE_CTX_new(us, them, p, g, q, bnsecret);
- BN_free(bnsecret);
- BN_free(q);
- BN_free(g);
- BN_free(p);
-
- return ctx;
-}
-
-static void jpake_send_part(BIO *conn, const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p)
-{
- BN_print(conn, p->gx);
- BIO_puts(conn, "\n");
- BN_print(conn, p->zkpx.gr);
- BIO_puts(conn, "\n");
- BN_print(conn, p->zkpx.b);
- BIO_puts(conn, "\n");
-}
-
-static void jpake_send_step1(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- JPAKE_STEP1 s1;
-
- JPAKE_STEP1_init(&s1);
- JPAKE_STEP1_generate(&s1, ctx);
- jpake_send_part(bconn, &s1.p1);
- jpake_send_part(bconn, &s1.p2);
- (void)BIO_flush(bconn);
- JPAKE_STEP1_release(&s1);
-}
-
-static void jpake_send_step2(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- JPAKE_STEP2 s2;
-
- JPAKE_STEP2_init(&s2);
- JPAKE_STEP2_generate(&s2, ctx);
- jpake_send_part(bconn, &s2);
- (void)BIO_flush(bconn);
- JPAKE_STEP2_release(&s2);
-}
-
-static void jpake_send_step3a(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- JPAKE_STEP3A s3a;
-
- JPAKE_STEP3A_init(&s3a);
- JPAKE_STEP3A_generate(&s3a, ctx);
- BIO_write(bconn, s3a.hhk, sizeof s3a.hhk);
- (void)BIO_flush(bconn);
- JPAKE_STEP3A_release(&s3a);
-}
-
-static void jpake_send_step3b(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- JPAKE_STEP3B s3b;
-
- JPAKE_STEP3B_init(&s3b);
- JPAKE_STEP3B_generate(&s3b, ctx);
- BIO_write(bconn, s3b.hk, sizeof s3b.hk);
- (void)BIO_flush(bconn);
- JPAKE_STEP3B_release(&s3b);
-}
-
-static void readbn(BIGNUM **bn, BIO *bconn)
-{
- char buf[10240];
- int l;
-
- l = BIO_gets(bconn, buf, sizeof buf);
- assert(l > 0);
- assert(buf[l - 1] == '\n');
- buf[l - 1] = '\0';
- BN_hex2bn(bn, buf);
-}
-
-static void jpake_receive_part(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, BIO *bconn)
-{
- readbn(&p->gx, bconn);
- readbn(&p->zkpx.gr, bconn);
- readbn(&p->zkpx.b, bconn);
-}
-
-static void jpake_receive_step1(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn)
-{
- JPAKE_STEP1 s1;
-
- JPAKE_STEP1_init(&s1);
- jpake_receive_part(&s1.p1, bconn);
- jpake_receive_part(&s1.p2, bconn);
- if (!JPAKE_STEP1_process(ctx, &s1)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- exit(1);
- }
- JPAKE_STEP1_release(&s1);
-}
-
-static void jpake_receive_step2(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn)
-{
- JPAKE_STEP2 s2;
-
- JPAKE_STEP2_init(&s2);
- jpake_receive_part(&s2, bconn);
- if (!JPAKE_STEP2_process(ctx, &s2)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- exit(1);
- }
- JPAKE_STEP2_release(&s2);
-}
-
-static void jpake_receive_step3a(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn)
-{
- JPAKE_STEP3A s3a;
- int l;
-
- JPAKE_STEP3A_init(&s3a);
- l = BIO_read(bconn, s3a.hhk, sizeof s3a.hhk);
- assert(l == sizeof s3a.hhk);
- if (!JPAKE_STEP3A_process(ctx, &s3a)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- exit(1);
- }
- JPAKE_STEP3A_release(&s3a);
-}
-
-static void jpake_receive_step3b(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn)
-{
- JPAKE_STEP3B s3b;
- int l;
-
- JPAKE_STEP3B_init(&s3b);
- l = BIO_read(bconn, s3b.hk, sizeof s3b.hk);
- assert(l == sizeof s3b.hk);
- if (!JPAKE_STEP3B_process(ctx, &s3b)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- exit(1);
- }
- JPAKE_STEP3B_release(&s3b);
-}
-
-void jpake_client_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret)
-{
- JPAKE_CTX *ctx;
- BIO *bconn;
-
- BIO_puts(out, "Authenticating with JPAKE\n");
-
- ctx = jpake_init("client", "server", secret);
-
- bconn = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- BIO_push(bconn, conn);
-
- jpake_send_step1(bconn, ctx);
- jpake_receive_step1(ctx, bconn);
- jpake_send_step2(bconn, ctx);
- jpake_receive_step2(ctx, bconn);
- jpake_send_step3a(bconn, ctx);
- jpake_receive_step3b(ctx, bconn);
-
- BIO_puts(out, "JPAKE authentication succeeded, setting PSK\n");
-
- psk_key = BN_bn2hex(JPAKE_get_shared_key(ctx));
-
- BIO_pop(bconn);
- BIO_free(bconn);
-
- JPAKE_CTX_free(ctx);
-}
-
-void jpake_server_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret)
-{
- JPAKE_CTX *ctx;
- BIO *bconn;
-
- BIO_puts(out, "Authenticating with JPAKE\n");
-
- ctx = jpake_init("server", "client", secret);
-
- bconn = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- BIO_push(bconn, conn);
-
- jpake_receive_step1(ctx, bconn);
- jpake_send_step1(bconn, ctx);
- jpake_receive_step2(ctx, bconn);
- jpake_send_step2(bconn, ctx);
- jpake_receive_step3a(ctx, bconn);
- jpake_send_step3b(bconn, ctx);
-
- BIO_puts(out, "JPAKE authentication succeeded, setting PSK\n");
-
- psk_key = BN_bn2hex(JPAKE_get_shared_key(ctx));
-
- BIO_pop(bconn);
- BIO_free(bconn);
-
- JPAKE_CTX_free(ctx);
-}
-
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-/*-
- * next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string
- * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised.
- * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success.
- * err: (maybe NULL) on failure, an error message line is written to this BIO.
- * in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi"
- *
- * returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure.
- */
-unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in)
-{
- size_t len;
- unsigned char *out;
- size_t i, start = 0;
-
- len = strlen(in);
- if (len >= 65535)
- return NULL;
-
- out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1);
- if (!out)
- return NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) {
- if (i == len || in[i] == ',') {
- if (i - start > 255) {
- OPENSSL_free(out);
- return NULL;
- }
- out[start] = i - start;
- start = i + 1;
- } else
- out[i + 1] = in[i];
- }
-
- *outlen = len + 1;
- return out;
-}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT &&
- * !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
-
-/*
- * Platform-specific sections
- */
-#if defined(_WIN32)
-# ifdef fileno
-# undef fileno
-# define fileno(a) (int)_fileno(a)
-# endif
-
-# include <windows.h>
-# include <tchar.h>
-
-static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to)
-{
- TCHAR *tfrom = NULL, *tto;
- DWORD err;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (sizeof(TCHAR) == 1) {
- tfrom = (TCHAR *)from;
- tto = (TCHAR *)to;
- } else { /* UNICODE path */
-
- size_t i, flen = strlen(from) + 1, tlen = strlen(to) + 1;
- tfrom = (TCHAR *)malloc(sizeof(TCHAR) * (flen + tlen));
- if (tfrom == NULL)
- goto err;
- tto = tfrom + flen;
-# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101
- if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, from, flen, (WCHAR *)tfrom, flen))
-# endif
- for (i = 0; i < flen; i++)
- tfrom[i] = (TCHAR)from[i];
-# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101
- if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, to, tlen, (WCHAR *)tto, tlen))
-# endif
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
- tto[i] = (TCHAR)to[i];
- }
-
- if (MoveFile(tfrom, tto))
- goto ok;
- err = GetLastError();
- if (err == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS || err == ERROR_FILE_EXISTS) {
- if (DeleteFile(tto) && MoveFile(tfrom, tto))
- goto ok;
- err = GetLastError();
- }
- if (err == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || err == ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND)
- errno = ENOENT;
- else if (err == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)
- errno = EACCES;
- else
- errno = EINVAL; /* we could map more codes... */
- err:
- ret = -1;
- ok:
- if (tfrom != NULL && tfrom != (TCHAR *)from)
- free(tfrom);
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
-/* app_tminterval section */
-#if defined(_WIN32)
-double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
-{
- FILETIME now;
- double ret = 0;
- static ULARGE_INTEGER tmstart;
- static int warning = 1;
-# ifdef _WIN32_WINNT
- static HANDLE proc = NULL;
-
- if (proc == NULL) {
- if (check_winnt())
- proc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE,
- GetCurrentProcessId());
- if (proc == NULL)
- proc = (HANDLE) - 1;
- }
-
- if (usertime && proc != (HANDLE) - 1) {
- FILETIME junk;
- GetProcessTimes(proc, &junk, &junk, &junk, &now);
- } else
-# endif
- {
- SYSTEMTIME systime;
-
- if (usertime && warning) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run "
- "this program on idle system.\n");
- warning = 0;
- }
- GetSystemTime(&systime);
- SystemTimeToFileTime(&systime, &now);
- }
-
- if (stop == TM_START) {
- tmstart.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime;
- tmstart.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime;
- } else {
- ULARGE_INTEGER tmstop;
-
- tmstop.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime;
- tmstop.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime;
-
- ret = (__int64)(tmstop.QuadPart - tmstart.QuadPart) * 1e-7;
- }
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-# include <time.h>
-
-double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
-{
- double ret = 0;
- static clock_t tmstart;
- static int warning = 1;
-
- if (usertime && warning) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run "
- "this program on idle system.\n");
- warning = 0;
- }
-
- if (stop == TM_START)
- tmstart = clock();
- else
- ret = (clock() - tmstart) / (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC;
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VXWORKS)
-# include <time.h>
-
-double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
-{
- double ret = 0;
-# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME
- static struct timespec tmstart;
- struct timespec now;
-# else
- static unsigned long tmstart;
- unsigned long now;
-# endif
- static int warning = 1;
-
- if (usertime && warning) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run "
- "this program on idle system.\n");
- warning = 0;
- }
-# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
- if (stop == TM_START)
- tmstart = now;
- else
- ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_nsec * 1e-9)
- - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_nsec * 1e-9));
-# else
- now = tickGet();
- if (stop == TM_START)
- tmstart = now;
- else
- ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)sysClkRateGet();
-# endif
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VMS)
-# include <time.h>
-# include <times.h>
-
-double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
-{
- static clock_t tmstart;
- double ret = 0;
- clock_t now;
-# ifdef __TMS
- struct tms rus;
-
- now = times(&rus);
- if (usertime)
- now = rus.tms_utime;
-# else
- if (usertime)
- now = clock(); /* sum of user and kernel times */
- else {
- struct timeval tv;
- gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
- now = (clock_t)((unsigned long long)tv.tv_sec * CLK_TCK +
- (unsigned long long)tv.tv_usec * (1000000 / CLK_TCK)
- );
- }
-# endif
- if (stop == TM_START)
- tmstart = now;
- else
- ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)(CLK_TCK);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#elif defined(_SC_CLK_TCK) /* by means of unistd.h */
-# include <sys/times.h>
-
-double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
-{
- double ret = 0;
- struct tms rus;
- clock_t now = times(&rus);
- static clock_t tmstart;
-
- if (usertime)
- now = rus.tms_utime;
-
- if (stop == TM_START)
- tmstart = now;
- else {
- long int tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK);
- ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)tck;
- }
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#else
-# include <sys/time.h>
-# include <sys/resource.h>
-
-double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
-{
- double ret = 0;
- struct rusage rus;
- struct timeval now;
- static struct timeval tmstart;
-
- if (usertime)
- getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rus), now = rus.ru_utime;
- else
- gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
-
- if (stop == TM_START)
- tmstart = now;
- else
- ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_usec * 1e-6)
- - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_usec * 1e-6));
-
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
-/* app_isdir section */
-#ifdef _WIN32
-int app_isdir(const char *name)
-{
- HANDLE hList;
- WIN32_FIND_DATA FileData;
-# if defined(UNICODE) || defined(_UNICODE)
- size_t i, len_0 = strlen(name) + 1;
-
- if (len_0 > sizeof(FileData.cFileName) / sizeof(FileData.cFileName[0]))
- return -1;
-
-# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101
- if (!MultiByteToWideChar
- (CP_ACP, 0, name, len_0, FileData.cFileName, len_0))
-# endif
- for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++)
- FileData.cFileName[i] = (WCHAR)name[i];
-
- hList = FindFirstFile(FileData.cFileName, &FileData);
-# else
- hList = FindFirstFile(name, &FileData);
-# endif
- if (hList == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
- return -1;
- FindClose(hList);
- return ((FileData.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0);
-}
-#else
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-# ifndef S_ISDIR
-# if defined(_S_IFMT) && defined(_S_IFDIR)
-# define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & _S_IFMT) == _S_IFDIR)
-# else
-# define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
-# endif
-# endif
-
-int app_isdir(const char *name)
-{
-# if defined(S_ISDIR)
- struct stat st;
-
- if (stat(name, &st) == 0)
- return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
- else
- return -1;
-# else
- return -1;
-# endif
-}
-#endif
-
-/* raw_read|write section */
-#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_INPUT_HANDLE)
-int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz)
-{
- DWORD n;
- if (ReadFile(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL))
- return (n);
- else
- return (-1);
-}
-#else
-int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz)
-{
- return read(fileno(stdin), buf, siz);
-}
-#endif
-
-#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE)
-int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz)
-{
- DWORD n;
- if (WriteFile(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL))
- return (n);
- else
- return (-1);
-}
-#else
-int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz)
-{
- return write(fileno(stdout), buf, siz);
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/apps.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/apps.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/apps.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/apps.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2978 @@
+/* apps/apps.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+/*
+ * On VMS, you need to define this to get the declaration of fileno(). The
+ * value 2 is to make sure no function defined in POSIX-2 is left undefined.
+ */
+# define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+# include <openssl/jpake.h>
+#endif
+
+#define NON_MAIN
+#include "apps.h"
+#undef NON_MAIN
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to);
+# define rename(from,to) WIN32_rename((from),(to))
+#endif
+
+typedef struct {
+ const char *name;
+ unsigned long flag;
+ unsigned long mask;
+} NAME_EX_TBL;
+
+static UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL;
+
+static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
+ const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl);
+static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
+ const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+/* Looks like this stuff is worth moving into separate function */
+static EVP_PKEY *load_netscape_key(BIO *err, BIO *key, const char *file,
+ const char *key_descrip, int format);
+#endif
+
+int app_init(long mesgwin);
+#ifdef undef /* never finished - probably never will be
+ * :-) */
+int args_from_file(char *file, int *argc, char **argv[])
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ int num, i;
+ unsigned int len;
+ static char *buf = NULL;
+ static char **arg = NULL;
+ char *p;
+
+ fp = fopen(file, "r");
+ if (fp == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_END) == 0)
+ len = ftell(fp), rewind(fp);
+ else
+ len = -1;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ *argc = 0;
+ *argv = NULL;
+
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ len = fread(buf, 1, len, fp);
+ if (len <= 1)
+ return (0);
+ buf[len] = '\0';
+
+ i = 0;
+ for (p = buf; *p; p++)
+ if (*p == '\n')
+ i++;
+ if (arg != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(arg);
+ arg = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (i * 2));
+
+ *argv = arg;
+ num = 0;
+ p = buf;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (!*p)
+ break;
+ if (*p == '#') { /* comment line */
+ while (*p && (*p != '\n'))
+ p++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* else we have a line */
+ *(arg++) = p;
+ num++;
+ while (*p && ((*p != ' ') && (*p != '\t') && (*p != '\n')))
+ p++;
+ if (!*p)
+ break;
+ if (*p == '\n') {
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* else it is a tab or space */
+ p++;
+ while (*p && ((*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t') || (*p == '\n')))
+ p++;
+ if (!*p)
+ break;
+ if (*p == '\n') {
+ p++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ *(arg++) = p++;
+ num++;
+ while (*p && (*p != '\n'))
+ p++;
+ if (!*p)
+ break;
+ /* else *p == '\n' */
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+ }
+ *argc = num;
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+int str2fmt(char *s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return FORMAT_UNDEF;
+ if ((*s == 'D') || (*s == 'd'))
+ return (FORMAT_ASN1);
+ else if ((*s == 'T') || (*s == 't'))
+ return (FORMAT_TEXT);
+ else if ((*s == 'N') || (*s == 'n'))
+ return (FORMAT_NETSCAPE);
+ else if ((*s == 'S') || (*s == 's'))
+ return (FORMAT_SMIME);
+ else if ((*s == 'M') || (*s == 'm'))
+ return (FORMAT_MSBLOB);
+ else if ((*s == '1')
+ || (strcmp(s, "PKCS12") == 0) || (strcmp(s, "pkcs12") == 0)
+ || (strcmp(s, "P12") == 0) || (strcmp(s, "p12") == 0))
+ return (FORMAT_PKCS12);
+ else if ((*s == 'E') || (*s == 'e'))
+ return (FORMAT_ENGINE);
+ else if ((*s == 'P') || (*s == 'p')) {
+ if (s[1] == 'V' || s[1] == 'v')
+ return FORMAT_PVK;
+ else
+ return (FORMAT_PEM);
+ } else
+ return (FORMAT_UNDEF);
+}
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+void program_name(char *in, char *out, int size)
+{
+ int i, n;
+ char *p = NULL;
+
+ n = strlen(in);
+ /* find the last '/', '\' or ':' */
+ for (i = n - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+ if ((in[i] == '/') || (in[i] == '\\') || (in[i] == ':')) {
+ p = &(in[i + 1]);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = in;
+ n = strlen(p);
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+ /* strip off trailing .nlm if present. */
+ if ((n > 4) && (p[n - 4] == '.') &&
+ ((p[n - 3] == 'n') || (p[n - 3] == 'N')) &&
+ ((p[n - 2] == 'l') || (p[n - 2] == 'L')) &&
+ ((p[n - 1] == 'm') || (p[n - 1] == 'M')))
+ n -= 4;
+# else
+ /* strip off trailing .exe if present. */
+ if ((n > 4) && (p[n - 4] == '.') &&
+ ((p[n - 3] == 'e') || (p[n - 3] == 'E')) &&
+ ((p[n - 2] == 'x') || (p[n - 2] == 'X')) &&
+ ((p[n - 1] == 'e') || (p[n - 1] == 'E')))
+ n -= 4;
+# endif
+
+ if (n > size - 1)
+ n = size - 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if ((p[i] >= 'A') && (p[i] <= 'Z'))
+ out[i] = p[i] - 'A' + 'a';
+ else
+ out[i] = p[i];
+ }
+ out[n] = '\0';
+}
+#else
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+void program_name(char *in, char *out, int size)
+{
+ char *p = in, *q;
+ char *chars = ":]>";
+
+ while (*chars != '\0') {
+ q = strrchr(p, *chars);
+ if (q > p)
+ p = q + 1;
+ chars++;
+ }
+
+ q = strrchr(p, '.');
+ if (q == NULL)
+ q = p + strlen(p);
+ strncpy(out, p, size - 1);
+ if (q - p >= size) {
+ out[size - 1] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ out[q - p] = '\0';
+ }
+}
+# else
+void program_name(char *in, char *out, int size)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ p = strrchr(in, '/');
+ if (p != NULL)
+ p++;
+ else
+ p = in;
+ BUF_strlcpy(out, p, size);
+}
+# endif
+#endif
+
+int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf, int *argc, char **argv[])
+{
+ int num, i;
+ char *p;
+
+ *argc = 0;
+ *argv = NULL;
+
+ i = 0;
+ if (arg->count == 0) {
+ arg->count = 20;
+ arg->data = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * arg->count);
+ if (arg->data == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < arg->count; i++)
+ arg->data[i] = NULL;
+
+ num = 0;
+ p = buf;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* first scan over white space */
+ if (!*p)
+ break;
+ while (*p && ((*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t') || (*p == '\n')))
+ p++;
+ if (!*p)
+ break;
+
+ /* The start of something good :-) */
+ if (num >= arg->count) {
+ char **tmp_p;
+ int tlen = arg->count + 20;
+ tmp_p = (char **)OPENSSL_realloc(arg->data,
+ sizeof(char *) * tlen);
+ if (tmp_p == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ arg->data = tmp_p;
+ arg->count = tlen;
+ /* initialize newly allocated data */
+ for (i = num; i < arg->count; i++)
+ arg->data[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ arg->data[num++] = p;
+
+ /* now look for the end of this */
+ if ((*p == '\'') || (*p == '\"')) { /* scan for closing quote */
+ i = *(p++);
+ arg->data[num - 1]++; /* jump over quote */
+ while (*p && (*p != i))
+ p++;
+ *p = '\0';
+ } else {
+ while (*p && ((*p != ' ') && (*p != '\t') && (*p != '\n')))
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == '\0')
+ p--;
+ else
+ *p = '\0';
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+ *argc = num;
+ *argv = arg->data;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#ifndef APP_INIT
+int app_init(long mesgwin)
+{
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+int dump_cert_text(BIO *out, X509 *x)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), NULL, 0);
+ BIO_puts(out, "subject=");
+ BIO_puts(out, p);
+ OPENSSL_free(p);
+
+ p = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), NULL, 0);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\nissuer=");
+ BIO_puts(out, p);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ OPENSSL_free(p);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ui_open(UI *ui)
+{
+ return UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL())(ui);
+}
+
+static int ui_read(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+ if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD
+ && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) {
+ switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
+ case UIT_PROMPT:
+ case UIT_VERIFY:
+ {
+ const char *password =
+ ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password;
+ if (password && password[0] != '\0') {
+ UI_set_result(ui, uis, password);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL())(ui, uis);
+}
+
+static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+ if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD
+ && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) {
+ switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
+ case UIT_PROMPT:
+ case UIT_VERIFY:
+ {
+ const char *password =
+ ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password;
+ if (password && password[0] != '\0')
+ return 1;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL())(ui, uis);
+}
+
+static int ui_close(UI *ui)
+{
+ return UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL())(ui);
+}
+
+int setup_ui_method(void)
+{
+ ui_method = UI_create_method("OpenSSL application user interface");
+ UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open);
+ UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ui_read);
+ UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write);
+ UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void destroy_ui_method(void)
+{
+ if (ui_method) {
+ UI_destroy_method(ui_method);
+ ui_method = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
+{
+ UI *ui = NULL;
+ int res = 0;
+ const char *prompt_info = NULL;
+ const char *password = NULL;
+ PW_CB_DATA *cb_data = (PW_CB_DATA *)cb_tmp;
+
+ if (cb_data) {
+ if (cb_data->password)
+ password = cb_data->password;
+ if (cb_data->prompt_info)
+ prompt_info = cb_data->prompt_info;
+ }
+
+ if (password) {
+ res = strlen(password);
+ if (res > bufsiz)
+ res = bufsiz;
+ memcpy(buf, password, res);
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ ui = UI_new_method(ui_method);
+ if (ui) {
+ int ok = 0;
+ char *buff = NULL;
+ int ui_flags = 0;
+ char *prompt = NULL;
+
+ prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info);
+ if (!prompt) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+ UI_free(ui);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ui_flags |= UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD;
+ UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0);
+
+ if (ok >= 0)
+ ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buf,
+ PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1);
+ if (ok >= 0 && verify) {
+ buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
+ if (!buff) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+ UI_free(ui);
+ OPENSSL_free(prompt);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buff,
+ PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1, buf);
+ }
+ if (ok >= 0)
+ do {
+ ok = UI_process(ui);
+ }
+ while (ok < 0 && UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE, 0, 0, 0));
+
+ if (buff) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, (unsigned int)bufsiz);
+ OPENSSL_free(buff);
+ }
+
+ if (ok >= 0)
+ res = strlen(buf);
+ if (ok == -1) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "User interface error\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz);
+ res = 0;
+ }
+ if (ok == -2) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "aborted!\n");
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz);
+ res = 0;
+ }
+ UI_free(ui);
+ OPENSSL_free(prompt);
+ }
+ return res;
+}
+
+static char *app_get_pass(BIO *err, char *arg, int keepbio);
+
+int app_passwd(BIO *err, char *arg1, char *arg2, char **pass1, char **pass2)
+{
+ int same;
+ if (!arg2 || !arg1 || strcmp(arg1, arg2))
+ same = 0;
+ else
+ same = 1;
+ if (arg1) {
+ *pass1 = app_get_pass(err, arg1, same);
+ if (!*pass1)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (pass1)
+ *pass1 = NULL;
+ if (arg2) {
+ *pass2 = app_get_pass(err, arg2, same ? 2 : 0);
+ if (!*pass2)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (pass2)
+ *pass2 = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static char *app_get_pass(BIO *err, char *arg, int keepbio)
+{
+ char *tmp, tpass[APP_PASS_LEN];
+ static BIO *pwdbio = NULL;
+ int i;
+ if (!strncmp(arg, "pass:", 5))
+ return BUF_strdup(arg + 5);
+ if (!strncmp(arg, "env:", 4)) {
+ tmp = getenv(arg + 4);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Can't read environment variable %s\n", arg + 4);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return BUF_strdup(tmp);
+ }
+ if (!keepbio || !pwdbio) {
+ if (!strncmp(arg, "file:", 5)) {
+ pwdbio = BIO_new_file(arg + 5, "r");
+ if (!pwdbio) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Can't open file %s\n", arg + 5);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#if !defined(_WIN32)
+ /*
+ * Under _WIN32, which covers even Win64 and CE, file
+ * descriptors referenced by BIO_s_fd are not inherited
+ * by child process and therefore below is not an option.
+ * It could have been an option if bss_fd.c was operating
+ * on real Windows descriptors, such as those obtained
+ * with CreateFile.
+ */
+ } else if (!strncmp(arg, "fd:", 3)) {
+ BIO *btmp;
+ i = atoi(arg + 3);
+ if (i >= 0)
+ pwdbio = BIO_new_fd(i, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ if ((i < 0) || !pwdbio) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Can't access file descriptor %s\n", arg + 3);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Can't do BIO_gets on an fd BIO so add a buffering BIO
+ */
+ btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ pwdbio = BIO_push(btmp, pwdbio);
+#endif
+ } else if (!strcmp(arg, "stdin")) {
+ pwdbio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ if (!pwdbio) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Can't open BIO for stdin\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Invalid password argument \"%s\"\n", arg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ i = BIO_gets(pwdbio, tpass, APP_PASS_LEN);
+ if (keepbio != 1) {
+ BIO_free_all(pwdbio);
+ pwdbio = NULL;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error reading password from BIO\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ tmp = strchr(tpass, '\n');
+ if (tmp)
+ *tmp = 0;
+ return BUF_strdup(tpass);
+}
+
+int add_oid_section(BIO *err, CONF *conf)
+{
+ char *p;
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp;
+ CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+ int i;
+ if (!(p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_section"))) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!(sktmp = NCONF_get_section(conf, p))) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "problem loading oid section %s\n", p);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) {
+ cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i);
+ if (OBJ_create(cnf->value, cnf->name, cnf->name) == NID_undef) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "problem creating object %s=%s\n",
+ cnf->name, cnf->value);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int load_pkcs12(BIO *err, BIO *in, const char *desc,
+ pem_password_cb *pem_cb, void *cb_data,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
+{
+ const char *pass;
+ char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+ int len, ret = 0;
+ PKCS12 *p12;
+ p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL);
+ if (p12 == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error loading PKCS12 file for %s\n", desc);
+ goto die;
+ }
+ /* See if an empty password will do */
+ if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0) || PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0))
+ pass = "";
+ else {
+ if (!pem_cb)
+ pem_cb = (pem_password_cb *)password_callback;
+ len = pem_cb(tpass, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, cb_data);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Passpharse callback error for %s\n", desc);
+ goto die;
+ }
+ if (len < PEM_BUFSIZE)
+ tpass[len] = 0;
+ if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, tpass, len)) {
+ BIO_printf(err,
+ "Mac verify error (wrong password?) in PKCS12 file for %s\n",
+ desc);
+ goto die;
+ }
+ pass = tpass;
+ }
+ ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, pkey, cert, ca);
+ die:
+ if (p12)
+ PKCS12_free(p12);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+X509 *load_cert(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
+ const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *cert_descrip)
+{
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ BIO *cert;
+
+ if ((cert = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (file == NULL) {
+#ifdef _IONBF
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
+ setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */
+#endif
+ BIO_set_fp(cert, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ } else {
+ if (BIO_read_filename(cert, file) <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", cert_descrip, file);
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (format == FORMAT_ASN1)
+ x = d2i_X509_bio(cert, NULL);
+ else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE) {
+ NETSCAPE_X509 *nx;
+ nx = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_X509), cert, NULL);
+ if (nx == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ if ((strncmp(NETSCAPE_CERT_HDR, (char *)nx->header->data,
+ nx->header->length) != 0)) {
+ NETSCAPE_X509_free(nx);
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error reading header on certificate\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ x = nx->cert;
+ nx->cert = NULL;
+ NETSCAPE_X509_free(nx);
+ } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM)
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(cert, NULL,
+ (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, NULL);
+ else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) {
+ if (!load_pkcs12(err, cert, cert_descrip, NULL, NULL, NULL, &x, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", cert_descrip);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ end:
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "unable to load certificate\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ }
+ if (cert != NULL)
+ BIO_free(cert);
+ return (x);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *load_key(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
+ const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip)
+{
+ BIO *key = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
+
+ cb_data.password = pass;
+ cb_data.prompt_info = file;
+
+ if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "no keyfile specified\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) {
+ if (!e)
+ BIO_printf(err, "no engine specified\n");
+ else {
+ pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data);
+ if (!pkey) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "cannot load %s from engine\n", key_descrip);
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ }
+ }
+ goto end;
+ }
+#endif
+ key = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) {
+#ifdef _IONBF
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
+ setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */
+#endif
+ BIO_set_fp(key, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ } else if (BIO_read_filename(key, file) <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", key_descrip, file);
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+ pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(key, NULL);
+ } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) {
+ pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(key, NULL,
+ (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+ &cb_data);
+ }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+ else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE || format == FORMAT_IISSGC)
+ pkey = load_netscape_key(err, key, file, key_descrip, format);
+#endif
+ else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) {
+ if (!load_pkcs12(err, key, key_descrip,
+ (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data,
+ &pkey, NULL, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined (OPENSSL_NO_RC4)
+ else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB)
+ pkey = b2i_PrivateKey_bio(key);
+ else if (format == FORMAT_PVK)
+ pkey = b2i_PVK_bio(key, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+ &cb_data);
+#endif
+ else {
+ BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for key file\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ end:
+ if (key != NULL)
+ BIO_free(key);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip);
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ }
+ return (pkey);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
+ const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip)
+{
+ BIO *key = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
+
+ cb_data.password = pass;
+ cb_data.prompt_info = file;
+
+ if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "no keyfile specified\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) {
+ if (!e)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "no engine specified\n");
+ else
+ pkey = ENGINE_load_public_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data);
+ goto end;
+ }
+#endif
+ key = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) {
+#ifdef _IONBF
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
+ setvbuf(stdin, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */
+#endif
+ BIO_set_fp(key, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ } else if (BIO_read_filename(key, file) <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", key_descrip, file);
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+ pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_bio(key, NULL);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (format == FORMAT_ASN1RSA) {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(key, NULL);
+ if (rsa) {
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ } else
+ pkey = NULL;
+ } else if (format == FORMAT_PEMRSA) {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(key, NULL,
+ (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+ &cb_data);
+ if (rsa) {
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ } else
+ pkey = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) {
+ pkey = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(key, NULL,
+ (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+ &cb_data);
+ }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+ else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE || format == FORMAT_IISSGC)
+ pkey = load_netscape_key(err, key, file, key_descrip, format);
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
+ else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB)
+ pkey = b2i_PublicKey_bio(key);
+#endif
+ else {
+ BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for key file\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ end:
+ if (key != NULL)
+ BIO_free(key);
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ BIO_printf(err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip);
+ return (pkey);
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+static EVP_PKEY *load_netscape_key(BIO *err, BIO *key, const char *file,
+ const char *key_descrip, int format)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int size, i;
+
+ buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ size = 0;
+ if (buf == NULL || pkey == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, size + 1024 * 10))
+ goto error;
+ i = BIO_read(key, &(buf->data[size]), 1024 * 10);
+ size += i;
+ if (i == 0)
+ break;
+ if (i < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error reading %s %s", key_descrip, file);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
+ rsa = d2i_RSA_NET(NULL, &p, (long)size, NULL,
+ (format == FORMAT_IISSGC ? 1 : 0));
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ return pkey;
+ error:
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 */
+
+static int load_certs_crls(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
+ const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **pcerts,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **pcrls)
+{
+ int i;
+ BIO *bio;
+ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *xis = NULL;
+ X509_INFO *xi;
+ PW_CB_DATA cb_data;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ cb_data.password = pass;
+ cb_data.prompt_info = file;
+
+ if (format != FORMAT_PEM) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", desc);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (file == NULL)
+ bio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ else
+ bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r");
+
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error opening %s %s\n", desc, file ? file : "stdin");
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ xis = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio, NULL,
+ (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
+ &cb_data);
+
+ BIO_free(bio);
+
+ if (pcerts) {
+ *pcerts = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (!*pcerts)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (pcrls) {
+ *pcrls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+ if (!*pcrls)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(xis); i++) {
+ xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(xis, i);
+ if (xi->x509 && pcerts) {
+ if (!sk_X509_push(*pcerts, xi->x509))
+ goto end;
+ xi->x509 = NULL;
+ }
+ if (xi->crl && pcrls) {
+ if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*pcrls, xi->crl))
+ goto end;
+ xi->crl = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pcerts && sk_X509_num(*pcerts) > 0)
+ rv = 1;
+
+ if (pcrls && sk_X509_CRL_num(*pcrls) > 0)
+ rv = 1;
+
+ end:
+
+ if (xis)
+ sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(xis, X509_INFO_free);
+
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ if (pcerts) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(*pcerts, X509_free);
+ *pcerts = NULL;
+ }
+ if (pcrls) {
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(*pcrls, X509_CRL_free);
+ *pcrls = NULL;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(err, "unable to load %s\n",
+ pcerts ? "certificates" : "CRLs");
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
+ const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+ if (!load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, &certs, NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ return certs;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *load_crls(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
+ const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
+ if (!load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, NULL, &crls))
+ return NULL;
+ return crls;
+}
+
+#define X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK (0xfL << 16)
+/* Return error for unknown extensions */
+#define X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT 0
+/* Print error for unknown extensions */
+#define X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN (1L << 16)
+/* ASN1 parse unknown extensions */
+#define X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN (2L << 16)
+/* BIO_dump unknown extensions */
+#define X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN (3L << 16)
+
+#define X509_FLAG_CA (X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER | X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY | \
+ X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER | X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION)
+
+int set_cert_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
+{
+ static const NAME_EX_TBL cert_tbl[] = {
+ {"compatible", X509_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffl},
+ {"ca_default", X509_FLAG_CA, 0xffffffffl},
+ {"no_header", X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER, 0},
+ {"no_version", X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION, 0},
+ {"no_serial", X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL, 0},
+ {"no_signame", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME, 0},
+ {"no_validity", X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY, 0},
+ {"no_subject", X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT, 0},
+ {"no_issuer", X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER, 0},
+ {"no_pubkey", X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY, 0},
+ {"no_extensions", X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS, 0},
+ {"no_sigdump", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP, 0},
+ {"no_aux", X509_FLAG_NO_AUX, 0},
+ {"no_attributes", X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES, 0},
+ {"ext_default", X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
+ {"ext_error", X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
+ {"ext_parse", X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
+ {"ext_dump", X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK},
+ {NULL, 0, 0}
+ };
+ return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, cert_tbl);
+}
+
+int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
+{
+ static const NAME_EX_TBL ex_tbl[] = {
+ {"esc_2253", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253, 0},
+ {"esc_ctrl", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL, 0},
+ {"esc_msb", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB, 0},
+ {"use_quote", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE, 0},
+ {"utf8", ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT, 0},
+ {"ignore_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE, 0},
+ {"show_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE, 0},
+ {"dump_all", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL, 0},
+ {"dump_nostr", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN, 0},
+ {"dump_der", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER, 0},
+ {"compat", XN_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffL},
+ {"sep_comma_plus", XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
+ {"sep_comma_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
+ {"sep_semi_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
+ {"sep_multiline", XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK},
+ {"dn_rev", XN_FLAG_DN_REV, 0},
+ {"nofname", XN_FLAG_FN_NONE, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
+ {"sname", XN_FLAG_FN_SN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
+ {"lname", XN_FLAG_FN_LN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
+ {"align", XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN, 0},
+ {"oid", XN_FLAG_FN_OID, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK},
+ {"space_eq", XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ, 0},
+ {"dump_unknown", XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, 0},
+ {"RFC2253", XN_FLAG_RFC2253, 0xffffffffL},
+ {"oneline", XN_FLAG_ONELINE, 0xffffffffL},
+ {"multiline", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
+ {"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
+ {NULL, 0, 0}
+ };
+ if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0)
+ *flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg)
+{
+ if (!strcasecmp(arg, "none"))
+ *copy_type = EXT_COPY_NONE;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "copy"))
+ *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ADD;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "copyall"))
+ *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ALL;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int copy_extensions(X509 *x, X509_REQ *req, int copy_type)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = NULL;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext, *tmpext;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ int i, idx, ret = 0;
+ if (!x || !req || (copy_type == EXT_COPY_NONE))
+ return 1;
+ exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(req);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+ ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+ obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
+ idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1);
+ /* Does extension exist? */
+ if (idx != -1) {
+ /* If normal copy don't override existing extension */
+ if (copy_type == EXT_COPY_ADD)
+ continue;
+ /* Delete all extensions of same type */
+ do {
+ tmpext = X509_get_ext(x, idx);
+ X509_delete_ext(x, idx);
+ X509_EXTENSION_free(tmpext);
+ idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1);
+ } while (idx != -1);
+ }
+ if (!X509_add_ext(x, ext, -1))
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ end:
+
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
+ const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl)
+{
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals;
+ CONF_VALUE *val;
+ int i, ret = 1;
+ if (!arg)
+ return 0;
+ vals = X509V3_parse_list(arg);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) {
+ val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i);
+ if (!set_table_opts(flags, val->name, in_tbl))
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
+ const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl)
+{
+ char c;
+ const NAME_EX_TBL *ptbl;
+ c = arg[0];
+
+ if (c == '-') {
+ c = 0;
+ arg++;
+ } else if (c == '+') {
+ c = 1;
+ arg++;
+ } else
+ c = 1;
+
+ for (ptbl = in_tbl; ptbl->name; ptbl++) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(arg, ptbl->name)) {
+ *flags &= ~ptbl->mask;
+ if (c)
+ *flags |= ptbl->flag;
+ else
+ *flags &= ~ptbl->flag;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void print_name(BIO *out, const char *title, X509_NAME *nm,
+ unsigned long lflags)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ char mline = 0;
+ int indent = 0;
+
+ if (title)
+ BIO_puts(out, title);
+ if ((lflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) {
+ mline = 1;
+ indent = 4;
+ }
+ if (lflags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) {
+ buf = X509_NAME_oneline(nm, 0, 0);
+ BIO_puts(out, buf);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ } else {
+ if (mline)
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(out, nm, indent, lflags);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ }
+}
+
+X509_STORE *setup_verify(BIO *bp, char *CAfile, char *CApath)
+{
+ X509_STORE *store;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
+ if (!(store = X509_STORE_new()))
+ goto end;
+ lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+ if (lookup == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ if (CAfile) {
+ if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, CAfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+ BIO_printf(bp, "Error loading file %s\n", CAfile);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else
+ X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
+
+ lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
+ if (lookup == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ if (CApath) {
+ if (!X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+ BIO_printf(bp, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else
+ X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return store;
+ end:
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+/* Try to load an engine in a shareable library */
+static ENGINE *try_load_engine(BIO *err, const char *engine, int debug)
+{
+ ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
+ if (e) {
+ if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "SO_PATH", engine, 0)
+ || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) {
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ e = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return e;
+}
+
+ENGINE *setup_engine(BIO *err, const char *engine, int debug)
+{
+ ENGINE *e = NULL;
+
+ if (engine) {
+ if (strcmp(engine, "auto") == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "enabling auto ENGINE support\n");
+ ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(engine)) == NULL
+ && (e = try_load_engine(err, engine, debug)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "invalid engine \"%s\"\n", engine);
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (debug) {
+ ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM, 0, err, 0);
+ }
+ ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "SET_USER_INTERFACE", 0, ui_method, 0, 1);
+ if (!ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "can't use that engine\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(err, "engine \"%s\" set.\n", ENGINE_get_id(e));
+
+ /* Free our "structural" reference. */
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ }
+ return e;
+}
+#endif
+
+int load_config(BIO *err, CONF *cnf)
+{
+ static int load_config_called = 0;
+ if (load_config_called)
+ return 1;
+ load_config_called = 1;
+ if (!cnf)
+ cnf = config;
+ if (!cnf)
+ return 1;
+
+ OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
+
+ if (CONF_modules_load(cnf, NULL, 0) <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error configuring OpenSSL\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+char *make_config_name()
+{
+ const char *t = X509_get_default_cert_area();
+ size_t len;
+ char *p;
+
+ len = strlen(t) + strlen(OPENSSL_CONF) + 2;
+ p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, t, len);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ BUF_strlcat(p, "/", len);
+#endif
+ BUF_strlcat(p, OPENSSL_CONF, len);
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+static unsigned long index_serial_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a)
+{
+ const char *n;
+
+ n = a[DB_serial];
+ while (*n == '0')
+ n++;
+ return (lh_strhash(n));
+}
+
+static int index_serial_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a,
+ const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b)
+{
+ const char *aa, *bb;
+
+ for (aa = a[DB_serial]; *aa == '0'; aa++) ;
+ for (bb = b[DB_serial]; *bb == '0'; bb++) ;
+ return (strcmp(aa, bb));
+}
+
+static int index_name_qual(char **a)
+{
+ return (a[0][0] == 'V');
+}
+
+static unsigned long index_name_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a)
+{
+ return (lh_strhash(a[DB_name]));
+}
+
+int index_name_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b)
+{
+ return (strcmp(a[DB_name], b[DB_name]));
+}
+
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING)
+#undef BSIZE
+#define BSIZE 256
+BIGNUM *load_serial(char *serialfile, int create, ASN1_INTEGER **retai)
+{
+ BIO *in = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
+ MS_STATIC char buf[1024];
+ ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL;
+
+ ai = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+ if (ai == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, serialfile) <= 0) {
+ if (!create) {
+ perror(serialfile);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ ret = BN_new();
+ if (ret == NULL || !rand_serial(ret, ai))
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(in, ai, buf, 1024)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load number from %s\n",
+ serialfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ai, NULL);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "error converting number from bin to BIGNUM\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret && retai) {
+ *retai = ai;
+ ai = NULL;
+ }
+ err:
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ if (ai != NULL)
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int save_serial(char *serialfile, char *suffix, BIGNUM *serial,
+ ASN1_INTEGER **retai)
+{
+ char buf[1][BSIZE];
+ BIO *out = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL;
+ int j;
+
+ if (suffix == NULL)
+ j = strlen(serialfile);
+ else
+ j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(suffix) + 1;
+ if (j >= BSIZE) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (suffix == NULL)
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf[0], serialfile, BSIZE);
+ else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", serialfile, suffix);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", serialfile, suffix);
+#endif
+ }
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: writing \"%s\"\n", buf[0]);
+#endif
+ out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_write_filename(out, buf[0]) <= 0) {
+ perror(serialfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((ai = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error converting serial to ASN.1 format\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, ai);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ ret = 1;
+ if (retai) {
+ *retai = ai;
+ ai = NULL;
+ }
+ err:
+ if (out != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(out);
+ if (ai != NULL)
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int rotate_serial(char *serialfile, char *new_suffix, char *old_suffix)
+{
+ char buf[5][BSIZE];
+ int i, j;
+
+ i = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(old_suffix);
+ j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(new_suffix);
+ if (i > j)
+ j = i;
+ if (j + 1 >= BSIZE) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", serialfile, new_suffix);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", serialfile, new_suffix);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.%s", serialfile, old_suffix);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-%s", serialfile, old_suffix);
+#endif
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n",
+ serialfile, buf[1]);
+#endif
+ if (rename(serialfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT
+#ifdef ENOTDIR
+ && errno != ENOTDIR
+#endif
+ ) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "unable to rename %s to %s\n", serialfile, buf[1]);
+ perror("reason");
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n",
+ buf[0], serialfile);
+#endif
+ if (rename(buf[0], serialfile) < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], serialfile);
+ perror("reason");
+ rename(buf[1], serialfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int rand_serial(BIGNUM *b, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
+{
+ BIGNUM *btmp;
+ int ret = 0;
+ if (b)
+ btmp = b;
+ else
+ btmp = BN_new();
+
+ if (!btmp)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!BN_pseudo_rand(btmp, SERIAL_RAND_BITS, 0, 0))
+ goto error;
+ if (ai && !BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(btmp, ai))
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ error:
+
+ if (!b)
+ BN_free(btmp);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+CA_DB *load_index(char *dbfile, DB_ATTR *db_attr)
+{
+ CA_DB *retdb = NULL;
+ TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
+ BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ CONF *dbattr_conf = NULL;
+ char buf[1][BSIZE];
+ long errorline = -1;
+
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, dbfile) <= 0) {
+ perror(dbfile);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", dbfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.attr", dbfile);
+#else
+ BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-attr", dbfile);
+#endif
+ dbattr_conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+ if (NCONF_load(dbattr_conf, buf[0], &errorline) <= 0) {
+ if (errorline > 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "error on line %ld of db attribute file '%s'\n",
+ errorline, buf[0]);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ NCONF_free(dbattr_conf);
+ dbattr_conf = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((retdb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CA_DB))) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ retdb->db = tmpdb;
+ tmpdb = NULL;
+ if (db_attr)
+ retdb->attributes = *db_attr;
+ else {
+ retdb->attributes.unique_subject = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (dbattr_conf) {
+ char *p = NCONF_get_string(dbattr_conf, NULL, "unique_subject");
+ if (p) {
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "DEBUG[load_index]: unique_subject = \"%s\"\n", p);
+#endif
+ retdb->attributes.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ err:
+ if (dbattr_conf)
+ NCONF_free(dbattr_conf);
+ if (tmpdb)
+ TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
+ if (in)
+ BIO_free_all(in);
+ return retdb;
+}
+
+int index_index(CA_DB *db)
+{
+ if (!TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_serial, NULL,
+ LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial),
+ LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "error creating serial number index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n",
+ db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (db->attributes.unique_subject
+ && !TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_name, index_name_qual,
+ LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name),
+ LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error creating name index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n",
+ db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int save_index(const char *dbfile, const char *suffix, CA_DB *db)
+{
+ char buf[3][BSIZE];
+ BIO *out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ int j;
+
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(suffix);
+ if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s.attr", dbfile);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s-attr", dbfile);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, suffix);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, suffix);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", dbfile, suffix);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", dbfile, suffix);
+#endif
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: writing \"%s\"\n", buf[0]);
+#endif
+ if (BIO_write_filename(out, buf[0]) <= 0) {
+ perror(dbfile);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", dbfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ j = TXT_DB_write(out, db->db);
+ if (j <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ BIO_free(out);
+
+ out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: writing \"%s\"\n", buf[1]);
+#endif
+ if (BIO_write_filename(out, buf[1]) <= 0) {
+ perror(buf[2]);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", buf[2]);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(out, "unique_subject = %s\n",
+ db->attributes.unique_subject ? "yes" : "no");
+ BIO_free(out);
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int rotate_index(const char *dbfile, const char *new_suffix,
+ const char *old_suffix)
+{
+ char buf[5][BSIZE];
+ int i, j;
+
+ i = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(old_suffix);
+ j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(new_suffix);
+ if (i > j)
+ j = i;
+ if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof buf[4], "%s.attr", dbfile);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof buf[4], "%s-attr", dbfile);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof buf[2], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s.%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof buf[0], "%s-%s", dbfile, new_suffix);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s.%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof buf[1], "%s-%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof buf[3], "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+#else
+ j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof buf[3], "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, old_suffix);
+#endif
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", dbfile, buf[1]);
+#endif
+ if (rename(dbfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT
+#ifdef ENOTDIR
+ && errno != ENOTDIR
+#endif
+ ) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", dbfile, buf[1]);
+ perror("reason");
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", buf[0], dbfile);
+#endif
+ if (rename(buf[0], dbfile) < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], dbfile);
+ perror("reason");
+ rename(buf[1], dbfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", buf[4], buf[3]);
+#endif
+ if (rename(buf[4], buf[3]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT
+#ifdef ENOTDIR
+ && errno != ENOTDIR
+#endif
+ ) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[4], buf[3]);
+ perror("reason");
+ rename(dbfile, buf[0]);
+ rename(buf[1], dbfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: renaming \"%s\" to \"%s\"\n", buf[2], buf[4]);
+#endif
+ if (rename(buf[2], buf[4]) < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[2], buf[4]);
+ perror("reason");
+ rename(buf[3], buf[4]);
+ rename(dbfile, buf[0]);
+ rename(buf[1], dbfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void free_index(CA_DB *db)
+{
+ if (db) {
+ if (db->db)
+ TXT_DB_free(db->db);
+ OPENSSL_free(db);
+ }
+}
+
+int parse_yesno(const char *str, int def)
+{
+ int ret = def;
+ if (str) {
+ switch (*str) {
+ case 'f': /* false */
+ case 'F': /* FALSE */
+ case 'n': /* no */
+ case 'N': /* NO */
+ case '0': /* 0 */
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case 't': /* true */
+ case 'T': /* TRUE */
+ case 'y': /* yes */
+ case 'Y': /* YES */
+ case '1': /* 1 */
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = def;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * subject is expected to be in the format /type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...
+ * where characters may be escaped by \
+ */
+X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
+{
+ size_t buflen = strlen(subject) + 1; /* to copy the types and values
+ * into. due to escaping, the copy
+ * can only become shorter */
+ char *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen);
+ size_t max_ne = buflen / 2 + 1; /* maximum number of name elements */
+ char **ne_types = OPENSSL_malloc(max_ne * sizeof(char *));
+ char **ne_values = OPENSSL_malloc(max_ne * sizeof(char *));
+ int *mval = OPENSSL_malloc(max_ne * sizeof(int));
+
+ char *sp = subject, *bp = buf;
+ int i, ne_num = 0;
+
+ X509_NAME *n = NULL;
+ int nid;
+
+ if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values || !mval) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (*subject != '/') {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject does not start with '/'.\n");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ sp++; /* skip leading / */
+
+ /* no multivalued RDN by default */
+ mval[ne_num] = 0;
+
+ while (*sp) {
+ /* collect type */
+ ne_types[ne_num] = bp;
+ while (*sp) {
+ if (*sp == '\\') { /* is there anything to escape in the
+ * type...? */
+ if (*++sp)
+ *bp++ = *sp++;
+ else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "escape character at end of string\n");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else if (*sp == '=') {
+ sp++;
+ *bp++ = '\0';
+ break;
+ } else
+ *bp++ = *sp++;
+ }
+ if (!*sp) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "end of string encountered while processing type of subject name element #%d\n",
+ ne_num);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ ne_values[ne_num] = bp;
+ while (*sp) {
+ if (*sp == '\\') {
+ if (*++sp)
+ *bp++ = *sp++;
+ else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "escape character at end of string\n");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else if (*sp == '/') {
+ sp++;
+ /* no multivalued RDN by default */
+ mval[ne_num + 1] = 0;
+ break;
+ } else if (*sp == '+' && multirdn) {
+ /*
+ * a not escaped + signals a mutlivalued RDN
+ */
+ sp++;
+ mval[ne_num + 1] = -1;
+ break;
+ } else
+ *bp++ = *sp++;
+ }
+ *bp++ = '\0';
+ ne_num++;
+ }
+
+ if (!(n = X509_NAME_new()))
+ goto error;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ne_num; i++) {
+ if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(ne_types[i])) == NID_undef) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Subject Attribute %s has no known NID, skipped\n",
+ ne_types[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!*ne_values[i]) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "No value provided for Subject Attribute %s, skipped\n",
+ ne_types[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID
+ (n, nid, chtype, (unsigned char *)ne_values[i], -1, -1, mval[i]))
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
+ OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(mval);
+ return n;
+
+ error:
+ X509_NAME_free(n);
+ if (ne_values)
+ OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
+ if (ne_types)
+ OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
+ if (mval)
+ OPENSSL_free(mval);
+ if (buf)
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
+ int *badarg, BIO *err, X509_VERIFY_PARAM **pm)
+{
+ ASN1_OBJECT *otmp = NULL;
+ unsigned long flags = 0;
+ int i;
+ int purpose = 0, depth = -1;
+ char **oldargs = *pargs;
+ char *arg = **pargs, *argn = (*pargs)[1];
+ time_t at_time = 0;
+ if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy")) {
+ if (!argn)
+ *badarg = 1;
+ else {
+ otmp = OBJ_txt2obj(argn, 0);
+ if (!otmp) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Invalid Policy \"%s\"\n", argn);
+ *badarg = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ (*pargs)++;
+ } else if (strcmp(arg, "-purpose") == 0) {
+ X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
+ if (!argn)
+ *badarg = 1;
+ else {
+ i = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(argn);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "unrecognized purpose\n");
+ *badarg = 1;
+ } else {
+ xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
+ purpose = X509_PURPOSE_get_id(xptmp);
+ }
+ }
+ (*pargs)++;
+ } else if (strcmp(arg, "-verify_depth") == 0) {
+ if (!argn)
+ *badarg = 1;
+ else {
+ depth = atoi(argn);
+ if (depth < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "invalid depth\n");
+ *badarg = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ (*pargs)++;
+ } else if (strcmp(arg, "-attime") == 0) {
+ if (!argn)
+ *badarg = 1;
+ else {
+ long timestamp;
+ /*
+ * interpret the -attime argument as seconds since Epoch
+ */
+ if (sscanf(argn, "%li", ×tamp) != 1) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing timestamp %s\n", argn);
+ *badarg = 1;
+ }
+ /* on some platforms time_t may be a float */
+ at_time = (time_t)timestamp;
+ }
+ (*pargs)++;
+ } else if (!strcmp(arg, "-ignore_critical"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-issuer_checks"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-crl_check"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-crl_check_all"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy_check"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-explicit_policy"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-inhibit_any"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-inhibit_map"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-x509_strict"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-extended_crl"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-use_deltas"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy_print"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS;
+ else
+ return 0;
+
+ if (*badarg) {
+ if (*pm)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(*pm);
+ *pm = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!*pm && !(*pm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new())) {
+ *badarg = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (otmp)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(*pm, otmp);
+ if (flags)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(*pm, flags);
+
+ if (purpose)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(*pm, purpose);
+
+ if (depth >= 0)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(*pm, depth);
+
+ if (at_time)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(*pm, at_time);
+
+ end:
+
+ (*pargs)++;
+
+ if (pargc)
+ *pargc -= *pargs - oldargs;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read whole contents of a BIO into an allocated memory buffer and return
+ * it.
+ */
+
+int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in)
+{
+ BIO *mem;
+ int len, ret;
+ unsigned char tbuf[1024];
+ mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (!mem)
+ return -1;
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((maxlen != -1) && maxlen < 1024)
+ len = maxlen;
+ else
+ len = 1024;
+ len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, len);
+ if (len <= 0)
+ break;
+ if (BIO_write(mem, tbuf, len) != len) {
+ BIO_free(mem);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ maxlen -= len;
+
+ if (maxlen == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **)out);
+ BIO_set_flags(mem, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+ BIO_free(mem);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *value)
+{
+ int rv;
+ char *stmp, *vtmp = NULL;
+ stmp = BUF_strdup(value);
+ if (!stmp)
+ return -1;
+ vtmp = strchr(stmp, ':');
+ if (vtmp) {
+ *vtmp = 0;
+ vtmp++;
+ }
+ rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ctx, stmp, vtmp);
+ OPENSSL_free(stmp);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static void nodes_print(BIO *out, const char *name,
+ STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ int i;
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s Policies:", name);
+ if (nodes) {
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) {
+ node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+ X509_POLICY_NODE_print(out, node, 2);
+ }
+ } else
+ BIO_puts(out, " <empty>\n");
+}
+
+void policies_print(BIO *out, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
+ int explicit_policy;
+ int free_out = 0;
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ out = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ free_out = 1;
+ }
+ tree = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(ctx);
+ explicit_policy = X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(ctx);
+
+ BIO_printf(out, "Require explicit Policy: %s\n",
+ explicit_policy ? "True" : "False");
+
+ nodes_print(out, "Authority", X509_policy_tree_get0_policies(tree));
+ nodes_print(out, "User", X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree));
+ if (free_out)
+ BIO_free(out);
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
+
+static JPAKE_CTX *jpake_init(const char *us, const char *them,
+ const char *secret)
+{
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *q = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *bnsecret = BN_new();
+ JPAKE_CTX *ctx;
+
+ /* Use a safe prime for p (that we found earlier) */
+ BN_hex2bn(&p,
+ "F9E5B365665EA7A05A9C534502780FEE6F1AB5BD4F49947FD036DBD7E905269AF46EF28B0FC07487EE4F5D20FB3C0AF8E700F3A2FA3414970CBED44FEDFF80CE78D800F184BB82435D137AADA2C6C16523247930A63B85661D1FC817A51ACD96168E95898A1F83A79FFB529368AA7833ABD1B0C3AEDDB14D2E1A2F71D99F763F");
+ g = BN_new();
+ BN_set_word(g, 2);
+ q = BN_new();
+ BN_rshift1(q, p);
+
+ BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char *)secret, strlen(secret), bnsecret);
+
+ ctx = JPAKE_CTX_new(us, them, p, g, q, bnsecret);
+ BN_free(bnsecret);
+ BN_free(q);
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(p);
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void jpake_send_part(BIO *conn, const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p)
+{
+ BN_print(conn, p->gx);
+ BIO_puts(conn, "\n");
+ BN_print(conn, p->zkpx.gr);
+ BIO_puts(conn, "\n");
+ BN_print(conn, p->zkpx.b);
+ BIO_puts(conn, "\n");
+}
+
+static void jpake_send_step1(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ JPAKE_STEP1 s1;
+
+ JPAKE_STEP1_init(&s1);
+ JPAKE_STEP1_generate(&s1, ctx);
+ jpake_send_part(bconn, &s1.p1);
+ jpake_send_part(bconn, &s1.p2);
+ (void)BIO_flush(bconn);
+ JPAKE_STEP1_release(&s1);
+}
+
+static void jpake_send_step2(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ JPAKE_STEP2 s2;
+
+ JPAKE_STEP2_init(&s2);
+ JPAKE_STEP2_generate(&s2, ctx);
+ jpake_send_part(bconn, &s2);
+ (void)BIO_flush(bconn);
+ JPAKE_STEP2_release(&s2);
+}
+
+static void jpake_send_step3a(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ JPAKE_STEP3A s3a;
+
+ JPAKE_STEP3A_init(&s3a);
+ JPAKE_STEP3A_generate(&s3a, ctx);
+ BIO_write(bconn, s3a.hhk, sizeof s3a.hhk);
+ (void)BIO_flush(bconn);
+ JPAKE_STEP3A_release(&s3a);
+}
+
+static void jpake_send_step3b(BIO *bconn, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ JPAKE_STEP3B s3b;
+
+ JPAKE_STEP3B_init(&s3b);
+ JPAKE_STEP3B_generate(&s3b, ctx);
+ BIO_write(bconn, s3b.hk, sizeof s3b.hk);
+ (void)BIO_flush(bconn);
+ JPAKE_STEP3B_release(&s3b);
+}
+
+static void readbn(BIGNUM **bn, BIO *bconn)
+{
+ char buf[10240];
+ int l;
+
+ l = BIO_gets(bconn, buf, sizeof buf);
+ assert(l > 0);
+ assert(buf[l - 1] == '\n');
+ buf[l - 1] = '\0';
+ BN_hex2bn(bn, buf);
+}
+
+static void jpake_receive_part(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, BIO *bconn)
+{
+ readbn(&p->gx, bconn);
+ readbn(&p->zkpx.gr, bconn);
+ readbn(&p->zkpx.b, bconn);
+}
+
+static void jpake_receive_step1(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn)
+{
+ JPAKE_STEP1 s1;
+
+ JPAKE_STEP1_init(&s1);
+ jpake_receive_part(&s1.p1, bconn);
+ jpake_receive_part(&s1.p2, bconn);
+ if (!JPAKE_STEP1_process(ctx, &s1)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ JPAKE_STEP1_release(&s1);
+}
+
+static void jpake_receive_step2(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn)
+{
+ JPAKE_STEP2 s2;
+
+ JPAKE_STEP2_init(&s2);
+ jpake_receive_part(&s2, bconn);
+ if (!JPAKE_STEP2_process(ctx, &s2)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ JPAKE_STEP2_release(&s2);
+}
+
+static void jpake_receive_step3a(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn)
+{
+ JPAKE_STEP3A s3a;
+ int l;
+
+ JPAKE_STEP3A_init(&s3a);
+ l = BIO_read(bconn, s3a.hhk, sizeof s3a.hhk);
+ assert(l == sizeof s3a.hhk);
+ if (!JPAKE_STEP3A_process(ctx, &s3a)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ JPAKE_STEP3A_release(&s3a);
+}
+
+static void jpake_receive_step3b(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bconn)
+{
+ JPAKE_STEP3B s3b;
+ int l;
+
+ JPAKE_STEP3B_init(&s3b);
+ l = BIO_read(bconn, s3b.hk, sizeof s3b.hk);
+ assert(l == sizeof s3b.hk);
+ if (!JPAKE_STEP3B_process(ctx, &s3b)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ JPAKE_STEP3B_release(&s3b);
+}
+
+void jpake_client_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret)
+{
+ JPAKE_CTX *ctx;
+ BIO *bconn;
+
+ BIO_puts(out, "Authenticating with JPAKE\n");
+
+ ctx = jpake_init("client", "server", secret);
+
+ bconn = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ BIO_push(bconn, conn);
+
+ jpake_send_step1(bconn, ctx);
+ jpake_receive_step1(ctx, bconn);
+ jpake_send_step2(bconn, ctx);
+ jpake_receive_step2(ctx, bconn);
+ jpake_send_step3a(bconn, ctx);
+ jpake_receive_step3b(ctx, bconn);
+
+ BIO_puts(out, "JPAKE authentication succeeded, setting PSK\n");
+
+ psk_key = BN_bn2hex(JPAKE_get_shared_key(ctx));
+
+ BIO_pop(bconn);
+ BIO_free(bconn);
+
+ JPAKE_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+void jpake_server_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret)
+{
+ JPAKE_CTX *ctx;
+ BIO *bconn;
+
+ BIO_puts(out, "Authenticating with JPAKE\n");
+
+ ctx = jpake_init("server", "client", secret);
+
+ bconn = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ BIO_push(bconn, conn);
+
+ jpake_receive_step1(ctx, bconn);
+ jpake_send_step1(bconn, ctx);
+ jpake_receive_step2(ctx, bconn);
+ jpake_send_step2(bconn, ctx);
+ jpake_receive_step3a(ctx, bconn);
+ jpake_send_step3b(bconn, ctx);
+
+ BIO_puts(out, "JPAKE authentication succeeded, setting PSK\n");
+
+ psk_key = BN_bn2hex(JPAKE_get_shared_key(ctx));
+
+ BIO_pop(bconn);
+ BIO_free(bconn);
+
+ JPAKE_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+/*-
+ * next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string
+ * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised.
+ * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success.
+ * err: (maybe NULL) on failure, an error message line is written to this BIO.
+ * in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi"
+ *
+ * returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure.
+ */
+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned char *out;
+ size_t i, start = 0;
+
+ len = strlen(in);
+ if (len >= 65535)
+ return NULL;
+
+ out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1);
+ if (!out)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) {
+ if (i == len || in[i] == ',') {
+ if (i - start > 255) {
+ OPENSSL_free(out);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ out[start] = i - start;
+ start = i + 1;
+ } else
+ out[i + 1] = in[i];
+ }
+
+ *outlen = len + 1;
+ return out;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT &&
+ * !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+
+/*
+ * Platform-specific sections
+ */
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+# ifdef fileno
+# undef fileno
+# define fileno(a) (int)_fileno(a)
+# endif
+
+# include <windows.h>
+# include <tchar.h>
+
+static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to)
+{
+ TCHAR *tfrom = NULL, *tto;
+ DWORD err;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (sizeof(TCHAR) == 1) {
+ tfrom = (TCHAR *)from;
+ tto = (TCHAR *)to;
+ } else { /* UNICODE path */
+
+ size_t i, flen = strlen(from) + 1, tlen = strlen(to) + 1;
+ tfrom = (TCHAR *)malloc(sizeof(TCHAR) * (flen + tlen));
+ if (tfrom == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ tto = tfrom + flen;
+# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101
+ if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, from, flen, (WCHAR *)tfrom, flen))
+# endif
+ for (i = 0; i < flen; i++)
+ tfrom[i] = (TCHAR)from[i];
+# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101
+ if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, to, tlen, (WCHAR *)tto, tlen))
+# endif
+ for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
+ tto[i] = (TCHAR)to[i];
+ }
+
+ if (MoveFile(tfrom, tto))
+ goto ok;
+ err = GetLastError();
+ if (err == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS || err == ERROR_FILE_EXISTS) {
+ if (DeleteFile(tto) && MoveFile(tfrom, tto))
+ goto ok;
+ err = GetLastError();
+ }
+ if (err == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || err == ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND)
+ errno = ENOENT;
+ else if (err == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)
+ errno = EACCES;
+ else
+ errno = EINVAL; /* we could map more codes... */
+ err:
+ ret = -1;
+ ok:
+ if (tfrom != NULL && tfrom != (TCHAR *)from)
+ free(tfrom);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* app_tminterval section */
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+ FILETIME now;
+ double ret = 0;
+ static ULARGE_INTEGER tmstart;
+ static int warning = 1;
+# ifdef _WIN32_WINNT
+ static HANDLE proc = NULL;
+
+ if (proc == NULL) {
+ if (check_winnt())
+ proc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE,
+ GetCurrentProcessId());
+ if (proc == NULL)
+ proc = (HANDLE) - 1;
+ }
+
+ if (usertime && proc != (HANDLE) - 1) {
+ FILETIME junk;
+ GetProcessTimes(proc, &junk, &junk, &junk, &now);
+ } else
+# endif
+ {
+ SYSTEMTIME systime;
+
+ if (usertime && warning) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run "
+ "this program on idle system.\n");
+ warning = 0;
+ }
+ GetSystemTime(&systime);
+ SystemTimeToFileTime(&systime, &now);
+ }
+
+ if (stop == TM_START) {
+ tmstart.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime;
+ tmstart.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime;
+ } else {
+ ULARGE_INTEGER tmstop;
+
+ tmstop.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime;
+ tmstop.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime;
+
+ ret = (__int64)(tmstop.QuadPart - tmstart.QuadPart) * 1e-7;
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+# include <time.h>
+
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+ double ret = 0;
+ static clock_t tmstart;
+ static int warning = 1;
+
+ if (usertime && warning) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run "
+ "this program on idle system.\n");
+ warning = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (stop == TM_START)
+ tmstart = clock();
+ else
+ ret = (clock() - tmstart) / (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC;
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VXWORKS)
+# include <time.h>
+
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+ double ret = 0;
+# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME
+ static struct timespec tmstart;
+ struct timespec now;
+# else
+ static unsigned long tmstart;
+ unsigned long now;
+# endif
+ static int warning = 1;
+
+ if (usertime && warning) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run "
+ "this program on idle system.\n");
+ warning = 0;
+ }
+# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
+ if (stop == TM_START)
+ tmstart = now;
+ else
+ ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_nsec * 1e-9)
+ - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_nsec * 1e-9));
+# else
+ now = tickGet();
+ if (stop == TM_START)
+ tmstart = now;
+ else
+ ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)sysClkRateGet();
+# endif
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VMS)
+# include <time.h>
+# include <times.h>
+
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+ static clock_t tmstart;
+ double ret = 0;
+ clock_t now;
+# ifdef __TMS
+ struct tms rus;
+
+ now = times(&rus);
+ if (usertime)
+ now = rus.tms_utime;
+# else
+ if (usertime)
+ now = clock(); /* sum of user and kernel times */
+ else {
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+ now = (clock_t)((unsigned long long)tv.tv_sec * CLK_TCK +
+ (unsigned long long)tv.tv_usec * (1000000 / CLK_TCK)
+ );
+ }
+# endif
+ if (stop == TM_START)
+ tmstart = now;
+ else
+ ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)(CLK_TCK);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#elif defined(_SC_CLK_TCK) /* by means of unistd.h */
+# include <sys/times.h>
+
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+ double ret = 0;
+ struct tms rus;
+ clock_t now = times(&rus);
+ static clock_t tmstart;
+
+ if (usertime)
+ now = rus.tms_utime;
+
+ if (stop == TM_START)
+ tmstart = now;
+ else {
+ long int tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK);
+ ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)tck;
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#else
+# include <sys/time.h>
+# include <sys/resource.h>
+
+double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime)
+{
+ double ret = 0;
+ struct rusage rus;
+ struct timeval now;
+ static struct timeval tmstart;
+
+ if (usertime)
+ getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rus), now = rus.ru_utime;
+ else
+ gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+
+ if (stop == TM_START)
+ tmstart = now;
+ else
+ ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_usec * 1e-6)
+ - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_usec * 1e-6));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* app_isdir section */
+#ifdef _WIN32
+int app_isdir(const char *name)
+{
+ HANDLE hList;
+ WIN32_FIND_DATA FileData;
+# if defined(UNICODE) || defined(_UNICODE)
+ size_t i, len_0 = strlen(name) + 1;
+
+ if (len_0 > sizeof(FileData.cFileName) / sizeof(FileData.cFileName[0]))
+ return -1;
+
+# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101
+ if (!MultiByteToWideChar
+ (CP_ACP, 0, name, len_0, FileData.cFileName, len_0))
+# endif
+ for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++)
+ FileData.cFileName[i] = (WCHAR)name[i];
+
+ hList = FindFirstFile(FileData.cFileName, &FileData);
+# else
+ hList = FindFirstFile(name, &FileData);
+# endif
+ if (hList == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+ return -1;
+ FindClose(hList);
+ return ((FileData.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0);
+}
+#else
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# ifndef S_ISDIR
+# if defined(_S_IFMT) && defined(_S_IFDIR)
+# define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & _S_IFMT) == _S_IFDIR)
+# else
+# define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
+# endif
+# endif
+
+int app_isdir(const char *name)
+{
+# if defined(S_ISDIR)
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(name, &st) == 0)
+ return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+ else
+ return -1;
+# else
+ return -1;
+# endif
+}
+#endif
+
+/* raw_read|write section */
+#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_INPUT_HANDLE)
+int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz)
+{
+ DWORD n;
+ if (ReadFile(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL))
+ return (n);
+ else
+ return (-1);
+}
+#else
+int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz)
+{
+ return read(fileno(stdin), buf, siz);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE)
+int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz)
+{
+ DWORD n;
+ if (WriteFile(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL))
+ return (n);
+ else
+ return (-1);
+}
+#else
+int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz)
+{
+ return write(fileno(stdout), buf, siz);
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/asn1pars.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/asn1pars.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/asn1pars.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,430 +0,0 @@
-/* apps/asn1pars.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-/*
- * A nice addition from Dr Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org> to add the
- * -strparse option which parses nested binary structures
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include "apps.h"
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-
-/*-
- * -inform arg - input format - default PEM (DER or PEM)
- * -in arg - input file - default stdin
- * -i - indent the details by depth
- * -offset - where in the file to start
- * -length - how many bytes to use
- * -oid file - extra oid description file
- */
-
-#undef PROG
-#define PROG asn1parse_main
-
-int MAIN(int, char **);
-
-static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf);
-
-int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int i, badops = 0, offset = 0, ret = 1, j;
- unsigned int length = 0;
- long num, tmplen;
- BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *b64 = NULL, *derout = NULL;
- int informat, indent = 0, noout = 0, dump = 0;
- char *infile = NULL, *str = NULL, *prog, *oidfile = NULL, *derfile = NULL;
- char *genstr = NULL, *genconf = NULL;
- unsigned char *tmpbuf;
- const unsigned char *ctmpbuf;
- BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *osk = NULL;
- ASN1_TYPE *at = NULL;
-
- informat = FORMAT_PEM;
-
- apps_startup();
-
- if (bio_err == NULL)
- if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL)
- BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
-
- if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
- goto end;
-
- prog = argv[0];
- argc--;
- argv++;
- if ((osk = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto end;
- }
- while (argc >= 1) {
- if (strcmp(*argv, "-inform") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- informat = str2fmt(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-in") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- infile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- derfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-i") == 0) {
- indent = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noout") == 0)
- noout = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-oid") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- oidfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-offset") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- offset = atoi(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-length") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- length = atoi(*(++argv));
- if (length == 0)
- goto bad;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dump") == 0) {
- dump = -1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dlimit") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- dump = atoi(*(++argv));
- if (dump <= 0)
- goto bad;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-strparse") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(osk, *(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-genstr") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- genstr = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-genconf") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- genconf = *(++argv);
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
- badops = 1;
- break;
- }
- argc--;
- argv++;
- }
-
- if (badops) {
- bad:
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [options] <infile\n", prog);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -inform arg input format - one of DER PEM\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -in arg input file\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -out arg output file (output format is always DER\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -noout arg don't produce any output\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -offset arg offset into file\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -length arg length of section in file\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -i indent entries\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dump dump unknown data in hex form\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -dlimit arg dump the first arg bytes of unknown data in hex form\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -oid file file of extra oid definitions\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -strparse offset\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " a series of these can be used to 'dig' into multiple\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " ASN1 blob wrappings\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -genstr str string to generate ASN1 structure from\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -genconf file file to generate ASN1 structure from\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- if ((in == NULL) || (out == NULL)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- {
- BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
- out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out);
- }
-#endif
-
- if (oidfile != NULL) {
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, oidfile) <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "problems opening %s\n", oidfile);
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- OBJ_create_objects(in);
- }
-
- if (infile == NULL)
- BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- else {
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) {
- perror(infile);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (derfile) {
- if (!(derout = BIO_new_file(derfile, "wb"))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "problems opening %s\n", derfile);
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
- goto end;
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, BUFSIZ * 8))
- goto end; /* Pre-allocate :-) */
-
- if (genstr || genconf) {
- num = do_generate(bio_err, genstr, genconf, buf);
- if (num < 0) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- else {
-
- if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) {
- BIO *tmp;
-
- if ((b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL)
- goto end;
- BIO_push(b64, in);
- tmp = in;
- in = b64;
- b64 = tmp;
- }
-
- num = 0;
- for (;;) {
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, (int)num + BUFSIZ))
- goto end;
- i = BIO_read(in, &(buf->data[num]), BUFSIZ);
- if (i <= 0)
- break;
- num += i;
- }
- }
- str = buf->data;
-
- /* If any structs to parse go through in sequence */
-
- if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(osk)) {
- tmpbuf = (unsigned char *)str;
- tmplen = num;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(osk); i++) {
- ASN1_TYPE *atmp;
- int typ;
- j = atoi(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i));
- if (j == 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "'%s' is an invalid number\n",
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i));
- continue;
- }
- tmpbuf += j;
- tmplen -= j;
- atmp = at;
- ctmpbuf = tmpbuf;
- at = d2i_ASN1_TYPE(NULL, &ctmpbuf, tmplen);
- ASN1_TYPE_free(atmp);
- if (!at) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing structure\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at);
- if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
- || (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n",
- typ == V_ASN1_NULL ? "NULL" : "OBJECT");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- /* hmm... this is a little evil but it works */
- tmpbuf = at->value.asn1_string->data;
- tmplen = at->value.asn1_string->length;
- }
- str = (char *)tmpbuf;
- num = tmplen;
- }
-
- if (offset >= num) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: offset too large\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- num -= offset;
-
- if ((length == 0) || ((long)length > num))
- length = (unsigned int)num;
- if (derout) {
- if (BIO_write(derout, str + offset, length) != (int)length) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing output\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
- if (!noout &&
- !ASN1_parse_dump(out, (unsigned char *)&(str[offset]), length,
- indent, dump)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- ret = 0;
- end:
- BIO_free(derout);
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- if (out != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(out);
- if (b64 != NULL)
- BIO_free(b64);
- if (ret != 0)
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- if (buf != NULL)
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- if (at != NULL)
- ASN1_TYPE_free(at);
- if (osk != NULL)
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(osk);
- OBJ_cleanup();
- apps_shutdown();
- OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
-}
-
-static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf)
-{
- CONF *cnf = NULL;
- int len;
- long errline = 0;
- unsigned char *p;
- ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL;
-
- if (genconf) {
- cnf = NCONF_new(NULL);
- if (!NCONF_load(cnf, genconf, &errline))
- goto conferr;
- if (!genstr)
- genstr = NCONF_get_string(cnf, "default", "asn1");
- if (!genstr) {
- BIO_printf(bio, "Can't find 'asn1' in '%s'\n", genconf);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf);
- NCONF_free(cnf);
- cnf = NULL;
-
- if (!atyp)
- return -1;
-
- len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(atyp, NULL);
-
- if (len <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, len))
- goto err;
-
- p = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
-
- i2d_ASN1_TYPE(atyp, &p);
-
- ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp);
- return len;
-
- conferr:
-
- if (errline > 0)
- BIO_printf(bio, "Error on line %ld of config file '%s'\n",
- errline, genconf);
- else
- BIO_printf(bio, "Error loading config file '%s'\n", genconf);
-
- err:
- NCONF_free(cnf);
- ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp);
-
- return -1;
-
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/asn1pars.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/asn1pars.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/asn1pars.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/asn1pars.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+/* apps/asn1pars.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+/*
+ * A nice addition from Dr Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org> to add the
+ * -strparse option which parses nested binary structures
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+/*-
+ * -inform arg - input format - default PEM (DER or PEM)
+ * -in arg - input file - default stdin
+ * -i - indent the details by depth
+ * -offset - where in the file to start
+ * -length - how many bytes to use
+ * -oid file - extra oid description file
+ */
+
+#undef PROG
+#define PROG asn1parse_main
+
+int MAIN(int, char **);
+
+static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf);
+
+int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int i, badops = 0, offset = 0, ret = 1, j;
+ unsigned int length = 0;
+ long num, tmplen;
+ BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *b64 = NULL, *derout = NULL;
+ int informat, indent = 0, noout = 0, dump = 0;
+ char *infile = NULL, *str = NULL, *prog, *oidfile = NULL, *derfile = NULL;
+ char *genstr = NULL, *genconf = NULL;
+ unsigned char *tmpbuf;
+ const unsigned char *ctmpbuf;
+ BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *osk = NULL;
+ ASN1_TYPE *at = NULL;
+
+ informat = FORMAT_PEM;
+
+ apps_startup();
+
+ if (bio_err == NULL)
+ if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL)
+ BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
+ goto end;
+
+ prog = argv[0];
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if ((osk = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ while (argc >= 1) {
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "-inform") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ informat = str2fmt(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-in") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ infile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ derfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-i") == 0) {
+ indent = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noout") == 0)
+ noout = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-oid") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ oidfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-offset") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ offset = atoi(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-length") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ length = atoi(*(++argv));
+ if (length == 0)
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dump") == 0) {
+ dump = -1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dlimit") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ dump = atoi(*(++argv));
+ if (dump <= 0)
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-strparse") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(osk, *(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-genstr") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ genstr = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-genconf") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ genconf = *(++argv);
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
+ badops = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+
+ if (badops) {
+ bad:
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [options] <infile\n", prog);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -inform arg input format - one of DER PEM\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -in arg input file\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -out arg output file (output format is always DER\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -noout arg don't produce any output\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -offset arg offset into file\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -length arg length of section in file\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -i indent entries\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dump dump unknown data in hex form\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -dlimit arg dump the first arg bytes of unknown data in hex form\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -oid file file of extra oid definitions\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -strparse offset\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " a series of these can be used to 'dig' into multiple\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " ASN1 blob wrappings\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -genstr str string to generate ASN1 structure from\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -genconf file file to generate ASN1 structure from\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if ((in == NULL) || (out == NULL)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ {
+ BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
+ out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (oidfile != NULL) {
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, oidfile) <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "problems opening %s\n", oidfile);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ OBJ_create_objects(in);
+ }
+
+ if (infile == NULL)
+ BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ else {
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) {
+ perror(infile);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (derfile) {
+ if (!(derout = BIO_new_file(derfile, "wb"))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "problems opening %s\n", derfile);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, BUFSIZ * 8))
+ goto end; /* Pre-allocate :-) */
+
+ if (genstr || genconf) {
+ num = do_generate(bio_err, genstr, genconf, buf);
+ if (num < 0) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ else {
+
+ if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) {
+ BIO *tmp;
+
+ if ((b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ BIO_push(b64, in);
+ tmp = in;
+ in = b64;
+ b64 = tmp;
+ }
+
+ num = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, (int)num + BUFSIZ))
+ goto end;
+ i = BIO_read(in, &(buf->data[num]), BUFSIZ);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ break;
+ num += i;
+ }
+ }
+ str = buf->data;
+
+ /* If any structs to parse go through in sequence */
+
+ if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(osk)) {
+ tmpbuf = (unsigned char *)str;
+ tmplen = num;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(osk); i++) {
+ ASN1_TYPE *atmp;
+ int typ;
+ j = atoi(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i));
+ if (j == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "'%s' is an invalid number\n",
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(osk, i));
+ continue;
+ }
+ tmpbuf += j;
+ tmplen -= j;
+ atmp = at;
+ ctmpbuf = tmpbuf;
+ at = d2i_ASN1_TYPE(NULL, &ctmpbuf, tmplen);
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(atmp);
+ if (!at) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing structure\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at);
+ if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+ || (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
+ || (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ));
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* hmm... this is a little evil but it works */
+ tmpbuf = at->value.asn1_string->data;
+ tmplen = at->value.asn1_string->length;
+ }
+ str = (char *)tmpbuf;
+ num = tmplen;
+ }
+
+ if (offset >= num) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: offset too large\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ num -= offset;
+
+ if ((length == 0) || ((long)length > num))
+ length = (unsigned int)num;
+ if (derout) {
+ if (BIO_write(derout, str + offset, length) != (int)length) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing output\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!noout &&
+ !ASN1_parse_dump(out, (unsigned char *)&(str[offset]), length,
+ indent, dump)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ BIO_free(derout);
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ if (out != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(out);
+ if (b64 != NULL)
+ BIO_free(b64);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (at != NULL)
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(at);
+ if (osk != NULL)
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(osk);
+ OBJ_cleanup();
+ apps_shutdown();
+ OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf)
+{
+ CONF *cnf = NULL;
+ int len;
+ long errline = 0;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL;
+
+ if (genconf) {
+ cnf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+ if (!NCONF_load(cnf, genconf, &errline))
+ goto conferr;
+ if (!genstr)
+ genstr = NCONF_get_string(cnf, "default", "asn1");
+ if (!genstr) {
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Can't find 'asn1' in '%s'\n", genconf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf);
+ NCONF_free(cnf);
+ cnf = NULL;
+
+ if (!atyp)
+ return -1;
+
+ len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(atyp, NULL);
+
+ if (len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, len))
+ goto err;
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
+
+ i2d_ASN1_TYPE(atyp, &p);
+
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp);
+ return len;
+
+ conferr:
+
+ if (errline > 0)
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Error on line %ld of config file '%s'\n",
+ errline, genconf);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Error loading config file '%s'\n", genconf);
+
+ err:
+ NCONF_free(cnf);
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp);
+
+ return -1;
+
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ca.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/ca.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ca.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2906 +0,0 @@
-/* apps/ca.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-/* The PPKI stuff has been donated by Jeff Barber <jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com> */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/txt_db.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-
-#ifndef W_OK
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-# if defined(__DECC)
-# include <unistd.h>
-# else
-# include <unixlib.h>
-# endif
-# elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-# include <sys/file.h>
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#include "apps.h"
-
-#ifndef W_OK
-# define F_OK 0
-# define X_OK 1
-# define W_OK 2
-# define R_OK 4
-#endif
-
-#undef PROG
-#define PROG ca_main
-
-#define BASE_SECTION "ca"
-#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf"
-
-#define ENV_DEFAULT_CA "default_ca"
-
-#define STRING_MASK "string_mask"
-#define UTF8_IN "utf8"
-
-#define ENV_DIR "dir"
-#define ENV_CERTS "certs"
-#define ENV_CRL_DIR "crl_dir"
-#define ENV_CA_DB "CA_DB"
-#define ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR "new_certs_dir"
-#define ENV_CERTIFICATE "certificate"
-#define ENV_SERIAL "serial"
-#define ENV_CRLNUMBER "crlnumber"
-#define ENV_CRL "crl"
-#define ENV_PRIVATE_KEY "private_key"
-#define ENV_RANDFILE "RANDFILE"
-#define ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS "default_days"
-#define ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE "default_startdate"
-#define ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE "default_enddate"
-#define ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_DAYS "default_crl_days"
-#define ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS "default_crl_hours"
-#define ENV_DEFAULT_MD "default_md"
-#define ENV_DEFAULT_EMAIL_DN "email_in_dn"
-#define ENV_PRESERVE "preserve"
-#define ENV_POLICY "policy"
-#define ENV_EXTENSIONS "x509_extensions"
-#define ENV_CRLEXT "crl_extensions"
-#define ENV_MSIE_HACK "msie_hack"
-#define ENV_NAMEOPT "name_opt"
-#define ENV_CERTOPT "cert_opt"
-#define ENV_EXTCOPY "copy_extensions"
-#define ENV_UNIQUE_SUBJECT "unique_subject"
-
-#define ENV_DATABASE "database"
-
-/* Additional revocation information types */
-
-#define REV_NONE 0 /* No addditional information */
-#define REV_CRL_REASON 1 /* Value is CRL reason code */
-#define REV_HOLD 2 /* Value is hold instruction */
-#define REV_KEY_COMPROMISE 3 /* Value is cert key compromise time */
-#define REV_CA_COMPROMISE 4 /* Value is CA key compromise time */
-
-static const char *ca_usage[] = {
- "usage: ca args\n",
- "\n",
- " -verbose - Talk alot while doing things\n",
- " -config file - A config file\n",
- " -name arg - The particular CA definition to use\n",
- " -gencrl - Generate a new CRL\n",
- " -crldays days - Days is when the next CRL is due\n",
- " -crlhours hours - Hours is when the next CRL is due\n",
- " -startdate YYMMDDHHMMSSZ - certificate validity notBefore\n",
- " -enddate YYMMDDHHMMSSZ - certificate validity notAfter (overrides -days)\n",
- " -days arg - number of days to certify the certificate for\n",
- " -md arg - md to use, one of md2, md5, sha or sha1\n",
- " -policy arg - The CA 'policy' to support\n",
- " -keyfile arg - private key file\n",
- " -keyform arg - private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)\n",
- " -key arg - key to decode the private key if it is encrypted\n",
- " -cert file - The CA certificate\n",
- " -selfsign - sign a certificate with the key associated with it\n",
- " -in file - The input PEM encoded certificate request(s)\n",
- " -out file - Where to put the output file(s)\n",
- " -outdir dir - Where to put output certificates\n",
- " -infiles .... - The last argument, requests to process\n",
- " -spkac file - File contains DN and signed public key and challenge\n",
- " -ss_cert file - File contains a self signed cert to sign\n",
- " -preserveDN - Don't re-order the DN\n",
- " -noemailDN - Don't add the EMAIL field into certificate' subject\n",
- " -batch - Don't ask questions\n",
- " -msie_hack - msie modifications to handle all those universal strings\n",
- " -revoke file - Revoke a certificate (given in file)\n",
- " -subj arg - Use arg instead of request's subject\n",
- " -utf8 - input characters are UTF8 (default ASCII)\n",
- " -multivalue-rdn - enable support for multivalued RDNs\n",
- " -extensions .. - Extension section (override value in config file)\n",
- " -extfile file - Configuration file with X509v3 extentions to add\n",
- " -crlexts .. - CRL extension section (override value in config file)\n",
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- " -engine e - use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n",
-#endif
- " -status serial - Shows certificate status given the serial number\n",
- " -updatedb - Updates db for expired certificates\n",
- NULL
-};
-
-#ifdef EFENCE
-extern int EF_PROTECT_FREE;
-extern int EF_PROTECT_BELOW;
-extern int EF_ALIGNMENT;
-#endif
-
-static void lookup_fail(const char *name, const char *tag);
-static int certify(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
- const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
- BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
- int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate,
- long days, int batch, char *ext_sect, CONF *conf,
- int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
- int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign);
-static int certify_cert(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
- const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
- BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
- int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate,
- char *enddate, long days, int batch, char *ext_sect,
- CONF *conf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
- unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy,
- ENGINE *e);
-static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst,
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
- BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
- int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate,
- char *enddate, long days, char *ext_sect, CONF *conf,
- int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
- unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy);
-static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der,
- int notext);
-static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
- const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial,
- char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn,
- int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days,
- int batch, int verbose, X509_REQ *req, char *ext_sect,
- CONF *conf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
- int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign);
-static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int ext, char *extval);
-static int get_certificate_status(const char *ser_status, CA_DB *db);
-static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db);
-static int check_time_format(const char *str);
-char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg);
-int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str);
-int old_entry_print(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, ASN1_STRING *str);
-static CONF *conf = NULL;
-static CONF *extconf = NULL;
-static char *section = NULL;
-
-static int preserve = 0;
-static int msie_hack = 0;
-
-int MAIN(int, char **);
-
-int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- ENGINE *e = NULL;
- char *key = NULL, *passargin = NULL;
- int create_ser = 0;
- int free_key = 0;
- int total = 0;
- int total_done = 0;
- int badops = 0;
- int ret = 1;
- int email_dn = 1;
- int req = 0;
- int verbose = 0;
- int gencrl = 0;
- int dorevoke = 0;
- int doupdatedb = 0;
- long crldays = 0;
- long crlhours = 0;
- long crlsec = 0;
- long errorline = -1;
- char *configfile = NULL;
- char *md = NULL;
- char *policy = NULL;
- char *keyfile = NULL;
- char *certfile = NULL;
- int keyform = FORMAT_PEM;
- char *infile = NULL;
- char *spkac_file = NULL;
- char *ss_cert_file = NULL;
- char *ser_status = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int output_der = 0;
- char *outfile = NULL;
- char *outdir = NULL;
- char *serialfile = NULL;
- char *crlnumberfile = NULL;
- char *extensions = NULL;
- char *extfile = NULL;
- char *subj = NULL;
- unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC;
- int multirdn = 0;
- char *tmp_email_dn = NULL;
- char *crl_ext = NULL;
- int rev_type = REV_NONE;
- char *rev_arg = NULL;
- BIGNUM *serial = NULL;
- BIGNUM *crlnumber = NULL;
- char *startdate = NULL;
- char *enddate = NULL;
- long days = 0;
- int batch = 0;
- int notext = 0;
- unsigned long nameopt = 0, certopt = 0;
- int default_op = 1;
- int ext_copy = EXT_COPY_NONE;
- int selfsign = 0;
- X509 *x509 = NULL, *x509p = NULL;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *Sout = NULL, *Cout = NULL;
- char *dbfile = NULL;
- CA_DB *db = NULL;
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
- X509_REVOKED *r = NULL;
- ASN1_TIME *tmptm;
- ASN1_INTEGER *tmpser;
- char *f;
- const char *p;
- char *const *pp;
- int i, j;
- const EVP_MD *dgst = NULL;
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attribs = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509) *cert_sk = NULL;
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL;
-#undef BSIZE
-#define BSIZE 256
- MS_STATIC char buf[3][BSIZE];
- char *randfile = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- char *engine = NULL;
-#endif
- char *tofree = NULL;
- DB_ATTR db_attr;
-
-#ifdef EFENCE
- EF_PROTECT_FREE = 1;
- EF_PROTECT_BELOW = 1;
- EF_ALIGNMENT = 0;
-#endif
-
- apps_startup();
-
- conf = NULL;
- key = NULL;
- section = NULL;
-
- preserve = 0;
- msie_hack = 0;
- if (bio_err == NULL)
- if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL)
- BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
-
- argc--;
- argv++;
- while (argc >= 1) {
- if (strcmp(*argv, "-verbose") == 0)
- verbose = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-config") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- configfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-name") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- section = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-subj") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- subj = *(++argv);
- /* preserve=1; */
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-utf8") == 0)
- chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-create_serial") == 0)
- create_ser = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-multivalue-rdn") == 0)
- multirdn = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-startdate") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- startdate = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-enddate") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- enddate = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-days") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- days = atoi(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-md") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- md = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-policy") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- policy = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyfile") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- keyfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyform") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- keyform = str2fmt(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-passin") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- passargin = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- key = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- certfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-selfsign") == 0)
- selfsign = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-in") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- infile = *(++argv);
- req = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- outfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-outdir") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- outdir = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sigopt") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- if (!sigopts)
- sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
- if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, *(++argv)))
- goto bad;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-notext") == 0)
- notext = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-batch") == 0)
- batch = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-preserveDN") == 0)
- preserve = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noemailDN") == 0)
- email_dn = 0;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-gencrl") == 0)
- gencrl = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msie_hack") == 0)
- msie_hack = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crldays") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- crldays = atol(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlhours") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- crlhours = atol(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlsec") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- crlsec = atol(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-infiles") == 0) {
- argc--;
- argv++;
- req = 1;
- break;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ss_cert") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- ss_cert_file = *(++argv);
- req = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-spkac") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- spkac_file = *(++argv);
- req = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-revoke") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- infile = *(++argv);
- dorevoke = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-extensions") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- extensions = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-extfile") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- extfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- ser_status = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-updatedb") == 0) {
- doupdatedb = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlexts") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- crl_ext = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_reason") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- rev_arg = *(++argv);
- rev_type = REV_CRL_REASON;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_hold") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- rev_arg = *(++argv);
- rev_type = REV_HOLD;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_compromise") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- rev_arg = *(++argv);
- rev_type = REV_KEY_COMPROMISE;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_CA_compromise") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- rev_arg = *(++argv);
- rev_type = REV_CA_COMPROMISE;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- engine = *(++argv);
- }
-#endif
- else {
- bad:
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
- badops = 1;
- break;
- }
- argc--;
- argv++;
- }
-
- if (badops) {
- const char **pp2;
-
- for (pp2 = ca_usage; (*pp2 != NULL); pp2++)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s", *pp2);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-
- /*****************************************************************/
- tofree = NULL;
- if (configfile == NULL)
- configfile = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF");
- if (configfile == NULL)
- configfile = getenv("SSLEAY_CONF");
- if (configfile == NULL) {
- const char *s = X509_get_default_cert_area();
- size_t len;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
- tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (!tofree) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
- goto err;
- }
- strcpy(tofree, s);
-#else
- len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
- tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (!tofree) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
- goto err;
- }
- BUF_strlcpy(tofree, s, len);
- BUF_strlcat(tofree, "/", len);
-#endif
- BUF_strlcat(tofree, CONFIG_FILE, len);
- configfile = tofree;
- }
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", configfile);
- conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
- if (NCONF_load(conf, configfile, &errorline) <= 0) {
- if (errorline <= 0)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error loading the config file '%s'\n",
- configfile);
- else
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error on line %ld of config file '%s'\n",
- errorline, configfile);
- goto err;
- }
- if (tofree) {
- OPENSSL_free(tofree);
- tofree = NULL;
- }
-
- if (!load_config(bio_err, conf))
- goto err;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
-#endif
-
- /* Lets get the config section we are using */
- if (section == NULL) {
- section = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_CA);
- if (section == NULL) {
- lookup_fail(BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_CA);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (conf != NULL) {
- p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_file");
- if (p == NULL)
- ERR_clear_error();
- if (p != NULL) {
- BIO *oid_bio;
-
- oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
- if (oid_bio == NULL) {
- /*-
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- */
- ERR_clear_error();
- } else {
- OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);
- BIO_free(oid_bio);
- }
- }
- if (!add_oid_section(bio_err, conf)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- randfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, "RANDFILE");
- if (randfile == NULL)
- ERR_clear_error();
- app_RAND_load_file(randfile, bio_err, 0);
-
- f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, STRING_MASK);
- if (!f)
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- if (f && !ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(f)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid global string mask setting %s\n", f);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (chtype != MBSTRING_UTF8) {
- f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, UTF8_IN);
- if (!f)
- ERR_clear_error();
- else if (!strcmp(f, "yes"))
- chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8;
- }
-
- db_attr.unique_subject = 1;
- p = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_UNIQUE_SUBJECT);
- if (p) {
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: unique_subject = \"%s\"\n", p);
-#endif
- db_attr.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1);
- } else
- ERR_clear_error();
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- if (!p)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: unique_subject undefined\n");
-#endif
-#ifdef RL_DEBUG
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: configured unique_subject is %d\n",
- db_attr.unique_subject);
-#endif
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- Sout = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- Cout = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- if ((in == NULL) || (out == NULL) || (Sout == NULL) || (Cout == NULL)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*****************************************************************/
- /* report status of cert with serial number given on command line */
- if (ser_status) {
- if ((dbfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE)) == NULL) {
- lookup_fail(section, ENV_DATABASE);
- goto err;
- }
- db = load_index(dbfile, &db_attr);
- if (db == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!index_index(db))
- goto err;
-
- if (get_certificate_status(ser_status, db) != 1)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error verifying serial %s!\n", ser_status);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*****************************************************************/
- /* we definitely need a private key, so let's get it */
-
- if ((keyfile == NULL) && ((keyfile = NCONF_get_string(conf,
- section,
- ENV_PRIVATE_KEY)) ==
- NULL)) {
- lookup_fail(section, ENV_PRIVATE_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!key) {
- free_key = 1;
- if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passargin, NULL, &key, NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- pkey = load_key(bio_err, keyfile, keyform, 0, key, e, "CA private key");
- if (key)
- OPENSSL_cleanse(key, strlen(key));
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- /* load_key() has already printed an appropriate message */
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*****************************************************************/
- /* we need a certificate */
- if (!selfsign || spkac_file || ss_cert_file || gencrl) {
- if ((certfile == NULL)
- && ((certfile = NCONF_get_string(conf,
- section,
- ENV_CERTIFICATE)) == NULL)) {
- lookup_fail(section, ENV_CERTIFICATE);
- goto err;
- }
- x509 = load_cert(bio_err, certfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e,
- "CA certificate");
- if (x509 == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!X509_check_private_key(x509, pkey)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "CA certificate and CA private key do not match\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (!selfsign)
- x509p = x509;
-
- f = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_PRESERVE);
- if (f == NULL)
- ERR_clear_error();
- if ((f != NULL) && ((*f == 'y') || (*f == 'Y')))
- preserve = 1;
- f = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_MSIE_HACK);
- if (f == NULL)
- ERR_clear_error();
- if ((f != NULL) && ((*f == 'y') || (*f == 'Y')))
- msie_hack = 1;
-
- f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_NAMEOPT);
-
- if (f) {
- if (!set_name_ex(&nameopt, f)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid name options: \"%s\"\n", f);
- goto err;
- }
- default_op = 0;
- } else
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CERTOPT);
-
- if (f) {
- if (!set_cert_ex(&certopt, f)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid certificate options: \"%s\"\n", f);
- goto err;
- }
- default_op = 0;
- } else
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_EXTCOPY);
-
- if (f) {
- if (!set_ext_copy(&ext_copy, f)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid extension copy option: \"%s\"\n", f);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- /*****************************************************************/
- /* lookup where to write new certificates */
- if ((outdir == NULL) && (req)) {
-
- if ((outdir = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR))
- == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "there needs to be defined a directory for new certificate to be placed in\n");
- goto err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- /*
- * outdir is a directory spec, but access() for VMS demands a
- * filename. In any case, stat(), below, will catch the problem if
- * outdir is not a directory spec, and the fopen() or open() will
- * catch an error if there is no write access.
- *
- * Presumably, this problem could also be solved by using the DEC C
- * routines to convert the directory syntax to Unixly, and give that
- * to access(). However, time's too short to do that just now.
- */
-# ifndef _WIN32
- if (access(outdir, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) != 0)
-# else
- if (_access(outdir, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) != 0)
-# endif
- {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "I am unable to access the %s directory\n",
- outdir);
- perror(outdir);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (app_isdir(outdir) <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s need to be a directory\n", outdir);
- perror(outdir);
- goto err;
- }
-#endif
- }
-
- /*****************************************************************/
- /* we need to load the database file */
- if ((dbfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE)) == NULL) {
- lookup_fail(section, ENV_DATABASE);
- goto err;
- }
- db = load_index(dbfile, &db_attr);
- if (db == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* Lets check some fields */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
- pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
- if ((pp[DB_type][0] != DB_TYPE_REV) && (pp[DB_rev_date][0] != '\0')) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "entry %d: not revoked yet, but has a revocation date\n",
- i + 1);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((pp[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) &&
- !make_revoked(NULL, pp[DB_rev_date])) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " in entry %d\n", i + 1);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!check_time_format((char *)pp[DB_exp_date])) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: invalid expiry date\n", i + 1);
- goto err;
- }
- p = pp[DB_serial];
- j = strlen(p);
- if (*p == '-') {
- p++;
- j--;
- }
- if ((j & 1) || (j < 2)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: bad serial number length (%d)\n",
- i + 1, j);
- goto err;
- }
- while (*p) {
- if (!(((*p >= '0') && (*p <= '9')) ||
- ((*p >= 'A') && (*p <= 'F')) ||
- ((*p >= 'a') && (*p <= 'f')))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "entry %d: bad serial number characters, char pos %ld, char is '%c'\n",
- i + 1, (long)(p - pp[DB_serial]), *p);
- goto err;
- }
- p++;
- }
- }
- if (verbose) {
- BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); /* cannot fail */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- {
- BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
- out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out);
- }
-#endif
- TXT_DB_write(out, db->db);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%d entries loaded from the database\n",
- sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data));
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "generating index\n");
- }
-
- if (!index_index(db))
- goto err;
-
- /*****************************************************************/
- /* Update the db file for expired certificates */
- if (doupdatedb) {
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Updating %s ...\n", dbfile);
-
- i = do_updatedb(db);
- if (i == -1) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
- goto err;
- } else if (i == 0) {
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "No entries found to mark expired\n");
- } else {
- if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old"))
- goto err;
-
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Done. %d entries marked as expired\n", i);
- }
- }
-
- /*****************************************************************/
- /* Read extentions config file */
- if (extfile) {
- extconf = NCONF_new(NULL);
- if (NCONF_load(extconf, extfile, &errorline) <= 0) {
- if (errorline <= 0)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: loading the config file '%s'\n",
- extfile);
- else
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "ERROR: on line %ld of config file '%s'\n",
- errorline, extfile);
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Successfully loaded extensions file %s\n",
- extfile);
-
- /* We can have sections in the ext file */
- if (!extensions
- && !(extensions =
- NCONF_get_string(extconf, "default", "extensions")))
- extensions = "default";
- }
-
- /*****************************************************************/
- if (req || gencrl) {
- if (outfile != NULL) {
- if (BIO_write_filename(Sout, outfile) <= 0) {
- perror(outfile);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- BIO_set_fp(Sout, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- {
- BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
- Sout = BIO_push(tmpbio, Sout);
- }
-#endif
- }
- }
-
- if ((md == NULL) && ((md = NCONF_get_string(conf,
- section,
- ENV_DEFAULT_MD)) == NULL)) {
- lookup_fail(section, ENV_DEFAULT_MD);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!strcmp(md, "default")) {
- int def_nid;
- if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) <= 0) {
- BIO_puts(bio_err, "no default digest\n");
- goto err;
- }
- md = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(def_nid);
- }
-
- if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyname(md)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is an unsupported message digest type\n", md);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (req) {
- if ((email_dn == 1) && ((tmp_email_dn = NCONF_get_string(conf,
- section,
- ENV_DEFAULT_EMAIL_DN))
- != NULL)) {
- if (strcmp(tmp_email_dn, "no") == 0)
- email_dn = 0;
- }
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "message digest is %s\n",
- OBJ_nid2ln(dgst->type));
- if ((policy == NULL) && ((policy = NCONF_get_string(conf,
- section,
- ENV_POLICY)) ==
- NULL)) {
- lookup_fail(section, ENV_POLICY);
- goto err;
- }
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "policy is %s\n", policy);
-
- if ((serialfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SERIAL))
- == NULL) {
- lookup_fail(section, ENV_SERIAL);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!extconf) {
- /*
- * no '-extfile' option, so we look for extensions in the main
- * configuration file
- */
- if (!extensions) {
- extensions = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_EXTENSIONS);
- if (!extensions)
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- if (extensions) {
- /* Check syntax of file */
- X509V3_CTX ctx;
- X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx);
- X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf);
- if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, extensions, NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Error Loading extension section %s\n",
- extensions);
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (startdate == NULL) {
- startdate = NCONF_get_string(conf, section,
- ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE);
- if (startdate == NULL)
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- if (startdate && !ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, startdate)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "start date is invalid, it should be YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if (startdate == NULL)
- startdate = "today";
-
- if (enddate == NULL) {
- enddate = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE);
- if (enddate == NULL)
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- if (enddate && !ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, enddate)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "end date is invalid, it should be YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (days == 0) {
- if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS, &days))
- days = 0;
- }
- if (!enddate && (days == 0)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "cannot lookup how many days to certify for\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((serial = load_serial(serialfile, create_ser, NULL)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error while loading serial number\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if (verbose) {
- if (BN_is_zero(serial))
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "next serial number is 00\n");
- else {
- if ((f = BN_bn2hex(serial)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "next serial number is %s\n", f);
- OPENSSL_free(f);
- }
- }
-
- if ((attribs = NCONF_get_section(conf, policy)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to find 'section' for %s\n", policy);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((cert_sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if (spkac_file != NULL) {
- total++;
- j = certify_spkac(&x, spkac_file, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts,
- attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn,
- email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, extensions,
- conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
- ext_copy);
- if (j < 0)
- goto err;
- if (j > 0) {
- total_done++;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
- goto err;
- if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if (outfile) {
- output_der = 1;
- batch = 1;
- }
- }
- }
- if (ss_cert_file != NULL) {
- total++;
- j = certify_cert(&x, ss_cert_file, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts,
- attribs,
- db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn,
- startdate, enddate, days, batch, extensions,
- conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
- ext_copy, e);
- if (j < 0)
- goto err;
- if (j > 0) {
- total_done++;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
- goto err;
- if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- if (infile != NULL) {
- total++;
- j = certify(&x, infile, pkey, x509p, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db,
- serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate,
- enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose,
- certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign);
- if (j < 0)
- goto err;
- if (j > 0) {
- total_done++;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
- goto err;
- if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
- total++;
- j = certify(&x, argv[i], pkey, x509p, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db,
- serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate,
- enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose,
- certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign);
- if (j < 0)
- goto err;
- if (j > 0) {
- total_done++;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
- goto err;
- if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- /*
- * we have a stack of newly certified certificates and a data base
- * and serial number that need updating
- */
-
- if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk) > 0) {
- if (!batch) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "\n%d out of %d certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]",
- total_done, total);
- (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
- buf[0][0] = '\0';
- if (!fgets(buf[0], 10, stdin)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "CERTIFICATION CANCELED: I/O error\n");
- ret = 0;
- goto err;
- }
- if ((buf[0][0] != 'y') && (buf[0][0] != 'Y')) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATION CANCELED\n");
- ret = 0;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Write out database with %d new entries\n",
- sk_X509_num(cert_sk));
-
- if (!save_serial(serialfile, "new", serial, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new certificates\n");
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cert_sk); i++) {
- int k;
- char *n;
-
- x = sk_X509_value(cert_sk, i);
-
- j = x->cert_info->serialNumber->length;
- p = (const char *)x->cert_info->serialNumber->data;
-
- if (strlen(outdir) >= (size_t)(j ? BSIZE - j * 2 - 6 : BSIZE - 8)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "certificate file name too long\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- strcpy(buf[2], outdir);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- BUF_strlcat(buf[2], "/", sizeof(buf[2]));
-#endif
-
- n = (char *)&(buf[2][strlen(buf[2])]);
- if (j > 0) {
- for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
- if (n >= &(buf[2][sizeof(buf[2])]))
- break;
- BIO_snprintf(n,
- &buf[2][0] + sizeof(buf[2]) - n,
- "%02X", (unsigned char)*(p++));
- n += 2;
- }
- } else {
- *(n++) = '0';
- *(n++) = '0';
- }
- *(n++) = '.';
- *(n++) = 'p';
- *(n++) = 'e';
- *(n++) = 'm';
- *n = '\0';
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing %s\n", buf[2]);
-
- if (BIO_write_filename(Cout, buf[2]) <= 0) {
- perror(buf[2]);
- goto err;
- }
- write_new_certificate(Cout, x, 0, notext);
- write_new_certificate(Sout, x, output_der, notext);
- }
-
- if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk)) {
- /* Rename the database and the serial file */
- if (!rotate_serial(serialfile, "new", "old"))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old"))
- goto err;
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Data Base Updated\n");
- }
- }
-
- /*****************************************************************/
- if (gencrl) {
- int crl_v2 = 0;
- if (!crl_ext) {
- crl_ext = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRLEXT);
- if (!crl_ext)
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- if (crl_ext) {
- /* Check syntax of file */
- X509V3_CTX ctx;
- X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx);
- X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf);
- if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, crl_ext, NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Error Loading CRL extension section %s\n",
- crl_ext);
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if ((crlnumberfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRLNUMBER))
- != NULL)
- if ((crlnumber = load_serial(crlnumberfile, 0, NULL)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error while loading CRL number\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!crldays && !crlhours && !crlsec) {
- if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section,
- ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_DAYS, &crldays))
- crldays = 0;
- if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section,
- ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS, &crlhours))
- crlhours = 0;
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- if ((crldays == 0) && (crlhours == 0) && (crlsec == 0)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "cannot lookup how long until the next CRL is issued\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "making CRL\n");
- if ((crl = X509_CRL_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_get_subject_name(x509)))
- goto err;
-
- tmptm = ASN1_TIME_new();
- if (!tmptm)
- goto err;
- X509_gmtime_adj(tmptm, 0);
- X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, tmptm);
- if (!X509_time_adj_ex(tmptm, crldays, crlhours * 60 * 60 + crlsec,
- NULL)) {
- BIO_puts(bio_err, "error setting CRL nextUpdate\n");
- goto err;
- }
- X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, tmptm);
-
- ASN1_TIME_free(tmptm);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
- pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
- if (pp[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) {
- if ((r = X509_REVOKED_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- j = make_revoked(r, pp[DB_rev_date]);
- if (!j)
- goto err;
- if (j == 2)
- crl_v2 = 1;
- if (!BN_hex2bn(&serial, pp[DB_serial]))
- goto err;
- tmpser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL);
- BN_free(serial);
- serial = NULL;
- if (!tmpser)
- goto err;
- X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(r, tmpser);
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpser);
- X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, r);
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * sort the data so it will be written in serial number order
- */
- X509_CRL_sort(crl);
-
- /* we now have a CRL */
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "signing CRL\n");
-
- /* Add any extensions asked for */
-
- if (crl_ext || crlnumberfile != NULL) {
- X509V3_CTX crlctx;
- X509V3_set_ctx(&crlctx, x509, NULL, NULL, crl, 0);
- X509V3_set_nconf(&crlctx, conf);
-
- if (crl_ext)
- if (!X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(conf, &crlctx, crl_ext, crl))
- goto err;
- if (crlnumberfile != NULL) {
- tmpser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(crlnumber, NULL);
- if (!tmpser)
- goto err;
- X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_crl_number, tmpser, 0, 0);
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpser);
- crl_v2 = 1;
- if (!BN_add_word(crlnumber, 1))
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (crl_ext || crl_v2) {
- if (!X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
- goto err; /* version 2 CRL */
- }
-
- /* we have a CRL number that need updating */
- if (crlnumberfile != NULL)
- if (!save_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", crlnumber, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- if (crlnumber) {
- BN_free(crlnumber);
- crlnumber = NULL;
- }
-
- if (!do_X509_CRL_sign(bio_err, crl, pkey, dgst, sigopts))
- goto err;
-
- PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(Sout, crl);
-
- if (crlnumberfile != NULL) /* Rename the crlnumber file */
- if (!rotate_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", "old"))
- goto err;
-
- }
- /*****************************************************************/
- if (dorevoke) {
- if (infile == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "no input files\n");
- goto err;
- } else {
- X509 *revcert;
- revcert = load_cert(bio_err, infile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, infile);
- if (revcert == NULL)
- goto err;
- j = do_revoke(revcert, db, rev_type, rev_arg);
- if (j <= 0)
- goto err;
- X509_free(revcert);
-
- if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old"))
- goto err;
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Data Base Updated\n");
- }
- }
- /*****************************************************************/
- ret = 0;
- err:
- if (tofree)
- OPENSSL_free(tofree);
- BIO_free_all(Cout);
- BIO_free_all(Sout);
- BIO_free_all(out);
- BIO_free_all(in);
-
- if (cert_sk)
- sk_X509_pop_free(cert_sk, X509_free);
-
- if (ret)
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- app_RAND_write_file(randfile, bio_err);
- if (free_key && key)
- OPENSSL_free(key);
- BN_free(serial);
- BN_free(crlnumber);
- free_index(db);
- if (sigopts)
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (x509)
- X509_free(x509);
- X509_CRL_free(crl);
- NCONF_free(conf);
- NCONF_free(extconf);
- OBJ_cleanup();
- apps_shutdown();
- OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
-}
-
-static void lookup_fail(const char *name, const char *tag)
-{
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "variable lookup failed for %s::%s\n", name, tag);
-}
-
-static int certify(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
- const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
- BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
- int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate,
- long days, int batch, char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf,
- int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
- int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign)
-{
- X509_REQ *req = NULL;
- BIO *in = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL;
- int ok = -1, i;
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
-
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) {
- perror(infile);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((req = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading certificate request in %s\n",
- infile);
- goto err;
- }
- if (verbose)
- X509_REQ_print(bio_err, req);
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the request matches the signature\n");
-
- if (selfsign && !X509_REQ_check_private_key(req, pkey)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Certificate request and CA private key do not match\n");
- ok = 0;
- goto err;
- }
- if ((pktmp = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n");
- goto err;
- }
- i = X509_REQ_verify(req, pktmp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
- if (i < 0) {
- ok = 0;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification problems....\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- ok = 0;
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Signature did not match the certificate request\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- } else
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n");
-
- ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj,
- chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch,
- verbose, req, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
- ext_copy, selfsign);
-
- err:
- if (req != NULL)
- X509_REQ_free(req);
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- return (ok);
-}
-
-static int certify_cert(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
- const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
- BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
- int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate,
- char *enddate, long days, int batch, char *ext_sect,
- CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
- unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy,
- ENGINE *e)
-{
- X509 *req = NULL;
- X509_REQ *rreq = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL;
- int ok = -1, i;
-
- if ((req =
- load_cert(bio_err, infile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, infile)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (verbose)
- X509_print(bio_err, req);
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the request matches the signature\n");
-
- if ((pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(req)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n");
- goto err;
- }
- i = X509_verify(req, pktmp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
- if (i < 0) {
- ok = 0;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification problems....\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- ok = 0;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature did not match the certificate\n");
- goto err;
- } else
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n");
-
- if ((rreq = X509_to_X509_REQ(req, NULL, EVP_md5())) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj,
- chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch,
- verbose, rreq, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
- ext_copy, 0);
-
- err:
- if (rreq != NULL)
- X509_REQ_free(rreq);
- if (req != NULL)
- X509_free(req);
- return (ok);
-}
-
-static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
- const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial,
- char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn,
- int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days,
- int batch, int verbose, X509_REQ *req, char *ext_sect,
- CONF *lconf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
- int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign)
-{
- X509_NAME *name = NULL, *CAname = NULL, *subject = NULL, *dn_subject =
- NULL;
- ASN1_UTCTIME *tm, *tmptm;
- ASN1_STRING *str, *str2;
- ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
- X509 *ret = NULL;
- X509_CINF *ci;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *tne, *push;
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
- int ok = -1, i, j, last, nid;
- const char *p;
- CONF_VALUE *cv;
- OPENSSL_STRING row[DB_NUMBER];
- OPENSSL_STRING *irow = NULL;
- OPENSSL_STRING *rrow = NULL;
- char buf[25];
-
- tmptm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
- if (tmptm == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n");
- return (0);
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
- row[i] = NULL;
-
- if (subj) {
- X509_NAME *n = parse_name(subj, chtype, multirdn);
-
- if (!n) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- X509_REQ_set_subject_name(req, n);
- req->req_info->enc.modified = 1;
- X509_NAME_free(n);
- }
-
- if (default_op)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "The Subject's Distinguished Name is as follows\n");
-
- name = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req);
- for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(name); i++) {
- ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
- str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
- obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ne);
-
- if (msie_hack) {
- /* assume all type should be strings */
- nid = OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object);
-
- if (str->type == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING)
- ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(str);
-
- if ((str->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) &&
- (nid != NID_pkcs9_emailAddress))
- str->type = V_ASN1_T61STRING;
-
- if ((nid == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) &&
- (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING))
- str->type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
- }
-
- /* If no EMAIL is wanted in the subject */
- if ((OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) && (!email_dn))
- continue;
-
- /* check some things */
- if ((OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) &&
- (str->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "\nemailAddress type needs to be of type IA5STRING\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if ((str->type != V_ASN1_BMPSTRING)
- && (str->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING)) {
- j = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(str->data, str->length);
- if (((j == V_ASN1_T61STRING) &&
- (str->type != V_ASN1_T61STRING)) ||
- ((j == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) &&
- (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "\nThe string contains characters that are illegal for the ASN.1 type\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (default_op)
- old_entry_print(bio_err, obj, str);
- }
-
- /* Ok, now we check the 'policy' stuff. */
- if ((subject = X509_NAME_new()) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* take a copy of the issuer name before we mess with it. */
- if (selfsign)
- CAname = X509_NAME_dup(name);
- else
- CAname = X509_NAME_dup(x509->cert_info->subject);
- if (CAname == NULL)
- goto err;
- str = str2 = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(policy); i++) {
- cv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(policy, i); /* get the object id */
- if ((j = OBJ_txt2nid(cv->name)) == NID_undef) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "%s:unknown object type in 'policy' configuration\n",
- cv->name);
- goto err;
- }
- obj = OBJ_nid2obj(j);
-
- last = -1;
- for (;;) {
- /* lookup the object in the supplied name list */
- j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, last);
- if (j < 0) {
- if (last != -1)
- break;
- tne = NULL;
- } else {
- tne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, j);
- }
- last = j;
-
- /* depending on the 'policy', decide what to do. */
- push = NULL;
- if (strcmp(cv->value, "optional") == 0) {
- if (tne != NULL)
- push = tne;
- } else if (strcmp(cv->value, "supplied") == 0) {
- if (tne == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "The %s field needed to be supplied and was missing\n",
- cv->name);
- goto err;
- } else
- push = tne;
- } else if (strcmp(cv->value, "match") == 0) {
- int last2;
-
- if (tne == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "The mandatory %s field was missing\n",
- cv->name);
- goto err;
- }
-
- last2 = -1;
-
- again2:
- j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(CAname, obj, last2);
- if ((j < 0) && (last2 == -1)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "The %s field does not exist in the CA certificate,\nthe 'policy' is misconfigured\n",
- cv->name);
- goto err;
- }
- if (j >= 0) {
- push = X509_NAME_get_entry(CAname, j);
- str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(tne);
- str2 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(push);
- last2 = j;
- if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(str, str2) != 0)
- goto again2;
- }
- if (j < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "The %s field needed to be the same in the\nCA certificate (%s) and the request (%s)\n",
- cv->name,
- ((str2 == NULL) ? "NULL" : (char *)str2->data),
- ((str == NULL) ? "NULL" : (char *)str->data));
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "%s:invalid type in 'policy' configuration\n",
- cv->value);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (push != NULL) {
- if (!X509_NAME_add_entry(subject, push, -1, 0)) {
- if (push != NULL)
- X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(push);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (j < 0)
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (preserve) {
- X509_NAME_free(subject);
- /* subject=X509_NAME_dup(X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req)); */
- subject = X509_NAME_dup(name);
- if (subject == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "The subject name appears to be ok, checking data base for clashes\n");
-
- /* Build the correct Subject if no e-mail is wanted in the subject */
- /*
- * and add it later on because of the method extensions are added
- * (altName)
- */
-
- if (email_dn)
- dn_subject = subject;
- else {
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpne;
- /*
- * Its best to dup the subject DN and then delete any email addresses
- * because this retains its structure.
- */
- if (!(dn_subject = X509_NAME_dup(subject))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn_subject,
- NID_pkcs9_emailAddress,
- -1)) >= 0) {
- tmpne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn_subject, i);
- X509_NAME_delete_entry(dn_subject, i);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpne);
- }
- }
-
- if (BN_is_zero(serial))
- row[DB_serial] = BUF_strdup("00");
- else
- row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(serial);
- if (row[DB_serial] == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (db->attributes.unique_subject) {
- OPENSSL_STRING *crow = row;
-
- rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_name, crow);
- if (rrow != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "ERROR:There is already a certificate for %s\n",
- row[DB_name]);
- }
- }
- if (rrow == NULL) {
- rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
- if (rrow != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "ERROR:Serial number %s has already been issued,\n",
- row[DB_serial]);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " check the database/serial_file for corruption\n");
- }
- }
-
- if (rrow != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "The matching entry has the following details\n");
- if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E')
- p = "Expired";
- else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R')
- p = "Revoked";
- else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V')
- p = "Valid";
- else
- p = "\ninvalid type, Data base error\n";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Type :%s\n", p);;
- if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') {
- p = rrow[DB_exp_date];
- if (p == NULL)
- p = "undef";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Was revoked on:%s\n", p);
- }
- p = rrow[DB_exp_date];
- if (p == NULL)
- p = "undef";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Expires on :%s\n", p);
- p = rrow[DB_serial];
- if (p == NULL)
- p = "undef";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial Number :%s\n", p);
- p = rrow[DB_file];
- if (p == NULL)
- p = "undef";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "File name :%s\n", p);
- p = rrow[DB_name];
- if (p == NULL)
- p = "undef";
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject Name :%s\n", p);
- ok = -1; /* This is now a 'bad' error. */
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* We are now totally happy, lets make and sign the certificate */
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Everything appears to be ok, creating and signing the certificate\n");
-
- if ((ret = X509_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ci = ret->cert_info;
-
-#ifdef X509_V3
- /* Make it an X509 v3 certificate. */
- if (!X509_set_version(ret, 2))
- goto err;
-#endif
-
- if (BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, ci->serialNumber) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (selfsign) {
- if (!X509_set_issuer_name(ret, subject))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!X509_set_issuer_name(ret, X509_get_subject_name(x509)))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(startdate, "today") == 0)
- X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(ret), 0);
- else
- ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_get_notBefore(ret), startdate);
-
- if (enddate == NULL)
- X509_time_adj_ex(X509_get_notAfter(ret), days, 0, NULL);
- else
- ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_get_notAfter(ret), enddate);
-
- if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, subject))
- goto err;
-
- pktmp = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req);
- i = X509_set_pubkey(ret, pktmp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
- if (!i)
- goto err;
-
- /* Lets add the extensions, if there are any */
- if (ext_sect) {
- X509V3_CTX ctx;
- if (ci->version == NULL)
- if ((ci->version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ASN1_INTEGER_set(ci->version, 2); /* version 3 certificate */
-
- /*
- * Free the current entries if any, there should not be any I believe
- */
- if (ci->extensions != NULL)
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(ci->extensions, X509_EXTENSION_free);
-
- ci->extensions = NULL;
-
- /* Initialize the context structure */
- if (selfsign)
- X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, ret, ret, req, NULL, 0);
- else
- X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, x509, ret, req, NULL, 0);
-
- if (extconf) {
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra configuration file found\n");
-
- /* Use the extconf configuration db LHASH */
- X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, extconf);
-
- /* Test the structure (needed?) */
- /* X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); */
-
- /* Adds exts contained in the configuration file */
- if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(extconf, &ctx, ext_sect, ret)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "ERROR: adding extensions in section %s\n",
- ext_sect);
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Successfully added extensions from file.\n");
- } else if (ext_sect) {
- /* We found extensions to be set from config file */
- X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, lconf);
-
- if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(lconf, &ctx, ext_sect, ret)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "ERROR: adding extensions in section %s\n",
- ext_sect);
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (verbose)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Successfully added extensions from config\n");
- }
- }
-
- /* Copy extensions from request (if any) */
-
- if (!copy_extensions(ret, req, ext_copy)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: adding extensions from request\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Set the right value for the noemailDN option */
- if (email_dn == 0) {
- if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, dn_subject))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!default_op) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate Details:\n");
- /*
- * Never print signature details because signature not present
- */
- certopt |= X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP | X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME;
- X509_print_ex(bio_err, ret, nameopt, certopt);
- }
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate is to be certified until ");
- ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(ret));
- if (days)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " (%ld days)", days);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
-
- if (!batch) {
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Sign the certificate? [y/n]:");
- (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
- buf[0] = '\0';
- if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, stdin)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "CERTIFICATE WILL NOT BE CERTIFIED: I/O error\n");
- ok = 0;
- goto err;
- }
- if (!((buf[0] == 'y') || (buf[0] == 'Y'))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATE WILL NOT BE CERTIFIED\n");
- ok = 0;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(ret);
- if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pktmp) &&
- !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
-
- if (!do_X509_sign(bio_err, ret, pkey, dgst, sigopts))
- goto err;
-
- /* We now just add it to the database */
- row[DB_type] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(2);
-
- tm = X509_get_notAfter(ret);
- row[DB_exp_date] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(tm->length + 1);
- memcpy(row[DB_exp_date], tm->data, tm->length);
- row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0';
-
- row[DB_rev_date] = NULL;
-
- /* row[DB_serial] done already */
- row[DB_file] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(8);
- row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ret), NULL, 0);
-
- if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_exp_date] == NULL) ||
- (row[DB_file] == NULL) || (row[DB_name] == NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- BUF_strlcpy(row[DB_file], "unknown", 8);
- row[DB_type][0] = 'V';
- row[DB_type][1] = '\0';
-
- if ((irow =
- (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (DB_NUMBER + 1))) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) {
- irow[i] = row[i];
- row[i] = NULL;
- }
- irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL;
-
- if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update database\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error);
- goto err;
- }
- ok = 1;
- err:
- for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
- if (row[i] != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(row[i]);
-
- if (CAname != NULL)
- X509_NAME_free(CAname);
- if (subject != NULL)
- X509_NAME_free(subject);
- if ((dn_subject != NULL) && !email_dn)
- X509_NAME_free(dn_subject);
- if (tmptm != NULL)
- ASN1_UTCTIME_free(tmptm);
- if (ok <= 0) {
- if (ret != NULL)
- X509_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
- } else
- *xret = ret;
- return (ok);
-}
-
-static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der,
- int notext)
-{
-
- if (output_der) {
- (void)i2d_X509_bio(bp, x);
- return;
- }
-#if 0
- /* ??? Not needed since X509_print prints all this stuff anyway */
- f = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), buf, 256);
- BIO_printf(bp, "issuer :%s\n", f);
-
- f = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, 256);
- BIO_printf(bp, "subject:%s\n", f);
-
- BIO_puts(bp, "serial :");
- i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, x->cert_info->serialNumber);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n\n");
-#endif
- if (!notext)
- X509_print(bp, x);
- PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x);
-}
-
-static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst,
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
- BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
- int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate,
- char *enddate, long days, char *ext_sect,
- CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
- unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy)
-{
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL;
- LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *parms = NULL;
- X509_REQ *req = NULL;
- CONF_VALUE *cv = NULL;
- NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL;
- X509_REQ_INFO *ri;
- char *type, *buf;
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL;
- X509_NAME *n = NULL;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = NULL;
- int ok = -1, i, j;
- long errline;
- int nid;
-
- /*
- * Load input file into a hash table. (This is just an easy
- * way to read and parse the file, then put it into a convenient
- * STACK format).
- */
- parms = CONF_load(NULL, infile, &errline);
- if (parms == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error on line %ld of %s\n", errline, infile);
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
-
- sk = CONF_get_section(parms, "default");
- if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) == 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "no name/value pairs found in %s\n", infile);
- CONF_free(parms);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Now create a dummy X509 request structure. We don't actually
- * have an X509 request, but we have many of the components
- * (a public key, various DN components). The idea is that we
- * put these components into the right X509 request structure
- * and we can use the same code as if you had a real X509 request.
- */
- req = X509_REQ_new();
- if (req == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Build up the subject name set.
- */
- ri = req->req_info;
- n = ri->subject;
-
- for (i = 0;; i++) {
- if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) <= i)
- break;
-
- cv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk, i);
- type = cv->name;
- /*
- * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances
- */
- for (buf = cv->name; *buf; buf++)
- if ((*buf == ':') || (*buf == ',') || (*buf == '.')) {
- buf++;
- if (*buf)
- type = buf;
- break;
- }
-
- buf = cv->value;
- if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef) {
- if (strcmp(type, "SPKAC") == 0) {
- spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(cv->value, -1);
- if (spki == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "unable to load Netscape SPKAC structure\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- continue;
- }
-
- if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype,
- (unsigned char *)buf, -1, -1, 0))
- goto err;
- }
- if (spki == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Netscape SPKAC structure not found in %s\n",
- infile);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Now extract the key from the SPKI structure.
- */
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Check that the SPKAC request matches the signature\n");
-
- if ((pktmp = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking SPKAC public key\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- j = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pktmp);
- if (j <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "signature verification failed on SPKAC public key\n");
- goto err;
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n");
-
- X509_REQ_set_pubkey(req, pktmp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
- ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj,
- chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, 1,
- verbose, req, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
- ext_copy, 0);
- err:
- if (req != NULL)
- X509_REQ_free(req);
- if (parms != NULL)
- CONF_free(parms);
- if (spki != NULL)
- NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki);
- if (ne != NULL)
- X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
-
- return (ok);
-}
-
-static int check_time_format(const char *str)
-{
- return ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, str);
-}
-
-static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int type, char *value)
-{
- ASN1_UTCTIME *tm = NULL;
- char *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow, **irow;
- char *rev_str = NULL;
- BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
- int ok = -1, i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
- row[i] = NULL;
- row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509), NULL, 0);
- bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), NULL);
- if (!bn)
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_zero(bn))
- row[DB_serial] = BUF_strdup("00");
- else
- row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(bn);
- BN_free(bn);
- if ((row[DB_name] == NULL) || (row[DB_serial] == NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * We have to lookup by serial number because name lookup skips revoked
- * certs
- */
- rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
- if (rrow == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Adding Entry with serial number %s to DB for %s\n",
- row[DB_serial], row[DB_name]);
-
- /* We now just add it to the database */
- row[DB_type] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(2);
-
- tm = X509_get_notAfter(x509);
- row[DB_exp_date] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(tm->length + 1);
- memcpy(row[DB_exp_date], tm->data, tm->length);
- row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0';
-
- row[DB_rev_date] = NULL;
-
- /* row[DB_serial] done already */
- row[DB_file] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(8);
-
- /* row[DB_name] done already */
-
- if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_exp_date] == NULL) ||
- (row[DB_file] == NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- BUF_strlcpy(row[DB_file], "unknown", 8);
- row[DB_type][0] = 'V';
- row[DB_type][1] = '\0';
-
- if ((irow =
- (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (DB_NUMBER + 1))) ==
- NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) {
- irow[i] = row[i];
- row[i] = NULL;
- }
- irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL;
-
- if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update database\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Revoke Certificate */
- ok = do_revoke(x509, db, type, value);
-
- goto err;
-
- } else if (index_name_cmp_noconst(row, rrow)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:name does not match %s\n", row[DB_name]);
- goto err;
- } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:Already revoked, serial number %s\n",
- row[DB_serial]);
- goto err;
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Revoking Certificate %s.\n", rrow[DB_serial]);
- rev_str = make_revocation_str(type, value);
- if (!rev_str) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in revocation arguments\n");
- goto err;
- }
- rrow[DB_type][0] = 'R';
- rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0';
- rrow[DB_rev_date] = rev_str;
- }
- ok = 1;
- err:
- for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) {
- if (row[i] != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(row[i]);
- }
- return (ok);
-}
-
-static int get_certificate_status(const char *serial, CA_DB *db)
-{
- char *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow;
- int ok = -1, i;
-
- /* Free Resources */
- for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
- row[i] = NULL;
-
- /* Malloc needed char spaces */
- row[DB_serial] = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(serial) + 2);
- if (row[DB_serial] == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (strlen(serial) % 2) {
- /*
- * Set the first char to 0
- */ ;
- row[DB_serial][0] = '0';
-
- /* Copy String from serial to row[DB_serial] */
- memcpy(row[DB_serial] + 1, serial, strlen(serial));
- row[DB_serial][strlen(serial) + 1] = '\0';
- } else {
- /* Copy String from serial to row[DB_serial] */
- memcpy(row[DB_serial], serial, strlen(serial));
- row[DB_serial][strlen(serial)] = '\0';
- }
-
- /* Make it Upper Case */
- for (i = 0; row[DB_serial][i] != '\0'; i++)
- row[DB_serial][i] = toupper((unsigned char)row[DB_serial][i]);
-
- ok = 1;
-
- /* Search for the certificate */
- rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
- if (rrow == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial %s not present in db.\n", row[DB_serial]);
- ok = -1;
- goto err;
- } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Valid (%c)\n",
- row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
- goto err;
- } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Revoked (%c)\n",
- row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
- goto err;
- } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E') {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired (%c)\n",
- row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
- goto err;
- } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'S') {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Suspended (%c)\n",
- row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
- goto err;
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Unknown (%c).\n",
- row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
- ok = -1;
- }
- err:
- for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) {
- if (row[i] != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(row[i]);
- }
- return (ok);
-}
-
-static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db)
-{
- ASN1_UTCTIME *a_tm = NULL;
- int i, cnt = 0;
- int db_y2k, a_y2k; /* flags = 1 if y >= 2000 */
- char **rrow, *a_tm_s;
-
- a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
-
- /* get actual time and make a string */
- a_tm = X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0);
- a_tm_s = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(a_tm->length + 1);
- if (a_tm_s == NULL) {
- cnt = -1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- memcpy(a_tm_s, a_tm->data, a_tm->length);
- a_tm_s[a_tm->length] = '\0';
-
- if (strncmp(a_tm_s, "49", 2) <= 0)
- a_y2k = 1;
- else
- a_y2k = 0;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
- rrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
-
- if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') {
- /* ignore entries that are not valid */
- if (strncmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], "49", 2) <= 0)
- db_y2k = 1;
- else
- db_y2k = 0;
-
- if (db_y2k == a_y2k) {
- /* all on the same y2k side */
- if (strcmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], a_tm_s) <= 0) {
- rrow[DB_type][0] = 'E';
- rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0';
- cnt++;
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]);
- }
- } else if (db_y2k < a_y2k) {
- rrow[DB_type][0] = 'E';
- rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0';
- cnt++;
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]);
- }
-
- }
- }
-
- err:
-
- ASN1_UTCTIME_free(a_tm);
- OPENSSL_free(a_tm_s);
-
- return (cnt);
-}
-
-static const char *crl_reasons[] = {
- /* CRL reason strings */
- "unspecified",
- "keyCompromise",
- "CACompromise",
- "affiliationChanged",
- "superseded",
- "cessationOfOperation",
- "certificateHold",
- "removeFromCRL",
- /* Additional pseudo reasons */
- "holdInstruction",
- "keyTime",
- "CAkeyTime"
-};
-
-#define NUM_REASONS (sizeof(crl_reasons) / sizeof(char *))
-
-/*
- * Given revocation information convert to a DB string. The format of the
- * string is: revtime[,reason,extra]. Where 'revtime' is the revocation time
- * (the current time). 'reason' is the optional CRL reason and 'extra' is any
- * additional argument
- */
-
-char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg)
-{
- char *other = NULL, *str;
- const char *reason = NULL;
- ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
- ASN1_UTCTIME *revtm = NULL;
- int i;
- switch (rev_type) {
- case REV_NONE:
- break;
-
- case REV_CRL_REASON:
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- if (!strcasecmp(rev_arg, crl_reasons[i])) {
- reason = crl_reasons[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- if (reason == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown CRL reason %s\n", rev_arg);
- return NULL;
- }
- break;
-
- case REV_HOLD:
- /* Argument is an OID */
-
- otmp = OBJ_txt2obj(rev_arg, 0);
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(otmp);
-
- if (otmp == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid object identifier %s\n", rev_arg);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- reason = "holdInstruction";
- other = rev_arg;
- break;
-
- case REV_KEY_COMPROMISE:
- case REV_CA_COMPROMISE:
-
- /* Argument is the key compromise time */
- if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(NULL, rev_arg)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Invalid time format %s. Need YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n",
- rev_arg);
- return NULL;
- }
- other = rev_arg;
- if (rev_type == REV_KEY_COMPROMISE)
- reason = "keyTime";
- else
- reason = "CAkeyTime";
-
- break;
-
- }
-
- revtm = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
-
- if (!revtm)
- return NULL;
-
- i = revtm->length + 1;
-
- if (reason)
- i += strlen(reason) + 1;
- if (other)
- i += strlen(other) + 1;
-
- str = OPENSSL_malloc(i);
-
- if (!str)
- return NULL;
-
- BUF_strlcpy(str, (char *)revtm->data, i);
- if (reason) {
- BUF_strlcat(str, ",", i);
- BUF_strlcat(str, reason, i);
- }
- if (other) {
- BUF_strlcat(str, ",", i);
- BUF_strlcat(str, other, i);
- }
- ASN1_UTCTIME_free(revtm);
- return str;
-}
-
-/*-
- * Convert revocation field to X509_REVOKED entry
- * return code:
- * 0 error
- * 1 OK
- * 2 OK and some extensions added (i.e. V2 CRL)
- */
-
-int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str)
-{
- char *tmp = NULL;
- int reason_code = -1;
- int i, ret = 0;
- ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
- ASN1_ENUMERATED *rtmp = NULL;
-
- ASN1_TIME *revDate = NULL;
-
- i = unpack_revinfo(&revDate, &reason_code, &hold, &comp_time, str);
-
- if (i == 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (rev && !X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(rev, revDate))
- goto err;
-
- if (rev && (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS)) {
- rtmp = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
- if (!rtmp || !ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(rtmp, reason_code))
- goto err;
- if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(rev, NID_crl_reason, rtmp, 0, 0))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rev && comp_time) {
- if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d
- (rev, NID_invalidity_date, comp_time, 0, 0))
- goto err;
- }
- if (rev && hold) {
- if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d
- (rev, NID_hold_instruction_code, hold, 0, 0))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS)
- ret = 2;
- else
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
-
- if (tmp)
- OPENSSL_free(tmp);
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold);
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time);
- ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(rtmp);
- ASN1_TIME_free(revDate);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-int old_entry_print(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, ASN1_STRING *str)
-{
- char buf[25], *pbuf, *p;
- int j;
- j = i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, obj);
- pbuf = buf;
- for (j = 22 - j; j > 0; j--)
- *(pbuf++) = ' ';
- *(pbuf++) = ':';
- *(pbuf++) = '\0';
- BIO_puts(bp, buf);
-
- if (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
- BIO_printf(bp, "PRINTABLE:'");
- else if (str->type == V_ASN1_T61STRING)
- BIO_printf(bp, "T61STRING:'");
- else if (str->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
- BIO_printf(bp, "IA5STRING:'");
- else if (str->type == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING)
- BIO_printf(bp, "UNIVERSALSTRING:'");
- else
- BIO_printf(bp, "ASN.1 %2d:'", str->type);
-
- p = (char *)str->data;
- for (j = str->length; j > 0; j--) {
- if ((*p >= ' ') && (*p <= '~'))
- BIO_printf(bp, "%c", *p);
- else if (*p & 0x80)
- BIO_printf(bp, "\\0x%02X", *p);
- else if ((unsigned char)*p == 0xf7)
- BIO_printf(bp, "^?");
- else
- BIO_printf(bp, "^%c", *p + '@');
- p++;
- }
- BIO_printf(bp, "'\n");
- return 1;
-}
-
-int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pinvtm, const char *str)
-{
- char *tmp = NULL;
- char *rtime_str, *reason_str = NULL, *arg_str = NULL, *p;
- int reason_code = -1;
- int ret = 0;
- unsigned int i;
- ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
- tmp = BUF_strdup(str);
-
- if (!tmp) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- p = strchr(tmp, ',');
-
- rtime_str = tmp;
-
- if (p) {
- *p = '\0';
- p++;
- reason_str = p;
- p = strchr(p, ',');
- if (p) {
- *p = '\0';
- arg_str = p + 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (prevtm) {
- *prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
- if (!*prevtm) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if (!ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(*prevtm, rtime_str)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid revocation date %s\n", rtime_str);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (reason_str) {
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_REASONS; i++) {
- if (!strcasecmp(reason_str, crl_reasons[i])) {
- reason_code = i;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (reason_code == OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid reason code %s\n", reason_str);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (reason_code == 7)
- reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL;
- else if (reason_code == 8) { /* Hold instruction */
- if (!arg_str) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing hold instruction\n");
- goto err;
- }
- reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD;
- hold = OBJ_txt2obj(arg_str, 0);
-
- if (!hold) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid object identifier %s\n",
- arg_str);
- goto err;
- }
- if (phold)
- *phold = hold;
- } else if ((reason_code == 9) || (reason_code == 10)) {
- if (!arg_str) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing compromised time\n");
- goto err;
- }
- comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
- if (!comp_time) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(comp_time, arg_str)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid compromised time %s\n", arg_str);
- goto err;
- }
- if (reason_code == 9)
- reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE;
- else
- reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE;
- }
- }
-
- if (preason)
- *preason = reason_code;
- if (pinvtm)
- *pinvtm = comp_time;
- else
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time);
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
-
- if (tmp)
- OPENSSL_free(tmp);
- if (!phold)
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold);
- if (!pinvtm)
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time);
-
- return ret;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ca.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/ca.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ca.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ca.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2902 @@
+/* apps/ca.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+/* The PPKI stuff has been donated by Jeff Barber <jeffb at issl.atl.hp.com> */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/txt_db.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+#ifndef W_OK
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# if defined(__DECC)
+# include <unistd.h>
+# else
+# include <unixlib.h>
+# endif
+# elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+# include <sys/file.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#include "apps.h"
+
+#ifndef W_OK
+# define F_OK 0
+# define X_OK 1
+# define W_OK 2
+# define R_OK 4
+#endif
+
+#undef PROG
+#define PROG ca_main
+
+#define BASE_SECTION "ca"
+#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf"
+
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_CA "default_ca"
+
+#define STRING_MASK "string_mask"
+#define UTF8_IN "utf8"
+
+#define ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR "new_certs_dir"
+#define ENV_CERTIFICATE "certificate"
+#define ENV_SERIAL "serial"
+#define ENV_CRLNUMBER "crlnumber"
+#define ENV_PRIVATE_KEY "private_key"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS "default_days"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE "default_startdate"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE "default_enddate"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_DAYS "default_crl_days"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS "default_crl_hours"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_MD "default_md"
+#define ENV_DEFAULT_EMAIL_DN "email_in_dn"
+#define ENV_PRESERVE "preserve"
+#define ENV_POLICY "policy"
+#define ENV_EXTENSIONS "x509_extensions"
+#define ENV_CRLEXT "crl_extensions"
+#define ENV_MSIE_HACK "msie_hack"
+#define ENV_NAMEOPT "name_opt"
+#define ENV_CERTOPT "cert_opt"
+#define ENV_EXTCOPY "copy_extensions"
+#define ENV_UNIQUE_SUBJECT "unique_subject"
+
+#define ENV_DATABASE "database"
+
+/* Additional revocation information types */
+
+#define REV_NONE 0 /* No addditional information */
+#define REV_CRL_REASON 1 /* Value is CRL reason code */
+#define REV_HOLD 2 /* Value is hold instruction */
+#define REV_KEY_COMPROMISE 3 /* Value is cert key compromise time */
+#define REV_CA_COMPROMISE 4 /* Value is CA key compromise time */
+
+static const char *ca_usage[] = {
+ "usage: ca args\n",
+ "\n",
+ " -verbose - Talk alot while doing things\n",
+ " -config file - A config file\n",
+ " -name arg - The particular CA definition to use\n",
+ " -gencrl - Generate a new CRL\n",
+ " -crldays days - Days is when the next CRL is due\n",
+ " -crlhours hours - Hours is when the next CRL is due\n",
+ " -startdate YYMMDDHHMMSSZ - certificate validity notBefore\n",
+ " -enddate YYMMDDHHMMSSZ - certificate validity notAfter (overrides -days)\n",
+ " -days arg - number of days to certify the certificate for\n",
+ " -md arg - md to use, one of md2, md5, sha or sha1\n",
+ " -policy arg - The CA 'policy' to support\n",
+ " -keyfile arg - private key file\n",
+ " -keyform arg - private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)\n",
+ " -key arg - key to decode the private key if it is encrypted\n",
+ " -cert file - The CA certificate\n",
+ " -selfsign - sign a certificate with the key associated with it\n",
+ " -in file - The input PEM encoded certificate request(s)\n",
+ " -out file - Where to put the output file(s)\n",
+ " -outdir dir - Where to put output certificates\n",
+ " -infiles .... - The last argument, requests to process\n",
+ " -spkac file - File contains DN and signed public key and challenge\n",
+ " -ss_cert file - File contains a self signed cert to sign\n",
+ " -preserveDN - Don't re-order the DN\n",
+ " -noemailDN - Don't add the EMAIL field into certificate' subject\n",
+ " -batch - Don't ask questions\n",
+ " -msie_hack - msie modifications to handle all those universal strings\n",
+ " -revoke file - Revoke a certificate (given in file)\n",
+ " -subj arg - Use arg instead of request's subject\n",
+ " -utf8 - input characters are UTF8 (default ASCII)\n",
+ " -multivalue-rdn - enable support for multivalued RDNs\n",
+ " -extensions .. - Extension section (override value in config file)\n",
+ " -extfile file - Configuration file with X509v3 extentions to add\n",
+ " -crlexts .. - CRL extension section (override value in config file)\n",
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ " -engine e - use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n",
+#endif
+ " -status serial - Shows certificate status given the serial number\n",
+ " -updatedb - Updates db for expired certificates\n",
+ NULL
+};
+
+#ifdef EFENCE
+extern int EF_PROTECT_FREE;
+extern int EF_PROTECT_BELOW;
+extern int EF_ALIGNMENT;
+#endif
+
+static void lookup_fail(const char *name, const char *tag);
+static int certify(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+ const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+ BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+ int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate,
+ long days, int batch, char *ext_sect, CONF *conf,
+ int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
+ int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign);
+static int certify_cert(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+ const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+ BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+ int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate,
+ char *enddate, long days, int batch, char *ext_sect,
+ CONF *conf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
+ unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy,
+ ENGINE *e);
+static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst,
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+ BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+ int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate,
+ char *enddate, long days, char *ext_sect, CONF *conf,
+ int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
+ unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy);
+static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der,
+ int notext);
+static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+ const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial,
+ char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn,
+ int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days,
+ int batch, int verbose, X509_REQ *req, char *ext_sect,
+ CONF *conf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
+ int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign);
+static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int ext, char *extval);
+static int get_certificate_status(const char *ser_status, CA_DB *db);
+static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db);
+static int check_time_format(const char *str);
+char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg);
+int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str);
+int old_entry_print(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, ASN1_STRING *str);
+static CONF *conf = NULL;
+static CONF *extconf = NULL;
+static char *section = NULL;
+
+static int preserve = 0;
+static int msie_hack = 0;
+
+int MAIN(int, char **);
+
+int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ ENGINE *e = NULL;
+ char *key = NULL, *passargin = NULL;
+ int create_ser = 0;
+ int free_key = 0;
+ int total = 0;
+ int total_done = 0;
+ int badops = 0;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int email_dn = 1;
+ int req = 0;
+ int verbose = 0;
+ int gencrl = 0;
+ int dorevoke = 0;
+ int doupdatedb = 0;
+ long crldays = 0;
+ long crlhours = 0;
+ long crlsec = 0;
+ long errorline = -1;
+ char *configfile = NULL;
+ char *md = NULL;
+ char *policy = NULL;
+ char *keyfile = NULL;
+ char *certfile = NULL;
+ int keyform = FORMAT_PEM;
+ char *infile = NULL;
+ char *spkac_file = NULL;
+ char *ss_cert_file = NULL;
+ char *ser_status = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int output_der = 0;
+ char *outfile = NULL;
+ char *outdir = NULL;
+ char *serialfile = NULL;
+ char *crlnumberfile = NULL;
+ char *extensions = NULL;
+ char *extfile = NULL;
+ char *subj = NULL;
+ unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC;
+ int multirdn = 0;
+ char *tmp_email_dn = NULL;
+ char *crl_ext = NULL;
+ int rev_type = REV_NONE;
+ char *rev_arg = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *serial = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *crlnumber = NULL;
+ char *startdate = NULL;
+ char *enddate = NULL;
+ long days = 0;
+ int batch = 0;
+ int notext = 0;
+ unsigned long nameopt = 0, certopt = 0;
+ int default_op = 1;
+ int ext_copy = EXT_COPY_NONE;
+ int selfsign = 0;
+ X509 *x509 = NULL, *x509p = NULL;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL, *Sout = NULL, *Cout = NULL;
+ char *dbfile = NULL;
+ CA_DB *db = NULL;
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ X509_REVOKED *r = NULL;
+ ASN1_TIME *tmptm;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *tmpser;
+ char *f;
+ const char *p;
+ char *const *pp;
+ int i, j;
+ const EVP_MD *dgst = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *attribs = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_sk = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL;
+#undef BSIZE
+#define BSIZE 256
+ MS_STATIC char buf[3][BSIZE];
+ char *randfile = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ char *engine = NULL;
+#endif
+ char *tofree = NULL;
+ DB_ATTR db_attr;
+
+#ifdef EFENCE
+ EF_PROTECT_FREE = 1;
+ EF_PROTECT_BELOW = 1;
+ EF_ALIGNMENT = 0;
+#endif
+
+ apps_startup();
+
+ conf = NULL;
+ key = NULL;
+ section = NULL;
+
+ preserve = 0;
+ msie_hack = 0;
+ if (bio_err == NULL)
+ if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL)
+ BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ while (argc >= 1) {
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "-verbose") == 0)
+ verbose = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-config") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ configfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-name") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ section = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-subj") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ subj = *(++argv);
+ /* preserve=1; */
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-utf8") == 0)
+ chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-create_serial") == 0)
+ create_ser = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-multivalue-rdn") == 0)
+ multirdn = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-startdate") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ startdate = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-enddate") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ enddate = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-days") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ days = atoi(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-md") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ md = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-policy") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ policy = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyfile") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ keyfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyform") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ keyform = str2fmt(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-passin") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ passargin = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ key = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ certfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-selfsign") == 0)
+ selfsign = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-in") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ infile = *(++argv);
+ req = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ outfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-outdir") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ outdir = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sigopt") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ if (!sigopts)
+ sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+ if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, *(++argv)))
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-notext") == 0)
+ notext = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-batch") == 0)
+ batch = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-preserveDN") == 0)
+ preserve = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noemailDN") == 0)
+ email_dn = 0;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-gencrl") == 0)
+ gencrl = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msie_hack") == 0)
+ msie_hack = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crldays") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ crldays = atol(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlhours") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ crlhours = atol(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlsec") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ crlsec = atol(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-infiles") == 0) {
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ req = 1;
+ break;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ss_cert") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ ss_cert_file = *(++argv);
+ req = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-spkac") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ spkac_file = *(++argv);
+ req = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-revoke") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ infile = *(++argv);
+ dorevoke = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-extensions") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ extensions = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-extfile") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ extfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ ser_status = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-updatedb") == 0) {
+ doupdatedb = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlexts") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ crl_ext = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_reason") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ rev_arg = *(++argv);
+ rev_type = REV_CRL_REASON;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_hold") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ rev_arg = *(++argv);
+ rev_type = REV_HOLD;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_compromise") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ rev_arg = *(++argv);
+ rev_type = REV_KEY_COMPROMISE;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crl_CA_compromise") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ rev_arg = *(++argv);
+ rev_type = REV_CA_COMPROMISE;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ engine = *(++argv);
+ }
+#endif
+ else {
+ bad:
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
+ badops = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+
+ if (badops) {
+ const char **pp2;
+
+ for (pp2 = ca_usage; (*pp2 != NULL); pp2++)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s", *pp2);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ tofree = NULL;
+ if (configfile == NULL)
+ configfile = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF");
+ if (configfile == NULL)
+ configfile = getenv("SSLEAY_CONF");
+ if (configfile == NULL) {
+ const char *s = X509_get_default_cert_area();
+ size_t len;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
+ tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (!tofree) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ strcpy(tofree, s);
+#else
+ len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
+ tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (!tofree) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BUF_strlcpy(tofree, s, len);
+ BUF_strlcat(tofree, "/", len);
+#endif
+ BUF_strlcat(tofree, CONFIG_FILE, len);
+ configfile = tofree;
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using configuration from %s\n", configfile);
+ conf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+ if (NCONF_load(conf, configfile, &errorline) <= 0) {
+ if (errorline <= 0)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error loading the config file '%s'\n",
+ configfile);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error on line %ld of config file '%s'\n",
+ errorline, configfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (tofree) {
+ OPENSSL_free(tofree);
+ tofree = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!load_config(bio_err, conf))
+ goto err;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+#endif
+
+ /* Lets get the config section we are using */
+ if (section == NULL) {
+ section = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_CA);
+ if (section == NULL) {
+ lookup_fail(BASE_SECTION, ENV_DEFAULT_CA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (conf != NULL) {
+ p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_file");
+ if (p == NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BIO *oid_bio;
+
+ oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
+ if (oid_bio == NULL) {
+ /*-
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ } else {
+ OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);
+ BIO_free(oid_bio);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!add_oid_section(bio_err, conf)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ randfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, "RANDFILE");
+ if (randfile == NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ app_RAND_load_file(randfile, bio_err, 0);
+
+ f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, STRING_MASK);
+ if (!f)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ if (f && !ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(f)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid global string mask setting %s\n", f);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (chtype != MBSTRING_UTF8) {
+ f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, UTF8_IN);
+ if (!f)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ else if (!strcmp(f, "yes"))
+ chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8;
+ }
+
+ db_attr.unique_subject = 1;
+ p = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_UNIQUE_SUBJECT);
+ if (p) {
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: unique_subject = \"%s\"\n", p);
+#endif
+ db_attr.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1);
+ } else
+ ERR_clear_error();
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ if (!p)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: unique_subject undefined\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef RL_DEBUG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DEBUG: configured unique_subject is %d\n",
+ db_attr.unique_subject);
+#endif
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ Sout = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ Cout = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if ((in == NULL) || (out == NULL) || (Sout == NULL) || (Cout == NULL)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ /* report status of cert with serial number given on command line */
+ if (ser_status) {
+ if ((dbfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE)) == NULL) {
+ lookup_fail(section, ENV_DATABASE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ db = load_index(dbfile, &db_attr);
+ if (db == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!index_index(db))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (get_certificate_status(ser_status, db) != 1)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error verifying serial %s!\n", ser_status);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ /* we definitely need a private key, so let's get it */
+
+ if ((keyfile == NULL) && ((keyfile = NCONF_get_string(conf,
+ section,
+ ENV_PRIVATE_KEY)) ==
+ NULL)) {
+ lookup_fail(section, ENV_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!key) {
+ free_key = 1;
+ if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passargin, NULL, &key, NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ pkey = load_key(bio_err, keyfile, keyform, 0, key, e, "CA private key");
+ if (key)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(key, strlen(key));
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ /* load_key() has already printed an appropriate message */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ /* we need a certificate */
+ if (!selfsign || spkac_file || ss_cert_file || gencrl) {
+ if ((certfile == NULL)
+ && ((certfile = NCONF_get_string(conf,
+ section,
+ ENV_CERTIFICATE)) == NULL)) {
+ lookup_fail(section, ENV_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x509 = load_cert(bio_err, certfile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e,
+ "CA certificate");
+ if (x509 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!X509_check_private_key(x509, pkey)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "CA certificate and CA private key do not match\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!selfsign)
+ x509p = x509;
+
+ f = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_PRESERVE);
+ if (f == NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ if ((f != NULL) && ((*f == 'y') || (*f == 'Y')))
+ preserve = 1;
+ f = NCONF_get_string(conf, BASE_SECTION, ENV_MSIE_HACK);
+ if (f == NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ if ((f != NULL) && ((*f == 'y') || (*f == 'Y')))
+ msie_hack = 1;
+
+ f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_NAMEOPT);
+
+ if (f) {
+ if (!set_name_ex(&nameopt, f)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid name options: \"%s\"\n", f);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ default_op = 0;
+ } else
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CERTOPT);
+
+ if (f) {
+ if (!set_cert_ex(&certopt, f)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid certificate options: \"%s\"\n", f);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ default_op = 0;
+ } else
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_EXTCOPY);
+
+ if (f) {
+ if (!set_ext_copy(&ext_copy, f)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid extension copy option: \"%s\"\n", f);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ /* lookup where to write new certificates */
+ if ((outdir == NULL) && (req)) {
+
+ if ((outdir = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR))
+ == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "there needs to be defined a directory for new certificate to be placed in\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ /*
+ * outdir is a directory spec, but access() for VMS demands a
+ * filename. In any case, stat(), below, will catch the problem if
+ * outdir is not a directory spec, and the fopen() or open() will
+ * catch an error if there is no write access.
+ *
+ * Presumably, this problem could also be solved by using the DEC C
+ * routines to convert the directory syntax to Unixly, and give that
+ * to access(). However, time's too short to do that just now.
+ */
+# ifndef _WIN32
+ if (access(outdir, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) != 0)
+# else
+ if (_access(outdir, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) != 0)
+# endif
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "I am unable to access the %s directory\n",
+ outdir);
+ perror(outdir);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (app_isdir(outdir) <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s need to be a directory\n", outdir);
+ perror(outdir);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ /* we need to load the database file */
+ if ((dbfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DATABASE)) == NULL) {
+ lookup_fail(section, ENV_DATABASE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ db = load_index(dbfile, &db_attr);
+ if (db == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Lets check some fields */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+ pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+ if ((pp[DB_type][0] != DB_TYPE_REV) && (pp[DB_rev_date][0] != '\0')) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "entry %d: not revoked yet, but has a revocation date\n",
+ i + 1);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((pp[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) &&
+ !make_revoked(NULL, pp[DB_rev_date])) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " in entry %d\n", i + 1);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!check_time_format((char *)pp[DB_exp_date])) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: invalid expiry date\n", i + 1);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = pp[DB_serial];
+ j = strlen(p);
+ if (*p == '-') {
+ p++;
+ j--;
+ }
+ if ((j & 1) || (j < 2)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "entry %d: bad serial number length (%d)\n",
+ i + 1, j);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ while (*p) {
+ if (!(((*p >= '0') && (*p <= '9')) ||
+ ((*p >= 'A') && (*p <= 'F')) ||
+ ((*p >= 'a') && (*p <= 'f')))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "entry %d: bad serial number characters, char pos %ld, char is '%c'\n",
+ i + 1, (long)(p - pp[DB_serial]), *p);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+ }
+ if (verbose) {
+ BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT); /* cannot fail */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ {
+ BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
+ out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out);
+ }
+#endif
+ TXT_DB_write(out, db->db);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%d entries loaded from the database\n",
+ sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data));
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "generating index\n");
+ }
+
+ if (!index_index(db))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ /* Update the db file for expired certificates */
+ if (doupdatedb) {
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Updating %s ...\n", dbfile);
+
+ i = do_updatedb(db);
+ if (i == -1) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else if (i == 0) {
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "No entries found to mark expired\n");
+ } else {
+ if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old"))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Done. %d entries marked as expired\n", i);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ /* Read extentions config file */
+ if (extfile) {
+ extconf = NCONF_new(NULL);
+ if (NCONF_load(extconf, extfile, &errorline) <= 0) {
+ if (errorline <= 0)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: loading the config file '%s'\n",
+ extfile);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "ERROR: on line %ld of config file '%s'\n",
+ errorline, extfile);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Successfully loaded extensions file %s\n",
+ extfile);
+
+ /* We can have sections in the ext file */
+ if (!extensions
+ && !(extensions =
+ NCONF_get_string(extconf, "default", "extensions")))
+ extensions = "default";
+ }
+
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ if (req || gencrl) {
+ if (outfile != NULL) {
+ if (BIO_write_filename(Sout, outfile) <= 0) {
+ perror(outfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ BIO_set_fp(Sout, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ {
+ BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
+ Sout = BIO_push(tmpbio, Sout);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((md == NULL) && ((md = NCONF_get_string(conf,
+ section,
+ ENV_DEFAULT_MD)) == NULL)) {
+ lookup_fail(section, ENV_DEFAULT_MD);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(md, "default")) {
+ int def_nid;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) <= 0) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "no default digest\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ md = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(def_nid);
+ }
+
+ if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyname(md)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is an unsupported message digest type\n", md);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (req) {
+ if ((email_dn == 1) && ((tmp_email_dn = NCONF_get_string(conf,
+ section,
+ ENV_DEFAULT_EMAIL_DN))
+ != NULL)) {
+ if (strcmp(tmp_email_dn, "no") == 0)
+ email_dn = 0;
+ }
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "message digest is %s\n",
+ OBJ_nid2ln(dgst->type));
+ if ((policy == NULL) && ((policy = NCONF_get_string(conf,
+ section,
+ ENV_POLICY)) ==
+ NULL)) {
+ lookup_fail(section, ENV_POLICY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "policy is %s\n", policy);
+
+ if ((serialfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_SERIAL))
+ == NULL) {
+ lookup_fail(section, ENV_SERIAL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!extconf) {
+ /*
+ * no '-extfile' option, so we look for extensions in the main
+ * configuration file
+ */
+ if (!extensions) {
+ extensions = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_EXTENSIONS);
+ if (!extensions)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ if (extensions) {
+ /* Check syntax of file */
+ X509V3_CTX ctx;
+ X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx);
+ X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf);
+ if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, extensions, NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Error Loading extension section %s\n",
+ extensions);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (startdate == NULL) {
+ startdate = NCONF_get_string(conf, section,
+ ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE);
+ if (startdate == NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ if (startdate && !ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, startdate)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "start date is invalid, it should be YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (startdate == NULL)
+ startdate = "today";
+
+ if (enddate == NULL) {
+ enddate = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE);
+ if (enddate == NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ if (enddate && !ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, enddate)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "end date is invalid, it should be YYMMDDHHMMSSZ or YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (days == 0) {
+ if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS, &days))
+ days = 0;
+ }
+ if (!enddate && (days == 0)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "cannot lookup how many days to certify for\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((serial = load_serial(serialfile, create_ser, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error while loading serial number\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (verbose) {
+ if (BN_is_zero(serial))
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "next serial number is 00\n");
+ else {
+ if ((f = BN_bn2hex(serial)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "next serial number is %s\n", f);
+ OPENSSL_free(f);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((attribs = NCONF_get_section(conf, policy)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to find 'section' for %s\n", policy);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((cert_sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (spkac_file != NULL) {
+ total++;
+ j = certify_spkac(&x, spkac_file, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts,
+ attribs, db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn,
+ email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, extensions,
+ conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
+ ext_copy);
+ if (j < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (j > 0) {
+ total_done++;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (outfile) {
+ output_der = 1;
+ batch = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (ss_cert_file != NULL) {
+ total++;
+ j = certify_cert(&x, ss_cert_file, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts,
+ attribs,
+ db, serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn,
+ startdate, enddate, days, batch, extensions,
+ conf, verbose, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
+ ext_copy, e);
+ if (j < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (j > 0) {
+ total_done++;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (infile != NULL) {
+ total++;
+ j = certify(&x, infile, pkey, x509p, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db,
+ serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate,
+ enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose,
+ certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign);
+ if (j < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (j > 0) {
+ total_done++;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ total++;
+ j = certify(&x, argv[i], pkey, x509p, dgst, sigopts, attribs, db,
+ serial, subj, chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate,
+ enddate, days, batch, extensions, conf, verbose,
+ certopt, nameopt, default_op, ext_copy, selfsign);
+ if (j < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (j > 0) {
+ total_done++;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ if (!BN_add_word(serial, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(cert_sk, x)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * we have a stack of newly certified certificates and a data base
+ * and serial number that need updating
+ */
+
+ if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk) > 0) {
+ if (!batch) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "\n%d out of %d certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]",
+ total_done, total);
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+ buf[0][0] = '\0';
+ if (!fgets(buf[0], 10, stdin)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "CERTIFICATION CANCELED: I/O error\n");
+ ret = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((buf[0][0] != 'y') && (buf[0][0] != 'Y')) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATION CANCELED\n");
+ ret = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Write out database with %d new entries\n",
+ sk_X509_num(cert_sk));
+
+ if (!save_serial(serialfile, "new", serial, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing new certificates\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cert_sk); i++) {
+ int k;
+ char *n;
+
+ x = sk_X509_value(cert_sk, i);
+
+ j = x->cert_info->serialNumber->length;
+ p = (const char *)x->cert_info->serialNumber->data;
+
+ if (strlen(outdir) >= (size_t)(j ? BSIZE - j * 2 - 6 : BSIZE - 8)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "certificate file name too long\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ strcpy(buf[2], outdir);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ BUF_strlcat(buf[2], "/", sizeof(buf[2]));
+#endif
+
+ n = (char *)&(buf[2][strlen(buf[2])]);
+ if (j > 0) {
+ for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
+ if (n >= &(buf[2][sizeof(buf[2])]))
+ break;
+ BIO_snprintf(n,
+ &buf[2][0] + sizeof(buf[2]) - n,
+ "%02X", (unsigned char)*(p++));
+ n += 2;
+ }
+ } else {
+ *(n++) = '0';
+ *(n++) = '0';
+ }
+ *(n++) = '.';
+ *(n++) = 'p';
+ *(n++) = 'e';
+ *(n++) = 'm';
+ *n = '\0';
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "writing %s\n", buf[2]);
+
+ if (BIO_write_filename(Cout, buf[2]) <= 0) {
+ perror(buf[2]);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ write_new_certificate(Cout, x, 0, notext);
+ write_new_certificate(Sout, x, output_der, notext);
+ }
+
+ if (sk_X509_num(cert_sk)) {
+ /* Rename the database and the serial file */
+ if (!rotate_serial(serialfile, "new", "old"))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old"))
+ goto err;
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Data Base Updated\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ if (gencrl) {
+ int crl_v2 = 0;
+ if (!crl_ext) {
+ crl_ext = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRLEXT);
+ if (!crl_ext)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ if (crl_ext) {
+ /* Check syntax of file */
+ X509V3_CTX ctx;
+ X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx);
+ X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf);
+ if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, crl_ext, NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Error Loading CRL extension section %s\n",
+ crl_ext);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((crlnumberfile = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CRLNUMBER))
+ != NULL)
+ if ((crlnumber = load_serial(crlnumberfile, 0, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error while loading CRL number\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!crldays && !crlhours && !crlsec) {
+ if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section,
+ ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_DAYS, &crldays))
+ crldays = 0;
+ if (!NCONF_get_number(conf, section,
+ ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS, &crlhours))
+ crlhours = 0;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ if ((crldays == 0) && (crlhours == 0) && (crlsec == 0)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "cannot lookup how long until the next CRL is issued\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "making CRL\n");
+ if ((crl = X509_CRL_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_get_subject_name(x509)))
+ goto err;
+
+ tmptm = ASN1_TIME_new();
+ if (!tmptm)
+ goto err;
+ X509_gmtime_adj(tmptm, 0);
+ X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, tmptm);
+ if (!X509_time_adj_ex(tmptm, crldays, crlhours * 60 * 60 + crlsec,
+ NULL)) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "error setting CRL nextUpdate\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, tmptm);
+
+ ASN1_TIME_free(tmptm);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+ pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+ if (pp[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) {
+ if ((r = X509_REVOKED_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ j = make_revoked(r, pp[DB_rev_date]);
+ if (!j)
+ goto err;
+ if (j == 2)
+ crl_v2 = 1;
+ if (!BN_hex2bn(&serial, pp[DB_serial]))
+ goto err;
+ tmpser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL);
+ BN_free(serial);
+ serial = NULL;
+ if (!tmpser)
+ goto err;
+ X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(r, tmpser);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpser);
+ X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, r);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * sort the data so it will be written in serial number order
+ */
+ X509_CRL_sort(crl);
+
+ /* we now have a CRL */
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "signing CRL\n");
+
+ /* Add any extensions asked for */
+
+ if (crl_ext || crlnumberfile != NULL) {
+ X509V3_CTX crlctx;
+ X509V3_set_ctx(&crlctx, x509, NULL, NULL, crl, 0);
+ X509V3_set_nconf(&crlctx, conf);
+
+ if (crl_ext)
+ if (!X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf(conf, &crlctx, crl_ext, crl))
+ goto err;
+ if (crlnumberfile != NULL) {
+ tmpser = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(crlnumber, NULL);
+ if (!tmpser)
+ goto err;
+ X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_crl_number, tmpser, 0, 0);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpser);
+ crl_v2 = 1;
+ if (!BN_add_word(crlnumber, 1))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (crl_ext || crl_v2) {
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
+ goto err; /* version 2 CRL */
+ }
+
+ /* we have a CRL number that need updating */
+ if (crlnumberfile != NULL)
+ if (!save_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", crlnumber, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (crlnumber) {
+ BN_free(crlnumber);
+ crlnumber = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!do_X509_CRL_sign(bio_err, crl, pkey, dgst, sigopts))
+ goto err;
+
+ PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL(Sout, crl);
+
+ if (crlnumberfile != NULL) /* Rename the crlnumber file */
+ if (!rotate_serial(crlnumberfile, "new", "old"))
+ goto err;
+
+ }
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ if (dorevoke) {
+ if (infile == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "no input files\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ X509 *revcert;
+ revcert = load_cert(bio_err, infile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, infile);
+ if (revcert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ j = do_revoke(revcert, db, rev_type, rev_arg);
+ if (j <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ X509_free(revcert);
+
+ if (!save_index(dbfile, "new", db))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!rotate_index(dbfile, "new", "old"))
+ goto err;
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Data Base Updated\n");
+ }
+ }
+ /*****************************************************************/
+ ret = 0;
+ err:
+ if (tofree)
+ OPENSSL_free(tofree);
+ BIO_free_all(Cout);
+ BIO_free_all(Sout);
+ BIO_free_all(out);
+ BIO_free_all(in);
+
+ if (cert_sk)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cert_sk, X509_free);
+
+ if (ret)
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ app_RAND_write_file(randfile, bio_err);
+ if (free_key && key)
+ OPENSSL_free(key);
+ BN_free(serial);
+ BN_free(crlnumber);
+ free_index(db);
+ if (sigopts)
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (x509)
+ X509_free(x509);
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ NCONF_free(conf);
+ NCONF_free(extconf);
+ OBJ_cleanup();
+ apps_shutdown();
+ OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+static void lookup_fail(const char *name, const char *tag)
+{
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "variable lookup failed for %s::%s\n", name, tag);
+}
+
+static int certify(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+ const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+ BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+ int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate,
+ long days, int batch, char *ext_sect, CONF *lconf,
+ int verbose, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
+ int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign)
+{
+ X509_REQ *req = NULL;
+ BIO *in = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL;
+ int ok = -1, i;
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) {
+ perror(infile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((req = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading certificate request in %s\n",
+ infile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (verbose)
+ X509_REQ_print(bio_err, req);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the request matches the signature\n");
+
+ if (selfsign && !X509_REQ_check_private_key(req, pkey)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Certificate request and CA private key do not match\n");
+ ok = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((pktmp = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = X509_REQ_verify(req, pktmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ ok = 0;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification problems....\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ ok = 0;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Signature did not match the certificate request\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n");
+
+ ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj,
+ chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch,
+ verbose, req, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
+ ext_copy, selfsign);
+
+ err:
+ if (req != NULL)
+ X509_REQ_free(req);
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+static int certify_cert(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+ const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+ BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+ int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate,
+ char *enddate, long days, int batch, char *ext_sect,
+ CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
+ unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy,
+ ENGINE *e)
+{
+ X509 *req = NULL;
+ X509_REQ *rreq = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL;
+ int ok = -1, i;
+
+ if ((req =
+ load_cert(bio_err, infile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, infile)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (verbose)
+ X509_print(bio_err, req);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Check that the request matches the signature\n");
+
+ if ((pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(req)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking public key\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = X509_verify(req, pktmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ ok = 0;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature verification problems....\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ ok = 0;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature did not match the certificate\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n");
+
+ if ((rreq = X509_to_X509_REQ(req, NULL, EVP_md5())) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj,
+ chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, batch,
+ verbose, rreq, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
+ ext_copy, 0);
+
+ err:
+ if (rreq != NULL)
+ X509_REQ_free(rreq);
+ if (req != NULL)
+ X509_free(req);
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
+ const EVP_MD *dgst, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db, BIGNUM *serial,
+ char *subj, unsigned long chtype, int multirdn,
+ int email_dn, char *startdate, char *enddate, long days,
+ int batch, int verbose, X509_REQ *req, char *ext_sect,
+ CONF *lconf, unsigned long certopt, unsigned long nameopt,
+ int default_op, int ext_copy, int selfsign)
+{
+ X509_NAME *name = NULL, *CAname = NULL, *subject = NULL, *dn_subject =
+ NULL;
+ ASN1_UTCTIME *tm, *tmptm;
+ ASN1_STRING *str, *str2;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509 *ret = NULL;
+ X509_CINF *ci;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *tne, *push;
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ int ok = -1, i, j, last, nid;
+ const char *p;
+ CONF_VALUE *cv;
+ OPENSSL_STRING row[DB_NUMBER];
+ OPENSSL_STRING *irow = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_STRING *rrow = NULL;
+ char buf[25];
+
+ tmptm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
+ if (tmptm == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+ row[i] = NULL;
+
+ if (subj) {
+ X509_NAME *n = parse_name(subj, chtype, multirdn);
+
+ if (!n) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_REQ_set_subject_name(req, n);
+ req->req_info->enc.modified = 1;
+ X509_NAME_free(n);
+ }
+
+ if (default_op)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "The Subject's Distinguished Name is as follows\n");
+
+ name = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req);
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(name); i++) {
+ ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
+ str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
+ obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ne);
+
+ if (msie_hack) {
+ /* assume all type should be strings */
+ nid = OBJ_obj2nid(ne->object);
+
+ if (str->type == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING)
+ ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(str);
+
+ if ((str->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) &&
+ (nid != NID_pkcs9_emailAddress))
+ str->type = V_ASN1_T61STRING;
+
+ if ((nid == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) &&
+ (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING))
+ str->type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+ }
+
+ /* If no EMAIL is wanted in the subject */
+ if ((OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) && (!email_dn))
+ continue;
+
+ /* check some things */
+ if ((OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress) &&
+ (str->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "\nemailAddress type needs to be of type IA5STRING\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((str->type != V_ASN1_BMPSTRING)
+ && (str->type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING)) {
+ j = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(str->data, str->length);
+ if (((j == V_ASN1_T61STRING) &&
+ (str->type != V_ASN1_T61STRING)) ||
+ ((j == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) &&
+ (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "\nThe string contains characters that are illegal for the ASN.1 type\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (default_op)
+ old_entry_print(bio_err, obj, str);
+ }
+
+ /* Ok, now we check the 'policy' stuff. */
+ if ((subject = X509_NAME_new()) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* take a copy of the issuer name before we mess with it. */
+ if (selfsign)
+ CAname = X509_NAME_dup(name);
+ else
+ CAname = X509_NAME_dup(x509->cert_info->subject);
+ if (CAname == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ str = str2 = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(policy); i++) {
+ cv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(policy, i); /* get the object id */
+ if ((j = OBJ_txt2nid(cv->name)) == NID_undef) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "%s:unknown object type in 'policy' configuration\n",
+ cv->name);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(j);
+
+ last = -1;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* lookup the object in the supplied name list */
+ j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(name, obj, last);
+ if (j < 0) {
+ if (last != -1)
+ break;
+ tne = NULL;
+ } else {
+ tne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, j);
+ }
+ last = j;
+
+ /* depending on the 'policy', decide what to do. */
+ push = NULL;
+ if (strcmp(cv->value, "optional") == 0) {
+ if (tne != NULL)
+ push = tne;
+ } else if (strcmp(cv->value, "supplied") == 0) {
+ if (tne == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "The %s field needed to be supplied and was missing\n",
+ cv->name);
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ push = tne;
+ } else if (strcmp(cv->value, "match") == 0) {
+ int last2;
+
+ if (tne == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "The mandatory %s field was missing\n",
+ cv->name);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ last2 = -1;
+
+ again2:
+ j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(CAname, obj, last2);
+ if ((j < 0) && (last2 == -1)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "The %s field does not exist in the CA certificate,\nthe 'policy' is misconfigured\n",
+ cv->name);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (j >= 0) {
+ push = X509_NAME_get_entry(CAname, j);
+ str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(tne);
+ str2 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(push);
+ last2 = j;
+ if (ASN1_STRING_cmp(str, str2) != 0)
+ goto again2;
+ }
+ if (j < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "The %s field needed to be the same in the\nCA certificate (%s) and the request (%s)\n",
+ cv->name,
+ ((str2 == NULL) ? "NULL" : (char *)str2->data),
+ ((str == NULL) ? "NULL" : (char *)str->data));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "%s:invalid type in 'policy' configuration\n",
+ cv->value);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (push != NULL) {
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry(subject, push, -1, 0)) {
+ if (push != NULL)
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(push);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (j < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (preserve) {
+ X509_NAME_free(subject);
+ /* subject=X509_NAME_dup(X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req)); */
+ subject = X509_NAME_dup(name);
+ if (subject == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "The subject name appears to be ok, checking data base for clashes\n");
+
+ /* Build the correct Subject if no e-mail is wanted in the subject */
+ /*
+ * and add it later on because of the method extensions are added
+ * (altName)
+ */
+
+ if (email_dn)
+ dn_subject = subject;
+ else {
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpne;
+ /*
+ * Its best to dup the subject DN and then delete any email addresses
+ * because this retains its structure.
+ */
+ if (!(dn_subject = X509_NAME_dup(subject))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(dn_subject,
+ NID_pkcs9_emailAddress,
+ -1)) >= 0) {
+ tmpne = X509_NAME_get_entry(dn_subject, i);
+ X509_NAME_delete_entry(dn_subject, i);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpne);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(serial))
+ row[DB_serial] = BUF_strdup("00");
+ else
+ row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(serial);
+ if (row[DB_serial] == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (db->attributes.unique_subject) {
+ OPENSSL_STRING *crow = row;
+
+ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_name, crow);
+ if (rrow != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "ERROR:There is already a certificate for %s\n",
+ row[DB_name]);
+ }
+ }
+ if (rrow == NULL) {
+ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
+ if (rrow != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "ERROR:Serial number %s has already been issued,\n",
+ row[DB_serial]);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " check the database/serial_file for corruption\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rrow != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "The matching entry has the following details\n");
+ if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E')
+ p = "Expired";
+ else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R')
+ p = "Revoked";
+ else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V')
+ p = "Valid";
+ else
+ p = "\ninvalid type, Data base error\n";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Type :%s\n", p);;
+ if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') {
+ p = rrow[DB_exp_date];
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = "undef";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Was revoked on:%s\n", p);
+ }
+ p = rrow[DB_exp_date];
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = "undef";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Expires on :%s\n", p);
+ p = rrow[DB_serial];
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = "undef";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial Number :%s\n", p);
+ p = rrow[DB_file];
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = "undef";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "File name :%s\n", p);
+ p = rrow[DB_name];
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = "undef";
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Subject Name :%s\n", p);
+ ok = -1; /* This is now a 'bad' error. */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We are now totally happy, lets make and sign the certificate */
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Everything appears to be ok, creating and signing the certificate\n");
+
+ if ((ret = X509_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ci = ret->cert_info;
+
+#ifdef X509_V3
+ /* Make it an X509 v3 certificate. */
+ if (!X509_set_version(ret, 2))
+ goto err;
+#endif
+
+ if (BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, ci->serialNumber) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (selfsign) {
+ if (!X509_set_issuer_name(ret, subject))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!X509_set_issuer_name(ret, X509_get_subject_name(x509)))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(startdate, "today") == 0)
+ X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(ret), 0);
+ else
+ ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_get_notBefore(ret), startdate);
+
+ if (enddate == NULL)
+ X509_time_adj_ex(X509_get_notAfter(ret), days, 0, NULL);
+ else
+ ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_get_notAfter(ret), enddate);
+
+ if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, subject))
+ goto err;
+
+ pktmp = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req);
+ i = X509_set_pubkey(ret, pktmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ if (!i)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Lets add the extensions, if there are any */
+ if (ext_sect) {
+ X509V3_CTX ctx;
+ if (ci->version == NULL)
+ if ((ci->version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(ci->version, 2); /* version 3 certificate */
+
+ /*
+ * Free the current entries if any, there should not be any I believe
+ */
+ if (ci->extensions != NULL)
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(ci->extensions, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+
+ ci->extensions = NULL;
+
+ /* Initialize the context structure */
+ if (selfsign)
+ X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, ret, ret, req, NULL, 0);
+ else
+ X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, x509, ret, req, NULL, 0);
+
+ if (extconf) {
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra configuration file found\n");
+
+ /* Use the extconf configuration db LHASH */
+ X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, extconf);
+
+ /* Test the structure (needed?) */
+ /* X509V3_set_ctx_test(&ctx); */
+
+ /* Adds exts contained in the configuration file */
+ if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(extconf, &ctx, ext_sect, ret)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "ERROR: adding extensions in section %s\n",
+ ext_sect);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Successfully added extensions from file.\n");
+ } else if (ext_sect) {
+ /* We found extensions to be set from config file */
+ X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, lconf);
+
+ if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(lconf, &ctx, ext_sect, ret)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "ERROR: adding extensions in section %s\n",
+ ext_sect);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Successfully added extensions from config\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Copy extensions from request (if any) */
+
+ if (!copy_extensions(ret, req, ext_copy)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR: adding extensions from request\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the right value for the noemailDN option */
+ if (email_dn == 0) {
+ if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, dn_subject))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!default_op) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate Details:\n");
+ /*
+ * Never print signature details because signature not present
+ */
+ certopt |= X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP | X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME;
+ X509_print_ex(bio_err, ret, nameopt, certopt);
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate is to be certified until ");
+ ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(ret));
+ if (days)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " (%ld days)", days);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+
+ if (!batch) {
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Sign the certificate? [y/n]:");
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ if (!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, stdin)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "CERTIFICATE WILL NOT BE CERTIFIED: I/O error\n");
+ ok = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!((buf[0] == 'y') || (buf[0] == 'Y'))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "CERTIFICATE WILL NOT BE CERTIFIED\n");
+ ok = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(ret);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pktmp) &&
+ !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+
+ if (!do_X509_sign(bio_err, ret, pkey, dgst, sigopts))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* We now just add it to the database */
+ row[DB_type] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(2);
+
+ tm = X509_get_notAfter(ret);
+ row[DB_exp_date] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(tm->length + 1);
+ memcpy(row[DB_exp_date], tm->data, tm->length);
+ row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0';
+
+ row[DB_rev_date] = NULL;
+
+ /* row[DB_serial] done already */
+ row[DB_file] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(8);
+ row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ret), NULL, 0);
+
+ if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_exp_date] == NULL) ||
+ (row[DB_file] == NULL) || (row[DB_name] == NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BUF_strlcpy(row[DB_file], "unknown", 8);
+ row[DB_type][0] = 'V';
+ row[DB_type][1] = '\0';
+
+ if ((irow =
+ (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (DB_NUMBER + 1))) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) {
+ irow[i] = row[i];
+ row[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL;
+
+ if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update database\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+ if (row[i] != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(row[i]);
+
+ if (CAname != NULL)
+ X509_NAME_free(CAname);
+ if (subject != NULL)
+ X509_NAME_free(subject);
+ if ((dn_subject != NULL) && !email_dn)
+ X509_NAME_free(dn_subject);
+ if (tmptm != NULL)
+ ASN1_UTCTIME_free(tmptm);
+ if (ok <= 0) {
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ X509_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ } else
+ *xret = ret;
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+static void write_new_certificate(BIO *bp, X509 *x, int output_der,
+ int notext)
+{
+
+ if (output_der) {
+ (void)i2d_X509_bio(bp, x);
+ return;
+ }
+#if 0
+ /* ??? Not needed since X509_print prints all this stuff anyway */
+ f = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), buf, 256);
+ BIO_printf(bp, "issuer :%s\n", f);
+
+ f = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, 256);
+ BIO_printf(bp, "subject:%s\n", f);
+
+ BIO_puts(bp, "serial :");
+ i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, x->cert_info->serialNumber);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n\n");
+#endif
+ if (!notext)
+ X509_print(bp, x);
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, x);
+}
+
+static int certify_spkac(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ X509 *x509, const EVP_MD *dgst,
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *policy, CA_DB *db,
+ BIGNUM *serial, char *subj, unsigned long chtype,
+ int multirdn, int email_dn, char *startdate,
+ char *enddate, long days, char *ext_sect,
+ CONF *lconf, int verbose, unsigned long certopt,
+ unsigned long nameopt, int default_op, int ext_copy)
+{
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL;
+ LHASH_OF(CONF_VALUE) *parms = NULL;
+ X509_REQ *req = NULL;
+ CONF_VALUE *cv = NULL;
+ NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL;
+ X509_REQ_INFO *ri;
+ char *type, *buf;
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *n = NULL;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = NULL;
+ int ok = -1, i, j;
+ long errline;
+ int nid;
+
+ /*
+ * Load input file into a hash table. (This is just an easy
+ * way to read and parse the file, then put it into a convenient
+ * STACK format).
+ */
+ parms = CONF_load(NULL, infile, &errline);
+ if (parms == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error on line %ld of %s\n", errline, infile);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ sk = CONF_get_section(parms, "default");
+ if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "no name/value pairs found in %s\n", infile);
+ CONF_free(parms);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now create a dummy X509 request structure. We don't actually
+ * have an X509 request, but we have many of the components
+ * (a public key, various DN components). The idea is that we
+ * put these components into the right X509 request structure
+ * and we can use the same code as if you had a real X509 request.
+ */
+ req = X509_REQ_new();
+ if (req == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Build up the subject name set.
+ */
+ ri = req->req_info;
+ n = ri->subject;
+
+ for (i = 0;; i++) {
+ if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sk) <= i)
+ break;
+
+ cv = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sk, i);
+ type = cv->name;
+ /*
+ * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances
+ */
+ for (buf = cv->name; *buf; buf++)
+ if ((*buf == ':') || (*buf == ',') || (*buf == '.')) {
+ buf++;
+ if (*buf)
+ type = buf;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ buf = cv->value;
+ if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type)) == NID_undef) {
+ if (strcmp(type, "SPKAC") == 0) {
+ spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(cv->value, -1);
+ if (spki == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "unable to load Netscape SPKAC structure\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype,
+ (unsigned char *)buf, -1, -1, 0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (spki == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Netscape SPKAC structure not found in %s\n",
+ infile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now extract the key from the SPKI structure.
+ */
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Check that the SPKAC request matches the signature\n");
+
+ if ((pktmp = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error unpacking SPKAC public key\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ j = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pktmp);
+ if (j <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "signature verification failed on SPKAC public key\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature ok\n");
+
+ X509_REQ_set_pubkey(req, pktmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ ok = do_body(xret, pkey, x509, dgst, sigopts, policy, db, serial, subj,
+ chtype, multirdn, email_dn, startdate, enddate, days, 1,
+ verbose, req, ext_sect, lconf, certopt, nameopt, default_op,
+ ext_copy, 0);
+ err:
+ if (req != NULL)
+ X509_REQ_free(req);
+ if (parms != NULL)
+ CONF_free(parms);
+ if (spki != NULL)
+ NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki);
+ if (ne != NULL)
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne);
+
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+static int check_time_format(const char *str)
+{
+ return ASN1_TIME_set_string(NULL, str);
+}
+
+static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int type, char *value)
+{
+ ASN1_UTCTIME *tm = NULL;
+ char *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow, **irow;
+ char *rev_str = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+ int ok = -1, i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+ row[i] = NULL;
+ row[DB_name] = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509), NULL, 0);
+ bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), NULL);
+ if (!bn)
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_zero(bn))
+ row[DB_serial] = BUF_strdup("00");
+ else
+ row[DB_serial] = BN_bn2hex(bn);
+ BN_free(bn);
+ if ((row[DB_name] == NULL) || (row[DB_serial] == NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We have to lookup by serial number because name lookup skips revoked
+ * certs
+ */
+ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
+ if (rrow == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Adding Entry with serial number %s to DB for %s\n",
+ row[DB_serial], row[DB_name]);
+
+ /* We now just add it to the database */
+ row[DB_type] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(2);
+
+ tm = X509_get_notAfter(x509);
+ row[DB_exp_date] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(tm->length + 1);
+ memcpy(row[DB_exp_date], tm->data, tm->length);
+ row[DB_exp_date][tm->length] = '\0';
+
+ row[DB_rev_date] = NULL;
+
+ /* row[DB_serial] done already */
+ row[DB_file] = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(8);
+
+ /* row[DB_name] done already */
+
+ if ((row[DB_type] == NULL) || (row[DB_exp_date] == NULL) ||
+ (row[DB_file] == NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BUF_strlcpy(row[DB_file], "unknown", 8);
+ row[DB_type][0] = 'V';
+ row[DB_type][1] = '\0';
+
+ if ((irow =
+ (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (DB_NUMBER + 1))) ==
+ NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) {
+ irow[i] = row[i];
+ row[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ irow[DB_NUMBER] = NULL;
+
+ if (!TXT_DB_insert(db->db, irow)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed to update database\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "TXT_DB error number %ld\n", db->db->error);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Revoke Certificate */
+ ok = do_revoke(x509, db, type, value);
+
+ goto err;
+
+ } else if (index_name_cmp_noconst(row, rrow)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:name does not match %s\n", row[DB_name]);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR:Already revoked, serial number %s\n",
+ row[DB_serial]);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Revoking Certificate %s.\n", rrow[DB_serial]);
+ rev_str = make_revocation_str(type, value);
+ if (!rev_str) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in revocation arguments\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rrow[DB_type][0] = 'R';
+ rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0';
+ rrow[DB_rev_date] = rev_str;
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) {
+ if (row[i] != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(row[i]);
+ }
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+static int get_certificate_status(const char *serial, CA_DB *db)
+{
+ char *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow;
+ int ok = -1, i;
+
+ /* Free Resources */
+ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+ row[i] = NULL;
+
+ /* Malloc needed char spaces */
+ row[DB_serial] = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(serial) + 2);
+ if (row[DB_serial] == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (strlen(serial) % 2) {
+ /*
+ * Set the first char to 0
+ */ ;
+ row[DB_serial][0] = '0';
+
+ /* Copy String from serial to row[DB_serial] */
+ memcpy(row[DB_serial] + 1, serial, strlen(serial));
+ row[DB_serial][strlen(serial) + 1] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ /* Copy String from serial to row[DB_serial] */
+ memcpy(row[DB_serial], serial, strlen(serial));
+ row[DB_serial][strlen(serial)] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ /* Make it Upper Case */
+ for (i = 0; row[DB_serial][i] != '\0'; i++)
+ row[DB_serial][i] = toupper((unsigned char)row[DB_serial][i]);
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ /* Search for the certificate */
+ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
+ if (rrow == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Serial %s not present in db.\n", row[DB_serial]);
+ ok = -1;
+ goto err;
+ } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Valid (%c)\n",
+ row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'R') {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Revoked (%c)\n",
+ row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'E') {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired (%c)\n",
+ row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'S') {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Suspended (%c)\n",
+ row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Unknown (%c).\n",
+ row[DB_serial], rrow[DB_type][0]);
+ ok = -1;
+ }
+ err:
+ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++) {
+ if (row[i] != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(row[i]);
+ }
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db)
+{
+ ASN1_UTCTIME *a_tm = NULL;
+ int i, cnt = 0;
+ int db_y2k, a_y2k; /* flags = 1 if y >= 2000 */
+ char **rrow, *a_tm_s;
+
+ a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
+ if (a_tm == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* get actual time and make a string */
+ a_tm = X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0);
+ a_tm_s = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(a_tm->length + 1);
+ if (a_tm_s == NULL) {
+ cnt = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(a_tm_s, a_tm->data, a_tm->length);
+ a_tm_s[a_tm->length] = '\0';
+
+ if (strncmp(a_tm_s, "49", 2) <= 0)
+ a_y2k = 1;
+ else
+ a_y2k = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) {
+ rrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+
+ if (rrow[DB_type][0] == 'V') {
+ /* ignore entries that are not valid */
+ if (strncmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], "49", 2) <= 0)
+ db_y2k = 1;
+ else
+ db_y2k = 0;
+
+ if (db_y2k == a_y2k) {
+ /* all on the same y2k side */
+ if (strcmp(rrow[DB_exp_date], a_tm_s) <= 0) {
+ rrow[DB_type][0] = 'E';
+ rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0';
+ cnt++;
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]);
+ }
+ } else if (db_y2k < a_y2k) {
+ rrow[DB_type][0] = 'E';
+ rrow[DB_type][1] = '\0';
+ cnt++;
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s=Expired\n", rrow[DB_serial]);
+ }
+
+ }
+ }
+
+ err:
+
+ ASN1_UTCTIME_free(a_tm);
+ OPENSSL_free(a_tm_s);
+
+ return (cnt);
+}
+
+static const char *crl_reasons[] = {
+ /* CRL reason strings */
+ "unspecified",
+ "keyCompromise",
+ "CACompromise",
+ "affiliationChanged",
+ "superseded",
+ "cessationOfOperation",
+ "certificateHold",
+ "removeFromCRL",
+ /* Additional pseudo reasons */
+ "holdInstruction",
+ "keyTime",
+ "CAkeyTime"
+};
+
+#define NUM_REASONS (sizeof(crl_reasons) / sizeof(char *))
+
+/*
+ * Given revocation information convert to a DB string. The format of the
+ * string is: revtime[,reason,extra]. Where 'revtime' is the revocation time
+ * (the current time). 'reason' is the optional CRL reason and 'extra' is any
+ * additional argument
+ */
+
+char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg)
+{
+ char *other = NULL, *str;
+ const char *reason = NULL;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
+ ASN1_UTCTIME *revtm = NULL;
+ int i;
+ switch (rev_type) {
+ case REV_NONE:
+ break;
+
+ case REV_CRL_REASON:
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(rev_arg, crl_reasons[i])) {
+ reason = crl_reasons[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (reason == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown CRL reason %s\n", rev_arg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case REV_HOLD:
+ /* Argument is an OID */
+
+ otmp = OBJ_txt2obj(rev_arg, 0);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(otmp);
+
+ if (otmp == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid object identifier %s\n", rev_arg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ reason = "holdInstruction";
+ other = rev_arg;
+ break;
+
+ case REV_KEY_COMPROMISE:
+ case REV_CA_COMPROMISE:
+
+ /* Argument is the key compromise time */
+ if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(NULL, rev_arg)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Invalid time format %s. Need YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ\n",
+ rev_arg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ other = rev_arg;
+ if (rev_type == REV_KEY_COMPROMISE)
+ reason = "keyTime";
+ else
+ reason = "CAkeyTime";
+
+ break;
+
+ }
+
+ revtm = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
+
+ if (!revtm)
+ return NULL;
+
+ i = revtm->length + 1;
+
+ if (reason)
+ i += strlen(reason) + 1;
+ if (other)
+ i += strlen(other) + 1;
+
+ str = OPENSSL_malloc(i);
+
+ if (!str)
+ return NULL;
+
+ BUF_strlcpy(str, (char *)revtm->data, i);
+ if (reason) {
+ BUF_strlcat(str, ",", i);
+ BUF_strlcat(str, reason, i);
+ }
+ if (other) {
+ BUF_strlcat(str, ",", i);
+ BUF_strlcat(str, other, i);
+ }
+ ASN1_UTCTIME_free(revtm);
+ return str;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Convert revocation field to X509_REVOKED entry
+ * return code:
+ * 0 error
+ * 1 OK
+ * 2 OK and some extensions added (i.e. V2 CRL)
+ */
+
+int make_revoked(X509_REVOKED *rev, const char *str)
+{
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ int reason_code = -1;
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED *rtmp = NULL;
+
+ ASN1_TIME *revDate = NULL;
+
+ i = unpack_revinfo(&revDate, &reason_code, &hold, &comp_time, str);
+
+ if (i == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (rev && !X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(rev, revDate))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (rev && (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS)) {
+ rtmp = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
+ if (!rtmp || !ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(rtmp, reason_code))
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(rev, NID_crl_reason, rtmp, 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rev && comp_time) {
+ if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d
+ (rev, NID_invalidity_date, comp_time, 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rev && hold) {
+ if (!X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d
+ (rev, NID_hold_instruction_code, hold, 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (reason_code != OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS)
+ ret = 2;
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+ if (tmp)
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold);
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time);
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(rtmp);
+ ASN1_TIME_free(revDate);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int old_entry_print(BIO *bp, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, ASN1_STRING *str)
+{
+ char buf[25], *pbuf, *p;
+ int j;
+ j = i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, obj);
+ pbuf = buf;
+ for (j = 22 - j; j > 0; j--)
+ *(pbuf++) = ' ';
+ *(pbuf++) = ':';
+ *(pbuf++) = '\0';
+ BIO_puts(bp, buf);
+
+ if (str->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
+ BIO_printf(bp, "PRINTABLE:'");
+ else if (str->type == V_ASN1_T61STRING)
+ BIO_printf(bp, "T61STRING:'");
+ else if (str->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
+ BIO_printf(bp, "IA5STRING:'");
+ else if (str->type == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING)
+ BIO_printf(bp, "UNIVERSALSTRING:'");
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bp, "ASN.1 %2d:'", str->type);
+
+ p = (char *)str->data;
+ for (j = str->length; j > 0; j--) {
+ if ((*p >= ' ') && (*p <= '~'))
+ BIO_printf(bp, "%c", *p);
+ else if (*p & 0x80)
+ BIO_printf(bp, "\\0x%02X", *p);
+ else if ((unsigned char)*p == 0xf7)
+ BIO_printf(bp, "^?");
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bp, "^%c", *p + '@');
+ p++;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bp, "'\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pinvtm, const char *str)
+{
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ char *rtime_str, *reason_str = NULL, *arg_str = NULL, *p;
+ int reason_code = -1;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned int i;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
+ tmp = BUF_strdup(str);
+
+ if (!tmp) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = strchr(tmp, ',');
+
+ rtime_str = tmp;
+
+ if (p) {
+ *p = '\0';
+ p++;
+ reason_str = p;
+ p = strchr(p, ',');
+ if (p) {
+ *p = '\0';
+ arg_str = p + 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (prevtm) {
+ *prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
+ if (!*prevtm) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(*prevtm, rtime_str)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid revocation date %s\n", rtime_str);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (reason_str) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_REASONS; i++) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(reason_str, crl_reasons[i])) {
+ reason_code = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (reason_code == OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid reason code %s\n", reason_str);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (reason_code == 7)
+ reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL;
+ else if (reason_code == 8) { /* Hold instruction */
+ if (!arg_str) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing hold instruction\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD;
+ hold = OBJ_txt2obj(arg_str, 0);
+
+ if (!hold) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid object identifier %s\n",
+ arg_str);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (phold)
+ *phold = hold;
+ } else if ((reason_code == 9) || (reason_code == 10)) {
+ if (!arg_str) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "missing compromised time\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
+ if (!comp_time) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(comp_time, arg_str)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid compromised time %s\n", arg_str);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (reason_code == 9)
+ reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE;
+ else
+ reason_code = OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (preason)
+ *preason = reason_code;
+ if (pinvtm)
+ *pinvtm = comp_time;
+ else
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time);
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+ if (tmp)
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ if (!phold)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(hold);
+ if (!pinvtm)
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(comp_time);
+
+ return ret;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ecparam.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/ecparam.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ecparam.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,659 +0,0 @@
-/* apps/ecparam.c */
-/*
- * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
- * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-# include <assert.h>
-# include <stdio.h>
-# include <stdlib.h>
-# include <time.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# include "apps.h"
-# include <openssl/bio.h>
-# include <openssl/err.h>
-# include <openssl/bn.h>
-# include <openssl/ec.h>
-# include <openssl/x509.h>
-# include <openssl/pem.h>
-
-# undef PROG
-# define PROG ecparam_main
-
-/*-
- * -inform arg - input format - default PEM (DER or PEM)
- * -outform arg - output format - default PEM
- * -in arg - input file - default stdin
- * -out arg - output file - default stdout
- * -noout - do not print the ec parameter
- * -text - print the ec parameters in text form
- * -check - validate the ec parameters
- * -C - print a 'C' function creating the parameters
- * -name arg - use the ec parameters with 'short name' name
- * -list_curves - prints a list of all currently available curve 'short names'
- * -conv_form arg - specifies the point conversion form
- * - possible values: compressed
- * uncompressed (default)
- * hybrid
- * -param_enc arg - specifies the way the ec parameters are encoded
- * in the asn1 der encoding
- * possible values: named_curve (default)
- * explicit
- * -no_seed - if 'explicit' parameters are chosen do not use the seed
- * -genkey - generate ec key
- * -rand file - files to use for random number input
- * -engine e - use engine e, possibly a hardware device
- */
-
-static int ecparam_print_var(BIO *, BIGNUM *, const char *, int,
- unsigned char *);
-
-int MAIN(int, char **);
-
-int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
- point_conversion_form_t form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
- int new_form = 0;
- int asn1_flag = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE;
- int new_asn1_flag = 0;
- char *curve_name = NULL, *inrand = NULL;
- int list_curves = 0, no_seed = 0, check = 0,
- badops = 0, text = 0, i, need_rand = 0, genkey = 0;
- char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
- BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
- int informat, outformat, noout = 0, C = 0, ret = 1;
- char *engine = NULL;
-
- BIGNUM *ec_p = NULL, *ec_a = NULL, *ec_b = NULL,
- *ec_gen = NULL, *ec_order = NULL, *ec_cofactor = NULL;
- unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
-
- apps_startup();
-
- if (bio_err == NULL)
- if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL)
- BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
-
- if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
- goto end;
-
- informat = FORMAT_PEM;
- outformat = FORMAT_PEM;
-
- prog = argv[0];
- argc--;
- argv++;
- while (argc >= 1) {
- if (strcmp(*argv, "-inform") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- informat = str2fmt(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-outform") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- outformat = str2fmt(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-in") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- infile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- outfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-text") == 0)
- text = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-C") == 0)
- C = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-check") == 0)
- check = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-name") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- curve_name = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-list_curves") == 0)
- list_curves = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-conv_form") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- ++argv;
- new_form = 1;
- if (strcmp(*argv, "compressed") == 0)
- form = POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "uncompressed") == 0)
- form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "hybrid") == 0)
- form = POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID;
- else
- goto bad;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-param_enc") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- ++argv;
- new_asn1_flag = 1;
- if (strcmp(*argv, "named_curve") == 0)
- asn1_flag = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "explicit") == 0)
- asn1_flag = 0;
- else
- goto bad;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_seed") == 0)
- no_seed = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noout") == 0)
- noout = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-genkey") == 0) {
- genkey = 1;
- need_rand = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rand") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- inrand = *(++argv);
- need_rand = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- engine = *(++argv);
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
- badops = 1;
- break;
- }
- argc--;
- argv++;
- }
-
- if (badops) {
- bad:
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [options] <infile >outfile\n", prog);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -inform arg input format - "
- "default PEM (DER or PEM)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -outform arg output format - "
- "default PEM\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -in arg input file - "
- "default stdin\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -out arg output file - "
- "default stdout\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -noout do not print the "
- "ec parameter\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -text print the ec "
- "parameters in text form\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -check validate the ec "
- "parameters\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -C print a 'C' "
- "function creating the parameters\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -name arg use the "
- "ec parameters with 'short name' name\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -list_curves prints a list of "
- "all currently available curve 'short names'\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -conv_form arg specifies the "
- "point conversion form \n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " possible values:"
- " compressed\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " "
- " uncompressed (default)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " "
- " hybrid\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -param_enc arg specifies the way"
- " the ec parameters are encoded\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " in the asn1 der "
- "encoding\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " possible values:"
- " named_curve (default)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " "
- " explicit\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_seed if 'explicit'"
- " parameters are chosen do not" " use the seed\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -genkey generate ec" " key\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -rand file files to use for"
- " random number input\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -engine e use engine e, "
- "possibly a hardware device\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- if ((in == NULL) || (out == NULL)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (infile == NULL)
- BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- else {
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) {
- perror(infile);
- goto end;
- }
- }
- if (outfile == NULL) {
- BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- {
- BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
- out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out);
- }
-# endif
- } else {
- if (BIO_write_filename(out, outfile) <= 0) {
- perror(outfile);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
-# endif
-
- if (list_curves) {
- EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
- size_t crv_len = 0;
- size_t n = 0;
-
- crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
-
- curves = OPENSSL_malloc((int)(sizeof(EC_builtin_curve) * crv_len));
-
- if (curves == NULL)
- goto end;
-
- if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) {
- OPENSSL_free(curves);
- goto end;
- }
-
- for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) {
- const char *comment;
- const char *sname;
- comment = curves[n].comment;
- sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid);
- if (comment == NULL)
- comment = "CURVE DESCRIPTION NOT AVAILABLE";
- if (sname == NULL)
- sname = "";
-
- BIO_printf(out, " %-10s: ", sname);
- BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", comment);
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(curves);
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (curve_name != NULL) {
- int nid;
-
- /*
- * workaround for the SECG curve names secp192r1 and secp256r1 (which
- * are the same as the curves prime192v1 and prime256v1 defined in
- * X9.62)
- */
- if (!strcmp(curve_name, "secp192r1")) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "using curve name prime192v1 "
- "instead of secp192r1\n");
- nid = NID_X9_62_prime192v1;
- } else if (!strcmp(curve_name, "secp256r1")) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "using curve name prime256v1 "
- "instead of secp256r1\n");
- nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
- } else
- nid = OBJ_sn2nid(curve_name);
-
- if (nid == 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", curve_name);
- goto end;
- }
-
- group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- if (group == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve (%s)\n", curve_name);
- goto end;
- }
- EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, asn1_flag);
- EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(group, form);
- } else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
- group = d2i_ECPKParameters_bio(in, NULL);
- } else if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) {
- group = PEM_read_bio_ECPKParameters(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (group == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load elliptic curve parameters\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (new_form)
- EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(group, form);
-
- if (new_asn1_flag)
- EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, asn1_flag);
-
- if (no_seed) {
- EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, NULL, 0);
- }
-
- if (text) {
- if (!ECPKParameters_print(out, group, 0))
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (check) {
- if (group == NULL)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "no elliptic curve parameters\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: ");
- if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- } else
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
-
- }
-
- if (C) {
- size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len = 0;
- const EC_POINT *point;
- int is_prime, len = 0;
- const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group);
-
- if ((ec_p = BN_new()) == NULL || (ec_a = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (ec_b = BN_new()) == NULL || (ec_gen = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (ec_order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (ec_cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- perror("OPENSSL_malloc");
- goto end;
- }
-
- is_prime = (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field);
-
- if (is_prime) {
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, ec_p, ec_a, ec_b, NULL))
- goto end;
- } else {
- /* TODO */
- goto end;
- }
-
- if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) == NULL)
- goto end;
- if (!EC_POINT_point2bn(group, point,
- EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(group),
- ec_gen, NULL))
- goto end;
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, ec_order, NULL))
- goto end;
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, ec_cofactor, NULL))
- goto end;
-
- if (!ec_p || !ec_a || !ec_b || !ec_gen || !ec_order || !ec_cofactor)
- goto end;
-
- len = BN_num_bits(ec_order);
-
- if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_p)) > buf_len)
- buf_len = tmp_len;
- if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_a)) > buf_len)
- buf_len = tmp_len;
- if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_b)) > buf_len)
- buf_len = tmp_len;
- if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_gen)) > buf_len)
- buf_len = tmp_len;
- if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_order)) > buf_len)
- buf_len = tmp_len;
- if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_cofactor)) > buf_len)
- buf_len = tmp_len;
-
- buffer = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len);
-
- if (buffer == NULL) {
- perror("OPENSSL_malloc");
- goto end;
- }
-
- ecparam_print_var(out, ec_p, "ec_p", len, buffer);
- ecparam_print_var(out, ec_a, "ec_a", len, buffer);
- ecparam_print_var(out, ec_b, "ec_b", len, buffer);
- ecparam_print_var(out, ec_gen, "ec_gen", len, buffer);
- ecparam_print_var(out, ec_order, "ec_order", len, buffer);
- ecparam_print_var(out, ec_cofactor, "ec_cofactor", len, buffer);
-
- BIO_printf(out, "\n\n");
-
- BIO_printf(out, "EC_GROUP *get_ec_group_%d(void)\n\t{\n", len);
- BIO_printf(out, "\tint ok=0;\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tEC_GROUP *group = NULL;\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tEC_POINT *point = NULL;\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tBIGNUM *tmp_1 = NULL, *tmp_2 = NULL, "
- "*tmp_3 = NULL;\n\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_1 = BN_bin2bn(ec_p_%d, "
- "sizeof(ec_p_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n\t\t"
- "goto err;\n", len, len);
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_2 = BN_bin2bn(ec_a_%d, "
- "sizeof(ec_a_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n\t\t"
- "goto err;\n", len, len);
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_3 = BN_bin2bn(ec_b_%d, "
- "sizeof(ec_b_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n\t\t"
- "goto err;\n", len, len);
- if (is_prime) {
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_"
- "GFp(tmp_1, tmp_2, tmp_3, NULL)) == NULL)"
- "\n\t\tgoto err;\n\n");
- } else {
- /* TODO */
- goto end;
- }
- BIO_printf(out, "\t/* build generator */\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_1 = BN_bin2bn(ec_gen_%d, "
- "sizeof(ec_gen_%d), tmp_1)) == NULL)"
- "\n\t\tgoto err;\n", len, len);
- BIO_printf(out, "\tpoint = EC_POINT_bn2point(group, tmp_1, "
- "NULL, NULL);\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif (point == NULL)\n\t\tgoto err;\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_2 = BN_bin2bn(ec_order_%d, "
- "sizeof(ec_order_%d), tmp_2)) == NULL)"
- "\n\t\tgoto err;\n", len, len);
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_3 = BN_bin2bn(ec_cofactor_%d, "
- "sizeof(ec_cofactor_%d), tmp_3)) == NULL)"
- "\n\t\tgoto err;\n", len, len);
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, point,"
- " tmp_2, tmp_3))\n\t\tgoto err;\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\n\tok=1;\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "err:\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif (tmp_1)\n\t\tBN_free(tmp_1);\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif (tmp_2)\n\t\tBN_free(tmp_2);\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif (tmp_3)\n\t\tBN_free(tmp_3);\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif (point)\n\t\tEC_POINT_free(point);\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\tif (!ok)\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\t\t{\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\t\tEC_GROUP_free(group);\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\t\tgroup = NULL;\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\t\t}\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "\treturn(group);\n\t}\n");
- }
-
- if (!noout) {
- if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
- i = i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(out, group);
- else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
- i = PEM_write_bio_ECPKParameters(out, group);
- else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for"
- " outfile\n");
- goto end;
- }
- if (!i) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write elliptic "
- "curve parameters\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (need_rand) {
- app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, (inrand != NULL));
- if (inrand != NULL)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
- app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
- }
-
- if (genkey) {
- EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new();
-
- if (eckey == NULL)
- goto end;
-
- assert(need_rand);
-
- if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) {
- EC_KEY_free(eckey);
- goto end;
- }
- if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
- i = i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(out, eckey);
- else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
- i = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(out, eckey, NULL,
- NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
- else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified "
- "for outfile\n");
- EC_KEY_free(eckey);
- goto end;
- }
- EC_KEY_free(eckey);
- }
-
- if (need_rand)
- app_RAND_write_file(NULL, bio_err);
-
- ret = 0;
- end:
- if (ec_p)
- BN_free(ec_p);
- if (ec_a)
- BN_free(ec_a);
- if (ec_b)
- BN_free(ec_b);
- if (ec_gen)
- BN_free(ec_gen);
- if (ec_order)
- BN_free(ec_order);
- if (ec_cofactor)
- BN_free(ec_cofactor);
- if (buffer)
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- if (out != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(out);
- if (group != NULL)
- EC_GROUP_free(group);
- apps_shutdown();
- OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
-}
-
-static int ecparam_print_var(BIO *out, BIGNUM *in, const char *var,
- int len, unsigned char *buffer)
-{
- BIO_printf(out, "static unsigned char %s_%d[] = {", var, len);
- if (BN_is_zero(in))
- BIO_printf(out, "\n\t0x00");
- else {
- int i, l;
-
- l = BN_bn2bin(in, buffer);
- for (i = 0; i < l - 1; i++) {
- if ((i % 12) == 0)
- BIO_printf(out, "\n\t");
- BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X,", buffer[i]);
- }
- if ((i % 12) == 0)
- BIO_printf(out, "\n\t");
- BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", buffer[i]);
- }
- BIO_printf(out, "\n\t};\n\n");
- return 1;
-}
-#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-# if PEDANTIC
-static void *dummy = &dummy;
-# endif
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ecparam.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/ecparam.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ecparam.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ecparam.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,658 @@
+/* apps/ecparam.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# include <assert.h>
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+# undef PROG
+# define PROG ecparam_main
+
+/*-
+ * -inform arg - input format - default PEM (DER or PEM)
+ * -outform arg - output format - default PEM
+ * -in arg - input file - default stdin
+ * -out arg - output file - default stdout
+ * -noout - do not print the ec parameter
+ * -text - print the ec parameters in text form
+ * -check - validate the ec parameters
+ * -C - print a 'C' function creating the parameters
+ * -name arg - use the ec parameters with 'short name' name
+ * -list_curves - prints a list of all currently available curve 'short names'
+ * -conv_form arg - specifies the point conversion form
+ * - possible values: compressed
+ * uncompressed (default)
+ * hybrid
+ * -param_enc arg - specifies the way the ec parameters are encoded
+ * in the asn1 der encoding
+ * possible values: named_curve (default)
+ * explicit
+ * -no_seed - if 'explicit' parameters are chosen do not use the seed
+ * -genkey - generate ec key
+ * -rand file - files to use for random number input
+ * -engine e - use engine e, possibly a hardware device
+ */
+
+static int ecparam_print_var(BIO *, BIGNUM *, const char *, int,
+ unsigned char *);
+
+int MAIN(int, char **);
+
+int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+ point_conversion_form_t form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
+ int new_form = 0;
+ int asn1_flag = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE;
+ int new_asn1_flag = 0;
+ char *curve_name = NULL, *inrand = NULL;
+ int list_curves = 0, no_seed = 0, check = 0,
+ badops = 0, text = 0, i, need_rand = 0, genkey = 0;
+ char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
+ BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+ int informat, outformat, noout = 0, C = 0, ret = 1;
+ char *engine = NULL;
+
+ BIGNUM *ec_p = NULL, *ec_a = NULL, *ec_b = NULL,
+ *ec_gen = NULL, *ec_order = NULL, *ec_cofactor = NULL;
+ unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
+
+ apps_startup();
+
+ if (bio_err == NULL)
+ if ((bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL)
+ BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
+ goto end;
+
+ informat = FORMAT_PEM;
+ outformat = FORMAT_PEM;
+
+ prog = argv[0];
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ while (argc >= 1) {
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "-inform") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ informat = str2fmt(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-outform") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ outformat = str2fmt(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-in") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ infile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ outfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-text") == 0)
+ text = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-C") == 0)
+ C = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-check") == 0)
+ check = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-name") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ curve_name = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-list_curves") == 0)
+ list_curves = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-conv_form") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ ++argv;
+ new_form = 1;
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "compressed") == 0)
+ form = POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "uncompressed") == 0)
+ form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "hybrid") == 0)
+ form = POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID;
+ else
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-param_enc") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ ++argv;
+ new_asn1_flag = 1;
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "named_curve") == 0)
+ asn1_flag = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "explicit") == 0)
+ asn1_flag = 0;
+ else
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_seed") == 0)
+ no_seed = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-noout") == 0)
+ noout = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-genkey") == 0) {
+ genkey = 1;
+ need_rand = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rand") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ inrand = *(++argv);
+ need_rand = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ engine = *(++argv);
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
+ badops = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+
+ if (badops) {
+ bad:
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s [options] <infile >outfile\n", prog);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -inform arg input format - "
+ "default PEM (DER or PEM)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -outform arg output format - "
+ "default PEM\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -in arg input file - "
+ "default stdin\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -out arg output file - "
+ "default stdout\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -noout do not print the "
+ "ec parameter\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -text print the ec "
+ "parameters in text form\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -check validate the ec "
+ "parameters\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -C print a 'C' "
+ "function creating the parameters\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -name arg use the "
+ "ec parameters with 'short name' name\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -list_curves prints a list of "
+ "all currently available curve 'short names'\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -conv_form arg specifies the "
+ "point conversion form \n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " possible values:"
+ " compressed\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " "
+ " uncompressed (default)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " "
+ " hybrid\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -param_enc arg specifies the way"
+ " the ec parameters are encoded\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " in the asn1 der "
+ "encoding\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " possible values:"
+ " named_curve (default)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " "
+ " explicit\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_seed if 'explicit'"
+ " parameters are chosen do not" " use the seed\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -genkey generate ec" " key\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -rand file files to use for"
+ " random number input\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -engine e use engine e, "
+ "possibly a hardware device\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if ((in == NULL) || (out == NULL)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (infile == NULL)
+ BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ else {
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) {
+ perror(infile);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ if (outfile == NULL) {
+ BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ {
+ BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
+ out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out);
+ }
+# endif
+ } else {
+ if (BIO_write_filename(out, outfile) <= 0) {
+ perror(outfile);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+# endif
+
+ if (list_curves) {
+ EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
+ size_t crv_len = 0;
+ size_t n = 0;
+
+ crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
+
+ curves = OPENSSL_malloc((int)(sizeof(EC_builtin_curve) * crv_len));
+
+ if (curves == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(curves);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) {
+ const char *comment;
+ const char *sname;
+ comment = curves[n].comment;
+ sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid);
+ if (comment == NULL)
+ comment = "CURVE DESCRIPTION NOT AVAILABLE";
+ if (sname == NULL)
+ sname = "";
+
+ BIO_printf(out, " %-10s: ", sname);
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", comment);
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(curves);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (curve_name != NULL) {
+ int nid;
+
+ /*
+ * workaround for the SECG curve names secp192r1 and secp256r1 (which
+ * are the same as the curves prime192v1 and prime256v1 defined in
+ * X9.62)
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(curve_name, "secp192r1")) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "using curve name prime192v1 "
+ "instead of secp192r1\n");
+ nid = NID_X9_62_prime192v1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(curve_name, "secp256r1")) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "using curve name prime256v1 "
+ "instead of secp256r1\n");
+ nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ } else
+ nid = OBJ_sn2nid(curve_name);
+
+ if (nid == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", curve_name);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ if (group == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve (%s)\n", curve_name);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, asn1_flag);
+ EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(group, form);
+ } else if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
+ group = d2i_ECPKParameters_bio(in, NULL);
+ } else if (informat == FORMAT_PEM) {
+ group = PEM_read_bio_ECPKParameters(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (group == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load elliptic curve parameters\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (new_form)
+ EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(group, form);
+
+ if (new_asn1_flag)
+ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, asn1_flag);
+
+ if (no_seed) {
+ EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (text) {
+ if (!ECPKParameters_print(out, group, 0))
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (check) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: ");
+ if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
+
+ }
+
+ if (C) {
+ size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len = 0;
+ const EC_POINT *point;
+ int is_prime, len = 0;
+ const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group);
+
+ if ((ec_p = BN_new()) == NULL || (ec_a = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (ec_b = BN_new()) == NULL || (ec_gen = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (ec_order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (ec_cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ perror("OPENSSL_malloc");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ is_prime = (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field);
+
+ if (is_prime) {
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, ec_p, ec_a, ec_b, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ /* TODO */
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ if (!EC_POINT_point2bn(group, point,
+ EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(group),
+ ec_gen, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, ec_order, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, ec_cofactor, NULL))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!ec_p || !ec_a || !ec_b || !ec_gen || !ec_order || !ec_cofactor)
+ goto end;
+
+ len = BN_num_bits(ec_order);
+
+ if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_p)) > buf_len)
+ buf_len = tmp_len;
+ if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_a)) > buf_len)
+ buf_len = tmp_len;
+ if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_b)) > buf_len)
+ buf_len = tmp_len;
+ if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_gen)) > buf_len)
+ buf_len = tmp_len;
+ if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_order)) > buf_len)
+ buf_len = tmp_len;
+ if ((tmp_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(ec_cofactor)) > buf_len)
+ buf_len = tmp_len;
+
+ buffer = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len);
+
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ perror("OPENSSL_malloc");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ecparam_print_var(out, ec_p, "ec_p", len, buffer);
+ ecparam_print_var(out, ec_a, "ec_a", len, buffer);
+ ecparam_print_var(out, ec_b, "ec_b", len, buffer);
+ ecparam_print_var(out, ec_gen, "ec_gen", len, buffer);
+ ecparam_print_var(out, ec_order, "ec_order", len, buffer);
+ ecparam_print_var(out, ec_cofactor, "ec_cofactor", len, buffer);
+
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n\n");
+
+ BIO_printf(out, "EC_GROUP *get_ec_group_%d(void)\n\t{\n", len);
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tint ok=0;\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tEC_GROUP *group = NULL;\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tEC_POINT *point = NULL;\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tBIGNUM *tmp_1 = NULL, *tmp_2 = NULL, "
+ "*tmp_3 = NULL;\n\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_1 = BN_bin2bn(ec_p_%d, "
+ "sizeof(ec_p_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n\t\t"
+ "goto err;\n", len, len);
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_2 = BN_bin2bn(ec_a_%d, "
+ "sizeof(ec_a_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n\t\t"
+ "goto err;\n", len, len);
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_3 = BN_bin2bn(ec_b_%d, "
+ "sizeof(ec_b_%d), NULL)) == NULL)\n\t\t"
+ "goto err;\n", len, len);
+ if (is_prime) {
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_"
+ "GFp(tmp_1, tmp_2, tmp_3, NULL)) == NULL)"
+ "\n\t\tgoto err;\n\n");
+ } else {
+ /* TODO */
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(out, "\t/* build generator */\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_1 = BN_bin2bn(ec_gen_%d, "
+ "sizeof(ec_gen_%d), tmp_1)) == NULL)"
+ "\n\t\tgoto err;\n", len, len);
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tpoint = EC_POINT_bn2point(group, tmp_1, "
+ "NULL, NULL);\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif (point == NULL)\n\t\tgoto err;\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_2 = BN_bin2bn(ec_order_%d, "
+ "sizeof(ec_order_%d), tmp_2)) == NULL)"
+ "\n\t\tgoto err;\n", len, len);
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif ((tmp_3 = BN_bin2bn(ec_cofactor_%d, "
+ "sizeof(ec_cofactor_%d), tmp_3)) == NULL)"
+ "\n\t\tgoto err;\n", len, len);
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, point,"
+ " tmp_2, tmp_3))\n\t\tgoto err;\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n\tok=1;\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "err:\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif (tmp_1)\n\t\tBN_free(tmp_1);\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif (tmp_2)\n\t\tBN_free(tmp_2);\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif (tmp_3)\n\t\tBN_free(tmp_3);\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif (point)\n\t\tEC_POINT_free(point);\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tif (!ok)\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\t\t{\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\t\tEC_GROUP_free(group);\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\t\tgroup = NULL;\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\t\t}\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "\treturn(group);\n\t}\n");
+ }
+
+ if (!noout) {
+ if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+ i = i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(out, group);
+ else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+ i = PEM_write_bio_ECPKParameters(out, group);
+ else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for"
+ " outfile\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!i) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to write elliptic "
+ "curve parameters\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (need_rand) {
+ app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, (inrand != NULL));
+ if (inrand != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+ app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+ }
+
+ if (genkey) {
+ EC_KEY *eckey = EC_KEY_new();
+
+ if (eckey == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ assert(need_rand);
+
+ if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) {
+ EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
+ i = i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(out, eckey);
+ else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
+ i = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(out, eckey, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified "
+ "for outfile\n");
+ EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ EC_KEY_free(eckey);
+ }
+
+ if (need_rand)
+ app_RAND_write_file(NULL, bio_err);
+
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ if (ec_p)
+ BN_free(ec_p);
+ if (ec_a)
+ BN_free(ec_a);
+ if (ec_b)
+ BN_free(ec_b);
+ if (ec_gen)
+ BN_free(ec_gen);
+ if (ec_order)
+ BN_free(ec_order);
+ if (ec_cofactor)
+ BN_free(ec_cofactor);
+ if (buffer)
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ if (out != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(out);
+ if (group != NULL)
+ EC_GROUP_free(group);
+ apps_shutdown();
+ OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+static int ecparam_print_var(BIO *out, BIGNUM *in, const char *var,
+ int len, unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+ BIO_printf(out, "static unsigned char %s_%d[] = {", var, len);
+ if (BN_is_zero(in))
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n\t0x00");
+ else {
+ int i, l;
+
+ l = BN_bn2bin(in, buffer);
+ for (i = 0; i < l - 1; i++) {
+ if ((i % 12) == 0)
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n\t");
+ BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X,", buffer[i]);
+ }
+ if ((i % 12) == 0)
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n\t");
+ BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", buffer[i]);
+ }
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n\t};\n\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy = &dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/engine.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/engine.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/engine.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,517 +0,0 @@
-/* apps/engine.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/*
- * Written by Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project
- * 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-# define APPS_WIN16
-#endif
-#include "apps.h"
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-# include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-# undef PROG
-# define PROG engine_main
-
-static const char *engine_usage[] = {
- "usage: engine opts [engine ...]\n",
- " -v[v[v[v]]] - verbose mode, for each engine, list its 'control commands'\n",
- " -vv will additionally display each command's description\n",
- " -vvv will also add the input flags for each command\n",
- " -vvvv will also show internal input flags\n",
- " -c - for each engine, also list the capabilities\n",
- " -t[t] - for each engine, check that they are really available\n",
- " -tt will display error trace for unavailable engines\n",
- " -pre <cmd> - runs command 'cmd' against the ENGINE before any attempts\n",
- " to load it (if -t is used)\n",
- " -post <cmd> - runs command 'cmd' against the ENGINE after loading it\n",
- " (only used if -t is also provided)\n",
- " NB: -pre and -post will be applied to all ENGINEs supplied on the command\n",
- " line, or all supported ENGINEs if none are specified.\n",
- " Eg. '-pre \"SO_PATH:/lib/libdriver.so\"' calls command \"SO_PATH\" with\n",
- " argument \"/lib/libdriver.so\".\n",
- NULL
-};
-
-static void identity(char *ptr)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
-{
- int l = strlen(s);
-
- if (*buf == NULL) {
- *size = step;
- *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(*size);
- if (*buf == NULL)
- return 0;
- **buf = '\0';
- }
-
- if (**buf != '\0')
- l += 2; /* ", " */
-
- if (strlen(*buf) + strlen(s) >= (unsigned int)*size) {
- *size += step;
- *buf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buf, *size);
- }
-
- if (*buf == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (**buf != '\0')
- BUF_strlcat(*buf, ", ", *size);
- BUF_strlcat(*buf, s, *size);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int util_flags(BIO *bio_out, unsigned int flags, const char *indent)
-{
- int started = 0, err = 0;
- /* Indent before displaying input flags */
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s%s(input flags): ", indent, indent);
- if (flags == 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "<no flags>\n");
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * If the object is internal, mark it in a way that shows instead of
- * having it part of all the other flags, even if it really is.
- */
- if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "[Internal] ");
- }
-
- if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "NUMERIC");
- started = 1;
- }
- /*
- * Now we check that no combinations of the mutually exclusive NUMERIC,
- * STRING, and NO_INPUT flags have been used. Future flags that can be
- * OR'd together with these would need to added after these to preserve
- * the testing logic.
- */
- if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING) {
- if (started) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "|");
- err = 1;
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "STRING");
- started = 1;
- }
- if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT) {
- if (started) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "|");
- err = 1;
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "NO_INPUT");
- started = 1;
- }
- /* Check for unknown flags */
- flags = flags & ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC &
- ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING &
- ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT & ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL;
- if (flags) {
- if (started)
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "|");
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "<0x%04X>", flags);
- }
- if (err)
- BIO_printf(bio_out, " <illegal flags!>");
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int util_verbose(ENGINE *e, int verbose, BIO *bio_out,
- const char *indent)
-{
- static const int line_wrap = 78;
- int num;
- int ret = 0;
- char *name = NULL;
- char *desc = NULL;
- int flags;
- int xpos = 0;
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *cmds = NULL;
- if (!ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
- ((num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE,
- 0, NULL, NULL)) <= 0)) {
-# if 0
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s<no control commands>\n", indent);
-# endif
- return 1;
- }
-
- cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
-
- if (!cmds)
- goto err;
- do {
- int len;
- /* Get the command input flags */
- if ((flags = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS, num,
- NULL, NULL)) < 0)
- goto err;
- if (!(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL) || verbose >= 4) {
- /* Get the command name */
- if ((len = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD, num,
- NULL, NULL)) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if ((name = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD, num, name,
- NULL) <= 0)
- goto err;
- /* Get the command description */
- if ((len = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD, num,
- NULL, NULL)) < 0)
- goto err;
- if (len > 0) {
- if ((desc = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD, num, desc,
- NULL) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- /* Now decide on the output */
- if (xpos == 0)
- /* Do an indent */
- xpos = BIO_puts(bio_out, indent);
- else
- /* Otherwise prepend a ", " */
- xpos += BIO_printf(bio_out, ", ");
- if (verbose == 1) {
- /*
- * We're just listing names, comma-delimited
- */
- if ((xpos > (int)strlen(indent)) &&
- (xpos + (int)strlen(name) > line_wrap)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
- xpos = BIO_puts(bio_out, indent);
- }
- xpos += BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s", name);
- } else {
- /* We're listing names plus descriptions */
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s: %s\n", name,
- (desc == NULL) ? "<no description>" : desc);
- /* ... and sometimes input flags */
- if ((verbose >= 3) && !util_flags(bio_out, flags, indent))
- goto err;
- xpos = 0;
- }
- }
- OPENSSL_free(name);
- name = NULL;
- if (desc) {
- OPENSSL_free(desc);
- desc = NULL;
- }
- /* Move to the next command */
- num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE, num, NULL, NULL);
- } while (num > 0);
- if (xpos > 0)
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (cmds)
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(cmds, identity);
- if (name)
- OPENSSL_free(name);
- if (desc)
- OPENSSL_free(desc);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void util_do_cmds(ENGINE *e, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *cmds,
- BIO *bio_out, const char *indent)
-{
- int loop, res, num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(cmds);
-
- if (num < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "[Error]: internal stack error\n");
- return;
- }
- for (loop = 0; loop < num; loop++) {
- char buf[256];
- const char *cmd, *arg;
- cmd = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(cmds, loop);
- res = 1; /* assume success */
- /* Check if this command has no ":arg" */
- if ((arg = strstr(cmd, ":")) == NULL) {
- if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, cmd, NULL, 0))
- res = 0;
- } else {
- if ((int)(arg - cmd) > 254) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "[Error]: command name too long\n");
- return;
- }
- memcpy(buf, cmd, (int)(arg - cmd));
- buf[arg - cmd] = '\0';
- arg++; /* Move past the ":" */
- /* Call the command with the argument */
- if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, buf, arg, 0))
- res = 0;
- }
- if (res)
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "[Success]: %s\n", cmd);
- else {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "[Failure]: %s\n", cmd);
- ERR_print_errors(bio_out);
- }
- }
-}
-
-int MAIN(int, char **);
-
-int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int ret = 1, i;
- const char **pp;
- int verbose = 0, list_cap = 0, test_avail = 0, test_avail_noise = 0;
- ENGINE *e;
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *engines = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pre_cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *post_cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
- int badops = 1;
- BIO *bio_out = NULL;
- const char *indent = " ";
-
- apps_startup();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
-
- if (bio_err == NULL)
- bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
- goto end;
- bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- {
- BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
- bio_out = BIO_push(tmpbio, bio_out);
- }
-# endif
-
- argc--;
- argv++;
- while (argc >= 1) {
- if (strncmp(*argv, "-v", 2) == 0) {
- if (strspn(*argv + 1, "v") < strlen(*argv + 1))
- goto skip_arg_loop;
- if ((verbose = strlen(*argv + 1)) > 4)
- goto skip_arg_loop;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-c") == 0)
- list_cap = 1;
- else if (strncmp(*argv, "-t", 2) == 0) {
- test_avail = 1;
- if (strspn(*argv + 1, "t") < strlen(*argv + 1))
- goto skip_arg_loop;
- if ((test_avail_noise = strlen(*argv + 1) - 1) > 1)
- goto skip_arg_loop;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pre") == 0) {
- argc--;
- argv++;
- if (argc == 0)
- goto skip_arg_loop;
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pre_cmds, *argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-post") == 0) {
- argc--;
- argv++;
- if (argc == 0)
- goto skip_arg_loop;
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(post_cmds, *argv);
- } else if ((strncmp(*argv, "-h", 2) == 0) ||
- (strcmp(*argv, "-?") == 0))
- goto skip_arg_loop;
- else
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(engines, *argv);
- argc--;
- argv++;
- }
- /* Looks like everything went OK */
- badops = 0;
- skip_arg_loop:
-
- if (badops) {
- for (pp = engine_usage; (*pp != NULL); pp++)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s", *pp);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(engines) == 0) {
- for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e != NULL; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(engines, (char *)ENGINE_get_id(e));
- }
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(engines); i++) {
- const char *id = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(engines, i);
- if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(id)) != NULL) {
- const char *name = ENGINE_get_name(e);
- /*
- * Do "id" first, then "name". Easier to auto-parse.
- */
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "(%s) %s\n", id, name);
- util_do_cmds(e, pre_cmds, bio_out, indent);
- if (strcmp(ENGINE_get_id(e), id) != 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "Loaded: (%s) %s\n",
- ENGINE_get_id(e), ENGINE_get_name(e));
- }
- if (list_cap) {
- int cap_size = 256;
- char *cap_buf = NULL;
- int k, n;
- const int *nids;
- ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR fn_c;
- ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR fn_d;
- ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR fn_pk;
-
- if (ENGINE_get_RSA(e) != NULL
- && !append_buf(&cap_buf, "RSA", &cap_size, 256))
- goto end;
- if (ENGINE_get_DSA(e) != NULL
- && !append_buf(&cap_buf, "DSA", &cap_size, 256))
- goto end;
- if (ENGINE_get_DH(e) != NULL
- && !append_buf(&cap_buf, "DH", &cap_size, 256))
- goto end;
- if (ENGINE_get_RAND(e) != NULL
- && !append_buf(&cap_buf, "RAND", &cap_size, 256))
- goto end;
-
- fn_c = ENGINE_get_ciphers(e);
- if (!fn_c)
- goto skip_ciphers;
- n = fn_c(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
- for (k = 0; k < n; ++k)
- if (!append_buf(&cap_buf,
- OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k]), &cap_size, 256))
- goto end;
-
- skip_ciphers:
- fn_d = ENGINE_get_digests(e);
- if (!fn_d)
- goto skip_digests;
- n = fn_d(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
- for (k = 0; k < n; ++k)
- if (!append_buf(&cap_buf,
- OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k]), &cap_size, 256))
- goto end;
-
- skip_digests:
- fn_pk = ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(e);
- if (!fn_pk)
- goto skip_pmeths;
- n = fn_pk(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
- for (k = 0; k < n; ++k)
- if (!append_buf(&cap_buf,
- OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k]), &cap_size, 256))
- goto end;
- skip_pmeths:
- if (cap_buf && (*cap_buf != '\0'))
- BIO_printf(bio_out, " [%s]\n", cap_buf);
-
- OPENSSL_free(cap_buf);
- }
- if (test_avail) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s", indent);
- if (ENGINE_init(e)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "[ available ]\n");
- util_do_cmds(e, post_cmds, bio_out, indent);
- ENGINE_finish(e);
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_out, "[ unavailable ]\n");
- if (test_avail_noise)
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- }
- if ((verbose > 0) && !util_verbose(e, verbose, bio_out, indent))
- goto end;
- ENGINE_free(e);
- } else
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- }
-
- ret = 0;
- end:
-
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(engines, identity);
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(pre_cmds, identity);
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(post_cmds, identity);
- if (bio_out != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(bio_out);
- apps_shutdown();
- OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
-}
-#else
-
-# if PEDANTIC
-static void *dummy = &dummy;
-# endif
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/engine.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/engine.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/engine.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/engine.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,512 @@
+/* apps/engine.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/*
+ * Written by Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+# define APPS_WIN16
+#endif
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+# undef PROG
+# define PROG engine_main
+
+static const char *engine_usage[] = {
+ "usage: engine opts [engine ...]\n",
+ " -v[v[v[v]]] - verbose mode, for each engine, list its 'control commands'\n",
+ " -vv will additionally display each command's description\n",
+ " -vvv will also add the input flags for each command\n",
+ " -vvvv will also show internal input flags\n",
+ " -c - for each engine, also list the capabilities\n",
+ " -t[t] - for each engine, check that they are really available\n",
+ " -tt will display error trace for unavailable engines\n",
+ " -pre <cmd> - runs command 'cmd' against the ENGINE before any attempts\n",
+ " to load it (if -t is used)\n",
+ " -post <cmd> - runs command 'cmd' against the ENGINE after loading it\n",
+ " (only used if -t is also provided)\n",
+ " NB: -pre and -post will be applied to all ENGINEs supplied on the command\n",
+ " line, or all supported ENGINEs if none are specified.\n",
+ " Eg. '-pre \"SO_PATH:/lib/libdriver.so\"' calls command \"SO_PATH\" with\n",
+ " argument \"/lib/libdriver.so\".\n",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static void identity(char *ptr)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
+{
+ if (*buf == NULL) {
+ *size = step;
+ *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(*size);
+ if (*buf == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ **buf = '\0';
+ }
+
+ if (strlen(*buf) + strlen(s) >= (unsigned int)*size) {
+ *size += step;
+ *buf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buf, *size);
+ }
+
+ if (*buf == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (**buf != '\0')
+ BUF_strlcat(*buf, ", ", *size);
+ BUF_strlcat(*buf, s, *size);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int util_flags(BIO *bio_out, unsigned int flags, const char *indent)
+{
+ int started = 0, err = 0;
+ /* Indent before displaying input flags */
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s%s(input flags): ", indent, indent);
+ if (flags == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "<no flags>\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If the object is internal, mark it in a way that shows instead of
+ * having it part of all the other flags, even if it really is.
+ */
+ if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "[Internal] ");
+ }
+
+ if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "NUMERIC");
+ started = 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now we check that no combinations of the mutually exclusive NUMERIC,
+ * STRING, and NO_INPUT flags have been used. Future flags that can be
+ * OR'd together with these would need to added after these to preserve
+ * the testing logic.
+ */
+ if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING) {
+ if (started) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "|");
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "STRING");
+ started = 1;
+ }
+ if (flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT) {
+ if (started) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "|");
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "NO_INPUT");
+ started = 1;
+ }
+ /* Check for unknown flags */
+ flags = flags & ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC &
+ ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING &
+ ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT & ~ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL;
+ if (flags) {
+ if (started)
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "|");
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "<0x%04X>", flags);
+ }
+ if (err)
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, " <illegal flags!>");
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int util_verbose(ENGINE *e, int verbose, BIO *bio_out,
+ const char *indent)
+{
+ static const int line_wrap = 78;
+ int num;
+ int ret = 0;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ char *desc = NULL;
+ int flags;
+ int xpos = 0;
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *cmds = NULL;
+ if (!ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
+ ((num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE,
+ 0, NULL, NULL)) <= 0)) {
+# if 0
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s<no control commands>\n", indent);
+# endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+
+ if (!cmds)
+ goto err;
+ do {
+ int len;
+ /* Get the command input flags */
+ if ((flags = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS, num,
+ NULL, NULL)) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!(flags & ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL) || verbose >= 4) {
+ /* Get the command name */
+ if ((len = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD, num,
+ NULL, NULL)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if ((name = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD, num, name,
+ NULL) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Get the command description */
+ if ((len = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD, num,
+ NULL, NULL)) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (len > 0) {
+ if ((desc = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD, num, desc,
+ NULL) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Now decide on the output */
+ if (xpos == 0)
+ /* Do an indent */
+ xpos = BIO_puts(bio_out, indent);
+ else
+ /* Otherwise prepend a ", " */
+ xpos += BIO_printf(bio_out, ", ");
+ if (verbose == 1) {
+ /*
+ * We're just listing names, comma-delimited
+ */
+ if ((xpos > (int)strlen(indent)) &&
+ (xpos + (int)strlen(name) > line_wrap)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+ xpos = BIO_puts(bio_out, indent);
+ }
+ xpos += BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s", name);
+ } else {
+ /* We're listing names plus descriptions */
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s: %s\n", name,
+ (desc == NULL) ? "<no description>" : desc);
+ /* ... and sometimes input flags */
+ if ((verbose >= 3) && !util_flags(bio_out, flags, indent))
+ goto err;
+ xpos = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(name);
+ name = NULL;
+ if (desc) {
+ OPENSSL_free(desc);
+ desc = NULL;
+ }
+ /* Move to the next command */
+ num = ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE, num, NULL, NULL);
+ } while (num > 0);
+ if (xpos > 0)
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (cmds)
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(cmds, identity);
+ if (name)
+ OPENSSL_free(name);
+ if (desc)
+ OPENSSL_free(desc);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void util_do_cmds(ENGINE *e, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *cmds,
+ BIO *bio_out, const char *indent)
+{
+ int loop, res, num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(cmds);
+
+ if (num < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "[Error]: internal stack error\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ for (loop = 0; loop < num; loop++) {
+ char buf[256];
+ const char *cmd, *arg;
+ cmd = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(cmds, loop);
+ res = 1; /* assume success */
+ /* Check if this command has no ":arg" */
+ if ((arg = strstr(cmd, ":")) == NULL) {
+ if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, cmd, NULL, 0))
+ res = 0;
+ } else {
+ if ((int)(arg - cmd) > 254) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "[Error]: command name too long\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, cmd, (int)(arg - cmd));
+ buf[arg - cmd] = '\0';
+ arg++; /* Move past the ":" */
+ /* Call the command with the argument */
+ if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, buf, arg, 0))
+ res = 0;
+ }
+ if (res)
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "[Success]: %s\n", cmd);
+ else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "[Failure]: %s\n", cmd);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_out);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int MAIN(int, char **);
+
+int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int ret = 1, i;
+ const char **pp;
+ int verbose = 0, list_cap = 0, test_avail = 0, test_avail_noise = 0;
+ ENGINE *e;
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *engines = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pre_cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *post_cmds = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+ int badops = 1;
+ BIO *bio_out = NULL;
+ const char *indent = " ";
+
+ apps_startup();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ if (bio_err == NULL)
+ bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ {
+ BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
+ bio_out = BIO_push(tmpbio, bio_out);
+ }
+# endif
+
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ while (argc >= 1) {
+ if (strncmp(*argv, "-v", 2) == 0) {
+ if (strspn(*argv + 1, "v") < strlen(*argv + 1))
+ goto skip_arg_loop;
+ if ((verbose = strlen(*argv + 1)) > 4)
+ goto skip_arg_loop;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-c") == 0)
+ list_cap = 1;
+ else if (strncmp(*argv, "-t", 2) == 0) {
+ test_avail = 1;
+ if (strspn(*argv + 1, "t") < strlen(*argv + 1))
+ goto skip_arg_loop;
+ if ((test_avail_noise = strlen(*argv + 1) - 1) > 1)
+ goto skip_arg_loop;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pre") == 0) {
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (argc == 0)
+ goto skip_arg_loop;
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pre_cmds, *argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-post") == 0) {
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (argc == 0)
+ goto skip_arg_loop;
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(post_cmds, *argv);
+ } else if ((strncmp(*argv, "-h", 2) == 0) ||
+ (strcmp(*argv, "-?") == 0))
+ goto skip_arg_loop;
+ else
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(engines, *argv);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+ /* Looks like everything went OK */
+ badops = 0;
+ skip_arg_loop:
+
+ if (badops) {
+ for (pp = engine_usage; (*pp != NULL); pp++)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s", *pp);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(engines) == 0) {
+ for (e = ENGINE_get_first(); e != NULL; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(engines, (char *)ENGINE_get_id(e));
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(engines); i++) {
+ const char *id = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(engines, i);
+ if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(id)) != NULL) {
+ const char *name = ENGINE_get_name(e);
+ /*
+ * Do "id" first, then "name". Easier to auto-parse.
+ */
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "(%s) %s\n", id, name);
+ util_do_cmds(e, pre_cmds, bio_out, indent);
+ if (strcmp(ENGINE_get_id(e), id) != 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "Loaded: (%s) %s\n",
+ ENGINE_get_id(e), ENGINE_get_name(e));
+ }
+ if (list_cap) {
+ int cap_size = 256;
+ char *cap_buf = NULL;
+ int k, n;
+ const int *nids;
+ ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR fn_c;
+ ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR fn_d;
+ ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR fn_pk;
+
+ if (ENGINE_get_RSA(e) != NULL
+ && !append_buf(&cap_buf, "RSA", &cap_size, 256))
+ goto end;
+ if (ENGINE_get_DSA(e) != NULL
+ && !append_buf(&cap_buf, "DSA", &cap_size, 256))
+ goto end;
+ if (ENGINE_get_DH(e) != NULL
+ && !append_buf(&cap_buf, "DH", &cap_size, 256))
+ goto end;
+ if (ENGINE_get_RAND(e) != NULL
+ && !append_buf(&cap_buf, "RAND", &cap_size, 256))
+ goto end;
+
+ fn_c = ENGINE_get_ciphers(e);
+ if (!fn_c)
+ goto skip_ciphers;
+ n = fn_c(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+ for (k = 0; k < n; ++k)
+ if (!append_buf(&cap_buf,
+ OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k]), &cap_size, 256))
+ goto end;
+
+ skip_ciphers:
+ fn_d = ENGINE_get_digests(e);
+ if (!fn_d)
+ goto skip_digests;
+ n = fn_d(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+ for (k = 0; k < n; ++k)
+ if (!append_buf(&cap_buf,
+ OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k]), &cap_size, 256))
+ goto end;
+
+ skip_digests:
+ fn_pk = ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(e);
+ if (!fn_pk)
+ goto skip_pmeths;
+ n = fn_pk(e, NULL, &nids, 0);
+ for (k = 0; k < n; ++k)
+ if (!append_buf(&cap_buf,
+ OBJ_nid2sn(nids[k]), &cap_size, 256))
+ goto end;
+ skip_pmeths:
+ if (cap_buf && (*cap_buf != '\0'))
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, " [%s]\n", cap_buf);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(cap_buf);
+ }
+ if (test_avail) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s", indent);
+ if (ENGINE_init(e)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "[ available ]\n");
+ util_do_cmds(e, post_cmds, bio_out, indent);
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_out, "[ unavailable ]\n");
+ if (test_avail_noise)
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+ if ((verbose > 0) && !util_verbose(e, verbose, bio_out, indent))
+ goto end;
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ } else
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(engines, identity);
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(pre_cmds, identity);
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(post_cmds, identity);
+ if (bio_out != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(bio_out);
+ apps_shutdown();
+ OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
+}
+#else
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy = &dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/md4.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/md4.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/md4.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/md4/md4.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/md4.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/md4.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/md4.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/md4.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/md4/md4.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ocsp.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/ocsp.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ocsp.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1325 +0,0 @@
-/* ocsp.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-# define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED/* So fd_set and friends get properly defined
- * on OpenVMS */
-# endif
-
-# define USE_SOCKETS
-
-# include <stdio.h>
-# include <stdlib.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# include <time.h>
-# include "apps.h" /* needs to be included before the openssl
- * headers! */
-# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-# include <openssl/crypto.h>
-# include <openssl/err.h>
-# include <openssl/ssl.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/bn.h>
-# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-# if defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
-# ifdef NETWARE_BSDSOCK
-# include <sys/socket.h>
-# include <sys/bsdskt.h>
-# else
-# include <novsock2.h>
-# endif
-# elif defined(NETWARE_LIBC)
-# ifdef NETWARE_BSDSOCK
-# include <sys/select.h>
-# else
-# include <novsock2.h>
-# endif
-# endif
-
-/* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */
-# define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60)
-
-static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert,
- const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
- STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids);
-static int add_ocsp_serial(OCSP_REQUEST **req, char *serial,
- const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
- STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids);
-static int print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *names,
- STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids, long nsec,
- long maxage);
-
-static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
- CA_DB *db, X509 *ca, X509 *rcert,
- EVP_PKEY *rkey, STACK_OF(X509) *rother,
- unsigned long flags, int nmin, int ndays);
-
-static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser);
-static BIO *init_responder(char *port);
-static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio,
- char *port);
-static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
-static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
- OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout);
-
-# undef PROG
-# define PROG ocsp_main
-
-int MAIN(int, char **);
-
-int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- ENGINE *e = NULL;
- char **args;
- char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = "/";
- char *thost = NULL, *tport = NULL, *tpath = NULL;
- char *reqin = NULL, *respin = NULL;
- char *reqout = NULL, *respout = NULL;
- char *signfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
- char *rsignfile = NULL, *rkeyfile = NULL;
- char *outfile = NULL;
- int add_nonce = 1, noverify = 0, use_ssl = -1;
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers = NULL;
- OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL;
- OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
- OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
- X509 *issuer = NULL, *cert = NULL;
- X509 *signer = NULL, *rsigner = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *key = NULL, *rkey = NULL;
- BIO *acbio = NULL, *cbio = NULL;
- BIO *derbio = NULL;
- BIO *out = NULL;
- int req_timeout = -1;
- int req_text = 0, resp_text = 0;
- long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1;
- char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL;
- X509_STORE *store = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sign_other = NULL, *verify_other = NULL, *rother = NULL;
- char *sign_certfile = NULL, *verify_certfile = NULL, *rcertfile = NULL;
- unsigned long sign_flags = 0, verify_flags = 0, rflags = 0;
- int ret = 1;
- int accept_count = -1;
- int badarg = 0;
- int i;
- int ignore_err = 0;
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *reqnames = NULL;
- STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids = NULL;
-
- X509 *rca_cert = NULL;
- char *ridx_filename = NULL;
- char *rca_filename = NULL;
- CA_DB *rdb = NULL;
- int nmin = 0, ndays = -1;
- const EVP_MD *cert_id_md = NULL;
-
- if (bio_err == NULL)
- bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
- goto end;
- SSL_load_error_strings();
- OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
- args = argv + 1;
- reqnames = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
- ids = sk_OCSP_CERTID_new_null();
- while (!badarg && *args && *args[0] == '-') {
- if (!strcmp(*args, "-out")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- outfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-timeout")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- req_timeout = atol(*args);
- if (req_timeout < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal timeout value %s\n", *args);
- badarg = 1;
- }
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-url")) {
- if (thost)
- OPENSSL_free(thost);
- if (tport)
- OPENSSL_free(tport);
- if (tpath)
- OPENSSL_free(tpath);
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- if (!OCSP_parse_url(*args, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n");
- badarg = 1;
- }
- thost = host;
- tport = port;
- tpath = path;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-host")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- host = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-port")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- port = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-header")) {
- if (args[1] && args[2]) {
- if (!X509V3_add_value(args[1], args[2], &headers))
- goto end;
- args += 2;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-ignore_err"))
- ignore_err = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-noverify"))
- noverify = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nonce"))
- add_nonce = 2;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_nonce"))
- add_nonce = 0;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-resp_no_certs"))
- rflags |= OCSP_NOCERTS;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-resp_key_id"))
- rflags |= OCSP_RESPID_KEY;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_certs"))
- sign_flags |= OCSP_NOCERTS;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_signature_verify"))
- verify_flags |= OCSP_NOSIGS;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_cert_verify"))
- verify_flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_chain"))
- verify_flags |= OCSP_NOCHAIN;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_cert_checks"))
- verify_flags |= OCSP_NOCHECKS;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_explicit"))
- verify_flags |= OCSP_NOEXPLICIT;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-trust_other"))
- verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_intern"))
- verify_flags |= OCSP_NOINTERN;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-text")) {
- req_text = 1;
- resp_text = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-req_text"))
- req_text = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-resp_text"))
- resp_text = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-reqin")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- reqin = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-respin")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- respin = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-signer")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- signfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-VAfile")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- verify_certfile = *args;
- verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-sign_other")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- sign_certfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-verify_other")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- verify_certfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CAfile")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- CAfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CApath")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- CApath = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-validity_period")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- nsec = atol(*args);
- if (nsec < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Illegal validity period %s\n", *args);
- badarg = 1;
- }
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-status_age")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- maxage = atol(*args);
- if (maxage < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal validity age %s\n", *args);
- badarg = 1;
- }
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-signkey")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- keyfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-reqout")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- reqout = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-respout")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- respout = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-path")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- path = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-issuer")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- X509_free(issuer);
- issuer = load_cert(bio_err, *args, FORMAT_PEM,
- NULL, e, "issuer certificate");
- if (!issuer)
- goto end;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-cert")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- X509_free(cert);
- cert = load_cert(bio_err, *args, FORMAT_PEM,
- NULL, e, "certificate");
- if (!cert)
- goto end;
- if (!cert_id_md)
- cert_id_md = EVP_sha1();
- if (!add_ocsp_cert(&req, cert, cert_id_md, issuer, ids))
- goto end;
- if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(reqnames, *args))
- goto end;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-serial")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- if (!cert_id_md)
- cert_id_md = EVP_sha1();
- if (!add_ocsp_serial(&req, *args, cert_id_md, issuer, ids))
- goto end;
- if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(reqnames, *args))
- goto end;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-index")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- ridx_filename = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CA")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- rca_filename = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nmin")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- nmin = atol(*args);
- if (nmin < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal update period %s\n", *args);
- badarg = 1;
- }
- }
- if (ndays == -1)
- ndays = 0;
- else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nrequest")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- accept_count = atol(*args);
- if (accept_count < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal accept count %s\n", *args);
- badarg = 1;
- }
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-ndays")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- ndays = atol(*args);
- if (ndays < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal update period %s\n", *args);
- badarg = 1;
- }
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rsigner")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- rsignfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rkey")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- rkeyfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rother")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- rcertfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if ((cert_id_md = EVP_get_digestbyname((*args) + 1)) == NULL) {
- badarg = 1;
- }
- args++;
- }
-
- /* Have we anything to do? */
- if (!req && !reqin && !respin && !(port && ridx_filename))
- badarg = 1;
-
- if (badarg) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "OCSP utility\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage ocsp [options]\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-out file output filename\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-issuer file issuer certificate\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-cert file certificate to check\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-serial n serial number to check\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-signer file certificate to sign OCSP request with\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-signkey file private key to sign OCSP request with\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-sign_other file additional certificates to include in signed request\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-no_certs don't include any certificates in signed request\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-req_text print text form of request\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-resp_text print text form of response\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-text print text form of request and response\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-reqout file write DER encoded OCSP request to \"file\"\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-respout file write DER encoded OCSP reponse to \"file\"\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-reqin file read DER encoded OCSP request from \"file\"\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-respin file read DER encoded OCSP reponse from \"file\"\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-nonce add OCSP nonce to request\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-no_nonce don't add OCSP nonce to request\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-url URL OCSP responder URL\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-host host:n send OCSP request to host on port n\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-path path to use in OCSP request\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-VAfile file validator certificates file\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-status_age n maximum status age in seconds\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-noverify don't verify response at all\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-verify_other file additional certificates to search for signer\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-trust_other don't verify additional certificates\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-no_intern don't search certificates contained in response for signer\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-no_signature_verify don't check signature on response\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-no_cert_verify don't check signing certificate\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-no_chain don't chain verify response\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-no_cert_checks don't do additional checks on signing certificate\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-port num port to run responder on\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-index file certificate status index file\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CA file CA certificate\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-rsigner file responder certificate to sign responses with\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-rkey file responder key to sign responses with\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-rother file other certificates to include in response\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-resp_no_certs don't include any certificates in response\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-nmin n number of minutes before next update\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-ndays n number of days before next update\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-resp_key_id identify reponse by signing certificate key ID\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-nrequest n number of requests to accept (default unlimited)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-<dgst alg> use specified digest in the request\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-timeout n timeout connection to OCSP responder after n seconds\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (outfile)
- out = BIO_new_file(outfile, "w");
- else
- out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- if (!out) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening output file\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!req && (add_nonce != 2))
- add_nonce = 0;
-
- if (!req && reqin) {
- derbio = BIO_new_file(reqin, "rb");
- if (!derbio) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Opening OCSP request file\n");
- goto end;
- }
- req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(derbio, NULL);
- BIO_free(derbio);
- if (!req) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading OCSP request\n");
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (!req && port) {
- acbio = init_responder(port);
- if (!acbio)
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (rsignfile && !rdb) {
- if (!rkeyfile)
- rkeyfile = rsignfile;
- rsigner = load_cert(bio_err, rsignfile, FORMAT_PEM,
- NULL, e, "responder certificate");
- if (!rsigner) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading responder certificate\n");
- goto end;
- }
- rca_cert = load_cert(bio_err, rca_filename, FORMAT_PEM,
- NULL, e, "CA certificate");
- if (rcertfile) {
- rother = load_certs(bio_err, rcertfile, FORMAT_PEM,
- NULL, e, "responder other certificates");
- if (!rother)
- goto end;
- }
- rkey = load_key(bio_err, rkeyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, NULL, NULL,
- "responder private key");
- if (!rkey)
- goto end;
- }
- if (acbio)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Waiting for OCSP client connections...\n");
-
- redo_accept:
-
- if (acbio) {
- if (!do_responder(&req, &cbio, acbio, port))
- goto end;
- if (!req) {
- resp =
- OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST,
- NULL);
- send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp);
- goto done_resp;
- }
- }
-
- if (!req && (signfile || reqout || host || add_nonce || ridx_filename)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Need an OCSP request for this operation!\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (req && add_nonce)
- OCSP_request_add1_nonce(req, NULL, -1);
-
- if (signfile) {
- if (!keyfile)
- keyfile = signfile;
- signer = load_cert(bio_err, signfile, FORMAT_PEM,
- NULL, e, "signer certificate");
- if (!signer) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading signer certificate\n");
- goto end;
- }
- if (sign_certfile) {
- sign_other = load_certs(bio_err, sign_certfile, FORMAT_PEM,
- NULL, e, "signer certificates");
- if (!sign_other)
- goto end;
- }
- key = load_key(bio_err, keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, NULL, NULL,
- "signer private key");
- if (!key)
- goto end;
-
- if (!OCSP_request_sign
- (req, signer, key, NULL, sign_other, sign_flags)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error signing OCSP request\n");
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (req_text && req)
- OCSP_REQUEST_print(out, req, 0);
-
- if (reqout) {
- derbio = BIO_new_file(reqout, "wb");
- if (!derbio) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening file %s\n", reqout);
- goto end;
- }
- i2d_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(derbio, req);
- BIO_free(derbio);
- }
-
- if (ridx_filename && (!rkey || !rsigner || !rca_cert)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Need a responder certificate, key and CA for this operation!\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (ridx_filename && !rdb) {
- rdb = load_index(ridx_filename, NULL);
- if (!rdb)
- goto end;
- if (!index_index(rdb))
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (rdb) {
- i = make_ocsp_response(&resp, req, rdb, rca_cert, rsigner, rkey,
- rother, rflags, nmin, ndays);
- if (cbio)
- send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp);
- } else if (host) {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
- resp = process_responder(bio_err, req, host, path,
- port, use_ssl, headers, req_timeout);
- if (!resp)
- goto end;
-# else
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Error creating connect BIO - sockets not supported.\n");
- goto end;
-# endif
- } else if (respin) {
- derbio = BIO_new_file(respin, "rb");
- if (!derbio) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Opening OCSP response file\n");
- goto end;
- }
- resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, NULL);
- BIO_free(derbio);
- if (!resp) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading OCSP response\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- } else {
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-
- done_resp:
-
- if (respout) {
- derbio = BIO_new_file(respout, "wb");
- if (!derbio) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening file %s\n", respout);
- goto end;
- }
- i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, resp);
- BIO_free(derbio);
- }
-
- i = OCSP_response_status(resp);
-
- if (i != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
- BIO_printf(out, "Responder Error: %s (%d)\n",
- OCSP_response_status_str(i), i);
- if (ignore_err)
- goto redo_accept;
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (resp_text)
- OCSP_RESPONSE_print(out, resp, 0);
-
- /* If running as responder don't verify our own response */
- if (cbio) {
- if (accept_count > 0)
- accept_count--;
- /* Redo if more connections needed */
- if (accept_count) {
- BIO_free_all(cbio);
- cbio = NULL;
- OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
- req = NULL;
- OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
- resp = NULL;
- goto redo_accept;
- }
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!store)
- store = setup_verify(bio_err, CAfile, CApath);
- if (!store)
- goto end;
- if (verify_certfile) {
- verify_other = load_certs(bio_err, verify_certfile, FORMAT_PEM,
- NULL, e, "validator certificate");
- if (!verify_other)
- goto end;
- }
-
- bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
-
- if (!bs) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing response\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!noverify) {
- if (req && ((i = OCSP_check_nonce(req, bs)) <= 0)) {
- if (i == -1)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: no nonce in response\n");
- else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nonce Verify error\n");
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, verify_other, store, verify_flags);
- if (i < 0)
- i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL, store, 0);
-
- if (i <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response Verify Failure\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- } else
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response verify OK\n");
-
- }
-
- if (!print_ocsp_summary(out, bs, req, reqnames, ids, nsec, maxage))
- goto end;
-
- ret = 0;
-
- end:
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- X509_free(signer);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- EVP_PKEY_free(key);
- EVP_PKEY_free(rkey);
- X509_free(issuer);
- X509_free(cert);
- X509_free(rsigner);
- X509_free(rca_cert);
- free_index(rdb);
- BIO_free_all(cbio);
- BIO_free_all(acbio);
- BIO_free(out);
- OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
- OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
- OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(reqnames);
- sk_OCSP_CERTID_free(ids);
- sk_X509_pop_free(sign_other, X509_free);
- sk_X509_pop_free(verify_other, X509_free);
- sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(headers, X509V3_conf_free);
-
- if (thost)
- OPENSSL_free(thost);
- if (tport)
- OPENSSL_free(tport);
- if (tpath)
- OPENSSL_free(tpath);
-
- OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
-}
-
-static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert,
- const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
- STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids)
-{
- OCSP_CERTID *id;
- if (!issuer) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "No issuer certificate specified\n");
- return 0;
- }
- if (!*req)
- *req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
- if (!*req)
- goto err;
- id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, cert, issuer);
- if (!id || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_push(ids, id))
- goto err;
- if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(*req, id))
- goto err;
- return 1;
-
- err:
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Creating OCSP request\n");
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int add_ocsp_serial(OCSP_REQUEST **req, char *serial,
- const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
- STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids)
-{
- OCSP_CERTID *id;
- X509_NAME *iname;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey;
- ASN1_INTEGER *sno;
- if (!issuer) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "No issuer certificate specified\n");
- return 0;
- }
- if (!*req)
- *req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
- if (!*req)
- goto err;
- iname = X509_get_subject_name(issuer);
- ikey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(issuer);
- sno = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, serial);
- if (!sno) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error converting serial number %s\n", serial);
- return 0;
- }
- id = OCSP_cert_id_new(cert_id_md, iname, ikey, sno);
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(sno);
- if (!id || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_push(ids, id))
- goto err;
- if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(*req, id))
- goto err;
- return 1;
-
- err:
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Creating OCSP request\n");
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *names,
- STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids, long nsec,
- long maxage)
-{
- OCSP_CERTID *id;
- char *name;
- int i;
-
- int status, reason;
-
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
-
- if (!bs || !req || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(names)
- || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_num(ids))
- return 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_CERTID_num(ids); i++) {
- id = sk_OCSP_CERTID_value(ids, i);
- name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(names, i);
- BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", name);
-
- if (!OCSP_resp_find_status(bs, id, &status, &reason,
- &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd)) {
- BIO_puts(out, "ERROR: No Status found.\n");
- continue;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check validity: if invalid write to output BIO so we know which
- * response this refers to.
- */
- if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, nsec, maxage)) {
- BIO_puts(out, "WARNING: Status times invalid.\n");
- ERR_print_errors(out);
- }
- BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
-
- BIO_puts(out, "\tThis Update: ");
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, thisupd);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
-
- if (nextupd) {
- BIO_puts(out, "\tNext Update: ");
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, nextupd);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- }
-
- if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED)
- continue;
-
- if (reason != -1)
- BIO_printf(out, "\tReason: %s\n", OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason));
-
- BIO_puts(out, "\tRevocation Time: ");
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, rev);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
- CA_DB *db, X509 *ca, X509 *rcert,
- EVP_PKEY *rkey, STACK_OF(X509) *rother,
- unsigned long flags, int nmin, int ndays)
-{
- ASN1_TIME *thisupd = NULL, *nextupd = NULL;
- OCSP_CERTID *cid, *ca_id = NULL;
- OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
- int i, id_count, ret = 1;
-
- id_count = OCSP_request_onereq_count(req);
-
- if (id_count <= 0) {
- *resp =
- OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, NULL);
- goto end;
- }
-
- bs = OCSP_BASICRESP_new();
- thisupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
- if (ndays != -1)
- nextupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, nmin * 60 + ndays * 3600 * 24);
-
- /* Examine each certificate id in the request */
- for (i = 0; i < id_count; i++) {
- OCSP_ONEREQ *one;
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
- char **inf;
- ASN1_OBJECT *cert_id_md_oid;
- const EVP_MD *cert_id_md;
- one = OCSP_request_onereq_get0(req, i);
- cid = OCSP_onereq_get0_id(one);
-
- OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, &cert_id_md_oid, NULL, NULL, cid);
-
- cert_id_md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cert_id_md_oid);
- if (!cert_id_md) {
- *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR,
- NULL);
- goto end;
- }
- if (ca_id)
- OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id);
- ca_id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, NULL, ca);
-
- /* Is this request about our CA? */
- if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(ca_id, cid)) {
- OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
- V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN,
- 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd);
- continue;
- }
- OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, &serial, cid);
- inf = lookup_serial(db, serial);
- if (!inf)
- OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
- V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN,
- 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd);
- else if (inf[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_VAL)
- OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
- V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD,
- 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd);
- else if (inf[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) {
- ASN1_OBJECT *inst = NULL;
- ASN1_TIME *revtm = NULL;
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *invtm = NULL;
- OCSP_SINGLERESP *single;
- int reason = -1;
- unpack_revinfo(&revtm, &reason, &inst, &invtm, inf[DB_rev_date]);
- single = OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
- V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED,
- reason, revtm, thisupd, nextupd);
- if (invtm)
- OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(single, NID_invalidity_date,
- invtm, 0, 0);
- else if (inst)
- OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(single,
- NID_hold_instruction_code, inst,
- 0, 0);
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(inst);
- ASN1_TIME_free(revtm);
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(invtm);
- }
- }
-
- OCSP_copy_nonce(bs, req);
-
- OCSP_basic_sign(bs, rcert, rkey, NULL, rother, flags);
-
- *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, bs);
-
- end:
- ASN1_TIME_free(thisupd);
- ASN1_TIME_free(nextupd);
- OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id);
- OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
- return ret;
-
-}
-
-static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser)
-{
- int i;
- BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
- char *itmp, *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow;
- for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
- row[i] = NULL;
- bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ser, NULL);
- OPENSSL_assert(bn); /* FIXME: should report an error at this
- * point and abort */
- if (BN_is_zero(bn))
- itmp = BUF_strdup("00");
- else
- itmp = BN_bn2hex(bn);
- row[DB_serial] = itmp;
- BN_free(bn);
- rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
- OPENSSL_free(itmp);
- return rrow;
-}
-
-/* Quick and dirty OCSP server: read in and parse input request */
-
-static BIO *init_responder(char *port)
-{
- BIO *acbio = NULL, *bufbio = NULL;
- bufbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- if (!bufbio)
- goto err;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
- acbio = BIO_new_accept(port);
-# else
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Error setting up accept BIO - sockets not supported.\n");
-# endif
- if (!acbio)
- goto err;
- BIO_set_accept_bios(acbio, bufbio);
- bufbio = NULL;
-
- if (BIO_do_accept(acbio) <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting up accept BIO\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
-
- return acbio;
-
- err:
- BIO_free_all(acbio);
- BIO_free(bufbio);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio,
- char *port)
-{
- int have_post = 0, len;
- OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL;
- char inbuf[1024];
- BIO *cbio = NULL;
-
- if (BIO_do_accept(acbio) <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error accepting connection\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- return 0;
- }
-
- cbio = BIO_pop(acbio);
- *pcbio = cbio;
-
- for (;;) {
- len = BIO_gets(cbio, inbuf, sizeof inbuf);
- if (len <= 0)
- return 1;
- /* Look for "POST" signalling start of query */
- if (!have_post) {
- if (strncmp(inbuf, "POST", 4)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request\n");
- return 1;
- }
- have_post = 1;
- }
- /* Look for end of headers */
- if ((inbuf[0] == '\r') || (inbuf[0] == '\n'))
- break;
- }
-
- /* Try to read OCSP request */
-
- req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(cbio, NULL);
-
- if (!req) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing OCSP request\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- }
-
- *preq = req;
-
- return 1;
-
-}
-
-static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp)
-{
- char http_resp[] =
- "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-type: application/ocsp-response\r\n"
- "Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n";
- if (!cbio)
- return 0;
- BIO_printf(cbio, http_resp, i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, NULL));
- i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(cbio, resp);
- (void)BIO_flush(cbio);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
- OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout)
-{
- int fd;
- int rv;
- int i;
- OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
- fd_set confds;
- struct timeval tv;
-
- if (req_timeout != -1)
- BIO_set_nbio(cbio, 1);
-
- rv = BIO_do_connect(cbio);
-
- if ((rv <= 0) && ((req_timeout == -1) || !BIO_should_retry(cbio))) {
- BIO_puts(err, "Error connecting BIO\n");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) <= 0) {
- BIO_puts(err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (req_timeout != -1 && rv <= 0) {
- FD_ZERO(&confds);
- openssl_fdset(fd, &confds);
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- tv.tv_sec = req_timeout;
- rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv);
- if (rv == 0) {
- BIO_puts(err, "Timeout on connect\n");
- return NULL;
- }
- }
-
- ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(cbio, path, NULL, -1);
- if (!ctx)
- return NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(headers); i++) {
- CONF_VALUE *hdr = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(headers, i);
- if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, hdr->name, hdr->value))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(ctx, req))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&rsp, ctx);
- if (rv != -1)
- break;
- if (req_timeout == -1)
- continue;
- FD_ZERO(&confds);
- openssl_fdset(fd, &confds);
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- tv.tv_sec = req_timeout;
- if (BIO_should_read(cbio))
- rv = select(fd + 1, (void *)&confds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
- else if (BIO_should_write(cbio))
- rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv);
- else {
- BIO_puts(err, "Unexpected retry condition\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if (rv == 0) {
- BIO_puts(err, "Timeout on request\n");
- break;
- }
- if (rv == -1) {
- BIO_puts(err, "Select error\n");
- break;
- }
-
- }
- err:
- if (ctx)
- OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- return rsp;
-}
-
-OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
- char *host, char *path, char *port,
- int use_ssl, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
- int req_timeout)
-{
- BIO *cbio = NULL;
- SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
- cbio = BIO_new_connect(host);
- if (!cbio) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Error creating connect BIO\n");
- goto end;
- }
- if (port)
- BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port);
- if (use_ssl == 1) {
- BIO *sbio;
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(err, "Error creating SSL context.\n");
- goto end;
- }
- SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
- sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1);
- cbio = BIO_push(sbio, cbio);
- }
- resp = query_responder(err, cbio, path, headers, req, req_timeout);
- if (!resp)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responder\n");
- end:
- if (cbio)
- BIO_free_all(cbio);
- if (ctx)
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- return resp;
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ocsp.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/ocsp.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ocsp.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/ocsp.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1325 @@
+/* ocsp.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED/* So fd_set and friends get properly defined
+ * on OpenVMS */
+# endif
+
+# define USE_SOCKETS
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include "apps.h" /* needs to be included before the openssl
+ * headers! */
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+# if defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
+# ifdef NETWARE_BSDSOCK
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+# include <sys/bsdskt.h>
+# else
+# include <novsock2.h>
+# endif
+# elif defined(NETWARE_LIBC)
+# ifdef NETWARE_BSDSOCK
+# include <sys/select.h>
+# else
+# include <novsock2.h>
+# endif
+# endif
+
+/* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */
+# define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60)
+
+static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert,
+ const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids);
+static int add_ocsp_serial(OCSP_REQUEST **req, char *serial,
+ const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids);
+static int print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *names,
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids, long nsec,
+ long maxage);
+
+static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+ CA_DB *db, X509 *ca, X509 *rcert,
+ EVP_PKEY *rkey, STACK_OF(X509) *rother,
+ unsigned long flags, int nmin, int ndays);
+
+static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser);
+static BIO *init_responder(char *port);
+static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio,
+ char *port);
+static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
+static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
+ OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout);
+
+# undef PROG
+# define PROG ocsp_main
+
+int MAIN(int, char **);
+
+int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ ENGINE *e = NULL;
+ char **args;
+ char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = "/";
+ char *thost = NULL, *tport = NULL, *tpath = NULL;
+ char *reqin = NULL, *respin = NULL;
+ char *reqout = NULL, *respout = NULL;
+ char *signfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
+ char *rsignfile = NULL, *rkeyfile = NULL;
+ char *outfile = NULL;
+ int add_nonce = 1, noverify = 0, use_ssl = -1;
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers = NULL;
+ OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL;
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+ OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
+ X509 *issuer = NULL, *cert = NULL;
+ X509 *signer = NULL, *rsigner = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *key = NULL, *rkey = NULL;
+ BIO *acbio = NULL, *cbio = NULL;
+ BIO *derbio = NULL;
+ BIO *out = NULL;
+ int req_timeout = -1;
+ int req_text = 0, resp_text = 0;
+ long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1;
+ char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL;
+ X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sign_other = NULL, *verify_other = NULL, *rother = NULL;
+ char *sign_certfile = NULL, *verify_certfile = NULL, *rcertfile = NULL;
+ unsigned long sign_flags = 0, verify_flags = 0, rflags = 0;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int accept_count = -1;
+ int badarg = 0;
+ int i;
+ int ignore_err = 0;
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *reqnames = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids = NULL;
+
+ X509 *rca_cert = NULL;
+ char *ridx_filename = NULL;
+ char *rca_filename = NULL;
+ CA_DB *rdb = NULL;
+ int nmin = 0, ndays = -1;
+ const EVP_MD *cert_id_md = NULL;
+
+ if (bio_err == NULL)
+ bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+ args = argv + 1;
+ reqnames = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+ ids = sk_OCSP_CERTID_new_null();
+ while (!badarg && *args && *args[0] == '-') {
+ if (!strcmp(*args, "-out")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ outfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-timeout")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ req_timeout = atol(*args);
+ if (req_timeout < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal timeout value %s\n", *args);
+ badarg = 1;
+ }
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-url")) {
+ if (thost)
+ OPENSSL_free(thost);
+ if (tport)
+ OPENSSL_free(tport);
+ if (tpath)
+ OPENSSL_free(tpath);
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ if (!OCSP_parse_url(*args, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n");
+ badarg = 1;
+ }
+ thost = host;
+ tport = port;
+ tpath = path;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-host")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ host = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-port")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ port = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-header")) {
+ if (args[1] && args[2]) {
+ if (!X509V3_add_value(args[1], args[2], &headers))
+ goto end;
+ args += 2;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-ignore_err"))
+ ignore_err = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-noverify"))
+ noverify = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nonce"))
+ add_nonce = 2;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_nonce"))
+ add_nonce = 0;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-resp_no_certs"))
+ rflags |= OCSP_NOCERTS;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-resp_key_id"))
+ rflags |= OCSP_RESPID_KEY;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_certs"))
+ sign_flags |= OCSP_NOCERTS;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_signature_verify"))
+ verify_flags |= OCSP_NOSIGS;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_cert_verify"))
+ verify_flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_chain"))
+ verify_flags |= OCSP_NOCHAIN;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_cert_checks"))
+ verify_flags |= OCSP_NOCHECKS;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_explicit"))
+ verify_flags |= OCSP_NOEXPLICIT;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-trust_other"))
+ verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_intern"))
+ verify_flags |= OCSP_NOINTERN;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-text")) {
+ req_text = 1;
+ resp_text = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-req_text"))
+ req_text = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-resp_text"))
+ resp_text = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-reqin")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ reqin = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-respin")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ respin = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-signer")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ signfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-VAfile")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ verify_certfile = *args;
+ verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-sign_other")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ sign_certfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-verify_other")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ verify_certfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CAfile")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ CAfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CApath")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ CApath = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-validity_period")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ nsec = atol(*args);
+ if (nsec < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Illegal validity period %s\n", *args);
+ badarg = 1;
+ }
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-status_age")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ maxage = atol(*args);
+ if (maxage < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal validity age %s\n", *args);
+ badarg = 1;
+ }
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-signkey")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ keyfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-reqout")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ reqout = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-respout")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ respout = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-path")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ path = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-issuer")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ issuer = load_cert(bio_err, *args, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, e, "issuer certificate");
+ if (!issuer)
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-cert")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ X509_free(cert);
+ cert = load_cert(bio_err, *args, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, e, "certificate");
+ if (!cert)
+ goto end;
+ if (!cert_id_md)
+ cert_id_md = EVP_sha1();
+ if (!add_ocsp_cert(&req, cert, cert_id_md, issuer, ids))
+ goto end;
+ if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(reqnames, *args))
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-serial")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ if (!cert_id_md)
+ cert_id_md = EVP_sha1();
+ if (!add_ocsp_serial(&req, *args, cert_id_md, issuer, ids))
+ goto end;
+ if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(reqnames, *args))
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-index")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ ridx_filename = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CA")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ rca_filename = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nmin")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ nmin = atol(*args);
+ if (nmin < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal update period %s\n", *args);
+ badarg = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ndays == -1)
+ ndays = 0;
+ else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nrequest")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ accept_count = atol(*args);
+ if (accept_count < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal accept count %s\n", *args);
+ badarg = 1;
+ }
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-ndays")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ ndays = atol(*args);
+ if (ndays < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Illegal update period %s\n", *args);
+ badarg = 1;
+ }
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rsigner")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ rsignfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rkey")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ rkeyfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rother")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ rcertfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if ((cert_id_md = EVP_get_digestbyname((*args) + 1)) == NULL) {
+ badarg = 1;
+ }
+ args++;
+ }
+
+ /* Have we anything to do? */
+ if (!req && !reqin && !respin && !(port && ridx_filename))
+ badarg = 1;
+
+ if (badarg) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "OCSP utility\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage ocsp [options]\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-out file output filename\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-issuer file issuer certificate\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-cert file certificate to check\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-serial n serial number to check\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-signer file certificate to sign OCSP request with\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-signkey file private key to sign OCSP request with\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-sign_other file additional certificates to include in signed request\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_certs don't include any certificates in signed request\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-req_text print text form of request\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-resp_text print text form of response\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-text print text form of request and response\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-reqout file write DER encoded OCSP request to \"file\"\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-respout file write DER encoded OCSP reponse to \"file\"\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-reqin file read DER encoded OCSP request from \"file\"\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-respin file read DER encoded OCSP reponse from \"file\"\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-nonce add OCSP nonce to request\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_nonce don't add OCSP nonce to request\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-url URL OCSP responder URL\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-host host:n send OCSP request to host on port n\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-path path to use in OCSP request\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-VAfile file validator certificates file\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-status_age n maximum status age in seconds\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-noverify don't verify response at all\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-verify_other file additional certificates to search for signer\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-trust_other don't verify additional certificates\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_intern don't search certificates contained in response for signer\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_signature_verify don't check signature on response\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_cert_verify don't check signing certificate\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_chain don't chain verify response\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-no_cert_checks don't do additional checks on signing certificate\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-port num port to run responder on\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-index file certificate status index file\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CA file CA certificate\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-rsigner file responder certificate to sign responses with\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-rkey file responder key to sign responses with\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-rother file other certificates to include in response\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-resp_no_certs don't include any certificates in response\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-nmin n number of minutes before next update\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-ndays n number of days before next update\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-resp_key_id identify reponse by signing certificate key ID\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-nrequest n number of requests to accept (default unlimited)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-<dgst alg> use specified digest in the request\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-timeout n timeout connection to OCSP responder after n seconds\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (outfile)
+ out = BIO_new_file(outfile, "w");
+ else
+ out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ if (!out) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening output file\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!req && (add_nonce != 2))
+ add_nonce = 0;
+
+ if (!req && reqin) {
+ derbio = BIO_new_file(reqin, "rb");
+ if (!derbio) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Opening OCSP request file\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(derbio, NULL);
+ BIO_free(derbio);
+ if (!req) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading OCSP request\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!req && port) {
+ acbio = init_responder(port);
+ if (!acbio)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (rsignfile && !rdb) {
+ if (!rkeyfile)
+ rkeyfile = rsignfile;
+ rsigner = load_cert(bio_err, rsignfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, e, "responder certificate");
+ if (!rsigner) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading responder certificate\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ rca_cert = load_cert(bio_err, rca_filename, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, e, "CA certificate");
+ if (rcertfile) {
+ rother = load_certs(bio_err, rcertfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, e, "responder other certificates");
+ if (!rother)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ rkey = load_key(bio_err, rkeyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, NULL, NULL,
+ "responder private key");
+ if (!rkey)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (acbio)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Waiting for OCSP client connections...\n");
+
+ redo_accept:
+
+ if (acbio) {
+ if (!do_responder(&req, &cbio, acbio, port))
+ goto end;
+ if (!req) {
+ resp =
+ OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST,
+ NULL);
+ send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp);
+ goto done_resp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!req && (signfile || reqout || host || add_nonce || ridx_filename)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Need an OCSP request for this operation!\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (req && add_nonce)
+ OCSP_request_add1_nonce(req, NULL, -1);
+
+ if (signfile) {
+ if (!keyfile)
+ keyfile = signfile;
+ signer = load_cert(bio_err, signfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, e, "signer certificate");
+ if (!signer) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading signer certificate\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (sign_certfile) {
+ sign_other = load_certs(bio_err, sign_certfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, e, "signer certificates");
+ if (!sign_other)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ key = load_key(bio_err, keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0, NULL, NULL,
+ "signer private key");
+ if (!key)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!OCSP_request_sign
+ (req, signer, key, NULL, sign_other, sign_flags)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error signing OCSP request\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (req_text && req)
+ OCSP_REQUEST_print(out, req, 0);
+
+ if (reqout) {
+ derbio = BIO_new_file(reqout, "wb");
+ if (!derbio) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening file %s\n", reqout);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ i2d_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(derbio, req);
+ BIO_free(derbio);
+ }
+
+ if (ridx_filename && (!rkey || !rsigner || !rca_cert)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Need a responder certificate, key and CA for this operation!\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (ridx_filename && !rdb) {
+ rdb = load_index(ridx_filename, NULL);
+ if (!rdb)
+ goto end;
+ if (!index_index(rdb))
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (rdb) {
+ i = make_ocsp_response(&resp, req, rdb, rca_cert, rsigner, rkey,
+ rother, rflags, nmin, ndays);
+ if (cbio)
+ send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp);
+ } else if (host) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+ resp = process_responder(bio_err, req, host, path,
+ port, use_ssl, headers, req_timeout);
+ if (!resp)
+ goto end;
+# else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Error creating connect BIO - sockets not supported.\n");
+ goto end;
+# endif
+ } else if (respin) {
+ derbio = BIO_new_file(respin, "rb");
+ if (!derbio) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Opening OCSP response file\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, NULL);
+ BIO_free(derbio);
+ if (!resp) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading OCSP response\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ done_resp:
+
+ if (respout) {
+ derbio = BIO_new_file(respout, "wb");
+ if (!derbio) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening file %s\n", respout);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, resp);
+ BIO_free(derbio);
+ }
+
+ i = OCSP_response_status(resp);
+
+ if (i != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
+ BIO_printf(out, "Responder Error: %s (%d)\n",
+ OCSP_response_status_str(i), i);
+ if (ignore_err)
+ goto redo_accept;
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (resp_text)
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_print(out, resp, 0);
+
+ /* If running as responder don't verify our own response */
+ if (cbio) {
+ if (accept_count > 0)
+ accept_count--;
+ /* Redo if more connections needed */
+ if (accept_count) {
+ BIO_free_all(cbio);
+ cbio = NULL;
+ OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
+ req = NULL;
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
+ resp = NULL;
+ goto redo_accept;
+ }
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!store)
+ store = setup_verify(bio_err, CAfile, CApath);
+ if (!store)
+ goto end;
+ if (verify_certfile) {
+ verify_other = load_certs(bio_err, verify_certfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, e, "validator certificate");
+ if (!verify_other)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
+
+ if (!bs) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing response\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!noverify) {
+ if (req && ((i = OCSP_check_nonce(req, bs)) <= 0)) {
+ if (i == -1)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: no nonce in response\n");
+ else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nonce Verify error\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, verify_other, store, verify_flags);
+ if (i < 0)
+ i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL, store, 0);
+
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response Verify Failure\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ } else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response verify OK\n");
+
+ }
+
+ if (!print_ocsp_summary(out, bs, req, reqnames, ids, nsec, maxage))
+ goto end;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ end:
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ X509_free(signer);
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(rkey);
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ X509_free(cert);
+ X509_free(rsigner);
+ X509_free(rca_cert);
+ free_index(rdb);
+ BIO_free_all(cbio);
+ BIO_free_all(acbio);
+ BIO_free(out);
+ OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
+ OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(reqnames);
+ sk_OCSP_CERTID_free(ids);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sign_other, X509_free);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(verify_other, X509_free);
+ sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(headers, X509V3_conf_free);
+
+ if (thost)
+ OPENSSL_free(thost);
+ if (tport)
+ OPENSSL_free(tport);
+ if (tpath)
+ OPENSSL_free(tpath);
+
+ OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+static int add_ocsp_cert(OCSP_REQUEST **req, X509 *cert,
+ const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids)
+{
+ OCSP_CERTID *id;
+ if (!issuer) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "No issuer certificate specified\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!*req)
+ *req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
+ if (!*req)
+ goto err;
+ id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, cert, issuer);
+ if (!id || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_push(ids, id))
+ goto err;
+ if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(*req, id))
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Creating OCSP request\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int add_ocsp_serial(OCSP_REQUEST **req, char *serial,
+ const EVP_MD *cert_id_md, X509 *issuer,
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids)
+{
+ OCSP_CERTID *id;
+ X509_NAME *iname;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *sno;
+ if (!issuer) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "No issuer certificate specified\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!*req)
+ *req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
+ if (!*req)
+ goto err;
+ iname = X509_get_subject_name(issuer);
+ ikey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(issuer);
+ sno = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, serial);
+ if (!sno) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error converting serial number %s\n", serial);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ id = OCSP_cert_id_new(cert_id_md, iname, ikey, sno);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(sno);
+ if (!id || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_push(ids, id))
+ goto err;
+ if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(*req, id))
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Creating OCSP request\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *names,
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) *ids, long nsec,
+ long maxage)
+{
+ OCSP_CERTID *id;
+ char *name;
+ int i;
+
+ int status, reason;
+
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+
+ if (!bs || !req || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(names)
+ || !sk_OCSP_CERTID_num(ids))
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_CERTID_num(ids); i++) {
+ id = sk_OCSP_CERTID_value(ids, i);
+ name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(names, i);
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", name);
+
+ if (!OCSP_resp_find_status(bs, id, &status, &reason,
+ &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd)) {
+ BIO_puts(out, "ERROR: No Status found.\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check validity: if invalid write to output BIO so we know which
+ * response this refers to.
+ */
+ if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, nsec, maxage)) {
+ BIO_puts(out, "WARNING: Status times invalid.\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(out);
+ }
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
+
+ BIO_puts(out, "\tThis Update: ");
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, thisupd);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+
+ if (nextupd) {
+ BIO_puts(out, "\tNext Update: ");
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, nextupd);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ }
+
+ if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED)
+ continue;
+
+ if (reason != -1)
+ BIO_printf(out, "\tReason: %s\n", OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason));
+
+ BIO_puts(out, "\tRevocation Time: ");
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(out, rev);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+ CA_DB *db, X509 *ca, X509 *rcert,
+ EVP_PKEY *rkey, STACK_OF(X509) *rother,
+ unsigned long flags, int nmin, int ndays)
+{
+ ASN1_TIME *thisupd = NULL, *nextupd = NULL;
+ OCSP_CERTID *cid, *ca_id = NULL;
+ OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
+ int i, id_count, ret = 1;
+
+ id_count = OCSP_request_onereq_count(req);
+
+ if (id_count <= 0) {
+ *resp =
+ OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, NULL);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ bs = OCSP_BASICRESP_new();
+ thisupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
+ if (ndays != -1)
+ nextupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, nmin * 60 + ndays * 3600 * 24);
+
+ /* Examine each certificate id in the request */
+ for (i = 0; i < id_count; i++) {
+ OCSP_ONEREQ *one;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
+ char **inf;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *cert_id_md_oid;
+ const EVP_MD *cert_id_md;
+ one = OCSP_request_onereq_get0(req, i);
+ cid = OCSP_onereq_get0_id(one);
+
+ OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, &cert_id_md_oid, NULL, NULL, cid);
+
+ cert_id_md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cert_id_md_oid);
+ if (!cert_id_md) {
+ *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR,
+ NULL);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ca_id)
+ OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id);
+ ca_id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, NULL, ca);
+
+ /* Is this request about our CA? */
+ if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(ca_id, cid)) {
+ OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
+ V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN,
+ 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd);
+ continue;
+ }
+ OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, &serial, cid);
+ inf = lookup_serial(db, serial);
+ if (!inf)
+ OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
+ V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN,
+ 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd);
+ else if (inf[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_VAL)
+ OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
+ V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD,
+ 0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd);
+ else if (inf[DB_type][0] == DB_TYPE_REV) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *inst = NULL;
+ ASN1_TIME *revtm = NULL;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *invtm = NULL;
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP *single;
+ int reason = -1;
+ unpack_revinfo(&revtm, &reason, &inst, &invtm, inf[DB_rev_date]);
+ single = OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
+ V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED,
+ reason, revtm, thisupd, nextupd);
+ if (invtm)
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(single, NID_invalidity_date,
+ invtm, 0, 0);
+ else if (inst)
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d(single,
+ NID_hold_instruction_code, inst,
+ 0, 0);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(inst);
+ ASN1_TIME_free(revtm);
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(invtm);
+ }
+ }
+
+ OCSP_copy_nonce(bs, req);
+
+ OCSP_basic_sign(bs, rcert, rkey, NULL, rother, flags);
+
+ *resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, bs);
+
+ end:
+ ASN1_TIME_free(thisupd);
+ ASN1_TIME_free(nextupd);
+ OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id);
+ OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser)
+{
+ int i;
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+ char *itmp, *row[DB_NUMBER], **rrow;
+ for (i = 0; i < DB_NUMBER; i++)
+ row[i] = NULL;
+ bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ser, NULL);
+ OPENSSL_assert(bn); /* FIXME: should report an error at this
+ * point and abort */
+ if (BN_is_zero(bn))
+ itmp = BUF_strdup("00");
+ else
+ itmp = BN_bn2hex(bn);
+ row[DB_serial] = itmp;
+ BN_free(bn);
+ rrow = TXT_DB_get_by_index(db->db, DB_serial, row);
+ OPENSSL_free(itmp);
+ return rrow;
+}
+
+/* Quick and dirty OCSP server: read in and parse input request */
+
+static BIO *init_responder(char *port)
+{
+ BIO *acbio = NULL, *bufbio = NULL;
+ bufbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ if (!bufbio)
+ goto err;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+ acbio = BIO_new_accept(port);
+# else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Error setting up accept BIO - sockets not supported.\n");
+# endif
+ if (!acbio)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_set_accept_bios(acbio, bufbio);
+ bufbio = NULL;
+
+ if (BIO_do_accept(acbio) <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting up accept BIO\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return acbio;
+
+ err:
+ BIO_free_all(acbio);
+ BIO_free(bufbio);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio,
+ char *port)
+{
+ int have_post = 0, len;
+ OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL;
+ char inbuf[1024];
+ BIO *cbio = NULL;
+
+ if (BIO_do_accept(acbio) <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error accepting connection\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ cbio = BIO_pop(acbio);
+ *pcbio = cbio;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ len = BIO_gets(cbio, inbuf, sizeof inbuf);
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return 1;
+ /* Look for "POST" signalling start of query */
+ if (!have_post) {
+ if (strncmp(inbuf, "POST", 4)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ have_post = 1;
+ }
+ /* Look for end of headers */
+ if ((inbuf[0] == '\r') || (inbuf[0] == '\n'))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to read OCSP request */
+
+ req = d2i_OCSP_REQUEST_bio(cbio, NULL);
+
+ if (!req) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing OCSP request\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+
+ *preq = req;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp)
+{
+ char http_resp[] =
+ "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-type: application/ocsp-response\r\n"
+ "Content-Length: %d\r\n\r\n";
+ if (!cbio)
+ return 0;
+ BIO_printf(cbio, http_resp, i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, NULL));
+ i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(cbio, resp);
+ (void)BIO_flush(cbio);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
+ OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout)
+{
+ int fd;
+ int rv;
+ int i;
+ OCSP_REQ_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
+ fd_set confds;
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ if (req_timeout != -1)
+ BIO_set_nbio(cbio, 1);
+
+ rv = BIO_do_connect(cbio);
+
+ if ((rv <= 0) && ((req_timeout == -1) || !BIO_should_retry(cbio))) {
+ BIO_puts(err, "Error connecting BIO\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) < 0) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (req_timeout != -1 && rv <= 0) {
+ FD_ZERO(&confds);
+ openssl_fdset(fd, &confds);
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ tv.tv_sec = req_timeout;
+ rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ BIO_puts(err, "Timeout on connect\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(cbio, path, NULL, -1);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(headers); i++) {
+ CONF_VALUE *hdr = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(headers, i);
+ if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, hdr->name, hdr->value))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(ctx, req))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&rsp, ctx);
+ if (rv != -1)
+ break;
+ if (req_timeout == -1)
+ continue;
+ FD_ZERO(&confds);
+ openssl_fdset(fd, &confds);
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ tv.tv_sec = req_timeout;
+ if (BIO_should_read(cbio))
+ rv = select(fd + 1, (void *)&confds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+ else if (BIO_should_write(cbio))
+ rv = select(fd + 1, NULL, (void *)&confds, NULL, &tv);
+ else {
+ BIO_puts(err, "Unexpected retry condition\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ BIO_puts(err, "Timeout on request\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (rv == -1) {
+ BIO_puts(err, "Select error\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ }
+ err:
+ if (ctx)
+ OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ return rsp;
+}
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+ char *host, char *path, char *port,
+ int use_ssl, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
+ int req_timeout)
+{
+ BIO *cbio = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+ cbio = BIO_new_connect(host);
+ if (!cbio) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error creating connect BIO\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (port)
+ BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port);
+ if (use_ssl == 1) {
+ BIO *sbio;
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error creating SSL context.\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+ sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1);
+ cbio = BIO_push(sbio, cbio);
+ }
+ resp = query_responder(err, cbio, path, headers, req, req_timeout);
+ if (!resp)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responder\n");
+ end:
+ if (cbio)
+ BIO_free_all(cbio);
+ if (ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return resp;
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/pkcs12.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/pkcs12.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/pkcs12.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1068 +0,0 @@
-/* pkcs12.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
-
-# include <stdio.h>
-# include <stdlib.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# include "apps.h"
-# include <openssl/crypto.h>
-# include <openssl/err.h>
-# include <openssl/pem.h>
-# include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-
-# define PROG pkcs12_main
-
-const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
-# define NOKEYS 0x1
-# define NOCERTS 0x2
-# define INFO 0x4
-# define CLCERTS 0x8
-# define CACERTS 0x10
-
-int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
-int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, PKCS12 *p12, char *pass, int passlen,
- int options, char *pempass);
-int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
- char *pass, int passlen, int options,
- char *pempass);
-int dump_certs_pkeys_bag(BIO *out, PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bags, char *pass,
- int passlen, int options, char *pempass);
-int print_attribs(BIO *out, STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrlst,
- const char *name);
-void hex_prin(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, int len);
-int alg_print(BIO *x, X509_ALGOR *alg);
-int cert_load(BIO *in, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
-static int set_pbe(BIO *err, int *ppbe, const char *str);
-
-int MAIN(int, char **);
-
-int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- ENGINE *e = NULL;
- char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *keyname = NULL;
- char *certfile = NULL;
- BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
- char **args;
- char *name = NULL;
- char *csp_name = NULL;
- int add_lmk = 0;
- PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
- char pass[50], macpass[50];
- int export_cert = 0;
- int options = 0;
- int chain = 0;
- int badarg = 0;
- int iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
- int maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
- int twopass = 0;
- int keytype = 0;
- int cert_pbe;
- int key_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
- int ret = 1;
- int macver = 1;
- int noprompt = 0;
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *canames = NULL;
- char *cpass = NULL, *mpass = NULL;
- char *passargin = NULL, *passargout = NULL, *passarg = NULL;
- char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL;
- char *inrand = NULL;
- char *macalg = NULL;
- char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- char *engine = NULL;
-# endif
-
- apps_startup();
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
- else
-# endif
- cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
-
- enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
- if (bio_err == NULL)
- bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
- goto end;
-
- args = argv + 1;
-
- while (*args) {
- if (*args[0] == '-') {
- if (!strcmp(*args, "-nokeys"))
- options |= NOKEYS;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-keyex"))
- keytype = KEY_EX;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-keysig"))
- keytype = KEY_SIG;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nocerts"))
- options |= NOCERTS;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-clcerts"))
- options |= CLCERTS;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-cacerts"))
- options |= CACERTS;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-noout"))
- options |= (NOKEYS | NOCERTS);
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-info"))
- options |= INFO;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-chain"))
- chain = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-twopass"))
- twopass = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nomacver"))
- macver = 0;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-descert"))
- cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-export"))
- export_cert = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-des"))
- enc = EVP_des_cbc();
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-des3"))
- enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-idea"))
- enc = EVP_idea_cbc();
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-seed"))
- enc = EVP_seed_cbc();
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-aes128"))
- enc = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-aes192"))
- enc = EVP_aes_192_cbc();
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-aes256"))
- enc = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-camellia128"))
- enc = EVP_camellia_128_cbc();
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-camellia192"))
- enc = EVP_camellia_192_cbc();
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-camellia256"))
- enc = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
-# endif
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-noiter"))
- iter = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-maciter"))
- maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nomaciter"))
- maciter = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nomac"))
- maciter = -1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-macalg"))
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- macalg = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nodes"))
- enc = NULL;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-certpbe")) {
- if (!set_pbe(bio_err, &cert_pbe, *++args))
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-keypbe")) {
- if (!set_pbe(bio_err, &key_pbe, *++args))
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rand")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- inrand = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-inkey")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- keyname = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-certfile")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- certfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-name")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- name = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-LMK"))
- add_lmk = 1;
- else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CSP")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- csp_name = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-caname")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- if (!canames)
- canames = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(canames, *args);
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-in")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- infile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-out")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- outfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-passin")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- passargin = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-passout")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- passargout = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-password")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- passarg = *args;
- noprompt = 1;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CApath")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- CApath = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CAfile")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- CAfile = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-engine")) {
- if (args[1]) {
- args++;
- engine = *args;
- } else
- badarg = 1;
-# endif
- } else
- badarg = 1;
-
- } else
- badarg = 1;
- args++;
- }
-
- if (badarg) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage: pkcs12 [options]\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-export output PKCS12 file\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-chain add certificate chain\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-inkey file private key if not infile\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-certfile f add all certs in f\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-name \"name\" use name as friendly name\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-caname \"nm\" use nm as CA friendly name (can be used more than once).\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-in infile input filename\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-out outfile output filename\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-noout don't output anything, just verify.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nomacver don't verify MAC.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nocerts don't output certificates.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-clcerts only output client certificates.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-cacerts only output CA certificates.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nokeys don't output private keys.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-info give info about PKCS#12 structure.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-des encrypt private keys with DES\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-des3 encrypt private keys with triple DES (default)\n");
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-idea encrypt private keys with idea\n");
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-seed encrypt private keys with seed\n");
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-aes128, -aes192, -aes256\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " encrypt PEM output with cbc aes\n");
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-camellia128, -camellia192, -camellia256\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " encrypt PEM output with cbc camellia\n");
-# endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nodes don't encrypt private keys\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-noiter don't use encryption iteration\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nomaciter don't use MAC iteration\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-maciter use MAC iteration\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nomac don't generate MAC\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-twopass separate MAC, encryption passwords\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-descert encrypt PKCS#12 certificates with triple DES (default RC2-40)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-certpbe alg specify certificate PBE algorithm (default RC2-40)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-keypbe alg specify private key PBE algorithm (default 3DES)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-macalg alg digest algorithm used in MAC (default SHA1)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-keyex set MS key exchange type\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-keysig set MS key signature type\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-password p set import/export password source\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-passin p input file pass phrase source\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-passout p output file pass phrase source\n");
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-engine e use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n");
-# endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR,
- LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " load the file (or the files in the directory) into\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " the random number generator\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CSP name Microsoft CSP name\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-LMK Add local machine keyset attribute to private key\n");
- goto end;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
-# endif
-
- if (passarg) {
- if (export_cert)
- passargout = passarg;
- else
- passargin = passarg;
- }
-
- if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passargin, passargout, &passin, &passout)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!cpass) {
- if (export_cert)
- cpass = passout;
- else
- cpass = passin;
- }
-
- if (cpass) {
- mpass = cpass;
- noprompt = 1;
- } else {
- cpass = pass;
- mpass = macpass;
- }
-
- if (export_cert || inrand) {
- app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, (inrand != NULL));
- if (inrand != NULL)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
- app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
- }
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_push_info("read files");
-# endif
-
- if (!infile)
- in = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- else
- in = BIO_new_file(infile, "rb");
- if (!in) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening input file %s\n",
- infile ? infile : "<stdin>");
- perror(infile);
- goto end;
- }
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
- CRYPTO_push_info("write files");
-# endif
-
- if (!outfile) {
- out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- {
- BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
- out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out);
- }
-# endif
- } else
- out = BIO_new_file(outfile, "wb");
- if (!out) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening output file %s\n",
- outfile ? outfile : "<stdout>");
- perror(outfile);
- goto end;
- }
- if (twopass) {
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_push_info("read MAC password");
-# endif
- if (EVP_read_pw_string
- (macpass, sizeof macpass, "Enter MAC Password:", export_cert)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
- goto end;
- }
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
-# endif
- }
-
- if (export_cert) {
- EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
- X509 *ucert = NULL, *x = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *macmd = NULL;
- unsigned char *catmp = NULL;
- int i;
-
- if ((options & (NOCERTS | NOKEYS)) == (NOCERTS | NOKEYS)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nothing to do!\n");
- goto export_end;
- }
-
- if (options & NOCERTS)
- chain = 0;
-
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_push_info("process -export_cert");
- CRYPTO_push_info("reading private key");
-# endif
- if (!(options & NOKEYS)) {
- key = load_key(bio_err, keyname ? keyname : infile,
- FORMAT_PEM, 1, passin, e, "private key");
- if (!key)
- goto export_end;
- }
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
- CRYPTO_push_info("reading certs from input");
-# endif
-
- /* Load in all certs in input file */
- if (!(options & NOCERTS)) {
- certs = load_certs(bio_err, infile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e,
- "certificates");
- if (!certs)
- goto export_end;
-
- if (key) {
- /* Look for matching private key */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- if (X509_check_private_key(x, key)) {
- ucert = x;
- /* Zero keyid and alias */
- X509_keyid_set1(ucert, NULL, 0);
- X509_alias_set1(ucert, NULL, 0);
- /* Remove from list */
- (void)sk_X509_delete(certs, i);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!ucert) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "No certificate matches private key\n");
- goto export_end;
- }
- }
-
- }
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
- CRYPTO_push_info("reading certs from input 2");
-# endif
-
- /* Add any more certificates asked for */
- if (certfile) {
- STACK_OF(X509) *morecerts = NULL;
- if (!(morecerts = load_certs(bio_err, certfile, FORMAT_PEM,
- NULL, e,
- "certificates from certfile")))
- goto export_end;
- while (sk_X509_num(morecerts) > 0)
- sk_X509_push(certs, sk_X509_shift(morecerts));
- sk_X509_free(morecerts);
- }
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
- CRYPTO_push_info("reading certs from certfile");
-# endif
-
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
- CRYPTO_push_info("building chain");
-# endif
-
- /* If chaining get chain from user cert */
- if (chain) {
- int vret;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain2;
- X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new();
- if (!store) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation error\n");
- goto export_end;
- }
- if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(store, CAfile, CApath))
- X509_STORE_set_default_paths(store);
-
- vret = get_cert_chain(ucert, store, &chain2);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
-
- if (!vret) {
- /* Exclude verified certificate */
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain2); i++)
- sk_X509_push(certs, sk_X509_value(chain2, i));
- /* Free first certificate */
- X509_free(sk_X509_value(chain2, 0));
- sk_X509_free(chain2);
- } else {
- if (vret >= 0)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error %s getting chain.\n",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(vret));
- else
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto export_end;
- }
- }
-
- /* Add any CA names */
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(canames); i++) {
- catmp = (unsigned char *)sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(canames, i);
- X509_alias_set1(sk_X509_value(certs, i), catmp, -1);
- }
-
- if (csp_name && key)
- EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(key, NID_ms_csp_name,
- MBSTRING_ASC, (unsigned char *)csp_name,
- -1);
-
- if (add_lmk && key)
- EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(key, NID_LocalKeySet, 0, NULL, -1);
-
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
- CRYPTO_push_info("reading password");
-# endif
-
- if (!noprompt &&
- EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Export Password:",
- 1)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
- goto export_end;
- }
- if (!twopass)
- BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass);
-
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
- CRYPTO_push_info("creating PKCS#12 structure");
-# endif
-
- p12 = PKCS12_create(cpass, name, key, ucert, certs,
- key_pbe, cert_pbe, iter, -1, keytype);
-
- if (!p12) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto export_end;
- }
-
- if (macalg) {
- macmd = EVP_get_digestbyname(macalg);
- if (!macmd) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown digest algorithm %s\n", macalg);
- }
- }
-
- if (maciter != -1)
- PKCS12_set_mac(p12, mpass, -1, NULL, 0, maciter, macmd);
-
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
- CRYPTO_push_info("writing pkcs12");
-# endif
-
- i2d_PKCS12_bio(out, p12);
-
- ret = 0;
-
- export_end:
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
- CRYPTO_push_info("process -export_cert: freeing");
-# endif
-
- if (key)
- EVP_PKEY_free(key);
- if (certs)
- sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
- if (ucert)
- X509_free(ucert);
-
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
-# endif
- goto end;
-
- }
-
- if (!(p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL))) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_push_info("read import password");
-# endif
- if (!noprompt
- && EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Import Password:",
- 0)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
- goto end;
- }
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
-# endif
-
- if (!twopass)
- BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass);
-
- if ((options & INFO) && p12->mac)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC Iteration %ld\n",
- p12->mac->iter ? ASN1_INTEGER_get(p12->mac->iter) : 1);
- if (macver) {
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_push_info("verify MAC");
-# endif
- /* If we enter empty password try no password first */
- if (!mpass[0] && PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) {
- /* If mac and crypto pass the same set it to NULL too */
- if (!twopass)
- cpass = NULL;
- } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, mpass, -1)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Mac verify error: invalid password?\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC verified OK\n");
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
-# endif
- }
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_push_info("output keys and certificates");
-# endif
- if (!dump_certs_keys_p12(out, p12, cpass, -1, options, passout)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error outputting keys and certificates\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
-# endif
- ret = 0;
- end:
- if (p12)
- PKCS12_free(p12);
- if (export_cert || inrand)
- app_RAND_write_file(NULL, bio_err);
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_remove_all_info();
-# endif
- BIO_free(in);
- BIO_free_all(out);
- if (canames)
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(canames);
- if (passin)
- OPENSSL_free(passin);
- if (passout)
- OPENSSL_free(passout);
- apps_shutdown();
- OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
-}
-
-int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, PKCS12 *p12, char *pass,
- int passlen, int options, char *pempass)
-{
- STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes = NULL;
- STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
- int i, bagnid;
- int ret = 0;
- PKCS7 *p7;
-
- if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)))
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) {
- p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);
- bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
- if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
- bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
- if (options & INFO)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "PKCS7 Data\n");
- } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
- if (options & INFO) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "PKCS7 Encrypted data: ");
- alg_print(bio_err, p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
- }
- bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
- } else
- continue;
- if (!bags)
- goto err;
- if (!dump_certs_pkeys_bags(out, bags, pass, passlen,
- options, pempass)) {
- sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- goto err;
- }
- sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- bags = NULL;
- }
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
-
- if (asafes)
- sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
- char *pass, int passlen, int options, char *pempass)
-{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
- if (!dump_certs_pkeys_bag(out,
- sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i),
- pass, passlen, options, pempass))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-int dump_certs_pkeys_bag(BIO *out, PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, char *pass,
- int passlen, int options, char *pempass)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
- X509 *x509;
-
- switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag)) {
- case NID_keyBag:
- if (options & INFO)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Key bag\n");
- if (options & NOKEYS)
- return 1;
- print_attribs(out, bag->attrib, "Bag Attributes");
- p8 = bag->value.keybag;
- if (!(pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8)))
- return 0;
- print_attribs(out, p8->attributes, "Key Attributes");
- PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, pempass);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- break;
-
- case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
- if (options & INFO) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Shrouded Keybag: ");
- alg_print(bio_err, bag->value.shkeybag->algor);
- }
- if (options & NOKEYS)
- return 1;
- print_attribs(out, bag->attrib, "Bag Attributes");
- if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
- return 0;
- if (!(pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8))) {
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
- return 0;
- }
- print_attribs(out, p8->attributes, "Key Attributes");
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
- PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, pempass);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- break;
-
- case NID_certBag:
- if (options & INFO)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate bag\n");
- if (options & NOCERTS)
- return 1;
- if (PKCS12_get_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID)) {
- if (options & CACERTS)
- return 1;
- } else if (options & CLCERTS)
- return 1;
- print_attribs(out, bag->attrib, "Bag Attributes");
- if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate)
- return 1;
- if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag)))
- return 0;
- dump_cert_text(out, x509);
- PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x509);
- X509_free(x509);
- break;
-
- case NID_safeContentsBag:
- if (options & INFO)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Safe Contents bag\n");
- print_attribs(out, bag->attrib, "Bag Attributes");
- return dump_certs_pkeys_bags(out, bag->value.safes, pass,
- passlen, options, pempass);
-
- default:
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning unsupported bag type: ");
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bio_err, bag->type);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- return 1;
- break;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Given a single certificate return a verified chain or NULL if error */
-
-/* Hope this is OK .... */
-
-int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
-{
- X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chn;
- int i = 0;
-
- /*
- * FIXME: Should really check the return status of X509_STORE_CTX_init
- * for an error, but how that fits into the return value of this function
- * is less obvious.
- */
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, store, cert, NULL);
- if (X509_verify_cert(&store_ctx) <= 0) {
- i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&store_ctx);
- if (i == 0)
- /*
- * avoid returning 0 if X509_verify_cert() did not set an
- * appropriate error value in the context
- */
- i = -1;
- chn = NULL;
- goto err;
- } else
- chn = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&store_ctx);
- err:
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
- *chain = chn;
-
- return i;
-}
-
-int alg_print(BIO *x, X509_ALGOR *alg)
-{
- PBEPARAM *pbe;
- const unsigned char *p;
- p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
- pbe = d2i_PBEPARAM(NULL, &p, alg->parameter->value.sequence->length);
- if (!pbe)
- return 1;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s, Iteration %ld\n",
- OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)),
- ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter));
- PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Load all certificates from a given file */
-
-int cert_load(BIO *in, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-{
- int ret;
- X509 *cert;
- ret = 0;
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_push_info("cert_load(): reading one cert");
-# endif
- while ((cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
-# endif
- ret = 1;
- sk_X509_push(sk, cert);
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_push_info("cert_load(): reading one cert");
-# endif
- }
-# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
- CRYPTO_pop_info();
-# endif
- if (ret)
- ERR_clear_error();
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* Generalised attribute print: handle PKCS#8 and bag attributes */
-
-int print_attribs(BIO *out, STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrlst,
- const char *name)
-{
- X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
- ASN1_TYPE *av;
- char *value;
- int i, attr_nid;
- if (!attrlst) {
- BIO_printf(out, "%s: <No Attributes>\n", name);
- return 1;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(attrlst)) {
- BIO_printf(out, "%s: <Empty Attributes>\n", name);
- return 1;
- }
- BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", name);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(attrlst); i++) {
- attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(attrlst, i);
- attr_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(attr->object);
- BIO_printf(out, " ");
- if (attr_nid == NID_undef) {
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, attr->object);
- BIO_printf(out, ": ");
- } else
- BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", OBJ_nid2ln(attr_nid));
-
- if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(attr->value.set)) {
- av = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(attr->value.set, 0);
- switch (av->type) {
- case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
- value = OPENSSL_uni2asc(av->value.bmpstring->data,
- av->value.bmpstring->length);
- BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", value);
- OPENSSL_free(value);
- break;
-
- case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
- hex_prin(out, av->value.octet_string->data,
- av->value.octet_string->length);
- BIO_printf(out, "\n");
- break;
-
- case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
- hex_prin(out, av->value.bit_string->data,
- av->value.bit_string->length);
- BIO_printf(out, "\n");
- break;
-
- default:
- BIO_printf(out, "<Unsupported tag %d>\n", av->type);
- break;
- }
- } else
- BIO_printf(out, "<No Values>\n");
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-void hex_prin(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, int len)
-{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- BIO_printf(out, "%02X ", buf[i]);
-}
-
-static int set_pbe(BIO *err, int *ppbe, const char *str)
-{
- if (!str)
- return 0;
- if (!strcmp(str, "NONE")) {
- *ppbe = -1;
- return 1;
- }
- *ppbe = OBJ_txt2nid(str);
- if (*ppbe == NID_undef) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown PBE algorithm %s\n", str);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/pkcs12.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/pkcs12.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/pkcs12.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/pkcs12.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1068 @@
+/* pkcs12.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include "apps.h"
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+# define PROG pkcs12_main
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+
+# define NOKEYS 0x1
+# define NOCERTS 0x2
+# define INFO 0x4
+# define CLCERTS 0x8
+# define CACERTS 0x10
+
+int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
+int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, PKCS12 *p12, char *pass, int passlen,
+ int options, char *pempass);
+int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
+ char *pass, int passlen, int options,
+ char *pempass);
+int dump_certs_pkeys_bag(BIO *out, PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bags, char *pass,
+ int passlen, int options, char *pempass);
+int print_attribs(BIO *out, STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrlst,
+ const char *name);
+void hex_prin(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, int len);
+int alg_print(BIO *x, X509_ALGOR *alg);
+int cert_load(BIO *in, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+static int set_pbe(BIO *err, int *ppbe, const char *str);
+
+int MAIN(int, char **);
+
+int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ ENGINE *e = NULL;
+ char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *keyname = NULL;
+ char *certfile = NULL;
+ BIO *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+ char **args;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ char *csp_name = NULL;
+ int add_lmk = 0;
+ PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
+ char pass[50], macpass[50];
+ int export_cert = 0;
+ int options = 0;
+ int chain = 0;
+ int badarg = 0;
+ int iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
+ int maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
+ int twopass = 0;
+ int keytype = 0;
+ int cert_pbe;
+ int key_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int macver = 1;
+ int noprompt = 0;
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *canames = NULL;
+ char *cpass = NULL, *mpass = NULL;
+ char *passargin = NULL, *passargout = NULL, *passarg = NULL;
+ char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL;
+ char *inrand = NULL;
+ char *macalg = NULL;
+ char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ char *engine = NULL;
+# endif
+
+ apps_startup();
+
+ enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+ if (bio_err == NULL)
+ bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
+ goto end;
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+ else
+# endif
+ cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+
+ args = argv + 1;
+
+ while (*args) {
+ if (*args[0] == '-') {
+ if (!strcmp(*args, "-nokeys"))
+ options |= NOKEYS;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-keyex"))
+ keytype = KEY_EX;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-keysig"))
+ keytype = KEY_SIG;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nocerts"))
+ options |= NOCERTS;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-clcerts"))
+ options |= CLCERTS;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-cacerts"))
+ options |= CACERTS;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-noout"))
+ options |= (NOKEYS | NOCERTS);
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-info"))
+ options |= INFO;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-chain"))
+ chain = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-twopass"))
+ twopass = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nomacver"))
+ macver = 0;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-descert"))
+ cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-export"))
+ export_cert = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-des"))
+ enc = EVP_des_cbc();
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-des3"))
+ enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-idea"))
+ enc = EVP_idea_cbc();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-seed"))
+ enc = EVP_seed_cbc();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-aes128"))
+ enc = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-aes192"))
+ enc = EVP_aes_192_cbc();
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-aes256"))
+ enc = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-camellia128"))
+ enc = EVP_camellia_128_cbc();
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-camellia192"))
+ enc = EVP_camellia_192_cbc();
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-camellia256"))
+ enc = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
+# endif
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-noiter"))
+ iter = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-maciter"))
+ maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nomaciter"))
+ maciter = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nomac"))
+ maciter = -1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-macalg"))
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ macalg = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-nodes"))
+ enc = NULL;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-certpbe")) {
+ if (!set_pbe(bio_err, &cert_pbe, *++args))
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-keypbe")) {
+ if (!set_pbe(bio_err, &key_pbe, *++args))
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rand")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ inrand = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-inkey")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ keyname = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-certfile")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ certfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-name")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ name = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-LMK"))
+ add_lmk = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CSP")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ csp_name = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-caname")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ if (!canames)
+ canames = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(canames, *args);
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-in")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ infile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-out")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ outfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-passin")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ passargin = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-passout")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ passargout = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-password")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ passarg = *args;
+ noprompt = 1;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CApath")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ CApath = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-CAfile")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ CAfile = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ } else if (!strcmp(*args, "-engine")) {
+ if (args[1]) {
+ args++;
+ engine = *args;
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+# endif
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+
+ } else
+ badarg = 1;
+ args++;
+ }
+
+ if (badarg) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage: pkcs12 [options]\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "where options are\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-export output PKCS12 file\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-chain add certificate chain\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-inkey file private key if not infile\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-certfile f add all certs in f\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-name \"name\" use name as friendly name\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-caname \"nm\" use nm as CA friendly name (can be used more than once).\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-in infile input filename\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-out outfile output filename\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-noout don't output anything, just verify.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nomacver don't verify MAC.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nocerts don't output certificates.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-clcerts only output client certificates.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-cacerts only output CA certificates.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nokeys don't output private keys.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-info give info about PKCS#12 structure.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-des encrypt private keys with DES\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-des3 encrypt private keys with triple DES (default)\n");
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-idea encrypt private keys with idea\n");
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-seed encrypt private keys with seed\n");
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-aes128, -aes192, -aes256\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " encrypt PEM output with cbc aes\n");
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-camellia128, -camellia192, -camellia256\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " encrypt PEM output with cbc camellia\n");
+# endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nodes don't encrypt private keys\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-noiter don't use encryption iteration\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nomaciter don't use MAC iteration\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-maciter use MAC iteration\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-nomac don't generate MAC\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-twopass separate MAC, encryption passwords\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-descert encrypt PKCS#12 certificates with triple DES (default RC2-40)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-certpbe alg specify certificate PBE algorithm (default RC2-40)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-keypbe alg specify private key PBE algorithm (default 3DES)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-macalg alg digest algorithm used in MAC (default SHA1)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-keyex set MS key exchange type\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-keysig set MS key signature type\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-password p set import/export password source\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-passin p input file pass phrase source\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-passout p output file pass phrase source\n");
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-engine e use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n");
+# endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR,
+ LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " load the file (or the files in the directory) into\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " the random number generator\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CSP name Microsoft CSP name\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "-LMK Add local machine keyset attribute to private key\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+# endif
+
+ if (passarg) {
+ if (export_cert)
+ passargout = passarg;
+ else
+ passargin = passarg;
+ }
+
+ if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passargin, passargout, &passin, &passout)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting passwords\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!cpass) {
+ if (export_cert)
+ cpass = passout;
+ else
+ cpass = passin;
+ }
+
+ if (cpass) {
+ mpass = cpass;
+ noprompt = 1;
+ } else {
+ cpass = pass;
+ mpass = macpass;
+ }
+
+ if (export_cert || inrand) {
+ app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, (inrand != NULL));
+ if (inrand != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+ app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+ }
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_push_info("read files");
+# endif
+
+ if (!infile)
+ in = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ else
+ in = BIO_new_file(infile, "rb");
+ if (!in) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening input file %s\n",
+ infile ? infile : "<stdin>");
+ perror(infile);
+ goto end;
+ }
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+ CRYPTO_push_info("write files");
+# endif
+
+ if (!outfile) {
+ out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ {
+ BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
+ out = BIO_push(tmpbio, out);
+ }
+# endif
+ } else
+ out = BIO_new_file(outfile, "wb");
+ if (!out) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening output file %s\n",
+ outfile ? outfile : "<stdout>");
+ perror(outfile);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (twopass) {
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_push_info("read MAC password");
+# endif
+ if (EVP_read_pw_string
+ (macpass, sizeof macpass, "Enter MAC Password:", export_cert)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+# endif
+ }
+
+ if (export_cert) {
+ EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+ X509 *ucert = NULL, *x = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *macmd = NULL;
+ unsigned char *catmp = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((options & (NOCERTS | NOKEYS)) == (NOCERTS | NOKEYS)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nothing to do!\n");
+ goto export_end;
+ }
+
+ if (options & NOCERTS)
+ chain = 0;
+
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_push_info("process -export_cert");
+ CRYPTO_push_info("reading private key");
+# endif
+ if (!(options & NOKEYS)) {
+ key = load_key(bio_err, keyname ? keyname : infile,
+ FORMAT_PEM, 1, passin, e, "private key");
+ if (!key)
+ goto export_end;
+ }
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+ CRYPTO_push_info("reading certs from input");
+# endif
+
+ /* Load in all certs in input file */
+ if (!(options & NOCERTS)) {
+ certs = load_certs(bio_err, infile, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e,
+ "certificates");
+ if (!certs)
+ goto export_end;
+
+ if (key) {
+ /* Look for matching private key */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (X509_check_private_key(x, key)) {
+ ucert = x;
+ /* Zero keyid and alias */
+ X509_keyid_set1(ucert, NULL, 0);
+ X509_alias_set1(ucert, NULL, 0);
+ /* Remove from list */
+ (void)sk_X509_delete(certs, i);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!ucert) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "No certificate matches private key\n");
+ goto export_end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+ CRYPTO_push_info("reading certs from input 2");
+# endif
+
+ /* Add any more certificates asked for */
+ if (certfile) {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *morecerts = NULL;
+ if (!(morecerts = load_certs(bio_err, certfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, e,
+ "certificates from certfile")))
+ goto export_end;
+ while (sk_X509_num(morecerts) > 0)
+ sk_X509_push(certs, sk_X509_shift(morecerts));
+ sk_X509_free(morecerts);
+ }
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+ CRYPTO_push_info("reading certs from certfile");
+# endif
+
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+ CRYPTO_push_info("building chain");
+# endif
+
+ /* If chaining get chain from user cert */
+ if (chain) {
+ int vret;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain2;
+ X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (!store) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation error\n");
+ goto export_end;
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(store, CAfile, CApath))
+ X509_STORE_set_default_paths(store);
+
+ vret = get_cert_chain(ucert, store, &chain2);
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+
+ if (!vret) {
+ /* Exclude verified certificate */
+ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain2); i++)
+ sk_X509_push(certs, sk_X509_value(chain2, i));
+ /* Free first certificate */
+ X509_free(sk_X509_value(chain2, 0));
+ sk_X509_free(chain2);
+ } else {
+ if (vret >= 0)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error %s getting chain.\n",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(vret));
+ else
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto export_end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Add any CA names */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(canames); i++) {
+ catmp = (unsigned char *)sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(canames, i);
+ X509_alias_set1(sk_X509_value(certs, i), catmp, -1);
+ }
+
+ if (csp_name && key)
+ EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(key, NID_ms_csp_name,
+ MBSTRING_ASC, (unsigned char *)csp_name,
+ -1);
+
+ if (add_lmk && key)
+ EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(key, NID_LocalKeySet, 0, NULL, -1);
+
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+ CRYPTO_push_info("reading password");
+# endif
+
+ if (!noprompt &&
+ EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Export Password:",
+ 1)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
+ goto export_end;
+ }
+ if (!twopass)
+ BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass);
+
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+ CRYPTO_push_info("creating PKCS#12 structure");
+# endif
+
+ p12 = PKCS12_create(cpass, name, key, ucert, certs,
+ key_pbe, cert_pbe, iter, -1, keytype);
+
+ if (!p12) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto export_end;
+ }
+
+ if (macalg) {
+ macmd = EVP_get_digestbyname(macalg);
+ if (!macmd) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown digest algorithm %s\n", macalg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (maciter != -1)
+ PKCS12_set_mac(p12, mpass, -1, NULL, 0, maciter, macmd);
+
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+ CRYPTO_push_info("writing pkcs12");
+# endif
+
+ i2d_PKCS12_bio(out, p12);
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ export_end:
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+ CRYPTO_push_info("process -export_cert: freeing");
+# endif
+
+ if (key)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+ if (certs)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ if (ucert)
+ X509_free(ucert);
+
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+# endif
+ goto end;
+
+ }
+
+ if (!(p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL))) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_push_info("read import password");
+# endif
+ if (!noprompt
+ && EVP_read_pw_string(pass, sizeof pass, "Enter Import Password:",
+ 0)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+# endif
+
+ if (!twopass)
+ BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass);
+
+ if ((options & INFO) && p12->mac)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC Iteration %ld\n",
+ p12->mac->iter ? ASN1_INTEGER_get(p12->mac->iter) : 1);
+ if (macver) {
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_push_info("verify MAC");
+# endif
+ /* If we enter empty password try no password first */
+ if (!mpass[0] && PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) {
+ /* If mac and crypto pass the same set it to NULL too */
+ if (!twopass)
+ cpass = NULL;
+ } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, mpass, -1)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Mac verify error: invalid password?\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC verified OK\n");
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+# endif
+ }
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_push_info("output keys and certificates");
+# endif
+ if (!dump_certs_keys_p12(out, p12, cpass, -1, options, passout)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error outputting keys and certificates\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+# endif
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ if (p12)
+ PKCS12_free(p12);
+ if (export_cert || inrand)
+ app_RAND_write_file(NULL, bio_err);
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_remove_all_info();
+# endif
+ BIO_free(in);
+ BIO_free_all(out);
+ if (canames)
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(canames);
+ if (passin)
+ OPENSSL_free(passin);
+ if (passout)
+ OPENSSL_free(passout);
+ apps_shutdown();
+ OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, PKCS12 *p12, char *pass,
+ int passlen, int options, char *pempass)
+{
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
+ int i, bagnid;
+ int ret = 0;
+ PKCS7 *p7;
+
+ if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)))
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) {
+ p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);
+ bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
+ bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+ if (options & INFO)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "PKCS7 Data\n");
+ } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+ if (options & INFO) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "PKCS7 Encrypted data: ");
+ alg_print(bio_err, p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
+ }
+ bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
+ } else
+ continue;
+ if (!bags)
+ goto err;
+ if (!dump_certs_pkeys_bags(out, bags, pass, passlen,
+ options, pempass)) {
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ bags = NULL;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+ if (asafes)
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
+ char *pass, int passlen, int options, char *pempass)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
+ if (!dump_certs_pkeys_bag(out,
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i),
+ pass, passlen, options, pempass))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int dump_certs_pkeys_bag(BIO *out, PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, char *pass,
+ int passlen, int options, char *pempass)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
+ X509 *x509;
+
+ switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag)) {
+ case NID_keyBag:
+ if (options & INFO)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Key bag\n");
+ if (options & NOKEYS)
+ return 1;
+ print_attribs(out, bag->attrib, "Bag Attributes");
+ p8 = bag->value.keybag;
+ if (!(pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8)))
+ return 0;
+ print_attribs(out, p8->attributes, "Key Attributes");
+ PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, pempass);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ break;
+
+ case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
+ if (options & INFO) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Shrouded Keybag: ");
+ alg_print(bio_err, bag->value.shkeybag->algor);
+ }
+ if (options & NOKEYS)
+ return 1;
+ print_attribs(out, bag->attrib, "Bag Attributes");
+ if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
+ return 0;
+ if (!(pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8))) {
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ print_attribs(out, p8->attributes, "Key Attributes");
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(out, pkey, enc, NULL, 0, NULL, pempass);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ break;
+
+ case NID_certBag:
+ if (options & INFO)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate bag\n");
+ if (options & NOCERTS)
+ return 1;
+ if (PKCS12_get_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID)) {
+ if (options & CACERTS)
+ return 1;
+ } else if (options & CLCERTS)
+ return 1;
+ print_attribs(out, bag->attrib, "Bag Attributes");
+ if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate)
+ return 1;
+ if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag)))
+ return 0;
+ dump_cert_text(out, x509);
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x509);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ break;
+
+ case NID_safeContentsBag:
+ if (options & INFO)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Safe Contents bag\n");
+ print_attribs(out, bag->attrib, "Bag Attributes");
+ return dump_certs_pkeys_bags(out, bag->value.safes, pass,
+ passlen, options, pempass);
+
+ default:
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning unsupported bag type: ");
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bio_err, bag->type);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Given a single certificate return a verified chain or NULL if error */
+
+/* Hope this is OK .... */
+
+int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chn;
+ int i = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Should really check the return status of X509_STORE_CTX_init
+ * for an error, but how that fits into the return value of this function
+ * is less obvious.
+ */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, store, cert, NULL);
+ if (X509_verify_cert(&store_ctx) <= 0) {
+ i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&store_ctx);
+ if (i == 0)
+ /*
+ * avoid returning 0 if X509_verify_cert() did not set an
+ * appropriate error value in the context
+ */
+ i = -1;
+ chn = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ chn = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&store_ctx);
+ err:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
+ *chain = chn;
+
+ return i;
+}
+
+int alg_print(BIO *x, X509_ALGOR *alg)
+{
+ PBEPARAM *pbe;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+ pbe = d2i_PBEPARAM(NULL, &p, alg->parameter->value.sequence->length);
+ if (!pbe)
+ return 1;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s, Iteration %ld\n",
+ OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)),
+ ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter));
+ PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Load all certificates from a given file */
+
+int cert_load(BIO *in, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ int ret;
+ X509 *cert;
+ ret = 0;
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_push_info("cert_load(): reading one cert");
+# endif
+ while ((cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+# endif
+ ret = 1;
+ sk_X509_push(sk, cert);
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_push_info("cert_load(): reading one cert");
+# endif
+ }
+# ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
+ CRYPTO_pop_info();
+# endif
+ if (ret)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Generalised attribute print: handle PKCS#8 and bag attributes */
+
+int print_attribs(BIO *out, STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attrlst,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr;
+ ASN1_TYPE *av;
+ char *value;
+ int i, attr_nid;
+ if (!attrlst) {
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s: <No Attributes>\n", name);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(attrlst)) {
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s: <Empty Attributes>\n", name);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", name);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(attrlst); i++) {
+ attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(attrlst, i);
+ attr_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(attr->object);
+ BIO_printf(out, " ");
+ if (attr_nid == NID_undef) {
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, attr->object);
+ BIO_printf(out, ": ");
+ } else
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", OBJ_nid2ln(attr_nid));
+
+ if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(attr->value.set)) {
+ av = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(attr->value.set, 0);
+ switch (av->type) {
+ case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
+ value = OPENSSL_uni2asc(av->value.bmpstring->data,
+ av->value.bmpstring->length);
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", value);
+ OPENSSL_free(value);
+ break;
+
+ case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
+ hex_prin(out, av->value.octet_string->data,
+ av->value.octet_string->length);
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+ break;
+
+ case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
+ hex_prin(out, av->value.bit_string->data,
+ av->value.bit_string->length);
+ BIO_printf(out, "\n");
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ BIO_printf(out, "<Unsupported tag %d>\n", av->type);
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ BIO_printf(out, "<No Values>\n");
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void hex_prin(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ BIO_printf(out, "%02X ", buf[i]);
+}
+
+static int set_pbe(BIO *err, int *ppbe, const char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return 0;
+ if (!strcmp(str, "NONE")) {
+ *ppbe = -1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ *ppbe = OBJ_txt2nid(str);
+ if (*ppbe == NID_undef) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown PBE algorithm %s\n", str);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_client.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/s_client.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_client.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2114 +0,0 @@
-/* apps/s_client.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-# define APPS_WIN16
-#endif
-
-/*
- * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of
- * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining
- * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is
- * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int
- */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT)
-# define __U_INT
-typedef unsigned int u_int;
-#endif
-
-#define USE_SOCKETS
-#include "apps.h"
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-# include <openssl/srp.h>
-#endif
-#include "s_apps.h"
-#include "timeouts.h"
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __VMS_VER < 70000000)
-/* FIONBIO used as a switch to enable ioctl, and that isn't in VMS < 7.0 */
-# undef FIONBIO
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
-# include <fcntl.h>
-#endif
-
-#undef PROG
-#define PROG s_client_main
-
-/*
- * #define SSL_HOST_NAME "www.netscape.com"
- */
-/*
- * #define SSL_HOST_NAME "193.118.187.102"
- */
-#define SSL_HOST_NAME "localhost"
-
-/* no default cert. */
-/*
- * #define TEST_CERT "client.pem"
- */
-
-#undef BUFSIZZ
-#define BUFSIZZ 1024*8
-
-extern int verify_depth;
-extern int verify_error;
-extern int verify_return_error;
-
-#ifdef FIONBIO
-static int c_nbio = 0;
-#endif
-static int c_Pause = 0;
-static int c_debug = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int c_tlsextdebug = 0;
-static int c_status_req = 0;
-#endif
-static int c_msg = 0;
-static int c_showcerts = 0;
-
-static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL;
-static int keymatexportlen = 20;
-
-static void sc_usage(void);
-static void print_stuff(BIO *berr, SSL *con, int full);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
-#endif
-static BIO *bio_c_out = NULL;
-static int c_quiet = 0;
-static int c_ign_eof = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-/* Default PSK identity and key */
-static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity";
-/*
- * char *psk_key=NULL; by default PSK is not used
- */
-
-static unsigned int psk_client_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
- unsigned int max_identity_len,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len)
-{
- unsigned int psk_len = 0;
- int ret;
- BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
-
- if (c_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "psk_client_cb\n");
- if (!hint) {
- /* no ServerKeyExchange message */
- if (c_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out,
- "NULL received PSK identity hint, continuing anyway\n");
- } else if (c_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Received PSK identity hint '%s'\n", hint);
-
- /*
- * lookup PSK identity and PSK key based on the given identity hint here
- */
- ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "%s", psk_identity);
- if (ret < 0 || (unsigned int)ret > max_identity_len)
- goto out_err;
- if (c_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity,
- ret);
- ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, psk_key);
- if (!ret) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n",
- psk_key);
- if (bn)
- BN_free(bn);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((unsigned int)BN_num_bytes(bn) > max_psk_len) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n",
- max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn));
- BN_free(bn);
- return 0;
- }
-
- psk_len = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk);
- BN_free(bn);
- if (psk_len == 0)
- goto out_err;
-
- if (c_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created PSK len=%d\n", psk_len);
-
- return psk_len;
- out_err:
- if (c_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK client callback\n");
- return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-static void sc_usage(void)
-{
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "usage: s_client args\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -host host - use -connect instead\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -port port - use -connect instead\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -connect host:port - who to connect to (default is %s:%s)\n",
- SSL_HOST_NAME, PORT_STR);
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -cert arg - certificate file to use, PEM format assumed\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -certform arg - certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -key arg - Private key file to use, in cert file if\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " not specified but cert file is.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -keyform arg - key format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -pass arg - private key file pass phrase source\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -pause - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -prexit - print session information even on connection failure\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -showcerts - show all certificates in the chain\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -debug - extra output\n");
-#ifdef WATT32
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -wdebug - WATT-32 tcp debugging\n");
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -msg - Show protocol messages\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nbio_test - more ssl protocol testing\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -state - print the 'ssl' states\n");
-#ifdef FIONBIO
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nbio - Run with non-blocking IO\n");
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -crlf - convert LF from terminal into CRLF\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -quiet - no s_client output\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -ign_eof - ignore input eof (default when -quiet)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ign_eof - don't ignore input eof\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk_identity arg - PSK identity\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -jpake arg - JPAKE secret to use\n");
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -srpuser user - SRP authentification for 'user'\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srppass arg - password for 'user'\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -srp_lateuser - SRP username into second ClientHello message\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -srp_moregroups - Tolerate other than the known g N values.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -srp_strength int - minimal length in bits for N (default %d).\n",
- SRP_MINIMAL_N);
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl2 - just use SSLv2\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl3 - just use SSLv3\n");
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_2 - just use TLSv1.2\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_1 - just use TLSv1.1\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -serverpref - Use server's cipher preferences (only SSLv2)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -cipher - preferred cipher to use, use the 'openssl ciphers'\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " command to see what is available\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -starttls prot - use the STARTTLS command before starting TLS\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " for those protocols that support it, where\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " 'prot' defines which one to assume. Currently,\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " only \"smtp\", \"pop3\", \"imap\", \"ftp\" and \"xmpp\"\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " are supported.\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -engine id - Initialise and use the specified engine\n");
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR,
- LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -sess_out arg - file to write SSL session to\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -sess_in arg - file to read SSL session from\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -servername host - Set TLS extension servername in ClientHello\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -status - request certificate status from server\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n");
-# endif
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -keymatexport label - Export keying material using label\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -keymatexportlen len - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-
-/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */
-typedef struct tlsextctx_st {
- BIO *biodebug;
- int ack;
-} tlsextctx;
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
-{
- tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg;
- const char *hn = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
- if (SSL_get_servername_type(s) != -1)
- p->ack = !SSL_session_reused(s) && hn != NULL;
- else
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use SSL_get_servername\n");
-
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-
-/* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */
-typedef struct srp_arg_st {
- char *srppassin;
- char *srplogin;
- int msg; /* copy from c_msg */
- int debug; /* copy from c_debug */
- int amp; /* allow more groups */
- int strength /* minimal size for N */ ;
-} SRP_ARG;
-
-# define SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64
-
-static int srp_Verify_N_and_g(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
-{
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *r = BN_new();
- int ret =
- g != NULL && N != NULL && bn_ctx != NULL && BN_is_odd(N) &&
- BN_is_prime_ex(N, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) &&
- p != NULL && BN_rshift1(p, N) &&
- /* p = (N-1)/2 */
- BN_is_prime_ex(p, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) &&
- r != NULL &&
- /* verify g^((N-1)/2) == -1 (mod N) */
- BN_mod_exp(r, g, p, N, bn_ctx) &&
- BN_add_word(r, 1) && BN_cmp(r, N) == 0;
-
- if (r)
- BN_free(r);
- if (p)
- BN_free(p);
- if (bn_ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*-
- * This callback is used here for two purposes:
- * - extended debugging
- * - making some primality tests for unknown groups
- * The callback is only called for a non default group.
- *
- * An application does not need the call back at all if
- * only the stanard groups are used. In real life situations,
- * client and server already share well known groups,
- * thus there is no need to verify them.
- * Furthermore, in case that a server actually proposes a group that
- * is not one of those defined in RFC 5054, it is more appropriate
- * to add the group to a static list and then compare since
- * primality tests are rather cpu consuming.
- */
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_verify_param_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-{
- SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg;
- BIGNUM *N = NULL, *g = NULL;
- if (!(N = SSL_get_srp_N(s)) || !(g = SSL_get_srp_g(s)))
- return 0;
- if (srp_arg->debug || srp_arg->msg || srp_arg->amp == 1) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP parameters:\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tN=");
- BN_print(bio_err, N);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n\tg=");
- BN_print(bio_err, g);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- }
-
- if (SRP_check_known_gN_param(g, N))
- return 1;
-
- if (srp_arg->amp == 1) {
- if (srp_arg->debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "SRP param N and g are not known params, going to check deeper.\n");
-
- /*
- * The srp_moregroups is a real debugging feature. Implementors
- * should rather add the value to the known ones. The minimal size
- * has already been tested.
- */
- if (BN_num_bits(g) <= BN_BITS && srp_Verify_N_and_g(N, g))
- return 1;
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g rejected.\n");
- return 0;
-}
-
-# define PWD_STRLEN 1024
-
-static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-{
- SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg;
- char *pass = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PWD_STRLEN + 1);
- PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp;
- int l;
-
- if (!pass) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- cb_tmp.password = (char *)srp_arg->srppassin;
- cb_tmp.prompt_info = "SRP user";
- if ((l = password_callback(pass, PWD_STRLEN, 0, &cb_tmp)) < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
- OPENSSL_free(pass);
- return NULL;
- }
- *(pass + l) = '\0';
-
- return pass;
-}
-
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-char *srtp_profiles = NULL;
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
-typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
- unsigned char *data;
- unsigned short len;
- int status;
-} tlsextnextprotoctx;
-
-static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
-
-static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
- void *arg)
-{
- tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg;
-
- if (!c_quiet) {
- /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */
- unsigned i;
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: ");
- for (i = 0; i < inlen;) {
- if (i)
- BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2);
- BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]);
- i += in[i] + 1;
- }
- BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1);
- }
-
- ctx->status =
- SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len);
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-}
-# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
-#endif
-
-enum {
- PROTO_OFF = 0,
- PROTO_SMTP,
- PROTO_POP3,
- PROTO_IMAP,
- PROTO_FTP,
- PROTO_XMPP
-};
-
-int MAIN(int, char **);
-
-int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- unsigned int off = 0, clr = 0;
- SSL *con = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_CTX *kctx;
-#endif
- int s, k, width, state = 0;
- char *cbuf = NULL, *sbuf = NULL, *mbuf = NULL;
- int cbuf_len, cbuf_off;
- int sbuf_len, sbuf_off;
- fd_set readfds, writefds;
- short port = PORT;
- int full_log = 1;
- char *host = SSL_HOST_NAME;
- char *cert_file = NULL, *key_file = NULL;
- int cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, key_format = FORMAT_PEM;
- char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL;
- X509 *cert = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
- char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL, *cipher = NULL;
- int reconnect = 0, badop = 0, verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE, bugs = 0;
- int crlf = 0;
- int write_tty, read_tty, write_ssl, read_ssl, tty_on, ssl_pending;
- SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- int ret = 1, in_init = 1, i, nbio_test = 0;
- int starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF;
- int prexit = 0;
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
- int badarg = 0;
- const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL;
- int socket_type = SOCK_STREAM;
- BIO *sbio;
- char *inrand = NULL;
- int mbuf_len = 0;
- struct timeval timeout, *timeoutp;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- char *engine_id = NULL;
- char *ssl_client_engine_id = NULL;
- ENGINE *ssl_client_engine = NULL;
-#endif
- ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
- struct timeval tv;
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
- int stdin_set = 0;
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- char *servername = NULL;
- tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, 0 };
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
-# endif
-#endif
- char *sess_in = NULL;
- char *sess_out = NULL;
- struct sockaddr peer;
- int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
- int fallback_scsv = 0;
- int enable_timeouts = 0;
- long socket_mtu = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- char *jpake_secret = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- char *srppass = NULL;
- int srp_lateuser = 0;
- SRP_ARG srp_arg = { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1024 };
-#endif
-
- meth = SSLv23_client_method();
-
- apps_startup();
- c_Pause = 0;
- c_quiet = 0;
- c_ign_eof = 0;
- c_debug = 0;
- c_msg = 0;
- c_showcerts = 0;
-
- if (bio_err == NULL)
- bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
- goto end;
-
- if (((cbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL) ||
- ((sbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL) ||
- ((mbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- verify_depth = 0;
- verify_error = X509_V_OK;
-#ifdef FIONBIO
- c_nbio = 0;
-#endif
-
- argc--;
- argv++;
- while (argc >= 1) {
- if (strcmp(*argv, "-host") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- host = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-port") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- port = atoi(*(++argv));
- if (port == 0)
- goto bad;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-connect") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- if (!extract_host_port(*(++argv), &host, NULL, &port))
- goto bad;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify") == 0) {
- verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- verify_depth = atoi(*(++argv));
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_depth);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- cert_file = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sess_out") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- sess_out = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sess_in") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- sess_in = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-certform") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- cert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
- } else if (args_verify(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &vpm)) {
- if (badarg)
- goto bad;
- continue;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify_return_error") == 0)
- verify_return_error = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-prexit") == 0)
- prexit = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlf") == 0)
- crlf = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-quiet") == 0) {
- c_quiet = 1;
- c_ign_eof = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ign_eof") == 0)
- c_ign_eof = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ign_eof") == 0)
- c_ign_eof = 0;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pause") == 0)
- c_Pause = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-debug") == 0)
- c_debug = 1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tlsextdebug") == 0)
- c_tlsextdebug = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status") == 0)
- c_status_req = 1;
-#endif
-#ifdef WATT32
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-wdebug") == 0)
- dbug_init();
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msg") == 0)
- c_msg = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-showcerts") == 0)
- c_showcerts = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio_test") == 0)
- nbio_test = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-state") == 0)
- state = 1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk_identity") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- psk_identity = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk") == 0) {
- size_t j;
-
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- psk_key = *(++argv);
- for (j = 0; j < strlen(psk_key); j++) {
- if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[j]))
- continue;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv);
- goto bad;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuser") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srp_arg.srplogin = *(++argv);
- meth = TLSv1_client_method();
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srppass") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srppass = *(++argv);
- meth = TLSv1_client_method();
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srp_strength") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srp_arg.strength = atoi(*(++argv));
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP minimal length for N is %d\n",
- srp_arg.strength);
- meth = TLSv1_client_method();
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srp_lateuser") == 0) {
- srp_lateuser = 1;
- meth = TLSv1_client_method();
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srp_moregroups") == 0) {
- srp_arg.amp = 1;
- meth = TLSv1_client_method();
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0)
- meth = SSLv2_client_method();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0)
- meth = SSLv3_client_method();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_2") == 0)
- meth = TLSv1_2_client_method();
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_1") == 0)
- meth = TLSv1_1_client_method();
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0)
- meth = TLSv1_client_method();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) {
- meth = DTLSv1_client_method();
- socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-fallback_scsv") == 0) {
- fallback_scsv = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-timeout") == 0)
- enable_timeouts = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-mtu") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bugs") == 0)
- bugs = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyform") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- key_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pass") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- passarg = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- key_file = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reconnect") == 0) {
- reconnect = 5;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- CApath = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- CAfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1_2") == 0)
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1_1") == 0)
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1") == 0)
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ssl3") == 0)
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ssl2") == 0)
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_comp") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ticket") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nextprotoneg") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
- }
-# endif
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverpref") == 0)
- off |= SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-legacy_renegotiation") == 0)
- off |= SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-legacy_server_connect") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_legacy_server_connect") == 0) {
- clr |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cipher") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- cipher = *(++argv);
- }
-#ifdef FIONBIO
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio") == 0) {
- c_nbio = 1;
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-starttls") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- ++argv;
- if (strcmp(*argv, "smtp") == 0)
- starttls_proto = PROTO_SMTP;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "pop3") == 0)
- starttls_proto = PROTO_POP3;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "imap") == 0)
- starttls_proto = PROTO_IMAP;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "ftp") == 0)
- starttls_proto = PROTO_FTP;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "xmpp") == 0)
- starttls_proto = PROTO_XMPP;
- else
- goto bad;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- engine_id = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl_client_engine") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- ssl_client_engine_id = *(++argv);
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rand") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- inrand = *(++argv);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-servername") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- servername = *(++argv);
- /* meth=TLSv1_client_method(); */
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-jpake") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- jpake_secret = *++argv;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-use_srtp") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srtp_profiles = *(++argv);
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexport") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- keymatexportlabel = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexportlen") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- keymatexportlen = atoi(*(++argv));
- if (keymatexportlen == 0)
- goto bad;
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
- badop = 1;
- break;
- }
- argc--;
- argv++;
- }
- if (badop) {
- bad:
- sc_usage();
- goto end;
- }
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
- if (jpake_secret) {
- if (psk_key) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use JPAKE and PSK together\n");
- goto end;
- }
- psk_identity = "JPAKE";
- if (cipher) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "JPAKE sets cipher to PSK\n");
- goto end;
- }
- cipher = "PSK";
- }
-#endif
-
- OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- next_proto.status = -1;
- if (next_proto_neg_in) {
- next_proto.data =
- next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in);
- if (next_proto.data == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n");
- goto end;
- }
- } else
- next_proto.data = NULL;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1);
- if (ssl_client_engine_id) {
- ssl_client_engine = ENGINE_by_id(ssl_client_engine_id);
- if (!ssl_client_engine) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting client auth engine\n");
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
- if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (key_file == NULL)
- key_file = cert_file;
-
- if (key_file) {
-
- key = load_key(bio_err, key_file, key_format, 0, pass, e,
- "client certificate private key file");
- if (!key) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- }
-
- if (cert_file) {
- cert = load_cert(bio_err, cert_file, cert_format,
- NULL, e, "client certificate file");
-
- if (!cert) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, 1) && inrand == NULL
- && !RAND_status()) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n");
- }
- if (inrand != NULL)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
- app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
-
- if (bio_c_out == NULL) {
- if (c_quiet && !c_debug && !c_msg) {
- bio_c_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
- } else {
- if (bio_c_out == NULL)
- bio_c_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (!app_passwd(bio_err, srppass, NULL, &srp_arg.srppassin, NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (vpm)
- SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (ssl_client_engine) {
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ctx, ssl_client_engine)) {
- BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting client auth engine\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine);
- goto end;
- }
- ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- if (psk_key != NULL)
-# else
- if (psk_key != NULL || jpake_secret)
-# endif
- {
- if (c_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out,
- "PSK key given or JPAKE in use, setting client callback\n");
- SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, psk_client_cb);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (srtp_profiles != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles);
-#endif
- if (bugs)
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_ALL | off);
- else
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, off);
-
- if (clr)
- SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, clr);
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- if (next_proto.data)
- SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto);
-#endif
-
- if (state)
- SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
- if (cipher != NULL)
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, cipher)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting cipher list\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-#if 0
- else
- SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, getenv("SSL_CIPHER"));
-#endif
-
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, verify_callback);
- if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, cert, key))
- goto end;
-
- if ((CAfile || CApath)
- && !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- }
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (servername != NULL) {
- tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_err;
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp);
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (srp_arg.srplogin) {
- if (!srp_lateuser && !SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(ctx, srp_arg.srplogin)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n");
- goto end;
- }
- srp_arg.msg = c_msg;
- srp_arg.debug = c_debug;
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_arg);
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb);
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(ctx, srp_arg.strength);
- if (c_msg || c_debug || srp_arg.amp == 0)
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(ctx,
- ssl_srp_verify_param_cb);
- }
-# endif
-#endif
-
- con = SSL_new(ctx);
- if (sess_in) {
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_in, "r");
- if (!stmp) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in);
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL);
- BIO_free(stmp);
- if (!sess) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in);
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- SSL_set_session(con, sess);
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
- }
-
- if (fallback_scsv)
- SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (servername != NULL) {
- if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con, servername)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set TLS servername extension.\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (con && (kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) {
- SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(con, kctx);
- kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVER, host);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-/* SSL_set_cipher_list(con,"RC4-MD5"); */
-#if 0
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(con, "Test client", 11);
-# endif
-#endif
-
- re_start:
-
- if (init_client(&s, host, port, socket_type) == 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "connect:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error());
- SHUTDOWN(s);
- goto end;
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "CONNECTED(%08X)\n", s);
-
-#ifdef FIONBIO
- if (c_nbio) {
- unsigned long l = 1;
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "turning on non blocking io\n");
- if (BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &l) < 0) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
- if (c_Pause & 0x01)
- SSL_set_debug(con, 1);
-
- if (SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) {
-
- sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- if (getsockname(s, &peer, (void *)&peerlen) < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "getsockname:errno=%d\n",
- get_last_socket_error());
- SHUTDOWN(s);
- goto end;
- }
-
- (void)BIO_ctrl_set_connected(sbio, 1, &peer);
-
- if (enable_timeouts) {
- timeout.tv_sec = 0;
- timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT;
- BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
-
- timeout.tv_sec = 0;
- timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT;
- BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
- }
-
- if (socket_mtu) {
- if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n",
- DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con));
- BIO_free(sbio);
- goto shut;
- }
- SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
- if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n");
- BIO_free(sbio);
- goto shut;
- }
- } else
- /* want to do MTU discovery */
- BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL);
- } else
- sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- if (nbio_test) {
- BIO *test;
-
- test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test());
- sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio);
- }
-
- if (c_debug) {
- SSL_set_debug(con, 1);
- BIO_set_callback(sbio, bio_dump_callback);
- BIO_set_callback_arg(sbio, (char *)bio_c_out);
- }
- if (c_msg) {
- SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
- SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_out);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (c_tlsextdebug) {
- SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
- SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_c_out);
- }
- if (c_status_req) {
- SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(con, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ocsp_resp_cb);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, bio_c_out);
-# if 0
- {
- STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
- OCSP_RESPID *id = OCSP_RESPID_new();
- id->value.byKey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- id->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY;
- ASN1_STRING_set(id->value.byKey, "Hello World", -1);
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(ids, id);
- SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(con, ids);
- }
-# endif
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- if (jpake_secret)
- jpake_client_auth(bio_c_out, sbio, jpake_secret);
-#endif
-
- SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio);
- SSL_set_connect_state(con);
-
- /* ok, lets connect */
- width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1;
-
- read_tty = 1;
- write_tty = 0;
- tty_on = 0;
- read_ssl = 1;
- write_ssl = 1;
-
- cbuf_len = 0;
- cbuf_off = 0;
- sbuf_len = 0;
- sbuf_off = 0;
-
- /* This is an ugly hack that does a lot of assumptions */
- /*
- * We do have to handle multi-line responses which may come in a single
- * packet or not. We therefore have to use BIO_gets() which does need a
- * buffering BIO. So during the initial chitchat we do push a buffering
- * BIO into the chain that is removed again later on to not disturb the
- * rest of the s_client operation.
- */
- if (starttls_proto == PROTO_SMTP) {
- int foundit = 0;
- BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
- /* wait for multi-line response to end from SMTP */
- do {
- mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- }
- while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-');
- /* STARTTLS command requires EHLO... */
- BIO_printf(fbio, "EHLO openssl.client.net\r\n");
- (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
- /* wait for multi-line response to end EHLO SMTP response */
- do {
- mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS"))
- foundit = 1;
- }
- while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-');
- (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
- BIO_pop(fbio);
- BIO_free(fbio);
- if (!foundit)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "didn't found starttls in server response,"
- " try anyway...\n");
- BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n");
- BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- } else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_POP3) {
- BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- BIO_printf(sbio, "STLS\r\n");
- BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- } else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_IMAP) {
- int foundit = 0;
- BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
- BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- /* STARTTLS command requires CAPABILITY... */
- BIO_printf(fbio, ". CAPABILITY\r\n");
- (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
- /* wait for multi-line CAPABILITY response */
- do {
- mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS"))
- foundit = 1;
- }
- while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[0] != '.');
- (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
- BIO_pop(fbio);
- BIO_free(fbio);
- if (!foundit)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "didn't found STARTTLS in server response,"
- " try anyway...\n");
- BIO_printf(sbio, ". STARTTLS\r\n");
- BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- } else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_FTP) {
- BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
- /* wait for multi-line response to end from FTP */
- do {
- mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- }
- while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-');
- (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
- BIO_pop(fbio);
- BIO_free(fbio);
- BIO_printf(sbio, "AUTH TLS\r\n");
- BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- }
- if (starttls_proto == PROTO_XMPP) {
- int seen = 0;
- BIO_printf(sbio, "<stream:stream "
- "xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' "
- "xmlns='jabber:client' to='%s' version='1.0'>", host);
- seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- mbuf[seen] = 0;
- while (!strstr
- (mbuf, "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'")) {
- if (strstr(mbuf, "/stream:features>"))
- goto shut;
- seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- mbuf[seen] = 0;
- }
- BIO_printf(sbio,
- "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>");
- seen = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- sbuf[seen] = 0;
- if (!strstr(sbuf, "<proceed"))
- goto shut;
- mbuf[0] = 0;
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- FD_ZERO(&readfds);
- FD_ZERO(&writefds);
-
- if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) &&
- DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout))
- timeoutp = &timeout;
- else
- timeoutp = NULL;
-
- if (SSL_in_init(con) && !SSL_total_renegotiations(con)) {
- in_init = 1;
- tty_on = 0;
- } else {
- tty_on = 1;
- if (in_init) {
- in_init = 0;
-#if 0 /* This test doesn't really work as intended
- * (needs to be fixed) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (servername != NULL && !SSL_session_reused(con)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out,
- "Server did %sacknowledge servername extension.\n",
- tlsextcbp.ack ? "" : "not ");
- }
-# endif
-#endif
- if (sess_out) {
- BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_out, "w");
- if (stmp) {
- PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, SSL_get_session(con));
- BIO_free(stmp);
- } else
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing session file %s\n",
- sess_out);
- }
- print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log);
- if (full_log > 0)
- full_log--;
-
- if (starttls_proto) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s", mbuf);
- /* We don't need to know any more */
- starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF;
- }
-
- if (reconnect) {
- reconnect--;
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out,
- "drop connection and then reconnect\n");
- SSL_shutdown(con);
- SSL_set_connect_state(con);
- SHUTDOWN(SSL_get_fd(con));
- goto re_start;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ssl_pending = read_ssl && SSL_pending(con);
-
- if (!ssl_pending) {
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined (OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
- if (tty_on) {
- if (read_tty)
- openssl_fdset(fileno(stdin), &readfds);
- if (write_tty)
- openssl_fdset(fileno(stdout), &writefds);
- }
- if (read_ssl)
- openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds);
- if (write_ssl)
- openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds);
-#else
- if (!tty_on || !write_tty) {
- if (read_ssl)
- openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds);
- if (write_ssl)
- openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds);
- }
-#endif
-/*- printf("mode tty(%d %d%d) ssl(%d%d)\n",
- tty_on,read_tty,write_tty,read_ssl,write_ssl);*/
-
- /*
- * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is
- * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is
- * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler:
- * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or
- * (void *).
- */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
- /*
- * Under Windows/DOS we make the assumption that we can always
- * write to the tty: therefore if we need to write to the tty we
- * just fall through. Otherwise we timeout the select every
- * second and see if there are any keypresses. Note: this is a
- * hack, in a proper Windows application we wouldn't do this.
- */
- i = 0;
- if (!write_tty) {
- if (read_tty) {
- tv.tv_sec = 1;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
- NULL, &tv);
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
- if (!i && (!_kbhit() || !read_tty))
- continue;
-# else
- if (!i && (!((_kbhit())
- || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 ==
- WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle
- (STD_INPUT_HANDLE),
- 0)))
- || !read_tty))
- continue;
-# endif
- } else
- i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
- NULL, timeoutp);
- }
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
- if (!write_tty) {
- if (read_tty) {
- tv.tv_sec = 1;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
- NULL, &tv);
- } else
- i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
- NULL, timeoutp);
- }
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
- /* Under BeOS-R5 the situation is similar to DOS */
- i = 0;
- stdin_set = 0;
- (void)fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
- if (!write_tty) {
- if (read_tty) {
- tv.tv_sec = 1;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
- NULL, &tv);
- if (read(fileno(stdin), sbuf, 0) >= 0)
- stdin_set = 1;
- if (!i && (stdin_set != 1 || !read_tty))
- continue;
- } else
- i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
- NULL, timeoutp);
- }
- (void)fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, 0);
-#else
- i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
- NULL, timeoutp);
-#endif
- if (i < 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad select %d\n",
- get_last_socket_error());
- goto shut;
- /* goto end; */
- }
- }
-
- if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION)
- && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occured\n");
- }
-
- if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds)) {
- k = SSL_write(con, &(cbuf[cbuf_off]), (unsigned int)cbuf_len);
- switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
- cbuf_off += k;
- cbuf_len -= k;
- if (k <= 0)
- goto end;
- /* we have done a write(con,NULL,0); */
- if (cbuf_len <= 0) {
- read_tty = 1;
- write_ssl = 0;
- } else { /* if (cbuf_len > 0) */
-
- read_tty = 0;
- write_ssl = 1;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write W BLOCK\n");
- write_ssl = 1;
- read_tty = 0;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write R BLOCK\n");
- write_tty = 0;
- read_ssl = 1;
- write_ssl = 0;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write X BLOCK\n");
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
- if (cbuf_len != 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "shutdown\n");
- ret = 0;
- goto shut;
- } else {
- read_tty = 1;
- write_ssl = 0;
- break;
- }
-
- case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- if ((k != 0) || (cbuf_len != 0)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "write:errno=%d\n",
- get_last_socket_error());
- goto shut;
- } else {
- read_tty = 1;
- write_ssl = 0;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto shut;
- }
- }
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
- /* Assume Windows/DOS/BeOS can always write */
- else if (!ssl_pending && write_tty)
-#else
- else if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), &writefds))
-#endif
- {
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- ascii2ebcdic(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), &(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len);
-#endif
- i = raw_write_stdout(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len);
-
- if (i <= 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "DONE\n");
- ret = 0;
- goto shut;
- /* goto end; */
- }
-
- sbuf_len -= i;;
- sbuf_off += i;
- if (sbuf_len <= 0) {
- read_ssl = 1;
- write_tty = 0;
- }
- } else if (ssl_pending || FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds)) {
-#ifdef RENEG
- {
- static int iiii;
- if (++iiii == 52) {
- SSL_renegotiate(con);
- iiii = 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#if 1
- k = SSL_read(con, sbuf, 1024 /* BUFSIZZ */ );
-#else
-/* Demo for pending and peek :-) */
- k = SSL_read(con, sbuf, 16);
- {
- char zbuf[10240];
- printf("read=%d pending=%d peek=%d\n", k, SSL_pending(con),
- SSL_peek(con, zbuf, 10240));
- }
-#endif
-
- switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
- if (k <= 0)
- goto end;
- sbuf_off = 0;
- sbuf_len = k;
-
- read_ssl = 0;
- write_tty = 1;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read W BLOCK\n");
- write_ssl = 1;
- read_tty = 0;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
- write_tty = 0;
- read_ssl = 1;
- if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0))
- write_ssl = 1;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read X BLOCK\n");
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- ret = get_last_socket_error();
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "read:errno=%d\n", ret);
- goto shut;
- case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "closed\n");
- ret = 0;
- goto shut;
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto shut;
- /* break; */
- }
- }
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
- else if (_kbhit())
-# else
- else if ((_kbhit())
- || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 ==
- WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0)))
-# endif
-#elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
- else if (_kbhit())
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
- else if (stdin_set)
-#else
- else if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), &readfds))
-#endif
- {
- if (crlf) {
- int j, lf_num;
-
- i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ / 2);
- lf_num = 0;
- /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
- if (cbuf[j] == '\n')
- lf_num++;
- for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
- cbuf[j + lf_num] = cbuf[j];
- if (cbuf[j] == '\n') {
- lf_num--;
- i++;
- cbuf[j + lf_num] = '\r';
- }
- }
- assert(lf_num == 0);
- } else
- i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ);
-
- if ((!c_ign_eof) && ((i <= 0) || (cbuf[0] == 'Q'))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "DONE\n");
- ret = 0;
- goto shut;
- }
-
- if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'R')) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATING\n");
- SSL_renegotiate(con);
- cbuf_len = 0;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'B')) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n");
- SSL_heartbeat(con);
- cbuf_len = 0;
- }
-#endif
- else {
- cbuf_len = i;
- cbuf_off = 0;
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- ebcdic2ascii(cbuf, cbuf, i);
-#endif
- }
-
- write_ssl = 1;
- read_tty = 0;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 0;
- shut:
- if (in_init)
- print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log);
- SSL_shutdown(con);
- SHUTDOWN(SSL_get_fd(con));
- end:
- if (con != NULL) {
- if (prexit != 0)
- print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, 1);
- SSL_free(con);
- }
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- if (next_proto.data)
- OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data);
-#endif
- if (ctx != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (cert)
- X509_free(cert);
- if (key)
- EVP_PKEY_free(key);
- if (pass)
- OPENSSL_free(pass);
- if (vpm)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
- if (cbuf != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(cbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- OPENSSL_free(cbuf);
- }
- if (sbuf != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- OPENSSL_free(sbuf);
- }
- if (mbuf != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
- OPENSSL_free(mbuf);
- }
- if (bio_c_out != NULL) {
- BIO_free(bio_c_out);
- bio_c_out = NULL;
- }
- apps_shutdown();
- OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
-}
-
-static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
-{
- X509 *peer = NULL;
- char *p;
- static const char *space = " ";
- char buf[BUFSIZ];
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk2;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- X509_NAME *xn;
- int j, i;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- const COMP_METHOD *comp, *expansion;
-#endif
- unsigned char *exportedkeymat;
-
- if (full) {
- int got_a_chain = 0;
-
- sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(s);
- if (sk != NULL) {
- got_a_chain = 1; /* we don't have it for SSL2 (yet) */
-
- BIO_printf(bio, "---\nCertificate chain\n");
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)),
- buf, sizeof buf);
- BIO_printf(bio, "%2d s:%s\n", i, buf);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)),
- buf, sizeof buf);
- BIO_printf(bio, " i:%s\n", buf);
- if (c_showcerts)
- PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, sk_X509_value(sk, i));
- }
- }
-
- BIO_printf(bio, "---\n");
- peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
- if (peer != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio, "Server certificate\n");
-
- /* Redundant if we showed the whole chain */
- if (!(c_showcerts && got_a_chain))
- PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, peer);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
- BIO_printf(bio, "subject=%s\n", buf);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
- BIO_printf(bio, "issuer=%s\n", buf);
- } else
- BIO_printf(bio, "no peer certificate available\n");
-
- sk2 = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
- if ((sk2 != NULL) && (sk_X509_NAME_num(sk2) > 0)) {
- BIO_printf(bio, "---\nAcceptable client certificate CA names\n");
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk2); i++) {
- xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk2, i);
- X509_NAME_oneline(xn, buf, sizeof(buf));
- BIO_write(bio, buf, strlen(buf));
- BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
- }
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio, "---\nNo client certificate CA names sent\n");
- }
- p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(s, buf, sizeof buf);
- if (p != NULL) {
- /*
- * This works only for SSL 2. In later protocol versions, the
- * client does not know what other ciphers (in addition to the
- * one to be used in the current connection) the server supports.
- */
-
- BIO_printf(bio,
- "---\nCiphers common between both SSL endpoints:\n");
- j = i = 0;
- while (*p) {
- if (*p == ':') {
- BIO_write(bio, space, 15 - j % 25);
- i++;
- j = 0;
- BIO_write(bio, ((i % 3) ? " " : "\n"), 1);
- } else {
- BIO_write(bio, p, 1);
- j++;
- }
- p++;
- }
- BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
- }
-
- BIO_printf(bio,
- "---\nSSL handshake has read %ld bytes and written %ld bytes\n",
- BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)),
- BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s)));
- }
- BIO_printf(bio, (SSL_cache_hit(s) ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, "));
- c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
- BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Cipher is %s\n",
- SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
- if (peer != NULL) {
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
- pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
- BIO_printf(bio, "Server public key is %d bit\n",
- EVP_PKEY_bits(pktmp));
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
- }
- BIO_printf(bio, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
- SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(s) ? "" : " NOT");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- comp = SSL_get_current_compression(s);
- expansion = SSL_get_current_expansion(s);
- BIO_printf(bio, "Compression: %s\n",
- comp ? SSL_COMP_get_name(comp) : "NONE");
- BIO_printf(bio, "Expansion: %s\n",
- expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE");
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- {
- /* Print out local port of connection: useful for debugging */
- int sock;
- struct sockaddr_in ladd;
- socklen_t ladd_size = sizeof(ladd);
- sock = SSL_get_fd(s);
- getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ladd, &ladd_size);
- BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "LOCAL PORT is %u\n", ntohs(ladd.sin_port));
- }
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- if (next_proto.status != -1) {
- const unsigned char *proto;
- unsigned int proto_len;
- SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len);
- BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status);
- BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len);
- BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- {
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile =
- SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(s);
-
- if (srtp_profile)
- BIO_printf(bio, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
- srtp_profile->name);
- }
-#endif
-
- SSL_SESSION_print(bio, SSL_get_session(s));
- if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio, "Keying material exporter:\n");
- BIO_printf(bio, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
- BIO_printf(bio, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen);
- exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen);
- if (exportedkeymat != NULL) {
- if (!SSL_export_keying_material(s, exportedkeymat,
- keymatexportlen,
- keymatexportlabel,
- strlen(keymatexportlabel),
- NULL, 0, 0)) {
- BIO_printf(bio, " Error\n");
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio, " Keying material: ");
- for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++)
- BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]);
- BIO_printf(bio, "\n");
- }
- OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
- }
- }
- BIO_printf(bio, "---\n");
- if (peer != NULL)
- X509_free(peer);
- /* flush, or debugging output gets mixed with http response */
- (void)BIO_flush(bio);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-
-static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-{
- const unsigned char *p;
- int len;
- OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp;
- len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
- BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response: ");
- if (!p) {
- BIO_puts(arg, "no response sent\n");
- return 1;
- }
- rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
- if (!rsp) {
- BIO_puts(arg, "response parse error\n");
- BIO_dump_indent(arg, (char *)p, len, 4);
- return 0;
- }
- BIO_puts(arg, "\n======================================\n");
- OCSP_RESPONSE_print(arg, rsp, 0);
- BIO_puts(arg, "======================================\n");
- OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
- return 1;
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_client.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/s_client.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_client.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_client.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2117 @@
+/* apps/s_client.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+# define APPS_WIN16
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of
+ * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining
+ * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is
+ * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT)
+# define __U_INT
+typedef unsigned int u_int;
+#endif
+
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+#endif
+#include "s_apps.h"
+#include "timeouts.h"
+
+#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __VMS_VER < 70000000)
+/* FIONBIO used as a switch to enable ioctl, and that isn't in VMS < 7.0 */
+# undef FIONBIO
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef PROG
+#define PROG s_client_main
+
+/*
+ * #define SSL_HOST_NAME "www.netscape.com"
+ */
+/*
+ * #define SSL_HOST_NAME "193.118.187.102"
+ */
+#define SSL_HOST_NAME "localhost"
+
+/* no default cert. */
+/*
+ * #define TEST_CERT "client.pem"
+ */
+
+#undef BUFSIZZ
+#define BUFSIZZ 1024*8
+
+extern int verify_depth;
+extern int verify_error;
+extern int verify_return_error;
+
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+static int c_nbio = 0;
+#endif
+static int c_Pause = 0;
+static int c_debug = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int c_tlsextdebug = 0;
+static int c_status_req = 0;
+#endif
+static int c_msg = 0;
+static int c_showcerts = 0;
+
+static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL;
+static int keymatexportlen = 20;
+
+static void sc_usage(void);
+static void print_stuff(BIO *berr, SSL *con, int full);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
+#endif
+static BIO *bio_c_out = NULL;
+static int c_quiet = 0;
+static int c_ign_eof = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+/* Default PSK identity and key */
+static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity";
+/*
+ * char *psk_key=NULL; by default PSK is not used
+ */
+
+static unsigned int psk_client_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+ unsigned int max_identity_len,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+ unsigned int psk_len = 0;
+ int ret;
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+
+ if (c_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "psk_client_cb\n");
+ if (!hint) {
+ /* no ServerKeyExchange message */
+ if (c_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out,
+ "NULL received PSK identity hint, continuing anyway\n");
+ } else if (c_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Received PSK identity hint '%s'\n", hint);
+
+ /*
+ * lookup PSK identity and PSK key based on the given identity hint here
+ */
+ ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "%s", psk_identity);
+ if (ret < 0 || (unsigned int)ret > max_identity_len)
+ goto out_err;
+ if (c_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity,
+ ret);
+ ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, psk_key);
+ if (!ret) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n",
+ psk_key);
+ if (bn)
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((unsigned int)BN_num_bytes(bn) > max_psk_len) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n",
+ max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn));
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ psk_len = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk);
+ BN_free(bn);
+ if (psk_len == 0)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ if (c_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created PSK len=%d\n", psk_len);
+
+ return psk_len;
+ out_err:
+ if (c_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK client callback\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void sc_usage(void)
+{
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "usage: s_client args\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -host host - use -connect instead\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -port port - use -connect instead\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -connect host:port - who to connect to (default is %s:%s)\n",
+ SSL_HOST_NAME, PORT_STR);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -cert arg - certificate file to use, PEM format assumed\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -certform arg - certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -key arg - Private key file to use, in cert file if\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " not specified but cert file is.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -keyform arg - key format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -pass arg - private key file pass phrase source\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -pause - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -prexit - print session information even on connection failure\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -showcerts - show all certificates in the chain\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -debug - extra output\n");
+#ifdef WATT32
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -wdebug - WATT-32 tcp debugging\n");
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -msg - Show protocol messages\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nbio_test - more ssl protocol testing\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -state - print the 'ssl' states\n");
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nbio - Run with non-blocking IO\n");
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -crlf - convert LF from terminal into CRLF\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -quiet - no s_client output\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -ign_eof - ignore input eof (default when -quiet)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ign_eof - don't ignore input eof\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk_identity arg - PSK identity\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -jpake arg - JPAKE secret to use\n");
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -srpuser user - SRP authentification for 'user'\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srppass arg - password for 'user'\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -srp_lateuser - SRP username into second ClientHello message\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -srp_moregroups - Tolerate other than the known g N values.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -srp_strength int - minimal length in bits for N (default %d).\n",
+ SRP_MINIMAL_N);
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl2 - just use SSLv2\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl3 - just use SSLv3\n");
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_2 - just use TLSv1.2\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_1 - just use TLSv1.1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -serverpref - Use server's cipher preferences (only SSLv2)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -cipher - preferred cipher to use, use the 'openssl ciphers'\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " command to see what is available\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -starttls prot - use the STARTTLS command before starting TLS\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " for those protocols that support it, where\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " 'prot' defines which one to assume. Currently,\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " only \"smtp\", \"pop3\", \"imap\", \"ftp\" and \"xmpp\"\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " are supported.\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -engine id - Initialise and use the specified engine\n");
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR,
+ LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -sess_out arg - file to write SSL session to\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -sess_in arg - file to read SSL session from\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -servername host - Set TLS extension servername in ClientHello\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -status - request certificate status from server\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n");
+# endif
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -keymatexport label - Export keying material using label\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -keymatexportlen len - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */
+typedef struct tlsextctx_st {
+ BIO *biodebug;
+ int ack;
+} tlsextctx;
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+ tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg;
+ const char *hn = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+ if (SSL_get_servername_type(s) != -1)
+ p->ack = !SSL_session_reused(s) && hn != NULL;
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use SSL_get_servername\n");
+
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+
+/* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */
+typedef struct srp_arg_st {
+ char *srppassin;
+ char *srplogin;
+ int msg; /* copy from c_msg */
+ int debug; /* copy from c_debug */
+ int amp; /* allow more groups */
+ int strength /* minimal size for N */ ;
+} SRP_ARG;
+
+# define SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64
+
+static int srp_Verify_N_and_g(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *r = BN_new();
+ int ret =
+ g != NULL && N != NULL && bn_ctx != NULL && BN_is_odd(N) &&
+ BN_is_prime_ex(N, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) &&
+ p != NULL && BN_rshift1(p, N) &&
+ /* p = (N-1)/2 */
+ BN_is_prime_ex(p, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) &&
+ r != NULL &&
+ /* verify g^((N-1)/2) == -1 (mod N) */
+ BN_mod_exp(r, g, p, N, bn_ctx) &&
+ BN_add_word(r, 1) && BN_cmp(r, N) == 0;
+
+ if (r)
+ BN_free(r);
+ if (p)
+ BN_free(p);
+ if (bn_ctx)
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * This callback is used here for two purposes:
+ * - extended debugging
+ * - making some primality tests for unknown groups
+ * The callback is only called for a non default group.
+ *
+ * An application does not need the call back at all if
+ * only the stanard groups are used. In real life situations,
+ * client and server already share well known groups,
+ * thus there is no need to verify them.
+ * Furthermore, in case that a server actually proposes a group that
+ * is not one of those defined in RFC 5054, it is more appropriate
+ * to add the group to a static list and then compare since
+ * primality tests are rather cpu consuming.
+ */
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_verify_param_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+ SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg;
+ BIGNUM *N = NULL, *g = NULL;
+ if (!(N = SSL_get_srp_N(s)) || !(g = SSL_get_srp_g(s)))
+ return 0;
+ if (srp_arg->debug || srp_arg->msg || srp_arg->amp == 1) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP parameters:\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tN=");
+ BN_print(bio_err, N);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n\tg=");
+ BN_print(bio_err, g);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ }
+
+ if (SRP_check_known_gN_param(g, N))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (srp_arg->amp == 1) {
+ if (srp_arg->debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "SRP param N and g are not known params, going to check deeper.\n");
+
+ /*
+ * The srp_moregroups is a real debugging feature. Implementors
+ * should rather add the value to the known ones. The minimal size
+ * has already been tested.
+ */
+ if (BN_num_bits(g) <= BN_BITS && srp_Verify_N_and_g(N, g))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g rejected.\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+# define PWD_STRLEN 1024
+
+static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+ SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg;
+ char *pass = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(PWD_STRLEN + 1);
+ PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp;
+ int l;
+
+ if (!pass) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ cb_tmp.password = (char *)srp_arg->srppassin;
+ cb_tmp.prompt_info = "SRP user";
+ if ((l = password_callback(pass, PWD_STRLEN, 0, &cb_tmp)) < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n");
+ OPENSSL_free(pass);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *(pass + l) = '\0';
+
+ return pass;
+}
+
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+char *srtp_profiles = NULL;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned short len;
+ int status;
+} tlsextnextprotoctx;
+
+static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
+
+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg;
+
+ if (!c_quiet) {
+ /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */
+ unsigned i;
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < inlen;) {
+ if (i)
+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2);
+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]);
+ i += in[i] + 1;
+ }
+ BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1);
+ }
+
+ ctx->status =
+ SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len);
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+#endif
+
+enum {
+ PROTO_OFF = 0,
+ PROTO_SMTP,
+ PROTO_POP3,
+ PROTO_IMAP,
+ PROTO_FTP,
+ PROTO_XMPP
+};
+
+int MAIN(int, char **);
+
+int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned int off = 0, clr = 0;
+ SSL *con = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_CTX *kctx;
+#endif
+ int s, k, width, state = 0;
+ char *cbuf = NULL, *sbuf = NULL, *mbuf = NULL;
+ int cbuf_len, cbuf_off;
+ int sbuf_len, sbuf_off;
+ fd_set readfds, writefds;
+ short port = PORT;
+ int full_log = 1;
+ char *host = SSL_HOST_NAME;
+ char *cert_file = NULL, *key_file = NULL;
+ int cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, key_format = FORMAT_PEM;
+ char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL;
+ X509 *cert = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+ char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL, *cipher = NULL;
+ int reconnect = 0, badop = 0, verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE, bugs = 0;
+ int crlf = 0;
+ int write_tty, read_tty, write_ssl, read_ssl, tty_on, ssl_pending;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int ret = 1, in_init = 1, i, nbio_test = 0;
+ int starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF;
+ int prexit = 0;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
+ int badarg = 0;
+ const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL;
+ int socket_type = SOCK_STREAM;
+ BIO *sbio;
+ char *inrand = NULL;
+ int mbuf_len = 0;
+ struct timeval timeout, *timeoutp;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ char *engine_id = NULL;
+ char *ssl_client_engine_id = NULL;
+ ENGINE *ssl_client_engine = NULL;
+#endif
+ ENGINE *e = NULL;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+ struct timeval tv;
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+ int stdin_set = 0;
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ char *servername = NULL;
+ tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, 0 };
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+ char *sess_in = NULL;
+ char *sess_out = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr peer;
+ int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
+ int fallback_scsv = 0;
+ int enable_timeouts = 0;
+ long socket_mtu = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ char *jpake_secret = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ char *srppass = NULL;
+ int srp_lateuser = 0;
+ SRP_ARG srp_arg = { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1024 };
+#endif
+
+ meth = SSLv23_client_method();
+
+ apps_startup();
+ c_Pause = 0;
+ c_quiet = 0;
+ c_ign_eof = 0;
+ c_debug = 0;
+ c_msg = 0;
+ c_showcerts = 0;
+
+ if (bio_err == NULL)
+ bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
+ goto end;
+
+ if (((cbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL) ||
+ ((sbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL) ||
+ ((mbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ verify_depth = 0;
+ verify_error = X509_V_OK;
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+ c_nbio = 0;
+#endif
+
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ while (argc >= 1) {
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "-host") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ host = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-port") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ port = atoi(*(++argv));
+ if (port == 0)
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-connect") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ if (!extract_host_port(*(++argv), &host, NULL, &port))
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify") == 0) {
+ verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ verify_depth = atoi(*(++argv));
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_depth);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ cert_file = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sess_out") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ sess_out = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-sess_in") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ sess_in = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-certform") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ cert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
+ } else if (args_verify(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &vpm)) {
+ if (badarg)
+ goto bad;
+ continue;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify_return_error") == 0)
+ verify_return_error = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-prexit") == 0)
+ prexit = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlf") == 0)
+ crlf = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-quiet") == 0) {
+ c_quiet = 1;
+ c_ign_eof = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ign_eof") == 0)
+ c_ign_eof = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ign_eof") == 0)
+ c_ign_eof = 0;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pause") == 0)
+ c_Pause = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-debug") == 0)
+ c_debug = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tlsextdebug") == 0)
+ c_tlsextdebug = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status") == 0)
+ c_status_req = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef WATT32
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-wdebug") == 0)
+ dbug_init();
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msg") == 0)
+ c_msg = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-showcerts") == 0)
+ c_showcerts = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio_test") == 0)
+ nbio_test = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-state") == 0)
+ state = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk_identity") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ psk_identity = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk") == 0) {
+ size_t j;
+
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ psk_key = *(++argv);
+ for (j = 0; j < strlen(psk_key); j++) {
+ if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[j]))
+ continue;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuser") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ srp_arg.srplogin = *(++argv);
+ meth = TLSv1_client_method();
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srppass") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ srppass = *(++argv);
+ meth = TLSv1_client_method();
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srp_strength") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ srp_arg.strength = atoi(*(++argv));
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP minimal length for N is %d\n",
+ srp_arg.strength);
+ meth = TLSv1_client_method();
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srp_lateuser") == 0) {
+ srp_lateuser = 1;
+ meth = TLSv1_client_method();
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srp_moregroups") == 0) {
+ srp_arg.amp = 1;
+ meth = TLSv1_client_method();
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0)
+ meth = SSLv2_client_method();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0)
+ meth = SSLv3_client_method();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_2") == 0)
+ meth = TLSv1_2_client_method();
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_1") == 0)
+ meth = TLSv1_1_client_method();
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0)
+ meth = TLSv1_client_method();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) {
+ meth = DTLSv1_client_method();
+ socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-fallback_scsv") == 0) {
+ fallback_scsv = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-timeout") == 0)
+ enable_timeouts = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-mtu") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bugs") == 0)
+ bugs = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyform") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ key_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pass") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ passarg = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ key_file = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reconnect") == 0) {
+ reconnect = 5;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ CApath = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ CAfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1_2") == 0)
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1_1") == 0)
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1") == 0)
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ssl3") == 0)
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ssl2") == 0)
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_comp") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ticket") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nextprotoneg") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverpref") == 0)
+ off |= SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-legacy_renegotiation") == 0)
+ off |= SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-legacy_server_connect") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_legacy_server_connect") == 0) {
+ clr |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cipher") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ cipher = *(++argv);
+ }
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio") == 0) {
+ c_nbio = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-starttls") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ ++argv;
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "smtp") == 0)
+ starttls_proto = PROTO_SMTP;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "pop3") == 0)
+ starttls_proto = PROTO_POP3;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "imap") == 0)
+ starttls_proto = PROTO_IMAP;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "ftp") == 0)
+ starttls_proto = PROTO_FTP;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "xmpp") == 0)
+ starttls_proto = PROTO_XMPP;
+ else
+ goto bad;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ engine_id = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl_client_engine") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ ssl_client_engine_id = *(++argv);
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rand") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ inrand = *(++argv);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-servername") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ servername = *(++argv);
+ /* meth=TLSv1_client_method(); */
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-jpake") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ jpake_secret = *++argv;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-use_srtp") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ srtp_profiles = *(++argv);
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexport") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ keymatexportlabel = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexportlen") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ keymatexportlen = atoi(*(++argv));
+ if (keymatexportlen == 0)
+ goto bad;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
+ badop = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+ if (badop) {
+ bad:
+ sc_usage();
+ goto end;
+ }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
+ if (jpake_secret) {
+ if (psk_key) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use JPAKE and PSK together\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ psk_identity = "JPAKE";
+ if (cipher) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "JPAKE sets cipher to PSK\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ cipher = "PSK";
+ }
+#endif
+
+ OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ next_proto.status = -1;
+ if (next_proto_neg_in) {
+ next_proto.data =
+ next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in);
+ if (next_proto.data == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else
+ next_proto.data = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1);
+ if (ssl_client_engine_id) {
+ ssl_client_engine = ENGINE_by_id(ssl_client_engine_id);
+ if (!ssl_client_engine) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting client auth engine\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (key_file == NULL)
+ key_file = cert_file;
+
+ if (key_file) {
+
+ key = load_key(bio_err, key_file, key_format, 0, pass, e,
+ "client certificate private key file");
+ if (!key) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ if (cert_file) {
+ cert = load_cert(bio_err, cert_file, cert_format,
+ NULL, e, "client certificate file");
+
+ if (!cert) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, 1) && inrand == NULL
+ && !RAND_status()) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n");
+ }
+ if (inrand != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+ app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+
+ if (bio_c_out == NULL) {
+ if (c_quiet && !c_debug && !c_msg) {
+ bio_c_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+ } else {
+ if (bio_c_out == NULL)
+ bio_c_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (!app_passwd(bio_err, srppass, NULL, &srp_arg.srppassin, NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (vpm)
+ SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (ssl_client_engine) {
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ctx, ssl_client_engine)) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting client auth engine\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ if (psk_key != NULL)
+# else
+ if (psk_key != NULL || jpake_secret)
+# endif
+ {
+ if (c_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out,
+ "PSK key given or JPAKE in use, setting client callback\n");
+ SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, psk_client_cb);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ if (srtp_profiles != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+ if (bugs)
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_ALL | off);
+ else
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, off);
+
+ if (clr)
+ SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, clr);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ if (next_proto.data)
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto);
+#endif
+
+ if (state)
+ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
+ if (cipher != NULL)
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, cipher)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting cipher list\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+#if 0
+ else
+ SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, getenv("SSL_CIPHER"));
+#endif
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, verify_callback);
+ if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, cert, key))
+ goto end;
+
+ if ((CAfile || CApath)
+ && !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (servername != NULL) {
+ tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_err;
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp);
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (srp_arg.srplogin) {
+ if (!srp_lateuser && !SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(ctx, srp_arg.srplogin)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ srp_arg.msg = c_msg;
+ srp_arg.debug = c_debug;
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_arg);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(ctx, srp_arg.strength);
+ if (c_msg || c_debug || srp_arg.amp == 0)
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(ctx,
+ ssl_srp_verify_param_cb);
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ con = SSL_new(ctx);
+ if (sess_in) {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_in, "r");
+ if (!stmp) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ BIO_free(stmp);
+ if (!sess) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ SSL_set_session(con, sess);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ }
+
+ if (fallback_scsv)
+ SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (servername != NULL) {
+ if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con, servername)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set TLS servername extension.\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (con && (kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) {
+ SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(con, kctx);
+ kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVER, host);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+/* SSL_set_cipher_list(con,"RC4-MD5"); */
+#if 0
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(con, "Test client", 11);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ re_start:
+
+ if (init_client(&s, host, port, socket_type) == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "connect:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error());
+ SHUTDOWN(s);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "CONNECTED(%08X)\n", s);
+
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+ if (c_nbio) {
+ unsigned long l = 1;
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "turning on non blocking io\n");
+ if (BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &l) < 0) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (c_Pause & 0x01)
+ SSL_set_debug(con, 1);
+
+ if (SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) {
+
+ sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ if (getsockname(s, &peer, (void *)&peerlen) < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "getsockname:errno=%d\n",
+ get_last_socket_error());
+ SHUTDOWN(s);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ (void)BIO_ctrl_set_connected(sbio, 1, &peer);
+
+ if (enable_timeouts) {
+ timeout.tv_sec = 0;
+ timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT;
+ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
+
+ timeout.tv_sec = 0;
+ timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT;
+ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
+ }
+
+ if (socket_mtu) {
+ if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n",
+ DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con));
+ BIO_free(sbio);
+ goto shut;
+ }
+ SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
+ if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n");
+ BIO_free(sbio);
+ goto shut;
+ }
+ } else
+ /* want to do MTU discovery */
+ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL);
+ } else
+ sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ if (nbio_test) {
+ BIO *test;
+
+ test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test());
+ sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio);
+ }
+
+ if (c_debug) {
+ SSL_set_debug(con, 1);
+ BIO_set_callback(sbio, bio_dump_callback);
+ BIO_set_callback_arg(sbio, (char *)bio_c_out);
+ }
+ if (c_msg) {
+ SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
+ SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_out);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (c_tlsextdebug) {
+ SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
+ SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_c_out);
+ }
+ if (c_status_req) {
+ SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(con, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ocsp_resp_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, bio_c_out);
+# if 0
+ {
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
+ OCSP_RESPID *id = OCSP_RESPID_new();
+ id->value.byKey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ id->type = V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY;
+ ASN1_STRING_set(id->value.byKey, "Hello World", -1);
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(ids, id);
+ SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(con, ids);
+ }
+# endif
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ if (jpake_secret)
+ jpake_client_auth(bio_c_out, sbio, jpake_secret);
+#endif
+
+ SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+ /* ok, lets connect */
+ width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1;
+
+ read_tty = 1;
+ write_tty = 0;
+ tty_on = 0;
+ read_ssl = 1;
+ write_ssl = 1;
+
+ cbuf_len = 0;
+ cbuf_off = 0;
+ sbuf_len = 0;
+ sbuf_off = 0;
+
+ /* This is an ugly hack that does a lot of assumptions */
+ /*
+ * We do have to handle multi-line responses which may come in a single
+ * packet or not. We therefore have to use BIO_gets() which does need a
+ * buffering BIO. So during the initial chitchat we do push a buffering
+ * BIO into the chain that is removed again later on to not disturb the
+ * rest of the s_client operation.
+ */
+ if (starttls_proto == PROTO_SMTP) {
+ int foundit = 0;
+ BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
+ /* wait for multi-line response to end from SMTP */
+ do {
+ mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ }
+ while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-');
+ /* STARTTLS command requires EHLO... */
+ BIO_printf(fbio, "EHLO openssl.client.net\r\n");
+ (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+ /* wait for multi-line response to end EHLO SMTP response */
+ do {
+ mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS"))
+ foundit = 1;
+ }
+ while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-');
+ (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+ BIO_pop(fbio);
+ BIO_free(fbio);
+ if (!foundit)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "didn't found starttls in server response,"
+ " try anyway...\n");
+ BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n");
+ BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ } else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_POP3) {
+ BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ BIO_printf(sbio, "STLS\r\n");
+ BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ } else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_IMAP) {
+ int foundit = 0;
+ BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
+ BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ /* STARTTLS command requires CAPABILITY... */
+ BIO_printf(fbio, ". CAPABILITY\r\n");
+ (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+ /* wait for multi-line CAPABILITY response */
+ do {
+ mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS"))
+ foundit = 1;
+ }
+ while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[0] != '.');
+ (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+ BIO_pop(fbio);
+ BIO_free(fbio);
+ if (!foundit)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "didn't found STARTTLS in server response,"
+ " try anyway...\n");
+ BIO_printf(sbio, ". STARTTLS\r\n");
+ BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ } else if (starttls_proto == PROTO_FTP) {
+ BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ BIO_push(fbio, sbio);
+ /* wait for multi-line response to end from FTP */
+ do {
+ mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ }
+ while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-');
+ (void)BIO_flush(fbio);
+ BIO_pop(fbio);
+ BIO_free(fbio);
+ BIO_printf(sbio, "AUTH TLS\r\n");
+ BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ }
+ if (starttls_proto == PROTO_XMPP) {
+ int seen = 0;
+ BIO_printf(sbio, "<stream:stream "
+ "xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' "
+ "xmlns='jabber:client' to='%s' version='1.0'>", host);
+ seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ mbuf[seen] = 0;
+ while (!strstr
+ (mbuf, "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'")) {
+ if (strstr(mbuf, "/stream:features>"))
+ goto shut;
+ seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ mbuf[seen] = 0;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(sbio,
+ "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>");
+ seen = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ sbuf[seen] = 0;
+ if (!strstr(sbuf, "<proceed"))
+ goto shut;
+ mbuf[0] = 0;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+ FD_ZERO(&writefds);
+
+ if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) &&
+ DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout))
+ timeoutp = &timeout;
+ else
+ timeoutp = NULL;
+
+ if (SSL_in_init(con) && !SSL_total_renegotiations(con)) {
+ in_init = 1;
+ tty_on = 0;
+ } else {
+ tty_on = 1;
+ if (in_init) {
+ in_init = 0;
+#if 0 /* This test doesn't really work as intended
+ * (needs to be fixed) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (servername != NULL && !SSL_session_reused(con)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out,
+ "Server did %sacknowledge servername extension.\n",
+ tlsextcbp.ack ? "" : "not ");
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+ if (sess_out) {
+ BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_out, "w");
+ if (stmp) {
+ PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, SSL_get_session(con));
+ BIO_free(stmp);
+ } else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing session file %s\n",
+ sess_out);
+ }
+ print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log);
+ if (full_log > 0)
+ full_log--;
+
+ if (starttls_proto) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s", mbuf);
+ /* We don't need to know any more */
+ starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF;
+ }
+
+ if (reconnect) {
+ reconnect--;
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out,
+ "drop connection and then reconnect\n");
+ SSL_shutdown(con);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+ SHUTDOWN(SSL_get_fd(con));
+ goto re_start;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_pending = read_ssl && SSL_pending(con);
+
+ if (!ssl_pending) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined (OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+ if (tty_on) {
+ if (read_tty)
+ openssl_fdset(fileno(stdin), &readfds);
+ if (write_tty)
+ openssl_fdset(fileno(stdout), &writefds);
+ }
+ if (read_ssl)
+ openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds);
+ if (write_ssl)
+ openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds);
+#else
+ if (!tty_on || !write_tty) {
+ if (read_ssl)
+ openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds);
+ if (write_ssl)
+ openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds);
+ }
+#endif
+/*- printf("mode tty(%d %d%d) ssl(%d%d)\n",
+ tty_on,read_tty,write_tty,read_ssl,write_ssl);*/
+
+ /*
+ * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is
+ * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is
+ * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler:
+ * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or
+ * (void *).
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+ /*
+ * Under Windows/DOS we make the assumption that we can always
+ * write to the tty: therefore if we need to write to the tty we
+ * just fall through. Otherwise we timeout the select every
+ * second and see if there are any keypresses. Note: this is a
+ * hack, in a proper Windows application we wouldn't do this.
+ */
+ i = 0;
+ if (!write_tty) {
+ if (read_tty) {
+ tv.tv_sec = 1;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
+ NULL, &tv);
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+ if (!i && (!_kbhit() || !read_tty))
+ continue;
+# else
+ if (!i && (!((_kbhit())
+ || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 ==
+ WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle
+ (STD_INPUT_HANDLE),
+ 0)))
+ || !read_tty))
+ continue;
+# endif
+ } else
+ i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
+ NULL, timeoutp);
+ }
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+ if (!write_tty) {
+ if (read_tty) {
+ tv.tv_sec = 1;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
+ NULL, &tv);
+ } else
+ i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
+ NULL, timeoutp);
+ }
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+ /* Under BeOS-R5 the situation is similar to DOS */
+ i = 0;
+ stdin_set = 0;
+ (void)fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
+ if (!write_tty) {
+ if (read_tty) {
+ tv.tv_sec = 1;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
+ NULL, &tv);
+ if (read(fileno(stdin), sbuf, 0) >= 0)
+ stdin_set = 1;
+ if (!i && (stdin_set != 1 || !read_tty))
+ continue;
+ } else
+ i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
+ NULL, timeoutp);
+ }
+ (void)fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, 0);
+#else
+ i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
+ NULL, timeoutp);
+#endif
+ if (i < 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad select %d\n",
+ get_last_socket_error());
+ goto shut;
+ /* goto end; */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occured\n");
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds)) {
+ k = SSL_write(con, &(cbuf[cbuf_off]), (unsigned int)cbuf_len);
+ switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ cbuf_off += k;
+ cbuf_len -= k;
+ if (k <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ /* we have done a write(con,NULL,0); */
+ if (cbuf_len <= 0) {
+ read_tty = 1;
+ write_ssl = 0;
+ } else { /* if (cbuf_len > 0) */
+
+ read_tty = 0;
+ write_ssl = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write W BLOCK\n");
+ write_ssl = 1;
+ read_tty = 0;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write R BLOCK\n");
+ write_tty = 0;
+ read_ssl = 1;
+ write_ssl = 0;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write X BLOCK\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ if (cbuf_len != 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "shutdown\n");
+ ret = 0;
+ goto shut;
+ } else {
+ read_tty = 1;
+ write_ssl = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ if ((k != 0) || (cbuf_len != 0)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "write:errno=%d\n",
+ get_last_socket_error());
+ goto shut;
+ } else {
+ read_tty = 1;
+ write_ssl = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto shut;
+ }
+ }
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+ /* Assume Windows/DOS/BeOS can always write */
+ else if (!ssl_pending && write_tty)
+#else
+ else if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), &writefds))
+#endif
+ {
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ ascii2ebcdic(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), &(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len);
+#endif
+ i = raw_write_stdout(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len);
+
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "DONE\n");
+ ret = 0;
+ goto shut;
+ /* goto end; */
+ }
+
+ sbuf_len -= i;;
+ sbuf_off += i;
+ if (sbuf_len <= 0) {
+ read_ssl = 1;
+ write_tty = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (ssl_pending || FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds)) {
+#ifdef RENEG
+ {
+ static int iiii;
+ if (++iiii == 52) {
+ SSL_renegotiate(con);
+ iiii = 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#if 1
+ k = SSL_read(con, sbuf, 1024 /* BUFSIZZ */ );
+#else
+/* Demo for pending and peek :-) */
+ k = SSL_read(con, sbuf, 16);
+ {
+ char zbuf[10240];
+ printf("read=%d pending=%d peek=%d\n", k, SSL_pending(con),
+ SSL_peek(con, zbuf, 10240));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ if (k <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ sbuf_off = 0;
+ sbuf_len = k;
+
+ read_ssl = 0;
+ write_tty = 1;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read W BLOCK\n");
+ write_ssl = 1;
+ read_tty = 0;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
+ write_tty = 0;
+ read_ssl = 1;
+ if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0))
+ write_ssl = 1;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read X BLOCK\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ ret = get_last_socket_error();
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "read:errno=%d\n", ret);
+ goto shut;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "closed\n");
+ ret = 0;
+ goto shut;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto shut;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+ }
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+ else if (_kbhit())
+# else
+ else if ((_kbhit())
+ || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 ==
+ WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0)))
+# endif
+#elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+ else if (_kbhit())
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+ else if (stdin_set)
+#else
+ else if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), &readfds))
+#endif
+ {
+ if (crlf) {
+ int j, lf_num;
+
+ i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ / 2);
+ lf_num = 0;
+ /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+ if (cbuf[j] == '\n')
+ lf_num++;
+ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+ cbuf[j + lf_num] = cbuf[j];
+ if (cbuf[j] == '\n') {
+ lf_num--;
+ i++;
+ cbuf[j + lf_num] = '\r';
+ }
+ }
+ assert(lf_num == 0);
+ } else
+ i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+
+ if ((!c_ign_eof) && ((i <= 0) || (cbuf[0] == 'Q'))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "DONE\n");
+ ret = 0;
+ goto shut;
+ }
+
+ if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'R')) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATING\n");
+ SSL_renegotiate(con);
+ cbuf_len = 0;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ else if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'B')) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n");
+ SSL_heartbeat(con);
+ cbuf_len = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ else {
+ cbuf_len = i;
+ cbuf_off = 0;
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ ebcdic2ascii(cbuf, cbuf, i);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ write_ssl = 1;
+ read_tty = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ shut:
+ if (in_init)
+ print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log);
+ SSL_shutdown(con);
+ SHUTDOWN(SSL_get_fd(con));
+ end:
+ if (con != NULL) {
+ if (prexit != 0)
+ print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, 1);
+ SSL_free(con);
+ }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ if (next_proto.data)
+ OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data);
+#endif
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (cert)
+ X509_free(cert);
+ if (key)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+ if (pass)
+ OPENSSL_free(pass);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin);
+#endif
+ if (vpm)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+ if (cbuf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(cbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ OPENSSL_free(cbuf);
+ }
+ if (sbuf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(sbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ OPENSSL_free(sbuf);
+ }
+ if (mbuf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
+ OPENSSL_free(mbuf);
+ }
+ if (bio_c_out != NULL) {
+ BIO_free(bio_c_out);
+ bio_c_out = NULL;
+ }
+ apps_shutdown();
+ OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
+{
+ X509 *peer = NULL;
+ char *p;
+ static const char *space = " ";
+ char buf[BUFSIZ];
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk2;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ X509_NAME *xn;
+ int j, i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ const COMP_METHOD *comp, *expansion;
+#endif
+ unsigned char *exportedkeymat;
+
+ if (full) {
+ int got_a_chain = 0;
+
+ sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(s);
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ got_a_chain = 1; /* we don't have it for SSL2 (yet) */
+
+ BIO_printf(bio, "---\nCertificate chain\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)),
+ buf, sizeof buf);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%2d s:%s\n", i, buf);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)),
+ buf, sizeof buf);
+ BIO_printf(bio, " i:%s\n", buf);
+ if (c_showcerts)
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, sk_X509_value(sk, i));
+ }
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio, "---\n");
+ peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
+ if (peer != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Server certificate\n");
+
+ /* Redundant if we showed the whole chain */
+ if (!(c_showcerts && got_a_chain))
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, peer);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "subject=%s\n", buf);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "issuer=%s\n", buf);
+ } else
+ BIO_printf(bio, "no peer certificate available\n");
+
+ sk2 = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ if ((sk2 != NULL) && (sk_X509_NAME_num(sk2) > 0)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio, "---\nAcceptable client certificate CA names\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk2); i++) {
+ xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk2, i);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(xn, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ BIO_write(bio, buf, strlen(buf));
+ BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio, "---\nNo client certificate CA names sent\n");
+ }
+ p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(s, buf, sizeof buf);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This works only for SSL 2. In later protocol versions, the
+ * client does not know what other ciphers (in addition to the
+ * one to be used in the current connection) the server supports.
+ */
+
+ BIO_printf(bio,
+ "---\nCiphers common between both SSL endpoints:\n");
+ j = i = 0;
+ while (*p) {
+ if (*p == ':') {
+ BIO_write(bio, space, 15 - j % 25);
+ i++;
+ j = 0;
+ BIO_write(bio, ((i % 3) ? " " : "\n"), 1);
+ } else {
+ BIO_write(bio, p, 1);
+ j++;
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+ BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio,
+ "---\nSSL handshake has read %ld bytes and written %ld bytes\n",
+ BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)),
+ BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s)));
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio, (SSL_cache_hit(s) ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, "));
+ c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Cipher is %s\n",
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ if (peer != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Server public key is %d bit\n",
+ EVP_PKEY_bits(pktmp));
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
+ SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(s) ? "" : " NOT");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ comp = SSL_get_current_compression(s);
+ expansion = SSL_get_current_expansion(s);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Compression: %s\n",
+ comp ? SSL_COMP_get_name(comp) : "NONE");
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Expansion: %s\n",
+ expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE");
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ /* Print out local port of connection: useful for debugging */
+ int sock;
+ struct sockaddr_in ladd;
+ socklen_t ladd_size = sizeof(ladd);
+ sock = SSL_get_fd(s);
+ getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ladd, &ladd_size);
+ BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "LOCAL PORT is %u\n", ntohs(ladd.sin_port));
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ if (next_proto.status != -1) {
+ const unsigned char *proto;
+ unsigned int proto_len;
+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status);
+ BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len);
+ BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ {
+ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile =
+ SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(s);
+
+ if (srtp_profile)
+ BIO_printf(bio, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
+ srtp_profile->name);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ SSL_SESSION_print(bio, SSL_get_session(s));
+ if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Keying material exporter:\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
+ BIO_printf(bio, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen);
+ exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen);
+ if (exportedkeymat != NULL) {
+ if (!SSL_export_keying_material(s, exportedkeymat,
+ keymatexportlen,
+ keymatexportlabel,
+ strlen(keymatexportlabel),
+ NULL, 0, 0)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio, " Error\n");
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio, " Keying material: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++)
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "\n");
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
+ }
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio, "---\n");
+ if (peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(peer);
+ /* flush, or debugging output gets mixed with http response */
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int len;
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp;
+ len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
+ BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response: ");
+ if (!p) {
+ BIO_puts(arg, "no response sent\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
+ if (!rsp) {
+ BIO_puts(arg, "response parse error\n");
+ BIO_dump_indent(arg, (char *)p, len, 4);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BIO_puts(arg, "\n======================================\n");
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_print(arg, rsp, 0);
+ BIO_puts(arg, "======================================\n");
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_server.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/s_server.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_server.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2963 +0,0 @@
-/* apps/s_server.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Until the key-gen callbacks are modified to use newer prototypes, we allow
- * deprecated functions for openssl-internal code
- */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-# undef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-#endif
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-# define APPS_WIN16
-#endif
-
-/* conflicts with winsock2 stuff on netware */
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-# include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-
-/*
- * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of
- * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining
- * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is
- * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int
- */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT)
-# define __U_INT
-typedef unsigned int u_int;
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#define USE_SOCKETS
-#include "apps.h"
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-# include <openssl/srp.h>
-#endif
-#include "s_apps.h"
-#include "timeouts.h"
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __VMS_VER < 70000000)
-/* FIONBIO used as a switch to enable ioctl, and that isn't in VMS < 7.0 */
-# undef FIONBIO
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
-# include <fcntl.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength);
-#endif
-static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context);
-static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context);
-static void close_accept_socket(void);
-static void sv_usage(void);
-static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *s);
-static void print_stats(BIO *bp, SSL_CTX *ctx);
-static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
- unsigned int *id_len);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile);
-static DH *get_dh2048(void);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef MONOLITH
-static void s_server_init(void);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = {
- 0xF6,0x42,0x57,0xB7,0x08,0x7F,0x08,0x17,0x72,0xA2,0xBA,0xD6,
- 0xA9,0x42,0xF3,0x05,0xE8,0xF9,0x53,0x11,0x39,0x4F,0xB6,0xF1,
- 0x6E,0xB9,0x4B,0x38,0x20,0xDA,0x01,0xA7,0x56,0xA3,0x14,0xE9,
- 0x8F,0x40,0x55,0xF3,0xD0,0x07,0xC6,0xCB,0x43,0xA9,0x94,0xAD,
- 0xF7,0x4C,0x64,0x86,0x49,0xF8,0x0C,0x83,0xBD,0x65,0xE9,0x17,
- 0xD4,0xA1,0xD3,0x50,0xF8,0xF5,0x59,0x5F,0xDC,0x76,0x52,0x4F,
- 0x3D,0x3D,0x8D,0xDB,0xCE,0x99,0xE1,0x57,0x92,0x59,0xCD,0xFD,
- 0xB8,0xAE,0x74,0x4F,0xC5,0xFC,0x76,0xBC,0x83,0xC5,0x47,0x30,
- 0x61,0xCE,0x7C,0xC9,0x66,0xFF,0x15,0xF9,0xBB,0xFD,0x91,0x5E,
- 0xC7,0x01,0xAA,0xD3,0x5B,0x9E,0x8D,0xA0,0xA5,0x72,0x3A,0xD4,
- 0x1A,0xF0,0xBF,0x46,0x00,0x58,0x2B,0xE5,0xF4,0x88,0xFD,0x58,
- 0x4E,0x49,0xDB,0xCD,0x20,0xB4,0x9D,0xE4,0x91,0x07,0x36,0x6B,
- 0x33,0x6C,0x38,0x0D,0x45,0x1D,0x0F,0x7C,0x88,0xB3,0x1C,0x7C,
- 0x5B,0x2D,0x8E,0xF6,0xF3,0xC9,0x23,0xC0,0x43,0xF0,0xA5,0x5B,
- 0x18,0x8D,0x8E,0xBB,0x55,0x8C,0xB8,0x5D,0x38,0xD3,0x34,0xFD,
- 0x7C,0x17,0x57,0x43,0xA3,0x1D,0x18,0x6C,0xDE,0x33,0x21,0x2C,
- 0xB5,0x2A,0xFF,0x3C,0xE1,0xB1,0x29,0x40,0x18,0x11,0x8D,0x7C,
- 0x84,0xA7,0x0A,0x72,0xD6,0x86,0xC4,0x03,0x19,0xC8,0x07,0x29,
- 0x7A,0xCA,0x95,0x0C,0xD9,0x96,0x9F,0xAB,0xD0,0x0A,0x50,0x9B,
- 0x02,0x46,0xD3,0x08,0x3D,0x66,0xA4,0x5D,0x41,0x9F,0x9C,0x7C,
- 0xBD,0x89,0x4B,0x22,0x19,0x26,0xBA,0xAB,0xA2,0x5E,0xC3,0x55,
- 0xE9,0x32,0x0B,0x3B,
-};
-
-static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = {
- 0x02,
-};
-
-DH *get_dh2048()
-{
- DH *dh;
-
- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
- return NULL;
- dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL);
- dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL);
- if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) {
- DH_free(dh);
- return NULL;
- }
- return dh;
-}
-#endif
-
-/* static int load_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file);*/
-
-#undef BUFSIZZ
-#define BUFSIZZ 16*1024
-static int bufsize = BUFSIZZ;
-static int accept_socket = -1;
-
-#define TEST_CERT "server.pem"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-# define TEST_CERT2 "server2.pem"
-#endif
-#undef PROG
-#define PROG s_server_main
-
-extern int verify_depth, verify_return_error;
-
-static char *cipher = NULL;
-static int s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
-static int s_server_session_id_context = 1; /* anything will do */
-static const char *s_cert_file = TEST_CERT, *s_key_file = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static const char *s_cert_file2 = TEST_CERT2, *s_key_file2 = NULL;
-#endif
-static char *s_dcert_file = NULL, *s_dkey_file = NULL;
-#ifdef FIONBIO
-static int s_nbio = 0;
-#endif
-static int s_nbio_test = 0;
-int s_crlf = 0;
-static SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static SSL_CTX *ctx2 = NULL;
-#endif
-static int www = 0;
-
-static BIO *bio_s_out = NULL;
-static int s_debug = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int s_tlsextdebug = 0;
-static int s_tlsextstatus = 0;
-static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
-#endif
-static int s_msg = 0;
-static int s_quiet = 0;
-
-static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL;
-static int keymatexportlen = 20;
-
-static int hack = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-static char *engine_id = NULL;
-#endif
-static const char *session_id_prefix = NULL;
-
-static int enable_timeouts = 0;
-static long socket_mtu;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
-static int cert_chain = 0;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity";
-char *psk_key = NULL; /* by default PSK is not used */
-
-static unsigned int psk_server_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len)
-{
- unsigned int psk_len = 0;
- int ret;
- BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
-
- if (s_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "psk_server_cb\n");
- if (!identity) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: client did not send PSK identity\n");
- goto out_err;
- }
- if (s_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "identity_len=%d identity=%s\n",
- (int)strlen(identity), identity);
-
- /* here we could lookup the given identity e.g. from a database */
- if (strcmp(identity, psk_identity) != 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK error: client identity not found"
- " (got '%s' expected '%s')\n", identity, psk_identity);
- goto out_err;
- }
- if (s_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK client identity found\n");
-
- /* convert the PSK key to binary */
- ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, psk_key);
- if (!ret) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n",
- psk_key);
- if (bn)
- BN_free(bn);
- return 0;
- }
- if (BN_num_bytes(bn) > (int)max_psk_len) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n",
- max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn));
- BN_free(bn);
- return 0;
- }
-
- ret = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk);
- BN_free(bn);
-
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out_err;
- psk_len = (unsigned int)ret;
-
- if (s_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "fetched PSK len=%d\n", psk_len);
- return psk_len;
- out_err:
- if (s_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK server callback\n");
- return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */
-typedef struct srpsrvparm_st {
- char *login;
- SRP_VBASE *vb;
- SRP_user_pwd *user;
-} srpsrvparm;
-
-/*
- * This callback pretends to require some asynchronous logic in order to
- * obtain a verifier. When the callback is called for a new connection we
- * return with a negative value. This will provoke the accept etc to return
- * with an LOOKUP_X509. The main logic of the reinvokes the suspended call
- * (which would normally occur after a worker has finished) and we set the
- * user parameters.
- */
-static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
-{
- srpsrvparm *p = (srpsrvparm *) arg;
- if (p->login == NULL && p->user == NULL) {
- p->login = SSL_get_srp_username(s);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP username = \"%s\"\n", p->login);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- if (p->user == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "User %s doesn't exist\n", p->login);
- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- }
- if (SSL_set_srp_server_param
- (s, p->user->N, p->user->g, p->user->s, p->user->v,
- p->user->info) < 0) {
- *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "SRP parameters set: username = \"%s\" info=\"%s\" \n",
- p->login, p->user->info);
- /* need to check whether there are memory leaks */
- p->user = NULL;
- p->login = NULL;
- return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
-}
-
-#endif
-
-#ifdef MONOLITH
-static void s_server_init(void)
-{
- accept_socket = -1;
- cipher = NULL;
- s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
- s_dcert_file = NULL;
- s_dkey_file = NULL;
- s_cert_file = TEST_CERT;
- s_key_file = NULL;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- s_cert_file2 = TEST_CERT2;
- s_key_file2 = NULL;
- ctx2 = NULL;
-# endif
-# ifdef FIONBIO
- s_nbio = 0;
-# endif
- s_nbio_test = 0;
- ctx = NULL;
- www = 0;
-
- bio_s_out = NULL;
- s_debug = 0;
- s_msg = 0;
- s_quiet = 0;
- hack = 0;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- engine_id = NULL;
-# endif
-}
-#endif
-
-static void sv_usage(void)
-{
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "usage: s_server [args ...]\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -accept arg - port to accept on (default is %d)\n", PORT);
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -context arg - set session ID context\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -Verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification, must have a cert.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -cert arg - certificate file to use\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " (default is %s)\n", TEST_CERT);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -crl_check - check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA.\n"
- " The CRL(s) are appended to the certificate file\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -crl_check_all - check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA\n"
- " or any other CRL in the CA chain. CRL(s) are appened to the\n"
- " the certificate file.\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -certform arg - certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -key arg - Private Key file to use, in cert file if\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " not specified (default is %s)\n",
- TEST_CERT);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -keyform arg - key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -pass arg - private key file pass phrase source\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -dcert arg - second certificate file to use (usually for DSA)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -dcertform x - second certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -dkey arg - second private key file to use (usually for DSA)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -dkeyform arg - second key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -dpass arg - second private key file pass phrase source\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -dhparam arg - DH parameter file to use, in cert file if not specified\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " or a default set of parameters is used\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -named_curve arg - Elliptic curve name to use for ephemeral ECDH keys.\n"
- " Use \"openssl ecparam -list_curves\" for all names\n"
- " (default is nistp256).\n");
-#endif
-#ifdef FIONBIO
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nbio - Run with non-blocking IO\n");
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -nbio_test - test with the non-blocking test bio\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -crlf - convert LF from terminal into CRLF\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -debug - Print more output\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -msg - Show protocol messages\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -state - Print the SSL states\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -nocert - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -cipher arg - play with 'openssl ciphers' to see what goes here\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -serverpref - Use server's cipher preferences\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -quiet - No server output\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tmp_rsa - Do not generate a tmp RSA key\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk_hint arg - PSK identity hint to use\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -jpake arg - JPAKE secret to use\n");
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srpvfile file - The verifier file for SRP\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -srpuserseed string - A seed string for a default user salt.\n");
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl2 - Just talk SSLv2\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl3 - Just talk SSLv3\n");
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_2 - Just talk TLSv1.2\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_1 - Just talk TLSv1.1\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1 - Just talk TLSv1\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dtls1 - Just talk DTLSv1\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -timeout - Enable timeouts\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -mtu - Set link layer MTU\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -chain - Read a certificate chain\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ssl2 - Just disable SSLv2\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ssl3 - Just disable SSLv3\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tls1 - Just disable TLSv1\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tls1_1 - Just disable TLSv1.1\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tls1_2 - Just disable TLSv1.2\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_dhe - Disable ephemeral DH\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ecdhe - Disable ephemeral ECDH\n");
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -bugs - Turn on SSL bug compatibility\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -hack - workaround for early Netscape code\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -www - Respond to a 'GET /' with a status page\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -WWW - Respond to a 'GET /<path> HTTP/1.0' with file ./<path>\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -HTTP - Respond to a 'GET /<path> HTTP/1.0' with file ./<path>\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " with the assumption it contains a complete HTTP response.\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -engine id - Initialise and use the specified engine\n");
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -id_prefix arg - Generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by 'arg'\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR,
- LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -servername host - servername for HostName TLS extension\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -servername_fatal - on mismatch send fatal alert (default warning alert)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -cert2 arg - certificate file to use for servername\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " (default is %s)\n", TEST_CERT2);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -key2 arg - Private Key file to use for servername, in cert file if\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " not specified (default is %s)\n",
- TEST_CERT2);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
-# endif
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -keymatexport label - Export keying material using label\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -keymatexportlen len - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -status - respond to certificate status requests\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -status_verbose - enable status request verbose printout\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -status_timeout n - status request responder timeout\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, " -status_url URL - status request fallback URL\n");
-}
-
-static int local_argc = 0;
-static char **local_argv;
-
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi);
-static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a);
-static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl);
-static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl);
-static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr);
-static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size);
-static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str);
-
-# define BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER (18|0x0200)
-static BIO_METHOD methods_ebcdic = {
- BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER,
- "EBCDIC/ASCII filter",
- ebcdic_write,
- ebcdic_read,
- ebcdic_puts,
- ebcdic_gets,
- ebcdic_ctrl,
- ebcdic_new,
- ebcdic_free,
-};
-
-typedef struct {
- size_t alloced;
- char buff[1];
-} EBCDIC_OUTBUFF;
-
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()
-{
- return (&methods_ebcdic);
-}
-
-static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi)
-{
- EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf;
-
- wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + 1024);
- if (!wbuf)
- return 0;
- wbuf->alloced = 1024;
- wbuf->buff[0] = '\0';
-
- bi->ptr = (char *)wbuf;
- bi->init = 1;
- bi->flags = 0;
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a)
-{
- if (a == NULL)
- return (0);
- if (a->ptr != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
- a->ptr = NULL;
- a->init = 0;
- a->flags = 0;
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (out == NULL || outl == 0)
- return (0);
- if (b->next_bio == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl);
- if (ret > 0)
- ascii2ebcdic(out, out, ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
-{
- EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf;
- int ret = 0;
- int num;
- unsigned char n;
-
- if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
- return (0);
- if (b->next_bio == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) b->ptr;
-
- if (inl > (num = wbuf->alloced)) {
- num = num + num; /* double the size */
- if (num < inl)
- num = inl;
- wbuf =
- (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + num);
- if (!wbuf)
- return 0;
- OPENSSL_free(b->ptr);
-
- wbuf->alloced = num;
- wbuf->buff[0] = '\0';
-
- b->ptr = (char *)wbuf;
- }
-
- ebcdic2ascii(wbuf->buff, in, inl);
-
- ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, wbuf->buff, inl);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
-{
- long ret;
-
- if (b->next_bio == NULL)
- return (0);
- switch (cmd) {
- case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
- ret = 0L;
- break;
- default:
- ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
- break;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
-{
- int i, ret = 0;
- if (bp->next_bio == NULL)
- return (0);
-/* return(BIO_gets(bp->next_bio,buf,size));*/
- for (i = 0; i < size - 1; ++i) {
- ret = ebcdic_read(bp, &buf[i], 1);
- if (ret <= 0)
- break;
- else if (buf[i] == '\n') {
- ++i;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (i < size)
- buf[i] = '\0';
- return (ret < 0 && i == 0) ? ret : i;
-}
-
-static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
-{
- if (bp->next_bio == NULL)
- return (0);
- return ebcdic_write(bp, str, strlen(str));
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-
-/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */
-typedef struct tlsextctx_st {
- char *servername;
- BIO *biodebug;
- int extension_error;
-} tlsextctx;
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
-{
- tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg;
- const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
- if (servername && p->biodebug)
- BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Hostname in TLS extension: \"%s\"\n",
- servername);
-
- if (!p->servername)
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-
- if (servername) {
- if (strcasecmp(servername, p->servername))
- return p->extension_error;
- if (ctx2) {
- BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Switching server context.\n");
- SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, ctx2);
- }
- }
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-}
-
-/* Structure passed to cert status callback */
-
-typedef struct tlsextstatusctx_st {
- /* Default responder to use */
- char *host, *path, *port;
- int use_ssl;
- int timeout;
- BIO *err;
- int verbose;
-} tlsextstatusctx;
-
-static tlsextstatusctx tlscstatp = { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, -1, NULL, 0 };
-
-/*
- * Certificate Status callback. This is called when a client includes a
- * certificate status request extension. This is a simplified version. It
- * examines certificates each time and makes one OCSP responder query for
- * each request. A full version would store details such as the OCSP
- * certificate IDs and minimise the number of OCSP responses by caching them
- * until they were considered "expired".
- */
-
-static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-{
- tlsextstatusctx *srctx = arg;
- BIO *err = srctx->err;
- char *host, *port, *path;
- int use_ssl;
- unsigned char *rspder = NULL;
- int rspderlen;
- STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *aia = NULL;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- X509_STORE_CTX inctx;
- X509_OBJECT obj;
- OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL;
- OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
- OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int i;
-# if 0
- STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids;
- SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(s, &ids);
- BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received %d ids\n",
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(ids));
-# endif
- if (srctx->verbose)
- BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: callback called\n");
- /* Build up OCSP query from server certificate */
- x = SSL_get_certificate(s);
- aia = X509_get1_ocsp(x);
- if (aia) {
- if (!OCSP_parse_url(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0),
- &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) {
- BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: can't parse AIA URL\n");
- goto err;
- }
- if (srctx->verbose)
- BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: AIA URL: %s\n",
- sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0));
- } else {
- if (!srctx->host) {
- BIO_puts(srctx->err,
- "cert_status: no AIA and no default responder URL\n");
- goto done;
- }
- host = srctx->host;
- path = srctx->path;
- port = srctx->port;
- use_ssl = srctx->use_ssl;
- }
-
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&inctx,
- SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s)),
- NULL, NULL))
- goto err;
- if (X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&inctx, X509_LU_X509,
- X509_get_issuer_name(x), &obj) <= 0) {
- BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: Can't retrieve issuer certificate.\n");
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&inctx);
- goto done;
- }
- req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
- if (!req)
- goto err;
- id = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, x, obj.data.x509);
- X509_free(obj.data.x509);
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&inctx);
- if (!id)
- goto err;
- if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(req, id))
- goto err;
- id = NULL;
- /* Add any extensions to the request */
- SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(s, &exts);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
- X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
- if (!OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(req, ext, -1))
- goto err;
- }
- resp = process_responder(err, req, host, path, port, use_ssl, NULL,
- srctx->timeout);
- if (!resp) {
- BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: error querying responder\n");
- goto done;
- }
- rspderlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, &rspder);
- if (rspderlen <= 0)
- goto err;
- SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, rspder, rspderlen);
- if (srctx->verbose) {
- BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: ocsp response sent:\n");
- OCSP_RESPONSE_print(err, resp, 2);
- }
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
- done:
- if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
- ERR_print_errors(err);
- if (aia) {
- OPENSSL_free(host);
- OPENSSL_free(path);
- OPENSSL_free(port);
- X509_email_free(aia);
- }
- if (id)
- OCSP_CERTID_free(id);
- if (req)
- OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
- if (resp)
- OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
- return ret;
- err:
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- goto done;
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
-typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
- unsigned char *data;
- unsigned int len;
-} tlsextnextprotoctx;
-
-static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
- unsigned int *len, void *arg)
-{
- tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg;
-
- *data = next_proto->data;
- *len = next_proto->len;
-
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-}
-# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
-
-#endif
-
-int MAIN(int, char **);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
-static char *jpake_secret = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-static srpsrvparm srp_callback_parm;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-static char *srtp_profiles = NULL;
-#endif
-
-int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
-{
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
- int badarg = 0;
- short port = PORT;
- char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
- unsigned char *context = NULL;
- char *dhfile = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- char *named_curve = NULL;
-#endif
- int badop = 0, bugs = 0;
- int ret = 1;
- int off = 0;
- int no_tmp_rsa = 0, no_dhe = 0, nocert = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- int no_ecdhe = 0;
-#endif
- int state = 0;
- const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL;
- int socket_type = SOCK_STREAM;
- ENGINE *e = NULL;
- char *inrand = NULL;
- int s_cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_key_format = FORMAT_PEM;
- char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL;
- char *dpassarg = NULL, *dpass = NULL;
- int s_dcert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_dkey_format = FORMAT_PEM;
- X509 *s_cert = NULL, *s_dcert = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *s_key = NULL, *s_dkey = NULL;
- int no_cache = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- EVP_PKEY *s_key2 = NULL;
- X509 *s_cert2 = NULL;
- tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING };
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
- tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */
- static char *psk_identity_hint = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- char *srpuserseed = NULL;
- char *srp_verifier_file = NULL;
-#endif
- meth = SSLv23_server_method();
-
- local_argc = argc;
- local_argv = argv;
-
- apps_startup();
-#ifdef MONOLITH
- s_server_init();
-#endif
-
- if (bio_err == NULL)
- bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
- goto end;
-
- verify_depth = 0;
-#ifdef FIONBIO
- s_nbio = 0;
-#endif
- s_nbio_test = 0;
-
- argc--;
- argv++;
-
- while (argc >= 1) {
- if ((strcmp(*argv, "-port") == 0) || (strcmp(*argv, "-accept") == 0)) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- if (!extract_port(*(++argv), &port))
- goto bad;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify") == 0) {
- s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- verify_depth = atoi(*(++argv));
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_depth);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-Verify") == 0) {
- s_server_verify =
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT |
- SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- verify_depth = atoi(*(++argv));
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "verify depth is %d, must return a certificate\n",
- verify_depth);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-context") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- context = (unsigned char *)*(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- s_cert_file = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-certform") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- s_cert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- s_key_file = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyform") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- s_key_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pass") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- passarg = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhparam") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- dhfile = *(++argv);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-named_curve") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- named_curve = *(++argv);
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcertform") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- s_dcert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcert") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- s_dcert_file = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dkeyform") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- s_dkey_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dpass") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- dpassarg = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dkey") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- s_dkey_file = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nocert") == 0) {
- nocert = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- CApath = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_cache") == 0)
- no_cache = 1;
- else if (args_verify(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &vpm)) {
- if (badarg)
- goto bad;
- continue;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify_return_error") == 0)
- verify_return_error = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverpref") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-legacy_renegotiation") == 0)
- off |= SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cipher") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- cipher = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- CAfile = *(++argv);
- }
-#ifdef FIONBIO
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio") == 0) {
- s_nbio = 1;
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio_test") == 0) {
-#ifdef FIONBIO
- s_nbio = 1;
-#endif
- s_nbio_test = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-debug") == 0) {
- s_debug = 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tlsextdebug") == 0)
- s_tlsextdebug = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status") == 0)
- s_tlsextstatus = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status_verbose") == 0) {
- s_tlsextstatus = 1;
- tlscstatp.verbose = 1;
- } else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-status_timeout")) {
- s_tlsextstatus = 1;
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- tlscstatp.timeout = atoi(*(++argv));
- } else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-status_url")) {
- s_tlsextstatus = 1;
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- if (!OCSP_parse_url(*(++argv),
- &tlscstatp.host,
- &tlscstatp.port,
- &tlscstatp.path, &tlscstatp.use_ssl)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n");
- goto bad;
- }
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msg") == 0) {
- s_msg = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-hack") == 0) {
- hack = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-state") == 0) {
- state = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlf") == 0) {
- s_crlf = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-quiet") == 0) {
- s_quiet = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bugs") == 0) {
- bugs = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tmp_rsa") == 0) {
- no_tmp_rsa = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0) {
- no_dhe = 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ecdhe") == 0) {
- no_ecdhe = 1;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk_hint") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- psk_identity_hint = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk") == 0) {
- size_t i;
-
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- psk_key = *(++argv);
- for (i = 0; i < strlen(psk_key); i++) {
- if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[i]))
- continue;
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv);
- goto bad;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpvfile") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srp_verifier_file = *(++argv);
- meth = TLSv1_server_method();
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuserseed") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srpuserseed = *(++argv);
- meth = TLSv1_server_method();
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-www") == 0) {
- www = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-WWW") == 0) {
- www = 2;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-HTTP") == 0) {
- www = 3;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ssl2") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ssl3") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1_1") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1_2") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_comp") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ticket") == 0) {
- off |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0) {
- meth = SSLv2_server_method();
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0) {
- meth = SSLv3_server_method();
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0) {
- meth = TLSv1_server_method();
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_1") == 0) {
- meth = TLSv1_1_server_method();
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_2") == 0) {
- meth = TLSv1_2_server_method();
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) {
- meth = DTLSv1_server_method();
- socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-timeout") == 0)
- enable_timeouts = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-mtu") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-chain") == 0)
- cert_chain = 1;
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-id_prefix") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- session_id_prefix = *(++argv);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- engine_id = *(++argv);
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rand") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- inrand = *(++argv);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-servername") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- tlsextcbp.servername = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-servername_fatal") == 0) {
- tlsextcbp.extension_error = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert2") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- s_cert_file2 = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key2") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- s_key_file2 = *(++argv);
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nextprotoneg") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
- }
-# endif
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-jpake") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- jpake_secret = *(++argv);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-use_srtp") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srtp_profiles = *(++argv);
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexport") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- keymatexportlabel = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexportlen") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- keymatexportlen = atoi(*(++argv));
- if (keymatexportlen == 0)
- goto bad;
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
- badop = 1;
- break;
- }
- argc--;
- argv++;
- }
- if (badop) {
- bad:
- sv_usage();
- goto end;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
- if (www && socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use -HTTP, -www or -WWW with DTLS\n");
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
- if (jpake_secret) {
- if (psk_key) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use JPAKE and PSK together\n");
- goto end;
- }
- psk_identity = "JPAKE";
- if (cipher) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "JPAKE sets cipher to PSK\n");
- goto end;
- }
- cipher = "PSK";
- }
-#endif
-
- SSL_load_error_strings();
- OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1);
-#endif
-
- if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passarg, dpassarg, &pass, &dpass)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (s_key_file == NULL)
- s_key_file = s_cert_file;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s_key_file2 == NULL)
- s_key_file2 = s_cert_file2;
-#endif
-
- if (nocert == 0) {
- s_key = load_key(bio_err, s_key_file, s_key_format, 0, pass, e,
- "server certificate private key file");
- if (!s_key) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- s_cert = load_cert(bio_err, s_cert_file, s_cert_format,
- NULL, e, "server certificate file");
-
- if (!s_cert) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (tlsextcbp.servername) {
- s_key2 = load_key(bio_err, s_key_file2, s_key_format, 0, pass, e,
- "second server certificate private key file");
- if (!s_key2) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- s_cert2 = load_cert(bio_err, s_cert_file2, s_cert_format,
- NULL, e, "second server certificate file");
-
- if (!s_cert2) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
- }
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- if (next_proto_neg_in) {
- unsigned short len;
- next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len, next_proto_neg_in);
- if (next_proto.data == NULL)
- goto end;
- next_proto.len = len;
- } else {
- next_proto.data = NULL;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (s_dcert_file) {
-
- if (s_dkey_file == NULL)
- s_dkey_file = s_dcert_file;
-
- s_dkey = load_key(bio_err, s_dkey_file, s_dkey_format,
- 0, dpass, e, "second certificate private key file");
- if (!s_dkey) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- s_dcert = load_cert(bio_err, s_dcert_file, s_dcert_format,
- NULL, e, "second server certificate file");
-
- if (!s_dcert) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- }
-
- if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, 1) && inrand == NULL
- && !RAND_status()) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n");
- }
- if (inrand != NULL)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
- app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
-
- if (bio_s_out == NULL) {
- if (s_quiet && !s_debug && !s_msg) {
- bio_s_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
- } else {
- if (bio_s_out == NULL)
- bio_s_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- }
- }
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
- if (nocert)
-#endif
- {
- s_cert_file = NULL;
- s_key_file = NULL;
- s_dcert_file = NULL;
- s_dkey_file = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- s_cert_file2 = NULL;
- s_key_file2 = NULL;
-#endif
- }
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- if (session_id_prefix) {
- if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n");
- else if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 16)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "warning: id_prefix is too long if you use SSLv2\n");
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx, generate_session_id)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix);
- }
- SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1);
- if (bugs)
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_ALL);
- if (hack)
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG);
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, off);
-
- if (state)
- SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
- if (no_cache)
- SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
- else
- SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 128);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (srtp_profiles != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles);
-#endif
-
-#if 0
- if (cipher == NULL)
- cipher = getenv("SSL_CIPHER");
-#endif
-
-#if 0
- if (s_cert_file == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "You must specify a certificate file for the server to use\n");
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
-
- if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
- (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx))) {
- /* BIO_printf(bio_err,"X509_load_verify_locations\n"); */
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- /* goto end; */
- }
- if (vpm)
- SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s_cert2) {
- ctx2 = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
- if (ctx2 == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (ctx2) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting secondary ctx parameters\n");
-
- if (session_id_prefix) {
- if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n");
- else if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 16)
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "warning: id_prefix is too long if you use SSLv2\n");
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx2, generate_session_id)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix);
- }
- SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx2, 1);
- if (bugs)
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2, SSL_OP_ALL);
- if (hack)
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG);
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2, off);
-
- if (state)
- SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx2, apps_ssl_info_callback);
-
- if (no_cache)
- SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx2, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
- else
- SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx2, 128);
-
- if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx2, CAfile, CApath)) ||
- (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx2))) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- }
- if (vpm)
- SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm);
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (next_proto.data)
- SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb,
- &next_proto);
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (!no_dhe) {
- DH *dh = NULL;
-
- if (dhfile)
- dh = load_dh_param(dhfile);
- else if (s_cert_file)
- dh = load_dh_param(s_cert_file);
-
- if (dh != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n");
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n");
- dh = get_dh2048();
- if (dh == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
- (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
-
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ctx2) {
- if (!dhfile) {
- DH *dh2 = load_dh_param(s_cert_file2);
- if (dh2 != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n");
- (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
-
- DH_free(dh);
- dh = dh2;
- }
- }
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx2, dh);
- }
-# endif
- DH_free(dh);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (!no_ecdhe) {
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
-
- if (named_curve) {
- int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(named_curve);
-
- if (nid == 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", named_curve);
- goto end;
- }
- ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- if (ecdh == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve (%s)\n",
- named_curve);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (ecdh != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp ECDH parameters\n");
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp ECDH parameters\n");
- ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
- if (ecdh == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve (nistp256)\n");
- goto end;
- }
- }
- (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
-
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx, ecdh);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ctx2)
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx2, ecdh);
-# endif
- EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_cert, s_key))
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ctx2 && !set_cert_key_stuff(ctx2, s_cert2, s_key2))
- goto end;
-#endif
- if (s_dcert != NULL) {
- if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_dcert, s_dkey))
- goto end;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# if 1
- if (!no_tmp_rsa) {
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ctx2)
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx2, tmp_rsa_cb);
-# endif
- }
-# else
- if (!no_tmp_rsa && SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx)) {
- RSA *rsa;
-
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Generating temp (512 bit) RSA key...");
- BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
-
- rsa = RSA_generate_key(512, RSA_F4, NULL);
-
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx, rsa)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ctx2) {
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx2, rsa)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-# endif
- RSA_free(rsa);
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
- }
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- if (psk_key != NULL)
-# else
- if (psk_key != NULL || jpake_secret)
-# endif
- {
- if (s_debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out,
- "PSK key given or JPAKE in use, setting server callback\n");
- SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(ctx, psk_server_cb);
- }
-
- if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(ctx, psk_identity_hint)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to context\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (cipher != NULL) {
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, cipher)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting cipher list\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ctx2 && !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx2, cipher)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting cipher list\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
- }
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, s_server_verify, verify_callback);
- SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void *)&s_server_session_id_context,
- sizeof s_server_session_id_context);
-
- /* Set DTLS cookie generation and verification callbacks */
- SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(ctx, generate_cookie_callback);
- SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cookie_callback);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ctx2) {
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx2, s_server_verify, verify_callback);
- SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx2,
- (void *)&s_server_session_id_context,
- sizeof s_server_session_id_context);
-
- tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_s_out;
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx2, ssl_servername_cb);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx2, &tlsextcbp);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (srp_verifier_file != NULL) {
- srp_callback_parm.vb = SRP_VBASE_new(srpuserseed);
- srp_callback_parm.user = NULL;
- srp_callback_parm.login = NULL;
- if ((ret =
- SRP_VBASE_init(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_verifier_file)) != SRP_NO_ERROR) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "Cannot initialize SRP verifier file \"%s\":ret=%d\n",
- srp_verifier_file, ret);
- goto end;
- }
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_callback_parm);
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
- } else
-#endif
- if (CAfile != NULL) {
- SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ctx2)
- SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx2, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
-#endif
- }
-
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n");
- (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
- if (www)
- do_server(port, socket_type, &accept_socket, www_body, context);
- else
- do_server(port, socket_type, &accept_socket, sv_body, context);
- print_stats(bio_s_out, ctx);
- ret = 0;
- end:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (s_cert)
- X509_free(s_cert);
- if (s_dcert)
- X509_free(s_dcert);
- if (s_key)
- EVP_PKEY_free(s_key);
- if (s_dkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(s_dkey);
- if (pass)
- OPENSSL_free(pass);
- if (dpass)
- OPENSSL_free(dpass);
- if (vpm)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (tlscstatp.host)
- OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host);
- if (tlscstatp.port)
- OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port);
- if (tlscstatp.path)
- OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path);
- if (ctx2 != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx2);
- if (s_cert2)
- X509_free(s_cert2);
- if (s_key2)
- EVP_PKEY_free(s_key2);
-#endif
- if (bio_s_out != NULL) {
- BIO_free(bio_s_out);
- bio_s_out = NULL;
- }
- apps_shutdown();
- OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
-}
-
-static void print_stats(BIO *bio, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
-{
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld items in the session cache\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_number(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects (SSL_connect())\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client renegotiates (SSL_connect())\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects that finished\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts (SSL_accept())\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server renegotiates (SSL_accept())\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts that finished\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache misses\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache timeouts\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld callback cache hits\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ssl_ctx));
- BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld cache full overflows (%ld allowed)\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ssl_ctx),
- SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ssl_ctx));
-}
-
-static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
-{
- char *buf = NULL;
- fd_set readfds;
- int ret = 1, width;
- int k, i;
- unsigned long l;
- SSL *con = NULL;
- BIO *sbio;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_CTX *kctx;
-#endif
- struct timeval timeout;
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
- struct timeval tv;
-#else
- struct timeval *timeoutp;
-#endif
-
- if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bufsize)) == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
- goto err;
- }
-#ifdef FIONBIO
- if (s_nbio) {
- unsigned long sl = 1;
-
- if (!s_quiet)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "turning on non blocking io\n");
- if (BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &sl) < 0)
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- }
-#endif
-
- if (con == NULL) {
- con = SSL_new(ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s_tlsextdebug) {
- SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
- SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
- }
- if (s_tlsextstatus) {
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cert_status_cb);
- tlscstatp.err = bio_err;
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, &tlscstatp);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if ((kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) {
- SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(con, kctx);
- kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVICE, KRB5SVC);
- kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_KEYTAB, KRB5KEYTAB);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- if (context)
- SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context));
- }
- SSL_clear(con);
-#if 0
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(con, "Test server", 11);
-# endif
-#endif
-
- if (SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) {
-
- sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- if (enable_timeouts) {
- timeout.tv_sec = 0;
- timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT;
- BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
-
- timeout.tv_sec = 0;
- timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT;
- BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
- }
-
- if (socket_mtu) {
- if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n",
- DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con));
- ret = -1;
- BIO_free(sbio);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
- if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n");
- ret = -1;
- BIO_free(sbio);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- /* want to do MTU discovery */
- BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL);
-
- /* turn on cookie exchange */
- SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
- } else
- sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- if (s_nbio_test) {
- BIO *test;
-
- test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test());
- sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- if (jpake_secret)
- jpake_server_auth(bio_s_out, sbio, jpake_secret);
-#endif
-
- SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio);
- SSL_set_accept_state(con);
- /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */
-
- if (s_debug) {
- SSL_set_debug(con, 1);
- BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback);
- BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out);
- }
- if (s_msg) {
- SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
- SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_out);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s_tlsextdebug) {
- SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
- SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
- }
-#endif
-
- width = s + 1;
- for (;;) {
- int read_from_terminal;
- int read_from_sslcon;
-
- read_from_terminal = 0;
- read_from_sslcon = SSL_pending(con);
-
- if (!read_from_sslcon) {
- FD_ZERO(&readfds);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
- openssl_fdset(fileno(stdin), &readfds);
-#endif
- openssl_fdset(s, &readfds);
- /*
- * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is
- * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is
- * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler:
- * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or
- * (void *).
- */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
- /*
- * Under DOS (non-djgpp) and Windows we can't select on stdin:
- * only on sockets. As a workaround we timeout the select every
- * second and check for any keypress. In a proper Windows
- * application we wouldn't do this because it is inefficient.
- */
- tv.tv_sec = 1;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
- if ((i < 0) || (!i && !_kbhit()))
- continue;
- if (_kbhit())
- read_from_terminal = 1;
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
- /* Under BeOS-R5 the situation is similar to DOS */
- tv.tv_sec = 1;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- (void)fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
- i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
- if ((i < 0) || (!i && read(fileno(stdin), buf, 0) < 0))
- continue;
- if (read(fileno(stdin), buf, 0) >= 0)
- read_from_terminal = 1;
- (void)fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, 0);
-#else
- if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) &&
- DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout))
- timeoutp = &timeout;
- else
- timeoutp = NULL;
-
- i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, timeoutp);
-
- if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION)
- && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occured\n");
- }
-
- if (i <= 0)
- continue;
- if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), &readfds))
- read_from_terminal = 1;
-#endif
- if (FD_ISSET(s, &readfds))
- read_from_sslcon = 1;
- }
- if (read_from_terminal) {
- if (s_crlf) {
- int j, lf_num;
-
- i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize / 2);
- lf_num = 0;
- /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
- if (buf[j] == '\n')
- lf_num++;
- for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
- buf[j + lf_num] = buf[j];
- if (buf[j] == '\n') {
- lf_num--;
- i++;
- buf[j + lf_num] = '\r';
- }
- }
- assert(lf_num == 0);
- } else
- i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize);
- if (!s_quiet) {
- if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'Q')) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
- SHUTDOWN(s);
- close_accept_socket();
- ret = -11;
- goto err;
- }
- if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'q')) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
- if (SSL_version(con) != DTLS1_VERSION)
- SHUTDOWN(s);
- /*
- * close_accept_socket(); ret= -11;
- */
- goto err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- if ((buf[0] == 'B') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n");
- SSL_heartbeat(con);
- i = 0;
- continue;
- }
-#endif
- if ((buf[0] == 'r') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) {
- SSL_renegotiate(con);
- i = SSL_do_handshake(con);
- printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i);
- i = 0; /* 13; */
- continue;
- /*
- * strcpy(buf,"server side RE-NEGOTIATE\n");
- */
- }
- if ((buf[0] == 'R') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) {
- SSL_set_verify(con,
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
- NULL);
- SSL_renegotiate(con);
- i = SSL_do_handshake(con);
- printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i);
- i = 0; /* 13; */
- continue;
- /*
- * strcpy(buf,"server side RE-NEGOTIATE asking for client
- * cert\n");
- */
- }
- if (buf[0] == 'P') {
- static const char *str = "Lets print some clear text\n";
- BIO_write(SSL_get_wbio(con), str, strlen(str));
- }
- if (buf[0] == 'S') {
- print_stats(bio_s_out, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con));
- }
- }
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
-#endif
- l = k = 0;
- for (;;) {
- /* should do a select for the write */
-#ifdef RENEG
- {
- static count = 0;
- if (++count == 100) {
- count = 0;
- SSL_renegotiate(con);
- }
- }
-#endif
- k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- while (SSL_get_error(con, k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during write\n");
- srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
- if (srp_callback_parm.user)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
- srp_callback_parm.user->info);
- else
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
- k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i);
- }
-#endif
- switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Write BLOCK\n");
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- /* break; */
- case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
- if (k > 0) {
- l += k;
- i -= k;
- }
- if (i <= 0)
- break;
- }
- }
- if (read_from_sslcon) {
- if (!SSL_is_init_finished(con)) {
- i = init_ssl_connection(con);
-
- if (i < 0) {
- ret = 0;
- goto err;
- } else if (i == 0) {
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- again:
- i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- while (SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
- srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
- if (srp_callback_parm.user)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
- srp_callback_parm.user->info);
- else
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
- i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize);
- }
-#endif
- switch (SSL_get_error(con, i)) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- ascii2ebcdic(buf, buf, i);
-#endif
- raw_write_stdout(buf, (unsigned int)i);
- if (SSL_pending(con))
- goto again;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Read BLOCK\n");
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- err:
- if (con != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "shutting down SSL\n");
-#if 1
- SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
-#else
- SSL_shutdown(con);
-#endif
- SSL_free(con);
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n");
- if (buf != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, bufsize);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- if (ret >= 0)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n");
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static void close_accept_socket(void)
-{
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "shutdown accept socket\n");
- if (accept_socket >= 0) {
- SHUTDOWN2(accept_socket);
- }
-}
-
-static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
-{
- int i;
- const char *str;
- X509 *peer;
- long verify_error;
- MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ];
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- char *client_princ;
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- const unsigned char *next_proto_neg;
- unsigned next_proto_neg_len;
-#endif
- unsigned char *exportedkeymat;
-
- i = SSL_accept(con);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
- srp_callback_parm.login);
- srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
- if (srp_callback_parm.user)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
- srp_callback_parm.user->info);
- else
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
- i = SSL_accept(con);
- }
-#endif
- if (i <= 0) {
- if (BIO_sock_should_retry(i)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DELAY\n");
- return (1);
- }
-
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR\n");
- verify_error = SSL_get_verify_result(con);
- if (verify_error != X509_V_OK) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:%s\n",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_error));
- } else
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- return (0);
- }
-
- PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(bio_s_out, SSL_get_session(con));
-
- peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
- if (peer != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Client certificate\n");
- PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_s_out, peer);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "subject=%s\n", buf);
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "issuer=%s\n", buf);
- X509_free(peer);
- }
-
- if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, sizeof buf) != NULL)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Shared ciphers:%s\n", buf);
- str = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CIPHER is %s\n", (str != NULL) ? str : "(NONE)");
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len);
- if (next_proto_neg) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "NEXTPROTO is ");
- BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len);
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- {
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile
- = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(con);
-
- if (srtp_profile)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
- srtp_profile->name);
- }
-#endif
- if (SSL_cache_hit(con))
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Reused session-id\n");
- if (SSL_ctrl(con, SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS, 0, NULL) &
- TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Peer has incorrect TLSv1 block padding\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- client_princ = kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(con));
- if (client_princ != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Kerberos peer principal is %s\n",
- client_princ);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
- SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT");
- if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Keying material exporter:\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen);
- exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen);
- if (exportedkeymat != NULL) {
- if (!SSL_export_keying_material(con, exportedkeymat,
- keymatexportlen,
- keymatexportlabel,
- strlen(keymatexportlabel),
- NULL, 0, 0)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Error\n");
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Keying material: ");
- for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]);
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
- }
- OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
- }
- }
-
- return (1);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile)
-{
- DH *ret = NULL;
- BIO *bio;
-
- if ((bio = BIO_new_file(dhfile, "r")) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ret = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- err:
- if (bio != NULL)
- BIO_free(bio);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-char *client_princ;
-#endif
-
-#if 0
-static int load_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file)
-{
- FILE *in;
- X509 *x = NULL;
-
- if ((in = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- for (;;) {
- if (PEM_read_X509(in, &x, NULL) == NULL)
- break;
- SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x);
- }
- if (x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
- fclose(in);
- return (1);
-}
-#endif
-
-static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
-{
- char *buf = NULL;
- int ret = 1;
- int i, j, k, dot;
- SSL *con;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- BIO *io, *ssl_bio, *sbio;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_CTX *kctx;
-#endif
-
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bufsize);
- if (buf == NULL)
- return (0);
- io = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
- if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL))
- goto err;
-
-#ifdef FIONBIO
- if (s_nbio) {
- unsigned long sl = 1;
-
- if (!s_quiet)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "turning on non blocking io\n");
- if (BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &sl) < 0)
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */
- if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io, bufsize))
- goto err;
-
- if ((con = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s_tlsextdebug) {
- SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
- SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if ((kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) {
- kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVICE, KRB5SVC);
- kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_KEYTAB, KRB5KEYTAB);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- if (context)
- SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context));
-
- sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- if (s_nbio_test) {
- BIO *test;
-
- test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test());
- sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio);
- }
- SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio);
- SSL_set_accept_state(con);
-
- /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */
- BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, con, BIO_CLOSE);
- BIO_push(io, ssl_bio);
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()), io);
-#endif
-
- if (s_debug) {
- SSL_set_debug(con, 1);
- BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback);
- BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out);
- }
- if (s_msg) {
- SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
- SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_out);
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- if (hack) {
- i = SSL_accept(con);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- while (i <= 0
- && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
- srp_callback_parm.login);
- srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
- if (srp_callback_parm.user)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
- srp_callback_parm.user->info);
- else
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
- i = SSL_accept(con);
- }
-#endif
- switch (SSL_get_error(con, i)) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
- continue;
- case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- SSL_renegotiate(con);
- SSL_write(con, NULL, 0);
- }
-
- i = BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1);
- if (i < 0) { /* error */
- if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) {
- if (!s_quiet)
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- } else {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
- delay(1000);
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
- sleep(1);
-#endif
- continue;
- }
- } else if (i == 0) { /* end of input */
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* else we have data */
- if (((www == 1) && (strncmp("GET ", buf, 4) == 0)) ||
- ((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 11) == 0))) {
- char *p;
- X509 *peer;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- static const char *space = " ";
-
- BIO_puts(io,
- "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n");
- BIO_puts(io, "<HTML><BODY BGCOLOR=\"#ffffff\">\n");
- BIO_puts(io, "<pre>\n");
-/* BIO_puts(io,SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));*/
- BIO_puts(io, "\n");
- for (i = 0; i < local_argc; i++) {
- BIO_puts(io, local_argv[i]);
- BIO_write(io, " ", 1);
- }
- BIO_puts(io, "\n");
-
- BIO_printf(io,
- "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
- SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ?
- "" : " NOT");
-
- /*
- * The following is evil and should not really be done
- */
- BIO_printf(io, "Ciphers supported in s_server binary\n");
- sk = SSL_get_ciphers(con);
- j = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk);
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
- BIO_printf(io, "%-11s:%-25s",
- SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
- if ((((i + 1) % 2) == 0) && (i + 1 != j))
- BIO_puts(io, "\n");
- }
- BIO_puts(io, "\n");
- p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, bufsize);
- if (p != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(io,
- "---\nCiphers common between both SSL end points:\n");
- j = i = 0;
- while (*p) {
- if (*p == ':') {
- BIO_write(io, space, 26 - j);
- i++;
- j = 0;
- BIO_write(io, ((i % 3) ? " " : "\n"), 1);
- } else {
- BIO_write(io, p, 1);
- j++;
- }
- p++;
- }
- BIO_puts(io, "\n");
- }
- BIO_printf(io, (SSL_cache_hit(con)
- ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, "));
- c = SSL_get_current_cipher(con);
- BIO_printf(io, "%s, Cipher is %s\n",
- SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
- SSL_SESSION_print(io, SSL_get_session(con));
- BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
- print_stats(io, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con));
- BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
- peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
- if (peer != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(io, "Client certificate\n");
- X509_print(io, peer);
- PEM_write_bio_X509(io, peer);
- } else
- BIO_puts(io, "no client certificate available\n");
- BIO_puts(io, "</BODY></HTML>\r\n\r\n");
- break;
- } else if ((www == 2 || www == 3)
- && (strncmp("GET /", buf, 5) == 0)) {
- BIO *file;
- char *p, *e;
- static const char *text =
- "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n";
-
- /* skip the '/' */
- p = &(buf[5]);
-
- dot = 1;
- for (e = p; *e != '\0'; e++) {
- if (e[0] == ' ')
- break;
-
- switch (dot) {
- case 1:
- dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 2 : 0;
- break;
- case 2:
- dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 3 : 0;
- break;
- case 3:
- dot = (e[0] == '/') ? -1 : 0;
- break;
- }
- if (dot == 0)
- dot = (e[0] == '/') ? 1 : 0;
- }
- dot = (dot == 3) || (dot == -1); /* filename contains ".."
- * component */
-
- if (*e == '\0') {
- BIO_puts(io, text);
- BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid file name\r\n", p);
- break;
- }
- *e = '\0';
-
- if (dot) {
- BIO_puts(io, text);
- BIO_printf(io, "'%s' contains '..' reference\r\n", p);
- break;
- }
-
- if (*p == '/') {
- BIO_puts(io, text);
- BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid path\r\n", p);
- break;
- }
-#if 0
- /* append if a directory lookup */
- if (e[-1] == '/')
- strcat(p, "index.html");
-#endif
-
- /* if a directory, do the index thang */
- if (app_isdir(p) > 0) {
-#if 0 /* must check buffer size */
- strcat(p, "/index.html");
-#else
- BIO_puts(io, text);
- BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is a directory\r\n", p);
- break;
-#endif
- }
-
- if ((file = BIO_new_file(p, "r")) == NULL) {
- BIO_puts(io, text);
- BIO_printf(io, "Error opening '%s'\r\n", p);
- ERR_print_errors(io);
- break;
- }
-
- if (!s_quiet)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "FILE:%s\n", p);
-
- if (www == 2) {
- i = strlen(p);
- if (((i > 5) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 5]), ".html") == 0)) ||
- ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".php") == 0)) ||
- ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".htm") == 0)))
- BIO_puts(io,
- "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n");
- else
- BIO_puts(io,
- "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n");
- }
- /* send the file */
- for (;;) {
- i = BIO_read(file, buf, bufsize);
- if (i <= 0)
- break;
-
-#ifdef RENEG
- total_bytes += i;
- fprintf(stderr, "%d\n", i);
- if (total_bytes > 3 * 1024) {
- total_bytes = 0;
- fprintf(stderr, "RENEGOTIATE\n");
- SSL_renegotiate(con);
- }
-#endif
-
- for (j = 0; j < i;) {
-#ifdef RENEG
- {
- static count = 0;
- if (++count == 13) {
- SSL_renegotiate(con);
- }
- }
-#endif
- k = BIO_write(io, &(buf[j]), i - j);
- if (k <= 0) {
- if (!BIO_should_retry(io))
- goto write_error;
- else {
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "rwrite W BLOCK\n");
- }
- } else {
- j += k;
- }
- }
- }
- write_error:
- BIO_free(file);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- i = (int)BIO_flush(io);
- if (i <= 0) {
- if (!BIO_should_retry(io))
- break;
- } else
- break;
- }
- end:
-#if 1
- /* make sure we re-use sessions */
- SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
-#else
- /* This kills performance */
- /*
- * SSL_shutdown(con); A shutdown gets sent in the BIO_free_all(io)
- * procession
- */
-#endif
-
- err:
-
- if (ret >= 0)
- BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n");
-
- if (buf != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- if (io != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(io);
-/* if (ssl_bio != NULL) BIO_free(ssl_bio);*/
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
-{
- BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
- static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL;
-
- if (!rsa_tmp && ((bn = BN_new()) == NULL))
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Allocation error in generating RSA key\n");
- if (!rsa_tmp && bn) {
- if (!s_quiet) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating temp (%d bit) RSA key...",
- keylength);
- (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
- }
- if (!BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4) || ((rsa_tmp = RSA_new()) == NULL) ||
- !RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_tmp, keylength, bn, NULL)) {
- if (rsa_tmp)
- RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
- rsa_tmp = NULL;
- }
- if (!s_quiet) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
- }
- BN_free(bn);
- }
- return (rsa_tmp);
-}
-#endif
-
-#define MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
-static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
- unsigned int *id_len)
-{
- unsigned int count = 0;
- do {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0)
- return 0;
- /*
- * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix
- * is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg.
- * the server could only possibly create 1 session ID (ie. the
- * prefix!) so all future session negotiations will fail due to
- * conflicts.
- */
- memcpy(id, session_id_prefix,
- (strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ?
- strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len);
- }
- while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
- (++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS));
- if (count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_server.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/apps/s_server.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_server.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/apps/s_server.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2978 @@
+/* apps/s_server.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Until the key-gen callbacks are modified to use newer prototypes, we allow
+ * deprecated functions for openssl-internal code
+ */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+# undef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+#endif
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+# define APPS_WIN16
+#endif
+
+/* conflicts with winsock2 stuff on netware */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of
+ * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining
+ * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is
+ * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT)
+# define __U_INT
+typedef unsigned int u_int;
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "apps.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+#endif
+#include "s_apps.h"
+#include "timeouts.h"
+
+#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __VMS_VER < 70000000)
+/* FIONBIO used as a switch to enable ioctl, and that isn't in VMS < 7.0 */
+# undef FIONBIO
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength);
+#endif
+static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context);
+static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context);
+static void close_accept_socket(void);
+static void sv_usage(void);
+static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *s);
+static void print_stats(BIO *bp, SSL_CTX *ctx);
+static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int *id_len);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile);
+static DH *get_dh2048(void);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MONOLITH
+static void s_server_init(void);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = {
+ 0xF6,0x42,0x57,0xB7,0x08,0x7F,0x08,0x17,0x72,0xA2,0xBA,0xD6,
+ 0xA9,0x42,0xF3,0x05,0xE8,0xF9,0x53,0x11,0x39,0x4F,0xB6,0xF1,
+ 0x6E,0xB9,0x4B,0x38,0x20,0xDA,0x01,0xA7,0x56,0xA3,0x14,0xE9,
+ 0x8F,0x40,0x55,0xF3,0xD0,0x07,0xC6,0xCB,0x43,0xA9,0x94,0xAD,
+ 0xF7,0x4C,0x64,0x86,0x49,0xF8,0x0C,0x83,0xBD,0x65,0xE9,0x17,
+ 0xD4,0xA1,0xD3,0x50,0xF8,0xF5,0x59,0x5F,0xDC,0x76,0x52,0x4F,
+ 0x3D,0x3D,0x8D,0xDB,0xCE,0x99,0xE1,0x57,0x92,0x59,0xCD,0xFD,
+ 0xB8,0xAE,0x74,0x4F,0xC5,0xFC,0x76,0xBC,0x83,0xC5,0x47,0x30,
+ 0x61,0xCE,0x7C,0xC9,0x66,0xFF,0x15,0xF9,0xBB,0xFD,0x91,0x5E,
+ 0xC7,0x01,0xAA,0xD3,0x5B,0x9E,0x8D,0xA0,0xA5,0x72,0x3A,0xD4,
+ 0x1A,0xF0,0xBF,0x46,0x00,0x58,0x2B,0xE5,0xF4,0x88,0xFD,0x58,
+ 0x4E,0x49,0xDB,0xCD,0x20,0xB4,0x9D,0xE4,0x91,0x07,0x36,0x6B,
+ 0x33,0x6C,0x38,0x0D,0x45,0x1D,0x0F,0x7C,0x88,0xB3,0x1C,0x7C,
+ 0x5B,0x2D,0x8E,0xF6,0xF3,0xC9,0x23,0xC0,0x43,0xF0,0xA5,0x5B,
+ 0x18,0x8D,0x8E,0xBB,0x55,0x8C,0xB8,0x5D,0x38,0xD3,0x34,0xFD,
+ 0x7C,0x17,0x57,0x43,0xA3,0x1D,0x18,0x6C,0xDE,0x33,0x21,0x2C,
+ 0xB5,0x2A,0xFF,0x3C,0xE1,0xB1,0x29,0x40,0x18,0x11,0x8D,0x7C,
+ 0x84,0xA7,0x0A,0x72,0xD6,0x86,0xC4,0x03,0x19,0xC8,0x07,0x29,
+ 0x7A,0xCA,0x95,0x0C,0xD9,0x96,0x9F,0xAB,0xD0,0x0A,0x50,0x9B,
+ 0x02,0x46,0xD3,0x08,0x3D,0x66,0xA4,0x5D,0x41,0x9F,0x9C,0x7C,
+ 0xBD,0x89,0x4B,0x22,0x19,0x26,0xBA,0xAB,0xA2,0x5E,0xC3,0x55,
+ 0xE9,0x32,0x0B,0x3B,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = {
+ 0x02,
+};
+
+DH *get_dh2048()
+{
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL);
+ dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL);
+ if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return dh;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* static int load_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file);*/
+
+#undef BUFSIZZ
+#define BUFSIZZ 16*1024
+static int bufsize = BUFSIZZ;
+static int accept_socket = -1;
+
+#define TEST_CERT "server.pem"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+# define TEST_CERT2 "server2.pem"
+#endif
+#undef PROG
+#define PROG s_server_main
+
+extern int verify_depth, verify_return_error;
+
+static char *cipher = NULL;
+static int s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+static int s_server_session_id_context = 1; /* anything will do */
+static const char *s_cert_file = TEST_CERT, *s_key_file = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static const char *s_cert_file2 = TEST_CERT2, *s_key_file2 = NULL;
+#endif
+static char *s_dcert_file = NULL, *s_dkey_file = NULL;
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+static int s_nbio = 0;
+#endif
+static int s_nbio_test = 0;
+int s_crlf = 0;
+static SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static SSL_CTX *ctx2 = NULL;
+#endif
+static int www = 0;
+
+static BIO *bio_s_out = NULL;
+static int s_debug = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int s_tlsextdebug = 0;
+static int s_tlsextstatus = 0;
+static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
+#endif
+static int s_msg = 0;
+static int s_quiet = 0;
+
+static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL;
+static int keymatexportlen = 20;
+
+static int hack = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+static char *engine_id = NULL;
+#endif
+static const char *session_id_prefix = NULL;
+
+static int enable_timeouts = 0;
+static long socket_mtu;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+static int cert_chain = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity";
+char *psk_key = NULL; /* by default PSK is not used */
+
+static unsigned int psk_server_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+ unsigned int psk_len = 0;
+ int ret;
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+
+ if (s_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "psk_server_cb\n");
+ if (!identity) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: client did not send PSK identity\n");
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ if (s_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "identity_len=%d identity=%s\n",
+ (int)strlen(identity), identity);
+
+ /* here we could lookup the given identity e.g. from a database */
+ if (strcmp(identity, psk_identity) != 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK error: client identity not found"
+ " (got '%s' expected '%s')\n", identity, psk_identity);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ if (s_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK client identity found\n");
+
+ /* convert the PSK key to binary */
+ ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, psk_key);
+ if (!ret) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n",
+ psk_key);
+ if (bn)
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bytes(bn) > (int)max_psk_len) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n",
+ max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn));
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk);
+ BN_free(bn);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_err;
+ psk_len = (unsigned int)ret;
+
+ if (s_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "fetched PSK len=%d\n", psk_len);
+ return psk_len;
+ out_err:
+ if (s_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK server callback\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */
+typedef struct srpsrvparm_st {
+ char *login;
+ SRP_VBASE *vb;
+ SRP_user_pwd *user;
+} srpsrvparm;
+
+/*
+ * This callback pretends to require some asynchronous logic in order to
+ * obtain a verifier. When the callback is called for a new connection we
+ * return with a negative value. This will provoke the accept etc to return
+ * with an LOOKUP_X509. The main logic of the reinvokes the suspended call
+ * (which would normally occur after a worker has finished) and we set the
+ * user parameters.
+ */
+static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+ srpsrvparm *p = (srpsrvparm *) arg;
+ if (p->login == NULL && p->user == NULL) {
+ p->login = SSL_get_srp_username(s);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP username = \"%s\"\n", p->login);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (p->user == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "User %s doesn't exist\n", p->login);
+ return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ }
+ if (SSL_set_srp_server_param
+ (s, p->user->N, p->user->g, p->user->s, p->user->v,
+ p->user->info) < 0) {
+ *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "SRP parameters set: username = \"%s\" info=\"%s\" \n",
+ p->login, p->user->info);
+ /* need to check whether there are memory leaks */
+ p->user = NULL;
+ p->login = NULL;
+ return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MONOLITH
+static void s_server_init(void)
+{
+ accept_socket = -1;
+ cipher = NULL;
+ s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+ s_dcert_file = NULL;
+ s_dkey_file = NULL;
+ s_cert_file = TEST_CERT;
+ s_key_file = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ s_cert_file2 = TEST_CERT2;
+ s_key_file2 = NULL;
+ ctx2 = NULL;
+# endif
+# ifdef FIONBIO
+ s_nbio = 0;
+# endif
+ s_nbio_test = 0;
+ ctx = NULL;
+ www = 0;
+
+ bio_s_out = NULL;
+ s_debug = 0;
+ s_msg = 0;
+ s_quiet = 0;
+ hack = 0;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ engine_id = NULL;
+# endif
+}
+#endif
+
+static void sv_usage(void)
+{
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "usage: s_server [args ...]\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -accept arg - port to accept on (default is %d)\n", PORT);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -context arg - set session ID context\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -Verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification, must have a cert.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -cert arg - certificate file to use\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " (default is %s)\n", TEST_CERT);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -crl_check - check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA.\n"
+ " The CRL(s) are appended to the certificate file\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -crl_check_all - check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA\n"
+ " or any other CRL in the CA chain. CRL(s) are appened to the\n"
+ " the certificate file.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -certform arg - certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -key arg - Private Key file to use, in cert file if\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " not specified (default is %s)\n",
+ TEST_CERT);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -keyform arg - key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -pass arg - private key file pass phrase source\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -dcert arg - second certificate file to use (usually for DSA)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -dcertform x - second certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -dkey arg - second private key file to use (usually for DSA)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -dkeyform arg - second key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -dpass arg - second private key file pass phrase source\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -dhparam arg - DH parameter file to use, in cert file if not specified\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " or a default set of parameters is used\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -named_curve arg - Elliptic curve name to use for ephemeral ECDH keys.\n"
+ " Use \"openssl ecparam -list_curves\" for all names\n"
+ " (default is nistp256).\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -nbio - Run with non-blocking IO\n");
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -nbio_test - test with the non-blocking test bio\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -crlf - convert LF from terminal into CRLF\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -debug - Print more output\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -msg - Show protocol messages\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -state - Print the SSL states\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -nocert - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -cipher arg - play with 'openssl ciphers' to see what goes here\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -serverpref - Use server's cipher preferences\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -quiet - No server output\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tmp_rsa - Do not generate a tmp RSA key\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk_hint arg - PSK identity hint to use\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -jpake arg - JPAKE secret to use\n");
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -srpvfile file - The verifier file for SRP\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -srpuserseed string - A seed string for a default user salt.\n");
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl2 - Just talk SSLv2\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl3 - Just talk SSLv3\n");
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_2 - Just talk TLSv1.2\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1_1 - Just talk TLSv1.1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -tls1 - Just talk TLSv1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -dtls1 - Just talk DTLSv1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -timeout - Enable timeouts\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -mtu - Set link layer MTU\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -chain - Read a certificate chain\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ssl2 - Just disable SSLv2\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ssl3 - Just disable SSLv3\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tls1 - Just disable TLSv1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tls1_1 - Just disable TLSv1.1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_tls1_2 - Just disable TLSv1.2\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_dhe - Disable ephemeral DH\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_ecdhe - Disable ephemeral ECDH\n");
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -bugs - Turn on SSL bug compatibility\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -hack - workaround for early Netscape code\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -www - Respond to a 'GET /' with a status page\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -WWW - Respond to a 'GET /<path> HTTP/1.0' with file ./<path>\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -HTTP - Respond to a 'GET /<path> HTTP/1.0' with file ./<path>\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " with the assumption it contains a complete HTTP response.\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -engine id - Initialise and use the specified engine\n");
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -id_prefix arg - Generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by 'arg'\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -rand file%cfile%c...\n", LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR,
+ LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -servername host - servername for HostName TLS extension\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -servername_fatal - on mismatch send fatal alert (default warning alert)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -cert2 arg - certificate file to use for servername\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " (default is %s)\n", TEST_CERT2);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -key2 arg - Private Key file to use for servername, in cert file if\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " not specified (default is %s)\n",
+ TEST_CERT2);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
+# endif
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -keymatexport label - Export keying material using label\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -keymatexportlen len - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -status - respond to certificate status requests\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -status_verbose - enable status request verbose printout\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ " -status_timeout n - status request responder timeout\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -status_url URL - status request fallback URL\n");
+}
+
+static int local_argc = 0;
+static char **local_argv;
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi);
+static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a);
+static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl);
+static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl);
+static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr);
+static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size);
+static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str);
+
+# define BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER (18|0x0200)
+static BIO_METHOD methods_ebcdic = {
+ BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER,
+ "EBCDIC/ASCII filter",
+ ebcdic_write,
+ ebcdic_read,
+ ebcdic_puts,
+ ebcdic_gets,
+ ebcdic_ctrl,
+ ebcdic_new,
+ ebcdic_free,
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ size_t alloced;
+ char buff[1];
+} EBCDIC_OUTBUFF;
+
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()
+{
+ return (&methods_ebcdic);
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+ EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf;
+
+ wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + 1024);
+ if (!wbuf)
+ return 0;
+ wbuf->alloced = 1024;
+ wbuf->buff[0] = '\0';
+
+ bi->ptr = (char *)wbuf;
+ bi->init = 1;
+ bi->flags = 0;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a)
+{
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ if (a->ptr != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
+ a->ptr = NULL;
+ a->init = 0;
+ a->flags = 0;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (out == NULL || outl == 0)
+ return (0);
+ if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, out, outl);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ ascii2ebcdic(out, out, ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+ EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int num;
+ unsigned char n;
+
+ if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0))
+ return (0);
+ if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) b->ptr;
+
+ if (inl > (num = wbuf->alloced)) {
+ num = num + num; /* double the size */
+ if (num < inl)
+ num = inl;
+ wbuf =
+ (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + num);
+ if (!wbuf)
+ return 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(b->ptr);
+
+ wbuf->alloced = num;
+ wbuf->buff[0] = '\0';
+
+ b->ptr = (char *)wbuf;
+ }
+
+ ebcdic2ascii(wbuf->buff, in, inl);
+
+ ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, wbuf->buff, inl);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+ if (b->next_bio == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+ ret = 0L;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+ break;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ if (bp->next_bio == NULL)
+ return (0);
+/* return(BIO_gets(bp->next_bio,buf,size));*/
+ for (i = 0; i < size - 1; ++i) {
+ ret = ebcdic_read(bp, &buf[i], 1);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ break;
+ else if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+ ++i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (i < size)
+ buf[i] = '\0';
+ return (ret < 0 && i == 0) ? ret : i;
+}
+
+static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+ if (bp->next_bio == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ return ebcdic_write(bp, str, strlen(str));
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+/* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */
+typedef struct tlsextctx_st {
+ char *servername;
+ BIO *biodebug;
+ int extension_error;
+} tlsextctx;
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+ tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg;
+ const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+ if (servername && p->biodebug)
+ BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Hostname in TLS extension: \"%s\"\n",
+ servername);
+
+ if (!p->servername)
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+
+ if (servername) {
+ if (strcasecmp(servername, p->servername))
+ return p->extension_error;
+ if (ctx2) {
+ BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Switching server context.\n");
+ SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, ctx2);
+ }
+ }
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+/* Structure passed to cert status callback */
+
+typedef struct tlsextstatusctx_st {
+ /* Default responder to use */
+ char *host, *path, *port;
+ int use_ssl;
+ int timeout;
+ BIO *err;
+ int verbose;
+} tlsextstatusctx;
+
+static tlsextstatusctx tlscstatp = { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, -1, NULL, 0 };
+
+/*
+ * Certificate Status callback. This is called when a client includes a
+ * certificate status request extension. This is a simplified version. It
+ * examines certificates each time and makes one OCSP responder query for
+ * each request. A full version would store details such as the OCSP
+ * certificate IDs and minimise the number of OCSP responses by caching them
+ * until they were considered "expired".
+ */
+
+static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+ tlsextstatusctx *srctx = arg;
+ BIO *err = srctx->err;
+ char *host, *port, *path;
+ int use_ssl;
+ unsigned char *rspder = NULL;
+ int rspderlen;
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *aia = NULL;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_STORE_CTX inctx;
+ X509_OBJECT obj;
+ OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL;
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+ OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int i;
+# if 0
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids;
+ SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(s, &ids);
+ BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received %d ids\n",
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(ids));
+# endif
+ if (srctx->verbose)
+ BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: callback called\n");
+ /* Build up OCSP query from server certificate */
+ x = SSL_get_certificate(s);
+ aia = X509_get1_ocsp(x);
+ if (aia) {
+ if (!OCSP_parse_url(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0),
+ &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) {
+ BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: can't parse AIA URL\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (srctx->verbose)
+ BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: AIA URL: %s\n",
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0));
+ } else {
+ if (!srctx->host) {
+ BIO_puts(srctx->err,
+ "cert_status: no AIA and no default responder URL\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ host = srctx->host;
+ path = srctx->path;
+ port = srctx->port;
+ use_ssl = srctx->use_ssl;
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&inctx,
+ SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s)),
+ NULL, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&inctx, X509_LU_X509,
+ X509_get_issuer_name(x), &obj) <= 0) {
+ BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: Can't retrieve issuer certificate.\n");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&inctx);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
+ if (!req)
+ goto err;
+ id = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, x, obj.data.x509);
+ X509_free(obj.data.x509);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&inctx);
+ if (!id)
+ goto err;
+ if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(req, id))
+ goto err;
+ id = NULL;
+ /* Add any extensions to the request */
+ SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(s, &exts);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+ if (!OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(req, ext, -1))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ resp = process_responder(err, req, host, path, port, use_ssl, NULL,
+ srctx->timeout);
+ if (!resp) {
+ BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: error querying responder\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ rspderlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, &rspder);
+ if (rspderlen <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, rspder, rspderlen);
+ if (srctx->verbose) {
+ BIO_puts(err, "cert_status: ocsp response sent:\n");
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_print(err, resp, 2);
+ }
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ done:
+ if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ if (aia) {
+ OPENSSL_free(host);
+ OPENSSL_free(path);
+ OPENSSL_free(port);
+ X509_email_free(aia);
+ }
+ if (id)
+ OCSP_CERTID_free(id);
+ if (req)
+ OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
+ if (resp)
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ goto done;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned int len;
+} tlsextnextprotoctx;
+
+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned int *len, void *arg)
+{
+ tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg;
+
+ *data = next_proto->data;
+ *len = next_proto->len;
+
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+
+#endif
+
+int MAIN(int, char **);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+static char *jpake_secret = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static srpsrvparm srp_callback_parm;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+static char *srtp_profiles = NULL;
+#endif
+
+int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
+ int badarg = 0;
+ short port = PORT;
+ char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
+ unsigned char *context = NULL;
+ char *dhfile = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ char *named_curve = NULL;
+#endif
+ int badop = 0, bugs = 0;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int off = 0;
+ int no_tmp_rsa = 0, no_dhe = 0, nocert = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ int no_ecdhe = 0;
+#endif
+ int state = 0;
+ const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL;
+ int socket_type = SOCK_STREAM;
+ ENGINE *e = NULL;
+ char *inrand = NULL;
+ int s_cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_key_format = FORMAT_PEM;
+ char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL;
+ char *dpassarg = NULL, *dpass = NULL;
+ int s_dcert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_dkey_format = FORMAT_PEM;
+ X509 *s_cert = NULL, *s_dcert = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *s_key = NULL, *s_dkey = NULL;
+ int no_cache = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ EVP_PKEY *s_key2 = NULL;
+ X509 *s_cert2 = NULL;
+ tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING };
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
+ tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */
+ static char *psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ char *srpuserseed = NULL;
+ char *srp_verifier_file = NULL;
+#endif
+ meth = SSLv23_server_method();
+
+ local_argc = argc;
+ local_argv = argv;
+
+ apps_startup();
+#ifdef MONOLITH
+ s_server_init();
+#endif
+
+ if (bio_err == NULL)
+ bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
+ goto end;
+
+ verify_depth = 0;
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+ s_nbio = 0;
+#endif
+ s_nbio_test = 0;
+
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+
+ while (argc >= 1) {
+ if ((strcmp(*argv, "-port") == 0) || (strcmp(*argv, "-accept") == 0)) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ if (!extract_port(*(++argv), &port))
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify") == 0) {
+ s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ verify_depth = atoi(*(++argv));
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_depth);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-Verify") == 0) {
+ s_server_verify =
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT |
+ SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ verify_depth = atoi(*(++argv));
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "verify depth is %d, must return a certificate\n",
+ verify_depth);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-context") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ context = (unsigned char *)*(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ s_cert_file = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-certform") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ s_cert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ s_key_file = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keyform") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ s_key_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pass") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ passarg = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhparam") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ dhfile = *(++argv);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-named_curve") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ named_curve = *(++argv);
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcertform") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ s_dcert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcert") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ s_dcert_file = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dkeyform") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ s_dkey_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dpass") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ dpassarg = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dkey") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ s_dkey_file = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nocert") == 0) {
+ nocert = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ CApath = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_cache") == 0)
+ no_cache = 1;
+ else if (args_verify(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &vpm)) {
+ if (badarg)
+ goto bad;
+ continue;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-verify_return_error") == 0)
+ verify_return_error = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-serverpref") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-legacy_renegotiation") == 0)
+ off |= SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cipher") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ cipher = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ CAfile = *(++argv);
+ }
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio") == 0) {
+ s_nbio = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nbio_test") == 0) {
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+ s_nbio = 1;
+#endif
+ s_nbio_test = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-debug") == 0) {
+ s_debug = 1;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tlsextdebug") == 0)
+ s_tlsextdebug = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status") == 0)
+ s_tlsextstatus = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-status_verbose") == 0) {
+ s_tlsextstatus = 1;
+ tlscstatp.verbose = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-status_timeout")) {
+ s_tlsextstatus = 1;
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ tlscstatp.timeout = atoi(*(++argv));
+ } else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-status_url")) {
+ s_tlsextstatus = 1;
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ if (!OCSP_parse_url(*(++argv),
+ &tlscstatp.host,
+ &tlscstatp.port,
+ &tlscstatp.path, &tlscstatp.use_ssl)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-msg") == 0) {
+ s_msg = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-hack") == 0) {
+ hack = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-state") == 0) {
+ state = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-crlf") == 0) {
+ s_crlf = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-quiet") == 0) {
+ s_quiet = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bugs") == 0) {
+ bugs = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tmp_rsa") == 0) {
+ no_tmp_rsa = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0) {
+ no_dhe = 1;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ecdhe") == 0) {
+ no_ecdhe = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk_hint") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ psk_identity_hint = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk") == 0) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ psk_key = *(++argv);
+ for (i = 0; i < strlen(psk_key); i++) {
+ if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[i]))
+ continue;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpvfile") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ srp_verifier_file = *(++argv);
+ meth = TLSv1_server_method();
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuserseed") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ srpuserseed = *(++argv);
+ meth = TLSv1_server_method();
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-www") == 0) {
+ www = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-WWW") == 0) {
+ www = 2;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-HTTP") == 0) {
+ www = 3;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ssl2") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ssl3") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1_1") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1_2") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_comp") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ticket") == 0) {
+ off |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0) {
+ meth = SSLv2_server_method();
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0) {
+ meth = SSLv3_server_method();
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0) {
+ meth = TLSv1_server_method();
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_1") == 0) {
+ meth = TLSv1_1_server_method();
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1_2") == 0) {
+ meth = TLSv1_2_server_method();
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) {
+ meth = DTLSv1_server_method();
+ socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-timeout") == 0)
+ enable_timeouts = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-mtu") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-chain") == 0)
+ cert_chain = 1;
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-id_prefix") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ session_id_prefix = *(++argv);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ engine_id = *(++argv);
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rand") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ inrand = *(++argv);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-servername") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ tlsextcbp.servername = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-servername_fatal") == 0) {
+ tlsextcbp.extension_error = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert2") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ s_cert_file2 = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key2") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ s_key_file2 = *(++argv);
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nextprotoneg") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-jpake") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ jpake_secret = *(++argv);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-use_srtp") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ srtp_profiles = *(++argv);
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexport") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ keymatexportlabel = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-keymatexportlen") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ keymatexportlen = atoi(*(++argv));
+ if (keymatexportlen == 0)
+ goto bad;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
+ badop = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+ if (badop) {
+ bad:
+ sv_usage();
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+ if (www && socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use -HTTP, -www or -WWW with DTLS\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
+ if (jpake_secret) {
+ if (psk_key) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use JPAKE and PSK together\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ psk_identity = "JPAKE";
+ if (cipher) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "JPAKE sets cipher to PSK\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ cipher = "PSK";
+ }
+#endif
+
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1);
+#endif
+
+ if (!app_passwd(bio_err, passarg, dpassarg, &pass, &dpass)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (s_key_file == NULL)
+ s_key_file = s_cert_file;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s_key_file2 == NULL)
+ s_key_file2 = s_cert_file2;
+#endif
+
+ if (nocert == 0) {
+ s_key = load_key(bio_err, s_key_file, s_key_format, 0, pass, e,
+ "server certificate private key file");
+ if (!s_key) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s_cert = load_cert(bio_err, s_cert_file, s_cert_format,
+ NULL, e, "server certificate file");
+
+ if (!s_cert) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (tlsextcbp.servername) {
+ s_key2 = load_key(bio_err, s_key_file2, s_key_format, 0, pass, e,
+ "second server certificate private key file");
+ if (!s_key2) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s_cert2 = load_cert(bio_err, s_cert_file2, s_cert_format,
+ NULL, e, "second server certificate file");
+
+ if (!s_cert2) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ if (next_proto_neg_in) {
+ unsigned short len;
+ next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len, next_proto_neg_in);
+ if (next_proto.data == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ next_proto.len = len;
+ } else {
+ next_proto.data = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (s_dcert_file) {
+
+ if (s_dkey_file == NULL)
+ s_dkey_file = s_dcert_file;
+
+ s_dkey = load_key(bio_err, s_dkey_file, s_dkey_format,
+ 0, dpass, e, "second certificate private key file");
+ if (!s_dkey) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s_dcert = load_cert(bio_err, s_dcert_file, s_dcert_format,
+ NULL, e, "second server certificate file");
+
+ if (!s_dcert) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, 1) && inrand == NULL
+ && !RAND_status()) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "warning, not much extra random data, consider using the -rand option\n");
+ }
+ if (inrand != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%ld semi-random bytes loaded\n",
+ app_RAND_load_files(inrand));
+
+ if (bio_s_out == NULL) {
+ if (s_quiet && !s_debug && !s_msg) {
+ bio_s_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+ } else {
+ if (bio_s_out == NULL)
+ bio_s_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ }
+ }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+ if (nocert)
+#endif
+ {
+ s_cert_file = NULL;
+ s_key_file = NULL;
+ s_dcert_file = NULL;
+ s_dkey_file = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ s_cert_file2 = NULL;
+ s_key_file2 = NULL;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (session_id_prefix) {
+ if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n");
+ else if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 16)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "warning: id_prefix is too long if you use SSLv2\n");
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx, generate_session_id)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix);
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1);
+ if (bugs)
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_ALL);
+ if (hack)
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, off);
+
+ if (state)
+ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
+ if (no_cache)
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+ else
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 128);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ if (srtp_profiles != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ cipher = getenv("SSL_CIPHER");
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+ if (s_cert_file == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "You must specify a certificate file for the server to use\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx))) {
+ /* BIO_printf(bio_err,"X509_load_verify_locations\n"); */
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ /* goto end; */
+ }
+ if (vpm)
+ SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s_cert2) {
+ ctx2 = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+ if (ctx2 == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx2) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting secondary ctx parameters\n");
+
+ if (session_id_prefix) {
+ if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n");
+ else if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 16)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "warning: id_prefix is too long if you use SSLv2\n");
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx2, generate_session_id)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix);
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx2, 1);
+ if (bugs)
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2, SSL_OP_ALL);
+ if (hack)
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2, off);
+
+ if (state)
+ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx2, apps_ssl_info_callback);
+
+ if (no_cache)
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx2, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+ else
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx2, 128);
+
+ if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx2, CAfile, CApath)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx2))) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+ if (vpm)
+ SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm);
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ if (next_proto.data)
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb,
+ &next_proto);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (!no_dhe) {
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+
+ if (dhfile)
+ dh = load_dh_param(dhfile);
+ else if (s_cert_file)
+ dh = load_dh_param(s_cert_file);
+
+ if (dh != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n");
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n");
+ dh = get_dh2048();
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ctx2) {
+ if (!dhfile) {
+ DH *dh2 = load_dh_param(s_cert_file2);
+ if (dh2 != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n");
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+
+ DH_free(dh);
+ dh = dh2;
+ }
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx2, dh);
+ }
+# endif
+ DH_free(dh);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (!no_ecdhe) {
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+
+ if (named_curve) {
+ int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(named_curve);
+
+ if (nid == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", named_curve);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ if (ecdh == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve (%s)\n",
+ named_curve);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ecdh != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp ECDH parameters\n");
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp ECDH parameters\n");
+ ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ if (ecdh == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve (nistp256)\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx, ecdh);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ctx2)
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx2, ecdh);
+# endif
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_cert, s_key))
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ctx2 && !set_cert_key_stuff(ctx2, s_cert2, s_key2))
+ goto end;
+#endif
+ if (s_dcert != NULL) {
+ if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_dcert, s_dkey))
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# if 1
+ if (!no_tmp_rsa) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ctx2)
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx2, tmp_rsa_cb);
+# endif
+ }
+# else
+ if (!no_tmp_rsa && SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx)) {
+ RSA *rsa;
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Generating temp (512 bit) RSA key...");
+ BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+
+ rsa = RSA_generate_key(512, RSA_F4, NULL);
+
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx, rsa)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ctx2) {
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx2, rsa)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ if (psk_key != NULL)
+# else
+ if (psk_key != NULL || jpake_secret)
+# endif
+ {
+ if (s_debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out,
+ "PSK key given or JPAKE in use, setting server callback\n");
+ SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(ctx, psk_server_cb);
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(ctx, psk_identity_hint)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to context\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (cipher != NULL) {
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, cipher)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting cipher list\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ctx2 && !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx2, cipher)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting cipher list\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, s_server_verify, verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void *)&s_server_session_id_context,
+ sizeof s_server_session_id_context);
+
+ /* Set DTLS cookie generation and verification callbacks */
+ SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(ctx, generate_cookie_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cookie_callback);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ctx2) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx2, s_server_verify, verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx2,
+ (void *)&s_server_session_id_context,
+ sizeof s_server_session_id_context);
+
+ tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_s_out;
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx2, ssl_servername_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx2, &tlsextcbp);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (srp_verifier_file != NULL) {
+ srp_callback_parm.vb = SRP_VBASE_new(srpuserseed);
+ srp_callback_parm.user = NULL;
+ srp_callback_parm.login = NULL;
+ if ((ret =
+ SRP_VBASE_init(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_verifier_file)) != SRP_NO_ERROR) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "Cannot initialize SRP verifier file \"%s\":ret=%d\n",
+ srp_verifier_file, ret);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_callback_parm);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (CAfile != NULL) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ctx2)
+ SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx2, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
+#endif
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n");
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
+ if (www)
+ do_server(port, socket_type, &accept_socket, www_body, context);
+ else
+ do_server(port, socket_type, &accept_socket, sv_body, context);
+ print_stats(bio_s_out, ctx);
+ ret = 0;
+ end:
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (s_cert)
+ X509_free(s_cert);
+ if (s_dcert)
+ X509_free(s_dcert);
+ if (s_key)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s_key);
+ if (s_dkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s_dkey);
+ if (pass)
+ OPENSSL_free(pass);
+ if (dpass)
+ OPENSSL_free(dpass);
+ if (vpm)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (tlscstatp.host)
+ OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host);
+ if (tlscstatp.port)
+ OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port);
+ if (tlscstatp.path)
+ OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path);
+ if (ctx2 != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx2);
+ if (s_cert2)
+ X509_free(s_cert2);
+ if (s_key2)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s_key2);
+#endif
+ if (bio_s_out != NULL) {
+ BIO_free(bio_s_out);
+ bio_s_out = NULL;
+ }
+ apps_shutdown();
+ OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
+}
+
+static void print_stats(BIO *bio, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
+{
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld items in the session cache\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_number(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects (SSL_connect())\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client renegotiates (SSL_connect())\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects that finished\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts (SSL_accept())\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server renegotiates (SSL_accept())\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts that finished\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache misses\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache timeouts\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld callback cache hits\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ssl_ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld cache full overflows (%ld allowed)\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ssl_ctx),
+ SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ssl_ctx));
+}
+
+static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
+{
+ char *buf = NULL;
+ fd_set readfds;
+ int ret = 1, width;
+ int k, i;
+ unsigned long l;
+ SSL *con = NULL;
+ BIO *sbio;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_CTX *kctx;
+#endif
+ struct timeval timeout;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+ struct timeval tv;
+#else
+ struct timeval *timeoutp;
+#endif
+
+ if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bufsize)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+ if (s_nbio) {
+ unsigned long sl = 1;
+
+ if (!s_quiet)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "turning on non blocking io\n");
+ if (BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &sl) < 0)
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (con == NULL) {
+ con = SSL_new(ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s_tlsextdebug) {
+ SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
+ SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
+ }
+ if (s_tlsextstatus) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cert_status_cb);
+ tlscstatp.err = bio_err;
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, &tlscstatp);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if ((kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) {
+ SSL_set0_kssl_ctx(con, kctx);
+ kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVICE, KRB5SVC);
+ kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_KEYTAB, KRB5KEYTAB);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ if (context)
+ SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context));
+ }
+ SSL_clear(con);
+#if 0
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(con, "Test server", 11);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ if (SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) {
+
+ sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ if (enable_timeouts) {
+ timeout.tv_sec = 0;
+ timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT;
+ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
+
+ timeout.tv_sec = 0;
+ timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT;
+ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
+ }
+
+ if (socket_mtu) {
+ if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n",
+ DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con));
+ ret = -1;
+ BIO_free(sbio);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
+ if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n");
+ ret = -1;
+ BIO_free(sbio);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ /* want to do MTU discovery */
+ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL);
+
+ /* turn on cookie exchange */
+ SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
+ } else
+ sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ if (s_nbio_test) {
+ BIO *test;
+
+ test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test());
+ sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ if (jpake_secret)
+ jpake_server_auth(bio_s_out, sbio, jpake_secret);
+#endif
+
+ SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio);
+ SSL_set_accept_state(con);
+ /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */
+
+ if (s_debug) {
+ SSL_set_debug(con, 1);
+ BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback);
+ BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out);
+ }
+ if (s_msg) {
+ SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
+ SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_out);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s_tlsextdebug) {
+ SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
+ SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ width = s + 1;
+ for (;;) {
+ int read_from_terminal;
+ int read_from_sslcon;
+
+ read_from_terminal = 0;
+ read_from_sslcon = SSL_pending(con);
+
+ if (!read_from_sslcon) {
+ FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+ openssl_fdset(fileno(stdin), &readfds);
+#endif
+ openssl_fdset(s, &readfds);
+ /*
+ * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is
+ * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is
+ * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler:
+ * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or
+ * (void *).
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+ /*
+ * Under DOS (non-djgpp) and Windows we can't select on stdin:
+ * only on sockets. As a workaround we timeout the select every
+ * second and check for any keypress. In a proper Windows
+ * application we wouldn't do this because it is inefficient.
+ */
+ tv.tv_sec = 1;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+ if ((i < 0) || (!i && !_kbhit()))
+ continue;
+ if (_kbhit())
+ read_from_terminal = 1;
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+ /* Under BeOS-R5 the situation is similar to DOS */
+ tv.tv_sec = 1;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ (void)fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
+ i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+ if ((i < 0) || (!i && read(fileno(stdin), buf, 0) < 0))
+ continue;
+ if (read(fileno(stdin), buf, 0) >= 0)
+ read_from_terminal = 1;
+ (void)fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, 0);
+#else
+ if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION) &&
+ DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout))
+ timeoutp = &timeout;
+ else
+ timeoutp = NULL;
+
+ i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, timeoutp);
+
+ if ((SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occured\n");
+ }
+
+ if (i <= 0)
+ continue;
+ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), &readfds))
+ read_from_terminal = 1;
+#endif
+ if (FD_ISSET(s, &readfds))
+ read_from_sslcon = 1;
+ }
+ if (read_from_terminal) {
+ if (s_crlf) {
+ int j, lf_num;
+
+ i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize / 2);
+ lf_num = 0;
+ /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+ if (buf[j] == '\n')
+ lf_num++;
+ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+ buf[j + lf_num] = buf[j];
+ if (buf[j] == '\n') {
+ lf_num--;
+ i++;
+ buf[j + lf_num] = '\r';
+ }
+ }
+ assert(lf_num == 0);
+ } else
+ i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize);
+ if (!s_quiet) {
+ if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'Q')) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
+ SHUTDOWN(s);
+ close_accept_socket();
+ ret = -11;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'q')) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
+ if (SSL_version(con) != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ SHUTDOWN(s);
+ /*
+ * close_accept_socket(); ret= -11;
+ */
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ if ((buf[0] == 'B') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n");
+ SSL_heartbeat(con);
+ i = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
+ if ((buf[0] == 'r') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) {
+ SSL_renegotiate(con);
+ i = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+ printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i);
+ i = 0; /* 13; */
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * strcpy(buf,"server side RE-NEGOTIATE\n");
+ */
+ }
+ if ((buf[0] == 'R') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) {
+ SSL_set_verify(con,
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
+ NULL);
+ SSL_renegotiate(con);
+ i = SSL_do_handshake(con);
+ printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i);
+ i = 0; /* 13; */
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * strcpy(buf,"server side RE-NEGOTIATE asking for client
+ * cert\n");
+ */
+ }
+ if (buf[0] == 'P') {
+ static const char *str = "Lets print some clear text\n";
+ BIO_write(SSL_get_wbio(con), str, strlen(str));
+ }
+ if (buf[0] == 'S') {
+ print_stats(bio_s_out, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con));
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
+#endif
+ l = k = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* should do a select for the write */
+#ifdef RENEG
+ {
+ static count = 0;
+ if (++count == 100) {
+ count = 0;
+ SSL_renegotiate(con);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ while (SSL_get_error(con, k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during write\n");
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+ k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i);
+ }
+#endif
+ switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Write BLOCK\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ /* break; */
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (k > 0) {
+ l += k;
+ i -= k;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (read_from_sslcon) {
+ if (!SSL_is_init_finished(con)) {
+ i = init_ssl_connection(con);
+
+ if (i < 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto err;
+ } else if (i == 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ again:
+ i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ while (SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+ i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize);
+ }
+#endif
+ switch (SSL_get_error(con, i)) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ ascii2ebcdic(buf, buf, i);
+#endif
+ raw_write_stdout(buf, (unsigned int)i);
+ if (SSL_pending(con))
+ goto again;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Read BLOCK\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n");
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ err:
+ if (con != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "shutting down SSL\n");
+#if 1
+ SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+#else
+ SSL_shutdown(con);
+#endif
+ SSL_free(con);
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n");
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, bufsize);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n");
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static void close_accept_socket(void)
+{
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "shutdown accept socket\n");
+ if (accept_socket >= 0) {
+ SHUTDOWN2(accept_socket);
+ }
+}
+
+static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
+{
+ int i;
+ const char *str;
+ X509 *peer;
+ long verify_error;
+ MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ];
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ char *client_princ;
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ const unsigned char *next_proto_neg;
+ unsigned next_proto_neg_len;
+#endif
+ unsigned char *exportedkeymat;
+
+ i = SSL_accept(con);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+ i = SSL_accept(con);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ if (BIO_sock_should_retry(i)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DELAY\n");
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR\n");
+ verify_error = SSL_get_verify_result(con);
+ if (verify_error != X509_V_OK) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:%s\n",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_error));
+ } else
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(bio_s_out, SSL_get_session(con));
+
+ peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
+ if (peer != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Client certificate\n");
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_s_out, peer);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "subject=%s\n", buf);
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer), buf, sizeof buf);
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "issuer=%s\n", buf);
+ X509_free(peer);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, sizeof buf) != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Shared ciphers:%s\n", buf);
+ str = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CIPHER is %s\n", (str != NULL) ? str : "(NONE)");
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len);
+ if (next_proto_neg) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "NEXTPROTO is ");
+ BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len);
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ {
+ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile
+ = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(con);
+
+ if (srtp_profile)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
+ srtp_profile->name);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (SSL_cache_hit(con))
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Reused session-id\n");
+ if (SSL_ctrl(con, SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS, 0, NULL) &
+ TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Peer has incorrect TLSv1 block padding\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ client_princ = kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ(SSL_get0_kssl_ctx(con));
+ if (client_princ != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Kerberos peer principal is %s\n",
+ client_princ);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
+ SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT");
+ if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Keying material exporter:\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen);
+ exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen);
+ if (exportedkeymat != NULL) {
+ if (!SSL_export_keying_material(con, exportedkeymat,
+ keymatexportlen,
+ keymatexportlabel,
+ strlen(keymatexportlabel),
+ NULL, 0, 0)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Error\n");
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Keying material: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]);
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile)
+{
+ DH *ret = NULL;
+ BIO *bio;
+
+ if ((bio = BIO_new_file(dhfile, "r")) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ err:
+ if (bio != NULL)
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+char *client_princ;
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+static int load_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file)
+{
+ FILE *in;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+
+ if ((in = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (PEM_read_X509(in, &x, NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x);
+ }
+ if (x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+ fclose(in);
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
+{
+ char *buf = NULL;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int i, j, k, dot;
+ SSL *con;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ BIO *io, *ssl_bio, *sbio;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_CTX *kctx;
+#endif
+
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bufsize);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ io = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+ if (s_nbio) {
+ unsigned long sl = 1;
+
+ if (!s_quiet)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "turning on non blocking io\n");
+ if (BIO_socket_ioctl(s, FIONBIO, &sl) < 0)
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */
+ if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io, bufsize))
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((con = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s_tlsextdebug) {
+ SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
+ SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if ((kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL) {
+ kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVICE, KRB5SVC);
+ kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_KEYTAB, KRB5KEYTAB);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ if (context)
+ SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context));
+
+ sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ if (s_nbio_test) {
+ BIO *test;
+
+ test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test());
+ sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio);
+ }
+ SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio);
+ SSL_set_accept_state(con);
+
+ /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */
+ BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, con, BIO_CLOSE);
+ BIO_push(io, ssl_bio);
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()), io);
+#endif
+
+ if (s_debug) {
+ SSL_set_debug(con, 1);
+ BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback);
+ BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out);
+ }
+ if (s_msg) {
+ SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
+ SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_out);
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (hack) {
+ i = SSL_accept(con);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ while (i <= 0
+ && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+ i = SSL_accept(con);
+ }
+#endif
+ switch (SSL_get_error(con, i)) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ continue;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ SSL_renegotiate(con);
+ SSL_write(con, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ i = BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1);
+ if (i < 0) { /* error */
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) {
+ if (!s_quiet)
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
+ && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+ delay(1000);
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
+ sleep(1);
+#endif
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else if (i == 0) { /* end of input */
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* else we have data */
+ if (((www == 1) && (strncmp("GET ", buf, 4) == 0)) ||
+ ((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 11) == 0))) {
+ char *p;
+ X509 *peer;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ static const char *space = " ";
+
+ BIO_puts(io,
+ "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n");
+ BIO_puts(io, "<HTML><BODY BGCOLOR=\"#ffffff\">\n");
+ BIO_puts(io, "<pre>\n");
+/* BIO_puts(io,SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));*/
+ BIO_puts(io, "\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < local_argc; i++) {
+ BIO_puts(io, local_argv[i]);
+ BIO_write(io, " ", 1);
+ }
+ BIO_puts(io, "\n");
+
+ BIO_printf(io,
+ "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
+ SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ?
+ "" : " NOT");
+
+ /*
+ * The following is evil and should not really be done
+ */
+ BIO_printf(io, "Ciphers supported in s_server binary\n");
+ sk = SSL_get_ciphers(con);
+ j = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk);
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ BIO_printf(io, "%-11s:%-25s",
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ if ((((i + 1) % 2) == 0) && (i + 1 != j))
+ BIO_puts(io, "\n");
+ }
+ BIO_puts(io, "\n");
+ p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, bufsize);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(io,
+ "---\nCiphers common between both SSL end points:\n");
+ j = i = 0;
+ while (*p) {
+ if (*p == ':') {
+ BIO_write(io, space, 26 - j);
+ i++;
+ j = 0;
+ BIO_write(io, ((i % 3) ? " " : "\n"), 1);
+ } else {
+ BIO_write(io, p, 1);
+ j++;
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+ BIO_puts(io, "\n");
+ }
+ BIO_printf(io, (SSL_cache_hit(con)
+ ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, "));
+ c = SSL_get_current_cipher(con);
+ BIO_printf(io, "%s, Cipher is %s\n",
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ SSL_SESSION_print(io, SSL_get_session(con));
+ BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
+ print_stats(io, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con));
+ BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
+ peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
+ if (peer != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(io, "Client certificate\n");
+ X509_print(io, peer);
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(io, peer);
+ } else
+ BIO_puts(io, "no client certificate available\n");
+ BIO_puts(io, "</BODY></HTML>\r\n\r\n");
+ break;
+ } else if ((www == 2 || www == 3)
+ && (strncmp("GET /", buf, 5) == 0)) {
+ BIO *file;
+ char *p, *e;
+ static const char *text =
+ "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n";
+
+ /* skip the '/' */
+ p = &(buf[5]);
+
+ dot = 1;
+ for (e = p; *e != '\0'; e++) {
+ if (e[0] == ' ')
+ break;
+
+ switch (dot) {
+ case 1:
+ dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 2 : 0;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 3 : 0;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ dot = (e[0] == '/') ? -1 : 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (dot == 0)
+ dot = (e[0] == '/') ? 1 : 0;
+ }
+ dot = (dot == 3) || (dot == -1); /* filename contains ".."
+ * component */
+
+ if (*e == '\0') {
+ BIO_puts(io, text);
+ BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid file name\r\n", p);
+ break;
+ }
+ *e = '\0';
+
+ if (dot) {
+ BIO_puts(io, text);
+ BIO_printf(io, "'%s' contains '..' reference\r\n", p);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (*p == '/') {
+ BIO_puts(io, text);
+ BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid path\r\n", p);
+ break;
+ }
+#if 0
+ /* append if a directory lookup */
+ if (e[-1] == '/')
+ strcat(p, "index.html");
+#endif
+
+ /* if a directory, do the index thang */
+ if (app_isdir(p) > 0) {
+#if 0 /* must check buffer size */
+ strcat(p, "/index.html");
+#else
+ BIO_puts(io, text);
+ BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is a directory\r\n", p);
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if ((file = BIO_new_file(p, "r")) == NULL) {
+ BIO_puts(io, text);
+ BIO_printf(io, "Error opening '%s'\r\n", p);
+ ERR_print_errors(io);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!s_quiet)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "FILE:%s\n", p);
+
+ if (www == 2) {
+ i = strlen(p);
+ if (((i > 5) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 5]), ".html") == 0)) ||
+ ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".php") == 0)) ||
+ ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".htm") == 0)))
+ BIO_puts(io,
+ "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n");
+ else
+ BIO_puts(io,
+ "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n");
+ }
+ /* send the file */
+ for (;;) {
+ i = BIO_read(file, buf, bufsize);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ break;
+
+#ifdef RENEG
+ total_bytes += i;
+ fprintf(stderr, "%d\n", i);
+ if (total_bytes > 3 * 1024) {
+ total_bytes = 0;
+ fprintf(stderr, "RENEGOTIATE\n");
+ SSL_renegotiate(con);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (j = 0; j < i;) {
+#ifdef RENEG
+ {
+ static count = 0;
+ if (++count == 13) {
+ SSL_renegotiate(con);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ k = BIO_write(io, &(buf[j]), i - j);
+ if (k <= 0) {
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(io))
+ goto write_error;
+ else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "rwrite W BLOCK\n");
+ }
+ } else {
+ j += k;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ write_error:
+ BIO_free(file);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ i = (int)BIO_flush(io);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(io))
+ break;
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
+ end:
+#if 1
+ /* make sure we re-use sessions */
+ SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+#else
+ /* This kills performance */
+ /*
+ * SSL_shutdown(con); A shutdown gets sent in the BIO_free_all(io)
+ * procession
+ */
+#endif
+
+ err:
+
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n");
+
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ if (io != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(io);
+/* if (ssl_bio != NULL) BIO_free(ssl_bio);*/
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+{
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+ static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (!rsa_tmp && ((bn = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Allocation error in generating RSA key\n");
+ if (!rsa_tmp && bn) {
+ if (!s_quiet) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating temp (%d bit) RSA key...",
+ keylength);
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+ }
+ if (!BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4) || ((rsa_tmp = RSA_new()) == NULL) ||
+ !RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_tmp, keylength, bn, NULL)) {
+ if (rsa_tmp)
+ RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
+ rsa_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+ if (!s_quiet) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+ }
+ BN_free(bn);
+ }
+ return (rsa_tmp);
+}
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int *id_len)
+{
+ unsigned int count = 0;
+ do {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix
+ * is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg.
+ * the server could only possibly create 1 session ID (ie. the
+ * prefix!) so all future session negotiations will fail due to
+ * conflicts.
+ */
+ memcpy(id, session_id_prefix,
+ (strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ?
+ strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len);
+ }
+ while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+ (++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+ if (count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/appveyor.yml (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/appveyor.yml)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/appveyor.yml (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/appveyor.yml 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+platform:
+ - x86
+ - x64
+
+environment:
+ matrix:
+ - VSVER: 9
+ - VSVER: 10
+ - VSVER: 11
+ - VSVER: 12
+ - VSVER: 14
+
+configuration:
+ - plain
+ - shared
+
+matrix:
+ allow_failures:
+ - platform: x64
+ VSVER: 9
+ - platform: x64
+ VSVER: 10
+ - platform: x64
+ VSVER: 11
+
+before_build:
+ - ps: >-
+ If ($env:Platform -Match "x86") {
+ $env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="x86"
+ $env:TARGET="VC-WIN32"
+ $env:DO="do_ms"
+ } Else {
+ $env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="amd64"
+ $env:TARGET="VC-WIN64A"
+ $env:DO="do_win64a"
+ }
+ - ps: >-
+ If ($env:Configuration -Like "*shared*") {
+ $env:MAK="ntdll.mak"
+ } Else {
+ $env:MAK="nt.mak"
+ }
+ - ps: $env:VSCOMNTOOLS=(Get-Content ("env:VS" + "$env:VSVER" + "0COMNTOOLS"))
+ - call "%VSCOMNTOOLS%\..\..\VC\vcvarsall.bat" %VCVARS_PLATFORM%
+ - perl Configure %TARGET% no-asm
+ - call ms\%DO%
+
+build_script:
+ - nmake /f ms\%MAK%
+
+test_script:
+ - nmake /f ms\%MAK% test
+
+notifications:
+ - provider: Email
+ to:
+ - openssl-commits at openssl.org
+ on_build_success: false
+ on_build_failure: true
+ on_build_status_changed: true
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2980 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# Version 4.3.
-#
-# You might fail to appreciate this module performance from the first
-# try. If compared to "vanilla" linux-ia32-icc target, i.e. considered
-# to be *the* best Intel C compiler without -KPIC, performance appears
-# to be virtually identical... But try to re-configure with shared
-# library support... Aha! Intel compiler "suddenly" lags behind by 30%
-# [on P4, more on others]:-) And if compared to position-independent
-# code generated by GNU C, this code performs *more* than *twice* as
-# fast! Yes, all this buzz about PIC means that unlike other hand-
-# coded implementations, this one was explicitly designed to be safe
-# to use even in shared library context... This also means that this
-# code isn't necessarily absolutely fastest "ever," because in order
-# to achieve position independence an extra register has to be
-# off-loaded to stack, which affects the benchmark result.
-#
-# Special note about instruction choice. Do you recall RC4_INT code
-# performing poorly on P4? It might be the time to figure out why.
-# RC4_INT code implies effective address calculations in base+offset*4
-# form. Trouble is that it seems that offset scaling turned to be
-# critical path... At least eliminating scaling resulted in 2.8x RC4
-# performance improvement [as you might recall]. As AES code is hungry
-# for scaling too, I [try to] avoid the latter by favoring off-by-2
-# shifts and masking the result with 0xFF<<2 instead of "boring" 0xFF.
-#
-# As was shown by Dean Gaudet <dean at arctic.org>, the above note turned
-# void. Performance improvement with off-by-2 shifts was observed on
-# intermediate implementation, which was spilling yet another register
-# to stack... Final offset*4 code below runs just a tad faster on P4,
-# but exhibits up to 10% improvement on other cores.
-#
-# Second version is "monolithic" replacement for aes_core.c, which in
-# addition to AES_[de|en]crypt implements private_AES_set_[de|en]cryption_key.
-# This made it possible to implement little-endian variant of the
-# algorithm without modifying the base C code. Motivating factor for
-# the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
-# register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
-# Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
-# better performance on most recent \xB5-archs...
-#
-# Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
-# up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
-# observed on P4 core, where "overall" imrovement coefficient, i.e. if
-# compared to PIC generated by GCC and in CBC mode, was observed to be
-# as large as 4x:-) CBC performance is virtually identical to ECB now
-# and on some platforms even better, e.g. 17.6 "small" cycles/byte on
-# Opteron, because certain function prologues and epilogues are
-# effectively taken out of the loop...
-#
-# Version 3.2 implements compressed tables and prefetch of these tables
-# in CBC[!] mode. Former means that 3/4 of table references are now
-# misaligned, which unfortunately has negative impact on elder IA-32
-# implementations, Pentium suffered 30% penalty, PIII - 10%.
-#
-# Version 3.3 avoids L1 cache aliasing between stack frame and
-# S-boxes, and 3.4 - L1 cache aliasing even between key schedule. The
-# latter is achieved by copying the key schedule to controlled place in
-# stack. This unfortunately has rather strong impact on small block CBC
-# performance, ~2x deterioration on 16-byte block if compared to 3.3.
-#
-# Version 3.5 checks if there is L1 cache aliasing between user-supplied
-# key schedule and S-boxes and abstains from copying the former if
-# there is no. This allows end-user to consciously retain small block
-# performance by aligning key schedule in specific manner.
-#
-# Version 3.6 compresses Td4 to 256 bytes and prefetches it in ECB.
-#
-# Current ECB performance numbers for 128-bit key in CPU cycles per
-# processed byte [measure commonly used by AES benchmarkers] are:
-#
-# small footprint fully unrolled
-# P4 24 22
-# AMD K8 20 19
-# PIII 25 23
-# Pentium 81 78
-#
-# Version 3.7 reimplements outer rounds as "compact." Meaning that
-# first and last rounds reference compact 256 bytes S-box. This means
-# that first round consumes a lot more CPU cycles and that encrypt
-# and decrypt performance becomes asymmetric. Encrypt performance
-# drops by 10-12%, while decrypt - by 20-25%:-( 256 bytes S-box is
-# aggressively pre-fetched.
-#
-# Version 4.0 effectively rolls back to 3.6 and instead implements
-# additional set of functions, _[x86|sse]_AES_[en|de]crypt_compact,
-# which use exclusively 256 byte S-box. These functions are to be
-# called in modes not concealing plain text, such as ECB, or when
-# we're asked to process smaller amount of data [or unconditionally
-# on hyper-threading CPU]. Currently it's called unconditionally from
-# AES_[en|de]crypt, which affects all modes, but CBC. CBC routine
-# still needs to be modified to switch between slower and faster
-# mode when appropriate... But in either case benchmark landscape
-# changes dramatically and below numbers are CPU cycles per processed
-# byte for 128-bit key.
-#
-# ECB encrypt ECB decrypt CBC large chunk
-# P4 56[60] 84[100] 23
-# AMD K8 48[44] 70[79] 18
-# PIII 41[50] 61[91] 24
-# Core 2 32[38] 45[70] 18.5
-# Pentium 120 160 77
-#
-# Version 4.1 switches to compact S-box even in key schedule setup.
-#
-# Version 4.2 prefetches compact S-box in every SSE round or in other
-# words every cache-line is *guaranteed* to be accessed within ~50
-# cycles window. Why just SSE? Because it's needed on hyper-threading
-# CPU! Which is also why it's prefetched with 64 byte stride. Best
-# part is that it has no negative effect on performance:-)
-#
-# Version 4.3 implements switch between compact and non-compact block
-# functions in AES_cbc_encrypt depending on how much data was asked
-# to be processed in one stroke.
-#
-######################################################################
-# Timing attacks are classified in two classes: synchronous when
-# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collects
-# timing data of various character afterwards, and asynchronous when
-# malicious code is executed on same CPU simultaneously with AES,
-# instruments itself and performs statistical analysis of this data.
-#
-# As far as synchronous attacks go the root to the AES timing
-# vulnerability is twofold. Firstly, of 256 S-box elements at most 160
-# are referred to in single 128-bit block operation. Well, in C
-# implementation with 4 distinct tables it's actually as little as 40
-# references per 256 elements table, but anyway... Secondly, even
-# though S-box elements are clustered into smaller amount of cache-
-# lines, smaller than 160 and even 40, it turned out that for certain
-# plain-text pattern[s] or simply put chosen plain-text and given key
-# few cache-lines remain unaccessed during block operation. Now, if
-# attacker can figure out this access pattern, he can deduct the key
-# [or at least part of it]. The natural way to mitigate this kind of
-# attacks is to minimize the amount of cache-lines in S-box and/or
-# prefetch them to ensure that every one is accessed for more uniform
-# timing. But note that *if* plain-text was concealed in such way that
-# input to block function is distributed *uniformly*, then attack
-# wouldn't apply. Now note that some encryption modes, most notably
-# CBC, do mask the plain-text in this exact way [secure cipher output
-# is distributed uniformly]. Yes, one still might find input that
-# would reveal the information about given key, but if amount of
-# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount of possible key
-# combinations then attack becomes infeasible. This is why revised
-# AES_cbc_encrypt "dares" to switch to larger S-box when larger chunk
-# of data is to be processed in one stroke. The current size limit of
-# 512 bytes is chosen to provide same [diminishigly low] probability
-# for cache-line to remain untouched in large chunk operation with
-# large S-box as for single block operation with compact S-box and
-# surely needs more careful consideration...
-#
-# As for asynchronous attacks. There are two flavours: attacker code
-# being interleaved with AES on hyper-threading CPU at *instruction*
-# level, and two processes time sharing single core. As for latter.
-# Two vectors. 1. Given that attacker process has higher priority,
-# yield execution to process performing AES just before timer fires
-# off the scheduler, immediately regain control of CPU and analyze the
-# cache state. For this attack to be efficient attacker would have to
-# effectively slow down the operation by several *orders* of magnitute,
-# by ratio of time slice to duration of handful of AES rounds, which
-# unlikely to remain unnoticed. Not to mention that this also means
-# that he would spend correspondigly more time to collect enough
-# statistical data to mount the attack. It's probably appropriate to
-# say that if adeversary reckons that this attack is beneficial and
-# risks to be noticed, you probably have larger problems having him
-# mere opportunity. In other words suggested code design expects you
-# to preclude/mitigate this attack by overall system security design.
-# 2. Attacker manages to make his code interrupt driven. In order for
-# this kind of attack to be feasible, interrupt rate has to be high
-# enough, again comparable to duration of handful of AES rounds. But
-# is there interrupt source of such rate? Hardly, not even 1Gbps NIC
-# generates interrupts at such raging rate...
-#
-# And now back to the former, hyper-threading CPU or more specifically
-# Intel P4. Recall that asynchronous attack implies that malicious
-# code instruments itself. And naturally instrumentation granularity
-# has be noticeably lower than duration of codepath accessing S-box.
-# Given that all cache-lines are accessed during that time that is.
-# Current implementation accesses *all* cache-lines within ~50 cycles
-# window, which is actually *less* than RDTSC latency on Intel P4!
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
-require "x86asm.pl";
-
-&asm_init($ARGV[0],"aes-586.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
-&static_label("AES_Te");
-&static_label("AES_Td");
-
-$s0="eax";
-$s1="ebx";
-$s2="ecx";
-$s3="edx";
-$key="edi";
-$acc="esi";
-$tbl="ebp";
-
-# stack frame layout in _[x86|sse]_AES_* routines, frame is allocated
-# by caller
-$__ra=&DWP(0,"esp"); # return address
-$__s0=&DWP(4,"esp"); # s0 backing store
-$__s1=&DWP(8,"esp"); # s1 backing store
-$__s2=&DWP(12,"esp"); # s2 backing store
-$__s3=&DWP(16,"esp"); # s3 backing store
-$__key=&DWP(20,"esp"); # pointer to key schedule
-$__end=&DWP(24,"esp"); # pointer to end of key schedule
-$__tbl=&DWP(28,"esp"); # %ebp backing store
-
-# stack frame layout in AES_[en|crypt] routines, which differs from
-# above by 4 and overlaps by %ebp backing store
-$_tbl=&DWP(24,"esp");
-$_esp=&DWP(28,"esp");
-
-sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
-
-$speed_limit=512; # chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
- # processed with compact routine in CBC mode
-$small_footprint=1; # $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
- # recent \xB5-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
- # I favor compact code to minimize cache
- # contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
- # in real-life applications...
-
-$vertical_spin=0; # shift "verticaly" defaults to 0, because of
- # its proof-of-concept status...
-# Note that there is no decvert(), as well as last encryption round is
-# performed with "horizontal" shifts. This is because this "vertical"
-# implementation [one which groups shifts on a given $s[i] to form a
-# "column," unlike "horizontal" one, which groups shifts on different
-# $s[i] to form a "row"] is work in progress. It was observed to run
-# few percents faster on Intel cores, but not AMD. On AMD K8 core it's
-# whole 12% slower:-( So we face a trade-off... Shall it be resolved
-# some day? Till then the code is considered experimental and by
-# default remains dormant...
-
-sub encvert()
-{ my ($te, at s) = @_;
- my $v0 = $acc, $v1 = $key;
-
- &mov ($v0,$s[3]); # copy s3
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$s[2]); # save s2
- &mov ($v1,$s[0]); # copy s0
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s[1]); # save s1
-
- &movz ($s[2],&HB($s[0]));
- &and ($s[0],0xFF);
- &mov ($s[0],&DWP(0,$te,$s[0],8)); # s0>>0
- &shr ($v1,16);
- &mov ($s[3],&DWP(3,$te,$s[2],8)); # s0>>8
- &movz ($s[1],&HB($v1));
- &and ($v1,0xFF);
- &mov ($s[2],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s0>>16
- &mov ($v1,$v0);
- &mov ($s[1],&DWP(1,$te,$s[1],8)); # s0>>24
-
- &and ($v0,0xFF);
- &xor ($s[3],&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>0
- &movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
- &shr ($v1,16);
- &xor ($s[2],&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>8
- &movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
- &and ($v1,0xFF);
- &xor ($s[1],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s3>>16
- &mov ($v1,&DWP(4,"esp")); # restore s2
- &xor ($s[0],&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>24
-
- &mov ($v0,$v1);
- &and ($v1,0xFF);
- &xor ($s[2],&DWP(0,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>0
- &movz ($v1,&HB($v0));
- &shr ($v0,16);
- &xor ($s[1],&DWP(3,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>8
- &movz ($v1,&HB($v0));
- &and ($v0,0xFF);
- &xor ($s[0],&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # s2>>16
- &mov ($v0,&DWP(8,"esp")); # restore s1
- &xor ($s[3],&DWP(1,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>24
-
- &mov ($v1,$v0);
- &and ($v0,0xFF);
- &xor ($s[1],&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>0
- &movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
- &shr ($v1,16);
- &xor ($s[0],&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>8
- &movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
- &and ($v1,0xFF);
- &xor ($s[3],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s1>>16
- &mov ($key,$__key); # reincarnate v1 as key
- &xor ($s[2],&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>24
-}
-
-# Another experimental routine, which features "horizontal spin," but
-# eliminates one reference to stack. Strangely enough runs slower...
-sub enchoriz()
-{ my $v0 = $key, $v1 = $acc;
-
- &movz ($v0,&LB($s0)); # 3, 2, 1, 0*
- &rotr ($s2,8); # 8,11,10, 9
- &mov ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 0
- &movz ($v0,&HB($s1)); # 7, 6, 5*, 4
- &rotr ($s3,16); # 13,12,15,14
- &xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 5
- &movz ($v0,&HB($s2)); # 8,11,10*, 9
- &rotr ($s0,16); # 1, 0, 3, 2
- &xor ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 10
- &movz ($v0,&HB($s3)); # 13,12,15*,14
- &xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 15, t[0] collected
- &mov ($__s0,$v1); # t[0] saved
-
- &movz ($v0,&LB($s1)); # 7, 6, 5, 4*
- &shr ($s1,16); # -, -, 7, 6
- &mov ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 4
- &movz ($v0,&LB($s3)); # 13,12,15,14*
- &xor ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 14
- &movz ($v0,&HB($s0)); # 1, 0, 3*, 2
- &and ($s3,0xffff0000); # 13,12, -, -
- &xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 3
- &movz ($v0,&LB($s2)); # 8,11,10, 9*
- &or ($s3,$s1); # 13,12, 7, 6
- &xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 9, t[1] collected
- &mov ($s1,$v1); # s[1]=t[1]
-
- &movz ($v0,&LB($s0)); # 1, 0, 3, 2*
- &shr ($s2,16); # -, -, 8,11
- &mov ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 2
- &movz ($v0,&HB($s3)); # 13,12, 7*, 6
- &xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 7
- &movz ($v0,&HB($s2)); # -, -, 8*,11
- &xor ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 8
- &mov ($v0,$s3);
- &shr ($v0,24); # 13
- &xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 13, t[2] collected
-
- &movz ($v0,&LB($s2)); # -, -, 8,11*
- &shr ($s0,24); # 1*
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 11
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(3,$te,$s0,8)); # 1
- &mov ($s0,$__s0); # s[0]=t[0]
- &movz ($v0,&LB($s3)); # 13,12, 7, 6*
- &shr ($s3,16); # , ,13,12
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 6
- &mov ($key,$__key); # reincarnate v0 as key
- &and ($s3,0xff); # , ,13,12*
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(0,$te,$s3,8)); # 12
- &xor ($s3,$s2); # s[2]=t[3] collected
- &mov ($s2,$v1); # s[2]=t[2]
-}
-
-# More experimental code... SSE one... Even though this one eliminates
-# *all* references to stack, it's not faster...
-sub sse_encbody()
-{
- &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 0
- &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x0d); # 7, 6, 3, 2
- &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(3,$tbl,"edx",8)); # 1
- &shr ("eax",16); # 5, 4
-
- &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 10
- &xor ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 10
- &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x08); # 13,12, 9, 8
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 11
- &xor ("edx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 11
- &shr ("ebx",16); # 15,14
-
- &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 5
- &xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 5
- &movq ("mm3",QWP(16,$key));
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 15
- &xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 15
- &movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
-
- &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 4
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 4
- &movd ("eax","mm2"); # 7, 6, 3, 2
- &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 14
- &xor ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 14
- &movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 13,12, 9, 8
-
- &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 3
- &xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 3
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 9
- &xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 9
- &movd ("mm1","ecx"); # t[1] collected
-
- &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 2
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 2
- &shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
- &punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected
- &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 8
- &xor ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 8
- &shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
-
- &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 7
- &xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 7
- &pxor ("mm0","mm3");
- &movz ("eax",&LB("eax")); # 6
- &xor ("edx",&DWP(2,$tbl,"eax",8)); # 6
- &pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x08); # 5, 4, 1, 0
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 13
- &xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 13
- &xor ("ecx",&DWP(24,$key)); # t[2]
- &movd ("mm4","ecx"); # t[2] collected
- &movz ("ebx",&LB("ebx")); # 12
- &xor ("edx",&DWP(0,$tbl,"ebx",8)); # 12
- &shr ("ecx",16);
- &movd ("eax","mm1"); # 5, 4, 1, 0
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(28,$key)); # t[3]
- &xor ("ebx","edx");
- &movd ("mm5","ebx"); # t[3] collected
- &and ("ebx",0xffff0000);
- &or ("ebx","ecx");
-
- &punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected
-}
-
-######################################################################
-# "Compact" block function
-######################################################################
-
-sub enccompact()
-{ my $Fn = mov;
- while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; }
- my ($i,$te, at s)=@_;
- my $tmp = $key;
- my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
-
- # $Fn is used in first compact round and its purpose is to
- # void restoration of some values from stack, so that after
- # 4xenccompact with extra argument $key value is left there...
- if ($i==3) { &$Fn ($key,$__key); }##%edx
- else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
- &and ($out,0xFF);
- if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1]
- if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2]
- &movz ($out,&BP(-128,$te,$out,1));
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax
- &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
- &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
- &shl ($tmp,8);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx
- else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]);
- &shr ($tmp,16); }
- if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2]
- &and ($tmp,0xFF);
- &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
- &shl ($tmp,16);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx
- elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2]
- else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]);
- &shr ($tmp,24); }
- &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
- &shl ($tmp,24);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
- if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
- if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); }
- &comment();
-}
-
-sub enctransform()
-{ my @s = ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- my $i = shift;
- my $tmp = $tbl;
- my $r2 = $key ;
-
- &mov ($acc,$s[$i]);
- &and ($acc,0x80808080);
- &mov ($tmp,$acc);
- &shr ($tmp,7);
- &lea ($r2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i]));
- &sub ($acc,$tmp);
- &and ($r2,0xfefefefe);
- &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
- &mov ($tmp,$s[$i]);
- &xor ($acc,$r2); # r2
-
- &xor ($s[$i],$acc); # r0 ^ r2
- &rotl ($s[$i],24);
- &xor ($s[$i],$acc) # ROTATE(r2^r0,24) ^ r2
- &rotr ($tmp,16);
- &xor ($s[$i],$tmp);
- &rotr ($tmp,8);
- &xor ($s[$i],$tmp);
-}
-
-&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
- # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
- &mov ($__key,$key); # save key
-
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
- &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
-
- # prefetch Te4
- &mov ($key,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($key,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($key,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($key,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
-
- &set_label("loop",16);
-
- &enccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,1);
- &enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0,1);
- &enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1,1);
- &enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2,1);
- &enctransform(2);
- &enctransform(3);
- &enctransform(0);
- &enctransform(1);
- &mov ($key,$__key);
- &mov ($tbl,$__tbl);
- &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &cmp ($key,$__end);
- &mov ($__key,$key);
- &jb (&label("loop"));
-
- &enccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- &enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
- &enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
- &enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
-
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(16,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(20,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(24,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(28,$key));
-
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
-
-######################################################################
-# "Compact" SSE block function.
-######################################################################
-#
-# Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
-# x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
-# Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
-# \xB5-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
-# better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
-# eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
-# minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.
-#
-# MMX register layout lsb
-# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
-# | mm4 | mm0 |
-# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
-# | s3 | s2 | s1 | s0 |
-# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
-# |15|14|13|12|11|10| 9| 8| 7| 6| 5| 4| 3| 2| 1| 0|
-# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
-#
-# Indexes translate as s[N/4]>>(8*(N%4)), e.g. 5 means s1>>8.
-# In this terms encryption and decryption "compact" permutation
-# matrices can be depicted as following:
-#
-# encryption lsb # decryption lsb
-# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
-# | t0 || 15 | 10 | 5 | 0 | # | t0 || 7 | 10 | 13 | 0 |
-# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
-# | t1 || 3 | 14 | 9 | 4 | # | t1 || 11 | 14 | 1 | 4 |
-# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
-# | t2 || 7 | 2 | 13 | 8 | # | t2 || 15 | 2 | 5 | 8 |
-# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
-# | t3 || 11 | 6 | 1 | 12 | # | t3 || 3 | 6 | 9 | 12 |
-# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
-#
-######################################################################
-# Why not xmm registers? Short answer. It was actually tested and
-# was not any faster, but *contrary*, most notably on Intel CPUs.
-# Longer answer. Main advantage of using mm registers is that movd
-# latency is lower, especially on Intel P4. While arithmetic
-# instructions are twice as many, they can be scheduled every cycle
-# and not every second one when they are operating on xmm register,
-# so that "arithmetic throughput" remains virtually the same. And
-# finally the code can be executed even on elder SSE-only CPUs:-)
-
-sub sse_enccompact()
-{
- &pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x08); # 5, 4, 1, 0
- &pshufw ("mm5","mm4",0x0d); # 15,14,11,10
- &movd ("eax","mm1"); # 5, 4, 1, 0
- &movd ("ebx","mm5"); # 15,14,11,10
-
- &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
- &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0
- &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x0d); # 7, 6, 3, 2
- &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1
- &movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1)); # 1
- &shl ("edx",8); # 1
- &shr ("eax",16); # 5, 4
-
- &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 10
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 10
- &shl ($acc,16); # 10
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 10
- &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x08); # 13,12, 9, 8
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 11
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 11
- &shl ($acc,24); # 11
- &or ("edx",$acc); # 11
- &shr ("ebx",16); # 15,14
-
- &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 5
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 5
- &shl ($acc,8); # 5
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 5
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 15
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 15
- &shl ($acc,24); # 15
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 15
- &movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
-
- &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 4
- &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 4
- &movd ("eax","mm2"); # 7, 6, 3, 2
- &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 14
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 14
- &shl ($acc,16); # 14
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 14
-
- &movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 13,12, 9, 8
- &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 3
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 3
- &shl ($acc,24); # 3
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 3
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 9
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 9
- &shl ($acc,8); # 9
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 9
- &movd ("mm1","ecx"); # t[1] collected
-
- &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 8
- &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 8
- &shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
- &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 2
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 2
- &shl ($acc,16); # 2
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 2
- &shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
-
- &punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected
-
- &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 7
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 7
- &shl ($acc,24); # 7
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 7
- &and ("eax",0xff); # 6
- &movz ("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1)); # 6
- &shl ("eax",16); # 6
- &or ("edx","eax"); # 6
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 13
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 13
- &shl ($acc,8); # 13
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 13
- &movd ("mm4","ecx"); # t[2] collected
- &and ("ebx",0xff); # 12
- &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1)); # 12
- &or ("edx","ebx"); # 12
- &movd ("mm5","edx"); # t[3] collected
-
- &punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected
-}
-
- if (!$x86only) {
-&function_begin_B("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
- &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0
- &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); # 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8
-
- # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
- &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
-
- &mov ($s0,0x1b1b1b1b); # magic constant
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s0);
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$s0);
-
- # prefetch Te4
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
-
- &set_label("loop",16);
- &sse_enccompact();
- &add ($key,16);
- &cmp ($key,$__end);
- &ja (&label("out"));
-
- &movq ("mm2",&QWP(8,"esp"));
- &pxor ("mm3","mm3"); &pxor ("mm7","mm7");
- &movq ("mm1","mm0"); &movq ("mm5","mm4"); # r0
- &pcmpgtb("mm3","mm0"); &pcmpgtb("mm7","mm4");
- &pand ("mm3","mm2"); &pand ("mm7","mm2");
- &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0xb1);# ROTATE(r0,16)
- &paddb ("mm0","mm0"); &paddb ("mm4","mm4");
- &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # = r2
- &pshufw ("mm3","mm2",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm7","mm6",0xb1);# r0
- &pxor ("mm1","mm0"); &pxor ("mm5","mm4"); # r0^r2
- &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= ROTATE(r0,16)
-
- &movq ("mm2","mm3"); &movq ("mm6","mm7");
- &pslld ("mm3",8); &pslld ("mm7",8);
- &psrld ("mm2",24); &psrld ("mm6",24);
- &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= r0<<8
- &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= r0>>24
-
- &movq ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm7","mm5");
- &movq ("mm2",&QWP(0,$key)); &movq ("mm6",&QWP(8,$key));
- &psrld ("mm1",8); &psrld ("mm5",8);
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
- &pslld ("mm3",24); &pslld ("mm7",24);
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
- &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= (r2^r0)<<8
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
- &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= (r2^r0)>>24
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
-
- &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6");
- &jmp (&label("loop"));
-
- &set_label("out",16);
- &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));
- &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
-
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
- }
-
-######################################################################
-# Vanilla block function.
-######################################################################
-
-sub encstep()
-{ my ($i,$te, at s) = @_;
- my $tmp = $key;
- my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
-
- # lines marked with #%e?x[i] denote "reordered" instructions...
- if ($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }##%edx
- else { &mov ($out,$s[0]);
- &and ($out,0xFF); }
- if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1]
- if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2]
- &mov ($out,&DWP(0,$te,$out,8));
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax
- &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
- &xor ($out,&DWP(3,$te,$tmp,8));
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx
- else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]);
- &shr ($tmp,16); }
- if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2]
- &and ($tmp,0xFF);
- &xor ($out,&DWP(2,$te,$tmp,8));
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx
- elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2]
- else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]);
- &shr ($tmp,24) }
- &xor ($out,&DWP(1,$te,$tmp,8));
- if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
- if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); }
- &comment();
-}
-
-sub enclast()
-{ my ($i,$te, at s)=@_;
- my $tmp = $key;
- my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
-
- if ($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }##%edx
- else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
- &and ($out,0xFF);
- if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1]
- if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2]
- &mov ($out,&DWP(2,$te,$out,8));
- &and ($out,0x000000ff);
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax
- &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
- &mov ($tmp,&DWP(0,$te,$tmp,8));
- &and ($tmp,0x0000ff00);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx
- else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]);
- &shr ($tmp,16); }
- if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2]
- &and ($tmp,0xFF);
- &mov ($tmp,&DWP(0,$te,$tmp,8));
- &and ($tmp,0x00ff0000);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx
- elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2]
- else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]);
- &shr ($tmp,24); }
- &mov ($tmp,&DWP(2,$te,$tmp,8));
- &and ($tmp,0xff000000);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
- if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
- if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); }
-}
-
-&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt");
- if ($vertical_spin) {
- # I need high parts of volatile registers to be accessible...
- &exch ($s1="edi",$key="ebx");
- &mov ($s2="esi",$acc="ecx");
- }
-
- # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
- &mov ($__key,$key); # save key
-
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
-
- if ($small_footprint) {
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
- &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
-
- &set_label("loop",16);
- if ($vertical_spin) {
- &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- } else {
- &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
- &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
- &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
- }
- &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
- &cmp ($key,$__end);
- &mov ($__key,$key);
- &jb (&label("loop"));
- }
- else {
- &cmp ($acc,10);
- &jle (&label("10rounds"));
- &cmp ($acc,12);
- &jle (&label("12rounds"));
-
- &set_label("14rounds",4);
- for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
- if ($vertical_spin) {
- &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- } else {
- &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
- &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
- &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
- }
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
- }
- &add ($key,32);
- &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key
- &set_label("12rounds",4);
- for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
- if ($vertical_spin) {
- &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- } else {
- &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
- &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
- &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
- }
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
- }
- &add ($key,32);
- &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key
- &set_label("10rounds",4);
- for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) {
- if ($vertical_spin) {
- &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- } else {
- &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
- &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
- &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
- }
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
- }
- }
-
- if ($vertical_spin) {
- # "reincarnate" some registers for "horizontal" spin...
- &mov ($s1="ebx",$key="edi");
- &mov ($s2="ecx",$acc="esi");
- }
- &enclast(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- &enclast(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
- &enclast(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
- &enclast(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
-
- &add ($key,$small_footprint?16:160);
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &ret ();
-
-&set_label("AES_Te",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
- &_data_word(0xa56363c6, 0x847c7cf8, 0x997777ee, 0x8d7b7bf6);
- &_data_word(0x0df2f2ff, 0xbd6b6bd6, 0xb16f6fde, 0x54c5c591);
- &_data_word(0x50303060, 0x03010102, 0xa96767ce, 0x7d2b2b56);
- &_data_word(0x19fefee7, 0x62d7d7b5, 0xe6abab4d, 0x9a7676ec);
- &_data_word(0x45caca8f, 0x9d82821f, 0x40c9c989, 0x877d7dfa);
- &_data_word(0x15fafaef, 0xeb5959b2, 0xc947478e, 0x0bf0f0fb);
- &_data_word(0xecadad41, 0x67d4d4b3, 0xfda2a25f, 0xeaafaf45);
- &_data_word(0xbf9c9c23, 0xf7a4a453, 0x967272e4, 0x5bc0c09b);
- &_data_word(0xc2b7b775, 0x1cfdfde1, 0xae93933d, 0x6a26264c);
- &_data_word(0x5a36366c, 0x413f3f7e, 0x02f7f7f5, 0x4fcccc83);
- &_data_word(0x5c343468, 0xf4a5a551, 0x34e5e5d1, 0x08f1f1f9);
- &_data_word(0x937171e2, 0x73d8d8ab, 0x53313162, 0x3f15152a);
- &_data_word(0x0c040408, 0x52c7c795, 0x65232346, 0x5ec3c39d);
- &_data_word(0x28181830, 0xa1969637, 0x0f05050a, 0xb59a9a2f);
- &_data_word(0x0907070e, 0x36121224, 0x9b80801b, 0x3de2e2df);
- &_data_word(0x26ebebcd, 0x6927274e, 0xcdb2b27f, 0x9f7575ea);
- &_data_word(0x1b090912, 0x9e83831d, 0x742c2c58, 0x2e1a1a34);
- &_data_word(0x2d1b1b36, 0xb26e6edc, 0xee5a5ab4, 0xfba0a05b);
- &_data_word(0xf65252a4, 0x4d3b3b76, 0x61d6d6b7, 0xceb3b37d);
- &_data_word(0x7b292952, 0x3ee3e3dd, 0x712f2f5e, 0x97848413);
- &_data_word(0xf55353a6, 0x68d1d1b9, 0x00000000, 0x2cededc1);
- &_data_word(0x60202040, 0x1ffcfce3, 0xc8b1b179, 0xed5b5bb6);
- &_data_word(0xbe6a6ad4, 0x46cbcb8d, 0xd9bebe67, 0x4b393972);
- &_data_word(0xde4a4a94, 0xd44c4c98, 0xe85858b0, 0x4acfcf85);
- &_data_word(0x6bd0d0bb, 0x2aefefc5, 0xe5aaaa4f, 0x16fbfbed);
- &_data_word(0xc5434386, 0xd74d4d9a, 0x55333366, 0x94858511);
- &_data_word(0xcf45458a, 0x10f9f9e9, 0x06020204, 0x817f7ffe);
- &_data_word(0xf05050a0, 0x443c3c78, 0xba9f9f25, 0xe3a8a84b);
- &_data_word(0xf35151a2, 0xfea3a35d, 0xc0404080, 0x8a8f8f05);
- &_data_word(0xad92923f, 0xbc9d9d21, 0x48383870, 0x04f5f5f1);
- &_data_word(0xdfbcbc63, 0xc1b6b677, 0x75dadaaf, 0x63212142);
- &_data_word(0x30101020, 0x1affffe5, 0x0ef3f3fd, 0x6dd2d2bf);
- &_data_word(0x4ccdcd81, 0x140c0c18, 0x35131326, 0x2fececc3);
- &_data_word(0xe15f5fbe, 0xa2979735, 0xcc444488, 0x3917172e);
- &_data_word(0x57c4c493, 0xf2a7a755, 0x827e7efc, 0x473d3d7a);
- &_data_word(0xac6464c8, 0xe75d5dba, 0x2b191932, 0x957373e6);
- &_data_word(0xa06060c0, 0x98818119, 0xd14f4f9e, 0x7fdcdca3);
- &_data_word(0x66222244, 0x7e2a2a54, 0xab90903b, 0x8388880b);
- &_data_word(0xca46468c, 0x29eeeec7, 0xd3b8b86b, 0x3c141428);
- &_data_word(0x79dedea7, 0xe25e5ebc, 0x1d0b0b16, 0x76dbdbad);
- &_data_word(0x3be0e0db, 0x56323264, 0x4e3a3a74, 0x1e0a0a14);
- &_data_word(0xdb494992, 0x0a06060c, 0x6c242448, 0xe45c5cb8);
- &_data_word(0x5dc2c29f, 0x6ed3d3bd, 0xefacac43, 0xa66262c4);
- &_data_word(0xa8919139, 0xa4959531, 0x37e4e4d3, 0x8b7979f2);
- &_data_word(0x32e7e7d5, 0x43c8c88b, 0x5937376e, 0xb76d6dda);
- &_data_word(0x8c8d8d01, 0x64d5d5b1, 0xd24e4e9c, 0xe0a9a949);
- &_data_word(0xb46c6cd8, 0xfa5656ac, 0x07f4f4f3, 0x25eaeacf);
- &_data_word(0xaf6565ca, 0x8e7a7af4, 0xe9aeae47, 0x18080810);
- &_data_word(0xd5baba6f, 0x887878f0, 0x6f25254a, 0x722e2e5c);
- &_data_word(0x241c1c38, 0xf1a6a657, 0xc7b4b473, 0x51c6c697);
- &_data_word(0x23e8e8cb, 0x7cdddda1, 0x9c7474e8, 0x211f1f3e);
- &_data_word(0xdd4b4b96, 0xdcbdbd61, 0x868b8b0d, 0x858a8a0f);
- &_data_word(0x907070e0, 0x423e3e7c, 0xc4b5b571, 0xaa6666cc);
- &_data_word(0xd8484890, 0x05030306, 0x01f6f6f7, 0x120e0e1c);
- &_data_word(0xa36161c2, 0x5f35356a, 0xf95757ae, 0xd0b9b969);
- &_data_word(0x91868617, 0x58c1c199, 0x271d1d3a, 0xb99e9e27);
- &_data_word(0x38e1e1d9, 0x13f8f8eb, 0xb398982b, 0x33111122);
- &_data_word(0xbb6969d2, 0x70d9d9a9, 0x898e8e07, 0xa7949433);
- &_data_word(0xb69b9b2d, 0x221e1e3c, 0x92878715, 0x20e9e9c9);
- &_data_word(0x49cece87, 0xff5555aa, 0x78282850, 0x7adfdfa5);
- &_data_word(0x8f8c8c03, 0xf8a1a159, 0x80898909, 0x170d0d1a);
- &_data_word(0xdabfbf65, 0x31e6e6d7, 0xc6424284, 0xb86868d0);
- &_data_word(0xc3414182, 0xb0999929, 0x772d2d5a, 0x110f0f1e);
- &_data_word(0xcbb0b07b, 0xfc5454a8, 0xd6bbbb6d, 0x3a16162c);
-
-#Te4 # four copies of Te4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing
- &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
- &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
- &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
- &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
- &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
- &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
- &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
- &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
- &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
- &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
- &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
- &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
- &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
- &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
- &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
- &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
- &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
- &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
- &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
- &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
- &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
- &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
- &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
- &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
- &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
- &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
- &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
- &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
- &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
- &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
- &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
- &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
-
- &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
- &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
- &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
- &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
- &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
- &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
- &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
- &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
- &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
- &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
- &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
- &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
- &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
- &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
- &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
- &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
- &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
- &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
- &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
- &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
- &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
- &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
- &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
- &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
- &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
- &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
- &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
- &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
- &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
- &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
- &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
- &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
-
- &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
- &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
- &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
- &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
- &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
- &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
- &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
- &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
- &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
- &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
- &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
- &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
- &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
- &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
- &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
- &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
- &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
- &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
- &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
- &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
- &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
- &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
- &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
- &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
- &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
- &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
- &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
- &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
- &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
- &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
- &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
- &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
-
- &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
- &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
- &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
- &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
- &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
- &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
- &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
- &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
- &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
- &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
- &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
- &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
- &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
- &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
- &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
- &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
- &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
- &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
- &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
- &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
- &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
- &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
- &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
- &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
- &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
- &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
- &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
- &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
- &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
- &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
- &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
- &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
-#rcon:
- &data_word(0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008);
- &data_word(0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080);
- &data_word(0x0000001b, 0x00000036, 0x00000000, 0x00000000);
- &data_word(0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000);
-&function_end_B("_x86_AES_encrypt");
-
-# void AES_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
-&function_begin("AES_encrypt");
- &mov ($acc,&wparam(0)); # load inp
- &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # load key
-
- &mov ($s0,"esp");
- &sub ("esp",36);
- &and ("esp",-64); # align to cache-line
-
- # place stack frame just "above" the key schedule
- &lea ($s1,&DWP(-64-63,$key));
- &sub ($s1,"esp");
- &neg ($s1);
- &and ($s1,0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
- &sub ("esp",$s1);
- &add ("esp",4); # 4 is reserved for caller's return address
- &mov ($_esp,$s0); # save stack pointer
-
- &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
- &set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop($tbl);
- &picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if (!$x86only);
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
-
- # pick Te4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule
- &lea ($s1,&DWP(768-4,"esp"));
- &sub ($s1,$tbl);
- &and ($s1,0x300);
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1));
-
- if (!$x86only) {
- &bt (&DWP(0,$s0),25); # check for SSE bit
- &jnc (&label("x86"));
-
- &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc));
- &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
- &call ("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
- &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer
- &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out
- &movq (&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0"); # write output data
- &movq (&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4");
- &emms ();
- &function_end_A();
- }
- &set_label("x86",16);
- &mov ($_tbl,$tbl);
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # load input data
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
- &call ("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
- &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer
- &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out
- &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output data
- &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
-&function_end("AES_encrypt");
-
-#--------------------------------------------------------------------#
-
-######################################################################
-# "Compact" block function
-######################################################################
-
-sub deccompact()
-{ my $Fn = mov;
- while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; }
- my ($i,$td, at s)=@_;
- my $tmp = $key;
- my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
-
- # $Fn is used in first compact round and its purpose is to
- # void restoration of some values from stack, so that after
- # 4xdeccompact with extra argument $key, $s0 and $s1 values
- # are left there...
- if($i==3) { &$Fn ($key,$__key); }
- else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
- &and ($out,0xFF);
- &movz ($out,&BP(-128,$td,$out,1));
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }
- &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
- &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1));
- &shl ($tmp,8);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc); }
- else { mov ($tmp,$s[2]); }
- &shr ($tmp,16);
- &and ($tmp,0xFF);
- &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1));
- &shl ($tmp,16);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &$Fn ($s[2],$__s1); }
- else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); }
- &shr ($tmp,24);
- &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1));
- &shl ($tmp,24);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
- if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
- if ($i==3) { &$Fn ($s[3],$__s0); }
-}
-
-# must be called with 2,3,0,1 as argument sequence!!!
-sub dectransform()
-{ my @s = ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- my $i = shift;
- my $tmp = $key;
- my $tp2 = @s[($i+2)%4]; $tp2 = @s[2] if ($i==1);
- my $tp4 = @s[($i+3)%4]; $tp4 = @s[3] if ($i==1);
- my $tp8 = $tbl;
-
- &mov ($acc,$s[$i]);
- &and ($acc,0x80808080);
- &mov ($tmp,$acc);
- &shr ($tmp,7);
- &lea ($tp2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i]));
- &sub ($acc,$tmp);
- &and ($tp2,0xfefefefe);
- &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
- &xor ($acc,$tp2);
- &mov ($tp2,$acc);
-
- &and ($acc,0x80808080);
- &mov ($tmp,$acc);
- &shr ($tmp,7);
- &lea ($tp4,&DWP(0,$tp2,$tp2));
- &sub ($acc,$tmp);
- &and ($tp4,0xfefefefe);
- &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
- &xor ($tp2,$s[$i]); # tp2^tp1
- &xor ($acc,$tp4);
- &mov ($tp4,$acc);
-
- &and ($acc,0x80808080);
- &mov ($tmp,$acc);
- &shr ($tmp,7);
- &lea ($tp8,&DWP(0,$tp4,$tp4));
- &sub ($acc,$tmp);
- &and ($tp8,0xfefefefe);
- &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
- &xor ($tp4,$s[$i]); # tp4^tp1
- &rotl ($s[$i],8); # = ROTATE(tp1,8)
- &xor ($tp8,$acc);
-
- &xor ($s[$i],$tp2);
- &xor ($tp2,$tp8);
- &rotl ($tp2,24);
- &xor ($s[$i],$tp4);
- &xor ($tp4,$tp8);
- &rotl ($tp4,16);
- &xor ($s[$i],$tp8); # ^= tp8^(tp4^tp1)^(tp2^tp1)
- &rotl ($tp8,8);
- &xor ($s[$i],$tp2); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24)
- &xor ($s[$i],$tp4); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16)
- &mov ($s[0],$__s0) if($i==2); #prefetch $s0
- &mov ($s[1],$__s1) if($i==3); #prefetch $s1
- &mov ($s[2],$__s2) if($i==1);
- &xor ($s[$i],$tp8); # ^= ROTATE(tp8,8)
-
- &mov ($s[3],$__s3) if($i==1);
- &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$s[$i]) if($i>=2);
-}
-
-&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
- # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
- &mov ($__key,$key); # save key
-
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
-
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
- &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
-
- # prefetch Td4
- &mov ($key,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($key,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($key,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($key,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
-
- &set_label("loop",16);
-
- &deccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1,1);
- &deccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2,1);
- &deccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3,1);
- &deccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0,1);
- &dectransform(2);
- &dectransform(3);
- &dectransform(0);
- &dectransform(1);
- &mov ($key,$__key);
- &mov ($tbl,$__tbl);
- &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &cmp ($key,$__end);
- &mov ($__key,$key);
- &jb (&label("loop"));
-
- &deccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
- &deccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
- &deccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
- &deccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
-
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(16,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(20,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(24,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(28,$key));
-
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
-
-######################################################################
-# "Compact" SSE block function.
-######################################################################
-
-sub sse_deccompact()
-{
- &pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x0c); # 7, 6, 1, 0
- &movd ("eax","mm1"); # 7, 6, 1, 0
-
- &pshufw ("mm5","mm4",0x09); # 13,12,11,10
- &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
- &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0
- &movd ("ebx","mm5"); # 13,12,11,10
- &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1
- &movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1)); # 1
- &shl ("edx",8); # 1
-
- &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x06); # 3, 2, 5, 4
- &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 10
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 10
- &shl ($acc,16); # 10
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 10
- &shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 11
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 11
- &shl ($acc,24); # 11
- &or ("edx",$acc); # 11
- &shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
-
- &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x03); # 9, 8,15,14
- &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 7
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 7
- &shl ($acc,24); # 7
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 7
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 13
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 13
- &shl ($acc,8); # 13
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 13
- &movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
-
- &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 6
- &movd ("eax","mm2"); # 3, 2, 5, 4
- &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 6
- &shl ("ecx",16); # 6
- &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 12
- &movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 9, 8,15,14
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 12
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 12
-
- &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 4
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 4
- &or ("edx",$acc); # 4
- &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 14
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 14
- &shl ($acc,16); # 14
- &or ("edx",$acc); # 14
- &movd ("mm1","edx"); # t[1] collected
-
- &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 5
- &movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 5
- &shl ("edx",8); # 5
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 15
- &shr ("eax",16); # 3, 2
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 15
- &shl ($acc,24); # 15
- &or ("edx",$acc); # 15
- &shr ("ebx",16); # 9, 8
-
- &punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected
-
- &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 9
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 9
- &shl ($acc,8); # 9
- &or ("ecx",$acc); # 9
- &and ("ebx",0xff); # 8
- &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1)); # 8
- &or ("edx","ebx"); # 8
- &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 2
- &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 2
- &shl ($acc,16); # 2
- &or ("edx",$acc); # 2
- &movd ("mm4","edx"); # t[2] collected
- &movz ("eax",&HB("eax")); # 3
- &movz ("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1)); # 3
- &shl ("eax",24); # 3
- &or ("ecx","eax"); # 3
- &movd ("mm5","ecx"); # t[3] collected
-
- &punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected
-}
-
- if (!$x86only) {
-&function_begin_B("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
- &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0
- &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); # 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8
-
- # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
- &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
-
- &mov ($s0,0x1b1b1b1b); # magic constant
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s0);
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$s0);
-
- # prefetch Td4
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
-
- &set_label("loop",16);
- &sse_deccompact();
- &add ($key,16);
- &cmp ($key,$__end);
- &ja (&label("out"));
-
- # ROTATE(x^y,N) == ROTATE(x,N)^ROTATE(y,N)
- &movq ("mm3","mm0"); &movq ("mm7","mm4");
- &movq ("mm2","mm0",1); &movq ("mm6","mm4",1);
- &movq ("mm1","mm0"); &movq ("mm5","mm4");
- &pshufw ("mm0","mm0",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm4","mm4",0xb1);# = ROTATE(tp0,16)
- &pslld ("mm2",8); &pslld ("mm6",8);
- &psrld ("mm3",8); &psrld ("mm7",8);
- &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= tp0<<8
- &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp0>>8
- &pslld ("mm2",16); &pslld ("mm6",16);
- &psrld ("mm3",16); &psrld ("mm7",16);
- &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= tp0<<24
- &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp0>>24
-
- &movq ("mm3",&QWP(8,"esp"));
- &pxor ("mm2","mm2"); &pxor ("mm6","mm6");
- &pcmpgtb("mm2","mm1"); &pcmpgtb("mm6","mm5");
- &pand ("mm2","mm3"); &pand ("mm6","mm3");
- &paddb ("mm1","mm1"); &paddb ("mm5","mm5");
- &pxor ("mm1","mm2"); &pxor ("mm5","mm6"); # tp2
- &movq ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm7","mm5");
- &movq ("mm2","mm1"); &movq ("mm6","mm5");
- &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp2
- &pslld ("mm3",24); &pslld ("mm7",24);
- &psrld ("mm2",8); &psrld ("mm6",8);
- &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp2<<24
- &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= tp2>>8
-
- &movq ("mm2",&QWP(8,"esp"));
- &pxor ("mm3","mm3"); &pxor ("mm7","mm7");
- &pcmpgtb("mm3","mm1"); &pcmpgtb("mm7","mm5");
- &pand ("mm3","mm2"); &pand ("mm7","mm2");
- &paddb ("mm1","mm1"); &paddb ("mm5","mm5");
- &pxor ("mm1","mm3"); &pxor ("mm5","mm7"); # tp4
- &pshufw ("mm3","mm1",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm7","mm5",0xb1);
- &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp4
- &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= ROTATE(tp4,16)
-
- &pxor ("mm3","mm3"); &pxor ("mm7","mm7");
- &pcmpgtb("mm3","mm1"); &pcmpgtb("mm7","mm5");
- &pand ("mm3","mm2"); &pand ("mm7","mm2");
- &paddb ("mm1","mm1"); &paddb ("mm5","mm5");
- &pxor ("mm1","mm3"); &pxor ("mm5","mm7"); # tp8
- &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp8
- &movq ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm7","mm5");
- &pshufw ("mm2","mm1",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm6","mm5",0xb1);
- &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= ROTATE(tp8,16)
- &pslld ("mm1",8); &pslld ("mm5",8);
- &psrld ("mm3",8); &psrld ("mm7",8);
- &movq ("mm2",&QWP(0,$key)); &movq ("mm6",&QWP(8,$key));
- &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp8<<8
- &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp8>>8
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
- &pslld ("mm1",16); &pslld ("mm5",16);
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
- &psrld ("mm3",16); &psrld ("mm7",16);
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
- &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp8<<24
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
- &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp8>>24
-
- &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6");
- &jmp (&label("loop"));
-
- &set_label("out",16);
- &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));
- &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
-
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
- }
-
-######################################################################
-# Vanilla block function.
-######################################################################
-
-sub decstep()
-{ my ($i,$td, at s) = @_;
- my $tmp = $key;
- my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
-
- # no instructions are reordered, as performance appears
- # optimal... or rather that all attempts to reorder didn't
- # result in better performance [which by the way is not a
- # bit lower than ecryption].
- if($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }
- else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
- &and ($out,0xFF);
- &mov ($out,&DWP(0,$td,$out,8));
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }
- &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
- &xor ($out,&DWP(3,$td,$tmp,8));
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc); }
- else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]); }
- &shr ($tmp,16);
- &and ($tmp,0xFF);
- &xor ($out,&DWP(2,$td,$tmp,8));
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }
- else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); }
- &shr ($tmp,24);
- &xor ($out,&DWP(1,$td,$tmp,8));
- if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
- if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$__s0); }
- &comment();
-}
-
-sub declast()
-{ my ($i,$td, at s)=@_;
- my $tmp = $key;
- my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
-
- if($i==0) { &lea ($td,&DWP(2048+128,$td));
- &mov ($tmp,&DWP(0-128,$td));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(32-128,$td));
- &mov ($tmp,&DWP(64-128,$td));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(96-128,$td));
- &mov ($tmp,&DWP(128-128,$td));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(160-128,$td));
- &mov ($tmp,&DWP(192-128,$td));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(224-128,$td));
- &lea ($td,&DWP(-128,$td)); }
- if($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }
- else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
- &and ($out,0xFF);
- &movz ($out,&BP(0,$td,$out,1));
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }
- &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
- &movz ($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1));
- &shl ($tmp,8);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc); }
- else { mov ($tmp,$s[2]); }
- &shr ($tmp,16);
- &and ($tmp,0xFF);
- &movz ($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1));
- &shl ($tmp,16);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
-
- if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }
- else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); }
- &shr ($tmp,24);
- &movz ($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1));
- &shl ($tmp,24);
- &xor ($out,$tmp);
- if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
- if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$__s0);
- &lea ($td,&DWP(-2048,$td)); }
-}
-
-&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_decrypt");
- # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
- &mov ($__key,$key); # save key
-
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
-
- if ($small_footprint) {
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
- &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
- &set_label("loop",16);
- &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
- &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
- &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
- &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
- &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
- &cmp ($key,$__end);
- &mov ($__key,$key);
- &jb (&label("loop"));
- }
- else {
- &cmp ($acc,10);
- &jle (&label("10rounds"));
- &cmp ($acc,12);
- &jle (&label("12rounds"));
-
- &set_label("14rounds",4);
- for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
- &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
- &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
- &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
- &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
- }
- &add ($key,32);
- &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key
- &set_label("12rounds",4);
- for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
- &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
- &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
- &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
- &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
- }
- &add ($key,32);
- &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key
- &set_label("10rounds",4);
- for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) {
- &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
- &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
- &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
- &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
- }
- }
-
- &declast(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
- &declast(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
- &declast(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
- &declast(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
-
- &add ($key,$small_footprint?16:160);
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &ret ();
-
-&set_label("AES_Td",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
- &_data_word(0x50a7f451, 0x5365417e, 0xc3a4171a, 0x965e273a);
- &_data_word(0xcb6bab3b, 0xf1459d1f, 0xab58faac, 0x9303e34b);
- &_data_word(0x55fa3020, 0xf66d76ad, 0x9176cc88, 0x254c02f5);
- &_data_word(0xfcd7e54f, 0xd7cb2ac5, 0x80443526, 0x8fa362b5);
- &_data_word(0x495ab1de, 0x671bba25, 0x980eea45, 0xe1c0fe5d);
- &_data_word(0x02752fc3, 0x12f04c81, 0xa397468d, 0xc6f9d36b);
- &_data_word(0xe75f8f03, 0x959c9215, 0xeb7a6dbf, 0xda595295);
- &_data_word(0x2d83bed4, 0xd3217458, 0x2969e049, 0x44c8c98e);
- &_data_word(0x6a89c275, 0x78798ef4, 0x6b3e5899, 0xdd71b927);
- &_data_word(0xb64fe1be, 0x17ad88f0, 0x66ac20c9, 0xb43ace7d);
- &_data_word(0x184adf63, 0x82311ae5, 0x60335197, 0x457f5362);
- &_data_word(0xe07764b1, 0x84ae6bbb, 0x1ca081fe, 0x942b08f9);
- &_data_word(0x58684870, 0x19fd458f, 0x876cde94, 0xb7f87b52);
- &_data_word(0x23d373ab, 0xe2024b72, 0x578f1fe3, 0x2aab5566);
- &_data_word(0x0728ebb2, 0x03c2b52f, 0x9a7bc586, 0xa50837d3);
- &_data_word(0xf2872830, 0xb2a5bf23, 0xba6a0302, 0x5c8216ed);
- &_data_word(0x2b1ccf8a, 0x92b479a7, 0xf0f207f3, 0xa1e2694e);
- &_data_word(0xcdf4da65, 0xd5be0506, 0x1f6234d1, 0x8afea6c4);
- &_data_word(0x9d532e34, 0xa055f3a2, 0x32e18a05, 0x75ebf6a4);
- &_data_word(0x39ec830b, 0xaaef6040, 0x069f715e, 0x51106ebd);
- &_data_word(0xf98a213e, 0x3d06dd96, 0xae053edd, 0x46bde64d);
- &_data_word(0xb58d5491, 0x055dc471, 0x6fd40604, 0xff155060);
- &_data_word(0x24fb9819, 0x97e9bdd6, 0xcc434089, 0x779ed967);
- &_data_word(0xbd42e8b0, 0x888b8907, 0x385b19e7, 0xdbeec879);
- &_data_word(0x470a7ca1, 0xe90f427c, 0xc91e84f8, 0x00000000);
- &_data_word(0x83868009, 0x48ed2b32, 0xac70111e, 0x4e725a6c);
- &_data_word(0xfbff0efd, 0x5638850f, 0x1ed5ae3d, 0x27392d36);
- &_data_word(0x64d90f0a, 0x21a65c68, 0xd1545b9b, 0x3a2e3624);
- &_data_word(0xb1670a0c, 0x0fe75793, 0xd296eeb4, 0x9e919b1b);
- &_data_word(0x4fc5c080, 0xa220dc61, 0x694b775a, 0x161a121c);
- &_data_word(0x0aba93e2, 0xe52aa0c0, 0x43e0223c, 0x1d171b12);
- &_data_word(0x0b0d090e, 0xadc78bf2, 0xb9a8b62d, 0xc8a91e14);
- &_data_word(0x8519f157, 0x4c0775af, 0xbbdd99ee, 0xfd607fa3);
- &_data_word(0x9f2601f7, 0xbcf5725c, 0xc53b6644, 0x347efb5b);
- &_data_word(0x7629438b, 0xdcc623cb, 0x68fcedb6, 0x63f1e4b8);
- &_data_word(0xcadc31d7, 0x10856342, 0x40229713, 0x2011c684);
- &_data_word(0x7d244a85, 0xf83dbbd2, 0x1132f9ae, 0x6da129c7);
- &_data_word(0x4b2f9e1d, 0xf330b2dc, 0xec52860d, 0xd0e3c177);
- &_data_word(0x6c16b32b, 0x99b970a9, 0xfa489411, 0x2264e947);
- &_data_word(0xc48cfca8, 0x1a3ff0a0, 0xd82c7d56, 0xef903322);
- &_data_word(0xc74e4987, 0xc1d138d9, 0xfea2ca8c, 0x360bd498);
- &_data_word(0xcf81f5a6, 0x28de7aa5, 0x268eb7da, 0xa4bfad3f);
- &_data_word(0xe49d3a2c, 0x0d927850, 0x9bcc5f6a, 0x62467e54);
- &_data_word(0xc2138df6, 0xe8b8d890, 0x5ef7392e, 0xf5afc382);
- &_data_word(0xbe805d9f, 0x7c93d069, 0xa92dd56f, 0xb31225cf);
- &_data_word(0x3b99acc8, 0xa77d1810, 0x6e639ce8, 0x7bbb3bdb);
- &_data_word(0x097826cd, 0xf418596e, 0x01b79aec, 0xa89a4f83);
- &_data_word(0x656e95e6, 0x7ee6ffaa, 0x08cfbc21, 0xe6e815ef);
- &_data_word(0xd99be7ba, 0xce366f4a, 0xd4099fea, 0xd67cb029);
- &_data_word(0xafb2a431, 0x31233f2a, 0x3094a5c6, 0xc066a235);
- &_data_word(0x37bc4e74, 0xa6ca82fc, 0xb0d090e0, 0x15d8a733);
- &_data_word(0x4a9804f1, 0xf7daec41, 0x0e50cd7f, 0x2ff69117);
- &_data_word(0x8dd64d76, 0x4db0ef43, 0x544daacc, 0xdf0496e4);
- &_data_word(0xe3b5d19e, 0x1b886a4c, 0xb81f2cc1, 0x7f516546);
- &_data_word(0x04ea5e9d, 0x5d358c01, 0x737487fa, 0x2e410bfb);
- &_data_word(0x5a1d67b3, 0x52d2db92, 0x335610e9, 0x1347d66d);
- &_data_word(0x8c61d79a, 0x7a0ca137, 0x8e14f859, 0x893c13eb);
- &_data_word(0xee27a9ce, 0x35c961b7, 0xede51ce1, 0x3cb1477a);
- &_data_word(0x59dfd29c, 0x3f73f255, 0x79ce1418, 0xbf37c773);
- &_data_word(0xeacdf753, 0x5baafd5f, 0x146f3ddf, 0x86db4478);
- &_data_word(0x81f3afca, 0x3ec468b9, 0x2c342438, 0x5f40a3c2);
- &_data_word(0x72c31d16, 0x0c25e2bc, 0x8b493c28, 0x41950dff);
- &_data_word(0x7101a839, 0xdeb30c08, 0x9ce4b4d8, 0x90c15664);
- &_data_word(0x6184cb7b, 0x70b632d5, 0x745c6c48, 0x4257b8d0);
-
-#Td4: # four copies of Td4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing
- &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
- &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
- &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
- &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
- &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
- &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
- &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
- &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
- &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
- &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
- &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
- &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
- &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
- &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
- &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
- &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
- &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
- &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
- &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
- &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
- &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
- &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
- &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
- &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
- &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
- &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
- &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
- &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
- &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
- &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
- &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
- &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
-
- &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
- &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
- &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
- &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
- &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
- &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
- &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
- &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
- &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
- &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
- &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
- &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
- &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
- &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
- &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
- &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
- &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
- &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
- &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
- &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
- &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
- &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
- &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
- &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
- &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
- &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
- &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
- &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
- &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
- &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
- &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
- &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
-
- &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
- &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
- &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
- &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
- &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
- &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
- &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
- &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
- &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
- &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
- &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
- &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
- &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
- &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
- &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
- &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
- &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
- &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
- &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
- &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
- &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
- &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
- &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
- &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
- &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
- &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
- &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
- &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
- &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
- &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
- &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
- &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
-
- &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
- &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
- &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
- &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
- &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
- &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
- &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
- &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
- &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
- &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
- &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
- &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
- &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
- &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
- &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
- &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
- &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
- &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
- &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
- &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
- &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
- &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
- &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
- &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
- &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
- &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
- &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
- &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
- &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
- &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
- &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
- &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
-&function_end_B("_x86_AES_decrypt");
-
-# void AES_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
-&function_begin("AES_decrypt");
- &mov ($acc,&wparam(0)); # load inp
- &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # load key
-
- &mov ($s0,"esp");
- &sub ("esp",36);
- &and ("esp",-64); # align to cache-line
-
- # place stack frame just "above" the key schedule
- &lea ($s1,&DWP(-64-63,$key));
- &sub ($s1,"esp");
- &neg ($s1);
- &and ($s1,0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
- &sub ("esp",$s1);
- &add ("esp",4); # 4 is reserved for caller's return address
- &mov ($_esp,$s0); # save stack pointer
-
- &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
- &set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop($tbl);
- &picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if(!$x86only);
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
-
- # pick Td4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule
- &lea ($s1,&DWP(768-4,"esp"));
- &sub ($s1,$tbl);
- &and ($s1,0x300);
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1));
-
- if (!$x86only) {
- &bt (&DWP(0,$s0),25); # check for SSE bit
- &jnc (&label("x86"));
-
- &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc));
- &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
- &call ("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
- &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer
- &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out
- &movq (&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0"); # write output data
- &movq (&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4");
- &emms ();
- &function_end_A();
- }
- &set_label("x86",16);
- &mov ($_tbl,$tbl);
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # load input data
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
- &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
- &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer
- &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out
- &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output data
- &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
-&function_end("AES_decrypt");
-
-# void AES_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out,
-# size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
-# unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
-{
-# stack frame layout
-# -4(%esp) # return address 0(%esp)
-# 0(%esp) # s0 backing store 4(%esp)
-# 4(%esp) # s1 backing store 8(%esp)
-# 8(%esp) # s2 backing store 12(%esp)
-# 12(%esp) # s3 backing store 16(%esp)
-# 16(%esp) # key backup 20(%esp)
-# 20(%esp) # end of key schedule 24(%esp)
-# 24(%esp) # %ebp backup 28(%esp)
-# 28(%esp) # %esp backup
-my $_inp=&DWP(32,"esp"); # copy of wparam(0)
-my $_out=&DWP(36,"esp"); # copy of wparam(1)
-my $_len=&DWP(40,"esp"); # copy of wparam(2)
-my $_key=&DWP(44,"esp"); # copy of wparam(3)
-my $_ivp=&DWP(48,"esp"); # copy of wparam(4)
-my $_tmp=&DWP(52,"esp"); # volatile variable
-#
-my $ivec=&DWP(60,"esp"); # ivec[16]
-my $aes_key=&DWP(76,"esp"); # copy of aes_key
-my $mark=&DWP(76+240,"esp"); # copy of aes_key->rounds
-
-&function_begin("AES_cbc_encrypt");
- &mov ($s2 eq "ecx"? $s2 : "",&wparam(2)); # load len
- &cmp ($s2,0);
- &je (&label("drop_out"));
-
- &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
- &set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop($tbl);
- &picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if(!$x86only);
-
- &cmp (&wparam(5),0);
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
- &jne (&label("picked_te"));
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("AES_Te"),$tbl));
- &set_label("picked_te");
-
- # one can argue if this is required
- &pushf ();
- &cld ();
-
- &cmp ($s2,$speed_limit);
- &jb (&label("slow_way"));
- &test ($s2,15);
- &jnz (&label("slow_way"));
- if (!$x86only) {
- &bt (&DWP(0,$s0),28); # check for hyper-threading bit
- &jc (&label("slow_way"));
- }
- # pre-allocate aligned stack frame...
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(-80-244,"esp"));
- &and ($acc,-64);
-
- # ... and make sure it doesn't alias with $tbl modulo 4096
- &mov ($s0,$tbl);
- &lea ($s1,&DWP(2048+256,$tbl));
- &mov ($s3,$acc);
- &and ($s0,0xfff); # s = %ebp&0xfff
- &and ($s1,0xfff); # e = (%ebp+2048+256)&0xfff
- &and ($s3,0xfff); # p = %esp&0xfff
-
- &cmp ($s3,$s1); # if (p>=e) %esp =- (p-e);
- &jb (&label("tbl_break_out"));
- &sub ($s3,$s1);
- &sub ($acc,$s3);
- &jmp (&label("tbl_ok"));
- &set_label("tbl_break_out",4); # else %esp -= (p-s)&0xfff + framesz;
- &sub ($s3,$s0);
- &and ($s3,0xfff);
- &add ($s3,384);
- &sub ($acc,$s3);
- &set_label("tbl_ok",4);
-
- &lea ($s3,&wparam(0)); # obtain pointer to parameter block
- &exch ("esp",$acc); # allocate stack frame
- &add ("esp",4); # reserve for return address!
- &mov ($_tbl,$tbl); # save %ebp
- &mov ($_esp,$acc); # save %esp
-
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$s3)); # load inp
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$s3)); # load out
- #&mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$s3)); # load len
- &mov ($key,&DWP(12,$s3)); # load key
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(16,$s3)); # load ivp
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(20,$s3)); # load enc flag
-
- &mov ($_inp,$s0); # save copy of inp
- &mov ($_out,$s1); # save copy of out
- &mov ($_len,$s2); # save copy of len
- &mov ($_key,$key); # save copy of key
- &mov ($_ivp,$acc); # save copy of ivp
-
- &mov ($mark,0); # copy of aes_key->rounds = 0;
- # do we copy key schedule to stack?
- &mov ($s1 eq "ebx" ? $s1 : "",$key);
- &mov ($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "",244/4);
- &sub ($s1,$tbl);
- &mov ("esi",$key);
- &and ($s1,0xfff);
- &lea ("edi",$aes_key);
- &cmp ($s1,2048+256);
- &jb (&label("do_copy"));
- &cmp ($s1,4096-244);
- &jb (&label("skip_copy"));
- &set_label("do_copy",4);
- &mov ($_key,"edi");
- &data_word(0xA5F3F689); # rep movsd
- &set_label("skip_copy");
-
- &mov ($key,16);
- &set_label("prefetch_tbl",4);
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$tbl));
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(32,$tbl));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(64,$tbl));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(96,$tbl));
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(128,$tbl));
- &sub ($key,1);
- &jnz (&label("prefetch_tbl"));
- &sub ($tbl,2048);
-
- &mov ($acc,$_inp);
- &mov ($key,$_ivp);
-
- &cmp ($s3,0);
- &je (&label("fast_decrypt"));
-
-#----------------------------- ENCRYPT -----------------------------#
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
-
- &set_label("fast_enc_loop",16);
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # xor input data
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
-
- &mov ($key,$_key); # load key
- &call ("_x86_AES_encrypt");
-
- &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
- &mov ($key,$_out); # load out
-
- &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # save output data
- &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
-
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
- &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
- &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
- &lea ($s3,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out
- &mov ($_out,$s3); # save out
- &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
- &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
- &jnz (&label("fast_enc_loop"));
- &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load ivp
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); # restore last 2 dwords
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
- &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # save ivec
- &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
-
- &cmp ($mark,0); # was the key schedule copied?
- &mov ("edi",$_key);
- &je (&label("skip_ezero"));
- # zero copy of key schedule
- &mov ("ecx",240/4);
- &xor ("eax","eax");
- &align (4);
- &data_word(0xABF3F689); # rep stosd
- &set_label("skip_ezero")
- &mov ("esp",$_esp);
- &popf ();
- &set_label("drop_out");
- &function_end_A();
- &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
-
-#----------------------------- DECRYPT -----------------------------#
-&set_label("fast_decrypt",16);
-
- &cmp ($acc,$_out);
- &je (&label("fast_dec_in_place")); # in-place processing...
-
- &mov ($_tmp,$key);
-
- &align (4);
- &set_label("fast_dec_loop",16);
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read input
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
-
- &mov ($key,$_key); # load key
- &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt");
-
- &mov ($key,$_tmp); # load ivp
- &mov ($acc,$_len); # load len
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &mov ($key,$_out); # load out
- &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
-
- &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # write output
- &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
-
- &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
- &mov ($_tmp,$acc); # save ivp
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
- &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
- &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out
- &mov ($_out,$key); # save out
- &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
- &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
- &jnz (&label("fast_dec_loop"));
- &mov ($key,$_tmp); # load temp ivp
- &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load user ivp
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
- &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # copy back to user
- &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
- &jmp (&label("fast_dec_out"));
-
- &set_label("fast_dec_in_place",16);
- &set_label("fast_dec_in_place_loop");
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read input
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
-
- &lea ($key,$ivec);
- &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy to temp
- &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
-
- &mov ($key,$_key); # load key
- &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt");
-
- &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp
- &mov ($acc,$_out); # load out
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output
- &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
-
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance out
- &mov ($_out,$acc); # save out
-
- &lea ($acc,$ivec);
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read temp
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
-
- &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy iv
- &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
-
- &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
- &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
- &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
- &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
- &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
- &jnz (&label("fast_dec_in_place_loop"));
-
- &set_label("fast_dec_out",4);
- &cmp ($mark,0); # was the key schedule copied?
- &mov ("edi",$_key);
- &je (&label("skip_dzero"));
- # zero copy of key schedule
- &mov ("ecx",240/4);
- &xor ("eax","eax");
- &align (4);
- &data_word(0xABF3F689); # rep stosd
- &set_label("skip_dzero")
- &mov ("esp",$_esp);
- &popf ();
- &function_end_A();
- &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
-
-#--------------------------- SLOW ROUTINE ---------------------------#
-&set_label("slow_way",16);
-
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$s0)) if (!$x86only);# load OPENSSL_ia32cap
- &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # load key
-
- # pre-allocate aligned stack frame...
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(-80,"esp"));
- &and ($acc,-64);
-
- # ... and make sure it doesn't alias with $key modulo 1024
- &lea ($s1,&DWP(-80-63,$key));
- &sub ($s1,$acc);
- &neg ($s1);
- &and ($s1,0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
- &sub ($acc,$s1);
-
- # pick S-box copy which can't overlap with stack frame or $key
- &lea ($s1,&DWP(768,$acc));
- &sub ($s1,$tbl);
- &and ($s1,0x300);
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1));
-
- &lea ($s3,&wparam(0)); # pointer to parameter block
-
- &exch ("esp",$acc);
- &add ("esp",4); # reserve for return address!
- &mov ($_tbl,$tbl); # save %ebp
- &mov ($_esp,$acc); # save %esp
- &mov ($_tmp,$s0); # save OPENSSL_ia32cap
-
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$s3)); # load inp
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$s3)); # load out
- #&mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$s3)); # load len
- #&mov ($key,&DWP(12,$s3)); # load key
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(16,$s3)); # load ivp
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(20,$s3)); # load enc flag
-
- &mov ($_inp,$s0); # save copy of inp
- &mov ($_out,$s1); # save copy of out
- &mov ($_len,$s2); # save copy of len
- &mov ($_key,$key); # save copy of key
- &mov ($_ivp,$acc); # save copy of ivp
-
- &mov ($key,$acc);
- &mov ($acc,$s0);
-
- &cmp ($s3,0);
- &je (&label("slow_decrypt"));
-
-#--------------------------- SLOW ENCRYPT ---------------------------#
- &cmp ($s2,16);
- &mov ($s3,$s1);
- &jb (&label("slow_enc_tail"));
-
- if (!$x86only) {
- &bt ($_tmp,25); # check for SSE bit
- &jnc (&label("slow_enc_x86"));
-
- &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # load iv
- &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
-
- &set_label("slow_enc_loop_sse",16);
- &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc)); # xor input data
- &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
-
- &mov ($key,$_key);
- &call ("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
-
- &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
- &mov ($key,$_out); # load out
- &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
-
- &movq (&QWP(0,$key),"mm0"); # save output data
- &movq (&QWP(8,$key),"mm4");
-
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
- &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
- &lea ($s3,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out
- &mov ($_out,$s3); # save out
- &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
- &cmp ($s2,16);
- &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
- &jae (&label("slow_enc_loop_sse"));
- &test ($s2,15);
- &jnz (&label("slow_enc_tail"));
- &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load ivp
- &movq (&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0"); # save ivec
- &movq (&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4");
- &emms ();
- &mov ("esp",$_esp);
- &popf ();
- &function_end_A();
- &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
- }
- &set_label("slow_enc_x86",16);
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
-
- &set_label("slow_enc_loop_x86",4);
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # xor input data
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
-
- &mov ($key,$_key); # load key
- &call ("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
-
- &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
- &mov ($key,$_out); # load out
-
- &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # save output data
- &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
-
- &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
- &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
- &lea ($s3,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out
- &mov ($_out,$s3); # save out
- &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
- &cmp ($s2,16);
- &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
- &jae (&label("slow_enc_loop_x86"));
- &test ($s2,15);
- &jnz (&label("slow_enc_tail"));
- &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load ivp
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); # restore last dwords
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
- &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # save ivec
- &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
-
- &mov ("esp",$_esp);
- &popf ();
- &function_end_A();
- &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
-
- &set_label("slow_enc_tail",16);
- &emms () if (!$x86only);
- &mov ($key eq "edi"? $key:"",$s3); # load out to edi
- &mov ($s1,16);
- &sub ($s1,$s2);
- &cmp ($key,$acc eq "esi"? $acc:""); # compare with inp
- &je (&label("enc_in_place"));
- &align (4);
- &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy input
- &jmp (&label("enc_skip_in_place"));
- &set_label("enc_in_place");
- &lea ($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2));
- &set_label("enc_skip_in_place");
- &mov ($s2,$s1);
- &xor ($s0,$s0);
- &align (4);
- &data_word(0xAAF3F689); # rep stosb # zero tail
-
- &mov ($key,$_ivp); # restore ivp
- &mov ($acc,$s3); # output as input
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &mov ($_len,16); # len=16
- &jmp (&label("slow_enc_loop_x86")); # one more spin...
-
-#--------------------------- SLOW DECRYPT ---------------------------#
-&set_label("slow_decrypt",16);
- if (!$x86only) {
- &bt ($_tmp,25); # check for SSE bit
- &jnc (&label("slow_dec_loop_x86"));
-
- &set_label("slow_dec_loop_sse",4);
- &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc)); # read input
- &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
-
- &mov ($key,$_key);
- &call ("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
-
- &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
- &lea ($s0,$ivec);
- &mov ($s1,$_out); # load out
- &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
- &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp
-
- &movq ("mm1",&QWP(0,$acc)); # re-read input
- &movq ("mm5",&QWP(8,$acc));
-
- &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # xor iv
- &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
-
- &movq (&QWP(0,$key),"mm1"); # copy input to iv
- &movq (&QWP(8,$key),"mm5");
-
- &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
- &jc (&label("slow_dec_partial_sse"));
-
- &movq (&QWP(0,$s1),"mm0"); # write output
- &movq (&QWP(8,$s1),"mm4");
-
- &lea ($s1,&DWP(16,$s1)); # advance out
- &mov ($_out,$s1); # save out
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
- &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
- &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
- &jnz (&label("slow_dec_loop_sse"));
- &emms ();
- &mov ("esp",$_esp);
- &popf ();
- &function_end_A();
- &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
-
- &set_label("slow_dec_partial_sse",16);
- &movq (&QWP(0,$s0),"mm0"); # save output to temp
- &movq (&QWP(8,$s0),"mm4");
- &emms ();
-
- &add ($s2 eq "ecx" ? "ecx":"",16);
- &mov ("edi",$s1); # out
- &mov ("esi",$s0); # temp
- &align (4);
- &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy partial output
-
- &mov ("esp",$_esp);
- &popf ();
- &function_end_A();
- &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
- }
- &set_label("slow_dec_loop_x86",16);
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read input
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
-
- &lea ($key,$ivec);
- &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy to temp
- &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
-
- &mov ($key,$_key); # load key
- &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
-
- &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp
- &mov ($acc,$_len); # load len
- &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv
- &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
- &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
- &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
-
- &sub ($acc,16);
- &jc (&label("slow_dec_partial_x86"));
-
- &mov ($_len,$acc); # save len
- &mov ($acc,$_out); # load out
-
- &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output
- &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
-
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance out
- &mov ($_out,$acc); # save out
-
- &lea ($acc,$ivec);
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read temp
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
-
- &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy it to iv
- &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
-
- &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
- &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
- &jnz (&label("slow_dec_loop_x86"));
- &mov ("esp",$_esp);
- &popf ();
- &function_end_A();
- &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
-
- &set_label("slow_dec_partial_x86",16);
- &lea ($acc,$ivec);
- &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # save output to temp
- &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
-
- &mov ($acc,$_inp);
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # re-read input
- &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
- &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
-
- &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy it to iv
- &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
- &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
-
- &mov ("ecx",$_len);
- &mov ("edi",$_out);
- &lea ("esi",$ivec);
- &align (4);
- &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy partial output
-
- &mov ("esp",$_esp);
- &popf ();
-&function_end("AES_cbc_encrypt");
-}
-
-#------------------------------------------------------------------#
-
-sub enckey()
-{
- &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[i]>>0
- &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
- &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[i]>>8
- &shl ("ebx",24);
- &xor ("eax","ebx");
-
- &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
- &shr ("edx",16);
- &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[i]>>16
- &xor ("eax","ebx");
-
- &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
- &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[i]>>24
- &shl ("ebx",8);
- &xor ("eax","ebx");
-
- &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
- &shl ("ebx",16);
- &xor ("eax","ebx");
-
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(1024-128,$tbl,"ecx",4)); # rcon
-}
-
-&function_begin("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
- &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # user supplied key
- &mov ("edi",&wparam(3)); # private key schedule
-
- &test ("esi",-1);
- &jz (&label("badpointer"));
- &test ("edi",-1);
- &jz (&label("badpointer"));
-
- &call (&label("pic_point"));
- &set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop($tbl);
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl));
-
- # prefetch Te4
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
-
- &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # number of bits in key
- &cmp ("ecx",128);
- &je (&label("10rounds"));
- &cmp ("ecx",192);
- &je (&label("12rounds"));
- &cmp ("ecx",256);
- &je (&label("14rounds"));
- &mov ("eax",-2); # invalid number of bits
- &jmp (&label("exit"));
-
- &set_label("10rounds");
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); # copy first 4 dwords
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
- &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
- &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
- &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
-
- &xor ("ecx","ecx");
- &jmp (&label("10shortcut"));
-
- &align (4);
- &set_label("10loop");
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); # rk[0]
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"edi")); # rk[3]
- &set_label("10shortcut");
- &enckey ();
-
- &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[4]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[5]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[6]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[7]
- &inc ("ecx");
- &add ("edi",16);
- &cmp ("ecx",10);
- &jl (&label("10loop"));
-
- &mov (&DWP(80,"edi"),10); # setup number of rounds
- &xor ("eax","eax");
- &jmp (&label("exit"));
-
- &set_label("12rounds");
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); # copy first 6 dwords
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
- &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
- &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
- &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(16,"esi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
- &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"ecx");
- &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"edx");
-
- &xor ("ecx","ecx");
- &jmp (&label("12shortcut"));
-
- &align (4);
- &set_label("12loop");
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); # rk[0]
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(20,"edi")); # rk[5]
- &set_label("12shortcut");
- &enckey ();
-
- &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[6]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[7]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(32,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[8]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(36,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[9]
-
- &cmp ("ecx",7);
- &je (&label("12break"));
- &inc ("ecx");
-
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(40,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[10]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(20,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(44,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[11]
-
- &add ("edi",24);
- &jmp (&label("12loop"));
-
- &set_label("12break");
- &mov (&DWP(72,"edi"),12); # setup number of rounds
- &xor ("eax","eax");
- &jmp (&label("exit"));
-
- &set_label("14rounds");
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); # copy first 8 dwords
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
- &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
- &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
- &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"esi"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
- &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx");
- &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx");
- &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx");
-
- &xor ("ecx","ecx");
- &jmp (&label("14shortcut"));
-
- &align (4);
- &set_label("14loop");
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"edi")); # rk[7]
- &set_label("14shortcut");
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); # rk[0]
-
- &enckey ();
-
- &mov (&DWP(32,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[8]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(36,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[9]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(40,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[10]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(44,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[11]
-
- &cmp ("ecx",6);
- &je (&label("14break"));
- &inc ("ecx");
-
- &mov ("edx","eax");
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"edi")); # rk[4]
- &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[11]>>0
- &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
- &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[11]>>8
- &xor ("eax","ebx");
-
- &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
- &shr ("edx",16);
- &shl ("ebx",8);
- &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[11]>>16
- &xor ("eax","ebx");
-
- &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
- &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[11]>>24
- &shl ("ebx",16);
- &xor ("eax","ebx");
-
- &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
- &shl ("ebx",24);
- &xor ("eax","ebx");
-
- &mov (&DWP(48,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[12]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(20,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(52,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[13]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(24,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(56,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[14]
- &xor ("eax",&DWP(28,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(60,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[15]
-
- &add ("edi",32);
- &jmp (&label("14loop"));
-
- &set_label("14break");
- &mov (&DWP(48,"edi"),14); # setup number of rounds
- &xor ("eax","eax");
- &jmp (&label("exit"));
-
- &set_label("badpointer");
- &mov ("eax",-1);
- &set_label("exit");
-&function_end("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
-
-# int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
-# AES_KEY *key)
-&function_begin_B("private_AES_set_encrypt_key");
- &call ("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("private_AES_set_encrypt_key");
-
-sub deckey()
-{ my ($i,$key,$tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8) = @_;
- my $tmp = $tbl;
-
- &mov ($acc,$tp1);
- &and ($acc,0x80808080);
- &mov ($tmp,$acc);
- &shr ($tmp,7);
- &lea ($tp2,&DWP(0,$tp1,$tp1));
- &sub ($acc,$tmp);
- &and ($tp2,0xfefefefe);
- &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
- &xor ($acc,$tp2);
- &mov ($tp2,$acc);
-
- &and ($acc,0x80808080);
- &mov ($tmp,$acc);
- &shr ($tmp,7);
- &lea ($tp4,&DWP(0,$tp2,$tp2));
- &sub ($acc,$tmp);
- &and ($tp4,0xfefefefe);
- &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
- &xor ($tp2,$tp1); # tp2^tp1
- &xor ($acc,$tp4);
- &mov ($tp4,$acc);
-
- &and ($acc,0x80808080);
- &mov ($tmp,$acc);
- &shr ($tmp,7);
- &lea ($tp8,&DWP(0,$tp4,$tp4));
- &xor ($tp4,$tp1); # tp4^tp1
- &sub ($acc,$tmp);
- &and ($tp8,0xfefefefe);
- &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
- &rotl ($tp1,8); # = ROTATE(tp1,8)
- &xor ($tp8,$acc);
-
- &mov ($tmp,&DWP(4*($i+1),$key)); # modulo-scheduled load
-
- &xor ($tp1,$tp2);
- &xor ($tp2,$tp8);
- &xor ($tp1,$tp4);
- &rotl ($tp2,24);
- &xor ($tp4,$tp8);
- &xor ($tp1,$tp8); # ^= tp8^(tp4^tp1)^(tp2^tp1)
- &rotl ($tp4,16);
- &xor ($tp1,$tp2); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24)
- &rotl ($tp8,8);
- &xor ($tp1,$tp4); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16)
- &mov ($tp2,$tmp);
- &xor ($tp1,$tp8); # ^= ROTATE(tp8,8)
-
- &mov (&DWP(4*$i,$key),$tp1);
-}
-
-# int private_AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
-# AES_KEY *key)
-&function_begin_B("private_AES_set_decrypt_key");
- &call ("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
- &cmp ("eax",0);
- &je (&label("proceed"));
- &ret ();
-
- &set_label("proceed");
- &push ("ebp");
- &push ("ebx");
- &push ("esi");
- &push ("edi");
-
- &mov ("esi",&wparam(2));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(240,"esi")); # pull number of rounds
- &lea ("ecx",&DWP(0,"","ecx",4));
- &lea ("edi",&DWP(0,"esi","ecx",4)); # pointer to last chunk
-
- &set_label("invert",4); # invert order of chunks
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,"edi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),"ecx");
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),"edx");
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(8,"esi"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"edi"));
- &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"ebx");
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"ecx");
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"edx");
- &add ("esi",16);
- &sub ("edi",16);
- &cmp ("esi","edi");
- &jne (&label("invert"));
-
- &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # pull number of rounds
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
- &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
- &mov (&wparam(2),$acc);
-
- &mov ($s0,&DWP(16,$key)); # modulo-scheduled load
- &set_label("permute",4); # permute the key schedule
- &add ($key,16);
- &deckey (0,$key,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
- &deckey (1,$key,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
- &deckey (2,$key,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
- &deckey (3,$key,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
- &cmp ($key,&wparam(2));
- &jb (&label("permute"));
-
- &xor ("eax","eax"); # return success
-&function_end("private_AES_set_decrypt_key");
-&asciz("AES for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
-
-&asm_finish();
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2980 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# Version 4.3.
+#
+# You might fail to appreciate this module performance from the first
+# try. If compared to "vanilla" linux-ia32-icc target, i.e. considered
+# to be *the* best Intel C compiler without -KPIC, performance appears
+# to be virtually identical... But try to re-configure with shared
+# library support... Aha! Intel compiler "suddenly" lags behind by 30%
+# [on P4, more on others]:-) And if compared to position-independent
+# code generated by GNU C, this code performs *more* than *twice* as
+# fast! Yes, all this buzz about PIC means that unlike other hand-
+# coded implementations, this one was explicitly designed to be safe
+# to use even in shared library context... This also means that this
+# code isn't necessarily absolutely fastest "ever," because in order
+# to achieve position independence an extra register has to be
+# off-loaded to stack, which affects the benchmark result.
+#
+# Special note about instruction choice. Do you recall RC4_INT code
+# performing poorly on P4? It might be the time to figure out why.
+# RC4_INT code implies effective address calculations in base+offset*4
+# form. Trouble is that it seems that offset scaling turned to be
+# critical path... At least eliminating scaling resulted in 2.8x RC4
+# performance improvement [as you might recall]. As AES code is hungry
+# for scaling too, I [try to] avoid the latter by favoring off-by-2
+# shifts and masking the result with 0xFF<<2 instead of "boring" 0xFF.
+#
+# As was shown by Dean Gaudet <dean at arctic.org>, the above note turned
+# void. Performance improvement with off-by-2 shifts was observed on
+# intermediate implementation, which was spilling yet another register
+# to stack... Final offset*4 code below runs just a tad faster on P4,
+# but exhibits up to 10% improvement on other cores.
+#
+# Second version is "monolithic" replacement for aes_core.c, which in
+# addition to AES_[de|en]crypt implements private_AES_set_[de|en]cryption_key.
+# This made it possible to implement little-endian variant of the
+# algorithm without modifying the base C code. Motivating factor for
+# the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
+# register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
+# Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
+# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
+#
+# Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
+# up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
+# observed on P4 core, where "overall" imrovement coefficient, i.e. if
+# compared to PIC generated by GCC and in CBC mode, was observed to be
+# as large as 4x:-) CBC performance is virtually identical to ECB now
+# and on some platforms even better, e.g. 17.6 "small" cycles/byte on
+# Opteron, because certain function prologues and epilogues are
+# effectively taken out of the loop...
+#
+# Version 3.2 implements compressed tables and prefetch of these tables
+# in CBC[!] mode. Former means that 3/4 of table references are now
+# misaligned, which unfortunately has negative impact on elder IA-32
+# implementations, Pentium suffered 30% penalty, PIII - 10%.
+#
+# Version 3.3 avoids L1 cache aliasing between stack frame and
+# S-boxes, and 3.4 - L1 cache aliasing even between key schedule. The
+# latter is achieved by copying the key schedule to controlled place in
+# stack. This unfortunately has rather strong impact on small block CBC
+# performance, ~2x deterioration on 16-byte block if compared to 3.3.
+#
+# Version 3.5 checks if there is L1 cache aliasing between user-supplied
+# key schedule and S-boxes and abstains from copying the former if
+# there is no. This allows end-user to consciously retain small block
+# performance by aligning key schedule in specific manner.
+#
+# Version 3.6 compresses Td4 to 256 bytes and prefetches it in ECB.
+#
+# Current ECB performance numbers for 128-bit key in CPU cycles per
+# processed byte [measure commonly used by AES benchmarkers] are:
+#
+# small footprint fully unrolled
+# P4 24 22
+# AMD K8 20 19
+# PIII 25 23
+# Pentium 81 78
+#
+# Version 3.7 reimplements outer rounds as "compact." Meaning that
+# first and last rounds reference compact 256 bytes S-box. This means
+# that first round consumes a lot more CPU cycles and that encrypt
+# and decrypt performance becomes asymmetric. Encrypt performance
+# drops by 10-12%, while decrypt - by 20-25%:-( 256 bytes S-box is
+# aggressively pre-fetched.
+#
+# Version 4.0 effectively rolls back to 3.6 and instead implements
+# additional set of functions, _[x86|sse]_AES_[en|de]crypt_compact,
+# which use exclusively 256 byte S-box. These functions are to be
+# called in modes not concealing plain text, such as ECB, or when
+# we're asked to process smaller amount of data [or unconditionally
+# on hyper-threading CPU]. Currently it's called unconditionally from
+# AES_[en|de]crypt, which affects all modes, but CBC. CBC routine
+# still needs to be modified to switch between slower and faster
+# mode when appropriate... But in either case benchmark landscape
+# changes dramatically and below numbers are CPU cycles per processed
+# byte for 128-bit key.
+#
+# ECB encrypt ECB decrypt CBC large chunk
+# P4 56[60] 84[100] 23
+# AMD K8 48[44] 70[79] 18
+# PIII 41[50] 61[91] 24
+# Core 2 32[38] 45[70] 18.5
+# Pentium 120 160 77
+#
+# Version 4.1 switches to compact S-box even in key schedule setup.
+#
+# Version 4.2 prefetches compact S-box in every SSE round or in other
+# words every cache-line is *guaranteed* to be accessed within ~50
+# cycles window. Why just SSE? Because it's needed on hyper-threading
+# CPU! Which is also why it's prefetched with 64 byte stride. Best
+# part is that it has no negative effect on performance:-)
+#
+# Version 4.3 implements switch between compact and non-compact block
+# functions in AES_cbc_encrypt depending on how much data was asked
+# to be processed in one stroke.
+#
+######################################################################
+# Timing attacks are classified in two classes: synchronous when
+# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collects
+# timing data of various character afterwards, and asynchronous when
+# malicious code is executed on same CPU simultaneously with AES,
+# instruments itself and performs statistical analysis of this data.
+#
+# As far as synchronous attacks go the root to the AES timing
+# vulnerability is twofold. Firstly, of 256 S-box elements at most 160
+# are referred to in single 128-bit block operation. Well, in C
+# implementation with 4 distinct tables it's actually as little as 40
+# references per 256 elements table, but anyway... Secondly, even
+# though S-box elements are clustered into smaller amount of cache-
+# lines, smaller than 160 and even 40, it turned out that for certain
+# plain-text pattern[s] or simply put chosen plain-text and given key
+# few cache-lines remain unaccessed during block operation. Now, if
+# attacker can figure out this access pattern, he can deduct the key
+# [or at least part of it]. The natural way to mitigate this kind of
+# attacks is to minimize the amount of cache-lines in S-box and/or
+# prefetch them to ensure that every one is accessed for more uniform
+# timing. But note that *if* plain-text was concealed in such way that
+# input to block function is distributed *uniformly*, then attack
+# wouldn't apply. Now note that some encryption modes, most notably
+# CBC, do mask the plain-text in this exact way [secure cipher output
+# is distributed uniformly]. Yes, one still might find input that
+# would reveal the information about given key, but if amount of
+# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount of possible key
+# combinations then attack becomes infeasible. This is why revised
+# AES_cbc_encrypt "dares" to switch to larger S-box when larger chunk
+# of data is to be processed in one stroke. The current size limit of
+# 512 bytes is chosen to provide same [diminishigly low] probability
+# for cache-line to remain untouched in large chunk operation with
+# large S-box as for single block operation with compact S-box and
+# surely needs more careful consideration...
+#
+# As for asynchronous attacks. There are two flavours: attacker code
+# being interleaved with AES on hyper-threading CPU at *instruction*
+# level, and two processes time sharing single core. As for latter.
+# Two vectors. 1. Given that attacker process has higher priority,
+# yield execution to process performing AES just before timer fires
+# off the scheduler, immediately regain control of CPU and analyze the
+# cache state. For this attack to be efficient attacker would have to
+# effectively slow down the operation by several *orders* of magnitute,
+# by ratio of time slice to duration of handful of AES rounds, which
+# unlikely to remain unnoticed. Not to mention that this also means
+# that he would spend correspondigly more time to collect enough
+# statistical data to mount the attack. It's probably appropriate to
+# say that if adeversary reckons that this attack is beneficial and
+# risks to be noticed, you probably have larger problems having him
+# mere opportunity. In other words suggested code design expects you
+# to preclude/mitigate this attack by overall system security design.
+# 2. Attacker manages to make his code interrupt driven. In order for
+# this kind of attack to be feasible, interrupt rate has to be high
+# enough, again comparable to duration of handful of AES rounds. But
+# is there interrupt source of such rate? Hardly, not even 1Gbps NIC
+# generates interrupts at such raging rate...
+#
+# And now back to the former, hyper-threading CPU or more specifically
+# Intel P4. Recall that asynchronous attack implies that malicious
+# code instruments itself. And naturally instrumentation granularity
+# has be noticeably lower than duration of codepath accessing S-box.
+# Given that all cache-lines are accessed during that time that is.
+# Current implementation accesses *all* cache-lines within ~50 cycles
+# window, which is actually *less* than RDTSC latency on Intel P4!
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"aes-586.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+&static_label("AES_Te");
+&static_label("AES_Td");
+
+$s0="eax";
+$s1="ebx";
+$s2="ecx";
+$s3="edx";
+$key="edi";
+$acc="esi";
+$tbl="ebp";
+
+# stack frame layout in _[x86|sse]_AES_* routines, frame is allocated
+# by caller
+$__ra=&DWP(0,"esp"); # return address
+$__s0=&DWP(4,"esp"); # s0 backing store
+$__s1=&DWP(8,"esp"); # s1 backing store
+$__s2=&DWP(12,"esp"); # s2 backing store
+$__s3=&DWP(16,"esp"); # s3 backing store
+$__key=&DWP(20,"esp"); # pointer to key schedule
+$__end=&DWP(24,"esp"); # pointer to end of key schedule
+$__tbl=&DWP(28,"esp"); # %ebp backing store
+
+# stack frame layout in AES_[en|crypt] routines, which differs from
+# above by 4 and overlaps by %ebp backing store
+$_tbl=&DWP(24,"esp");
+$_esp=&DWP(28,"esp");
+
+sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
+
+$speed_limit=512; # chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
+ # processed with compact routine in CBC mode
+$small_footprint=1; # $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
+ # recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
+ # I favor compact code to minimize cache
+ # contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
+ # in real-life applications...
+
+$vertical_spin=0; # shift "verticaly" defaults to 0, because of
+ # its proof-of-concept status...
+# Note that there is no decvert(), as well as last encryption round is
+# performed with "horizontal" shifts. This is because this "vertical"
+# implementation [one which groups shifts on a given $s[i] to form a
+# "column," unlike "horizontal" one, which groups shifts on different
+# $s[i] to form a "row"] is work in progress. It was observed to run
+# few percents faster on Intel cores, but not AMD. On AMD K8 core it's
+# whole 12% slower:-( So we face a trade-off... Shall it be resolved
+# some day? Till then the code is considered experimental and by
+# default remains dormant...
+
+sub encvert()
+{ my ($te, at s) = @_;
+ my $v0 = $acc, $v1 = $key;
+
+ &mov ($v0,$s[3]); # copy s3
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$s[2]); # save s2
+ &mov ($v1,$s[0]); # copy s0
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s[1]); # save s1
+
+ &movz ($s[2],&HB($s[0]));
+ &and ($s[0],0xFF);
+ &mov ($s[0],&DWP(0,$te,$s[0],8)); # s0>>0
+ &shr ($v1,16);
+ &mov ($s[3],&DWP(3,$te,$s[2],8)); # s0>>8
+ &movz ($s[1],&HB($v1));
+ &and ($v1,0xFF);
+ &mov ($s[2],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s0>>16
+ &mov ($v1,$v0);
+ &mov ($s[1],&DWP(1,$te,$s[1],8)); # s0>>24
+
+ &and ($v0,0xFF);
+ &xor ($s[3],&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>0
+ &movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
+ &shr ($v1,16);
+ &xor ($s[2],&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>8
+ &movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
+ &and ($v1,0xFF);
+ &xor ($s[1],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s3>>16
+ &mov ($v1,&DWP(4,"esp")); # restore s2
+ &xor ($s[0],&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # s3>>24
+
+ &mov ($v0,$v1);
+ &and ($v1,0xFF);
+ &xor ($s[2],&DWP(0,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>0
+ &movz ($v1,&HB($v0));
+ &shr ($v0,16);
+ &xor ($s[1],&DWP(3,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>8
+ &movz ($v1,&HB($v0));
+ &and ($v0,0xFF);
+ &xor ($s[0],&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # s2>>16
+ &mov ($v0,&DWP(8,"esp")); # restore s1
+ &xor ($s[3],&DWP(1,$te,$v1,8)); # s2>>24
+
+ &mov ($v1,$v0);
+ &and ($v0,0xFF);
+ &xor ($s[1],&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>0
+ &movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
+ &shr ($v1,16);
+ &xor ($s[0],&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>8
+ &movz ($v0,&HB($v1));
+ &and ($v1,0xFF);
+ &xor ($s[3],&DWP(2,$te,$v1,8)); # s1>>16
+ &mov ($key,$__key); # reincarnate v1 as key
+ &xor ($s[2],&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # s1>>24
+}
+
+# Another experimental routine, which features "horizontal spin," but
+# eliminates one reference to stack. Strangely enough runs slower...
+sub enchoriz()
+{ my $v0 = $key, $v1 = $acc;
+
+ &movz ($v0,&LB($s0)); # 3, 2, 1, 0*
+ &rotr ($s2,8); # 8,11,10, 9
+ &mov ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 0
+ &movz ($v0,&HB($s1)); # 7, 6, 5*, 4
+ &rotr ($s3,16); # 13,12,15,14
+ &xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 5
+ &movz ($v0,&HB($s2)); # 8,11,10*, 9
+ &rotr ($s0,16); # 1, 0, 3, 2
+ &xor ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 10
+ &movz ($v0,&HB($s3)); # 13,12,15*,14
+ &xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 15, t[0] collected
+ &mov ($__s0,$v1); # t[0] saved
+
+ &movz ($v0,&LB($s1)); # 7, 6, 5, 4*
+ &shr ($s1,16); # -, -, 7, 6
+ &mov ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 4
+ &movz ($v0,&LB($s3)); # 13,12,15,14*
+ &xor ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 14
+ &movz ($v0,&HB($s0)); # 1, 0, 3*, 2
+ &and ($s3,0xffff0000); # 13,12, -, -
+ &xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 3
+ &movz ($v0,&LB($s2)); # 8,11,10, 9*
+ &or ($s3,$s1); # 13,12, 7, 6
+ &xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 9, t[1] collected
+ &mov ($s1,$v1); # s[1]=t[1]
+
+ &movz ($v0,&LB($s0)); # 1, 0, 3, 2*
+ &shr ($s2,16); # -, -, 8,11
+ &mov ($v1,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 2
+ &movz ($v0,&HB($s3)); # 13,12, 7*, 6
+ &xor ($v1,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 7
+ &movz ($v0,&HB($s2)); # -, -, 8*,11
+ &xor ($v1,&DWP(0,$te,$v0,8)); # 8
+ &mov ($v0,$s3);
+ &shr ($v0,24); # 13
+ &xor ($v1,&DWP(3,$te,$v0,8)); # 13, t[2] collected
+
+ &movz ($v0,&LB($s2)); # -, -, 8,11*
+ &shr ($s0,24); # 1*
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(1,$te,$v0,8)); # 11
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(3,$te,$s0,8)); # 1
+ &mov ($s0,$__s0); # s[0]=t[0]
+ &movz ($v0,&LB($s3)); # 13,12, 7, 6*
+ &shr ($s3,16); # , ,13,12
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(2,$te,$v0,8)); # 6
+ &mov ($key,$__key); # reincarnate v0 as key
+ &and ($s3,0xff); # , ,13,12*
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(0,$te,$s3,8)); # 12
+ &xor ($s3,$s2); # s[2]=t[3] collected
+ &mov ($s2,$v1); # s[2]=t[2]
+}
+
+# More experimental code... SSE one... Even though this one eliminates
+# *all* references to stack, it's not faster...
+sub sse_encbody()
+{
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 0
+ &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x0d); # 7, 6, 3, 2
+ &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(3,$tbl,"edx",8)); # 1
+ &shr ("eax",16); # 5, 4
+
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 10
+ &xor ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 10
+ &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x08); # 13,12, 9, 8
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 11
+ &xor ("edx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 11
+ &shr ("ebx",16); # 15,14
+
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 5
+ &xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 5
+ &movq ("mm3",QWP(16,$key));
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 15
+ &xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 15
+ &movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
+
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 4
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 4
+ &movd ("eax","mm2"); # 7, 6, 3, 2
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 14
+ &xor ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 14
+ &movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 13,12, 9, 8
+
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 3
+ &xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 3
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 9
+ &xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 9
+ &movd ("mm1","ecx"); # t[1] collected
+
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 2
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(2,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 2
+ &shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
+ &punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 8
+ &xor ("ecx",&DWP(0,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 8
+ &shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
+
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 7
+ &xor ("ecx",&DWP(1,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 7
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm3");
+ &movz ("eax",&LB("eax")); # 6
+ &xor ("edx",&DWP(2,$tbl,"eax",8)); # 6
+ &pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x08); # 5, 4, 1, 0
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 13
+ &xor ("ecx",&DWP(3,$tbl,$acc,8)); # 13
+ &xor ("ecx",&DWP(24,$key)); # t[2]
+ &movd ("mm4","ecx"); # t[2] collected
+ &movz ("ebx",&LB("ebx")); # 12
+ &xor ("edx",&DWP(0,$tbl,"ebx",8)); # 12
+ &shr ("ecx",16);
+ &movd ("eax","mm1"); # 5, 4, 1, 0
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(28,$key)); # t[3]
+ &xor ("ebx","edx");
+ &movd ("mm5","ebx"); # t[3] collected
+ &and ("ebx",0xffff0000);
+ &or ("ebx","ecx");
+
+ &punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# "Compact" block function
+######################################################################
+
+sub enccompact()
+{ my $Fn = mov;
+ while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; }
+ my ($i,$te, at s)=@_;
+ my $tmp = $key;
+ my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+ # $Fn is used in first compact round and its purpose is to
+ # void restoration of some values from stack, so that after
+ # 4xenccompact with extra argument $key value is left there...
+ if ($i==3) { &$Fn ($key,$__key); }##%edx
+ else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
+ &and ($out,0xFF);
+ if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1]
+ if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2]
+ &movz ($out,&BP(-128,$te,$out,1));
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax
+ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+ &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
+ &shl ($tmp,8);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx
+ else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]);
+ &shr ($tmp,16); }
+ if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2]
+ &and ($tmp,0xFF);
+ &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
+ &shl ($tmp,16);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx
+ elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2]
+ else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]);
+ &shr ($tmp,24); }
+ &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$te,$tmp,1));
+ &shl ($tmp,24);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+ if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
+ if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); }
+ &comment();
+}
+
+sub enctransform()
+{ my @s = ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ my $i = shift;
+ my $tmp = $tbl;
+ my $r2 = $key ;
+
+ &mov ($acc,$s[$i]);
+ &and ($acc,0x80808080);
+ &mov ($tmp,$acc);
+ &shr ($tmp,7);
+ &lea ($r2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i]));
+ &sub ($acc,$tmp);
+ &and ($r2,0xfefefefe);
+ &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+ &mov ($tmp,$s[$i]);
+ &xor ($acc,$r2); # r2
+
+ &xor ($s[$i],$acc); # r0 ^ r2
+ &rotl ($s[$i],24);
+ &xor ($s[$i],$acc) # ROTATE(r2^r0,24) ^ r2
+ &rotr ($tmp,16);
+ &xor ($s[$i],$tmp);
+ &rotr ($tmp,8);
+ &xor ($s[$i],$tmp);
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
+ # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+ &mov ($__key,$key); # save key
+
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+ &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
+
+ # prefetch Te4
+ &mov ($key,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($key,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($key,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($key,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
+
+ &set_label("loop",16);
+
+ &enccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,1);
+ &enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0,1);
+ &enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1,1);
+ &enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2,1);
+ &enctransform(2);
+ &enctransform(3);
+ &enctransform(0);
+ &enctransform(1);
+ &mov ($key,$__key);
+ &mov ($tbl,$__tbl);
+ &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &cmp ($key,$__end);
+ &mov ($__key,$key);
+ &jb (&label("loop"));
+
+ &enccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ &enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+ &enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+ &enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(16,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(20,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(24,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(28,$key));
+
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
+
+######################################################################
+# "Compact" SSE block function.
+######################################################################
+#
+# Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
+# x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
+# Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
+# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
+# better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
+# eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
+# minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.
+#
+# MMX register layout lsb
+# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+# | mm4 | mm0 |
+# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+# | s3 | s2 | s1 | s0 |
+# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+# |15|14|13|12|11|10| 9| 8| 7| 6| 5| 4| 3| 2| 1| 0|
+# +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+#
+# Indexes translate as s[N/4]>>(8*(N%4)), e.g. 5 means s1>>8.
+# In this terms encryption and decryption "compact" permutation
+# matrices can be depicted as following:
+#
+# encryption lsb # decryption lsb
+# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
+# | t0 || 15 | 10 | 5 | 0 | # | t0 || 7 | 10 | 13 | 0 |
+# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
+# | t1 || 3 | 14 | 9 | 4 | # | t1 || 11 | 14 | 1 | 4 |
+# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
+# | t2 || 7 | 2 | 13 | 8 | # | t2 || 15 | 2 | 5 | 8 |
+# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
+# | t3 || 11 | 6 | 1 | 12 | # | t3 || 3 | 6 | 9 | 12 |
+# +----++----+----+----+----+ # +----++----+----+----+----+
+#
+######################################################################
+# Why not xmm registers? Short answer. It was actually tested and
+# was not any faster, but *contrary*, most notably on Intel CPUs.
+# Longer answer. Main advantage of using mm registers is that movd
+# latency is lower, especially on Intel P4. While arithmetic
+# instructions are twice as many, they can be scheduled every cycle
+# and not every second one when they are operating on xmm register,
+# so that "arithmetic throughput" remains virtually the same. And
+# finally the code can be executed even on elder SSE-only CPUs:-)
+
+sub sse_enccompact()
+{
+ &pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x08); # 5, 4, 1, 0
+ &pshufw ("mm5","mm4",0x0d); # 15,14,11,10
+ &movd ("eax","mm1"); # 5, 4, 1, 0
+ &movd ("ebx","mm5"); # 15,14,11,10
+
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
+ &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0
+ &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x0d); # 7, 6, 3, 2
+ &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1
+ &movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1)); # 1
+ &shl ("edx",8); # 1
+ &shr ("eax",16); # 5, 4
+
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 10
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 10
+ &shl ($acc,16); # 10
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 10
+ &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x08); # 13,12, 9, 8
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 11
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 11
+ &shl ($acc,24); # 11
+ &or ("edx",$acc); # 11
+ &shr ("ebx",16); # 15,14
+
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 5
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 5
+ &shl ($acc,8); # 5
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 5
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 15
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 15
+ &shl ($acc,24); # 15
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 15
+ &movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
+
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 4
+ &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 4
+ &movd ("eax","mm2"); # 7, 6, 3, 2
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 14
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 14
+ &shl ($acc,16); # 14
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 14
+
+ &movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 13,12, 9, 8
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 3
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 3
+ &shl ($acc,24); # 3
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 3
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 9
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 9
+ &shl ($acc,8); # 9
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 9
+ &movd ("mm1","ecx"); # t[1] collected
+
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 8
+ &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 8
+ &shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 2
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 2
+ &shl ($acc,16); # 2
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 2
+ &shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
+
+ &punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected
+
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 7
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 7
+ &shl ($acc,24); # 7
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 7
+ &and ("eax",0xff); # 6
+ &movz ("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1)); # 6
+ &shl ("eax",16); # 6
+ &or ("edx","eax"); # 6
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 13
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 13
+ &shl ($acc,8); # 13
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 13
+ &movd ("mm4","ecx"); # t[2] collected
+ &and ("ebx",0xff); # 12
+ &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1)); # 12
+ &or ("edx","ebx"); # 12
+ &movd ("mm5","edx"); # t[3] collected
+
+ &punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected
+}
+
+ if (!$x86only) {
+&function_begin_B("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
+ &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0
+ &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); # 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8
+
+ # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+ &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
+
+ &mov ($s0,0x1b1b1b1b); # magic constant
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s0);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$s0);
+
+ # prefetch Te4
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
+
+ &set_label("loop",16);
+ &sse_enccompact();
+ &add ($key,16);
+ &cmp ($key,$__end);
+ &ja (&label("out"));
+
+ &movq ("mm2",&QWP(8,"esp"));
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm3"); &pxor ("mm7","mm7");
+ &movq ("mm1","mm0"); &movq ("mm5","mm4"); # r0
+ &pcmpgtb("mm3","mm0"); &pcmpgtb("mm7","mm4");
+ &pand ("mm3","mm2"); &pand ("mm7","mm2");
+ &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0xb1);# ROTATE(r0,16)
+ &paddb ("mm0","mm0"); &paddb ("mm4","mm4");
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # = r2
+ &pshufw ("mm3","mm2",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm7","mm6",0xb1);# r0
+ &pxor ("mm1","mm0"); &pxor ("mm5","mm4"); # r0^r2
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= ROTATE(r0,16)
+
+ &movq ("mm2","mm3"); &movq ("mm6","mm7");
+ &pslld ("mm3",8); &pslld ("mm7",8);
+ &psrld ("mm2",24); &psrld ("mm6",24);
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= r0<<8
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= r0>>24
+
+ &movq ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm7","mm5");
+ &movq ("mm2",&QWP(0,$key)); &movq ("mm6",&QWP(8,$key));
+ &psrld ("mm1",8); &psrld ("mm5",8);
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+ &pslld ("mm3",24); &pslld ("mm7",24);
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= (r2^r0)<<8
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= (r2^r0)>>24
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6");
+ &jmp (&label("loop"));
+
+ &set_label("out",16);
+ &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));
+ &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
+
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
+ }
+
+######################################################################
+# Vanilla block function.
+######################################################################
+
+sub encstep()
+{ my ($i,$te, at s) = @_;
+ my $tmp = $key;
+ my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+ # lines marked with #%e?x[i] denote "reordered" instructions...
+ if ($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }##%edx
+ else { &mov ($out,$s[0]);
+ &and ($out,0xFF); }
+ if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1]
+ if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2]
+ &mov ($out,&DWP(0,$te,$out,8));
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax
+ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+ &xor ($out,&DWP(3,$te,$tmp,8));
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx
+ else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]);
+ &shr ($tmp,16); }
+ if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2]
+ &and ($tmp,0xFF);
+ &xor ($out,&DWP(2,$te,$tmp,8));
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx
+ elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2]
+ else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]);
+ &shr ($tmp,24) }
+ &xor ($out,&DWP(1,$te,$tmp,8));
+ if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
+ if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); }
+ &comment();
+}
+
+sub enclast()
+{ my ($i,$te, at s)=@_;
+ my $tmp = $key;
+ my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+ if ($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }##%edx
+ else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
+ &and ($out,0xFF);
+ if ($i==1) { &shr ($s[0],16); }#%ebx[1]
+ if ($i==2) { &shr ($s[0],24); }#%ecx[2]
+ &mov ($out,&DWP(2,$te,$out,8));
+ &and ($out,0x000000ff);
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }##%eax
+ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+ &mov ($tmp,&DWP(0,$te,$tmp,8));
+ &and ($tmp,0x0000ff00);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$__s0); }##%ebx
+ else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]);
+ &shr ($tmp,16); }
+ if ($i==2) { &and ($s[1],0xFF); }#%edx[2]
+ &and ($tmp,0xFF);
+ &mov ($tmp,&DWP(0,$te,$tmp,8));
+ &and ($tmp,0x00ff0000);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }##%ecx
+ elsif($i==2){ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[3])); }#%ebx[2]
+ else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]);
+ &shr ($tmp,24); }
+ &mov ($tmp,&DWP(2,$te,$tmp,8));
+ &and ($tmp,0xff000000);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+ if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
+ if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$acc); }
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt");
+ if ($vertical_spin) {
+ # I need high parts of volatile registers to be accessible...
+ &exch ($s1="edi",$key="ebx");
+ &mov ($s2="esi",$acc="ecx");
+ }
+
+ # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+ &mov ($__key,$key); # save key
+
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
+
+ if ($small_footprint) {
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+ &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
+
+ &set_label("loop",16);
+ if ($vertical_spin) {
+ &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ } else {
+ &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+ &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+ &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+ }
+ &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+ &cmp ($key,$__end);
+ &mov ($__key,$key);
+ &jb (&label("loop"));
+ }
+ else {
+ &cmp ($acc,10);
+ &jle (&label("10rounds"));
+ &cmp ($acc,12);
+ &jle (&label("12rounds"));
+
+ &set_label("14rounds",4);
+ for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+ if ($vertical_spin) {
+ &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ } else {
+ &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+ &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+ &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+ }
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+ }
+ &add ($key,32);
+ &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key
+ &set_label("12rounds",4);
+ for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+ if ($vertical_spin) {
+ &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ } else {
+ &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+ &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+ &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+ }
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+ }
+ &add ($key,32);
+ &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key
+ &set_label("10rounds",4);
+ for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) {
+ if ($vertical_spin) {
+ &encvert($tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ } else {
+ &encstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ &encstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+ &encstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+ &encstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+ }
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ($vertical_spin) {
+ # "reincarnate" some registers for "horizontal" spin...
+ &mov ($s1="ebx",$key="edi");
+ &mov ($s2="ecx",$acc="esi");
+ }
+ &enclast(0,$tbl,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ &enclast(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+ &enclast(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+ &enclast(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+
+ &add ($key,$small_footprint?16:160);
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &ret ();
+
+&set_label("AES_Te",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
+ &_data_word(0xa56363c6, 0x847c7cf8, 0x997777ee, 0x8d7b7bf6);
+ &_data_word(0x0df2f2ff, 0xbd6b6bd6, 0xb16f6fde, 0x54c5c591);
+ &_data_word(0x50303060, 0x03010102, 0xa96767ce, 0x7d2b2b56);
+ &_data_word(0x19fefee7, 0x62d7d7b5, 0xe6abab4d, 0x9a7676ec);
+ &_data_word(0x45caca8f, 0x9d82821f, 0x40c9c989, 0x877d7dfa);
+ &_data_word(0x15fafaef, 0xeb5959b2, 0xc947478e, 0x0bf0f0fb);
+ &_data_word(0xecadad41, 0x67d4d4b3, 0xfda2a25f, 0xeaafaf45);
+ &_data_word(0xbf9c9c23, 0xf7a4a453, 0x967272e4, 0x5bc0c09b);
+ &_data_word(0xc2b7b775, 0x1cfdfde1, 0xae93933d, 0x6a26264c);
+ &_data_word(0x5a36366c, 0x413f3f7e, 0x02f7f7f5, 0x4fcccc83);
+ &_data_word(0x5c343468, 0xf4a5a551, 0x34e5e5d1, 0x08f1f1f9);
+ &_data_word(0x937171e2, 0x73d8d8ab, 0x53313162, 0x3f15152a);
+ &_data_word(0x0c040408, 0x52c7c795, 0x65232346, 0x5ec3c39d);
+ &_data_word(0x28181830, 0xa1969637, 0x0f05050a, 0xb59a9a2f);
+ &_data_word(0x0907070e, 0x36121224, 0x9b80801b, 0x3de2e2df);
+ &_data_word(0x26ebebcd, 0x6927274e, 0xcdb2b27f, 0x9f7575ea);
+ &_data_word(0x1b090912, 0x9e83831d, 0x742c2c58, 0x2e1a1a34);
+ &_data_word(0x2d1b1b36, 0xb26e6edc, 0xee5a5ab4, 0xfba0a05b);
+ &_data_word(0xf65252a4, 0x4d3b3b76, 0x61d6d6b7, 0xceb3b37d);
+ &_data_word(0x7b292952, 0x3ee3e3dd, 0x712f2f5e, 0x97848413);
+ &_data_word(0xf55353a6, 0x68d1d1b9, 0x00000000, 0x2cededc1);
+ &_data_word(0x60202040, 0x1ffcfce3, 0xc8b1b179, 0xed5b5bb6);
+ &_data_word(0xbe6a6ad4, 0x46cbcb8d, 0xd9bebe67, 0x4b393972);
+ &_data_word(0xde4a4a94, 0xd44c4c98, 0xe85858b0, 0x4acfcf85);
+ &_data_word(0x6bd0d0bb, 0x2aefefc5, 0xe5aaaa4f, 0x16fbfbed);
+ &_data_word(0xc5434386, 0xd74d4d9a, 0x55333366, 0x94858511);
+ &_data_word(0xcf45458a, 0x10f9f9e9, 0x06020204, 0x817f7ffe);
+ &_data_word(0xf05050a0, 0x443c3c78, 0xba9f9f25, 0xe3a8a84b);
+ &_data_word(0xf35151a2, 0xfea3a35d, 0xc0404080, 0x8a8f8f05);
+ &_data_word(0xad92923f, 0xbc9d9d21, 0x48383870, 0x04f5f5f1);
+ &_data_word(0xdfbcbc63, 0xc1b6b677, 0x75dadaaf, 0x63212142);
+ &_data_word(0x30101020, 0x1affffe5, 0x0ef3f3fd, 0x6dd2d2bf);
+ &_data_word(0x4ccdcd81, 0x140c0c18, 0x35131326, 0x2fececc3);
+ &_data_word(0xe15f5fbe, 0xa2979735, 0xcc444488, 0x3917172e);
+ &_data_word(0x57c4c493, 0xf2a7a755, 0x827e7efc, 0x473d3d7a);
+ &_data_word(0xac6464c8, 0xe75d5dba, 0x2b191932, 0x957373e6);
+ &_data_word(0xa06060c0, 0x98818119, 0xd14f4f9e, 0x7fdcdca3);
+ &_data_word(0x66222244, 0x7e2a2a54, 0xab90903b, 0x8388880b);
+ &_data_word(0xca46468c, 0x29eeeec7, 0xd3b8b86b, 0x3c141428);
+ &_data_word(0x79dedea7, 0xe25e5ebc, 0x1d0b0b16, 0x76dbdbad);
+ &_data_word(0x3be0e0db, 0x56323264, 0x4e3a3a74, 0x1e0a0a14);
+ &_data_word(0xdb494992, 0x0a06060c, 0x6c242448, 0xe45c5cb8);
+ &_data_word(0x5dc2c29f, 0x6ed3d3bd, 0xefacac43, 0xa66262c4);
+ &_data_word(0xa8919139, 0xa4959531, 0x37e4e4d3, 0x8b7979f2);
+ &_data_word(0x32e7e7d5, 0x43c8c88b, 0x5937376e, 0xb76d6dda);
+ &_data_word(0x8c8d8d01, 0x64d5d5b1, 0xd24e4e9c, 0xe0a9a949);
+ &_data_word(0xb46c6cd8, 0xfa5656ac, 0x07f4f4f3, 0x25eaeacf);
+ &_data_word(0xaf6565ca, 0x8e7a7af4, 0xe9aeae47, 0x18080810);
+ &_data_word(0xd5baba6f, 0x887878f0, 0x6f25254a, 0x722e2e5c);
+ &_data_word(0x241c1c38, 0xf1a6a657, 0xc7b4b473, 0x51c6c697);
+ &_data_word(0x23e8e8cb, 0x7cdddda1, 0x9c7474e8, 0x211f1f3e);
+ &_data_word(0xdd4b4b96, 0xdcbdbd61, 0x868b8b0d, 0x858a8a0f);
+ &_data_word(0x907070e0, 0x423e3e7c, 0xc4b5b571, 0xaa6666cc);
+ &_data_word(0xd8484890, 0x05030306, 0x01f6f6f7, 0x120e0e1c);
+ &_data_word(0xa36161c2, 0x5f35356a, 0xf95757ae, 0xd0b9b969);
+ &_data_word(0x91868617, 0x58c1c199, 0x271d1d3a, 0xb99e9e27);
+ &_data_word(0x38e1e1d9, 0x13f8f8eb, 0xb398982b, 0x33111122);
+ &_data_word(0xbb6969d2, 0x70d9d9a9, 0x898e8e07, 0xa7949433);
+ &_data_word(0xb69b9b2d, 0x221e1e3c, 0x92878715, 0x20e9e9c9);
+ &_data_word(0x49cece87, 0xff5555aa, 0x78282850, 0x7adfdfa5);
+ &_data_word(0x8f8c8c03, 0xf8a1a159, 0x80898909, 0x170d0d1a);
+ &_data_word(0xdabfbf65, 0x31e6e6d7, 0xc6424284, 0xb86868d0);
+ &_data_word(0xc3414182, 0xb0999929, 0x772d2d5a, 0x110f0f1e);
+ &_data_word(0xcbb0b07b, 0xfc5454a8, 0xd6bbbb6d, 0x3a16162c);
+
+#Te4 # four copies of Te4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing
+ &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+ &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+ &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+ &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+ &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+ &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+ &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+ &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+ &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+ &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+ &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+ &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+ &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+ &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+ &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+ &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+ &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+ &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+ &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+ &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+ &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+ &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+ &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+ &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+ &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+ &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+ &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+ &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+ &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+ &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+ &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+ &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+
+ &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+ &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+ &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+ &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+ &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+ &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+ &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+ &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+ &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+ &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+ &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+ &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+ &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+ &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+ &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+ &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+ &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+ &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+ &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+ &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+ &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+ &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+ &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+ &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+ &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+ &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+ &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+ &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+ &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+ &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+ &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+ &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+
+ &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+ &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+ &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+ &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+ &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+ &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+ &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+ &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+ &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+ &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+ &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+ &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+ &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+ &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+ &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+ &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+ &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+ &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+ &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+ &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+ &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+ &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+ &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+ &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+ &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+ &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+ &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+ &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+ &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+ &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+ &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+ &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+
+ &data_byte(0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5);
+ &data_byte(0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76);
+ &data_byte(0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0);
+ &data_byte(0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0);
+ &data_byte(0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc);
+ &data_byte(0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15);
+ &data_byte(0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a);
+ &data_byte(0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75);
+ &data_byte(0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0);
+ &data_byte(0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84);
+ &data_byte(0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b);
+ &data_byte(0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf);
+ &data_byte(0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85);
+ &data_byte(0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8);
+ &data_byte(0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5);
+ &data_byte(0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2);
+ &data_byte(0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17);
+ &data_byte(0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73);
+ &data_byte(0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88);
+ &data_byte(0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb);
+ &data_byte(0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c);
+ &data_byte(0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79);
+ &data_byte(0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9);
+ &data_byte(0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08);
+ &data_byte(0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6);
+ &data_byte(0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a);
+ &data_byte(0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e);
+ &data_byte(0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e);
+ &data_byte(0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94);
+ &data_byte(0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf);
+ &data_byte(0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68);
+ &data_byte(0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16);
+#rcon:
+ &data_word(0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008);
+ &data_word(0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080);
+ &data_word(0x0000001b, 0x00000036, 0x00000000, 0x00000000);
+ &data_word(0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000);
+&function_end_B("_x86_AES_encrypt");
+
+# void AES_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+&function_begin("AES_encrypt");
+ &mov ($acc,&wparam(0)); # load inp
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # load key
+
+ &mov ($s0,"esp");
+ &sub ("esp",36);
+ &and ("esp",-64); # align to cache-line
+
+ # place stack frame just "above" the key schedule
+ &lea ($s1,&DWP(-64-63,$key));
+ &sub ($s1,"esp");
+ &neg ($s1);
+ &and ($s1,0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+ &sub ("esp",$s1);
+ &add ("esp",4); # 4 is reserved for caller's return address
+ &mov ($_esp,$s0); # save stack pointer
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
+ &set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop($tbl);
+ &picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if (!$x86only);
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
+
+ # pick Te4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule
+ &lea ($s1,&DWP(768-4,"esp"));
+ &sub ($s1,$tbl);
+ &and ($s1,0x300);
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1));
+
+ if (!$x86only) {
+ &bt (&DWP(0,$s0),25); # check for SSE bit
+ &jnc (&label("x86"));
+
+ &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc));
+ &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
+ &call ("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer
+ &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out
+ &movq (&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0"); # write output data
+ &movq (&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4");
+ &emms ();
+ &function_end_A();
+ }
+ &set_label("x86",16);
+ &mov ($_tbl,$tbl);
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # load input data
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+ &call ("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer
+ &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output data
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+&function_end("AES_encrypt");
+
+#--------------------------------------------------------------------#
+
+######################################################################
+# "Compact" block function
+######################################################################
+
+sub deccompact()
+{ my $Fn = mov;
+ while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; }
+ my ($i,$td, at s)=@_;
+ my $tmp = $key;
+ my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+ # $Fn is used in first compact round and its purpose is to
+ # void restoration of some values from stack, so that after
+ # 4xdeccompact with extra argument $key, $s0 and $s1 values
+ # are left there...
+ if($i==3) { &$Fn ($key,$__key); }
+ else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
+ &and ($out,0xFF);
+ &movz ($out,&BP(-128,$td,$out,1));
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }
+ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+ &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1));
+ &shl ($tmp,8);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc); }
+ else { mov ($tmp,$s[2]); }
+ &shr ($tmp,16);
+ &and ($tmp,0xFF);
+ &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1));
+ &shl ($tmp,16);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &$Fn ($s[2],$__s1); }
+ else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); }
+ &shr ($tmp,24);
+ &movz ($tmp,&BP(-128,$td,$tmp,1));
+ &shl ($tmp,24);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+ if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
+ if ($i==3) { &$Fn ($s[3],$__s0); }
+}
+
+# must be called with 2,3,0,1 as argument sequence!!!
+sub dectransform()
+{ my @s = ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ my $i = shift;
+ my $tmp = $key;
+ my $tp2 = @s[($i+2)%4]; $tp2 = @s[2] if ($i==1);
+ my $tp4 = @s[($i+3)%4]; $tp4 = @s[3] if ($i==1);
+ my $tp8 = $tbl;
+
+ &mov ($acc,$s[$i]);
+ &and ($acc,0x80808080);
+ &mov ($tmp,$acc);
+ &shr ($tmp,7);
+ &lea ($tp2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i]));
+ &sub ($acc,$tmp);
+ &and ($tp2,0xfefefefe);
+ &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+ &xor ($acc,$tp2);
+ &mov ($tp2,$acc);
+
+ &and ($acc,0x80808080);
+ &mov ($tmp,$acc);
+ &shr ($tmp,7);
+ &lea ($tp4,&DWP(0,$tp2,$tp2));
+ &sub ($acc,$tmp);
+ &and ($tp4,0xfefefefe);
+ &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+ &xor ($tp2,$s[$i]); # tp2^tp1
+ &xor ($acc,$tp4);
+ &mov ($tp4,$acc);
+
+ &and ($acc,0x80808080);
+ &mov ($tmp,$acc);
+ &shr ($tmp,7);
+ &lea ($tp8,&DWP(0,$tp4,$tp4));
+ &sub ($acc,$tmp);
+ &and ($tp8,0xfefefefe);
+ &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+ &xor ($tp4,$s[$i]); # tp4^tp1
+ &rotl ($s[$i],8); # = ROTATE(tp1,8)
+ &xor ($tp8,$acc);
+
+ &xor ($s[$i],$tp2);
+ &xor ($tp2,$tp8);
+ &rotl ($tp2,24);
+ &xor ($s[$i],$tp4);
+ &xor ($tp4,$tp8);
+ &rotl ($tp4,16);
+ &xor ($s[$i],$tp8); # ^= tp8^(tp4^tp1)^(tp2^tp1)
+ &rotl ($tp8,8);
+ &xor ($s[$i],$tp2); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24)
+ &xor ($s[$i],$tp4); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16)
+ &mov ($s[0],$__s0) if($i==2); #prefetch $s0
+ &mov ($s[1],$__s1) if($i==3); #prefetch $s1
+ &mov ($s[2],$__s2) if($i==1);
+ &xor ($s[$i],$tp8); # ^= ROTATE(tp8,8)
+
+ &mov ($s[3],$__s3) if($i==1);
+ &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$s[$i]) if($i>=2);
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
+ # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+ &mov ($__key,$key); # save key
+
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
+
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+ &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
+
+ # prefetch Td4
+ &mov ($key,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($key,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($key,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($key,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
+
+ &set_label("loop",16);
+
+ &deccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1,1);
+ &deccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2,1);
+ &deccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3,1);
+ &deccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0,1);
+ &dectransform(2);
+ &dectransform(3);
+ &dectransform(0);
+ &dectransform(1);
+ &mov ($key,$__key);
+ &mov ($tbl,$__tbl);
+ &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &cmp ($key,$__end);
+ &mov ($__key,$key);
+ &jb (&label("loop"));
+
+ &deccompact(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+ &deccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+ &deccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+ &deccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(16,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(20,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(24,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(28,$key));
+
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
+
+######################################################################
+# "Compact" SSE block function.
+######################################################################
+
+sub sse_deccompact()
+{
+ &pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x0c); # 7, 6, 1, 0
+ &movd ("eax","mm1"); # 7, 6, 1, 0
+
+ &pshufw ("mm5","mm4",0x09); # 13,12,11,10
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
+ &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0
+ &movd ("ebx","mm5"); # 13,12,11,10
+ &movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1
+ &movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1)); # 1
+ &shl ("edx",8); # 1
+
+ &pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x06); # 3, 2, 5, 4
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 10
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 10
+ &shl ($acc,16); # 10
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 10
+ &shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 11
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 11
+ &shl ($acc,24); # 11
+ &or ("edx",$acc); # 11
+ &shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
+
+ &pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x03); # 9, 8,15,14
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 7
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 7
+ &shl ($acc,24); # 7
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 7
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 13
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 13
+ &shl ($acc,8); # 13
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 13
+ &movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
+
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 6
+ &movd ("eax","mm2"); # 3, 2, 5, 4
+ &movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 6
+ &shl ("ecx",16); # 6
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 12
+ &movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 9, 8,15,14
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 12
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 12
+
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 4
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 4
+ &or ("edx",$acc); # 4
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 14
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 14
+ &shl ($acc,16); # 14
+ &or ("edx",$acc); # 14
+ &movd ("mm1","edx"); # t[1] collected
+
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 5
+ &movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 5
+ &shl ("edx",8); # 5
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 15
+ &shr ("eax",16); # 3, 2
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 15
+ &shl ($acc,24); # 15
+ &or ("edx",$acc); # 15
+ &shr ("ebx",16); # 9, 8
+
+ &punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected
+
+ &movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 9
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 9
+ &shl ($acc,8); # 9
+ &or ("ecx",$acc); # 9
+ &and ("ebx",0xff); # 8
+ &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1)); # 8
+ &or ("edx","ebx"); # 8
+ &movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 2
+ &movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 2
+ &shl ($acc,16); # 2
+ &or ("edx",$acc); # 2
+ &movd ("mm4","edx"); # t[2] collected
+ &movz ("eax",&HB("eax")); # 3
+ &movz ("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1)); # 3
+ &shl ("eax",24); # 3
+ &or ("ecx","eax"); # 3
+ &movd ("mm5","ecx"); # t[3] collected
+
+ &punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected
+}
+
+ if (!$x86only) {
+&function_begin_B("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
+ &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0
+ &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key)); # 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8
+
+ # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+ &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
+
+ &mov ($s0,0x1b1b1b1b); # magic constant
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$s0);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$s0);
+
+ # prefetch Td4
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
+
+ &set_label("loop",16);
+ &sse_deccompact();
+ &add ($key,16);
+ &cmp ($key,$__end);
+ &ja (&label("out"));
+
+ # ROTATE(x^y,N) == ROTATE(x,N)^ROTATE(y,N)
+ &movq ("mm3","mm0"); &movq ("mm7","mm4");
+ &movq ("mm2","mm0",1); &movq ("mm6","mm4",1);
+ &movq ("mm1","mm0"); &movq ("mm5","mm4");
+ &pshufw ("mm0","mm0",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm4","mm4",0xb1);# = ROTATE(tp0,16)
+ &pslld ("mm2",8); &pslld ("mm6",8);
+ &psrld ("mm3",8); &psrld ("mm7",8);
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= tp0<<8
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp0>>8
+ &pslld ("mm2",16); &pslld ("mm6",16);
+ &psrld ("mm3",16); &psrld ("mm7",16);
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= tp0<<24
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp0>>24
+
+ &movq ("mm3",&QWP(8,"esp"));
+ &pxor ("mm2","mm2"); &pxor ("mm6","mm6");
+ &pcmpgtb("mm2","mm1"); &pcmpgtb("mm6","mm5");
+ &pand ("mm2","mm3"); &pand ("mm6","mm3");
+ &paddb ("mm1","mm1"); &paddb ("mm5","mm5");
+ &pxor ("mm1","mm2"); &pxor ("mm5","mm6"); # tp2
+ &movq ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm7","mm5");
+ &movq ("mm2","mm1"); &movq ("mm6","mm5");
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp2
+ &pslld ("mm3",24); &pslld ("mm7",24);
+ &psrld ("mm2",8); &psrld ("mm6",8);
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp2<<24
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= tp2>>8
+
+ &movq ("mm2",&QWP(8,"esp"));
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm3"); &pxor ("mm7","mm7");
+ &pcmpgtb("mm3","mm1"); &pcmpgtb("mm7","mm5");
+ &pand ("mm3","mm2"); &pand ("mm7","mm2");
+ &paddb ("mm1","mm1"); &paddb ("mm5","mm5");
+ &pxor ("mm1","mm3"); &pxor ("mm5","mm7"); # tp4
+ &pshufw ("mm3","mm1",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm7","mm5",0xb1);
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp4
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= ROTATE(tp4,16)
+
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm3"); &pxor ("mm7","mm7");
+ &pcmpgtb("mm3","mm1"); &pcmpgtb("mm7","mm5");
+ &pand ("mm3","mm2"); &pand ("mm7","mm2");
+ &paddb ("mm1","mm1"); &paddb ("mm5","mm5");
+ &pxor ("mm1","mm3"); &pxor ("mm5","mm7"); # tp8
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp8
+ &movq ("mm3","mm1"); &movq ("mm7","mm5");
+ &pshufw ("mm2","mm1",0xb1); &pshufw ("mm6","mm5",0xb1);
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6"); # ^= ROTATE(tp8,16)
+ &pslld ("mm1",8); &pslld ("mm5",8);
+ &psrld ("mm3",8); &psrld ("mm7",8);
+ &movq ("mm2",&QWP(0,$key)); &movq ("mm6",&QWP(8,$key));
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp8<<8
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp8>>8
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+ &pslld ("mm1",16); &pslld ("mm5",16);
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+ &psrld ("mm3",16); &psrld ("mm7",16);
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm1"); &pxor ("mm4","mm5"); # ^= tp8<<24
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm3"); &pxor ("mm4","mm7"); # ^= tp8>>24
+
+ &pxor ("mm0","mm2"); &pxor ("mm4","mm6");
+ &jmp (&label("loop"));
+
+ &set_label("out",16);
+ &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key));
+ &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
+
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
+ }
+
+######################################################################
+# Vanilla block function.
+######################################################################
+
+sub decstep()
+{ my ($i,$td, at s) = @_;
+ my $tmp = $key;
+ my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+ # no instructions are reordered, as performance appears
+ # optimal... or rather that all attempts to reorder didn't
+ # result in better performance [which by the way is not a
+ # bit lower than ecryption].
+ if($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }
+ else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
+ &and ($out,0xFF);
+ &mov ($out,&DWP(0,$td,$out,8));
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }
+ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+ &xor ($out,&DWP(3,$td,$tmp,8));
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc); }
+ else { &mov ($tmp,$s[2]); }
+ &shr ($tmp,16);
+ &and ($tmp,0xFF);
+ &xor ($out,&DWP(2,$td,$tmp,8));
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }
+ else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); }
+ &shr ($tmp,24);
+ &xor ($out,&DWP(1,$td,$tmp,8));
+ if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
+ if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$__s0); }
+ &comment();
+}
+
+sub declast()
+{ my ($i,$td, at s)=@_;
+ my $tmp = $key;
+ my $out = $i==3?$s[0]:$acc;
+
+ if($i==0) { &lea ($td,&DWP(2048+128,$td));
+ &mov ($tmp,&DWP(0-128,$td));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(32-128,$td));
+ &mov ($tmp,&DWP(64-128,$td));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(96-128,$td));
+ &mov ($tmp,&DWP(128-128,$td));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(160-128,$td));
+ &mov ($tmp,&DWP(192-128,$td));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(224-128,$td));
+ &lea ($td,&DWP(-128,$td)); }
+ if($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }
+ else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
+ &and ($out,0xFF);
+ &movz ($out,&BP(0,$td,$out,1));
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[1]; }
+ &movz ($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
+ &movz ($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1));
+ &shl ($tmp,8);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc); }
+ else { mov ($tmp,$s[2]); }
+ &shr ($tmp,16);
+ &and ($tmp,0xFF);
+ &movz ($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1));
+ &shl ($tmp,16);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+
+ if ($i==3) { $tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],$__s1); }
+ else { &mov ($tmp,$s[3]); }
+ &shr ($tmp,24);
+ &movz ($tmp,&BP(0,$td,$tmp,1));
+ &shl ($tmp,24);
+ &xor ($out,$tmp);
+ if ($i<2) { &mov (&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out); }
+ if ($i==3) { &mov ($s[3],$__s0);
+ &lea ($td,&DWP(-2048,$td)); }
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+ # note that caller is expected to allocate stack frame for me!
+ &mov ($__key,$key); # save key
+
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor with key
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # load key->rounds
+
+ if ($small_footprint) {
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+ &mov ($__end,$acc); # end of key schedule
+ &set_label("loop",16);
+ &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+ &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+ &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+ &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+ &add ($key,16); # advance rd_key
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+ &cmp ($key,$__end);
+ &mov ($__key,$key);
+ &jb (&label("loop"));
+ }
+ else {
+ &cmp ($acc,10);
+ &jle (&label("10rounds"));
+ &cmp ($acc,12);
+ &jle (&label("12rounds"));
+
+ &set_label("14rounds",4);
+ for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+ &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+ &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+ &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+ &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+ }
+ &add ($key,32);
+ &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key
+ &set_label("12rounds",4);
+ for ($i=1;$i<3;$i++) {
+ &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+ &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+ &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+ &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+ }
+ &add ($key,32);
+ &mov ($__key,$key); # advance rd_key
+ &set_label("10rounds",4);
+ for ($i=1;$i<10;$i++) {
+ &decstep(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+ &decstep(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+ &decstep(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+ &decstep(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(16*$i+0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(16*$i+4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(16*$i+8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(16*$i+12,$key));
+ }
+ }
+
+ &declast(0,$tbl,$s0,$s3,$s2,$s1);
+ &declast(1,$tbl,$s1,$s0,$s3,$s2);
+ &declast(2,$tbl,$s2,$s1,$s0,$s3);
+ &declast(3,$tbl,$s3,$s2,$s1,$s0);
+
+ &add ($key,$small_footprint?16:160);
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &ret ();
+
+&set_label("AES_Td",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
+ &_data_word(0x50a7f451, 0x5365417e, 0xc3a4171a, 0x965e273a);
+ &_data_word(0xcb6bab3b, 0xf1459d1f, 0xab58faac, 0x9303e34b);
+ &_data_word(0x55fa3020, 0xf66d76ad, 0x9176cc88, 0x254c02f5);
+ &_data_word(0xfcd7e54f, 0xd7cb2ac5, 0x80443526, 0x8fa362b5);
+ &_data_word(0x495ab1de, 0x671bba25, 0x980eea45, 0xe1c0fe5d);
+ &_data_word(0x02752fc3, 0x12f04c81, 0xa397468d, 0xc6f9d36b);
+ &_data_word(0xe75f8f03, 0x959c9215, 0xeb7a6dbf, 0xda595295);
+ &_data_word(0x2d83bed4, 0xd3217458, 0x2969e049, 0x44c8c98e);
+ &_data_word(0x6a89c275, 0x78798ef4, 0x6b3e5899, 0xdd71b927);
+ &_data_word(0xb64fe1be, 0x17ad88f0, 0x66ac20c9, 0xb43ace7d);
+ &_data_word(0x184adf63, 0x82311ae5, 0x60335197, 0x457f5362);
+ &_data_word(0xe07764b1, 0x84ae6bbb, 0x1ca081fe, 0x942b08f9);
+ &_data_word(0x58684870, 0x19fd458f, 0x876cde94, 0xb7f87b52);
+ &_data_word(0x23d373ab, 0xe2024b72, 0x578f1fe3, 0x2aab5566);
+ &_data_word(0x0728ebb2, 0x03c2b52f, 0x9a7bc586, 0xa50837d3);
+ &_data_word(0xf2872830, 0xb2a5bf23, 0xba6a0302, 0x5c8216ed);
+ &_data_word(0x2b1ccf8a, 0x92b479a7, 0xf0f207f3, 0xa1e2694e);
+ &_data_word(0xcdf4da65, 0xd5be0506, 0x1f6234d1, 0x8afea6c4);
+ &_data_word(0x9d532e34, 0xa055f3a2, 0x32e18a05, 0x75ebf6a4);
+ &_data_word(0x39ec830b, 0xaaef6040, 0x069f715e, 0x51106ebd);
+ &_data_word(0xf98a213e, 0x3d06dd96, 0xae053edd, 0x46bde64d);
+ &_data_word(0xb58d5491, 0x055dc471, 0x6fd40604, 0xff155060);
+ &_data_word(0x24fb9819, 0x97e9bdd6, 0xcc434089, 0x779ed967);
+ &_data_word(0xbd42e8b0, 0x888b8907, 0x385b19e7, 0xdbeec879);
+ &_data_word(0x470a7ca1, 0xe90f427c, 0xc91e84f8, 0x00000000);
+ &_data_word(0x83868009, 0x48ed2b32, 0xac70111e, 0x4e725a6c);
+ &_data_word(0xfbff0efd, 0x5638850f, 0x1ed5ae3d, 0x27392d36);
+ &_data_word(0x64d90f0a, 0x21a65c68, 0xd1545b9b, 0x3a2e3624);
+ &_data_word(0xb1670a0c, 0x0fe75793, 0xd296eeb4, 0x9e919b1b);
+ &_data_word(0x4fc5c080, 0xa220dc61, 0x694b775a, 0x161a121c);
+ &_data_word(0x0aba93e2, 0xe52aa0c0, 0x43e0223c, 0x1d171b12);
+ &_data_word(0x0b0d090e, 0xadc78bf2, 0xb9a8b62d, 0xc8a91e14);
+ &_data_word(0x8519f157, 0x4c0775af, 0xbbdd99ee, 0xfd607fa3);
+ &_data_word(0x9f2601f7, 0xbcf5725c, 0xc53b6644, 0x347efb5b);
+ &_data_word(0x7629438b, 0xdcc623cb, 0x68fcedb6, 0x63f1e4b8);
+ &_data_word(0xcadc31d7, 0x10856342, 0x40229713, 0x2011c684);
+ &_data_word(0x7d244a85, 0xf83dbbd2, 0x1132f9ae, 0x6da129c7);
+ &_data_word(0x4b2f9e1d, 0xf330b2dc, 0xec52860d, 0xd0e3c177);
+ &_data_word(0x6c16b32b, 0x99b970a9, 0xfa489411, 0x2264e947);
+ &_data_word(0xc48cfca8, 0x1a3ff0a0, 0xd82c7d56, 0xef903322);
+ &_data_word(0xc74e4987, 0xc1d138d9, 0xfea2ca8c, 0x360bd498);
+ &_data_word(0xcf81f5a6, 0x28de7aa5, 0x268eb7da, 0xa4bfad3f);
+ &_data_word(0xe49d3a2c, 0x0d927850, 0x9bcc5f6a, 0x62467e54);
+ &_data_word(0xc2138df6, 0xe8b8d890, 0x5ef7392e, 0xf5afc382);
+ &_data_word(0xbe805d9f, 0x7c93d069, 0xa92dd56f, 0xb31225cf);
+ &_data_word(0x3b99acc8, 0xa77d1810, 0x6e639ce8, 0x7bbb3bdb);
+ &_data_word(0x097826cd, 0xf418596e, 0x01b79aec, 0xa89a4f83);
+ &_data_word(0x656e95e6, 0x7ee6ffaa, 0x08cfbc21, 0xe6e815ef);
+ &_data_word(0xd99be7ba, 0xce366f4a, 0xd4099fea, 0xd67cb029);
+ &_data_word(0xafb2a431, 0x31233f2a, 0x3094a5c6, 0xc066a235);
+ &_data_word(0x37bc4e74, 0xa6ca82fc, 0xb0d090e0, 0x15d8a733);
+ &_data_word(0x4a9804f1, 0xf7daec41, 0x0e50cd7f, 0x2ff69117);
+ &_data_word(0x8dd64d76, 0x4db0ef43, 0x544daacc, 0xdf0496e4);
+ &_data_word(0xe3b5d19e, 0x1b886a4c, 0xb81f2cc1, 0x7f516546);
+ &_data_word(0x04ea5e9d, 0x5d358c01, 0x737487fa, 0x2e410bfb);
+ &_data_word(0x5a1d67b3, 0x52d2db92, 0x335610e9, 0x1347d66d);
+ &_data_word(0x8c61d79a, 0x7a0ca137, 0x8e14f859, 0x893c13eb);
+ &_data_word(0xee27a9ce, 0x35c961b7, 0xede51ce1, 0x3cb1477a);
+ &_data_word(0x59dfd29c, 0x3f73f255, 0x79ce1418, 0xbf37c773);
+ &_data_word(0xeacdf753, 0x5baafd5f, 0x146f3ddf, 0x86db4478);
+ &_data_word(0x81f3afca, 0x3ec468b9, 0x2c342438, 0x5f40a3c2);
+ &_data_word(0x72c31d16, 0x0c25e2bc, 0x8b493c28, 0x41950dff);
+ &_data_word(0x7101a839, 0xdeb30c08, 0x9ce4b4d8, 0x90c15664);
+ &_data_word(0x6184cb7b, 0x70b632d5, 0x745c6c48, 0x4257b8d0);
+
+#Td4: # four copies of Td4 to choose from to avoid L1 aliasing
+ &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+ &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+ &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+ &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+ &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+ &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+ &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+ &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+ &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+ &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+ &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+ &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+ &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+ &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+ &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+ &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+ &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+ &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+ &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+ &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+ &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+ &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+ &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+ &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+ &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+ &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+ &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+ &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+ &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+ &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+ &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+ &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+
+ &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+ &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+ &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+ &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+ &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+ &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+ &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+ &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+ &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+ &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+ &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+ &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+ &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+ &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+ &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+ &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+ &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+ &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+ &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+ &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+ &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+ &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+ &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+ &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+ &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+ &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+ &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+ &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+ &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+ &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+ &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+ &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+
+ &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+ &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+ &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+ &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+ &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+ &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+ &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+ &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+ &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+ &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+ &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+ &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+ &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+ &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+ &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+ &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+ &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+ &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+ &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+ &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+ &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+ &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+ &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+ &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+ &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+ &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+ &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+ &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+ &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+ &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+ &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+ &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+
+ &data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
+ &data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
+ &data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
+ &data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
+ &data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
+ &data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
+ &data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
+ &data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
+ &data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
+ &data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
+ &data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
+ &data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
+ &data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
+ &data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
+ &data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
+ &data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
+ &data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
+ &data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
+ &data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
+ &data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
+ &data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
+ &data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
+ &data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
+ &data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
+ &data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
+ &data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
+ &data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
+ &data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
+ &data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
+ &data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
+ &data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
+ &data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
+&function_end_B("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+
+# void AES_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+&function_begin("AES_decrypt");
+ &mov ($acc,&wparam(0)); # load inp
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(2)); # load key
+
+ &mov ($s0,"esp");
+ &sub ("esp",36);
+ &and ("esp",-64); # align to cache-line
+
+ # place stack frame just "above" the key schedule
+ &lea ($s1,&DWP(-64-63,$key));
+ &sub ($s1,"esp");
+ &neg ($s1);
+ &and ($s1,0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+ &sub ("esp",$s1);
+ &add ("esp",4); # 4 is reserved for caller's return address
+ &mov ($_esp,$s0); # save stack pointer
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
+ &set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop($tbl);
+ &picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if(!$x86only);
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
+
+ # pick Td4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule
+ &lea ($s1,&DWP(768-4,"esp"));
+ &sub ($s1,$tbl);
+ &and ($s1,0x300);
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1));
+
+ if (!$x86only) {
+ &bt (&DWP(0,$s0),25); # check for SSE bit
+ &jnc (&label("x86"));
+
+ &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc));
+ &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
+ &call ("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer
+ &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out
+ &movq (&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0"); # write output data
+ &movq (&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4");
+ &emms ();
+ &function_end_A();
+ }
+ &set_label("x86",16);
+ &mov ($_tbl,$tbl);
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # load input data
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+ &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp); # restore stack pointer
+ &mov ($acc,&wparam(1)); # load out
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output data
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+&function_end("AES_decrypt");
+
+# void AES_cbc_encrypt (const void char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+# size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+# unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+{
+# stack frame layout
+# -4(%esp) # return address 0(%esp)
+# 0(%esp) # s0 backing store 4(%esp)
+# 4(%esp) # s1 backing store 8(%esp)
+# 8(%esp) # s2 backing store 12(%esp)
+# 12(%esp) # s3 backing store 16(%esp)
+# 16(%esp) # key backup 20(%esp)
+# 20(%esp) # end of key schedule 24(%esp)
+# 24(%esp) # %ebp backup 28(%esp)
+# 28(%esp) # %esp backup
+my $_inp=&DWP(32,"esp"); # copy of wparam(0)
+my $_out=&DWP(36,"esp"); # copy of wparam(1)
+my $_len=&DWP(40,"esp"); # copy of wparam(2)
+my $_key=&DWP(44,"esp"); # copy of wparam(3)
+my $_ivp=&DWP(48,"esp"); # copy of wparam(4)
+my $_tmp=&DWP(52,"esp"); # volatile variable
+#
+my $ivec=&DWP(60,"esp"); # ivec[16]
+my $aes_key=&DWP(76,"esp"); # copy of aes_key
+my $mark=&DWP(76+240,"esp"); # copy of aes_key->rounds
+
+&function_begin("AES_cbc_encrypt");
+ &mov ($s2 eq "ecx"? $s2 : "",&wparam(2)); # load len
+ &cmp ($s2,0);
+ &je (&label("drop_out"));
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
+ &set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop($tbl);
+ &picmeup($s0,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tbl,&label("pic_point")) if(!$x86only);
+
+ &cmp (&wparam(5),0);
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
+ &jne (&label("picked_te"));
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("AES_Te"),$tbl));
+ &set_label("picked_te");
+
+ # one can argue if this is required
+ &pushf ();
+ &cld ();
+
+ &cmp ($s2,$speed_limit);
+ &jb (&label("slow_way"));
+ &test ($s2,15);
+ &jnz (&label("slow_way"));
+ if (!$x86only) {
+ &bt (&DWP(0,$s0),28); # check for hyper-threading bit
+ &jc (&label("slow_way"));
+ }
+ # pre-allocate aligned stack frame...
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(-80-244,"esp"));
+ &and ($acc,-64);
+
+ # ... and make sure it doesn't alias with $tbl modulo 4096
+ &mov ($s0,$tbl);
+ &lea ($s1,&DWP(2048+256,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s3,$acc);
+ &and ($s0,0xfff); # s = %ebp&0xfff
+ &and ($s1,0xfff); # e = (%ebp+2048+256)&0xfff
+ &and ($s3,0xfff); # p = %esp&0xfff
+
+ &cmp ($s3,$s1); # if (p>=e) %esp =- (p-e);
+ &jb (&label("tbl_break_out"));
+ &sub ($s3,$s1);
+ &sub ($acc,$s3);
+ &jmp (&label("tbl_ok"));
+ &set_label("tbl_break_out",4); # else %esp -= (p-s)&0xfff + framesz;
+ &sub ($s3,$s0);
+ &and ($s3,0xfff);
+ &add ($s3,384);
+ &sub ($acc,$s3);
+ &set_label("tbl_ok",4);
+
+ &lea ($s3,&wparam(0)); # obtain pointer to parameter block
+ &exch ("esp",$acc); # allocate stack frame
+ &add ("esp",4); # reserve for return address!
+ &mov ($_tbl,$tbl); # save %ebp
+ &mov ($_esp,$acc); # save %esp
+
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$s3)); # load inp
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$s3)); # load out
+ #&mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$s3)); # load len
+ &mov ($key,&DWP(12,$s3)); # load key
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(16,$s3)); # load ivp
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(20,$s3)); # load enc flag
+
+ &mov ($_inp,$s0); # save copy of inp
+ &mov ($_out,$s1); # save copy of out
+ &mov ($_len,$s2); # save copy of len
+ &mov ($_key,$key); # save copy of key
+ &mov ($_ivp,$acc); # save copy of ivp
+
+ &mov ($mark,0); # copy of aes_key->rounds = 0;
+ # do we copy key schedule to stack?
+ &mov ($s1 eq "ebx" ? $s1 : "",$key);
+ &mov ($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "",244/4);
+ &sub ($s1,$tbl);
+ &mov ("esi",$key);
+ &and ($s1,0xfff);
+ &lea ("edi",$aes_key);
+ &cmp ($s1,2048+256);
+ &jb (&label("do_copy"));
+ &cmp ($s1,4096-244);
+ &jb (&label("skip_copy"));
+ &set_label("do_copy",4);
+ &mov ($_key,"edi");
+ &data_word(0xA5F3F689); # rep movsd
+ &set_label("skip_copy");
+
+ &mov ($key,16);
+ &set_label("prefetch_tbl",4);
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(32,$tbl));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(64,$tbl));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(96,$tbl));
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(128,$tbl));
+ &sub ($key,1);
+ &jnz (&label("prefetch_tbl"));
+ &sub ($tbl,2048);
+
+ &mov ($acc,$_inp);
+ &mov ($key,$_ivp);
+
+ &cmp ($s3,0);
+ &je (&label("fast_decrypt"));
+
+#----------------------------- ENCRYPT -----------------------------#
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+
+ &set_label("fast_enc_loop",16);
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # xor input data
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+ &mov ($key,$_key); # load key
+ &call ("_x86_AES_encrypt");
+
+ &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
+ &mov ($key,$_out); # load out
+
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # save output data
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
+ &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
+ &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
+ &lea ($s3,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out
+ &mov ($_out,$s3); # save out
+ &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
+ &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
+ &jnz (&label("fast_enc_loop"));
+ &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load ivp
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); # restore last 2 dwords
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # save ivec
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+ &cmp ($mark,0); # was the key schedule copied?
+ &mov ("edi",$_key);
+ &je (&label("skip_ezero"));
+ # zero copy of key schedule
+ &mov ("ecx",240/4);
+ &xor ("eax","eax");
+ &align (4);
+ &data_word(0xABF3F689); # rep stosd
+ &set_label("skip_ezero")
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp);
+ &popf ();
+ &set_label("drop_out");
+ &function_end_A();
+ &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
+
+#----------------------------- DECRYPT -----------------------------#
+&set_label("fast_decrypt",16);
+
+ &cmp ($acc,$_out);
+ &je (&label("fast_dec_in_place")); # in-place processing...
+
+ &mov ($_tmp,$key);
+
+ &align (4);
+ &set_label("fast_dec_loop",16);
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read input
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+ &mov ($key,$_key); # load key
+ &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+
+ &mov ($key,$_tmp); # load ivp
+ &mov ($acc,$_len); # load len
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &mov ($key,$_out); # load out
+ &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
+
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # write output
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+ &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
+ &mov ($_tmp,$acc); # save ivp
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
+ &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out
+ &mov ($_out,$key); # save out
+ &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
+ &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
+ &jnz (&label("fast_dec_loop"));
+ &mov ($key,$_tmp); # load temp ivp
+ &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load user ivp
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # copy back to user
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+ &jmp (&label("fast_dec_out"));
+
+ &set_label("fast_dec_in_place",16);
+ &set_label("fast_dec_in_place_loop");
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read input
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+ &lea ($key,$ivec);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy to temp
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+ &mov ($key,$_key); # load key
+ &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt");
+
+ &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp
+ &mov ($acc,$_out); # load out
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance out
+ &mov ($_out,$acc); # save out
+
+ &lea ($acc,$ivec);
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read temp
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy iv
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+ &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
+ &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
+ &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
+ &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
+ &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
+ &jnz (&label("fast_dec_in_place_loop"));
+
+ &set_label("fast_dec_out",4);
+ &cmp ($mark,0); # was the key schedule copied?
+ &mov ("edi",$_key);
+ &je (&label("skip_dzero"));
+ # zero copy of key schedule
+ &mov ("ecx",240/4);
+ &xor ("eax","eax");
+ &align (4);
+ &data_word(0xABF3F689); # rep stosd
+ &set_label("skip_dzero")
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp);
+ &popf ();
+ &function_end_A();
+ &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
+
+#--------------------------- SLOW ROUTINE ---------------------------#
+&set_label("slow_way",16);
+
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$s0)) if (!$x86only);# load OPENSSL_ia32cap
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # load key
+
+ # pre-allocate aligned stack frame...
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(-80,"esp"));
+ &and ($acc,-64);
+
+ # ... and make sure it doesn't alias with $key modulo 1024
+ &lea ($s1,&DWP(-80-63,$key));
+ &sub ($s1,$acc);
+ &neg ($s1);
+ &and ($s1,0x3C0); # modulo 1024, but aligned to cache-line
+ &sub ($acc,$s1);
+
+ # pick S-box copy which can't overlap with stack frame or $key
+ &lea ($s1,&DWP(768,$acc));
+ &sub ($s1,$tbl);
+ &and ($s1,0x300);
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl,$s1));
+
+ &lea ($s3,&wparam(0)); # pointer to parameter block
+
+ &exch ("esp",$acc);
+ &add ("esp",4); # reserve for return address!
+ &mov ($_tbl,$tbl); # save %ebp
+ &mov ($_esp,$acc); # save %esp
+ &mov ($_tmp,$s0); # save OPENSSL_ia32cap
+
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$s3)); # load inp
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$s3)); # load out
+ #&mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$s3)); # load len
+ #&mov ($key,&DWP(12,$s3)); # load key
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(16,$s3)); # load ivp
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(20,$s3)); # load enc flag
+
+ &mov ($_inp,$s0); # save copy of inp
+ &mov ($_out,$s1); # save copy of out
+ &mov ($_len,$s2); # save copy of len
+ &mov ($_key,$key); # save copy of key
+ &mov ($_ivp,$acc); # save copy of ivp
+
+ &mov ($key,$acc);
+ &mov ($acc,$s0);
+
+ &cmp ($s3,0);
+ &je (&label("slow_decrypt"));
+
+#--------------------------- SLOW ENCRYPT ---------------------------#
+ &cmp ($s2,16);
+ &mov ($s3,$s1);
+ &jb (&label("slow_enc_tail"));
+
+ if (!$x86only) {
+ &bt ($_tmp,25); # check for SSE bit
+ &jnc (&label("slow_enc_x86"));
+
+ &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # load iv
+ &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
+
+ &set_label("slow_enc_loop_sse",16);
+ &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc)); # xor input data
+ &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
+
+ &mov ($key,$_key);
+ &call ("_sse_AES_encrypt_compact");
+
+ &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
+ &mov ($key,$_out); # load out
+ &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
+
+ &movq (&QWP(0,$key),"mm0"); # save output data
+ &movq (&QWP(8,$key),"mm4");
+
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
+ &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
+ &lea ($s3,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out
+ &mov ($_out,$s3); # save out
+ &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
+ &cmp ($s2,16);
+ &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
+ &jae (&label("slow_enc_loop_sse"));
+ &test ($s2,15);
+ &jnz (&label("slow_enc_tail"));
+ &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load ivp
+ &movq (&QWP(0,$acc),"mm0"); # save ivec
+ &movq (&QWP(8,$acc),"mm4");
+ &emms ();
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp);
+ &popf ();
+ &function_end_A();
+ &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
+ }
+ &set_label("slow_enc_x86",16);
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # load iv
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+
+ &set_label("slow_enc_loop_x86",4);
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # xor input data
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+ &mov ($key,$_key); # load key
+ &call ("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
+
+ &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
+ &mov ($key,$_out); # load out
+
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # save output data
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+ &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
+ &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
+ &lea ($s3,&DWP(16,$key)); # advance out
+ &mov ($_out,$s3); # save out
+ &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
+ &cmp ($s2,16);
+ &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
+ &jae (&label("slow_enc_loop_x86"));
+ &test ($s2,15);
+ &jnz (&label("slow_enc_tail"));
+ &mov ($acc,$_ivp); # load ivp
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$key)); # restore last dwords
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # save ivec
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp);
+ &popf ();
+ &function_end_A();
+ &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
+
+ &set_label("slow_enc_tail",16);
+ &emms () if (!$x86only);
+ &mov ($key eq "edi"? $key:"",$s3); # load out to edi
+ &mov ($s1,16);
+ &sub ($s1,$s2);
+ &cmp ($key,$acc eq "esi"? $acc:""); # compare with inp
+ &je (&label("enc_in_place"));
+ &align (4);
+ &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy input
+ &jmp (&label("enc_skip_in_place"));
+ &set_label("enc_in_place");
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2));
+ &set_label("enc_skip_in_place");
+ &mov ($s2,$s1);
+ &xor ($s0,$s0);
+ &align (4);
+ &data_word(0xAAF3F689); # rep stosb # zero tail
+
+ &mov ($key,$_ivp); # restore ivp
+ &mov ($acc,$s3); # output as input
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$key));
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &mov ($_len,16); # len=16
+ &jmp (&label("slow_enc_loop_x86")); # one more spin...
+
+#--------------------------- SLOW DECRYPT ---------------------------#
+&set_label("slow_decrypt",16);
+ if (!$x86only) {
+ &bt ($_tmp,25); # check for SSE bit
+ &jnc (&label("slow_dec_loop_x86"));
+
+ &set_label("slow_dec_loop_sse",4);
+ &movq ("mm0",&QWP(0,$acc)); # read input
+ &movq ("mm4",&QWP(8,$acc));
+
+ &mov ($key,$_key);
+ &call ("_sse_AES_decrypt_compact");
+
+ &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
+ &lea ($s0,$ivec);
+ &mov ($s1,$_out); # load out
+ &mov ($s2,$_len); # load len
+ &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp
+
+ &movq ("mm1",&QWP(0,$acc)); # re-read input
+ &movq ("mm5",&QWP(8,$acc));
+
+ &pxor ("mm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # xor iv
+ &pxor ("mm4",&QWP(8,$key));
+
+ &movq (&QWP(0,$key),"mm1"); # copy input to iv
+ &movq (&QWP(8,$key),"mm5");
+
+ &sub ($s2,16); # decrease len
+ &jc (&label("slow_dec_partial_sse"));
+
+ &movq (&QWP(0,$s1),"mm0"); # write output
+ &movq (&QWP(8,$s1),"mm4");
+
+ &lea ($s1,&DWP(16,$s1)); # advance out
+ &mov ($_out,$s1); # save out
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
+ &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
+ &mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
+ &jnz (&label("slow_dec_loop_sse"));
+ &emms ();
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp);
+ &popf ();
+ &function_end_A();
+ &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
+
+ &set_label("slow_dec_partial_sse",16);
+ &movq (&QWP(0,$s0),"mm0"); # save output to temp
+ &movq (&QWP(8,$s0),"mm4");
+ &emms ();
+
+ &add ($s2 eq "ecx" ? "ecx":"",16);
+ &mov ("edi",$s1); # out
+ &mov ("esi",$s0); # temp
+ &align (4);
+ &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy partial output
+
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp);
+ &popf ();
+ &function_end_A();
+ &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
+ }
+ &set_label("slow_dec_loop_x86",16);
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read input
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+ &lea ($key,$ivec);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy to temp
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+ &mov ($key,$_key); # load key
+ &call ("_x86_AES_decrypt_compact");
+
+ &mov ($key,$_ivp); # load ivp
+ &mov ($acc,$_len); # load len
+ &xor ($s0,&DWP(0,$key)); # xor iv
+ &xor ($s1,&DWP(4,$key));
+ &xor ($s2,&DWP(8,$key));
+ &xor ($s3,&DWP(12,$key));
+
+ &sub ($acc,16);
+ &jc (&label("slow_dec_partial_x86"));
+
+ &mov ($_len,$acc); # save len
+ &mov ($acc,$_out); # load out
+
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # write output
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance out
+ &mov ($_out,$acc); # save out
+
+ &lea ($acc,$ivec);
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # read temp
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy it to iv
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+ &mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
+ &mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
+ &jnz (&label("slow_dec_loop_x86"));
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp);
+ &popf ();
+ &function_end_A();
+ &pushf (); # kludge, never executed
+
+ &set_label("slow_dec_partial_x86",16);
+ &lea ($acc,$ivec);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$acc),$s0); # save output to temp
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$acc),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
+
+ &mov ($acc,$_inp);
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(0,$acc)); # re-read input
+ &mov ($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
+ &mov ($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
+ &mov ($s3,&DWP(12,$acc));
+
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$key),$s0); # copy it to iv
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$key),$s1);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$key),$s2);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$key),$s3);
+
+ &mov ("ecx",$_len);
+ &mov ("edi",$_out);
+ &lea ("esi",$ivec);
+ &align (4);
+ &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb # copy partial output
+
+ &mov ("esp",$_esp);
+ &popf ();
+&function_end("AES_cbc_encrypt");
+}
+
+#------------------------------------------------------------------#
+
+sub enckey()
+{
+ &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[i]>>0
+ &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+ &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[i]>>8
+ &shl ("ebx",24);
+ &xor ("eax","ebx");
+
+ &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+ &shr ("edx",16);
+ &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[i]>>16
+ &xor ("eax","ebx");
+
+ &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+ &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[i]>>24
+ &shl ("ebx",8);
+ &xor ("eax","ebx");
+
+ &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+ &shl ("ebx",16);
+ &xor ("eax","ebx");
+
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(1024-128,$tbl,"ecx",4)); # rcon
+}
+
+&function_begin("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
+ &mov ("esi",&wparam(1)); # user supplied key
+ &mov ("edi",&wparam(3)); # private key schedule
+
+ &test ("esi",-1);
+ &jz (&label("badpointer"));
+ &test ("edi",-1);
+ &jz (&label("badpointer"));
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point"));
+ &set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop($tbl);
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("AES_Te")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(2048+128,$tbl));
+
+ # prefetch Te4
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(32-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(64-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(96-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(128-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(160-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(192-128,$tbl));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(224-128,$tbl));
+
+ &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # number of bits in key
+ &cmp ("ecx",128);
+ &je (&label("10rounds"));
+ &cmp ("ecx",192);
+ &je (&label("12rounds"));
+ &cmp ("ecx",256);
+ &je (&label("14rounds"));
+ &mov ("eax",-2); # invalid number of bits
+ &jmp (&label("exit"));
+
+ &set_label("10rounds");
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); # copy first 4 dwords
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+
+ &xor ("ecx","ecx");
+ &jmp (&label("10shortcut"));
+
+ &align (4);
+ &set_label("10loop");
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); # rk[0]
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"edi")); # rk[3]
+ &set_label("10shortcut");
+ &enckey ();
+
+ &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[4]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[5]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[6]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[7]
+ &inc ("ecx");
+ &add ("edi",16);
+ &cmp ("ecx",10);
+ &jl (&label("10loop"));
+
+ &mov (&DWP(80,"edi"),10); # setup number of rounds
+ &xor ("eax","eax");
+ &jmp (&label("exit"));
+
+ &set_label("12rounds");
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); # copy first 6 dwords
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"ecx");
+ &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"edx");
+
+ &xor ("ecx","ecx");
+ &jmp (&label("12shortcut"));
+
+ &align (4);
+ &set_label("12loop");
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); # rk[0]
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(20,"edi")); # rk[5]
+ &set_label("12shortcut");
+ &enckey ();
+
+ &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[6]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[7]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(32,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[8]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(36,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[9]
+
+ &cmp ("ecx",7);
+ &je (&label("12break"));
+ &inc ("ecx");
+
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(16,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(40,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[10]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(20,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(44,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[11]
+
+ &add ("edi",24);
+ &jmp (&label("12loop"));
+
+ &set_label("12break");
+ &mov (&DWP(72,"edi"),12); # setup number of rounds
+ &xor ("eax","eax");
+ &jmp (&label("exit"));
+
+ &set_label("14rounds");
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi")); # copy first 8 dwords
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"ecx");
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"edx");
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(16,"edi"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP(20,"edi"),"ebx");
+ &mov (&DWP(24,"edi"),"ecx");
+ &mov (&DWP(28,"edi"),"edx");
+
+ &xor ("ecx","ecx");
+ &jmp (&label("14shortcut"));
+
+ &align (4);
+ &set_label("14loop");
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(28,"edi")); # rk[7]
+ &set_label("14shortcut");
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi")); # rk[0]
+
+ &enckey ();
+
+ &mov (&DWP(32,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[8]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(36,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[9]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(40,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[10]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(44,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[11]
+
+ &cmp ("ecx",6);
+ &je (&label("14break"));
+ &inc ("ecx");
+
+ &mov ("edx","eax");
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(16,"edi")); # rk[4]
+ &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[11]>>0
+ &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+ &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[11]>>8
+ &xor ("eax","ebx");
+
+ &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+ &shr ("edx",16);
+ &shl ("ebx",8);
+ &movz ("esi",&LB("edx")); # rk[11]>>16
+ &xor ("eax","ebx");
+
+ &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+ &movz ("esi",&HB("edx")); # rk[11]>>24
+ &shl ("ebx",16);
+ &xor ("eax","ebx");
+
+ &movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"esi",1));
+ &shl ("ebx",24);
+ &xor ("eax","ebx");
+
+ &mov (&DWP(48,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[12]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(20,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(52,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[13]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(24,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(56,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[14]
+ &xor ("eax",&DWP(28,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(60,"edi"),"eax"); # rk[15]
+
+ &add ("edi",32);
+ &jmp (&label("14loop"));
+
+ &set_label("14break");
+ &mov (&DWP(48,"edi"),14); # setup number of rounds
+ &xor ("eax","eax");
+ &jmp (&label("exit"));
+
+ &set_label("badpointer");
+ &mov ("eax",-1);
+ &set_label("exit");
+&function_end("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
+
+# int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+# AES_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("private_AES_set_encrypt_key");
+ &call ("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("private_AES_set_encrypt_key");
+
+sub deckey()
+{ my ($i,$key,$tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8) = @_;
+ my $tmp = $tbl;
+
+ &mov ($acc,$tp1);
+ &and ($acc,0x80808080);
+ &mov ($tmp,$acc);
+ &shr ($tmp,7);
+ &lea ($tp2,&DWP(0,$tp1,$tp1));
+ &sub ($acc,$tmp);
+ &and ($tp2,0xfefefefe);
+ &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+ &xor ($acc,$tp2);
+ &mov ($tp2,$acc);
+
+ &and ($acc,0x80808080);
+ &mov ($tmp,$acc);
+ &shr ($tmp,7);
+ &lea ($tp4,&DWP(0,$tp2,$tp2));
+ &sub ($acc,$tmp);
+ &and ($tp4,0xfefefefe);
+ &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+ &xor ($tp2,$tp1); # tp2^tp1
+ &xor ($acc,$tp4);
+ &mov ($tp4,$acc);
+
+ &and ($acc,0x80808080);
+ &mov ($tmp,$acc);
+ &shr ($tmp,7);
+ &lea ($tp8,&DWP(0,$tp4,$tp4));
+ &xor ($tp4,$tp1); # tp4^tp1
+ &sub ($acc,$tmp);
+ &and ($tp8,0xfefefefe);
+ &and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
+ &rotl ($tp1,8); # = ROTATE(tp1,8)
+ &xor ($tp8,$acc);
+
+ &mov ($tmp,&DWP(4*($i+1),$key)); # modulo-scheduled load
+
+ &xor ($tp1,$tp2);
+ &xor ($tp2,$tp8);
+ &xor ($tp1,$tp4);
+ &rotl ($tp2,24);
+ &xor ($tp4,$tp8);
+ &xor ($tp1,$tp8); # ^= tp8^(tp4^tp1)^(tp2^tp1)
+ &rotl ($tp4,16);
+ &xor ($tp1,$tp2); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24)
+ &rotl ($tp8,8);
+ &xor ($tp1,$tp4); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16)
+ &mov ($tp2,$tmp);
+ &xor ($tp1,$tp8); # ^= ROTATE(tp8,8)
+
+ &mov (&DWP(4*$i,$key),$tp1);
+}
+
+# int private_AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
+# AES_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("private_AES_set_decrypt_key");
+ &call ("_x86_AES_set_encrypt_key");
+ &cmp ("eax",0);
+ &je (&label("proceed"));
+ &ret ();
+
+ &set_label("proceed");
+ &push ("ebp");
+ &push ("ebx");
+ &push ("esi");
+ &push ("edi");
+
+ &mov ("esi",&wparam(2));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(240,"esi")); # pull number of rounds
+ &lea ("ecx",&DWP(0,"","ecx",4));
+ &lea ("edi",&DWP(0,"esi","ecx",4)); # pointer to last chunk
+
+ &set_label("invert",4); # invert order of chunks
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"edi"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"edi"),"ebx");
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),"ecx");
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),"edx");
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"edi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"edi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"edi"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"edi"),"ebx");
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"ecx");
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"edx");
+ &add ("esi",16);
+ &sub ("edi",16);
+ &cmp ("esi","edi");
+ &jne (&label("invert"));
+
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($acc,&DWP(240,$key)); # pull number of rounds
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(-2,$acc,$acc));
+ &lea ($acc,&DWP(0,$key,$acc,8));
+ &mov (&wparam(2),$acc);
+
+ &mov ($s0,&DWP(16,$key)); # modulo-scheduled load
+ &set_label("permute",4); # permute the key schedule
+ &add ($key,16);
+ &deckey (0,$key,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
+ &deckey (1,$key,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0);
+ &deckey (2,$key,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1);
+ &deckey (3,$key,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2);
+ &cmp ($key,&wparam(2));
+ &jb (&label("permute"));
+
+ &xor ("eax","eax"); # return success
+&function_end("private_AES_set_decrypt_key");
+&asciz("AES for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2189 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# This module implements support for Intel AES-NI extension. In
-# OpenSSL context it's used with Intel engine, but can also be used as
-# drop-in replacement for crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl [see below for
-# details].
-#
-# Performance.
-#
-# To start with see corresponding paragraph in aesni-x86_64.pl...
-# Instead of filling table similar to one found there I've chosen to
-# summarize *comparison* results for raw ECB, CTR and CBC benchmarks.
-# The simplified table below represents 32-bit performance relative
-# to 64-bit one in every given point. Ratios vary for different
-# encryption modes, therefore interval values.
-#
-# 16-byte 64-byte 256-byte 1-KB 8-KB
-# 53-67% 67-84% 91-94% 95-98% 97-99.5%
-#
-# Lower ratios for smaller block sizes are perfectly understandable,
-# because function call overhead is higher in 32-bit mode. Largest
-# 8-KB block performance is virtually same: 32-bit code is less than
-# 1% slower for ECB, CBC and CCM, and ~3% slower otherwise.
-
-# January 2011
-#
-# See aesni-x86_64.pl for details. Unlike x86_64 version this module
-# interleaves at most 6 aes[enc|dec] instructions, because there are
-# not enough registers for 8x interleave [which should be optimal for
-# Sandy Bridge]. Actually, performance results for 6x interleave
-# factor presented in aesni-x86_64.pl (except for CTR) are for this
-# module.
-
-# April 2011
-#
-# Add aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt. Westmere spends 1.50 cycles processing
-# one byte out of 8KB with 128-bit key, Sandy Bridge - 1.09.
-
-$PREFIX="aesni"; # if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
- # generates drop-in replacement for
- # crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl:-)
-$inline=1; # inline _aesni_[en|de]crypt
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
-require "x86asm.pl";
-
-&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
-
-if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") { $movekey=*movups; }
-else { $movekey=*movups; }
-
-$len="eax";
-$rounds="ecx";
-$key="edx";
-$inp="esi";
-$out="edi";
-$rounds_="ebx"; # backup copy for $rounds
-$key_="ebp"; # backup copy for $key
-
-$rndkey0="xmm0";
-$rndkey1="xmm1";
-$inout0="xmm2";
-$inout1="xmm3";
-$inout2="xmm4";
-$inout3="xmm5"; $in1="xmm5";
-$inout4="xmm6"; $in0="xmm6";
-$inout5="xmm7"; $ivec="xmm7";
-
-# AESNI extenstion
-sub aeskeygenassist
-{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
- if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
- { &data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0xdf,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm); }
-}
-sub aescommon
-{ my($opcodelet,$dst,$src)=@_;
- if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
- { &data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2);}
-}
-sub aesimc { aescommon(0xdb, at _); }
-sub aesenc { aescommon(0xdc, at _); }
-sub aesenclast { aescommon(0xdd, at _); }
-sub aesdec { aescommon(0xde, at _); }
-sub aesdeclast { aescommon(0xdf, at _); }
-
-# Inline version of internal aesni_[en|de]crypt1
-{ my $sn;
-sub aesni_inline_generate1
-{ my ($p,$inout,$ivec)=@_; $inout=$inout0 if (!defined($inout));
- $sn++;
-
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
- &xorps ($ivec,$rndkey0) if (defined($ivec));
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
- &xorps ($inout,$ivec) if (defined($ivec));
- &xorps ($inout,$rndkey0) if (!defined($ivec));
- &set_label("${p}1_loop_$sn");
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
- &dec ($rounds);
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key));
- &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
- &jnz (&label("${p}1_loop_$sn"));
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout,$rndkey1)";
-}}
-
-sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop
-{ my ($p,$inout)=@_; $inout=$inout0 if (!defined($inout));
-
- &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt1");
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x10,$key));
- &xorps ($inout,$rndkey0);
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x20,$key));
- &lea ($key,&DWP(0x30,$key));
- &cmp ($rounds,11);
- &jb (&label("${p}128"));
- &lea ($key,&DWP(0x20,$key));
- &je (&label("${p}192"));
- &lea ($key,&DWP(0x20,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(-0x40,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-0x30,$key));
- &set_label("${p}192");
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(-0x20,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-0x10,$key));
- &set_label("${p}128");
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x50,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x60,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x70,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout,$rndkey0)";
- &ret();
- &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt1");
-}
-
-# void $PREFIX_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
-&aesni_generate1("enc") if (!$inline);
-&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
- &mov ("eax",&wparam(0));
- &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,"eax"));
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
- &mov ("eax",&wparam(1));
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
- &movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
-
-# void $PREFIX_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
-&aesni_generate1("dec") if(!$inline);
-&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
- &mov ("eax",&wparam(0));
- &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,"eax"));
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
- &mov ("eax",&wparam(1));
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
- &movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
-
-# _aesni_[en|de]cryptN are private interfaces, N denotes interleave
-# factor. Why 3x subroutine were originally used in loops? Even though
-# aes[enc|dec] latency was originally 6, it could be scheduled only
-# every *2nd* cycle. Thus 3x interleave was the one providing optimal
-# utilization, i.e. when subroutine's throughput is virtually same as
-# of non-interleaved subroutine [for number of input blocks up to 3].
-# This is why it makes no sense to implement 2x subroutine.
-# aes[enc|dec] latency in next processor generation is 8, but the
-# instructions can be scheduled every cycle. Optimal interleave for
-# new processor is therefore 8x, but it's unfeasible to accommodate it
-# in XMM registers addreassable in 32-bit mode and therefore 6x is
-# used instead...
-
-sub aesni_generate3
-{ my $p=shift;
-
- &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3");
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &shr ($rounds,1);
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
- &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
- &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
- &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
-
- &set_label("${p}3_loop");
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
- &dec ($rounds);
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &jnz (&label("${p}3_loop"));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
- &ret();
- &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3");
-}
-
-# 4x interleave is implemented to improve small block performance,
-# most notably [and naturally] 4 block by ~30%. One can argue that one
-# should have implemented 5x as well, but improvement would be <20%,
-# so it's not worth it...
-sub aesni_generate4
-{ my $p=shift;
-
- &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4");
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
- &shr ($rounds,1);
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
- &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
- &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
- &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
- &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
-
- &set_label("${p}4_loop");
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
- &dec ($rounds);
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey0)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &jnz (&label("${p}4_loop"));
-
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout3,$rndkey0)";
- &ret();
- &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4");
-}
-
-sub aesni_generate6
-{ my $p=shift;
-
- &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt6");
- &static_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter");
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &shr ($rounds,1);
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
- &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
- &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); # pxor does better here
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
- &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
- &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
- &dec ($rounds);
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
- &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0);
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
- &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
- &jmp (&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter"));
-
- &set_label("${p}6_loop",16);
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
- &dec ($rounds);
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
- &set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter",16);
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey0)";
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &jnz (&label("${p}6_loop"));
-
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout3,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout4,$rndkey0)";
- eval"&aes${p}last ($inout5,$rndkey0)";
- &ret();
- &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt6");
-}
-&aesni_generate3("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
-&aesni_generate3("dec");
-&aesni_generate4("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
-&aesni_generate4("dec");
-&aesni_generate6("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
-&aesni_generate6("dec");
-
-if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
-######################################################################
-# void aesni_ecb_encrypt (const void *in, void *out,
-# size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
-# int enc);
-&function_begin("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($key,&wparam(3));
- &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4));
- &and ($len,-16);
- &jz (&label("ecb_ret"));
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
- &test ($rounds_,$rounds_);
- &jz (&label("ecb_decrypt"));
-
- &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
- &cmp ($len,0x60);
- &jb (&label("ecb_enc_tail"));
-
- &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
- &sub ($len,0x60);
- &jmp (&label("ecb_enc_loop6_enter"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_enc_loop6",16);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
- &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
- &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
-&set_label("ecb_enc_loop6_enter");
-
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt6");
-
- &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
- &sub ($len,0x60);
- &jnc (&label("ecb_enc_loop6"));
-
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
- &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
- &add ($len,0x60);
- &jz (&label("ecb_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_enc_tail");
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &cmp ($len,0x20);
- &jb (&label("ecb_enc_one"));
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &je (&label("ecb_enc_two"));
- &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &cmp ($len,0x40);
- &jb (&label("ecb_enc_three"));
- &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &je (&label("ecb_enc_four"));
- &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout5,$inout5);
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt6");
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
- jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_enc_one",16);
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_enc_two",16);
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_enc_three",16);
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_enc_four",16);
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt4");
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
-######################################################################
-&set_label("ecb_decrypt",16);
- &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
- &cmp ($len,0x60);
- &jb (&label("ecb_dec_tail"));
-
- &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
- &sub ($len,0x60);
- &jmp (&label("ecb_dec_loop6_enter"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_dec_loop6",16);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
- &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
- &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
-&set_label("ecb_dec_loop6_enter");
-
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt6");
-
- &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
- &sub ($len,0x60);
- &jnc (&label("ecb_dec_loop6"));
-
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
- &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
- &add ($len,0x60);
- &jz (&label("ecb_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_dec_tail");
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &cmp ($len,0x20);
- &jb (&label("ecb_dec_one"));
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &je (&label("ecb_dec_two"));
- &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &cmp ($len,0x40);
- &jb (&label("ecb_dec_three"));
- &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &je (&label("ecb_dec_four"));
- &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout5,$inout5);
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt6");
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
- &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_dec_one",16);
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_dec_two",16);
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_dec_three",16);
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ecb_dec_four",16);
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt4");
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
-
-&set_label("ecb_ret");
-&function_end("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
-
-######################################################################
-# void aesni_ccm64_[en|de]crypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out,
-# size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
-# const char *ivec,char *cmac);
-#
-# Handles only complete blocks, operates on 64-bit counter and
-# does not update *ivec! Nor does it finalize CMAC value
-# (see engine/eng_aesni.c for details)
-#
-{ my $cmac=$inout1;
-&function_begin("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks");
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($key,&wparam(3));
- &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4));
- &mov ($rounds,&wparam(5));
- &mov ($key_,"esp");
- &sub ("esp",60);
- &and ("esp",-16); # align stack
- &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$key_);
-
- &movdqu ($ivec,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec
- &movdqu ($cmac,&QWP(0,$rounds)); # load cmac
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
-
- # compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f);
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b);
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607);
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203);
-
- # compose counter increment vector on stack
- &mov ($rounds_,1);
- &xor ($key_,$key_);
- &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_);
- &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),$key_);
- &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),$key_);
- &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_);
-
- &shr ($rounds,1);
- &lea ($key_,&DWP(0,$key));
- &movdqa ($inout3,&QWP(0,"esp"));
- &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
- &pshufb ($ivec,$inout3);
-
-&set_label("ccm64_enc_outer");
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
- &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp));
-
- &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
- &xorps ($rndkey0,$in0);
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
- &xorps ($cmac,$rndkey0); # cmac^=inp
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
-
-&set_label("ccm64_enc2_loop");
- &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
- &dec ($rounds);
- &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
- &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey0);
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
- &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey0);
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &jnz (&label("ccm64_enc2_loop"));
- &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
- &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
- &paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
- &aesenclast ($inout0,$rndkey0);
- &aesenclast ($cmac,$rndkey0);
-
- &dec ($len);
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
- &xorps ($in0,$inout0); # inp^=E(ivec)
- &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0); # save output
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out));
- &pshufb ($inout0,$inout3);
- &jnz (&label("ccm64_enc_outer"));
-
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
- &mov ($out,&wparam(5));
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
-&function_end("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks");
-
-&function_begin("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($key,&wparam(3));
- &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4));
- &mov ($rounds,&wparam(5));
- &mov ($key_,"esp");
- &sub ("esp",60);
- &and ("esp",-16); # align stack
- &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$key_);
-
- &movdqu ($ivec,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec
- &movdqu ($cmac,&QWP(0,$rounds)); # load cmac
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
-
- # compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f);
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b);
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607);
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203);
-
- # compose counter increment vector on stack
- &mov ($rounds_,1);
- &xor ($key_,$key_);
- &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_);
- &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),$key_);
- &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),$key_);
- &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_);
-
- &movdqa ($inout3,&QWP(0,"esp")); # bswap mask
- &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
-
- &mov ($key_,$key);
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
-
- &pshufb ($ivec,$inout3);
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
- &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load inp
- &paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
- &lea ($inp,&QWP(16,$inp));
- &jmp (&label("ccm64_dec_outer"));
-
-&set_label("ccm64_dec_outer",16);
- &xorps ($in0,$inout0); # inp ^= E(ivec)
- &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0); # save output
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out));
- &pshufb ($inout0,$inout3);
-
- &sub ($len,1);
- &jz (&label("ccm64_dec_break"));
-
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
- &shr ($rounds,1);
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
- &xorps ($in0,$rndkey0);
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
- &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
- &xorps ($cmac,$in0); # cmac^=out
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
-
-&set_label("ccm64_dec2_loop");
- &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
- &dec ($rounds);
- &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
- &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey0);
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
- &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey0);
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &jnz (&label("ccm64_dec2_loop"));
- &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load inp
- &paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
- &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
- &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
- &lea ($inp,&QWP(16,$inp));
- &aesenclast ($inout0,$rndkey0);
- &aesenclast ($cmac,$rndkey0);
- &jmp (&label("ccm64_dec_outer"));
-
-&set_label("ccm64_dec_break",16);
- &mov ($key,$key_);
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc",$cmac,$in0); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1",$cmac); }
-
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
- &mov ($out,&wparam(5));
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
-&function_end("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
-}
-
-######################################################################
-# void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out,
-# size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
-# const char *ivec);
-#
-# Handles only complete blocks, operates on 32-bit counter and
-# does not update *ivec! (see engine/eng_aesni.c for details)
-#
-# stack layout:
-# 0 pshufb mask
-# 16 vector addend: 0,6,6,6
-# 32 counter-less ivec
-# 48 1st triplet of counter vector
-# 64 2nd triplet of counter vector
-# 80 saved %esp
-
-&function_begin("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks");
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($key,&wparam(3));
- &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4));
- &mov ($key_,"esp");
- &sub ("esp",88);
- &and ("esp",-16); # align stack
- &mov (&DWP(80,"esp"),$key_);
-
- &cmp ($len,1);
- &je (&label("ctr32_one_shortcut"));
-
- &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec
-
- # compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f);
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b);
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607);
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203);
-
- # compose counter increment vector on stack
- &mov ($rounds,6);
- &xor ($key_,$key_);
- &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds);
- &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),$rounds);
- &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),$rounds);
- &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_);
-
- &pextrd ($rounds_,$inout5,3); # pull 32-bit counter
- &pinsrd ($inout5,$key_,3); # wipe 32-bit counter
-
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key->rounds
-
- # compose 2 vectors of 3x32-bit counters
- &bswap ($rounds_);
- &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
- &movdqa ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # load byte-swap mask
- &pinsrd ($rndkey1,$rounds_,0);
- &lea ($key_,&DWP(3,$rounds_));
- &pinsrd ($rndkey0,$key_,0);
- &inc ($rounds_);
- &pinsrd ($rndkey1,$rounds_,1);
- &inc ($key_);
- &pinsrd ($rndkey0,$key_,1);
- &inc ($rounds_);
- &pinsrd ($rndkey1,$rounds_,2);
- &inc ($key_);
- &pinsrd ($rndkey0,$key_,2);
- &movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey1); # save 1st triplet
- &pshufb ($rndkey1,$inout0); # byte swap
- &movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save 2nd triplet
- &pshufb ($rndkey0,$inout0); # byte swap
-
- &pshufd ($inout0,$rndkey1,3<<6); # place counter to upper dword
- &pshufd ($inout1,$rndkey1,2<<6);
- &cmp ($len,6);
- &jb (&label("ctr32_tail"));
- &movdqa (&QWP(32,"esp"),$inout5); # save counter-less ivec
- &shr ($rounds,1);
- &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
- &sub ($len,6);
- &jmp (&label("ctr32_loop6"));
-
-&set_label("ctr32_loop6",16);
- &pshufd ($inout2,$rndkey1,1<<6);
- &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP(32,"esp")); # pull counter-less ivec
- &pshufd ($inout3,$rndkey0,3<<6);
- &por ($inout0,$rndkey1); # merge counter-less ivec
- &pshufd ($inout4,$rndkey0,2<<6);
- &por ($inout1,$rndkey1);
- &pshufd ($inout5,$rndkey0,1<<6);
- &por ($inout2,$rndkey1);
- &por ($inout3,$rndkey1);
- &por ($inout4,$rndkey1);
- &por ($inout5,$rndkey1);
-
- # inlining _aesni_encrypt6's prologue gives ~4% improvement...
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
- &dec ($rounds);
- &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0);
- &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
- &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
- &aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
- &aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0);
- &aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
- &aesenc ($inout4,$rndkey1);
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &aesenc ($inout5,$rndkey1);
-
- &call (&label("_aesni_encrypt6_enter"));
-
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey1);
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey0);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movdqa ($rndkey0,&QWP(16,"esp")); # load increment
- &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
- &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP(48,"esp")); # load 1st triplet
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
-
- &paddd ($rndkey1,$rndkey0); # 1st triplet increment
- &paddd ($rndkey0,&QWP(64,"esp")); # 2nd triplet increment
- &movdqa ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # load byte swap mask
-
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout3,$inout1);
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
- &movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey1); # save 1st triplet
- &pshufb ($rndkey1,$inout0); # byte swap
- &xorps ($inout4,$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &xorps ($inout5,$inout1);
- &movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save 2nd triplet
- &pshufb ($rndkey0,$inout0); # byte swap
- &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
- &pshufd ($inout0,$rndkey1,3<<6);
- &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
-
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
- &pshufd ($inout1,$rndkey1,2<<6);
- &sub ($len,6);
- &jnc (&label("ctr32_loop6"));
-
- &add ($len,6);
- &jz (&label("ctr32_ret"));
- &mov ($key,$key_);
- &lea ($rounds,&DWP(1,"",$rounds,2)); # restore $rounds
- &movdqa ($inout5,&QWP(32,"esp")); # pull count-less ivec
-
-&set_label("ctr32_tail");
- &por ($inout0,$inout5);
- &cmp ($len,2);
- &jb (&label("ctr32_one"));
-
- &pshufd ($inout2,$rndkey1,1<<6);
- &por ($inout1,$inout5);
- &je (&label("ctr32_two"));
-
- &pshufd ($inout3,$rndkey0,3<<6);
- &por ($inout2,$inout5);
- &cmp ($len,4);
- &jb (&label("ctr32_three"));
-
- &pshufd ($inout4,$rndkey0,2<<6);
- &por ($inout3,$inout5);
- &je (&label("ctr32_four"));
-
- &por ($inout4,$inout5);
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt6");
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey1);
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey0);
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &xorps ($inout4,$rndkey1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
- &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ctr32_one_shortcut",16);
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
-
-&set_label("ctr32_one");
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
- &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &xorps ($in0,$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0);
- &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ctr32_two",16);
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
- &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3);
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ctr32_three",16);
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
- &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3);
- &movups ($inout5,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret"));
-
-&set_label("ctr32_four",16);
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt4");
- &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movups ($inout5,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout4);
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout5);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
-
-&set_label("ctr32_ret");
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(80,"esp"));
-&function_end("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks");
-
-######################################################################
-# void aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
-# const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2
-# const unsigned char iv[16]);
-#
-{ my ($tweak,$twtmp,$twres,$twmask)=($rndkey1,$rndkey0,$inout0,$inout1);
-
-&function_begin("aesni_xts_encrypt");
- &mov ($key,&wparam(4)); # key2
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(5)); # clear-text tweak
-
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key2->rounds
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
-
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # key1
-
- &mov ($key_,"esp");
- &sub ("esp",16*7+8);
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key1->rounds
- &and ("esp",-16); # align stack
-
- &mov (&DWP(16*6+0,"esp"),0x87); # compose the magic constant
- &mov (&DWP(16*6+4,"esp"),0);
- &mov (&DWP(16*6+8,"esp"),1);
- &mov (&DWP(16*6+12,"esp"),0);
- &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save original $len
- &mov (&DWP(16*7+4,"esp"),$key_); # save original %esp
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,$inout0);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(6*16,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
-
- &and ($len,-16);
- &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
- &sub ($len,16*6);
- &jc (&label("xts_enc_short"));
-
- &shr ($rounds,1);
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
- &jmp (&label("xts_enc_loop6"));
-
-&set_label("xts_enc_loop6",16);
- for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$tweak);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
- }
- &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i++,"esp"),$tweak);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
- &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input
- &pxor ($inout5,$tweak);
-
- # inline _aesni_encrypt6 prologue and flip xor with tweak and key[0]
- &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); # input^=rndkey[0]
- &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
- &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
- &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
- &movdqu ($rndkey1,&QWP(16*5,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0);
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak
- &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey1);
-
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
- &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
- &aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
- &dec ($rounds);
- &aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
- &aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
- &aesenc ($inout4,$rndkey1);
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &aesenc ($inout5,$rndkey1);
- &call (&label("_aesni_encrypt6_enter"));
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); # last tweak
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
- &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
- &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
- &xorps ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
- &xorps ($inout5,$tweak);
- &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &movups (&QWP(16*5,$out),$inout5);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*6,$out));
- &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87
-
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
-
- &sub ($len,16*6);
- &jnc (&label("xts_enc_loop6"));
-
- &lea ($rounds,&DWP(1,"",$rounds,2)); # restore $rounds
- &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
-
-&set_label("xts_enc_short");
- &add ($len,16*6);
- &jz (&label("xts_enc_done6x"));
-
- &movdqa ($inout3,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
- &cmp ($len,0x20);
- &jb (&label("xts_enc_one"));
-
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
- &je (&label("xts_enc_two"));
-
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &movdqa ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
- &cmp ($len,0x40);
- &jb (&label("xts_enc_three"));
-
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &movdqa ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout3);
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout4);
- &je (&label("xts_enc_four"));
-
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout5);
- &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$tweak);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($inout0,1);
- &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pxor ($inout5,$tweak);
-
- &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
- &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
- &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*5,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak
- &pxor ($inout4,$inout5);
-
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt6");
-
- &movaps ($tweak,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); # last tweak
- &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
- &xorps ($inout4,$tweak);
- &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
- &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*5,$out));
- &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done"));
-
-&set_label("xts_enc_one",16);
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*1,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*1,$out));
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,$inout3); # last tweak
- &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done"));
-
-&set_label("xts_enc_two",16);
- &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
-
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*2,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
-
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
-
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*2,$out));
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak
- &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done"));
-
-&set_label("xts_enc_three",16);
- &movaps ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
- &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*3,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
-
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
-
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*3,$out));
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,$inout5); # last tweak
- &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done"));
-
-&set_label("xts_enc_four",16);
- &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
-
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
- &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
- &movups ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
- &xorps ($inout3,$inout4);
-
- &call ("_aesni_encrypt4");
-
- &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &xorps ($inout3,$inout4);
- &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*4,$out));
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak
- &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done"));
-
-&set_label("xts_enc_done6x",16); # $tweak is pre-calculated
- &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len
- &and ($len,15);
- &jz (&label("xts_enc_ret"));
- &movdqa ($inout3,$tweak);
- &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16
- &jmp (&label("xts_enc_steal"));
-
-&set_label("xts_enc_done",16);
- &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &and ($len,15);
- &jz (&label("xts_enc_ret"));
-
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16
- &pshufd ($inout3,$twtmp,0x13);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($inout3,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); # isolate carry and residue
- &pxor ($inout3,$tweak);
-
-&set_label("xts_enc_steal");
- &movz ($rounds,&BP(0,$inp));
- &movz ($key,&BP(-16,$out));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(1,$inp));
- &mov (&BP(-16,$out),&LB($rounds));
- &mov (&BP(0,$out),&LB($key));
- &lea ($out,&DWP(1,$out));
- &sub ($len,1);
- &jnz (&label("xts_enc_steal"));
-
- &sub ($out,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # rewind $out
- &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
-
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(-16,$out)); # load input
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
- &movups (&QWP(-16,$out),$inout0); # write output
-
-&set_label("xts_enc_ret");
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp
-&function_end("aesni_xts_encrypt");
-
-&function_begin("aesni_xts_decrypt");
- &mov ($key,&wparam(4)); # key2
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(5)); # clear-text tweak
-
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key2->rounds
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
-
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # key1
-
- &mov ($key_,"esp");
- &sub ("esp",16*7+8);
- &and ("esp",-16); # align stack
-
- &xor ($rounds_,$rounds_); # if(len%16) len-=16;
- &test ($len,15);
- &setnz (&LB($rounds_));
- &shl ($rounds_,4);
- &sub ($len,$rounds_);
-
- &mov (&DWP(16*6+0,"esp"),0x87); # compose the magic constant
- &mov (&DWP(16*6+4,"esp"),0);
- &mov (&DWP(16*6+8,"esp"),1);
- &mov (&DWP(16*6+12,"esp"),0);
- &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save original $len
- &mov (&DWP(16*7+4,"esp"),$key_); # save original %esp
-
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key1->rounds
- &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,$inout0);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(6*16,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
-
- &and ($len,-16);
- &sub ($len,16*6);
- &jc (&label("xts_dec_short"));
-
- &shr ($rounds,1);
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
- &jmp (&label("xts_dec_loop6"));
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_loop6",16);
- for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$tweak);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
- }
- &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i++,"esp"),$tweak);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
- &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input
- &pxor ($inout5,$tweak);
-
- # inline _aesni_encrypt6 prologue and flip xor with tweak and key[0]
- &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); # input^=rndkey[0]
- &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
- &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
- &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
- &movdqu ($rndkey1,&QWP(16*5,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0);
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak
- &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey1);
-
- &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
- &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &aesdec ($inout0,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
- &aesdec ($inout1,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
- &dec ($rounds);
- &aesdec ($inout2,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
- &aesdec ($inout3,$rndkey1);
- &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
- &aesdec ($inout4,$rndkey1);
- &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
- &aesdec ($inout5,$rndkey1);
- &call (&label("_aesni_decrypt6_enter"));
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); # last tweak
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
- &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
- &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
- &xorps ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
- &xorps ($inout5,$tweak);
- &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &movups (&QWP(16*5,$out),$inout5);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*6,$out));
- &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87
-
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
-
- &sub ($len,16*6);
- &jnc (&label("xts_dec_loop6"));
-
- &lea ($rounds,&DWP(1,"",$rounds,2)); # restore $rounds
- &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_short");
- &add ($len,16*6);
- &jz (&label("xts_dec_done6x"));
-
- &movdqa ($inout3,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
- &cmp ($len,0x20);
- &jb (&label("xts_dec_one"));
-
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
- &je (&label("xts_dec_two"));
-
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &movdqa ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
- &cmp ($len,0x40);
- &jb (&label("xts_dec_three"));
-
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &movdqa ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout3);
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout4);
- &je (&label("xts_dec_four"));
-
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout5);
- &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$tweak);
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($inout0,1);
- &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pxor ($inout5,$tweak);
-
- &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
- &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
- &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*5,$inp));
- &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
- &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak
- &pxor ($inout4,$inout5);
-
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt6");
-
- &movaps ($tweak,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); # last tweak
- &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
- &xorps ($inout4,$tweak);
- &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
- &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*5,$out));
- &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done"));
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_one",16);
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*1,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*1,$out));
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,$inout3); # last tweak
- &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done"));
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_two",16);
- &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
-
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*2,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
-
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
-
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*2,$out));
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak
- &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done"));
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_three",16);
- &movaps ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
- &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*3,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
-
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
-
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*3,$out));
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,$inout5); # last tweak
- &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done"));
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_four",16);
- &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
-
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
- &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
- &movups ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
- &xorps ($inout3,$inout4);
-
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt4");
-
- &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
- &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
- &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
- &xorps ($inout3,$inout4);
- &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16*4,$out));
-
- &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak
- &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done"));
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_done6x",16); # $tweak is pre-calculated
- &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len
- &and ($len,15);
- &jz (&label("xts_dec_ret"));
- &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16
- &jmp (&label("xts_dec_only_one_more"));
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_done",16);
- &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &and ($len,15);
- &jz (&label("xts_dec_ret"));
-
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16
- &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
- &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
- &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp"));
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
- &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_only_one_more");
- &pshufd ($inout3,$twtmp,0x13);
- &movdqa ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
- &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
- &pand ($inout3,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
- &pxor ($inout3,$tweak);
-
- &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
-
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # write output
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_steal");
- &movz ($rounds,&BP(16,$inp));
- &movz ($key,&BP(0,$out));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(1,$inp));
- &mov (&BP(0,$out),&LB($rounds));
- &mov (&BP(16,$out),&LB($key));
- &lea ($out,&DWP(1,$out));
- &sub ($len,1);
- &jnz (&label("xts_dec_steal"));
-
- &sub ($out,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # rewind $out
- &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
-
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$out)); # load input
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout4); # input^=tweak
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
- &xorps ($inout0,$inout4); # output^=tweak
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # write output
-
-&set_label("xts_dec_ret");
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp
-&function_end("aesni_xts_decrypt");
-}
-}
-
-######################################################################
-# void $PREFIX_cbc_encrypt (const void *inp, void *out,
-# size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
-# unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
-&function_begin("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($rounds_,"esp");
- &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
- &sub ($rounds_,24);
- &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
- &and ($rounds_,-16);
- &mov ($key,&wparam(3));
- &mov ($key_,&wparam(4));
- &test ($len,$len);
- &jz (&label("cbc_abort"));
-
- &cmp (&wparam(5),0);
- &xchg ($rounds_,"esp"); # alloca
- &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0,$key_)); # load IV
- &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
- &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
- &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_); # save original %esp
- &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
- &je (&label("cbc_decrypt"));
-
- &movaps ($inout0,$ivec);
- &cmp ($len,16);
- &jb (&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
- &sub ($len,16);
- &jmp (&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
-
-&set_label("cbc_enc_loop",16);
- &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0,$inp)); # input actually
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc",$inout0,$ivec); }
- else
- { &xorps($inout0,$ivec); &call("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
- &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # store output
- &lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out));
- &sub ($len,16);
- &jnc (&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
- &add ($len,16);
- &jnz (&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
- &movaps ($ivec,$inout0);
- &jmp (&label("cbc_ret"));
-
-&set_label("cbc_enc_tail");
- &mov ("ecx",$len); # zaps $rounds
- &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb
- &mov ("ecx",16); # zero tail
- &sub ("ecx",$len);
- &xor ("eax","eax"); # zaps $len
- &data_word(0xAAF3F689); # rep stosb
- &lea ($out,&DWP(-16,$out)); # rewind $out by 1 block
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
- &mov ($inp,$out); # $inp and $out are the same
- &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
- &jmp (&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
-######################################################################
-&set_label("cbc_decrypt",16);
- &cmp ($len,0x50);
- &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_tail"));
- &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$ivec); # save IV
- &sub ($len,0x50);
- &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_loop6_enter"));
-
-&set_label("cbc_dec_loop6",16);
- &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save IV
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout5);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
-&set_label("cbc_dec_loop6_enter");
- &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
-
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt6");
-
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # ^=IV
- &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey1);
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey0);
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey1);
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout4,$rndkey0);
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x50,$inp)); # IV
- &xorps ($inout5,$rndkey1);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &mov ($rounds,$rounds_) # restore $rounds
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
- &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x50,$out));
- &sub ($len,0x60);
- &ja (&label("cbc_dec_loop6"));
-
- &movaps ($inout0,$inout5);
- &movaps ($ivec,$rndkey0);
- &add ($len,0x50);
- &jle (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
-&set_label("cbc_dec_tail");
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movaps ($in0,$inout0);
- &cmp ($len,0x10);
- &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_one"));
-
- &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &movaps ($in1,$inout1);
- &cmp ($len,0x20);
- &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_two"));
-
- &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &cmp ($len,0x30);
- &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_three"));
-
- &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &cmp ($len,0x40);
- &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_four"));
-
- &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
- &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$ivec); # save IV
- &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout5,$inout5);
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt6");
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # ^= IV
- &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey1);
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey0);
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey1);
- &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); # IV
- &xorps ($inout4,$rndkey0);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x40,$out));
- &movaps ($inout0,$inout4);
- &sub ($len,0x50);
- &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
-
-&set_label("cbc_dec_one",16);
- if ($inline)
- { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
- else
- { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
- &xorps ($inout0,$ivec);
- &movaps ($ivec,$in0);
- &sub ($len,0x10);
- &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
-
-&set_label("cbc_dec_two",16);
- &xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
- &xorps ($inout0,$ivec);
- &xorps ($inout1,$in0);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movaps ($inout0,$inout1);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
- &movaps ($ivec,$in1);
- &sub ($len,0x20);
- &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
-
-&set_label("cbc_dec_three",16);
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
- &xorps ($inout0,$ivec);
- &xorps ($inout1,$in0);
- &xorps ($inout2,$in1);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &movaps ($inout0,$inout2);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x20,$out));
- &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &sub ($len,0x30);
- &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
-
-&set_label("cbc_dec_four",16);
- &call ("_aesni_decrypt4");
- &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
- &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout0,$ivec);
- &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
- &xorps ($inout1,$in0);
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
- &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
- &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0);
- &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
- &lea ($out,&DWP(0x30,$out));
- &movaps ($inout0,$inout3);
- &sub ($len,0x40);
-
-&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_collected");
- &and ($len,15);
- &jnz (&label("cbc_dec_tail_partial"));
- &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
- &jmp (&label("cbc_ret"));
-
-&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_partial",16);
- &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
- &mov ("ecx",16);
- &mov ($inp,"esp");
- &sub ("ecx",$len);
- &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb
-
-&set_label("cbc_ret");
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(16,"esp")); # pull original %esp
- &mov ($key_,&wparam(4));
- &movups (&QWP(0,$key_),$ivec); # output IV
-&set_label("cbc_abort");
-&function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
-
-######################################################################
-# Mechanical port from aesni-x86_64.pl.
-#
-# _aesni_set_encrypt_key is private interface,
-# input:
-# "eax" const unsigned char *userKey
-# $rounds int bits
-# $key AES_KEY *key
-# output:
-# "eax" return code
-# $round rounds
-
-&function_begin_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
- &test ("eax","eax");
- &jz (&label("bad_pointer"));
- &test ($key,$key);
- &jz (&label("bad_pointer"));
-
- &movups ("xmm0",&QWP(0,"eax")); # pull first 128 bits of *userKey
- &xorps ("xmm4","xmm4"); # low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0
- &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
- &cmp ($rounds,256);
- &je (&label("14rounds"));
- &cmp ($rounds,192);
- &je (&label("12rounds"));
- &cmp ($rounds,128);
- &jne (&label("bad_keybits"));
-
-&set_label("10rounds",16);
- &mov ($rounds,9);
- &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01); # round 1
- &call (&label("key_128_cold"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x2); # round 2
- &call (&label("key_128"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x04); # round 3
- &call (&label("key_128"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x08); # round 4
- &call (&label("key_128"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x10); # round 5
- &call (&label("key_128"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x20); # round 6
- &call (&label("key_128"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x40); # round 7
- &call (&label("key_128"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x80); # round 8
- &call (&label("key_128"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x1b); # round 9
- &call (&label("key_128"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x36); # round 10
- &call (&label("key_128"));
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
- &mov (&DWP(80,$key),$rounds);
- &xor ("eax","eax");
- &ret();
-
-&set_label("key_128",16);
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
- &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
-&set_label("key_128_cold");
- &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
- &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
- &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
- &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
- &shufps ("xmm1","xmm1",0b11111111); # critical path
- &xorps ("xmm0","xmm1");
- &ret();
-
-&set_label("12rounds",16);
- &movq ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining 1/3 of *userKey
- &mov ($rounds,11);
- &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0") # round 0
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 1,2
- &call (&label("key_192a_cold"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02); # round 2,3
- &call (&label("key_192b"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x04); # round 4,5
- &call (&label("key_192a"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x08); # round 5,6
- &call (&label("key_192b"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x10); # round 7,8
- &call (&label("key_192a"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x20); # round 8,9
- &call (&label("key_192b"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x40); # round 10,11
- &call (&label("key_192a"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x80); # round 11,12
- &call (&label("key_192b"));
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
- &mov (&DWP(48,$key),$rounds);
- &xor ("eax","eax");
- &ret();
-
-&set_label("key_192a",16);
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
- &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
-&set_label("key_192a_cold",16);
- &movaps ("xmm5","xmm2");
-&set_label("key_192b_warm");
- &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
- &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
- &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
- &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
- &pslldq ("xmm3",4);
- &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
- &pshufd ("xmm1","xmm1",0b01010101); # critical path
- &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
- &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1");
- &pshufd ("xmm3","xmm0",0b11111111);
- &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
- &ret();
-
-&set_label("key_192b",16);
- &movaps ("xmm3","xmm0");
- &shufps ("xmm5","xmm0",0b01000100);
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm5");
- &shufps ("xmm3","xmm2",0b01001110);
- &$movekey (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm3");
- &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
- &jmp (&label("key_192b_warm"));
-
-&set_label("14rounds",16);
- &movups ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining half of *userKey
- &mov ($rounds,13);
- &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
- &$movekey (&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
- &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2"); # round 1
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 2
- &call (&label("key_256a_cold"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01); # round 3
- &call (&label("key_256b"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02); # round 4
- &call (&label("key_256a"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x02); # round 5
- &call (&label("key_256b"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x04); # round 6
- &call (&label("key_256a"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x04); # round 7
- &call (&label("key_256b"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x08); # round 8
- &call (&label("key_256a"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x08); # round 9
- &call (&label("key_256b"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x10); # round 10
- &call (&label("key_256a"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x10); # round 11
- &call (&label("key_256b"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x20); # round 12
- &call (&label("key_256a"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x20); # round 13
- &call (&label("key_256b"));
- &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x40); # round 14
- &call (&label("key_256a"));
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
- &mov (&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
- &xor ("eax","eax");
- &ret();
-
-&set_label("key_256a",16);
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
- &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
-&set_label("key_256a_cold");
- &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
- &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
- &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
- &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
- &shufps ("xmm1","xmm1",0b11111111); # critical path
- &xorps ("xmm0","xmm1");
- &ret();
-
-&set_label("key_256b",16);
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
- &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
-
- &shufps ("xmm4","xmm2",0b00010000);
- &xorps ("xmm2","xmm4");
- &shufps ("xmm4","xmm2",0b10001100);
- &xorps ("xmm2","xmm4");
- &shufps ("xmm1","xmm1",0b10101010); # critical path
- &xorps ("xmm2","xmm1");
- &ret();
-
-&set_label("bad_pointer",4);
- &mov ("eax",-1);
- &ret ();
-&set_label("bad_keybits",4);
- &mov ("eax",-2);
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
-
-# int $PREFIX_set_encrypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
-# AES_KEY *key)
-&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key");
- &mov ("eax",&wparam(0));
- &mov ($rounds,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
- &call ("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key");
-
-# int $PREFIX_set_decrypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
-# AES_KEY *key)
-&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
- &mov ("eax",&wparam(0));
- &mov ($rounds,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
- &call ("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
- &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
- &shl ($rounds,4) # rounds-1 after _aesni_set_encrypt_key
- &test ("eax","eax");
- &jnz (&label("dec_key_ret"));
- &lea ("eax",&DWP(16,$key,$rounds)); # end of key schedule
-
- &$movekey ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # just swap
- &$movekey ("xmm1",&QWP(0,"eax"));
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,"eax"),"xmm0");
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm1");
- &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
- &lea ("eax",&DWP(-16,"eax"));
-
-&set_label("dec_key_inverse");
- &$movekey ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # swap and inverse
- &$movekey ("xmm1",&QWP(0,"eax"));
- &aesimc ("xmm0","xmm0");
- &aesimc ("xmm1","xmm1");
- &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
- &lea ("eax",&DWP(-16,"eax"));
- &$movekey (&QWP(16,"eax"),"xmm0");
- &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm1");
- &cmp ("eax",$key);
- &ja (&label("dec_key_inverse"));
-
- &$movekey ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # inverse middle
- &aesimc ("xmm0","xmm0");
- &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
-
- &xor ("eax","eax"); # return success
-&set_label("dec_key_ret");
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
-&asciz("AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
-
-&asm_finish();
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2189 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# This module implements support for Intel AES-NI extension. In
+# OpenSSL context it's used with Intel engine, but can also be used as
+# drop-in replacement for crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl [see below for
+# details].
+#
+# Performance.
+#
+# To start with see corresponding paragraph in aesni-x86_64.pl...
+# Instead of filling table similar to one found there I've chosen to
+# summarize *comparison* results for raw ECB, CTR and CBC benchmarks.
+# The simplified table below represents 32-bit performance relative
+# to 64-bit one in every given point. Ratios vary for different
+# encryption modes, therefore interval values.
+#
+# 16-byte 64-byte 256-byte 1-KB 8-KB
+# 53-67% 67-84% 91-94% 95-98% 97-99.5%
+#
+# Lower ratios for smaller block sizes are perfectly understandable,
+# because function call overhead is higher in 32-bit mode. Largest
+# 8-KB block performance is virtually same: 32-bit code is less than
+# 1% slower for ECB, CBC and CCM, and ~3% slower otherwise.
+
+# January 2011
+#
+# See aesni-x86_64.pl for details. Unlike x86_64 version this module
+# interleaves at most 6 aes[enc|dec] instructions, because there are
+# not enough registers for 8x interleave [which should be optimal for
+# Sandy Bridge]. Actually, performance results for 6x interleave
+# factor presented in aesni-x86_64.pl (except for CTR) are for this
+# module.
+
+# April 2011
+#
+# Add aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt. Westmere spends 1.50 cycles processing
+# one byte out of 8KB with 128-bit key, Sandy Bridge - 1.09.
+
+$PREFIX="aesni"; # if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
+ # generates drop-in replacement for
+ # crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl:-)
+$inline=1; # inline _aesni_[en|de]crypt
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
+
+if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") { $movekey=*movups; }
+else { $movekey=*movups; }
+
+$len="eax";
+$rounds="ecx";
+$key="edx";
+$inp="esi";
+$out="edi";
+$rounds_="ebx"; # backup copy for $rounds
+$key_="ebp"; # backup copy for $key
+
+$rndkey0="xmm0";
+$rndkey1="xmm1";
+$inout0="xmm2";
+$inout1="xmm3";
+$inout2="xmm4";
+$inout3="xmm5"; $in1="xmm5";
+$inout4="xmm6"; $in0="xmm6";
+$inout5="xmm7"; $ivec="xmm7";
+
+# AESNI extension
+sub aeskeygenassist
+{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
+ if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+ { &data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x3a,0xdf,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2,$imm); }
+}
+sub aescommon
+{ my($opcodelet,$dst,$src)=@_;
+ if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+ { &data_byte(0x66,0x0f,0x38,$opcodelet,0xc0|($1<<3)|$2);}
+}
+sub aesimc { aescommon(0xdb, at _); }
+sub aesenc { aescommon(0xdc, at _); }
+sub aesenclast { aescommon(0xdd, at _); }
+sub aesdec { aescommon(0xde, at _); }
+sub aesdeclast { aescommon(0xdf, at _); }
+
+# Inline version of internal aesni_[en|de]crypt1
+{ my $sn;
+sub aesni_inline_generate1
+{ my ($p,$inout,$ivec)=@_; $inout=$inout0 if (!defined($inout));
+ $sn++;
+
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+ &xorps ($ivec,$rndkey0) if (defined($ivec));
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ &xorps ($inout,$ivec) if (defined($ivec));
+ &xorps ($inout,$rndkey0) if (!defined($ivec));
+ &set_label("${p}1_loop_$sn");
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+ &jnz (&label("${p}1_loop_$sn"));
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout,$rndkey1)";
+}}
+
+sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop
+{ my ($p,$inout)=@_; $inout=$inout0 if (!defined($inout));
+
+ &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt1");
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x10,$key));
+ &xorps ($inout,$rndkey0);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x20,$key));
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(0x30,$key));
+ &cmp ($rounds,11);
+ &jb (&label("${p}128"));
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(0x20,$key));
+ &je (&label("${p}192"));
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(0x20,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(-0x40,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-0x30,$key));
+ &set_label("${p}192");
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(-0x20,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-0x10,$key));
+ &set_label("${p}128");
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x50,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x60,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey0)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x70,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout,$rndkey0)";
+ &ret();
+ &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt1");
+}
+
+# void $PREFIX_encrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+&aesni_generate1("enc") if (!$inline);
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
+ &mov ("eax",&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,"eax"));
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+ &mov ("eax",&wparam(1));
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
+ &movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
+
+# void $PREFIX_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
+&aesni_generate1("dec") if(!$inline);
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
+ &mov ("eax",&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,"eax"));
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+ &mov ("eax",&wparam(1));
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
+ &movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
+
+# _aesni_[en|de]cryptN are private interfaces, N denotes interleave
+# factor. Why 3x subroutine were originally used in loops? Even though
+# aes[enc|dec] latency was originally 6, it could be scheduled only
+# every *2nd* cycle. Thus 3x interleave was the one providing optimal
+# utilization, i.e. when subroutine's throughput is virtually same as
+# of non-interleaved subroutine [for number of input blocks up to 3].
+# This is why it makes no sense to implement 2x subroutine.
+# aes[enc|dec] latency in next processor generation is 8, but the
+# instructions can be scheduled every cycle. Optimal interleave for
+# new processor is therefore 8x, but it's unfeasible to accommodate it
+# in XMM registers addreassable in 32-bit mode and therefore 6x is
+# used instead...
+
+sub aesni_generate3
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+ &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3");
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &shr ($rounds,1);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
+ &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
+ &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+
+ &set_label("${p}3_loop");
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &jnz (&label("${p}3_loop"));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+ &ret();
+ &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3");
+}
+
+# 4x interleave is implemented to improve small block performance,
+# most notably [and naturally] 4 block by ~30%. One can argue that one
+# should have implemented 5x as well, but improvement would be <20%,
+# so it's not worth it...
+sub aesni_generate4
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+ &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4");
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+ &shr ($rounds,1);
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
+ &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
+ &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
+ &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+
+ &set_label("${p}4_loop");
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey0)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &jnz (&label("${p}4_loop"));
+
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout3,$rndkey0)";
+ &ret();
+ &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4");
+}
+
+sub aesni_generate6
+{ my $p=shift;
+
+ &function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt6");
+ &static_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter");
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &shr ($rounds,1);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
+ &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); # pxor does better here
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+ &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+ &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+ &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0);
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+ &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
+ &jmp (&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter"));
+
+ &set_label("${p}6_loop",16);
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
+ &set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter",16);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey0)";
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &jnz (&label("${p}6_loop"));
+
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout3,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout4,$rndkey0)";
+ eval"&aes${p}last ($inout5,$rndkey0)";
+ &ret();
+ &function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt6");
+}
+&aesni_generate3("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate3("dec");
+&aesni_generate4("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate4("dec");
+&aesni_generate6("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
+&aesni_generate6("dec");
+
+if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_ecb_encrypt (const void *in, void *out,
+# size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+# int enc);
+&function_begin("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(3));
+ &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4));
+ &and ($len,-16);
+ &jz (&label("ecb_ret"));
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+ &test ($rounds_,$rounds_);
+ &jz (&label("ecb_decrypt"));
+
+ &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
+ &cmp ($len,0x60);
+ &jb (&label("ecb_enc_tail"));
+
+ &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+ &sub ($len,0x60);
+ &jmp (&label("ecb_enc_loop6_enter"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_loop6",16);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+ &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
+ &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+&set_label("ecb_enc_loop6_enter");
+
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt6");
+
+ &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
+ &sub ($len,0x60);
+ &jnc (&label("ecb_enc_loop6"));
+
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
+ &add ($len,0x60);
+ &jz (&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_tail");
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &cmp ($len,0x20);
+ &jb (&label("ecb_enc_one"));
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &je (&label("ecb_enc_two"));
+ &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &cmp ($len,0x40);
+ &jb (&label("ecb_enc_three"));
+ &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &je (&label("ecb_enc_four"));
+ &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout5,$inout5);
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt6");
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+ jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_one",16);
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_two",16);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_three",16);
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_enc_four",16);
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt4");
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
+######################################################################
+&set_label("ecb_decrypt",16);
+ &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
+ &cmp ($len,0x60);
+ &jb (&label("ecb_dec_tail"));
+
+ &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+ &sub ($len,0x60);
+ &jmp (&label("ecb_dec_loop6_enter"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_loop6",16);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+ &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
+ &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+&set_label("ecb_dec_loop6_enter");
+
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt6");
+
+ &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
+ &sub ($len,0x60);
+ &jnc (&label("ecb_dec_loop6"));
+
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
+ &add ($len,0x60);
+ &jz (&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_tail");
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &cmp ($len,0x20);
+ &jb (&label("ecb_dec_one"));
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &je (&label("ecb_dec_two"));
+ &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &cmp ($len,0x40);
+ &jb (&label("ecb_dec_three"));
+ &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &je (&label("ecb_dec_four"));
+ &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout5,$inout5);
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt6");
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+ &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_one",16);
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_two",16);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_three",16);
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ecb_dec_four",16);
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt4");
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+
+&set_label("ecb_ret");
+&function_end("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
+
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_ccm64_[en|de]crypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out,
+# size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+# const char *ivec,char *cmac);
+#
+# Handles only complete blocks, operates on 64-bit counter and
+# does not update *ivec! Nor does it finalize CMAC value
+# (see engine/eng_aesni.c for details)
+#
+{ my $cmac=$inout1;
+&function_begin("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks");
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(3));
+ &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4));
+ &mov ($rounds,&wparam(5));
+ &mov ($key_,"esp");
+ &sub ("esp",60);
+ &and ("esp",-16); # align stack
+ &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$key_);
+
+ &movdqu ($ivec,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec
+ &movdqu ($cmac,&QWP(0,$rounds)); # load cmac
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+ # compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203);
+
+ # compose counter increment vector on stack
+ &mov ($rounds_,1);
+ &xor ($key_,$key_);
+ &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_);
+ &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),$key_);
+ &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),$key_);
+ &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_);
+
+ &shr ($rounds,1);
+ &lea ($key_,&DWP(0,$key));
+ &movdqa ($inout3,&QWP(0,"esp"));
+ &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
+ &pshufb ($ivec,$inout3);
+
+&set_label("ccm64_enc_outer");
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
+ &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+
+ &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
+ &xorps ($rndkey0,$in0);
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
+ &xorps ($cmac,$rndkey0); # cmac^=inp
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+
+&set_label("ccm64_enc2_loop");
+ &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+ &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey0);
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey0);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &jnz (&label("ccm64_enc2_loop"));
+ &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
+ &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
+ &paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
+ &aesenclast ($inout0,$rndkey0);
+ &aesenclast ($cmac,$rndkey0);
+
+ &dec ($len);
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+ &xorps ($in0,$inout0); # inp^=E(ivec)
+ &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0); # save output
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out));
+ &pshufb ($inout0,$inout3);
+ &jnz (&label("ccm64_enc_outer"));
+
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
+ &mov ($out,&wparam(5));
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
+&function_end("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks");
+
+&function_begin("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(3));
+ &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4));
+ &mov ($rounds,&wparam(5));
+ &mov ($key_,"esp");
+ &sub ("esp",60);
+ &and ("esp",-16); # align stack
+ &mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$key_);
+
+ &movdqu ($ivec,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec
+ &movdqu ($cmac,&QWP(0,$rounds)); # load cmac
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+ # compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203);
+
+ # compose counter increment vector on stack
+ &mov ($rounds_,1);
+ &xor ($key_,$key_);
+ &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_);
+ &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),$key_);
+ &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),$key_);
+ &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_);
+
+ &movdqa ($inout3,&QWP(0,"esp")); # bswap mask
+ &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
+
+ &mov ($key_,$key);
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
+
+ &pshufb ($ivec,$inout3);
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
+ &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load inp
+ &paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
+ &lea ($inp,&QWP(16,$inp));
+ &jmp (&label("ccm64_dec_outer"));
+
+&set_label("ccm64_dec_outer",16);
+ &xorps ($in0,$inout0); # inp ^= E(ivec)
+ &movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0); # save output
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out));
+ &pshufb ($inout0,$inout3);
+
+ &sub ($len,1);
+ &jz (&label("ccm64_dec_break"));
+
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
+ &shr ($rounds,1);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
+ &xorps ($in0,$rndkey0);
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
+ &xorps ($cmac,$in0); # cmac^=out
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+
+&set_label("ccm64_dec2_loop");
+ &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
+ &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey0);
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey0);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &jnz (&label("ccm64_dec2_loop"));
+ &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load inp
+ &paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
+ &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
+ &aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
+ &lea ($inp,&QWP(16,$inp));
+ &aesenclast ($inout0,$rndkey0);
+ &aesenclast ($cmac,$rndkey0);
+ &jmp (&label("ccm64_dec_outer"));
+
+&set_label("ccm64_dec_break",16);
+ &mov ($key,$key_);
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc",$cmac,$in0); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1",$cmac); }
+
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
+ &mov ($out,&wparam(5));
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
+&function_end("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks (const void *in, void *out,
+# size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+# const char *ivec);
+#
+# Handles only complete blocks, operates on 32-bit counter and
+# does not update *ivec! (see engine/eng_aesni.c for details)
+#
+# stack layout:
+# 0 pshufb mask
+# 16 vector addend: 0,6,6,6
+# 32 counter-less ivec
+# 48 1st triplet of counter vector
+# 64 2nd triplet of counter vector
+# 80 saved %esp
+
+&function_begin("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks");
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(3));
+ &mov ($rounds_,&wparam(4));
+ &mov ($key_,"esp");
+ &sub ("esp",88);
+ &and ("esp",-16); # align stack
+ &mov (&DWP(80,"esp"),$key_);
+
+ &cmp ($len,1);
+ &je (&label("ctr32_one_shortcut"));
+
+ &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec
+
+ # compose byte-swap control mask for pshufb on stack
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),0x0c0d0e0f);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),0x08090a0b);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),0x04050607);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),0x00010203);
+
+ # compose counter increment vector on stack
+ &mov ($rounds,6);
+ &xor ($key_,$key_);
+ &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds);
+ &mov (&DWP(20,"esp"),$rounds);
+ &mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),$rounds);
+ &mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_);
+
+ &pextrd ($rounds_,$inout5,3); # pull 32-bit counter
+ &pinsrd ($inout5,$key_,3); # wipe 32-bit counter
+
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key->rounds
+
+ # compose 2 vectors of 3x32-bit counters
+ &bswap ($rounds_);
+ &pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
+ &movdqa ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # load byte-swap mask
+ &pinsrd ($rndkey1,$rounds_,0);
+ &lea ($key_,&DWP(3,$rounds_));
+ &pinsrd ($rndkey0,$key_,0);
+ &inc ($rounds_);
+ &pinsrd ($rndkey1,$rounds_,1);
+ &inc ($key_);
+ &pinsrd ($rndkey0,$key_,1);
+ &inc ($rounds_);
+ &pinsrd ($rndkey1,$rounds_,2);
+ &inc ($key_);
+ &pinsrd ($rndkey0,$key_,2);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey1); # save 1st triplet
+ &pshufb ($rndkey1,$inout0); # byte swap
+ &movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save 2nd triplet
+ &pshufb ($rndkey0,$inout0); # byte swap
+
+ &pshufd ($inout0,$rndkey1,3<<6); # place counter to upper dword
+ &pshufd ($inout1,$rndkey1,2<<6);
+ &cmp ($len,6);
+ &jb (&label("ctr32_tail"));
+ &movdqa (&QWP(32,"esp"),$inout5); # save counter-less ivec
+ &shr ($rounds,1);
+ &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
+ &sub ($len,6);
+ &jmp (&label("ctr32_loop6"));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_loop6",16);
+ &pshufd ($inout2,$rndkey1,1<<6);
+ &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP(32,"esp")); # pull counter-less ivec
+ &pshufd ($inout3,$rndkey0,3<<6);
+ &por ($inout0,$rndkey1); # merge counter-less ivec
+ &pshufd ($inout4,$rndkey0,2<<6);
+ &por ($inout1,$rndkey1);
+ &pshufd ($inout5,$rndkey0,1<<6);
+ &por ($inout2,$rndkey1);
+ &por ($inout3,$rndkey1);
+ &por ($inout4,$rndkey1);
+ &por ($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+ # inlining _aesni_encrypt6's prologue gives ~4% improvement...
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ &pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0);
+ &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
+ &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
+ &aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
+ &aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0);
+ &aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
+ &aesenc ($inout4,$rndkey1);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &aesenc ($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+ &call (&label("_aesni_encrypt6_enter"));
+
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey1);
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movdqa ($rndkey0,&QWP(16,"esp")); # load increment
+ &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
+ &movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP(48,"esp")); # load 1st triplet
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+
+ &paddd ($rndkey1,$rndkey0); # 1st triplet increment
+ &paddd ($rndkey0,&QWP(64,"esp")); # 2nd triplet increment
+ &movdqa ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # load byte swap mask
+
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout3,$inout1);
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+ &movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey1); # save 1st triplet
+ &pshufb ($rndkey1,$inout0); # byte swap
+ &xorps ($inout4,$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &xorps ($inout5,$inout1);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save 2nd triplet
+ &pshufb ($rndkey0,$inout0); # byte swap
+ &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+ &pshufd ($inout0,$rndkey1,3<<6);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
+
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
+ &pshufd ($inout1,$rndkey1,2<<6);
+ &sub ($len,6);
+ &jnc (&label("ctr32_loop6"));
+
+ &add ($len,6);
+ &jz (&label("ctr32_ret"));
+ &mov ($key,$key_);
+ &lea ($rounds,&DWP(1,"",$rounds,2)); # restore $rounds
+ &movdqa ($inout5,&QWP(32,"esp")); # pull count-less ivec
+
+&set_label("ctr32_tail");
+ &por ($inout0,$inout5);
+ &cmp ($len,2);
+ &jb (&label("ctr32_one"));
+
+ &pshufd ($inout2,$rndkey1,1<<6);
+ &por ($inout1,$inout5);
+ &je (&label("ctr32_two"));
+
+ &pshufd ($inout3,$rndkey0,3<<6);
+ &por ($inout2,$inout5);
+ &cmp ($len,4);
+ &jb (&label("ctr32_three"));
+
+ &pshufd ($inout4,$rndkey0,2<<6);
+ &por ($inout3,$inout5);
+ &je (&label("ctr32_four"));
+
+ &por ($inout4,$inout5);
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt6");
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey1);
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey0);
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &xorps ($inout4,$rndkey1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+ &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_one_shortcut",16);
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$rounds_)); # load ivec
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_one");
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
+ &movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &xorps ($in0,$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0);
+ &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_two",16);
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
+ &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3);
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_three",16);
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
+ &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3);
+ &movups ($inout5,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &jmp (&label("ctr32_ret"));
+
+&set_label("ctr32_four",16);
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt4");
+ &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movups ($inout5,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout4);
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout5);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+
+&set_label("ctr32_ret");
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(80,"esp"));
+&function_end("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks");
+
+######################################################################
+# void aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
+# const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2
+# const unsigned char iv[16]);
+#
+{ my ($tweak,$twtmp,$twres,$twmask)=($rndkey1,$rndkey0,$inout0,$inout1);
+
+&function_begin("aesni_xts_encrypt");
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(4)); # key2
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(5)); # clear-text tweak
+
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key2->rounds
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
+
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # key1
+
+ &mov ($key_,"esp");
+ &sub ("esp",16*7+8);
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key1->rounds
+ &and ("esp",-16); # align stack
+
+ &mov (&DWP(16*6+0,"esp"),0x87); # compose the magic constant
+ &mov (&DWP(16*6+4,"esp"),0);
+ &mov (&DWP(16*6+8,"esp"),1);
+ &mov (&DWP(16*6+12,"esp"),0);
+ &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save original $len
+ &mov (&DWP(16*7+4,"esp"),$key_); # save original %esp
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,$inout0);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(6*16,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+
+ &and ($len,-16);
+ &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
+ &sub ($len,16*6);
+ &jc (&label("xts_enc_short"));
+
+ &shr ($rounds,1);
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
+ &jmp (&label("xts_enc_loop6"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_loop6",16);
+ for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$tweak);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+ }
+ &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i++,"esp"),$tweak);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
+ &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input
+ &pxor ($inout5,$tweak);
+
+ # inline _aesni_encrypt6 prologue and flip xor with tweak and key[0]
+ &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); # input^=rndkey[0]
+ &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
+ &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
+ &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
+ &movdqu ($rndkey1,&QWP(16*5,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0);
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak
+ &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
+ &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+ &aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ &aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+ &aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
+ &aesenc ($inout4,$rndkey1);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &aesenc ($inout5,$rndkey1);
+ &call (&label("_aesni_encrypt6_enter"));
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); # last tweak
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
+ &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+ &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+ &xorps ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+ &xorps ($inout5,$tweak);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*5,$out),$inout5);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*6,$out));
+ &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87
+
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+
+ &sub ($len,16*6);
+ &jnc (&label("xts_enc_loop6"));
+
+ &lea ($rounds,&DWP(1,"",$rounds,2)); # restore $rounds
+ &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_short");
+ &add ($len,16*6);
+ &jz (&label("xts_enc_done6x"));
+
+ &movdqa ($inout3,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
+ &cmp ($len,0x20);
+ &jb (&label("xts_enc_one"));
+
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+ &je (&label("xts_enc_two"));
+
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &movdqa ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+ &cmp ($len,0x40);
+ &jb (&label("xts_enc_three"));
+
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &movdqa ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout3);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout4);
+ &je (&label("xts_enc_four"));
+
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout5);
+ &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$tweak);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($inout0,1);
+ &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pxor ($inout5,$tweak);
+
+ &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
+ &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
+ &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*5,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak
+ &pxor ($inout4,$inout5);
+
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt6");
+
+ &movaps ($tweak,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); # last tweak
+ &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+ &xorps ($inout4,$tweak);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*5,$out));
+ &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_one",16);
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*1,$out));
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,$inout3); # last tweak
+ &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_two",16);
+ &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
+
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*2,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
+
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
+
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*2,$out));
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak
+ &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_three",16);
+ &movaps ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*3,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
+
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
+
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*3,$out));
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,$inout5); # last tweak
+ &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_four",16);
+ &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
+
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
+ &movups ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
+ &xorps ($inout3,$inout4);
+
+ &call ("_aesni_encrypt4");
+
+ &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &xorps ($inout3,$inout4);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*4,$out));
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak
+ &jmp (&label("xts_enc_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_done6x",16); # $tweak is pre-calculated
+ &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len
+ &and ($len,15);
+ &jz (&label("xts_enc_ret"));
+ &movdqa ($inout3,$tweak);
+ &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16
+ &jmp (&label("xts_enc_steal"));
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_done",16);
+ &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &and ($len,15);
+ &jz (&label("xts_enc_ret"));
+
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16
+ &pshufd ($inout3,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($inout3,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pxor ($inout3,$tweak);
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_steal");
+ &movz ($rounds,&BP(0,$inp));
+ &movz ($key,&BP(-16,$out));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(1,$inp));
+ &mov (&BP(-16,$out),&LB($rounds));
+ &mov (&BP(0,$out),&LB($key));
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(1,$out));
+ &sub ($len,1);
+ &jnz (&label("xts_enc_steal"));
+
+ &sub ($out,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # rewind $out
+ &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
+
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(-16,$out)); # load input
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
+ &movups (&QWP(-16,$out),$inout0); # write output
+
+&set_label("xts_enc_ret");
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp
+&function_end("aesni_xts_encrypt");
+
+&function_begin("aesni_xts_decrypt");
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(4)); # key2
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(5)); # clear-text tweak
+
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key2->rounds
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
+
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # key1
+
+ &mov ($key_,"esp");
+ &sub ("esp",16*7+8);
+ &and ("esp",-16); # align stack
+
+ &xor ($rounds_,$rounds_); # if(len%16) len-=16;
+ &test ($len,15);
+ &setnz (&LB($rounds_));
+ &shl ($rounds_,4);
+ &sub ($len,$rounds_);
+
+ &mov (&DWP(16*6+0,"esp"),0x87); # compose the magic constant
+ &mov (&DWP(16*6+4,"esp"),0);
+ &mov (&DWP(16*6+8,"esp"),1);
+ &mov (&DWP(16*6+12,"esp"),0);
+ &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save original $len
+ &mov (&DWP(16*7+4,"esp"),$key_); # save original %esp
+
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key)); # key1->rounds
+ &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,$inout0);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(6*16,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+
+ &and ($len,-16);
+ &sub ($len,16*6);
+ &jc (&label("xts_dec_short"));
+
+ &shr ($rounds,1);
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
+ &jmp (&label("xts_dec_loop6"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_loop6",16);
+ for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$tweak);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+ }
+ &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i++,"esp"),$tweak);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
+ &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input
+ &pxor ($inout5,$tweak);
+
+ # inline _aesni_encrypt6 prologue and flip xor with tweak and key[0]
+ &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); # input^=rndkey[0]
+ &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
+ &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
+ &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
+ &movdqu ($rndkey1,&QWP(16*5,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0);
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*6,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*$i,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak
+ &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey1);
+
+ &$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
+ &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &aesdec ($inout0,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+ &aesdec ($inout1,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+ &dec ($rounds);
+ &aesdec ($inout2,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+ &aesdec ($inout3,$rndkey1);
+ &pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
+ &aesdec ($inout4,$rndkey1);
+ &$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
+ &aesdec ($inout5,$rndkey1);
+ &call (&label("_aesni_decrypt6_enter"));
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,&QWP(16*5,"esp")); # last tweak
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
+ &pcmpgtd ($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+ &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+ &xorps ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+ &xorps ($inout5,$tweak);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*5,$out),$inout5);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*6,$out));
+ &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp")); # 0x0...010...87
+
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+
+ &sub ($len,16*6);
+ &jnc (&label("xts_dec_loop6"));
+
+ &lea ($rounds,&DWP(1,"",$rounds,2)); # restore $rounds
+ &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_short");
+ &add ($len,16*6);
+ &jz (&label("xts_dec_done6x"));
+
+ &movdqa ($inout3,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
+ &cmp ($len,0x20);
+ &jb (&label("xts_dec_one"));
+
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+ &je (&label("xts_dec_two"));
+
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &movdqa ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+ &cmp ($len,0x40);
+ &jb (&label("xts_dec_three"));
+
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &movdqa ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),$inout3);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),$inout4);
+ &je (&label("xts_dec_four"));
+
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),$inout5);
+ &pshufd ($inout5,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),$tweak);
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($inout0,1);
+ &pand ($inout5,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pxor ($inout5,$tweak);
+
+ &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
+ &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
+ &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*5,$inp));
+ &pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+ &movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),$inout5); # save last tweak
+ &pxor ($inout4,$inout5);
+
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt6");
+
+ &movaps ($tweak,&QWP(16*4,"esp")); # last tweak
+ &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &xorps ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &xorps ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+ &xorps ($inout4,$tweak);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*4,$out),$inout4);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*5,$out));
+ &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_one",16);
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*1,$out));
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,$inout3); # last tweak
+ &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_two",16);
+ &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
+
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*2,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
+
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
+
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*2,$out));
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak
+ &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_three",16);
+ &movaps ($inout5,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*3,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
+
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
+
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*3,$out));
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,$inout5); # last tweak
+ &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_four",16);
+ &movaps ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside last tweak
+
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,$inp)); # load input
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
+ &movups ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # input^=tweak
+ &movups ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,$inp));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16*4,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
+ &xorps ($inout3,$inout4);
+
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt4");
+
+ &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(16*0,"esp")); # output^=tweak
+ &xorps ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout5);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+ &xorps ($inout3,$inout4);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*1,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*2,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(16*3,$out),$inout3);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16*4,$out));
+
+ &movdqa ($tweak,$inout4); # last tweak
+ &jmp (&label("xts_dec_done"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_done6x",16); # $tweak is pre-calculated
+ &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len
+ &and ($len,15);
+ &jz (&label("xts_dec_ret"));
+ &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16
+ &jmp (&label("xts_dec_only_one_more"));
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_done",16);
+ &mov ($len,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # restore original $len
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &and ($len,15);
+ &jz (&label("xts_dec_ret"));
+
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &mov (&DWP(16*7+0,"esp"),$len); # save $len%16
+ &pshufd ($twres,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &pxor ($twtmp,$twtmp);
+ &movdqa ($twmask,&QWP(16*6,"esp"));
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
+ &pxor ($tweak,$twres);
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_only_one_more");
+ &pshufd ($inout3,$twtmp,0x13);
+ &movdqa ($inout4,$tweak); # put aside previous tweak
+ &paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
+ &pand ($inout3,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
+ &pxor ($inout3,$tweak);
+
+ &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
+
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_steal");
+ &movz ($rounds,&BP(16,$inp));
+ &movz ($key,&BP(0,$out));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(1,$inp));
+ &mov (&BP(0,$out),&LB($rounds));
+ &mov (&BP(16,$out),&LB($key));
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(1,$out));
+ &sub ($len,1);
+ &jnz (&label("xts_dec_steal"));
+
+ &sub ($out,&DWP(16*7+0,"esp")); # rewind $out
+ &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
+
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$out)); # load input
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout4); # input^=tweak
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
+ &xorps ($inout0,$inout4); # output^=tweak
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # write output
+
+&set_label("xts_dec_ret");
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp
+&function_end("aesni_xts_decrypt");
+}
+}
+
+######################################################################
+# void $PREFIX_cbc_encrypt (const void *inp, void *out,
+# size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+# unsigned char *ivp,const int enc);
+&function_begin("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($rounds_,"esp");
+ &mov ($out,&wparam(1));
+ &sub ($rounds_,24);
+ &mov ($len,&wparam(2));
+ &and ($rounds_,-16);
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(3));
+ &mov ($key_,&wparam(4));
+ &test ($len,$len);
+ &jz (&label("cbc_abort"));
+
+ &cmp (&wparam(5),0);
+ &xchg ($rounds_,"esp"); # alloca
+ &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0,$key_)); # load IV
+ &mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key));
+ &mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
+ &mov (&DWP(16,"esp"),$rounds_); # save original %esp
+ &mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
+ &je (&label("cbc_decrypt"));
+
+ &movaps ($inout0,$ivec);
+ &cmp ($len,16);
+ &jb (&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
+ &sub ($len,16);
+ &jmp (&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_enc_loop",16);
+ &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0,$inp)); # input actually
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("enc",$inout0,$ivec); }
+ else
+ { &xorps($inout0,$ivec); &call("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
+ &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # store output
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out));
+ &sub ($len,16);
+ &jnc (&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+ &add ($len,16);
+ &jnz (&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
+ &movaps ($ivec,$inout0);
+ &jmp (&label("cbc_ret"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_enc_tail");
+ &mov ("ecx",$len); # zaps $rounds
+ &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb
+ &mov ("ecx",16); # zero tail
+ &sub ("ecx",$len);
+ &xor ("eax","eax"); # zaps $len
+ &data_word(0xAAF3F689); # rep stosb
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(-16,$out)); # rewind $out by 1 block
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
+ &mov ($inp,$out); # $inp and $out are the same
+ &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
+ &jmp (&label("cbc_enc_loop"));
+######################################################################
+&set_label("cbc_decrypt",16);
+ &cmp ($len,0x50);
+ &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_tail"));
+ &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$ivec); # save IV
+ &sub ($len,0x50);
+ &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_loop6_enter"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_loop6",16);
+ &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save IV
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout5);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
+&set_label("cbc_dec_loop6_enter");
+ &movdqu ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
+
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt6");
+
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # ^=IV
+ &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey1);
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey0);
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey1);
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout4,$rndkey0);
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x50,$inp)); # IV
+ &xorps ($inout5,$rndkey1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &mov ($rounds,$rounds_) # restore $rounds
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
+ &movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x50,$out));
+ &sub ($len,0x60);
+ &ja (&label("cbc_dec_loop6"));
+
+ &movaps ($inout0,$inout5);
+ &movaps ($ivec,$rndkey0);
+ &add ($len,0x50);
+ &jle (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
+&set_label("cbc_dec_tail");
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movaps ($in0,$inout0);
+ &cmp ($len,0x10);
+ &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_one"));
+
+ &movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &movaps ($in1,$inout1);
+ &cmp ($len,0x20);
+ &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_two"));
+
+ &movups ($inout2,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &cmp ($len,0x30);
+ &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_three"));
+
+ &movups ($inout3,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &cmp ($len,0x40);
+ &jbe (&label("cbc_dec_four"));
+
+ &movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x40,$inp));
+ &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$ivec); # save IV
+ &movups ($inout0,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout5,$inout5);
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt6");
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$inp));
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # ^= IV
+ &xorps ($inout1,$rndkey1);
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey0);
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey1);
+ &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x40,$inp)); # IV
+ &xorps ($inout4,$rndkey0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x40,$out));
+ &movaps ($inout0,$inout4);
+ &sub ($len,0x50);
+ &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_one",16);
+ if ($inline)
+ { &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
+ else
+ { &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
+ &xorps ($inout0,$ivec);
+ &movaps ($ivec,$in0);
+ &sub ($len,0x10);
+ &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_two",16);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
+ &xorps ($inout0,$ivec);
+ &xorps ($inout1,$in0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movaps ($inout0,$inout1);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
+ &movaps ($ivec,$in1);
+ &sub ($len,0x20);
+ &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_three",16);
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
+ &xorps ($inout0,$ivec);
+ &xorps ($inout1,$in0);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$in1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &movaps ($inout0,$inout2);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x20,$out));
+ &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &sub ($len,0x30);
+ &jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_four",16);
+ &call ("_aesni_decrypt4");
+ &movups ($rndkey1,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
+ &movups ($rndkey0,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout0,$ivec);
+ &movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
+ &xorps ($inout1,$in0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
+ &xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0);
+ &movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
+ &lea ($out,&DWP(0x30,$out));
+ &movaps ($inout0,$inout3);
+ &sub ($len,0x40);
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_collected");
+ &and ($len,15);
+ &jnz (&label("cbc_dec_tail_partial"));
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
+ &jmp (&label("cbc_ret"));
+
+&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_partial",16);
+ &movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
+ &mov ("ecx",16);
+ &mov ($inp,"esp");
+ &sub ("ecx",$len);
+ &data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb
+
+&set_label("cbc_ret");
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(16,"esp")); # pull original %esp
+ &mov ($key_,&wparam(4));
+ &movups (&QWP(0,$key_),$ivec); # output IV
+&set_label("cbc_abort");
+&function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
+
+######################################################################
+# Mechanical port from aesni-x86_64.pl.
+#
+# _aesni_set_encrypt_key is private interface,
+# input:
+# "eax" const unsigned char *userKey
+# $rounds int bits
+# $key AES_KEY *key
+# output:
+# "eax" return code
+# $round rounds
+
+&function_begin_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+ &test ("eax","eax");
+ &jz (&label("bad_pointer"));
+ &test ($key,$key);
+ &jz (&label("bad_pointer"));
+
+ &movups ("xmm0",&QWP(0,"eax")); # pull first 128 bits of *userKey
+ &xorps ("xmm4","xmm4"); # low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+ &cmp ($rounds,256);
+ &je (&label("14rounds"));
+ &cmp ($rounds,192);
+ &je (&label("12rounds"));
+ &cmp ($rounds,128);
+ &jne (&label("bad_keybits"));
+
+&set_label("10rounds",16);
+ &mov ($rounds,9);
+ &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01); # round 1
+ &call (&label("key_128_cold"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x2); # round 2
+ &call (&label("key_128"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x04); # round 3
+ &call (&label("key_128"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x08); # round 4
+ &call (&label("key_128"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x10); # round 5
+ &call (&label("key_128"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x20); # round 6
+ &call (&label("key_128"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x40); # round 7
+ &call (&label("key_128"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x80); # round 8
+ &call (&label("key_128"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x1b); # round 9
+ &call (&label("key_128"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x36); # round 10
+ &call (&label("key_128"));
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+ &mov (&DWP(80,$key),$rounds);
+ &xor ("eax","eax");
+ &ret();
+
+&set_label("key_128",16);
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+&set_label("key_128_cold");
+ &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
+ &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
+ &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
+ &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
+ &shufps ("xmm1","xmm1",0b11111111); # critical path
+ &xorps ("xmm0","xmm1");
+ &ret();
+
+&set_label("12rounds",16);
+ &movq ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining 1/3 of *userKey
+ &mov ($rounds,11);
+ &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0") # round 0
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 1,2
+ &call (&label("key_192a_cold"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02); # round 2,3
+ &call (&label("key_192b"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x04); # round 4,5
+ &call (&label("key_192a"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x08); # round 5,6
+ &call (&label("key_192b"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x10); # round 7,8
+ &call (&label("key_192a"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x20); # round 8,9
+ &call (&label("key_192b"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x40); # round 10,11
+ &call (&label("key_192a"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x80); # round 11,12
+ &call (&label("key_192b"));
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+ &mov (&DWP(48,$key),$rounds);
+ &xor ("eax","eax");
+ &ret();
+
+&set_label("key_192a",16);
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+&set_label("key_192a_cold",16);
+ &movaps ("xmm5","xmm2");
+&set_label("key_192b_warm");
+ &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
+ &movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
+ &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
+ &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
+ &pslldq ("xmm3",4);
+ &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
+ &pshufd ("xmm1","xmm1",0b01010101); # critical path
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
+ &pxor ("xmm0","xmm1");
+ &pshufd ("xmm3","xmm0",0b11111111);
+ &pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
+ &ret();
+
+&set_label("key_192b",16);
+ &movaps ("xmm3","xmm0");
+ &shufps ("xmm5","xmm0",0b01000100);
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm5");
+ &shufps ("xmm3","xmm2",0b01001110);
+ &$movekey (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm3");
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
+ &jmp (&label("key_192b_warm"));
+
+&set_label("14rounds",16);
+ &movups ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining half of *userKey
+ &mov ($rounds,13);
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+ &$movekey (&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
+ &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2"); # round 1
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 2
+ &call (&label("key_256a_cold"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01); # round 3
+ &call (&label("key_256b"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02); # round 4
+ &call (&label("key_256a"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x02); # round 5
+ &call (&label("key_256b"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x04); # round 6
+ &call (&label("key_256a"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x04); # round 7
+ &call (&label("key_256b"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x08); # round 8
+ &call (&label("key_256a"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x08); # round 9
+ &call (&label("key_256b"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x10); # round 10
+ &call (&label("key_256a"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x10); # round 11
+ &call (&label("key_256b"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x20); # round 12
+ &call (&label("key_256a"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x20); # round 13
+ &call (&label("key_256b"));
+ &aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x40); # round 14
+ &call (&label("key_256a"));
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+ &mov (&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
+ &xor ("eax","eax");
+ &ret();
+
+&set_label("key_256a",16);
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+&set_label("key_256a_cold");
+ &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b00010000);
+ &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
+ &shufps ("xmm4","xmm0",0b10001100);
+ &xorps ("xmm0","xmm4");
+ &shufps ("xmm1","xmm1",0b11111111); # critical path
+ &xorps ("xmm0","xmm1");
+ &ret();
+
+&set_label("key_256b",16);
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+
+ &shufps ("xmm4","xmm2",0b00010000);
+ &xorps ("xmm2","xmm4");
+ &shufps ("xmm4","xmm2",0b10001100);
+ &xorps ("xmm2","xmm4");
+ &shufps ("xmm1","xmm1",0b10101010); # critical path
+ &xorps ("xmm2","xmm1");
+ &ret();
+
+&set_label("bad_pointer",4);
+ &mov ("eax",-1);
+ &ret ();
+&set_label("bad_keybits",4);
+ &mov ("eax",-2);
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+
+# int $PREFIX_set_encrypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+# AES_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key");
+ &mov ("eax",&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($rounds,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
+ &call ("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key");
+
+# int $PREFIX_set_decrypt_key (const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+# AES_KEY *key)
+&function_begin_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
+ &mov ("eax",&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($rounds,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
+ &call ("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
+ &mov ($key,&wparam(2));
+ &shl ($rounds,4) # rounds-1 after _aesni_set_encrypt_key
+ &test ("eax","eax");
+ &jnz (&label("dec_key_ret"));
+ &lea ("eax",&DWP(16,$key,$rounds)); # end of key schedule
+
+ &$movekey ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # just swap
+ &$movekey ("xmm1",&QWP(0,"eax"));
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,"eax"),"xmm0");
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm1");
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+ &lea ("eax",&DWP(-16,"eax"));
+
+&set_label("dec_key_inverse");
+ &$movekey ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # swap and inverse
+ &$movekey ("xmm1",&QWP(0,"eax"));
+ &aesimc ("xmm0","xmm0");
+ &aesimc ("xmm1","xmm1");
+ &lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
+ &lea ("eax",&DWP(-16,"eax"));
+ &$movekey (&QWP(16,"eax"),"xmm0");
+ &$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm1");
+ &cmp ("eax",$key);
+ &ja (&label("dec_key_inverse"));
+
+ &$movekey ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key)); # inverse middle
+ &aesimc ("xmm0","xmm0");
+ &$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
+
+ &xor ("eax","eax"); # return success
+&set_label("dec_key_ret");
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
+&asciz("AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,405 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-
-static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
- int indent);
-static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
- int offset, int depth, int indent, int dump);
-static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
- int indent)
-{
- static const char fmt[] = "%-18s";
- char str[128];
- const char *p;
-
- if (constructed & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
- p = "cons: ";
- else
- p = "prim: ";
- if (BIO_write(bp, p, 6) < 6)
- goto err;
- BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128);
-
- p = str;
- if ((xclass & V_ASN1_PRIVATE) == V_ASN1_PRIVATE)
- BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "priv [ %d ] ", tag);
- else if ((xclass & V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) == V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)
- BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "cont [ %d ]", tag);
- else if ((xclass & V_ASN1_APPLICATION) == V_ASN1_APPLICATION)
- BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "appl [ %d ]", tag);
- else if (tag > 30)
- BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "<ASN1 %d>", tag);
- else
- p = ASN1_tag2str(tag);
-
- if (BIO_printf(bp, fmt, p) <= 0)
- goto err;
- return (1);
- err:
- return (0);
-}
-
-int ASN1_parse(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent)
-{
- return (asn1_parse2(bp, &pp, len, 0, 0, indent, 0));
-}
-
-int ASN1_parse_dump(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent,
- int dump)
-{
- return (asn1_parse2(bp, &pp, len, 0, 0, indent, dump));
-}
-
-static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
- int offset, int depth, int indent, int dump)
-{
- const unsigned char *p, *ep, *tot, *op, *opp;
- long len;
- int tag, xclass, ret = 0;
- int nl, hl, j, r;
- ASN1_OBJECT *o = NULL;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
- /* ASN1_BMPSTRING *bmp=NULL; */
- int dump_indent;
-
-#if 0
- dump_indent = indent;
-#else
- dump_indent = 6; /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
-#endif
- p = *pp;
- tot = p + length;
- op = p - 1;
- while ((p < tot) && (op < p)) {
- op = p;
- j = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length);
-#ifdef LINT
- j = j;
-#endif
- if (j & 0x80) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "Error in encoding\n", 18) <= 0)
- goto end;
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- hl = (p - op);
- length -= hl;
- /*
- * if j == 0x21 it is a constructed indefinite length object
- */
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "%5ld:", (long)offset + (long)(op - *pp))
- <= 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (j != (V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)) {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "d=%-2d hl=%ld l=%4ld ",
- depth, (long)hl, len) <= 0)
- goto end;
- } else {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "d=%-2d hl=%ld l=inf ", depth, (long)hl) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- if (!asn1_print_info(bp, tag, xclass, j, (indent) ? depth : 0))
- goto end;
- if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
- ep = p + len;
- if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (len > length) {
- BIO_printf(bp, "length is greater than %ld\n", length);
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- if ((j == 0x21) && (len == 0)) {
- for (;;) {
- r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, (long)(tot - p),
- offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
- indent, dump);
- if (r == 0) {
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- if ((r == 2) || (p >= tot))
- break;
- }
- } else
- while (p < ep) {
- r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, (long)len,
- offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
- indent, dump);
- if (r == 0) {
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- }
- } else if (xclass != 0) {
- p += len;
- if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- } else {
- nl = 0;
- if ((tag == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) ||
- (tag == V_ASN1_T61STRING) ||
- (tag == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) ||
- (tag == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) ||
- (tag == V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING) ||
- (tag == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) ||
- (tag == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) || (tag == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- if ((len > 0) && BIO_write(bp, (const char *)p, (int)len)
- != (int)len)
- goto end;
- } else if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
- opp = op;
- if (d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(&o, &opp, len + hl) != NULL) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, o);
- } else {
- if (BIO_write(bp, ":BAD OBJECT", 11) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- } else if (tag == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) {
- int ii;
-
- opp = op;
- ii = d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
- if (ii < 0) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "Bad boolean\n", 12) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- BIO_printf(bp, ":%d", ii);
- } else if (tag == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING) {
- /* do the BMP thang */
- } else if (tag == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
- int i, printable = 1;
-
- opp = op;
- os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
- if (os != NULL && os->length > 0) {
- opp = os->data;
- /*
- * testing whether the octet string is printable
- */
- for (i = 0; i < os->length; i++) {
- if (((opp[i] < ' ') &&
- (opp[i] != '\n') &&
- (opp[i] != '\r') &&
- (opp[i] != '\t')) || (opp[i] > '~')) {
- printable = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (printable)
- /* printable string */
- {
- if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (BIO_write(bp, (const char *)opp, os->length) <= 0)
- goto end;
- } else if (!dump)
- /*
- * not printable => print octet string as hex dump
- */
- {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "[HEX DUMP]:", 11) <= 0)
- goto end;
- for (i = 0; i < os->length; i++) {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", opp[i]) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- } else
- /* print the normal dump */
- {
- if (!nl) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- if (BIO_dump_indent(bp,
- (const char *)opp,
- ((dump == -1 || dump >
- os->
- length) ? os->length : dump),
- dump_indent) <= 0)
- goto end;
- nl = 1;
- }
- }
- if (os != NULL) {
- M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
- os = NULL;
- }
- } else if (tag == V_ASN1_INTEGER) {
- ASN1_INTEGER *bs;
- int i;
-
- opp = op;
- bs = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
- if (bs != NULL) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
- if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", bs->data[i]) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- if (bs->length == 0) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- } else {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "BAD INTEGER", 11) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(bs);
- } else if (tag == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) {
- ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs;
- int i;
-
- opp = op;
- bs = d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
- if (bs != NULL) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED)
- if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", bs->data[i]) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- if (bs->length == 0) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- } else {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "BAD ENUMERATED", 14) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(bs);
- } else if (len > 0 && dump) {
- if (!nl) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- if (BIO_dump_indent(bp, (const char *)p,
- ((dump == -1 || dump > len) ? len : dump),
- dump_indent) <= 0)
- goto end;
- nl = 1;
- }
-
- if (!nl) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- p += len;
- if ((tag == V_ASN1_EOC) && (xclass == 0)) {
- ret = 2; /* End of sequence */
- goto end;
- }
- }
- length -= len;
- }
- ret = 1;
- end:
- if (o != NULL)
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
- if (os != NULL)
- M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
- *pp = p;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag)
-{
- static const char *const tag2str[] = {
- /* 0-4 */
- "EOC", "BOOLEAN", "INTEGER", "BIT STRING", "OCTET STRING",
- /* 5-9 */
- "NULL", "OBJECT", "OBJECT DESCRIPTOR", "EXTERNAL", "REAL",
- /* 10-13 */
- "ENUMERATED", "<ASN1 11>", "UTF8STRING", "<ASN1 13>",
- /* 15-17 */
- "<ASN1 14>", "<ASN1 15>", "SEQUENCE", "SET",
- /* 18-20 */
- "NUMERICSTRING", "PRINTABLESTRING", "T61STRING",
- /* 21-24 */
- "VIDEOTEXSTRING", "IA5STRING", "UTCTIME", "GENERALIZEDTIME",
- /* 25-27 */
- "GRAPHICSTRING", "VISIBLESTRING", "GENERALSTRING",
- /* 28-30 */
- "UNIVERSALSTRING", "<ASN1 29>", "BMPSTRING"
- };
-
- if ((tag == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || (tag == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED))
- tag &= ~0x100;
-
- if (tag < 0 || tag > 30)
- return "(unknown)";
- return tag2str[tag];
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
+/* crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+#ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH
+#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
+#endif
+
+static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
+ int indent);
+static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
+ int offset, int depth, int indent, int dump);
+static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
+ int indent)
+{
+ static const char fmt[] = "%-18s";
+ char str[128];
+ const char *p;
+
+ if (constructed & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
+ p = "cons: ";
+ else
+ p = "prim: ";
+ if (BIO_write(bp, p, 6) < 6)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128);
+
+ p = str;
+ if ((xclass & V_ASN1_PRIVATE) == V_ASN1_PRIVATE)
+ BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "priv [ %d ] ", tag);
+ else if ((xclass & V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) == V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)
+ BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "cont [ %d ]", tag);
+ else if ((xclass & V_ASN1_APPLICATION) == V_ASN1_APPLICATION)
+ BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "appl [ %d ]", tag);
+ else if (tag > 30)
+ BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof str, "<ASN1 %d>", tag);
+ else
+ p = ASN1_tag2str(tag);
+
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, fmt, p) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ return (1);
+ err:
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int ASN1_parse(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent)
+{
+ return (asn1_parse2(bp, &pp, len, 0, 0, indent, 0));
+}
+
+int ASN1_parse_dump(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent,
+ int dump)
+{
+ return (asn1_parse2(bp, &pp, len, 0, 0, indent, dump));
+}
+
+static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
+ int offset, int depth, int indent, int dump)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p, *ep, *tot, *op, *opp;
+ long len;
+ int tag, xclass, ret = 0;
+ int nl, hl, j, r;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *o = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+ /* ASN1_BMPSTRING *bmp=NULL; */
+ int dump_indent;
+
+#if 0
+ dump_indent = indent;
+#else
+ dump_indent = 6; /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
+#endif
+
+ if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) {
+ BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = *pp;
+ tot = p + length;
+ op = p - 1;
+ while ((p < tot) && (op < p)) {
+ op = p;
+ j = ASN1_get_object(&p, &len, &tag, &xclass, length);
+#ifdef LINT
+ j = j;
+#endif
+ if (j & 0x80) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "Error in encoding\n", 18) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ hl = (p - op);
+ length -= hl;
+ /*
+ * if j == 0x21 it is a constructed indefinite length object
+ */
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%5ld:", (long)offset + (long)(op - *pp))
+ <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (j != (V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "d=%-2d hl=%ld l=%4ld ",
+ depth, (long)hl, len) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "d=%-2d hl=%ld l=inf ", depth, (long)hl) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!asn1_print_info(bp, tag, xclass, j, (indent) ? depth : 0))
+ goto end;
+ if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
+ ep = p + len;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (len > length) {
+ BIO_printf(bp, "length is greater than %ld\n", length);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if ((j == 0x21) && (len == 0)) {
+ for (;;) {
+ r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, (long)(tot - p),
+ offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
+ indent, dump);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if ((r == 2) || (p >= tot))
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ while (p < ep) {
+ r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, (long)len,
+ offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
+ indent, dump);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (xclass != 0) {
+ p += len;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ nl = 0;
+ if ((tag == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) ||
+ (tag == V_ASN1_T61STRING) ||
+ (tag == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) ||
+ (tag == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) ||
+ (tag == V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING) ||
+ (tag == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) ||
+ (tag == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) || (tag == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if ((len > 0) && BIO_write(bp, (const char *)p, (int)len)
+ != (int)len)
+ goto end;
+ } else if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
+ opp = op;
+ if (d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(&o, &opp, len + hl) != NULL) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, o);
+ } else {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, ":BAD OBJECT", 11) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else if (tag == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN) {
+ int ii;
+
+ opp = op;
+ ii = d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
+ if (ii < 0) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "Bad boolean\n", 12) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bp, ":%d", ii);
+ } else if (tag == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING) {
+ /* do the BMP thang */
+ } else if (tag == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
+ int i, printable = 1;
+
+ opp = op;
+ os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
+ if (os != NULL && os->length > 0) {
+ opp = os->data;
+ /*
+ * testing whether the octet string is printable
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < os->length; i++) {
+ if (((opp[i] < ' ') &&
+ (opp[i] != '\n') &&
+ (opp[i] != '\r') &&
+ (opp[i] != '\t')) || (opp[i] > '~')) {
+ printable = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (printable)
+ /* printable string */
+ {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, (const char *)opp, os->length) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ } else if (!dump)
+ /*
+ * not printable => print octet string as hex dump
+ */
+ {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "[HEX DUMP]:", 11) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ for (i = 0; i < os->length; i++) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", opp[i]) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else
+ /* print the normal dump */
+ {
+ if (!nl) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (BIO_dump_indent(bp,
+ (const char *)opp,
+ ((dump == -1 || dump >
+ os->
+ length) ? os->length : dump),
+ dump_indent) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ nl = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (os != NULL) {
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+ os = NULL;
+ }
+ } else if (tag == V_ASN1_INTEGER) {
+ ASN1_INTEGER *bs;
+ int i;
+
+ opp = op;
+ bs = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
+ if (bs != NULL) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", bs->data[i]) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (bs->length == 0) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "BAD INTEGER", 11) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(bs);
+ } else if (tag == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) {
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs;
+ int i;
+
+ opp = op;
+ bs = d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
+ if (bs != NULL) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED)
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", bs->data[i]) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (bs->length == 0) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "BAD ENUMERATED", 14) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(bs);
+ } else if (len > 0 && dump) {
+ if (!nl) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (BIO_dump_indent(bp, (const char *)p,
+ ((dump == -1 || dump > len) ? len : dump),
+ dump_indent) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ nl = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!nl) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ p += len;
+ if ((tag == V_ASN1_EOC) && (xclass == 0)) {
+ ret = 2; /* End of sequence */
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ length -= len;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ end:
+ if (o != NULL)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
+ if (os != NULL)
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+ *pp = p;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag)
+{
+ static const char *const tag2str[] = {
+ /* 0-4 */
+ "EOC", "BOOLEAN", "INTEGER", "BIT STRING", "OCTET STRING",
+ /* 5-9 */
+ "NULL", "OBJECT", "OBJECT DESCRIPTOR", "EXTERNAL", "REAL",
+ /* 10-13 */
+ "ENUMERATED", "<ASN1 11>", "UTF8STRING", "<ASN1 13>",
+ /* 15-17 */
+ "<ASN1 14>", "<ASN1 15>", "SEQUENCE", "SET",
+ /* 18-20 */
+ "NUMERICSTRING", "PRINTABLESTRING", "T61STRING",
+ /* 21-24 */
+ "VIDEOTEXSTRING", "IA5STRING", "UTCTIME", "GENERALIZEDTIME",
+ /* 25-27 */
+ "GRAPHICSTRING", "VISIBLESTRING", "GENERALSTRING",
+ /* 28-30 */
+ "UNIVERSALSTRING", "<ASN1 29>", "BMPSTRING"
+ };
+
+ if ((tag == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || (tag == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED))
+ tag &= ~0x100;
+
+ if (tag < 0 || tag > 30)
+ return "(unknown)";
+ return tag2str[tag];
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include "asn1_locl.h"
-
-EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
- long length)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *ret;
-
- if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) {
- if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return (NULL);
- }
- } else {
- ret = *a;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (ret->engine) {
- ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
- ret->engine = NULL;
- }
-#endif
- }
-
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode ||
- !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, pp, length)) {
- if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) {
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
- p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
- if (!p8)
- goto err;
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
- ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
-
- } else {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (a != NULL)
- (*a) = ret;
- return (ret);
- err:
- if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)))
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * This works like d2i_PrivateKey() except it automatically works out the
- * type
- */
-
-EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
- long length)
-{
- STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *inkey;
- const unsigned char *p;
- int keytype;
- p = *pp;
- /*
- * Dirty trick: read in the ASN1 data into a STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE): by
- * analyzing it we can determine the passed structure: this assumes the
- * input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE.
- */
- inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length);
- /*
- * Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we
- * can just count the elements.
- */
- if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 6)
- keytype = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
- else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 4)
- keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
- else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not
- * traditional format */
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
- EVP_PKEY *ret;
-
- sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
- if (!p8) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_AUTOPRIVATEKEY,
- ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
- if (a) {
- *a = ret;
- }
- return ret;
- } else
- keytype = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
- sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
- return d2i_PrivateKey(keytype, a, pp, length);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/* crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ long length)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret;
+ const unsigned char *p = *pp;
+
+ if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) {
+ if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = *a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (ret->engine) {
+ ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
+ ret->engine = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, type)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode ||
+ !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) {
+ if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) {
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
+ p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
+ if (!p8)
+ goto err;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ *pp = p;
+ if (a != NULL)
+ (*a) = ret;
+ return (ret);
+ err:
+ if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)))
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This works like d2i_PrivateKey() except it automatically works out the
+ * type
+ */
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ long length)
+{
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *inkey;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int keytype;
+ p = *pp;
+ /*
+ * Dirty trick: read in the ASN1 data into a STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE): by
+ * analyzing it we can determine the passed structure: this assumes the
+ * input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE.
+ */
+ inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length);
+ p = *pp;
+ /*
+ * Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we
+ * can just count the elements.
+ */
+ if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 6)
+ keytype = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+ else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 4)
+ keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+ else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not
+ * traditional format */
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
+ EVP_PKEY *ret;
+
+ sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+ if (!p8) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_AUTOPRIVATEKEY,
+ ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ *pp = p;
+ if (a) {
+ *a = ret;
+ }
+ return ret;
+ } else
+ keytype = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+ sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+ return d2i_PrivateKey(keytype, a, pp, length);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1228 +0,0 @@
-/* tasn_dec.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len);
-static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf);
-
-static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
- char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth);
-
-static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen);
-
-static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass,
- char *inf, char *cst,
- const unsigned char **in, long len,
- int exptag, int expclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx);
-
-static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
- const unsigned char **in, long len,
- const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
- ASN1_TLC *ctx);
-static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
- const unsigned char **in, long len,
- const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
- ASN1_TLC *ctx);
-static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
- const unsigned char **in, long len,
- const ASN1_ITEM *it,
- int tag, int aclass, char opt,
- ASN1_TLC *ctx);
-
-/* Table to convert tags to bit values, used for MSTRING type */
-static const unsigned long tag2bit[32] = {
- /* tags 0 - 3 */
- 0, 0, 0, B_ASN1_BIT_STRING,
- /* tags 4- 7 */
- B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
- /* tags 8-11 */
- B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
- /* tags 12-15 */
- B_ASN1_UTF8STRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
- /* tags 16-19 */
- B_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING,
- /* tags 20-22 */
- B_ASN1_T61STRING, B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING, B_ASN1_IA5STRING,
- /* tags 23-24 */
- B_ASN1_UTCTIME, B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,
- /* tags 25-27 */
- B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING, B_ASN1_ISO64STRING, B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING,
- /* tags 28-31 */
- B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_BMPSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
-};
-
-unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag)
-{
- if ((tag < 0) || (tag > 30))
- return 0;
- return tag2bit[tag];
-}
-
-/* Macro to initialize and invalidate the cache */
-
-#define asn1_tlc_clear(c) if (c) (c)->valid = 0
-/* Version to avoid compiler warning about 'c' always non-NULL */
-#define asn1_tlc_clear_nc(c) (c)->valid = 0
-
-/*
- * Decode an ASN1 item, this currently behaves just like a standard 'd2i'
- * function. 'in' points to a buffer to read the data from, in future we
- * will have more advanced versions that can input data a piece at a time and
- * this will simply be a special case.
- */
-
-ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
- const unsigned char **in, long len,
- const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
- ASN1_TLC c;
- ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL;
- if (!pval)
- pval = &ptmpval;
- asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
- if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0)
- return *pval;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int ASN1_template_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
- const unsigned char **in, long len,
- const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
-{
- ASN1_TLC c;
- asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
- return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, tt, 0, &c);
-}
-
-/*
- * Decode an item, taking care of IMPLICIT tagging, if any. If 'opt' set and
- * tag mismatch return -1 to handle OPTIONAL
- */
-
-int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
- const ASN1_ITEM *it,
- int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
-{
- const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
- const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
- const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
- const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
- ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
- const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
- unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */
- unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass;
- char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
- long tmplen;
- int i;
- int otag;
- int ret = 0;
- ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
- if (!pval)
- return 0;
- if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
- asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
- else
- asn1_cb = 0;
-
- switch (it->itype) {
- case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
- if (it->templates) {
- /*
- * tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template
- * because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this
- * isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item
- * template in the template itself.
- */
- if ((tag != -1) || opt) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
- ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE);
- goto err;
- }
- return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
- it->templates, opt, ctx);
- }
- return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
- tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
- break;
-
- case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
- p = *in;
- /* Just read in tag and class */
- ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
- &p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx);
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Must be UNIVERSAL class */
- if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
- /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
- if (opt)
- return -1;
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Check tag matches bit map */
- if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) {
- /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
- if (opt)
- return -1;
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG);
- goto err;
- }
- return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx);
-
- case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
- /* Use new style d2i */
- ef = it->funcs;
- return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
-
- case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
- /* we must resort to old style evil hackery */
- cf = it->funcs;
-
- /* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */
- if (opt) {
- int exptag;
- p = *in;
- if (tag == -1)
- exptag = it->utype;
- else
- exptag = tag;
- /*
- * Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag
- */
-
- ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- &p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx);
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (ret == -1)
- return -1;
- }
-
- /*
- * This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the
- * underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one
- * present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back
- * afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes
- * this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which
- * will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy
- * the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we
- * should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the
- * buffer.
- */
-
- if (tag != -1) {
- wp = *(unsigned char **)in;
- imphack = *wp;
- if (p == NULL) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- *wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
- | it->utype);
- }
-
- ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len);
-
- if (tag != -1)
- *wp = imphack;
-
- if (ptmpval)
- return 1;
-
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
-
- case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
- if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
- goto auxerr;
- if (*pval) {
- /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
- i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
- if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
- tt = it->templates + i;
- pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
- ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
- asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
- }
- } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */
- p = *in;
- for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
- pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
- /*
- * We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence can be recognised.
- */
- ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx);
- /* If field not present, try the next one */
- if (ret == -1)
- continue;
- /* If positive return, read OK, break loop */
- if (ret > 0)
- break;
- /* Otherwise must be an ASN1 parsing error */
- errtt = tt;
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */
- if (i == it->tcount) {
- /* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */
- if (opt) {
- /* Free and zero it */
- ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
- return -1;
- }
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
- *in = p;
- if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
- goto auxerr;
- return 1;
-
- case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
- case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
- p = *in;
- tmplen = len;
-
- /* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
- if (tag == -1) {
- tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
- aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
- }
- /* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */
- ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst,
- &p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- } else if (ret == -1)
- return -1;
- if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
- len = tmplen - (p - *in);
- seq_nolen = 1;
- }
- /* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
- else
- seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
- if (!cst) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
- goto auxerr;
-
- /* Free up and zero any ADB found */
- for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
- if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
- const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
- ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
- seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
- pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
- ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
- }
- }
-
- /* Get each field entry */
- for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
- const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
- ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
- seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
- if (!seqtt)
- goto err;
- pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
- /* Have we ran out of data? */
- if (!len)
- break;
- q = p;
- if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
- if (!seq_eoc) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
- goto err;
- }
- len -= p - q;
- seq_eoc = 0;
- q = p;
- break;
- }
- /*
- * This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be
- * omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still
- * data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it
- * increases efficiency in some cases.
- */
- if (i == (it->tcount - 1))
- isopt = 0;
- else
- isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL);
- /*
- * attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
- */
-
- ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx);
- if (!ret) {
- errtt = seqtt;
- goto err;
- } else if (ret == -1) {
- /*
- * OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field.
- */
- ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
- continue;
- }
- /* Update length */
- len -= p - q;
- }
-
- /* Check for EOC if expecting one */
- if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Check all data read */
- if (!seq_nolen && len) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we
- * may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL
- * and clear any that are.
- */
- for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
- const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
- seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
- if (!seqtt)
- goto err;
- if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) {
- ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
- pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
- ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
- } else {
- errtt = seqtt;
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /* Save encoding */
- if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
- goto auxerr;
- *in = p;
- if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
- goto auxerr;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return 0;
- }
- auxerr:
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
- err:
- ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
- if (errtt)
- ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
- ", Type=", it->sname);
- else
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "Type=", it->sname);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Templates are handled with two separate functions. One handles any
- * EXPLICIT tag and the other handles the rest.
- */
-
-static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
- const unsigned char **in, long inlen,
- const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
- ASN1_TLC *ctx)
-{
- int flags, aclass;
- int ret;
- long len;
- const unsigned char *p, *q;
- char exp_eoc;
- if (!val)
- return 0;
- flags = tt->flags;
- aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
-
- p = *in;
-
- /* Check if EXPLICIT tag expected */
- if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) {
- char cst;
- /*
- * Need to work out amount of data available to the inner content and
- * where it starts: so read in EXPLICIT header to get the info.
- */
- ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &exp_eoc, &cst,
- &p, inlen, tt->tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
- q = p;
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- return 0;
- } else if (ret == -1)
- return -1;
- if (!cst) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I,
- ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
- return 0;
- }
- /* We've found the field so it can't be OPTIONAL now */
- ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx);
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- /* We read the field in OK so update length */
- len -= p - q;
- if (exp_eoc) {
- /* If NDEF we must have an EOC here */
- if (!asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * Otherwise we must hit the EXPLICIT tag end or its an error
- */
- if (len) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I,
- ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- } else
- return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx);
-
- *in = p;
- return 1;
-
- err:
- ASN1_template_free(val, tt);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
- const unsigned char **in, long len,
- const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
- ASN1_TLC *ctx)
-{
- int flags, aclass;
- int ret;
- const unsigned char *p, *q;
- if (!val)
- return 0;
- flags = tt->flags;
- aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
-
- p = *in;
- q = p;
-
- if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
- /* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */
- int sktag, skaclass;
- char sk_eoc;
- /* First work out expected inner tag value */
- if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) {
- sktag = tt->tag;
- skaclass = aclass;
- } else {
- skaclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
- if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF)
- sktag = V_ASN1_SET;
- else
- sktag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
- }
- /* Get the tag */
- ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &sk_eoc, NULL,
- &p, len, sktag, skaclass, opt, ctx);
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- return 0;
- } else if (ret == -1)
- return -1;
- if (!*val)
- *val = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_new_null();
- else {
- /*
- * We've got a valid STACK: free up any items present
- */
- STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sktmp = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*val;
- ASN1_VALUE *vtmp;
- while (sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sktmp) > 0) {
- vtmp = sk_ASN1_VALUE_pop(sktmp);
- ASN1_item_ex_free(&vtmp, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item));
- }
- }
-
- if (!*val) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Read as many items as we can */
- while (len > 0) {
- ASN1_VALUE *skfield;
- q = p;
- /* See if EOC found */
- if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
- if (!sk_eoc) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
- ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
- goto err;
- }
- len -= p - q;
- sk_eoc = 0;
- break;
- }
- skfield = NULL;
- if (!ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&skfield, &p, len,
- ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, 0, ctx)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
- ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- len -= p - q;
- if (!sk_ASN1_VALUE_push((STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*val, skfield)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (sk_eoc) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) {
- /* IMPLICIT tagging */
- ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len,
- ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag, aclass, opt,
- ctx);
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- } else if (ret == -1)
- return -1;
- } else {
- /* Nothing special */
- ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
- -1, 0, opt, ctx);
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- } else if (ret == -1)
- return -1;
- }
-
- *in = p;
- return 1;
-
- err:
- ASN1_template_free(val, tt);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
- const unsigned char **in, long inlen,
- const ASN1_ITEM *it,
- int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0, utype;
- long plen;
- char cst, inf, free_cont = 0;
- const unsigned char *p;
- BUF_MEM buf;
- const unsigned char *cont = NULL;
- long len;
- if (!pval) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL);
- return 0; /* Should never happen */
- }
-
- if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
- utype = tag;
- tag = -1;
- } else
- utype = it->utype;
-
- if (utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
- /* If type is ANY need to figure out type from tag */
- unsigned char oclass;
- if (tag >= 0) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY);
- return 0;
- }
- if (opt) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE,
- ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY);
- return 0;
- }
- p = *in;
- ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &utype, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
- &p, inlen, -1, 0, 0, ctx);
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
- utype = V_ASN1_OTHER;
- }
- if (tag == -1) {
- tag = utype;
- aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
- }
- p = *in;
- /* Check header */
- ret = asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &inf, &cst,
- &p, inlen, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- return 0;
- } else if (ret == -1)
- return -1;
- ret = 0;
- /* SEQUENCE, SET and "OTHER" are left in encoded form */
- if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER)) {
- /*
- * Clear context cache for type OTHER because the auto clear when we
- * have a exact match wont work
- */
- if (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER) {
- asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
- }
- /* SEQUENCE and SET must be constructed */
- else if (!cst) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE,
- ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- cont = *in;
- /* If indefinite length constructed find the real end */
- if (inf) {
- if (!asn1_find_end(&p, plen, inf))
- goto err;
- len = p - cont;
- } else {
- len = p - cont + plen;
- p += plen;
- buf.data = NULL;
- }
- } else if (cst) {
- if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
- || utype == V_ASN1_OBJECT || utype == V_ASN1_INTEGER
- || utype == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE);
- return 0;
- }
- buf.length = 0;
- buf.max = 0;
- buf.data = NULL;
- /*
- * Should really check the internal tags are correct but some things
- * may get this wrong. The relevant specs say that constructed string
- * types should be OCTET STRINGs internally irrespective of the type.
- * So instead just check for UNIVERSAL class and ignore the tag.
- */
- if (!asn1_collect(&buf, &p, plen, inf, -1, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0)) {
- free_cont = 1;
- goto err;
- }
- len = buf.length;
- /* Append a final null to string */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(&buf, len + 1)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- buf.data[len] = 0;
- cont = (const unsigned char *)buf.data;
- free_cont = 1;
- } else {
- cont = p;
- len = plen;
- p += plen;
- }
-
- /* We now have content length and type: translate into a structure */
- if (!asn1_ex_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, &free_cont, it))
- goto err;
-
- *in = p;
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (free_cont && buf.data)
- OPENSSL_free(buf.data);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* Translate ASN1 content octets into a structure */
-
-int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
- int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
- ASN1_VALUE **opval = NULL;
- ASN1_STRING *stmp;
- ASN1_TYPE *typ = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
- const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
- ASN1_INTEGER **tint;
- pf = it->funcs;
-
- if (pf && pf->prim_c2i)
- return pf->prim_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it);
- /* If ANY type clear type and set pointer to internal value */
- if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
- if (!*pval) {
- typ = ASN1_TYPE_new();
- if (typ == NULL)
- goto err;
- *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)typ;
- } else
- typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
-
- if (utype != typ->type)
- ASN1_TYPE_set(typ, utype, NULL);
- opval = pval;
- pval = &typ->value.asn1_value;
- }
- switch (utype) {
- case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
- if (!c2i_ASN1_OBJECT((ASN1_OBJECT **)pval, &cont, len))
- goto err;
- break;
-
- case V_ASN1_NULL:
- if (len) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)1;
- break;
-
- case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
- if (len != 1) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- } else {
- ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool;
- tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval;
- *tbool = *cont;
- }
- break;
-
- case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
- if (!c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING **)pval, &cont, len))
- goto err;
- break;
-
- case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
- case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
- case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
- tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval;
- if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len))
- goto err;
- /* Fixup type to match the expected form */
- (*tint)->type = utype | ((*tint)->type & V_ASN1_NEG);
- break;
-
- case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
- case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
- case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
- case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
- case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
- case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
- case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
- case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
- case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
- case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
- case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
- case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
- case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
- case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
- case V_ASN1_OTHER:
- case V_ASN1_SET:
- case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
- default:
- if (utype == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING && (len & 1)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (utype == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING && (len & 3)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I,
- ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- /* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */
- if (!*pval) {
- stmp = ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype);
- if (!stmp) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)stmp;
- } else {
- stmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
- stmp->type = utype;
- }
- /* If we've already allocated a buffer use it */
- if (*free_cont) {
- if (stmp->data)
- OPENSSL_free(stmp->data);
- stmp->data = (unsigned char *)cont; /* UGLY CAST! RL */
- stmp->length = len;
- *free_cont = 0;
- } else {
- if (!ASN1_STRING_set(stmp, cont, len)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
- *pval = NULL;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- break;
- }
- /* If ASN1_ANY and NULL type fix up value */
- if (typ && (utype == V_ASN1_NULL))
- typ->value.ptr = NULL;
-
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (!ret) {
- ASN1_TYPE_free(typ);
- if (opval)
- *opval = NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * This function finds the end of an ASN1 structure when passed its maximum
- * length, whether it is indefinite length and a pointer to the content. This
- * is more efficient than calling asn1_collect because it does not recurse on
- * each indefinite length header.
- */
-
-static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf)
-{
- int expected_eoc;
- long plen;
- const unsigned char *p = *in, *q;
- /* If not indefinite length constructed just add length */
- if (inf == 0) {
- *in += len;
- return 1;
- }
- expected_eoc = 1;
- /*
- * Indefinite length constructed form. Find the end when enough EOCs are
- * found. If more indefinite length constructed headers are encountered
- * increment the expected eoc count otherwise just skip to the end of the
- * data.
- */
- while (len > 0) {
- if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
- expected_eoc--;
- if (expected_eoc == 0)
- break;
- len -= 2;
- continue;
- }
- q = p;
- /* Just read in a header: only care about the length */
- if (!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &inf, NULL, &p, len,
- -1, 0, 0, NULL)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (inf)
- expected_eoc++;
- else
- p += plen;
- len -= p - q;
- }
- if (expected_eoc) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
- return 0;
- }
- *in = p;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * This function collects the asn1 data from a constructred string type into
- * a buffer. The values of 'in' and 'len' should refer to the contents of the
- * constructed type and 'inf' should be set if it is indefinite length.
- */
-
-#ifndef ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST
-/*
- * This determines how many levels of recursion are permitted in ASN1 string
- * types. If it is not limited stack overflows can occur. If set to zero no
- * recursion is allowed at all. Although zero should be adequate examples
- * exist that require a value of 1. So 5 should be more than enough.
- */
-# define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5
-#endif
-
-static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
- char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth)
-{
- const unsigned char *p, *q;
- long plen;
- char cst, ininf;
- p = *in;
- inf &= 1;
- /*
- * If no buffer and not indefinite length constructed just pass over the
- * encoded data
- */
- if (!buf && !inf) {
- *in += len;
- return 1;
- }
- while (len > 0) {
- q = p;
- /* Check for EOC */
- if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
- /*
- * EOC is illegal outside indefinite length constructed form
- */
- if (!inf) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
- return 0;
- }
- inf = 0;
- break;
- }
-
- if (!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &ininf, &cst, &p,
- len, tag, aclass, 0, NULL)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* If indefinite length constructed update max length */
- if (cst) {
- if (depth >= ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!asn1_collect(buf, &p, plen, ininf, tag, aclass, depth + 1))
- return 0;
- } else if (plen && !collect_data(buf, &p, plen))
- return 0;
- len -= p - q;
- }
- if (inf) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
- return 0;
- }
- *in = p;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen)
-{
- int len;
- if (buf) {
- len = buf->length;
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, len + plen)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(buf->data + len, *p, plen);
- }
- *p += plen;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Check for ASN1 EOC and swallow it if found */
-
-static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len)
-{
- const unsigned char *p;
- if (len < 2)
- return 0;
- p = *in;
- if (!p[0] && !p[1]) {
- *in += 2;
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check an ASN1 tag and length: a bit like ASN1_get_object but it sets the
- * length for indefinite length constructed form, we don't know the exact
- * length but we can set an upper bound to the amount of data available minus
- * the header length just read.
- */
-
-static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass,
- char *inf, char *cst,
- const unsigned char **in, long len,
- int exptag, int expclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
-{
- int i;
- int ptag, pclass;
- long plen;
- const unsigned char *p, *q;
- p = *in;
- q = p;
-
- if (ctx && ctx->valid) {
- i = ctx->ret;
- plen = ctx->plen;
- pclass = ctx->pclass;
- ptag = ctx->ptag;
- p += ctx->hdrlen;
- } else {
- i = ASN1_get_object(&p, &plen, &ptag, &pclass, len);
- if (ctx) {
- ctx->ret = i;
- ctx->plen = plen;
- ctx->pclass = pclass;
- ctx->ptag = ptag;
- ctx->hdrlen = p - q;
- ctx->valid = 1;
- /*
- * If definite length, and no error, length + header can't exceed
- * total amount of data available.
- */
- if (!(i & 0x81) && ((plen + ctx->hdrlen) > len)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
- asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (i & 0x80) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER);
- asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
- return 0;
- }
- if (exptag >= 0) {
- if ((exptag != ptag) || (expclass != pclass)) {
- /*
- * If type is OPTIONAL, not an error: indicate missing type.
- */
- if (opt)
- return -1;
- asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * We have a tag and class match: assume we are going to do something
- * with it
- */
- asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
- }
-
- if (i & 1)
- plen = len - (p - q);
-
- if (inf)
- *inf = i & 1;
-
- if (cst)
- *cst = i & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
-
- if (olen)
- *olen = plen;
-
- if (oclass)
- *oclass = pclass;
-
- if (otag)
- *otag = ptag;
-
- *in = p;
- return 1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1231 @@
+/* tasn_dec.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len);
+static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf);
+
+static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth);
+
+static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen);
+
+static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass,
+ char *inf, char *cst,
+ const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ int exptag, int expclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+
+static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
+ ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+ const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
+ ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ int tag, int aclass, char opt,
+ ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+
+/* Table to convert tags to bit values, used for MSTRING type */
+static const unsigned long tag2bit[32] = {
+ /* tags 0 - 3 */
+ 0, 0, 0, B_ASN1_BIT_STRING,
+ /* tags 4- 7 */
+ B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
+ /* tags 8-11 */
+ B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
+ /* tags 12-15 */
+ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
+ /* tags 16-19 */
+ B_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING,
+ /* tags 20-22 */
+ B_ASN1_T61STRING, B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING, B_ASN1_IA5STRING,
+ /* tags 23-24 */
+ B_ASN1_UTCTIME, B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,
+ /* tags 25-27 */
+ B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING, B_ASN1_ISO64STRING, B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING,
+ /* tags 28-31 */
+ B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_BMPSTRING, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,
+};
+
+unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag)
+{
+ if ((tag < 0) || (tag > 30))
+ return 0;
+ return tag2bit[tag];
+}
+
+/* Macro to initialize and invalidate the cache */
+
+#define asn1_tlc_clear(c) if (c) (c)->valid = 0
+/* Version to avoid compiler warning about 'c' always non-NULL */
+#define asn1_tlc_clear_nc(c) (c)->valid = 0
+
+/*
+ * Decode an ASN1 item, this currently behaves just like a standard 'd2i'
+ * function. 'in' points to a buffer to read the data from, in future we
+ * will have more advanced versions that can input data a piece at a time and
+ * this will simply be a special case.
+ */
+
+ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+ ASN1_TLC c;
+ ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL;
+ if (!pval)
+ pval = &ptmpval;
+ asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
+ if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0)
+ return *pval;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int ASN1_template_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
+{
+ ASN1_TLC c;
+ asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
+ return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, tt, 0, &c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode an item, taking care of IMPLICIT tagging, if any. If 'opt' set and
+ * tag mismatch return -1 to handle OPTIONAL
+ */
+
+int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
+ const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
+ const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
+ const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
+ ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb;
+ const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q;
+ unsigned char *wp = NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */
+ unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass;
+ char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt;
+ long tmplen;
+ int i;
+ int otag;
+ int ret = 0;
+ ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
+ int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+ aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+ if (!pval)
+ return 0;
+ if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
+ asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
+ else
+ asn1_cb = 0;
+
+ switch (it->itype) {
+ case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
+ if (it->templates) {
+ /*
+ * tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item template
+ * because the flags can't get passed down. In practice this
+ * isn't a problem: we include the relevant flags from the item
+ * template in the template itself.
+ */
+ if ((tag != -1) || opt) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
+ ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
+ it->templates, opt, ctx);
+ }
+ return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
+ tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
+ p = *in;
+ /* Just read in tag and class */
+ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
+ &p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Must be UNIVERSAL class */
+ if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
+ /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
+ if (opt)
+ return -1;
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Check tag matches bit map */
+ if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) {
+ /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
+ if (opt)
+ return -1;
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx);
+
+ case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
+ /* Use new style d2i */
+ ef = it->funcs;
+ return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+
+ case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
+ /* we must resort to old style evil hackery */
+ cf = it->funcs;
+
+ /* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */
+ if (opt) {
+ int exptag;
+ p = *in;
+ if (tag == -1)
+ exptag = it->utype;
+ else
+ exptag = tag;
+ /*
+ * Don't care about anything other than presence of expected tag
+ */
+
+ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ &p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ret == -1)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: since the
+ * underlying code is expecting a tag and class other than the one
+ * present we change the buffer temporarily then change it back
+ * afterwards. This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. Yes
+ * this is *horrible* but it is only needed for old style d2i which
+ * will hopefully not be around for much longer. FIXME: should copy
+ * the buffer then modify it so the input buffer can be const: we
+ * should *always* copy because the old style d2i might modify the
+ * buffer.
+ */
+
+ if (tag != -1) {
+ wp = *(unsigned char **)in;
+ imphack = *wp;
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
+ | it->utype);
+ }
+
+ ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len);
+
+ if (tag != -1)
+ *wp = imphack;
+
+ if (ptmpval)
+ return 1;
+
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+
+ case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
+ if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+ goto auxerr;
+ if (*pval) {
+ /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
+ i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
+ if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
+ tt = it->templates + i;
+ pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
+ ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
+ asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
+ }
+ } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */
+ p = *in;
+ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+ pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
+ /*
+ * We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence can be recognised.
+ */
+ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx);
+ /* If field not present, try the next one */
+ if (ret == -1)
+ continue;
+ /* If positive return, read OK, break loop */
+ if (ret > 0)
+ break;
+ /* Otherwise must be an ASN1 parsing error */
+ errtt = tt;
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */
+ if (i == it->tcount) {
+ /* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */
+ if (opt) {
+ /* Free and zero it */
+ ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
+ if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
+ goto auxerr;
+ *in = p;
+ return 1;
+
+ case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
+ case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
+ p = *in;
+ tmplen = len;
+
+ /* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
+ if (tag == -1) {
+ tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+ aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
+ }
+ /* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */
+ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst,
+ &p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (ret == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) {
+ len = tmplen - (p - *in);
+ seq_nolen = 1;
+ }
+ /* If indefinite we don't do a length check */
+ else
+ seq_nolen = seq_eoc;
+ if (!cst) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
+ goto auxerr;
+
+ /* Free up and zero any ADB found */
+ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+ if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+ ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+ seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+ pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Get each field entry */
+ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+ ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+ seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+ if (!seqtt)
+ goto err;
+ pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+ /* Have we ran out of data? */
+ if (!len)
+ break;
+ q = p;
+ if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+ if (!seq_eoc) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ len -= p - q;
+ seq_eoc = 0;
+ q = p;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field cannot be
+ * omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE and there is still
+ * data to be read. This isn't strictly necessary but it
+ * increases efficiency in some cases.
+ */
+ if (i == (it->tcount - 1))
+ isopt = 0;
+ else
+ isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL);
+ /*
+ * attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
+ */
+
+ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx);
+ if (!ret) {
+ errtt = seqtt;
+ goto err;
+ } else if (ret == -1) {
+ /*
+ * OPTIONAL component absent. Free and zero the field.
+ */
+ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Update length */
+ len -= p - q;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for EOC if expecting one */
+ if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Check all data read */
+ if (!seq_nolen && len) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, however we
+ * may not have read all fields so check all remaining are OPTIONAL
+ * and clear any that are.
+ */
+ for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+ seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+ if (!seqtt)
+ goto err;
+ if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) {
+ ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+ pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+ } else {
+ errtt = seqtt;
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Save encoding */
+ if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
+ goto auxerr;
+ if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
+ goto auxerr;
+ *in = p;
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ auxerr:
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
+ err:
+ if (combine == 0)
+ ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+ if (errtt)
+ ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
+ ", Type=", it->sname);
+ else
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "Type=", it->sname);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Templates are handled with two separate functions. One handles any
+ * EXPLICIT tag and the other handles the rest.
+ */
+
+static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+ const unsigned char **in, long inlen,
+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
+ ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+ int flags, aclass;
+ int ret;
+ long len;
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ char exp_eoc;
+ if (!val)
+ return 0;
+ flags = tt->flags;
+ aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
+
+ p = *in;
+
+ /* Check if EXPLICIT tag expected */
+ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) {
+ char cst;
+ /*
+ * Need to work out amount of data available to the inner content and
+ * where it starts: so read in EXPLICIT header to get the info.
+ */
+ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &exp_eoc, &cst,
+ &p, inlen, tt->tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+ q = p;
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (ret == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if (!cst) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I,
+ ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* We've found the field so it can't be OPTIONAL now */
+ ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* We read the field in OK so update length */
+ len -= p - q;
+ if (exp_eoc) {
+ /* If NDEF we must have an EOC here */
+ if (!asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Otherwise we must hit the EXPLICIT tag end or its an error
+ */
+ if (len) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I,
+ ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else
+ return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx);
+
+ *in = p;
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ ASN1_template_free(val, tt);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
+ const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
+ ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+ int flags, aclass;
+ int ret;
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ if (!val)
+ return 0;
+ flags = tt->flags;
+ aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS;
+
+ p = *in;
+ q = p;
+
+ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) {
+ /* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */
+ int sktag, skaclass;
+ char sk_eoc;
+ /* First work out expected inner tag value */
+ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) {
+ sktag = tt->tag;
+ skaclass = aclass;
+ } else {
+ skaclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
+ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF)
+ sktag = V_ASN1_SET;
+ else
+ sktag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+ }
+ /* Get the tag */
+ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &sk_eoc, NULL,
+ &p, len, sktag, skaclass, opt, ctx);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (ret == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if (!*val)
+ *val = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_new_null();
+ else {
+ /*
+ * We've got a valid STACK: free up any items present
+ */
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sktmp = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*val;
+ ASN1_VALUE *vtmp;
+ while (sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sktmp) > 0) {
+ vtmp = sk_ASN1_VALUE_pop(sktmp);
+ ASN1_item_ex_free(&vtmp, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!*val) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Read as many items as we can */
+ while (len > 0) {
+ ASN1_VALUE *skfield;
+ q = p;
+ /* See if EOC found */
+ if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+ if (!sk_eoc) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
+ ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ len -= p - q;
+ sk_eoc = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ skfield = NULL;
+ if (!ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&skfield, &p, len,
+ ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, 0, ctx)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
+ ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ len -= p - q;
+ if (!sk_ASN1_VALUE_push((STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)*val, skfield)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (sk_eoc) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) {
+ /* IMPLICIT tagging */
+ ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len,
+ ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag, aclass, opt,
+ ctx);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (ret == -1)
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ /* Nothing special */
+ ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+ -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (ret == -1)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *in = p;
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ ASN1_template_free(val, tt);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ const unsigned char **in, long inlen,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0, utype;
+ long plen;
+ char cst, inf, free_cont = 0;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ BUF_MEM buf;
+ const unsigned char *cont = NULL;
+ long len;
+ if (!pval) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL);
+ return 0; /* Should never happen */
+ }
+
+ if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) {
+ utype = tag;
+ tag = -1;
+ } else
+ utype = it->utype;
+
+ if (utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
+ /* If type is ANY need to figure out type from tag */
+ unsigned char oclass;
+ if (tag >= 0) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (opt) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE,
+ ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p = *in;
+ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &utype, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
+ &p, inlen, -1, 0, 0, ctx);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
+ utype = V_ASN1_OTHER;
+ }
+ if (tag == -1) {
+ tag = utype;
+ aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
+ }
+ p = *in;
+ /* Check header */
+ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &inf, &cst,
+ &p, inlen, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (ret == -1)
+ return -1;
+ ret = 0;
+ /* SEQUENCE, SET and "OTHER" are left in encoded form */
+ if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER)) {
+ /*
+ * Clear context cache for type OTHER because the auto clear when we
+ * have a exact match wont work
+ */
+ if (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER) {
+ asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
+ }
+ /* SEQUENCE and SET must be constructed */
+ else if (!cst) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE,
+ ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ cont = *in;
+ /* If indefinite length constructed find the real end */
+ if (inf) {
+ if (!asn1_find_end(&p, plen, inf))
+ goto err;
+ len = p - cont;
+ } else {
+ len = p - cont + plen;
+ p += plen;
+ buf.data = NULL;
+ }
+ } else if (cst) {
+ if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
+ || utype == V_ASN1_OBJECT || utype == V_ASN1_INTEGER
+ || utype == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buf.length = 0;
+ buf.max = 0;
+ buf.data = NULL;
+ /*
+ * Should really check the internal tags are correct but some things
+ * may get this wrong. The relevant specs say that constructed string
+ * types should be OCTET STRINGs internally irrespective of the type.
+ * So instead just check for UNIVERSAL class and ignore the tag.
+ */
+ if (!asn1_collect(&buf, &p, plen, inf, -1, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0)) {
+ free_cont = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ len = buf.length;
+ /* Append a final null to string */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(&buf, len + 1)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buf.data[len] = 0;
+ cont = (const unsigned char *)buf.data;
+ free_cont = 1;
+ } else {
+ cont = p;
+ len = plen;
+ p += plen;
+ }
+
+ /* We now have content length and type: translate into a structure */
+ if (!asn1_ex_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, &free_cont, it))
+ goto err;
+
+ *in = p;
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (free_cont && buf.data)
+ OPENSSL_free(buf.data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Translate ASN1 content octets into a structure */
+
+int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+ int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+ ASN1_VALUE **opval = NULL;
+ ASN1_STRING *stmp;
+ ASN1_TYPE *typ = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf;
+ ASN1_INTEGER **tint;
+ pf = it->funcs;
+
+ if (pf && pf->prim_c2i)
+ return pf->prim_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it);
+ /* If ANY type clear type and set pointer to internal value */
+ if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) {
+ if (!*pval) {
+ typ = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+ if (typ == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)typ;
+ } else
+ typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
+
+ if (utype != typ->type)
+ ASN1_TYPE_set(typ, utype, NULL);
+ opval = pval;
+ pval = &typ->value.asn1_value;
+ }
+ switch (utype) {
+ case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+ if (!c2i_ASN1_OBJECT((ASN1_OBJECT **)pval, &cont, len))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+
+ case V_ASN1_NULL:
+ if (len) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)1;
+ break;
+
+ case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+ if (len != 1) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool;
+ tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval;
+ *tbool = *cont;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
+ if (!c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING **)pval, &cont, len))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+
+ case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
+ case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
+ case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
+ case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
+ tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval;
+ if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len))
+ goto err;
+ /* Fixup type to match the expected form */
+ (*tint)->type = utype | ((*tint)->type & V_ASN1_NEG);
+ break;
+
+ case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
+ case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
+ case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
+ case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
+ case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
+ case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
+ case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+ case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+ case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
+ case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
+ case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
+ case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
+ case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
+ case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
+ case V_ASN1_OTHER:
+ case V_ASN1_SET:
+ case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
+ default:
+ if (utype == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING && (len & 1)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (utype == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING && (len & 3)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I,
+ ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */
+ if (!*pval) {
+ stmp = ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype);
+ if (!stmp) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)stmp;
+ } else {
+ stmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
+ stmp->type = utype;
+ }
+ /* If we've already allocated a buffer use it */
+ if (*free_cont) {
+ if (stmp->data)
+ OPENSSL_free(stmp->data);
+ stmp->data = (unsigned char *)cont; /* UGLY CAST! RL */
+ stmp->length = len;
+ *free_cont = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (!ASN1_STRING_set(stmp, cont, len)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
+ *pval = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ /* If ASN1_ANY and NULL type fix up value */
+ if (typ && (utype == V_ASN1_NULL))
+ typ->value.ptr = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (!ret) {
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(typ);
+ if (opval)
+ *opval = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function finds the end of an ASN1 structure when passed its maximum
+ * length, whether it is indefinite length and a pointer to the content. This
+ * is more efficient than calling asn1_collect because it does not recurse on
+ * each indefinite length header.
+ */
+
+static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf)
+{
+ int expected_eoc;
+ long plen;
+ const unsigned char *p = *in, *q;
+ /* If not indefinite length constructed just add length */
+ if (inf == 0) {
+ *in += len;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ expected_eoc = 1;
+ /*
+ * Indefinite length constructed form. Find the end when enough EOCs are
+ * found. If more indefinite length constructed headers are encountered
+ * increment the expected eoc count otherwise just skip to the end of the
+ * data.
+ */
+ while (len > 0) {
+ if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+ expected_eoc--;
+ if (expected_eoc == 0)
+ break;
+ len -= 2;
+ continue;
+ }
+ q = p;
+ /* Just read in a header: only care about the length */
+ if (!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &inf, NULL, &p, len,
+ -1, 0, 0, NULL)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (inf)
+ expected_eoc++;
+ else
+ p += plen;
+ len -= p - q;
+ }
+ if (expected_eoc) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *in = p;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function collects the asn1 data from a constructred string type into
+ * a buffer. The values of 'in' and 'len' should refer to the contents of the
+ * constructed type and 'inf' should be set if it is indefinite length.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST
+/*
+ * This determines how many levels of recursion are permitted in ASN1 string
+ * types. If it is not limited stack overflows can occur. If set to zero no
+ * recursion is allowed at all. Although zero should be adequate examples
+ * exist that require a value of 1. So 5 should be more than enough.
+ */
+# define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5
+#endif
+
+static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ long plen;
+ char cst, ininf;
+ p = *in;
+ inf &= 1;
+ /*
+ * If no buffer and not indefinite length constructed just pass over the
+ * encoded data
+ */
+ if (!buf && !inf) {
+ *in += len;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ while (len > 0) {
+ q = p;
+ /* Check for EOC */
+ if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
+ /*
+ * EOC is illegal outside indefinite length constructed form
+ */
+ if (!inf) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ inf = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &ininf, &cst, &p,
+ len, tag, aclass, 0, NULL)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If indefinite length constructed update max length */
+ if (cst) {
+ if (depth >= ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!asn1_collect(buf, &p, plen, ininf, tag, aclass, depth + 1))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (plen && !collect_data(buf, &p, plen))
+ return 0;
+ len -= p - q;
+ }
+ if (inf) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *in = p;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen)
+{
+ int len;
+ if (buf) {
+ len = buf->length;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, len + plen)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf->data + len, *p, plen);
+ }
+ *p += plen;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check for ASN1 EOC and swallow it if found */
+
+static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ if (len < 2)
+ return 0;
+ p = *in;
+ if (!p[0] && !p[1]) {
+ *in += 2;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check an ASN1 tag and length: a bit like ASN1_get_object but it sets the
+ * length for indefinite length constructed form, we don't know the exact
+ * length but we can set an upper bound to the amount of data available minus
+ * the header length just read.
+ */
+
+static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass,
+ char *inf, char *cst,
+ const unsigned char **in, long len,
+ int exptag, int expclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+ int ptag, pclass;
+ long plen;
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ p = *in;
+ q = p;
+
+ if (ctx && ctx->valid) {
+ i = ctx->ret;
+ plen = ctx->plen;
+ pclass = ctx->pclass;
+ ptag = ctx->ptag;
+ p += ctx->hdrlen;
+ } else {
+ i = ASN1_get_object(&p, &plen, &ptag, &pclass, len);
+ if (ctx) {
+ ctx->ret = i;
+ ctx->plen = plen;
+ ctx->pclass = pclass;
+ ctx->ptag = ptag;
+ ctx->hdrlen = p - q;
+ ctx->valid = 1;
+ /*
+ * If definite length, and no error, length + header can't exceed
+ * total amount of data available.
+ */
+ if (!(i & 0x81) && ((plen + ctx->hdrlen) > len)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+ asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (i & 0x80) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER);
+ asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (exptag >= 0) {
+ if ((exptag != ptag) || (expclass != pclass)) {
+ /*
+ * If type is OPTIONAL, not an error: indicate missing type.
+ */
+ if (opt)
+ return -1;
+ asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We have a tag and class match: assume we are going to do something
+ * with it
+ */
+ asn1_tlc_clear(ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (i & 1)
+ plen = len - (p - q);
+
+ if (inf)
+ *inf = i & 1;
+
+ if (cst)
+ *cst = i & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+
+ if (olen)
+ *olen = plen;
+
+ if (oclass)
+ *oclass = pclass;
+
+ if (otag)
+ *otag = ptag;
+
+ *in = p;
+ return 1;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-/* x_bignum.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-/*
- * Custom primitive type for BIGNUM handling. This reads in an ASN1_INTEGER
- * as a BIGNUM directly. Currently it ignores the sign which isn't a problem
- * since all BIGNUMs used are non negative and anything that looks negative
- * is normally due to an encoding error.
- */
-
-#define BN_SENSITIVE 1
-
-static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
-static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
-
-static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
- const ASN1_ITEM *it);
-static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
- int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
-
-static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS bignum_pf = {
- NULL, 0,
- bn_new,
- bn_free,
- 0,
- bn_c2i,
- bn_i2c
-};
-
-ASN1_ITEM_start(BIGNUM)
- ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &bignum_pf, 0, "BIGNUM"
-ASN1_ITEM_end(BIGNUM)
-
-ASN1_ITEM_start(CBIGNUM)
- ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &bignum_pf, BN_SENSITIVE, "BIGNUM"
-ASN1_ITEM_end(CBIGNUM)
-
-static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
- *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new();
- if (*pval)
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
- if (!*pval)
- return;
- if (it->size & BN_SENSITIVE)
- BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
- else
- BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
- *pval = NULL;
-}
-
-static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
- const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
- BIGNUM *bn;
- int pad;
- if (!*pval)
- return -1;
- bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
- /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */
- if (BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7)
- pad = 0;
- else
- pad = 1;
- if (cont) {
- if (pad)
- *cont++ = 0;
- BN_bn2bin(bn, cont);
- }
- return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn);
-}
-
-static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
- int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
- BIGNUM *bn;
- if (!*pval)
- bn_new(pval, it);
- bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
- if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
- bn_free(pval, it);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+/* x_bignum.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/*
+ * Custom primitive type for BIGNUM handling. This reads in an ASN1_INTEGER
+ * as a BIGNUM directly. Currently it ignores the sign which isn't a problem
+ * since all BIGNUMs used are non negative and anything that looks negative
+ * is normally due to an encoding error.
+ */
+
+#define BN_SENSITIVE 1
+
+static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+ int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+
+static ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS bignum_pf = {
+ NULL, 0,
+ bn_new,
+ bn_free,
+ 0,
+ bn_c2i,
+ bn_i2c
+};
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(BIGNUM)
+ ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &bignum_pf, 0, "BIGNUM"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(BIGNUM)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_start(CBIGNUM)
+ ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &bignum_pf, BN_SENSITIVE, "BIGNUM"
+ASN1_ITEM_end(CBIGNUM)
+
+static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+ *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new();
+ if (*pval)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+ if (!*pval)
+ return;
+ if (it->size & BN_SENSITIVE)
+ BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
+ else
+ BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
+ *pval = NULL;
+}
+
+static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+ const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+ BIGNUM *bn;
+ int pad;
+ if (!*pval)
+ return -1;
+ bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
+ /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */
+ if (BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7)
+ pad = 0;
+ else
+ pad = 1;
+ if (cont) {
+ if (pad)
+ *cont++ = 0;
+ BN_bn2bin(bn, cont);
+ }
+ return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn);
+}
+
+static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
+ int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+{
+ BIGNUM *bn;
+
+ if (*pval == NULL && !bn_new(pval, it))
+ return 0;
+ bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
+ if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
+ bn_free(pval, it);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,371 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include "asn1_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-# include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif
-
-/* Minor tweak to operation: free up EVP_PKEY */
-static int pubkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
- void *exarg)
-{
- if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
- X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval;
- EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey);
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(X509_PUBKEY, pubkey_cb) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_PUBKEY, algor, X509_ALGOR),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_PUBKEY, public_key, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(X509_PUBKEY, X509_PUBKEY)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_PUBKEY)
-
-int X509_PUBKEY_set(X509_PUBKEY **x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- X509_PUBKEY *pk = NULL;
-
- if (x == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- if ((pk = X509_PUBKEY_new()) == NULL)
- goto error;
-
- if (pkey->ameth) {
- if (pkey->ameth->pub_encode) {
- if (!pkey->ameth->pub_encode(pk, pkey)) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET,
- X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR);
- goto error;
- }
- } else {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- goto error;
- }
- } else {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (*x != NULL)
- X509_PUBKEY_free(*x);
-
- *x = pk;
-
- return 1;
- error:
- if (pk != NULL)
- X509_PUBKEY_free(pk);
- return 0;
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
-
- if (key == NULL)
- goto error;
-
- if (key->pkey != NULL) {
- CRYPTO_add(&key->pkey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- return key->pkey;
- }
-
- if (key->public_key == NULL)
- goto error;
-
- if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, OBJ_obj2nid(key->algor->algorithm))) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (ret->ameth->pub_decode) {
- if (!ret->ameth->pub_decode(ret, key)) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto error;
- }
- } else {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- goto error;
- }
-
- /* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- if (key->pkey) {
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
- ret = key->pkey;
- } else {
- key->pkey = ret;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- }
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-
- return ret;
-
- error:
- if (ret != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Now two pseudo ASN1 routines that take an EVP_PKEY structure and encode or
- * decode as X509_PUBKEY
- */
-
-EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
-{
- X509_PUBKEY *xpk;
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
- xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, pp, length);
- if (!xpk)
- return NULL;
- pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk);
- X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
- if (!pktmp)
- return NULL;
- if (a) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(*a);
- *a = pktmp;
- }
- return pktmp;
-}
-
-int i2d_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
-{
- X509_PUBKEY *xpk = NULL;
- int ret;
- if (!a)
- return 0;
- if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&xpk, a))
- return 0;
- ret = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk, pp);
- X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * The following are equivalents but which return RSA and DSA keys
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- RSA *key;
- const unsigned char *q;
- q = *pp;
- pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
- if (!pkey)
- return NULL;
- key = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (!key)
- return NULL;
- *pp = q;
- if (a) {
- RSA_free(*a);
- *a = key;
- }
- return key;
-}
-
-int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
- int ret;
- if (!a)
- return 0;
- pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (!pktmp) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pktmp, a);
- ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- DSA *key;
- const unsigned char *q;
- q = *pp;
- pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
- if (!pkey)
- return NULL;
- key = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (!key)
- return NULL;
- *pp = q;
- if (a) {
- DSA_free(*a);
- *a = key;
- }
- return key;
-}
-
-int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
- int ret;
- if (!a)
- return 0;
- pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (!pktmp) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pktmp, a);
- ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- EC_KEY *key;
- const unsigned char *q;
- q = *pp;
- pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
- if (!pkey)
- return (NULL);
- key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (!key)
- return (NULL);
- *pp = q;
- if (a) {
- EC_KEY_free(*a);
- *a = key;
- }
- return (key);
-}
-
-int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
- int ret;
- if (!a)
- return (0);
- if ((pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pktmp, a);
- ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-int X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(X509_PUBKEY *pub, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj,
- int ptype, void *pval,
- unsigned char *penc, int penclen)
-{
- if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pub->algor, aobj, ptype, pval))
- return 0;
- if (penc) {
- if (pub->public_key->data)
- OPENSSL_free(pub->public_key->data);
- pub->public_key->data = penc;
- pub->public_key->length = penclen;
- /* Set number of unused bits to zero */
- pub->public_key->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
- pub->public_key->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg,
- const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen,
- X509_ALGOR **pa, X509_PUBKEY *pub)
-{
- if (ppkalg)
- *ppkalg = pub->algor->algorithm;
- if (pk) {
- *pk = pub->public_key->data;
- *ppklen = pub->public_key->length;
- }
- if (pa)
- *pa = pub->algor;
- return 1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+/* crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Minor tweak to operation: free up EVP_PKEY */
+static int pubkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+{
+ if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
+ X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(X509_PUBKEY, pubkey_cb) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_PUBKEY, algor, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_PUBKEY, public_key, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(X509_PUBKEY, X509_PUBKEY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_PUBKEY)
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_set(X509_PUBKEY **x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ X509_PUBKEY *pk = NULL;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ if ((pk = X509_PUBKEY_new()) == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (pkey->ameth) {
+ if (pkey->ameth->pub_encode) {
+ if (!pkey->ameth->pub_encode(pk, pkey)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET,
+ X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (*x != NULL)
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(*x);
+
+ *x = pk;
+
+ return 1;
+ error:
+ if (pk != NULL)
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(pk);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (key->pkey != NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&key->pkey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ return key->pkey;
+ }
+
+ if (key->public_key == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, OBJ_obj2nid(key->algor->algorithm))) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->ameth->pub_decode) {
+ if (!ret->ameth->pub_decode(ret, key)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET, X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ if (key->pkey) {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ ret = key->pkey;
+ } else {
+ key->pkey = ret;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+
+ return ret;
+
+ error:
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Now two pseudo ASN1 routines that take an EVP_PKEY structure and encode or
+ * decode as X509_PUBKEY
+ */
+
+EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ X509_PUBKEY *xpk;
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ q = *pp;
+ xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+ if (!xpk)
+ return NULL;
+ pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk);
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
+ if (!pktmp)
+ return NULL;
+ *pp = q;
+ if (a) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(*a);
+ *a = pktmp;
+ }
+ return pktmp;
+}
+
+int i2d_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ X509_PUBKEY *xpk = NULL;
+ int ret;
+ if (!a)
+ return 0;
+ if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&xpk, a))
+ return 0;
+ ret = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk, pp);
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following are equivalents but which return RSA and DSA keys
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ RSA *key;
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ q = *pp;
+ pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+ if (!pkey)
+ return NULL;
+ key = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (!key)
+ return NULL;
+ *pp = q;
+ if (a) {
+ RSA_free(*a);
+ *a = key;
+ }
+ return key;
+}
+
+int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ int ret;
+ if (!a)
+ return 0;
+ pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (!pktmp) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pktmp, a);
+ ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ DSA *key;
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ q = *pp;
+ pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+ if (!pkey)
+ return NULL;
+ key = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (!key)
+ return NULL;
+ *pp = q;
+ if (a) {
+ DSA_free(*a);
+ *a = key;
+ }
+ return key;
+}
+
+int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ int ret;
+ if (!a)
+ return 0;
+ pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (!pktmp) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pktmp, a);
+ ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ EC_KEY *key;
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ q = *pp;
+ pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
+ if (!pkey)
+ return (NULL);
+ key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (!key)
+ return (NULL);
+ *pp = q;
+ if (a) {
+ EC_KEY_free(*a);
+ *a = key;
+ }
+ return (key);
+}
+
+int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ int ret;
+ if (!a)
+ return (0);
+ if ((pktmp = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pktmp, a);
+ ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pktmp, pp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(X509_PUBKEY *pub, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj,
+ int ptype, void *pval,
+ unsigned char *penc, int penclen)
+{
+ if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pub->algor, aobj, ptype, pval))
+ return 0;
+ if (penc) {
+ if (pub->public_key->data)
+ OPENSSL_free(pub->public_key->data);
+ pub->public_key->data = penc;
+ pub->public_key->length = penclen;
+ /* Set number of unused bits to zero */
+ pub->public_key->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+ pub->public_key->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg,
+ const unsigned char **pk, int *ppklen,
+ X509_ALGOR **pa, X509_PUBKEY *pub)
+{
+ if (ppkalg)
+ *ppkalg = pub->algor->algorithm;
+ if (pk) {
+ *pk = pub->public_key->data;
+ *ppklen = pub->public_key->length;
+ }
+ if (pa)
+ *pa = pub->algor;
+ return 1;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/asn1/x_x509.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = {
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
- ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
- ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
- ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
-/* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */
-
-extern void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
-
-static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
- void *exarg)
-{
- X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval;
-
- switch (operation) {
-
- case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
- ret->valid = 0;
- ret->name = NULL;
- ret->ex_flags = 0;
- ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
- ret->skid = NULL;
- ret->akid = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
- ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL;
- ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL;
-#endif
- ret->aux = NULL;
- ret->crldp = NULL;
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
- break;
-
- case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
- if (ret->name != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ret->name);
- ret->name = X509_NAME_oneline(ret->cert_info->subject, NULL, 0);
- break;
-
- case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
- X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
- AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
- CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
- policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
- GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
- NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
- sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
- ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
-#endif
-
- if (ret->name != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ret->name);
- break;
-
- }
-
- return 1;
-
-}
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509, x509_cb, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509, X509)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509)
-
-int X509_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-}
-
-int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg)
-{
- return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
-}
-
-void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx)
-{
- return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
-}
-
-/*
- * X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
- * extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
- * is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
- * reliable source such as local storage.
- */
-
-X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
-{
- const unsigned char *q;
- X509 *ret;
- int freeret = 0;
-
- /* Save start position */
- q = *pp;
-
- if (!a || *a == NULL) {
- freeret = 1;
- }
- ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
- /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
- if (!ret)
- return NULL;
- /* update length */
- length -= *pp - q;
- if (!length)
- return ret;
- if (!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length))
- goto err;
- return ret;
- err:
- if (freeret) {
- X509_free(ret);
- if (a)
- *a = NULL;
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
-{
- int length;
- length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
- if (a)
- length += i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
- return length;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/* crypto/asn1/x_x509.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = {
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
+ ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
+ ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
+ ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
+/* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */
+
+extern void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
+
+static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+{
+ X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval;
+
+ switch (operation) {
+
+ case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
+ ret->valid = 0;
+ ret->name = NULL;
+ ret->ex_flags = 0;
+ ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
+ ret->skid = NULL;
+ ret->akid = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL;
+ ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL;
+#endif
+ ret->aux = NULL;
+ ret->crldp = NULL;
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
+ if (ret->name != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->name);
+ ret->name = X509_NAME_oneline(ret->cert_info->subject, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+ X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
+ CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
+ policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
+ NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
+ ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
+#endif
+
+ if (ret->name != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->name);
+ break;
+
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509, x509_cb, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509, X509)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509)
+
+int X509_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
+ * extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
+ * is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
+ * reliable source such as local storage.
+ */
+
+X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+{
+ const unsigned char *q;
+ X509 *ret;
+ int freeret = 0;
+
+ /* Save start position */
+ q = *pp;
+
+ if (!a || *a == NULL) {
+ freeret = 1;
+ }
+ ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
+ /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
+ if (!ret)
+ return NULL;
+ /* update length */
+ length -= q - *pp;
+ if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
+ goto err;
+ *pp = q;
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ if (freeret) {
+ X509_free(ret);
+ if (a)
+ *a = NULL;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+ int length;
+ length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
+ if (a)
+ length += i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
+ return length;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bio/b_dump.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/b_dump.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/bio/b_dump.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-/*
- * Stolen from tjh's ssl/ssl_trc.c stuff.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bio_lcl.h"
-
-#define TRUNCATE
-#define DUMP_WIDTH 16
-#define DUMP_WIDTH_LESS_INDENT(i) (DUMP_WIDTH-((i-(i>6?6:i)+3)/4))
-
-int BIO_dump_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
- void *u, const char *s, int len)
-{
- return BIO_dump_indent_cb(cb, u, s, len, 0);
-}
-
-int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
- void *u, const char *s, int len, int indent)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- char buf[288 + 1], tmp[20], str[128 + 1];
- int i, j, rows, trc;
- unsigned char ch;
- int dump_width;
-
- trc = 0;
-
-#ifdef TRUNCATE
- for (; (len > 0) && ((s[len - 1] == ' ') || (s[len - 1] == '\0')); len--)
- trc++;
-#endif
-
- if (indent < 0)
- indent = 0;
- if (indent) {
- if (indent > 128)
- indent = 128;
- memset(str, ' ', indent);
- }
- str[indent] = '\0';
-
- dump_width = DUMP_WIDTH_LESS_INDENT(indent);
- rows = (len / dump_width);
- if ((rows * dump_width) < len)
- rows++;
- for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
- buf[0] = '\0'; /* start with empty string */
- BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf);
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
- BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
- for (j = 0; j < dump_width; j++) {
- if (((i * dump_width) + j) >= len) {
- BUF_strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof buf);
- } else {
- ch = ((unsigned char)*(s + i * dump_width + j)) & 0xff;
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%02x%c", ch,
- j == 7 ? '-' : ' ');
- BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
- }
- }
- BUF_strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof buf);
- for (j = 0; j < dump_width; j++) {
- if (((i * dump_width) + j) >= len)
- break;
- ch = ((unsigned char)*(s + i * dump_width + j)) & 0xff;
-#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%c",
- ((ch >= ' ') && (ch <= '~')) ? ch : '.');
-#else
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%c",
- ((ch >= os_toascii[' ']) && (ch <= os_toascii['~']))
- ? os_toebcdic[ch]
- : '.');
-#endif
- BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
- }
- BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf);
- /*
- * if this is the last call then update the ddt_dump thing so that we
- * will move the selection point in the debug window
- */
- ret += cb((void *)buf, strlen(buf), u);
- }
-#ifdef TRUNCATE
- if (trc > 0) {
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%04x - <SPACES/NULS>\n", str,
- len + trc);
- ret += cb((void *)buf, strlen(buf), u);
- }
-#endif
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-static int write_fp(const void *data, size_t len, void *fp)
-{
- return UP_fwrite(data, len, 1, fp);
-}
-
-int BIO_dump_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len)
-{
- return BIO_dump_cb(write_fp, fp, s, len);
-}
-
-int BIO_dump_indent_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len, int indent)
-{
- return BIO_dump_indent_cb(write_fp, fp, s, len, indent);
-}
-#endif
-
-static int write_bio(const void *data, size_t len, void *bp)
-{
- return BIO_write((BIO *)bp, (const char *)data, len);
-}
-
-int BIO_dump(BIO *bp, const char *s, int len)
-{
- return BIO_dump_cb(write_bio, bp, s, len);
-}
-
-int BIO_dump_indent(BIO *bp, const char *s, int len, int indent)
-{
- return BIO_dump_indent_cb(write_bio, bp, s, len, indent);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/b_dump.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bio/b_dump.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/b_dump.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/b_dump.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+/* crypto/bio/b_dump.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Stolen from tjh's ssl/ssl_trc.c stuff.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "bio_lcl.h"
+
+#define TRUNCATE
+#define DUMP_WIDTH 16
+#define DUMP_WIDTH_LESS_INDENT(i) (DUMP_WIDTH-((i-(i>6?6:i)+3)/4))
+
+int BIO_dump_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
+ void *u, const char *s, int len)
+{
+ return BIO_dump_indent_cb(cb, u, s, len, 0);
+}
+
+int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
+ void *u, const char *s, int len, int indent)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ char buf[288 + 1], tmp[20], str[128 + 1];
+ int i, j, rows, trc;
+ unsigned char ch;
+ int dump_width;
+
+ trc = 0;
+
+#ifdef TRUNCATE
+ for (; (len > 0) && ((s[len - 1] == ' ') || (s[len - 1] == '\0')); len--)
+ trc++;
+#endif
+
+ if (indent < 0)
+ indent = 0;
+ if (indent) {
+ if (indent > 128)
+ indent = 128;
+ memset(str, ' ', indent);
+ }
+ str[indent] = '\0';
+
+ dump_width = DUMP_WIDTH_LESS_INDENT(indent);
+ rows = (len / dump_width);
+ if ((rows * dump_width) < len)
+ rows++;
+ for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
+ for (j = 0; j < dump_width; j++) {
+ if (((i * dump_width) + j) >= len) {
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof buf);
+ } else {
+ ch = ((unsigned char)*(s + i * dump_width + j)) & 0xff;
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%02x%c", ch,
+ j == 7 ? '-' : ' ');
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
+ }
+ }
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof buf);
+ for (j = 0; j < dump_width; j++) {
+ if (((i * dump_width) + j) >= len)
+ break;
+ ch = ((unsigned char)*(s + i * dump_width + j)) & 0xff;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%c",
+ ((ch >= ' ') && (ch <= '~')) ? ch : '.');
+#else
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%c",
+ ((ch >= os_toascii[' ']) && (ch <= os_toascii['~']))
+ ? os_toebcdic[ch]
+ : '.');
+#endif
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
+ }
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, "\n", sizeof buf);
+ /*
+ * if this is the last call then update the ddt_dump thing so that we
+ * will move the selection point in the debug window
+ */
+ ret += cb((void *)buf, strlen(buf), u);
+ }
+#ifdef TRUNCATE
+ if (trc > 0) {
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%04x - <SPACES/NULS>\n", str,
+ len + trc);
+ ret += cb((void *)buf, strlen(buf), u);
+ }
+#endif
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+static int write_fp(const void *data, size_t len, void *fp)
+{
+ return UP_fwrite(data, len, 1, fp);
+}
+
+int BIO_dump_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len)
+{
+ return BIO_dump_cb(write_fp, fp, s, len);
+}
+
+int BIO_dump_indent_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len, int indent)
+{
+ return BIO_dump_indent_cb(write_fp, fp, s, len, indent);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int write_bio(const void *data, size_t len, void *bp)
+{
+ return BIO_write((BIO *)bp, (const char *)data, len);
+}
+
+int BIO_dump(BIO *bp, const char *s, int len)
+{
+ return BIO_dump_cb(write_bio, bp, s, len);
+}
+
+int BIO_dump_indent(BIO *bp, const char *s, int len, int indent)
+{
+ return BIO_dump_indent_cb(write_bio, bp, s, len, indent);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bio.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bio/bio.h 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bio.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,875 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/bio/bio.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_BIO_H
-# define HEADER_BIO_H
-
-# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-# include <stdio.h>
-# endif
-# include <stdarg.h>
-
-# include <openssl/crypto.h>
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-# include <stdint.h>
-# else
-# include <inttypes.h>
-# endif
-# endif
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* These are the 'types' of BIOs */
-# define BIO_TYPE_NONE 0
-# define BIO_TYPE_MEM (1|0x0400)
-# define BIO_TYPE_FILE (2|0x0400)
-
-# define BIO_TYPE_FD (4|0x0400|0x0100)
-# define BIO_TYPE_SOCKET (5|0x0400|0x0100)
-# define BIO_TYPE_NULL (6|0x0400)
-# define BIO_TYPE_SSL (7|0x0200)
-# define BIO_TYPE_MD (8|0x0200)/* passive filter */
-# define BIO_TYPE_BUFFER (9|0x0200)/* filter */
-# define BIO_TYPE_CIPHER (10|0x0200)/* filter */
-# define BIO_TYPE_BASE64 (11|0x0200)/* filter */
-# define BIO_TYPE_CONNECT (12|0x0400|0x0100)/* socket - connect */
-# define BIO_TYPE_ACCEPT (13|0x0400|0x0100)/* socket for accept */
-# define BIO_TYPE_PROXY_CLIENT (14|0x0200)/* client proxy BIO */
-# define BIO_TYPE_PROXY_SERVER (15|0x0200)/* server proxy BIO */
-# define BIO_TYPE_NBIO_TEST (16|0x0200)/* server proxy BIO */
-# define BIO_TYPE_NULL_FILTER (17|0x0200)
-# define BIO_TYPE_BER (18|0x0200)/* BER -> bin filter */
-# define BIO_TYPE_BIO (19|0x0400)/* (half a) BIO pair */
-# define BIO_TYPE_LINEBUFFER (20|0x0200)/* filter */
-# define BIO_TYPE_DGRAM (21|0x0400|0x0100)
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-# define BIO_TYPE_DGRAM_SCTP (24|0x0400|0x0100)
-# endif
-# define BIO_TYPE_ASN1 (22|0x0200)/* filter */
-# define BIO_TYPE_COMP (23|0x0200)/* filter */
-
-# define BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 0x0100/* socket, fd, connect or accept */
-# define BIO_TYPE_FILTER 0x0200
-# define BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK 0x0400
-
-/*
- * BIO_FILENAME_READ|BIO_CLOSE to open or close on free.
- * BIO_set_fp(in,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
- */
-# define BIO_NOCLOSE 0x00
-# define BIO_CLOSE 0x01
-
-/*
- * These are used in the following macros and are passed to BIO_ctrl()
- */
-# define BIO_CTRL_RESET 1/* opt - rewind/zero etc */
-# define BIO_CTRL_EOF 2/* opt - are we at the eof */
-# define BIO_CTRL_INFO 3/* opt - extra tit-bits */
-# define BIO_CTRL_SET 4/* man - set the 'IO' type */
-# define BIO_CTRL_GET 5/* man - get the 'IO' type */
-# define BIO_CTRL_PUSH 6/* opt - internal, used to signify change */
-# define BIO_CTRL_POP 7/* opt - internal, used to signify change */
-# define BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE 8/* man - set the 'close' on free */
-# define BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE 9/* man - set the 'close' on free */
-# define BIO_CTRL_PENDING 10/* opt - is their more data buffered */
-# define BIO_CTRL_FLUSH 11/* opt - 'flush' buffered output */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DUP 12/* man - extra stuff for 'duped' BIO */
-# define BIO_CTRL_WPENDING 13/* opt - number of bytes still to write */
-/* callback is int cb(BIO *bio,state,ret); */
-# define BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK 14/* opt - set callback function */
-# define BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK 15/* opt - set callback function */
-
-# define BIO_CTRL_SET_FILENAME 30/* BIO_s_file special */
-
-/* dgram BIO stuff */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT 31/* BIO dgram special */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED 32/* allow for an externally connected
- * socket to be passed in */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT 33/* setsockopt, essentially */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT 34/* getsockopt, essentially */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT 35/* setsockopt, essentially */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMEOUT 36/* getsockopt, essentially */
-
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP 37/* flag whether the last */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP 38/* I/O operation tiemd out */
-
-/* #ifdef IP_MTU_DISCOVER */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER 39/* set DF bit on egress packets */
-/* #endif */
-
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU 40/* as kernel for current MTU */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU 47
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU 41/* get cached value for MTU */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU 42/* set cached value for MTU.
- * want to use this if asking
- * the kernel fails */
-
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED 43/* check whether the MTU was
- * exceed in the previous write
- * operation */
-
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER 46
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER 44/* Destination for the data */
-
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT 45/* Next DTLS handshake timeout
- * to adjust socket timeouts */
-
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD 49
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-/* SCTP stuff */
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE 50
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY 51
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY 52
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD 53
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_SNDINFO 60
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_SNDINFO 61
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO 62
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO 63
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_PRINFO 64
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_PRINFO 65
-# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN 70
-# endif
-
-/* modifiers */
-# define BIO_FP_READ 0x02
-# define BIO_FP_WRITE 0x04
-# define BIO_FP_APPEND 0x08
-# define BIO_FP_TEXT 0x10
-
-# define BIO_FLAGS_READ 0x01
-# define BIO_FLAGS_WRITE 0x02
-# define BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL 0x04
-# define BIO_FLAGS_RWS (BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL)
-# define BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY 0x08
-# ifndef BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK
-/*
- * "UPLINK" flag denotes file descriptors provided by application. It
- * defaults to 0, as most platforms don't require UPLINK interface.
- */
-# define BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK 0
-# endif
-
-/* Used in BIO_gethostbyname() */
-# define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_HITS 1
-# define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_MISSES 2
-# define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_CACHE_SIZE 3
-# define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_GET_ENTRY 4
-# define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_FLUSH 5
-
-/* Mostly used in the SSL BIO */
-/*-
- * Not used anymore
- * #define BIO_FLAGS_PROTOCOL_DELAYED_READ 0x10
- * #define BIO_FLAGS_PROTOCOL_DELAYED_WRITE 0x20
- * #define BIO_FLAGS_PROTOCOL_STARTUP 0x40
- */
-
-# define BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL 0x100
-
-/*
- * This is used with memory BIOs: it means we shouldn't free up or change the
- * data in any way.
- */
-# define BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY 0x200
-
-typedef struct bio_st BIO;
-
-void BIO_set_flags(BIO *b, int flags);
-int BIO_test_flags(const BIO *b, int flags);
-void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *b, int flags);
-
-# define BIO_get_flags(b) BIO_test_flags(b, ~(0x0))
-# define BIO_set_retry_special(b) \
- BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
-# define BIO_set_retry_read(b) \
- BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
-# define BIO_set_retry_write(b) \
- BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
-
-/* These are normally used internally in BIOs */
-# define BIO_clear_retry_flags(b) \
- BIO_clear_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_RWS|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
-# define BIO_get_retry_flags(b) \
- BIO_test_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_RWS|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
-
-/* These should be used by the application to tell why we should retry */
-# define BIO_should_read(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_READ)
-# define BIO_should_write(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_WRITE)
-# define BIO_should_io_special(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL)
-# define BIO_retry_type(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_RWS)
-# define BIO_should_retry(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY)
-
-/*
- * The next three are used in conjunction with the BIO_should_io_special()
- * condition. After this returns true, BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int
- * *reason); will walk the BIO stack and return the 'reason' for the special
- * and the offending BIO. Given a BIO, BIO_get_retry_reason(bio) will return
- * the code.
- */
-/*
- * Returned from the SSL bio when the certificate retrieval code had an error
- */
-# define BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP 0x01
-/* Returned from the connect BIO when a connect would have blocked */
-# define BIO_RR_CONNECT 0x02
-/* Returned from the accept BIO when an accept would have blocked */
-# define BIO_RR_ACCEPT 0x03
-
-/* These are passed by the BIO callback */
-# define BIO_CB_FREE 0x01
-# define BIO_CB_READ 0x02
-# define BIO_CB_WRITE 0x03
-# define BIO_CB_PUTS 0x04
-# define BIO_CB_GETS 0x05
-# define BIO_CB_CTRL 0x06
-
-/*
- * The callback is called before and after the underling operation, The
- * BIO_CB_RETURN flag indicates if it is after the call
- */
-# define BIO_CB_RETURN 0x80
-# define BIO_CB_return(a) ((a)|BIO_CB_RETURN))
-# define BIO_cb_pre(a) (!((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN))
-# define BIO_cb_post(a) ((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN)
-
-long (*BIO_get_callback(const BIO *b)) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *,
- int, long, long);
-void BIO_set_callback(BIO *b,
- long (*callback) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *,
- int, long, long));
-char *BIO_get_callback_arg(const BIO *b);
-void BIO_set_callback_arg(BIO *b, char *arg);
-
-const char *BIO_method_name(const BIO *b);
-int BIO_method_type(const BIO *b);
-
-typedef void bio_info_cb (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long,
- long);
-
-typedef struct bio_method_st {
- int type;
- const char *name;
- int (*bwrite) (BIO *, const char *, int);
- int (*bread) (BIO *, char *, int);
- int (*bputs) (BIO *, const char *);
- int (*bgets) (BIO *, char *, int);
- long (*ctrl) (BIO *, int, long, void *);
- int (*create) (BIO *);
- int (*destroy) (BIO *);
- long (*callback_ctrl) (BIO *, int, bio_info_cb *);
-} BIO_METHOD;
-
-struct bio_st {
- BIO_METHOD *method;
- /* bio, mode, argp, argi, argl, ret */
- long (*callback) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long, long);
- char *cb_arg; /* first argument for the callback */
- int init;
- int shutdown;
- int flags; /* extra storage */
- int retry_reason;
- int num;
- void *ptr;
- struct bio_st *next_bio; /* used by filter BIOs */
- struct bio_st *prev_bio; /* used by filter BIOs */
- int references;
- unsigned long num_read;
- unsigned long num_write;
- CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
-};
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
-
-typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct {
- /*-
- * Buffers are setup like this:
- *
- * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
- * +---------------------------------------------------+
- * | consumed | remaining | free space |
- * +---------------------------------------------------+
- * <-- off --><------- len ------->
- */
- /*- BIO *bio; *//*
- * this is now in the BIO struct
- */
- int ibuf_size; /* how big is the input buffer */
- int obuf_size; /* how big is the output buffer */
- char *ibuf; /* the char array */
- int ibuf_len; /* how many bytes are in it */
- int ibuf_off; /* write/read offset */
- char *obuf; /* the char array */
- int obuf_len; /* how many bytes are in it */
- int obuf_off; /* write/read offset */
-} BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX;
-
-/* Prefix and suffix callback in ASN1 BIO */
-typedef int asn1_ps_func (BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
- void *parg);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-/* SCTP parameter structs */
-struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo {
- uint16_t snd_sid;
- uint16_t snd_flags;
- uint32_t snd_ppid;
- uint32_t snd_context;
-};
-
-struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo {
- uint16_t rcv_sid;
- uint16_t rcv_ssn;
- uint16_t rcv_flags;
- uint32_t rcv_ppid;
- uint32_t rcv_tsn;
- uint32_t rcv_cumtsn;
- uint32_t rcv_context;
-};
-
-struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
- uint16_t pr_policy;
- uint32_t pr_value;
-};
-# endif
-
-/* connect BIO stuff */
-# define BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE 1
-# define BIO_CONN_S_GET_IP 2
-# define BIO_CONN_S_GET_PORT 3
-# define BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET 4
-# define BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT 5
-# define BIO_CONN_S_OK 6
-# define BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT 7
-# define BIO_CONN_S_NBIO 8
-/*
- * #define BIO_CONN_get_param_hostname BIO_ctrl
- */
-
-# define BIO_C_SET_CONNECT 100
-# define BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE 101
-# define BIO_C_SET_NBIO 102
-# define BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM 103
-# define BIO_C_SET_FD 104
-# define BIO_C_GET_FD 105
-# define BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR 106
-# define BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR 107
-# define BIO_C_SET_FILENAME 108
-# define BIO_C_SET_SSL 109
-# define BIO_C_GET_SSL 110
-# define BIO_C_SET_MD 111
-# define BIO_C_GET_MD 112
-# define BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_STATUS 113
-# define BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM 114
-# define BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR 115
-# define BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES 116
-# define BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE 117
-# define BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT 118
-# define BIO_C_SSL_MODE 119
-# define BIO_C_GET_MD_CTX 120
-# define BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM 121
-# define BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA 122/* data to read first */
-# define BIO_C_GET_CONNECT 123
-# define BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT 124
-# define BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES 125
-# define BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES 126
-# define BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT 127
-# define BIO_C_FILE_SEEK 128
-# define BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_CTX 129
-# define BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN 130/* return end of input
- * value */
-# define BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE 131
-# define BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE 132
-# define BIO_C_FILE_TELL 133
-# define BIO_C_GET_SOCKS 134
-# define BIO_C_SET_SOCKS 135
-
-# define BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE 136/* for BIO_s_bio */
-# define BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE 137
-# define BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR 138
-# define BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR 139
-# define BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE 140
-# define BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST 141
-# define BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR 142
-# define BIO_C_NREAD0 143
-# define BIO_C_NREAD 144
-# define BIO_C_NWRITE0 145
-# define BIO_C_NWRITE 146
-# define BIO_C_RESET_READ_REQUEST 147
-# define BIO_C_SET_MD_CTX 148
-
-# define BIO_C_SET_PREFIX 149
-# define BIO_C_GET_PREFIX 150
-# define BIO_C_SET_SUFFIX 151
-# define BIO_C_GET_SUFFIX 152
-
-# define BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG 153
-# define BIO_C_GET_EX_ARG 154
-
-# define BIO_set_app_data(s,arg) BIO_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
-# define BIO_get_app_data(s) BIO_get_ex_data(s,0)
-
-/* BIO_s_connect() and BIO_s_socks4a_connect() */
-# define BIO_set_conn_hostname(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,0,(char *)name)
-# define BIO_set_conn_port(b,port) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,1,(char *)port)
-# define BIO_set_conn_ip(b,ip) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,2,(char *)ip)
-# define BIO_set_conn_int_port(b,port) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,3,(char *)port)
-# define BIO_get_conn_hostname(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,0)
-# define BIO_get_conn_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,1)
-# define BIO_get_conn_ip(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,2)
-# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,0)
-
-# define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL)
-
-/* BIO_s_accept_socket() */
-# define BIO_set_accept_port(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,0,(char *)name)
-# define BIO_get_accept_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,0)
-/* #define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL) */
-# define BIO_set_nbio_accept(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,1,(n)?(void *)"a":NULL)
-# define BIO_set_accept_bios(b,bio) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,2,(char *)bio)
-
-# define BIO_BIND_NORMAL 0
-# define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR_IF_UNUSED 1
-# define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR 2
-# define BIO_set_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE,mode,NULL)
-# define BIO_get_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE,0,NULL)
-
-# define BIO_do_connect(b) BIO_do_handshake(b)
-# define BIO_do_accept(b) BIO_do_handshake(b)
-# define BIO_do_handshake(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE,0,NULL)
-
-/* BIO_s_proxy_client() */
-# define BIO_set_url(b,url) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,0,(char *)(url))
-# define BIO_set_proxies(b,p) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,1,(char *)(p))
-/* BIO_set_nbio(b,n) */
-# define BIO_set_filter_bio(b,s) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,2,(char *)(s))
-/* BIO *BIO_get_filter_bio(BIO *bio); */
-# define BIO_set_proxy_cb(b,cb) BIO_callback_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,3,(void *(*cb)()))
-# define BIO_set_proxy_header(b,sk) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,4,(char *)sk)
-# define BIO_set_no_connect_return(b,bool) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,5,bool)
-
-# define BIO_get_proxy_header(b,skp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,0,(char *)skp)
-# define BIO_get_proxies(b,pxy_p) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,1,(char *)(pxy_p))
-# define BIO_get_url(b,url) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,2,(char *)(url))
-# define BIO_get_no_connect_return(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,5,NULL)
-
-# define BIO_set_fd(b,fd,c) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FD,c,fd)
-# define BIO_get_fd(b,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FD,0,(char *)c)
-
-# define BIO_set_fp(b,fp,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR,c,(char *)fp)
-# define BIO_get_fp(b,fpp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR,0,(char *)fpp)
-
-# define BIO_seek(b,ofs) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_SEEK,ofs,NULL)
-# define BIO_tell(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_TELL,0,NULL)
-
-/*
- * name is cast to lose const, but might be better to route through a
- * function so we can do it safely
- */
-# ifdef CONST_STRICT
-/*
- * If you are wondering why this isn't defined, its because CONST_STRICT is
- * purely a compile-time kludge to allow const to be checked.
- */
-int BIO_read_filename(BIO *b, const char *name);
-# else
-# define BIO_read_filename(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
- BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_READ,(char *)name)
-# endif
-# define BIO_write_filename(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
- BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_WRITE,name)
-# define BIO_append_filename(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
- BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_APPEND,name)
-# define BIO_rw_filename(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
- BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_READ|BIO_FP_WRITE,name)
-
-/*
- * WARNING WARNING, this ups the reference count on the read bio of the SSL
- * structure. This is because the ssl read BIO is now pointed to by the
- * next_bio field in the bio. So when you free the BIO, make sure you are
- * doing a BIO_free_all() to catch the underlying BIO.
- */
-# define BIO_set_ssl(b,ssl,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL,c,(char *)ssl)
-# define BIO_get_ssl(b,sslp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL,0,(char *)sslp)
-# define BIO_set_ssl_mode(b,client) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SSL_MODE,client,NULL)
-# define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(b,num) \
- BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES,num,NULL);
-# define BIO_get_num_renegotiates(b) \
- BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES,0,NULL);
-# define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(b,seconds) \
- BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT,seconds,NULL);
-
-/* defined in evp.h */
-/* #define BIO_set_md(b,md) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_MD,1,(char *)md) */
-
-# define BIO_get_mem_data(b,pp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,(char *)pp)
-# define BIO_set_mem_buf(b,bm,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM,c,(char *)bm)
-# define BIO_get_mem_ptr(b,pp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR,0,(char *)pp)
-# define BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b,v) \
- BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN,v,NULL)
-
-/* For the BIO_f_buffer() type */
-# define BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES,0,NULL)
-# define BIO_set_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,NULL)
-# define BIO_set_read_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,0)
-# define BIO_set_write_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,1)
-# define BIO_set_buffer_read_data(b,buf,num) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA,num,buf)
-
-/* Don't use the next one unless you know what you are doing :-) */
-# define BIO_dup_state(b,ret) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_DUP,0,(char *)(ret))
-
-# define BIO_reset(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_RESET,0,NULL)
-# define BIO_eof(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_EOF,0,NULL)
-# define BIO_set_close(b,c) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE,(c),NULL)
-# define BIO_get_close(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE,0,NULL)
-# define BIO_pending(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_PENDING,0,NULL)
-# define BIO_wpending(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_WPENDING,0,NULL)
-/* ...pending macros have inappropriate return type */
-size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *b);
-size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *b);
-# define BIO_flush(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_FLUSH,0,NULL)
-# define BIO_get_info_callback(b,cbp) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK,0, \
- cbp)
-# define BIO_set_info_callback(b,cb) (int)BIO_callback_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK,cb)
-
-/* For the BIO_f_buffer() type */
-# define BIO_buffer_get_num_lines(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET,0,NULL)
-
-/* For BIO_s_bio() */
-# define BIO_set_write_buf_size(b,size) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,size,NULL)
-# define BIO_get_write_buf_size(b,size) (size_t)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,size,NULL)
-# define BIO_make_bio_pair(b1,b2) (int)BIO_ctrl(b1,BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR,0,b2)
-# define BIO_destroy_bio_pair(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR,0,NULL)
-# define BIO_shutdown_wr(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR, 0, NULL)
-/* macros with inappropriate type -- but ...pending macros use int too: */
-# define BIO_get_write_guarantee(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE,0,NULL)
-# define BIO_get_read_request(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST,0,NULL)
-size_t BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(BIO *b);
-size_t BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(BIO *b);
-int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *b);
-
-/* ctrl macros for dgram */
-# define BIO_ctrl_dgram_connect(b,peer) \
- (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT,0, (char *)peer)
-# define BIO_ctrl_set_connected(b, state, peer) \
- (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED, state, (char *)peer)
-# define BIO_dgram_recv_timedout(b) \
- (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP, 0, NULL)
-# define BIO_dgram_send_timedout(b) \
- (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP, 0, NULL)
-# define BIO_dgram_get_peer(b,peer) \
- (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer)
-# define BIO_dgram_set_peer(b,peer) \
- (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer)
-# define BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(b) \
- (unsigned int)BIO_ctrl((b), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD, 0, NULL)
-
-/* These two aren't currently implemented */
-/* int BIO_get_ex_num(BIO *bio); */
-/* void BIO_set_ex_free_func(BIO *bio,int idx,void (*cb)()); */
-int BIO_set_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx, void *data);
-void *BIO_get_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx);
-int BIO_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
-unsigned long BIO_number_read(BIO *bio);
-unsigned long BIO_number_written(BIO *bio);
-
-/* For BIO_f_asn1() */
-int BIO_asn1_set_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *prefix,
- asn1_ps_func *prefix_free);
-int BIO_asn1_get_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **pprefix,
- asn1_ps_func **pprefix_free);
-int BIO_asn1_set_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *suffix,
- asn1_ps_func *suffix_free);
-int BIO_asn1_get_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **psuffix,
- asn1_ps_func **psuffix_free);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void);
-BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode);
-BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag);
-# define BIO_s_file_internal BIO_s_file
-# endif
-BIO *BIO_new(BIO_METHOD *type);
-int BIO_set(BIO *a, BIO_METHOD *type);
-int BIO_free(BIO *a);
-void BIO_vfree(BIO *a);
-int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *data, int len);
-int BIO_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size);
-int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *data, int len);
-int BIO_puts(BIO *bp, const char *buf);
-int BIO_indent(BIO *b, int indent, int max);
-long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd,
- void (*fp) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int,
- long, long));
-char *BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg);
-long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, int iarg);
-BIO *BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *append);
-BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *b);
-void BIO_free_all(BIO *a);
-BIO *BIO_find_type(BIO *b, int bio_type);
-BIO *BIO_next(BIO *b);
-BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int *reason);
-int BIO_get_retry_reason(BIO *bio);
-BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in);
-
-int BIO_nread0(BIO *bio, char **buf);
-int BIO_nread(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num);
-int BIO_nwrite0(BIO *bio, char **buf);
-int BIO_nwrite(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num);
-
-long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi,
- long argl, long ret);
-
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void);
-BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len);
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void);
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_connect(void);
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void);
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_OS2
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_log(void);
-# endif
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_bio(void);
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_null(void);
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_null(void);
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_buffer(void);
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_linebuffer(void);
-# endif
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_nbio_test(void);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram(void);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram_sctp(void);
-# endif
-# endif
-
-/* BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ber(void); */
-
-int BIO_sock_should_retry(int i);
-int BIO_sock_non_fatal_error(int error);
-int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int error);
-
-int BIO_fd_should_retry(int i);
-int BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(int error);
-int BIO_dump_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
- void *u, const char *s, int len);
-int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
- void *u, const char *s, int len, int indent);
-int BIO_dump(BIO *b, const char *bytes, int len);
-int BIO_dump_indent(BIO *b, const char *bytes, int len, int indent);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-int BIO_dump_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len);
-int BIO_dump_indent_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len, int indent);
-# endif
-struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name);
-/*-
- * We might want a thread-safe interface too:
- * struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname_r(const char *name,
- * struct hostent *result, void *buffer, size_t buflen);
- * or something similar (caller allocates a struct hostent,
- * pointed to by "result", and additional buffer space for the various
- * substructures; if the buffer does not suffice, NULL is returned
- * and an appropriate error code is set).
- */
-int BIO_sock_error(int sock);
-int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg);
-int BIO_socket_nbio(int fd, int mode);
-int BIO_get_port(const char *str, unsigned short *port_ptr);
-int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip);
-int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host_port, int mode);
-int BIO_accept(int sock, char **ip_port);
-int BIO_sock_init(void);
-void BIO_sock_cleanup(void);
-int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int sock, int turn_on);
-
-BIO *BIO_new_socket(int sock, int close_flag);
-BIO *BIO_new_dgram(int fd, int close_flag);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag);
-int BIO_dgram_is_sctp(BIO *bio);
-int BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb(BIO *b,
- void (*handle_notifications) (BIO *bio,
- void
- *context,
- void *buf),
- void *context);
-int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b);
-int BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(BIO *b);
-# endif
-BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag);
-BIO *BIO_new_connect(char *host_port);
-BIO *BIO_new_accept(char *host_port);
-
-int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1, size_t writebuf1,
- BIO **bio2, size_t writebuf2);
-/*
- * If successful, returns 1 and in *bio1, *bio2 two BIO pair endpoints.
- * Otherwise returns 0 and sets *bio1 and *bio2 to NULL. Size 0 uses default
- * value.
- */
-
-void BIO_copy_next_retry(BIO *b);
-
-/*
- * long BIO_ghbn_ctrl(int cmd,int iarg,char *parg);
- */
-
-# ifdef __GNUC__
-# define __bio_h__attr__ __attribute__
-# else
-# define __bio_h__attr__(x)
-# endif
-int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, const char *format, ...)
-__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 2, 3)));
-int BIO_vprintf(BIO *bio, const char *format, va_list args)
-__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 2, 0)));
-int BIO_snprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, ...)
-__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 4)));
-int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args)
-__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 0)));
-# undef __bio_h__attr__
-
-/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-/*
- * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
- * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
- */
-void ERR_load_BIO_strings(void);
-
-/* Error codes for the BIO functions. */
-
-/* Function codes. */
-# define BIO_F_ACPT_STATE 100
-# define BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT 101
-# define BIO_F_BIO_BER_GET_HEADER 102
-# define BIO_F_BIO_CALLBACK_CTRL 131
-# define BIO_F_BIO_CTRL 103
-# define BIO_F_BIO_GETHOSTBYNAME 120
-# define BIO_F_BIO_GETS 104
-# define BIO_F_BIO_GET_ACCEPT_SOCKET 105
-# define BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP 106
-# define BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT 107
-# define BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR 121
-# define BIO_F_BIO_NEW 108
-# define BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE 109
-# define BIO_F_BIO_NEW_MEM_BUF 126
-# define BIO_F_BIO_NREAD 123
-# define BIO_F_BIO_NREAD0 124
-# define BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE 125
-# define BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE0 122
-# define BIO_F_BIO_PUTS 110
-# define BIO_F_BIO_READ 111
-# define BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INIT 112
-# define BIO_F_BIO_WRITE 113
-# define BIO_F_BUFFER_CTRL 114
-# define BIO_F_CONN_CTRL 127
-# define BIO_F_CONN_STATE 115
-# define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ 132
-# define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE 133
-# define BIO_F_FILE_CTRL 116
-# define BIO_F_FILE_READ 130
-# define BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL 129
-# define BIO_F_MEM_READ 128
-# define BIO_F_MEM_WRITE 117
-# define BIO_F_SSL_NEW 118
-# define BIO_F_WSASTARTUP 119
-
-/* Reason codes. */
-# define BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR 100
-# define BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE 101
-# define BIO_R_BAD_HOSTNAME_LOOKUP 102
-# define BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE 124
-# define BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR 103
-# define BIO_R_EOF_ON_MEMORY_BIO 127
-# define BIO_R_ERROR_SETTING_NBIO 104
-# define BIO_R_ERROR_SETTING_NBIO_ON_ACCEPTED_SOCKET 105
-# define BIO_R_ERROR_SETTING_NBIO_ON_ACCEPT_SOCKET 106
-# define BIO_R_GETHOSTBYNAME_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET 107
-# define BIO_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT 125
-# define BIO_R_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS 108
-# define BIO_R_IN_USE 123
-# define BIO_R_KEEPALIVE 109
-# define BIO_R_NBIO_CONNECT_ERROR 110
-# define BIO_R_NO_ACCEPT_PORT_SPECIFIED 111
-# define BIO_R_NO_HOSTNAME_SPECIFIED 112
-# define BIO_R_NO_PORT_DEFINED 113
-# define BIO_R_NO_PORT_SPECIFIED 114
-# define BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE 128
-# define BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER 115
-# define BIO_R_TAG_MISMATCH 116
-# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_BIND_SOCKET 117
-# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET 118
-# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_LISTEN_SOCKET 119
-# define BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED 120
-# define BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD 121
-# define BIO_R_WRITE_TO_READ_ONLY_BIO 126
-# define BIO_R_WSASTARTUP 122
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bio.h (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bio/bio.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bio.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bio.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,875 @@
+/* crypto/bio/bio.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BIO_H
+# define HEADER_BIO_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+# include <stdio.h>
+# endif
+# include <stdarg.h>
+
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# include <stdint.h>
+# else
+# include <inttypes.h>
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* These are the 'types' of BIOs */
+# define BIO_TYPE_NONE 0
+# define BIO_TYPE_MEM (1|0x0400)
+# define BIO_TYPE_FILE (2|0x0400)
+
+# define BIO_TYPE_FD (4|0x0400|0x0100)
+# define BIO_TYPE_SOCKET (5|0x0400|0x0100)
+# define BIO_TYPE_NULL (6|0x0400)
+# define BIO_TYPE_SSL (7|0x0200)
+# define BIO_TYPE_MD (8|0x0200)/* passive filter */
+# define BIO_TYPE_BUFFER (9|0x0200)/* filter */
+# define BIO_TYPE_CIPHER (10|0x0200)/* filter */
+# define BIO_TYPE_BASE64 (11|0x0200)/* filter */
+# define BIO_TYPE_CONNECT (12|0x0400|0x0100)/* socket - connect */
+# define BIO_TYPE_ACCEPT (13|0x0400|0x0100)/* socket for accept */
+# define BIO_TYPE_PROXY_CLIENT (14|0x0200)/* client proxy BIO */
+# define BIO_TYPE_PROXY_SERVER (15|0x0200)/* server proxy BIO */
+# define BIO_TYPE_NBIO_TEST (16|0x0200)/* server proxy BIO */
+# define BIO_TYPE_NULL_FILTER (17|0x0200)
+# define BIO_TYPE_BER (18|0x0200)/* BER -> bin filter */
+# define BIO_TYPE_BIO (19|0x0400)/* (half a) BIO pair */
+# define BIO_TYPE_LINEBUFFER (20|0x0200)/* filter */
+# define BIO_TYPE_DGRAM (21|0x0400|0x0100)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+# define BIO_TYPE_DGRAM_SCTP (24|0x0400|0x0100)
+# endif
+# define BIO_TYPE_ASN1 (22|0x0200)/* filter */
+# define BIO_TYPE_COMP (23|0x0200)/* filter */
+
+# define BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 0x0100/* socket, fd, connect or accept */
+# define BIO_TYPE_FILTER 0x0200
+# define BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK 0x0400
+
+/*
+ * BIO_FILENAME_READ|BIO_CLOSE to open or close on free.
+ * BIO_set_fp(in,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ */
+# define BIO_NOCLOSE 0x00
+# define BIO_CLOSE 0x01
+
+/*
+ * These are used in the following macros and are passed to BIO_ctrl()
+ */
+# define BIO_CTRL_RESET 1/* opt - rewind/zero etc */
+# define BIO_CTRL_EOF 2/* opt - are we at the eof */
+# define BIO_CTRL_INFO 3/* opt - extra tit-bits */
+# define BIO_CTRL_SET 4/* man - set the 'IO' type */
+# define BIO_CTRL_GET 5/* man - get the 'IO' type */
+# define BIO_CTRL_PUSH 6/* opt - internal, used to signify change */
+# define BIO_CTRL_POP 7/* opt - internal, used to signify change */
+# define BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE 8/* man - set the 'close' on free */
+# define BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE 9/* man - set the 'close' on free */
+# define BIO_CTRL_PENDING 10/* opt - is their more data buffered */
+# define BIO_CTRL_FLUSH 11/* opt - 'flush' buffered output */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DUP 12/* man - extra stuff for 'duped' BIO */
+# define BIO_CTRL_WPENDING 13/* opt - number of bytes still to write */
+/* callback is int cb(BIO *bio,state,ret); */
+# define BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK 14/* opt - set callback function */
+# define BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK 15/* opt - set callback function */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_SET_FILENAME 30/* BIO_s_file special */
+
+/* dgram BIO stuff */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT 31/* BIO dgram special */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED 32/* allow for an externally connected
+ * socket to be passed in */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT 33/* setsockopt, essentially */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT 34/* getsockopt, essentially */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT 35/* setsockopt, essentially */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMEOUT 36/* getsockopt, essentially */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP 37/* flag whether the last */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP 38/* I/O operation tiemd out */
+
+/* #ifdef IP_MTU_DISCOVER */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER 39/* set DF bit on egress packets */
+/* #endif */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU 40/* as kernel for current MTU */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU 47
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU 41/* get cached value for MTU */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU 42/* set cached value for MTU.
+ * want to use this if asking
+ * the kernel fails */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED 43/* check whether the MTU was
+ * exceed in the previous write
+ * operation */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER 46
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER 44/* Destination for the data */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT 45/* Next DTLS handshake timeout
+ * to adjust socket timeouts */
+
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD 49
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+/* SCTP stuff */
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE 50
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY 51
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY 52
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD 53
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_SNDINFO 60
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_SNDINFO 61
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO 62
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO 63
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_PRINFO 64
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_PRINFO 65
+# define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN 70
+# endif
+
+/* modifiers */
+# define BIO_FP_READ 0x02
+# define BIO_FP_WRITE 0x04
+# define BIO_FP_APPEND 0x08
+# define BIO_FP_TEXT 0x10
+
+# define BIO_FLAGS_READ 0x01
+# define BIO_FLAGS_WRITE 0x02
+# define BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL 0x04
+# define BIO_FLAGS_RWS (BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL)
+# define BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY 0x08
+# ifndef BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK
+/*
+ * "UPLINK" flag denotes file descriptors provided by application. It
+ * defaults to 0, as most platforms don't require UPLINK interface.
+ */
+# define BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK 0
+# endif
+
+/* Used in BIO_gethostbyname() */
+# define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_HITS 1
+# define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_MISSES 2
+# define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_CACHE_SIZE 3
+# define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_GET_ENTRY 4
+# define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_FLUSH 5
+
+/* Mostly used in the SSL BIO */
+/*-
+ * Not used anymore
+ * #define BIO_FLAGS_PROTOCOL_DELAYED_READ 0x10
+ * #define BIO_FLAGS_PROTOCOL_DELAYED_WRITE 0x20
+ * #define BIO_FLAGS_PROTOCOL_STARTUP 0x40
+ */
+
+# define BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL 0x100
+
+/*
+ * This is used with memory BIOs: it means we shouldn't free up or change the
+ * data in any way.
+ */
+# define BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY 0x200
+
+typedef struct bio_st BIO;
+
+void BIO_set_flags(BIO *b, int flags);
+int BIO_test_flags(const BIO *b, int flags);
+void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *b, int flags);
+
+# define BIO_get_flags(b) BIO_test_flags(b, ~(0x0))
+# define BIO_set_retry_special(b) \
+ BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
+# define BIO_set_retry_read(b) \
+ BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
+# define BIO_set_retry_write(b) \
+ BIO_set_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
+
+/* These are normally used internally in BIOs */
+# define BIO_clear_retry_flags(b) \
+ BIO_clear_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_RWS|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
+# define BIO_get_retry_flags(b) \
+ BIO_test_flags(b, (BIO_FLAGS_RWS|BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY))
+
+/* These should be used by the application to tell why we should retry */
+# define BIO_should_read(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_READ)
+# define BIO_should_write(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_WRITE)
+# define BIO_should_io_special(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL)
+# define BIO_retry_type(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_RWS)
+# define BIO_should_retry(a) BIO_test_flags(a, BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY)
+
+/*
+ * The next three are used in conjunction with the BIO_should_io_special()
+ * condition. After this returns true, BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int
+ * *reason); will walk the BIO stack and return the 'reason' for the special
+ * and the offending BIO. Given a BIO, BIO_get_retry_reason(bio) will return
+ * the code.
+ */
+/*
+ * Returned from the SSL bio when the certificate retrieval code had an error
+ */
+# define BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP 0x01
+/* Returned from the connect BIO when a connect would have blocked */
+# define BIO_RR_CONNECT 0x02
+/* Returned from the accept BIO when an accept would have blocked */
+# define BIO_RR_ACCEPT 0x03
+
+/* These are passed by the BIO callback */
+# define BIO_CB_FREE 0x01
+# define BIO_CB_READ 0x02
+# define BIO_CB_WRITE 0x03
+# define BIO_CB_PUTS 0x04
+# define BIO_CB_GETS 0x05
+# define BIO_CB_CTRL 0x06
+
+/*
+ * The callback is called before and after the underling operation, The
+ * BIO_CB_RETURN flag indicates if it is after the call
+ */
+# define BIO_CB_RETURN 0x80
+# define BIO_CB_return(a) ((a)|BIO_CB_RETURN)
+# define BIO_cb_pre(a) (!((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN))
+# define BIO_cb_post(a) ((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN)
+
+long (*BIO_get_callback(const BIO *b)) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *,
+ int, long, long);
+void BIO_set_callback(BIO *b,
+ long (*callback) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *,
+ int, long, long));
+char *BIO_get_callback_arg(const BIO *b);
+void BIO_set_callback_arg(BIO *b, char *arg);
+
+const char *BIO_method_name(const BIO *b);
+int BIO_method_type(const BIO *b);
+
+typedef void bio_info_cb (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long,
+ long);
+
+typedef struct bio_method_st {
+ int type;
+ const char *name;
+ int (*bwrite) (BIO *, const char *, int);
+ int (*bread) (BIO *, char *, int);
+ int (*bputs) (BIO *, const char *);
+ int (*bgets) (BIO *, char *, int);
+ long (*ctrl) (BIO *, int, long, void *);
+ int (*create) (BIO *);
+ int (*destroy) (BIO *);
+ long (*callback_ctrl) (BIO *, int, bio_info_cb *);
+} BIO_METHOD;
+
+struct bio_st {
+ BIO_METHOD *method;
+ /* bio, mode, argp, argi, argl, ret */
+ long (*callback) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int, long, long);
+ char *cb_arg; /* first argument for the callback */
+ int init;
+ int shutdown;
+ int flags; /* extra storage */
+ int retry_reason;
+ int num;
+ void *ptr;
+ struct bio_st *next_bio; /* used by filter BIOs */
+ struct bio_st *prev_bio; /* used by filter BIOs */
+ int references;
+ unsigned long num_read;
+ unsigned long num_write;
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+};
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
+
+typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct {
+ /*-
+ * Buffers are setup like this:
+ *
+ * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
+ * +---------------------------------------------------+
+ * | consumed | remaining | free space |
+ * +---------------------------------------------------+
+ * <-- off --><------- len ------->
+ */
+ /*- BIO *bio; *//*
+ * this is now in the BIO struct
+ */
+ int ibuf_size; /* how big is the input buffer */
+ int obuf_size; /* how big is the output buffer */
+ char *ibuf; /* the char array */
+ int ibuf_len; /* how many bytes are in it */
+ int ibuf_off; /* write/read offset */
+ char *obuf; /* the char array */
+ int obuf_len; /* how many bytes are in it */
+ int obuf_off; /* write/read offset */
+} BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX;
+
+/* Prefix and suffix callback in ASN1 BIO */
+typedef int asn1_ps_func (BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
+ void *parg);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+/* SCTP parameter structs */
+struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo {
+ uint16_t snd_sid;
+ uint16_t snd_flags;
+ uint32_t snd_ppid;
+ uint32_t snd_context;
+};
+
+struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo {
+ uint16_t rcv_sid;
+ uint16_t rcv_ssn;
+ uint16_t rcv_flags;
+ uint32_t rcv_ppid;
+ uint32_t rcv_tsn;
+ uint32_t rcv_cumtsn;
+ uint32_t rcv_context;
+};
+
+struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
+ uint16_t pr_policy;
+ uint32_t pr_value;
+};
+# endif
+
+/* connect BIO stuff */
+# define BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE 1
+# define BIO_CONN_S_GET_IP 2
+# define BIO_CONN_S_GET_PORT 3
+# define BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET 4
+# define BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT 5
+# define BIO_CONN_S_OK 6
+# define BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT 7
+# define BIO_CONN_S_NBIO 8
+/*
+ * #define BIO_CONN_get_param_hostname BIO_ctrl
+ */
+
+# define BIO_C_SET_CONNECT 100
+# define BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE 101
+# define BIO_C_SET_NBIO 102
+# define BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM 103
+# define BIO_C_SET_FD 104
+# define BIO_C_GET_FD 105
+# define BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR 106
+# define BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR 107
+# define BIO_C_SET_FILENAME 108
+# define BIO_C_SET_SSL 109
+# define BIO_C_GET_SSL 110
+# define BIO_C_SET_MD 111
+# define BIO_C_GET_MD 112
+# define BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_STATUS 113
+# define BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM 114
+# define BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR 115
+# define BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES 116
+# define BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE 117
+# define BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT 118
+# define BIO_C_SSL_MODE 119
+# define BIO_C_GET_MD_CTX 120
+# define BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM 121
+# define BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA 122/* data to read first */
+# define BIO_C_GET_CONNECT 123
+# define BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT 124
+# define BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES 125
+# define BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES 126
+# define BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT 127
+# define BIO_C_FILE_SEEK 128
+# define BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_CTX 129
+# define BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN 130/* return end of input
+ * value */
+# define BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE 131
+# define BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE 132
+# define BIO_C_FILE_TELL 133
+# define BIO_C_GET_SOCKS 134
+# define BIO_C_SET_SOCKS 135
+
+# define BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE 136/* for BIO_s_bio */
+# define BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE 137
+# define BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR 138
+# define BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR 139
+# define BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE 140
+# define BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST 141
+# define BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR 142
+# define BIO_C_NREAD0 143
+# define BIO_C_NREAD 144
+# define BIO_C_NWRITE0 145
+# define BIO_C_NWRITE 146
+# define BIO_C_RESET_READ_REQUEST 147
+# define BIO_C_SET_MD_CTX 148
+
+# define BIO_C_SET_PREFIX 149
+# define BIO_C_GET_PREFIX 150
+# define BIO_C_SET_SUFFIX 151
+# define BIO_C_GET_SUFFIX 152
+
+# define BIO_C_SET_EX_ARG 153
+# define BIO_C_GET_EX_ARG 154
+
+# define BIO_set_app_data(s,arg) BIO_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
+# define BIO_get_app_data(s) BIO_get_ex_data(s,0)
+
+/* BIO_s_connect() and BIO_s_socks4a_connect() */
+# define BIO_set_conn_hostname(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,0,(char *)name)
+# define BIO_set_conn_port(b,port) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,1,(char *)port)
+# define BIO_set_conn_ip(b,ip) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,2,(char *)ip)
+# define BIO_set_conn_int_port(b,port) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_CONNECT,3,(char *)port)
+# define BIO_get_conn_hostname(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,0)
+# define BIO_get_conn_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,1)
+# define BIO_get_conn_ip(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,2)
+# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,0)
+
+# define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL)
+
+/* BIO_s_accept_socket() */
+# define BIO_set_accept_port(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,0,(char *)name)
+# define BIO_get_accept_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,0)
+/* #define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL) */
+# define BIO_set_nbio_accept(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,1,(n)?(void *)"a":NULL)
+# define BIO_set_accept_bios(b,bio) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,2,(char *)bio)
+
+# define BIO_BIND_NORMAL 0
+# define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR_IF_UNUSED 1
+# define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR 2
+# define BIO_set_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE,mode,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE,0,NULL)
+
+# define BIO_do_connect(b) BIO_do_handshake(b)
+# define BIO_do_accept(b) BIO_do_handshake(b)
+# define BIO_do_handshake(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE,0,NULL)
+
+/* BIO_s_proxy_client() */
+# define BIO_set_url(b,url) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,0,(char *)(url))
+# define BIO_set_proxies(b,p) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,1,(char *)(p))
+/* BIO_set_nbio(b,n) */
+# define BIO_set_filter_bio(b,s) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,2,(char *)(s))
+/* BIO *BIO_get_filter_bio(BIO *bio); */
+# define BIO_set_proxy_cb(b,cb) BIO_callback_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,3,(void *(*cb)()))
+# define BIO_set_proxy_header(b,sk) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,4,(char *)sk)
+# define BIO_set_no_connect_return(b,bool) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_PROXY_PARAM,5,bool)
+
+# define BIO_get_proxy_header(b,skp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,0,(char *)skp)
+# define BIO_get_proxies(b,pxy_p) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,1,(char *)(pxy_p))
+# define BIO_get_url(b,url) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,2,(char *)(url))
+# define BIO_get_no_connect_return(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,5,NULL)
+
+# define BIO_set_fd(b,fd,c) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FD,c,fd)
+# define BIO_get_fd(b,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FD,0,(char *)c)
+
+# define BIO_set_fp(b,fp,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR,c,(char *)fp)
+# define BIO_get_fp(b,fpp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR,0,(char *)fpp)
+
+# define BIO_seek(b,ofs) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_SEEK,ofs,NULL)
+# define BIO_tell(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_TELL,0,NULL)
+
+/*
+ * name is cast to lose const, but might be better to route through a
+ * function so we can do it safely
+ */
+# ifdef CONST_STRICT
+/*
+ * If you are wondering why this isn't defined, its because CONST_STRICT is
+ * purely a compile-time kludge to allow const to be checked.
+ */
+int BIO_read_filename(BIO *b, const char *name);
+# else
+# define BIO_read_filename(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
+ BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_READ,(char *)name)
+# endif
+# define BIO_write_filename(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
+ BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_WRITE,name)
+# define BIO_append_filename(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
+ BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_APPEND,name)
+# define BIO_rw_filename(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILENAME, \
+ BIO_CLOSE|BIO_FP_READ|BIO_FP_WRITE,name)
+
+/*
+ * WARNING WARNING, this ups the reference count on the read bio of the SSL
+ * structure. This is because the ssl read BIO is now pointed to by the
+ * next_bio field in the bio. So when you free the BIO, make sure you are
+ * doing a BIO_free_all() to catch the underlying BIO.
+ */
+# define BIO_set_ssl(b,ssl,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL,c,(char *)ssl)
+# define BIO_get_ssl(b,sslp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL,0,(char *)sslp)
+# define BIO_set_ssl_mode(b,client) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SSL_MODE,client,NULL)
+# define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(b,num) \
+ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES,num,NULL);
+# define BIO_get_num_renegotiates(b) \
+ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES,0,NULL);
+# define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(b,seconds) \
+ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT,seconds,NULL);
+
+/* defined in evp.h */
+/* #define BIO_set_md(b,md) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_MD,1,(char *)md) */
+
+# define BIO_get_mem_data(b,pp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,(char *)pp)
+# define BIO_set_mem_buf(b,bm,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM,c,(char *)bm)
+# define BIO_get_mem_ptr(b,pp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR,0,(char *)pp)
+# define BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b,v) \
+ BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN,v,NULL)
+
+/* For the BIO_f_buffer() type */
+# define BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_set_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,NULL)
+# define BIO_set_read_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,0)
+# define BIO_set_write_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,1)
+# define BIO_set_buffer_read_data(b,buf,num) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA,num,buf)
+
+/* Don't use the next one unless you know what you are doing :-) */
+# define BIO_dup_state(b,ret) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_DUP,0,(char *)(ret))
+
+# define BIO_reset(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_RESET,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_eof(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_EOF,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_set_close(b,c) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE,(c),NULL)
+# define BIO_get_close(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_pending(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_PENDING,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_wpending(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_WPENDING,0,NULL)
+/* ...pending macros have inappropriate return type */
+size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *b);
+size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *b);
+# define BIO_flush(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_FLUSH,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_info_callback(b,cbp) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK,0, \
+ cbp)
+# define BIO_set_info_callback(b,cb) (int)BIO_callback_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK,cb)
+
+/* For the BIO_f_buffer() type */
+# define BIO_buffer_get_num_lines(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_GET,0,NULL)
+
+/* For BIO_s_bio() */
+# define BIO_set_write_buf_size(b,size) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,size,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_write_buf_size(b,size) (size_t)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,size,NULL)
+# define BIO_make_bio_pair(b1,b2) (int)BIO_ctrl(b1,BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR,0,b2)
+# define BIO_destroy_bio_pair(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_shutdown_wr(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR, 0, NULL)
+/* macros with inappropriate type -- but ...pending macros use int too: */
+# define BIO_get_write_guarantee(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_read_request(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST,0,NULL)
+size_t BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(BIO *b);
+size_t BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(BIO *b);
+int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *b);
+
+/* ctrl macros for dgram */
+# define BIO_ctrl_dgram_connect(b,peer) \
+ (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT,0, (char *)peer)
+# define BIO_ctrl_set_connected(b, state, peer) \
+ (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED, state, (char *)peer)
+# define BIO_dgram_recv_timedout(b) \
+ (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP, 0, NULL)
+# define BIO_dgram_send_timedout(b) \
+ (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP, 0, NULL)
+# define BIO_dgram_get_peer(b,peer) \
+ (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer)
+# define BIO_dgram_set_peer(b,peer) \
+ (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer)
+# define BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(b) \
+ (unsigned int)BIO_ctrl((b), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD, 0, NULL)
+
+/* These two aren't currently implemented */
+/* int BIO_get_ex_num(BIO *bio); */
+/* void BIO_set_ex_free_func(BIO *bio,int idx,void (*cb)()); */
+int BIO_set_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx, void *data);
+void *BIO_get_ex_data(BIO *bio, int idx);
+int BIO_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+unsigned long BIO_number_read(BIO *bio);
+unsigned long BIO_number_written(BIO *bio);
+
+/* For BIO_f_asn1() */
+int BIO_asn1_set_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *prefix,
+ asn1_ps_func *prefix_free);
+int BIO_asn1_get_prefix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **pprefix,
+ asn1_ps_func **pprefix_free);
+int BIO_asn1_set_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func *suffix,
+ asn1_ps_func *suffix_free);
+int BIO_asn1_get_suffix(BIO *b, asn1_ps_func **psuffix,
+ asn1_ps_func **psuffix_free);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void);
+BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode);
+BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag);
+# define BIO_s_file_internal BIO_s_file
+# endif
+BIO *BIO_new(BIO_METHOD *type);
+int BIO_set(BIO *a, BIO_METHOD *type);
+int BIO_free(BIO *a);
+void BIO_vfree(BIO *a);
+int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *data, int len);
+int BIO_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size);
+int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *data, int len);
+int BIO_puts(BIO *bp, const char *buf);
+int BIO_indent(BIO *b, int indent, int max);
+long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd,
+ void (*fp) (struct bio_st *, int, const char *, int,
+ long, long));
+char *BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg);
+long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, int iarg);
+BIO *BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *append);
+BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *b);
+void BIO_free_all(BIO *a);
+BIO *BIO_find_type(BIO *b, int bio_type);
+BIO *BIO_next(BIO *b);
+BIO *BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int *reason);
+int BIO_get_retry_reason(BIO *bio);
+BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in);
+
+int BIO_nread0(BIO *bio, char **buf);
+int BIO_nread(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num);
+int BIO_nwrite0(BIO *bio, char **buf);
+int BIO_nwrite(BIO *bio, char **buf, int num);
+
+long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi,
+ long argl, long ret);
+
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void);
+BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len);
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void);
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_connect(void);
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void);
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_OS2
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_log(void);
+# endif
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_bio(void);
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_null(void);
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_null(void);
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_buffer(void);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_linebuffer(void);
+# endif
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_nbio_test(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram_sctp(void);
+# endif
+# endif
+
+/* BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ber(void); */
+
+int BIO_sock_should_retry(int i);
+int BIO_sock_non_fatal_error(int error);
+int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int error);
+
+int BIO_fd_should_retry(int i);
+int BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(int error);
+int BIO_dump_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
+ void *u, const char *s, int len);
+int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
+ void *u, const char *s, int len, int indent);
+int BIO_dump(BIO *b, const char *bytes, int len);
+int BIO_dump_indent(BIO *b, const char *bytes, int len, int indent);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+int BIO_dump_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len);
+int BIO_dump_indent_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len, int indent);
+# endif
+struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name);
+/*-
+ * We might want a thread-safe interface too:
+ * struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname_r(const char *name,
+ * struct hostent *result, void *buffer, size_t buflen);
+ * or something similar (caller allocates a struct hostent,
+ * pointed to by "result", and additional buffer space for the various
+ * substructures; if the buffer does not suffice, NULL is returned
+ * and an appropriate error code is set).
+ */
+int BIO_sock_error(int sock);
+int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg);
+int BIO_socket_nbio(int fd, int mode);
+int BIO_get_port(const char *str, unsigned short *port_ptr);
+int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip);
+int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host_port, int mode);
+int BIO_accept(int sock, char **ip_port);
+int BIO_sock_init(void);
+void BIO_sock_cleanup(void);
+int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int sock, int turn_on);
+
+BIO *BIO_new_socket(int sock, int close_flag);
+BIO *BIO_new_dgram(int fd, int close_flag);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag);
+int BIO_dgram_is_sctp(BIO *bio);
+int BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb(BIO *b,
+ void (*handle_notifications) (BIO *bio,
+ void
+ *context,
+ void *buf),
+ void *context);
+int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b);
+int BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(BIO *b);
+# endif
+BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag);
+BIO *BIO_new_connect(char *host_port);
+BIO *BIO_new_accept(char *host_port);
+
+int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1, size_t writebuf1,
+ BIO **bio2, size_t writebuf2);
+/*
+ * If successful, returns 1 and in *bio1, *bio2 two BIO pair endpoints.
+ * Otherwise returns 0 and sets *bio1 and *bio2 to NULL. Size 0 uses default
+ * value.
+ */
+
+void BIO_copy_next_retry(BIO *b);
+
+/*
+ * long BIO_ghbn_ctrl(int cmd,int iarg,char *parg);
+ */
+
+# ifdef __GNUC__
+# define __bio_h__attr__ __attribute__
+# else
+# define __bio_h__attr__(x)
+# endif
+int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, const char *format, ...)
+__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 2, 3)));
+int BIO_vprintf(BIO *bio, const char *format, va_list args)
+__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 2, 0)));
+int BIO_snprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, ...)
+__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 4)));
+int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args)
+__bio_h__attr__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 0)));
+# undef __bio_h__attr__
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+void ERR_load_BIO_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the BIO functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define BIO_F_ACPT_STATE 100
+# define BIO_F_BIO_ACCEPT 101
+# define BIO_F_BIO_BER_GET_HEADER 102
+# define BIO_F_BIO_CALLBACK_CTRL 131
+# define BIO_F_BIO_CTRL 103
+# define BIO_F_BIO_GETHOSTBYNAME 120
+# define BIO_F_BIO_GETS 104
+# define BIO_F_BIO_GET_ACCEPT_SOCKET 105
+# define BIO_F_BIO_GET_HOST_IP 106
+# define BIO_F_BIO_GET_PORT 107
+# define BIO_F_BIO_MAKE_PAIR 121
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NEW 108
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE 109
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NEW_MEM_BUF 126
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NREAD 123
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NREAD0 124
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE 125
+# define BIO_F_BIO_NWRITE0 122
+# define BIO_F_BIO_PUTS 110
+# define BIO_F_BIO_READ 111
+# define BIO_F_BIO_SOCK_INIT 112
+# define BIO_F_BIO_WRITE 113
+# define BIO_F_BUFFER_CTRL 114
+# define BIO_F_CONN_CTRL 127
+# define BIO_F_CONN_STATE 115
+# define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ 132
+# define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE 133
+# define BIO_F_FILE_CTRL 116
+# define BIO_F_FILE_READ 130
+# define BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL 129
+# define BIO_F_MEM_READ 128
+# define BIO_F_MEM_WRITE 117
+# define BIO_F_SSL_NEW 118
+# define BIO_F_WSASTARTUP 119
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define BIO_R_ACCEPT_ERROR 100
+# define BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE 101
+# define BIO_R_BAD_HOSTNAME_LOOKUP 102
+# define BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE 124
+# define BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR 103
+# define BIO_R_EOF_ON_MEMORY_BIO 127
+# define BIO_R_ERROR_SETTING_NBIO 104
+# define BIO_R_ERROR_SETTING_NBIO_ON_ACCEPTED_SOCKET 105
+# define BIO_R_ERROR_SETTING_NBIO_ON_ACCEPT_SOCKET 106
+# define BIO_R_GETHOSTBYNAME_ADDR_IS_NOT_AF_INET 107
+# define BIO_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT 125
+# define BIO_R_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS 108
+# define BIO_R_IN_USE 123
+# define BIO_R_KEEPALIVE 109
+# define BIO_R_NBIO_CONNECT_ERROR 110
+# define BIO_R_NO_ACCEPT_PORT_SPECIFIED 111
+# define BIO_R_NO_HOSTNAME_SPECIFIED 112
+# define BIO_R_NO_PORT_DEFINED 113
+# define BIO_R_NO_PORT_SPECIFIED 114
+# define BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE 128
+# define BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER 115
+# define BIO_R_TAG_MISMATCH 116
+# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_BIND_SOCKET 117
+# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_SOCKET 118
+# define BIO_R_UNABLE_TO_LISTEN_SOCKET 119
+# define BIO_R_UNINITIALIZED 120
+# define BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD 121
+# define BIO_R_WRITE_TO_READ_ONLY_BIO 126
+# define BIO_R_WSASTARTUP 122
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bio/bss_file.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bss_file.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,465 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/bio/bss_file.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-/*-
- * 03-Dec-1997 rdenny at dc3.com Fix bug preventing use of stdin/stdout
- * with binary data (e.g. asn1parse -inform DER < xxx) under
- * Windows
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_BSS_FILE_C
-# define HEADER_BSS_FILE_C
-
-# if defined(__linux) || defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
-/*
- * Following definition aliases fopen to fopen64 on above mentioned
- * platforms. This makes it possible to open and sequentially access files
- * larger than 2GB from 32-bit application. It does not allow to traverse
- * them beyond 2GB with fseek/ftell, but on the other hand *no* 32-bit
- * platform permits that, not with fseek/ftell. Not to mention that breaking
- * 2GB limit for seeking would require surgery to *our* API. But sequential
- * access suffices for practical cases when you can run into large files,
- * such as fingerprinting, so we can let API alone. For reference, the list
- * of 32-bit platforms which allow for sequential access of large files
- * without extra "magic" comprise *BSD, Darwin, IRIX...
- */
-# ifndef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS
-# define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
-# endif
-# endif
-
-# include <stdio.h>
-# include <errno.h>
-# include "cryptlib.h"
-# include "bio_lcl.h"
-# include <openssl/err.h>
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
-# include <nwfileio.h>
-# endif
-
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
-static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_new(BIO *h);
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_free(BIO *data);
-static BIO_METHOD methods_filep = {
- BIO_TYPE_FILE,
- "FILE pointer",
- file_write,
- file_read,
- file_puts,
- file_gets,
- file_ctrl,
- file_new,
- file_free,
- NULL,
-};
-
-BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
-{
- BIO *ret;
- FILE *file = NULL;
-
-# if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8)
- int sz, len_0 = (int)strlen(filename) + 1;
- DWORD flags;
-
- /*
- * Basically there are three cases to cover: a) filename is
- * pure ASCII string; b) actual UTF-8 encoded string and
- * c) locale-ized string, i.e. one containing 8-bit
- * characters that are meaningful in current system locale.
- * If filename is pure ASCII or real UTF-8 encoded string,
- * MultiByteToWideChar succeeds and _wfopen works. If
- * filename is locale-ized string, chances are that
- * MultiByteToWideChar fails reporting
- * ERROR_NO_UNICODE_TRANSLATION, in which case we fall
- * back to fopen...
- */
- if ((sz = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, (flags = MB_ERR_INVALID_CHARS),
- filename, len_0, NULL, 0)) > 0 ||
- (GetLastError() == ERROR_INVALID_FLAGS &&
- (sz = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, (flags = 0),
- filename, len_0, NULL, 0)) > 0)
- ) {
- WCHAR wmode[8];
- WCHAR *wfilename = _alloca(sz * sizeof(WCHAR));
-
- if (MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, flags,
- filename, len_0, wfilename, sz) &&
- MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, mode, strlen(mode) + 1,
- wmode, sizeof(wmode) / sizeof(wmode[0])) &&
- (file = _wfopen(wfilename, wmode)) == NULL &&
- (errno == ENOENT || errno == EBADF)
- ) {
- /*
- * UTF-8 decode succeeded, but no file, filename
- * could still have been locale-ized...
- */
- file = fopen(filename, mode);
- }
- } else if (GetLastError() == ERROR_NO_UNICODE_TRANSLATION) {
- file = fopen(filename, mode);
- }
-# else
- file = fopen(filename, mode);
-# endif
- if (file == NULL) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
- if (errno == ENOENT)
- BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
- else
- BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- return (NULL);
- }
- if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
- fclose(file);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- BIO_clear_flags(ret, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* we did fopen -> we disengage
- * UPLINK */
- BIO_set_fp(ret, file, BIO_CLOSE);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag)
-{
- BIO *ret;
-
- if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- BIO_set_flags(ret, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* redundant, left for
- * documentation puposes */
- BIO_set_fp(ret, stream, close_flag);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void)
-{
- return (&methods_filep);
-}
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_new(BIO *bi)
-{
- bi->init = 0;
- bi->num = 0;
- bi->ptr = NULL;
- bi->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK; /* default to UPLINK */
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_free(BIO *a)
-{
- if (a == NULL)
- return (0);
- if (a->shutdown) {
- if ((a->init) && (a->ptr != NULL)) {
- if (a->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
- UP_fclose(a->ptr);
- else
- fclose(a->ptr);
- a->ptr = NULL;
- a->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK;
- }
- a->init = 0;
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (b->init && (out != NULL)) {
- if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
- ret = UP_fread(out, 1, (int)outl, b->ptr);
- else
- ret = fread(out, 1, (int)outl, (FILE *)b->ptr);
- if (ret == 0
- && (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) ? UP_ferror((FILE *)b->ptr) :
- ferror((FILE *)b->ptr)) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_FREAD, get_last_sys_error());
- BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_READ, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- ret = -1;
- }
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (b->init && (in != NULL)) {
- if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
- ret = UP_fwrite(in, (int)inl, 1, b->ptr);
- else
- ret = fwrite(in, (int)inl, 1, (FILE *)b->ptr);
- if (ret)
- ret = inl;
- /* ret=fwrite(in,1,(int)inl,(FILE *)b->ptr); */
- /*
- * according to Tim Hudson <tjh at cryptsoft.com>, the commented out
- * version above can cause 'inl' write calls under some stupid stdio
- * implementations (VMS)
- */
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
-{
- long ret = 1;
- FILE *fp = (FILE *)b->ptr;
- FILE **fpp;
- char p[4];
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK:
- case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
- if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
- ret = (long)UP_fseek(b->ptr, num, 0);
- else
- ret = (long)fseek(fp, num, 0);
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_EOF:
- if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
- ret = (long)UP_feof(fp);
- else
- ret = (long)feof(fp);
- break;
- case BIO_C_FILE_TELL:
- case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
- if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
- ret = UP_ftell(b->ptr);
- else
- ret = ftell(fp);
- break;
- case BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR:
- file_free(b);
- b->shutdown = (int)num & BIO_CLOSE;
- b->ptr = ptr;
- b->init = 1;
-# if BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK!=0
-# if defined(__MINGW32__) && defined(__MSVCRT__) && !defined(_IOB_ENTRIES)
-# define _IOB_ENTRIES 20
-# endif
-# if defined(_IOB_ENTRIES)
- /* Safety net to catch purely internal BIO_set_fp calls */
- if ((size_t)ptr >= (size_t)stdin &&
- (size_t)ptr < (size_t)(stdin + _IOB_ENTRIES))
- BIO_clear_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK);
-# endif
-# endif
-# ifdef UP_fsetmod
- if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
- UP_fsetmod(b->ptr, (char)((num & BIO_FP_TEXT) ? 't' : 'b'));
- else
-# endif
- {
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
- int fd = _fileno((FILE *)ptr);
- if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
- _setmode(fd, _O_TEXT);
- else
- _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
- int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
- /* Under CLib there are differences in file modes */
- if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
- setmode(fd, O_TEXT);
- else
- setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
- int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
- /* Set correct text/binary mode */
- if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
- _setmode(fd, _O_TEXT);
- /* Dangerous to set stdin/stdout to raw (unless redirected) */
- else {
- if (fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO) {
- if (isatty(fd) <= 0)
- _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
- } else
- _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
- }
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
- int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
- if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
- setmode(fd, O_TEXT);
- else
- setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
-# endif
- }
- break;
- case BIO_C_SET_FILENAME:
- file_free(b);
- b->shutdown = (int)num & BIO_CLOSE;
- if (num & BIO_FP_APPEND) {
- if (num & BIO_FP_READ)
- BUF_strlcpy(p, "a+", sizeof p);
- else
- BUF_strlcpy(p, "a", sizeof p);
- } else if ((num & BIO_FP_READ) && (num & BIO_FP_WRITE))
- BUF_strlcpy(p, "r+", sizeof p);
- else if (num & BIO_FP_WRITE)
- BUF_strlcpy(p, "w", sizeof p);
- else if (num & BIO_FP_READ)
- BUF_strlcpy(p, "r", sizeof p);
- else {
- BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE);
- ret = 0;
- break;
- }
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
- if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
- strcat(p, "b");
- else
- strcat(p, "t");
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
- if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
- strcat(p, "b");
- else
- strcat(p, "t");
-# endif
- fp = fopen(ptr, p);
- if (fp == NULL) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')");
- BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- ret = 0;
- break;
- }
- b->ptr = fp;
- b->init = 1;
- BIO_clear_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* we did fopen -> we disengage
- * UPLINK */
- break;
- case BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR:
- /* the ptr parameter is actually a FILE ** in this case. */
- if (ptr != NULL) {
- fpp = (FILE **)ptr;
- *fpp = (FILE *)b->ptr;
- }
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
- ret = (long)b->shutdown;
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
- b->shutdown = (int)num;
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
- if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
- UP_fflush(b->ptr);
- else
- fflush((FILE *)b->ptr);
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
- ret = 1;
- break;
-
- case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
- case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
- case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
- case BIO_CTRL_POP:
- default:
- ret = 0;
- break;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- buf[0] = '\0';
- if (bp->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) {
- if (!UP_fgets(buf, size, bp->ptr))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!fgets(buf, size, (FILE *)bp->ptr))
- goto err;
- }
- if (buf[0] != '\0')
- ret = strlen(buf);
- err:
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK file_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
-{
- int n, ret;
-
- n = strlen(str);
- ret = file_write(bp, str, n);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
-
-#endif /* HEADER_BSS_FILE_C */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bss_file.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bio/bss_file.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bss_file.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bio/bss_file.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+/* crypto/bio/bss_file.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+/*-
+ * 03-Dec-1997 rdenny at dc3.com Fix bug preventing use of stdin/stdout
+ * with binary data (e.g. asn1parse -inform DER < xxx) under
+ * Windows
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BSS_FILE_C
+# define HEADER_BSS_FILE_C
+
+# if defined(__linux) || defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
+/*
+ * Following definition aliases fopen to fopen64 on above mentioned
+ * platforms. This makes it possible to open and sequentially access files
+ * larger than 2GB from 32-bit application. It does not allow to traverse
+ * them beyond 2GB with fseek/ftell, but on the other hand *no* 32-bit
+ * platform permits that, not with fseek/ftell. Not to mention that breaking
+ * 2GB limit for seeking would require surgery to *our* API. But sequential
+ * access suffices for practical cases when you can run into large files,
+ * such as fingerprinting, so we can let API alone. For reference, the list
+ * of 32-bit platforms which allow for sequential access of large files
+ * without extra "magic" comprise *BSD, Darwin, IRIX...
+ */
+# ifndef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS
+# define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
+# endif
+# endif
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+# include "cryptlib.h"
+# include "bio_lcl.h"
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
+# include <nwfileio.h>
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size);
+static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_new(BIO *h);
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_free(BIO *data);
+static BIO_METHOD methods_filep = {
+ BIO_TYPE_FILE,
+ "FILE pointer",
+ file_write,
+ file_read,
+ file_puts,
+ file_gets,
+ file_ctrl,
+ file_new,
+ file_free,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+static FILE *file_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+{
+ FILE *file = NULL;
+
+# if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8)
+ int sz, len_0 = (int)strlen(filename) + 1;
+ DWORD flags;
+
+ /*
+ * Basically there are three cases to cover: a) filename is
+ * pure ASCII string; b) actual UTF-8 encoded string and
+ * c) locale-ized string, i.e. one containing 8-bit
+ * characters that are meaningful in current system locale.
+ * If filename is pure ASCII or real UTF-8 encoded string,
+ * MultiByteToWideChar succeeds and _wfopen works. If
+ * filename is locale-ized string, chances are that
+ * MultiByteToWideChar fails reporting
+ * ERROR_NO_UNICODE_TRANSLATION, in which case we fall
+ * back to fopen...
+ */
+ if ((sz = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, (flags = MB_ERR_INVALID_CHARS),
+ filename, len_0, NULL, 0)) > 0 ||
+ (GetLastError() == ERROR_INVALID_FLAGS &&
+ (sz = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, (flags = 0),
+ filename, len_0, NULL, 0)) > 0)
+ ) {
+ WCHAR wmode[8];
+ WCHAR *wfilename = _alloca(sz * sizeof(WCHAR));
+
+ if (MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, flags,
+ filename, len_0, wfilename, sz) &&
+ MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, mode, strlen(mode) + 1,
+ wmode, sizeof(wmode) / sizeof(wmode[0])) &&
+ (file = _wfopen(wfilename, wmode)) == NULL &&
+ (errno == ENOENT || errno == EBADF)
+ ) {
+ /*
+ * UTF-8 decode succeeded, but no file, filename
+ * could still have been locale-ized...
+ */
+ file = fopen(filename, mode);
+ }
+ } else if (GetLastError() == ERROR_NO_UNICODE_TRANSLATION) {
+ file = fopen(filename, mode);
+ }
+# else
+ file = fopen(filename, mode);
+# endif
+ return (file);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+{
+ BIO *ret;
+ FILE *file = file_fopen(filename, mode);
+
+ if (file == NULL) {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
+ ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
+ if (errno == ENOENT)
+ BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
+ else
+ BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+ fclose(file);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ BIO_clear_flags(ret, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* we did fopen -> we disengage
+ * UPLINK */
+ BIO_set_fp(ret, file, BIO_CLOSE);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int close_flag)
+{
+ BIO *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ BIO_set_flags(ret, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* redundant, left for
+ * documentation puposes */
+ BIO_set_fp(ret, stream, close_flag);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_file(void)
+{
+ return (&methods_filep);
+}
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+ bi->init = 0;
+ bi->num = 0;
+ bi->ptr = NULL;
+ bi->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK; /* default to UPLINK */
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_free(BIO *a)
+{
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ if (a->shutdown) {
+ if ((a->init) && (a->ptr != NULL)) {
+ if (a->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+ UP_fclose(a->ptr);
+ else
+ fclose(a->ptr);
+ a->ptr = NULL;
+ a->flags = BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK;
+ }
+ a->init = 0;
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (b->init && (out != NULL)) {
+ if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+ ret = UP_fread(out, 1, (int)outl, b->ptr);
+ else
+ ret = fread(out, 1, (int)outl, (FILE *)b->ptr);
+ if (ret == 0
+ && (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) ? UP_ferror((FILE *)b->ptr) :
+ ferror((FILE *)b->ptr)) {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_FREAD, get_last_sys_error());
+ BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_READ, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (b->init && (in != NULL)) {
+ if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+ ret = UP_fwrite(in, (int)inl, 1, b->ptr);
+ else
+ ret = fwrite(in, (int)inl, 1, (FILE *)b->ptr);
+ if (ret)
+ ret = inl;
+ /* ret=fwrite(in,1,(int)inl,(FILE *)b->ptr); */
+ /*
+ * according to Tim Hudson <tjh at cryptsoft.com>, the commented out
+ * version above can cause 'inl' write calls under some stupid stdio
+ * implementations (VMS)
+ */
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+ long ret = 1;
+ FILE *fp = (FILE *)b->ptr;
+ FILE **fpp;
+ char p[4];
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK:
+ case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+ if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+ ret = (long)UP_fseek(b->ptr, num, 0);
+ else
+ ret = (long)fseek(fp, num, 0);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_EOF:
+ if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+ ret = (long)UP_feof(fp);
+ else
+ ret = (long)feof(fp);
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_FILE_TELL:
+ case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+ if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+ ret = UP_ftell(b->ptr);
+ else
+ ret = ftell(fp);
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR:
+ file_free(b);
+ b->shutdown = (int)num & BIO_CLOSE;
+ b->ptr = ptr;
+ b->init = 1;
+# if BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK!=0
+# if defined(__MINGW32__) && defined(__MSVCRT__) && !defined(_IOB_ENTRIES)
+# define _IOB_ENTRIES 20
+# endif
+# if defined(_IOB_ENTRIES)
+ /* Safety net to catch purely internal BIO_set_fp calls */
+ if ((size_t)ptr >= (size_t)stdin &&
+ (size_t)ptr < (size_t)(stdin + _IOB_ENTRIES))
+ BIO_clear_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK);
+# endif
+# endif
+# ifdef UP_fsetmod
+ if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+ UP_fsetmod(b->ptr, (char)((num & BIO_FP_TEXT) ? 't' : 'b'));
+ else
+# endif
+ {
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+ int fd = _fileno((FILE *)ptr);
+ if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
+ _setmode(fd, _O_TEXT);
+ else
+ _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
+ int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
+ /* Under CLib there are differences in file modes */
+ if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
+ setmode(fd, O_TEXT);
+ else
+ setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+ int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
+ /* Set correct text/binary mode */
+ if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
+ _setmode(fd, _O_TEXT);
+ /* Dangerous to set stdin/stdout to raw (unless redirected) */
+ else {
+ if (fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO) {
+ if (isatty(fd) <= 0)
+ _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
+ } else
+ _setmode(fd, _O_BINARY);
+ }
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+ int fd = fileno((FILE *)ptr);
+ if (num & BIO_FP_TEXT)
+ setmode(fd, O_TEXT);
+ else
+ setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
+# endif
+ }
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_SET_FILENAME:
+ file_free(b);
+ b->shutdown = (int)num & BIO_CLOSE;
+ if (num & BIO_FP_APPEND) {
+ if (num & BIO_FP_READ)
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, "a+", sizeof p);
+ else
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, "a", sizeof p);
+ } else if ((num & BIO_FP_READ) && (num & BIO_FP_WRITE))
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, "r+", sizeof p);
+ else if (num & BIO_FP_WRITE)
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, "w", sizeof p);
+ else if (num & BIO_FP_READ)
+ BUF_strlcpy(p, "r", sizeof p);
+ else {
+ BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, BIO_R_BAD_FOPEN_MODE);
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+ if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
+ strcat(p, "b");
+ else
+ strcat(p, "t");
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+ if (!(num & BIO_FP_TEXT))
+ strcat(p, "b");
+ else
+ strcat(p, "t");
+# endif
+ fp = file_fopen(ptr, p);
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
+ ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')");
+ BIOerr(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ b->ptr = fp;
+ b->init = 1;
+ BIO_clear_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK); /* we did fopen -> we disengage
+ * UPLINK */
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR:
+ /* the ptr parameter is actually a FILE ** in this case. */
+ if (ptr != NULL) {
+ fpp = (FILE **)ptr;
+ *fpp = (FILE *)b->ptr;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+ ret = (long)b->shutdown;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+ b->shutdown = (int)num;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+ if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
+ UP_fflush(b->ptr);
+ else
+ fflush((FILE *)b->ptr);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+ case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+ case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
+ case BIO_CTRL_POP:
+ default:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ if (bp->flags & BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK) {
+ if (!UP_fgets(buf, size, bp->ptr))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!fgets(buf, size, (FILE *)bp->ptr))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ ret = strlen(buf);
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK file_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+ int n, ret;
+
+ n = strlen(str);
+ ret = file_write(bp, str, n);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
+
+#endif /* HEADER_BSS_FILE_C */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,278 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# May 2011
-#
-# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication
-# used in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from
-# C for the time being... Except that it has two code paths: pure
-# integer code suitable for any ARMv4 and later CPU and NEON code
-# suitable for ARMv7. Pure integer 1x1 multiplication subroutine runs
-# in ~45 cycles on dual-issue core such as Cortex A8, which is ~50%
-# faster than compiler-generated code. For ECDH and ECDSA verify (but
-# not for ECDSA sign) it means 25%-45% improvement depending on key
-# length, more for longer keys. Even though NEON 1x1 multiplication
-# runs in even less cycles, ~30, improvement is measurable only on
-# longer keys. One has to optimize code elsewhere to get NEON glow...
-
-while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
-open STDOUT,">$output";
-
-sub Dlo() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2):""; }
-sub Dhi() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2+1):""; }
-sub Q() { shift=~m|d([1-3]?[02468])|?"q".($1/2):""; }
-
-$code=<<___;
-#include "arm_arch.h"
-
-.text
-.code 32
-
-#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
-.fpu neon
-
-.type mul_1x1_neon,%function
-.align 5
-mul_1x1_neon:
- vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q1")`,d16,#8 @ q1-q3 are slided $a
- vmull.p8 `&Q("d0")`,d16,d17 @ a\xB7bb
- vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q2")`,d16,#16
- vmull.p8 q1,`&Dlo("q1")`,d17 @ a<<8\xB7bb
- vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q3")`,d16,#24
- vmull.p8 q2,`&Dlo("q2")`,d17 @ a<<16\xB7bb
- vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q1")`,#8
- vmull.p8 q3,`&Dlo("q3")`,d17 @ a<<24\xB7bb
- vshl.u64 `&Dhi("q1")`,#24
- veor d0,`&Dlo("q1")`
- vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q2")`,#16
- veor d0,`&Dhi("q1")`
- vshl.u64 `&Dhi("q2")`,#16
- veor d0,`&Dlo("q2")`
- vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q3")`,#24
- veor d0,`&Dhi("q2")`
- vshl.u64 `&Dhi("q3")`,#8
- veor d0,`&Dlo("q3")`
- veor d0,`&Dhi("q3")`
- bx lr
-.size mul_1x1_neon,.-mul_1x1_neon
-#endif
-___
-################
-# private interface to mul_1x1_ialu
-#
-$a="r1";
-$b="r0";
-
-($a0,$a1,$a2,$a12,$a4,$a14)=
-($hi,$lo,$t0,$t1, $i0,$i1 )=map("r$_",(4..9),12);
-
-$mask="r12";
-
-$code.=<<___;
-.type mul_1x1_ialu,%function
-.align 5
-mul_1x1_ialu:
- mov $a0,#0
- bic $a1,$a,#3<<30 @ a1=a&0x3fffffff
- str $a0,[sp,#0] @ tab[0]=0
- add $a2,$a1,$a1 @ a2=a1<<1
- str $a1,[sp,#4] @ tab[1]=a1
- eor $a12,$a1,$a2 @ a1^a2
- str $a2,[sp,#8] @ tab[2]=a2
- mov $a4,$a1,lsl#2 @ a4=a1<<2
- str $a12,[sp,#12] @ tab[3]=a1^a2
- eor $a14,$a1,$a4 @ a1^a4
- str $a4,[sp,#16] @ tab[4]=a4
- eor $a0,$a2,$a4 @ a2^a4
- str $a14,[sp,#20] @ tab[5]=a1^a4
- eor $a12,$a12,$a4 @ a1^a2^a4
- str $a0,[sp,#24] @ tab[6]=a2^a4
- and $i0,$mask,$b,lsl#2
- str $a12,[sp,#28] @ tab[7]=a1^a2^a4
-
- and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#1
- ldr $lo,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b & 0x7]
- and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#4
- ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 3 & 0x7]
- and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#7
- ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 6 & 0x7]
- eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#3 @ stall
- mov $hi,$t1,lsr#29
- ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 9 & 0x7]
-
- and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#10
- eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#6
- eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#26
- ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 12 & 0x7]
-
- and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#13
- eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#9
- eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#23
- ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 15 & 0x7]
-
- and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#16
- eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#12
- eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#20
- ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 18 & 0x7]
-
- and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#19
- eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#15
- eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#17
- ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 21 & 0x7]
-
- and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#22
- eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#18
- eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#14
- ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 24 & 0x7]
-
- and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#25
- eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#21
- eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#11
- ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 27 & 0x7]
-
- tst $a,#1<<30
- and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#28
- eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#24
- eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#8
- ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 30 ]
-
- eorne $lo,$lo,$b,lsl#30
- eorne $hi,$hi,$b,lsr#2
- tst $a,#1<<31
- eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#27
- eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#5
- eorne $lo,$lo,$b,lsl#31
- eorne $hi,$hi,$b,lsr#1
- eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#30
- eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#2
-
- mov pc,lr
-.size mul_1x1_ialu,.-mul_1x1_ialu
-___
-################
-# void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
-# BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
-# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0\xB7b1b0
-
-($A1,$B1,$A0,$B0,$A1B1,$A0B0)=map("d$_",(18..23));
-
-$code.=<<___;
-.global bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
-.type bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,%function
-.align 5
-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
-#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
- ldr r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
-.Lpic: ldr r12,[pc,r12]
- tst r12,#1
- beq .Lialu
-
- veor $A1,$A1
- vmov.32 $B1,r3,r3 @ two copies of b1
- vmov.32 ${A1}[0],r1 @ a1
-
- veor $A0,$A0
- vld1.32 ${B0}[],[sp,:32] @ two copies of b0
- vmov.32 ${A0}[0],r2 @ a0
- mov r12,lr
-
- vmov d16,$A1
- vmov d17,$B1
- bl mul_1x1_neon @ a1\xB7b1
- vmov $A1B1,d0
-
- vmov d16,$A0
- vmov d17,$B0
- bl mul_1x1_neon @ a0\xB7b0
- vmov $A0B0,d0
-
- veor d16,$A0,$A1
- veor d17,$B0,$B1
- veor $A0,$A0B0,$A1B1
- bl mul_1x1_neon @ (a0+a1)\xB7(b0+b1)
-
- veor d0,$A0 @ (a0+a1)\xB7(b0+b1)-a0\xB7b0-a1\xB7b1
- vshl.u64 d1,d0,#32
- vshr.u64 d0,d0,#32
- veor $A0B0,d1
- veor $A1B1,d0
- vst1.32 {${A0B0}[0]},[r0,:32]!
- vst1.32 {${A0B0}[1]},[r0,:32]!
- vst1.32 {${A1B1}[0]},[r0,:32]!
- vst1.32 {${A1B1}[1]},[r0,:32]
- bx r12
-.align 4
-.Lialu:
-#endif
-___
-$ret="r10"; # reassigned 1st argument
-$code.=<<___;
- stmdb sp!,{r4-r10,lr}
- mov $ret,r0 @ reassign 1st argument
- mov $b,r3 @ $b=b1
- ldr r3,[sp,#32] @ load b0
- mov $mask,#7<<2
- sub sp,sp,#32 @ allocate tab[8]
-
- bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1\xB7b1
- str $lo,[$ret,#8]
- str $hi,[$ret,#12]
-
- eor $b,$b,r3 @ flip b0 and b1
- eor $a,$a,r2 @ flip a0 and a1
- eor r3,r3,$b
- eor r2,r2,$a
- eor $b,$b,r3
- eor $a,$a,r2
- bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0\xB7b0
- str $lo,[$ret]
- str $hi,[$ret,#4]
-
- eor $a,$a,r2
- eor $b,$b,r3
- bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)\xB7(b1+b0)
-___
- at r=map("r$_",(6..9));
-$code.=<<___;
- ldmia $ret,{@r[0]- at r[3]}
- eor $lo,$lo,$hi
- eor $hi,$hi, at r[1]
- eor $lo,$lo, at r[0]
- eor $hi,$hi, at r[2]
- eor $lo,$lo, at r[3]
- eor $hi,$hi, at r[3]
- str $hi,[$ret,#8]
- eor $lo,$lo,$hi
- add sp,sp,#32 @ destroy tab[8]
- str $lo,[$ret,#4]
-
-#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
- ldmia sp!,{r4-r10,pc}
-#else
- ldmia sp!,{r4-r10,lr}
- tst lr,#1
- moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet
- bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
-#endif
-.size bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
-#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
-.align 5
-.LOPENSSL_armcap:
-.word OPENSSL_armcap_P-(.Lpic+8)
-#endif
-.asciz "GF(2^m) Multiplication for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
-.align 5
-
-.comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
-___
-
-$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
-$code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
-print $code;
-close STDOUT; # enforce flush
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# May 2011
+#
+# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication
+# used in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from
+# C for the time being... Except that it has two code paths: pure
+# integer code suitable for any ARMv4 and later CPU and NEON code
+# suitable for ARMv7. Pure integer 1x1 multiplication subroutine runs
+# in ~45 cycles on dual-issue core such as Cortex A8, which is ~50%
+# faster than compiler-generated code. For ECDH and ECDSA verify (but
+# not for ECDSA sign) it means 25%-45% improvement depending on key
+# length, more for longer keys. Even though NEON 1x1 multiplication
+# runs in even less cycles, ~30, improvement is measurable only on
+# longer keys. One has to optimize code elsewhere to get NEON glow...
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+sub Dlo() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2):""; }
+sub Dhi() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2+1):""; }
+sub Q() { shift=~m|d([1-3]?[02468])|?"q".($1/2):""; }
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+.code 32
+
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+.fpu neon
+
+.type mul_1x1_neon,%function
+.align 5
+mul_1x1_neon:
+ vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q1")`,d16,#8 @ q1-q3 are slided $a
+ vmull.p8 `&Q("d0")`,d16,d17 @ a·bb
+ vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q2")`,d16,#16
+ vmull.p8 q1,`&Dlo("q1")`,d17 @ a<<8·bb
+ vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q3")`,d16,#24
+ vmull.p8 q2,`&Dlo("q2")`,d17 @ a<<16·bb
+ vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q1")`,#8
+ vmull.p8 q3,`&Dlo("q3")`,d17 @ a<<24·bb
+ vshl.u64 `&Dhi("q1")`,#24
+ veor d0,`&Dlo("q1")`
+ vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q2")`,#16
+ veor d0,`&Dhi("q1")`
+ vshl.u64 `&Dhi("q2")`,#16
+ veor d0,`&Dlo("q2")`
+ vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q3")`,#24
+ veor d0,`&Dhi("q2")`
+ vshl.u64 `&Dhi("q3")`,#8
+ veor d0,`&Dlo("q3")`
+ veor d0,`&Dhi("q3")`
+ bx lr
+.size mul_1x1_neon,.-mul_1x1_neon
+#endif
+___
+################
+# private interface to mul_1x1_ialu
+#
+$a="r1";
+$b="r0";
+
+($a0,$a1,$a2,$a12,$a4,$a14)=
+($hi,$lo,$t0,$t1, $i0,$i1 )=map("r$_",(4..9),12);
+
+$mask="r12";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.type mul_1x1_ialu,%function
+.align 5
+mul_1x1_ialu:
+ mov $a0,#0
+ bic $a1,$a,#3<<30 @ a1=a&0x3fffffff
+ str $a0,[sp,#0] @ tab[0]=0
+ add $a2,$a1,$a1 @ a2=a1<<1
+ str $a1,[sp,#4] @ tab[1]=a1
+ eor $a12,$a1,$a2 @ a1^a2
+ str $a2,[sp,#8] @ tab[2]=a2
+ mov $a4,$a1,lsl#2 @ a4=a1<<2
+ str $a12,[sp,#12] @ tab[3]=a1^a2
+ eor $a14,$a1,$a4 @ a1^a4
+ str $a4,[sp,#16] @ tab[4]=a4
+ eor $a0,$a2,$a4 @ a2^a4
+ str $a14,[sp,#20] @ tab[5]=a1^a4
+ eor $a12,$a12,$a4 @ a1^a2^a4
+ str $a0,[sp,#24] @ tab[6]=a2^a4
+ and $i0,$mask,$b,lsl#2
+ str $a12,[sp,#28] @ tab[7]=a1^a2^a4
+
+ and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#1
+ ldr $lo,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b & 0x7]
+ and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#4
+ ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 3 & 0x7]
+ and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#7
+ ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 6 & 0x7]
+ eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#3 @ stall
+ mov $hi,$t1,lsr#29
+ ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 9 & 0x7]
+
+ and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#10
+ eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#6
+ eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#26
+ ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 12 & 0x7]
+
+ and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#13
+ eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#9
+ eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#23
+ ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 15 & 0x7]
+
+ and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#16
+ eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#12
+ eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#20
+ ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 18 & 0x7]
+
+ and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#19
+ eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#15
+ eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#17
+ ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 21 & 0x7]
+
+ and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#22
+ eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#18
+ eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#14
+ ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 24 & 0x7]
+
+ and $i1,$mask,$b,lsr#25
+ eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#21
+ eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#11
+ ldr $t1,[sp,$i1] @ tab[b >> 27 & 0x7]
+
+ tst $a,#1<<30
+ and $i0,$mask,$b,lsr#28
+ eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#24
+ eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#8
+ ldr $t0,[sp,$i0] @ tab[b >> 30 ]
+
+ eorne $lo,$lo,$b,lsl#30
+ eorne $hi,$hi,$b,lsr#2
+ tst $a,#1<<31
+ eor $lo,$lo,$t1,lsl#27
+ eor $hi,$hi,$t1,lsr#5
+ eorne $lo,$lo,$b,lsl#31
+ eorne $hi,$hi,$b,lsr#1
+ eor $lo,$lo,$t0,lsl#30
+ eor $hi,$hi,$t0,lsr#2
+
+ mov pc,lr
+.size mul_1x1_ialu,.-mul_1x1_ialu
+___
+################
+# void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
+# BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
+# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0
+
+($A1,$B1,$A0,$B0,$A1B1,$A0B0)=map("d$_",(18..23));
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.global bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.type bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,%function
+.align 5
+bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+ ldr r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
+.Lpic: ldr r12,[pc,r12]
+ tst r12,#1
+ beq .Lialu
+
+ veor $A1,$A1
+ vmov.32 $B1,r3,r3 @ two copies of b1
+ vmov.32 ${A1}[0],r1 @ a1
+
+ veor $A0,$A0
+ vld1.32 ${B0}[],[sp,:32] @ two copies of b0
+ vmov.32 ${A0}[0],r2 @ a0
+ mov r12,lr
+
+ vmov d16,$A1
+ vmov d17,$B1
+ bl mul_1x1_neon @ a1·b1
+ vmov $A1B1,d0
+
+ vmov d16,$A0
+ vmov d17,$B0
+ bl mul_1x1_neon @ a0·b0
+ vmov $A0B0,d0
+
+ veor d16,$A0,$A1
+ veor d17,$B0,$B1
+ veor $A0,$A0B0,$A1B1
+ bl mul_1x1_neon @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+
+ veor d0,$A0 @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
+ vshl.u64 d1,d0,#32
+ vshr.u64 d0,d0,#32
+ veor $A0B0,d1
+ veor $A1B1,d0
+ vst1.32 {${A0B0}[0]},[r0,:32]!
+ vst1.32 {${A0B0}[1]},[r0,:32]!
+ vst1.32 {${A1B1}[0]},[r0,:32]!
+ vst1.32 {${A1B1}[1]},[r0,:32]
+ bx r12
+.align 4
+.Lialu:
+#endif
+___
+$ret="r10"; # reassigned 1st argument
+$code.=<<___;
+ stmdb sp!,{r4-r10,lr}
+ mov $ret,r0 @ reassign 1st argument
+ mov $b,r3 @ $b=b1
+ ldr r3,[sp,#32] @ load b0
+ mov $mask,#7<<2
+ sub sp,sp,#32 @ allocate tab[8]
+
+ bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1
+ str $lo,[$ret,#8]
+ str $hi,[$ret,#12]
+
+ eor $b,$b,r3 @ flip b0 and b1
+ eor $a,$a,r2 @ flip a0 and a1
+ eor r3,r3,$b
+ eor r2,r2,$a
+ eor $b,$b,r3
+ eor $a,$a,r2
+ bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0
+ str $lo,[$ret]
+ str $hi,[$ret,#4]
+
+ eor $a,$a,r2
+ eor $b,$b,r3
+ bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0)
+___
+ at r=map("r$_",(6..9));
+$code.=<<___;
+ ldmia $ret,{@r[0]- at r[3]}
+ eor $lo,$lo,$hi
+ eor $hi,$hi, at r[1]
+ eor $lo,$lo, at r[0]
+ eor $hi,$hi, at r[2]
+ eor $lo,$lo, at r[3]
+ eor $hi,$hi, at r[3]
+ str $hi,[$ret,#8]
+ eor $lo,$lo,$hi
+ add sp,sp,#32 @ destroy tab[8]
+ str $lo,[$ret,#4]
+
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+ ldmia sp!,{r4-r10,pc}
+#else
+ ldmia sp!,{r4-r10,lr}
+ tst lr,#1
+ moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+ bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+.align 5
+.LOPENSSL_armcap:
+.word OPENSSL_armcap_P-(.Lpic+8)
+#endif
+.asciz "GF(2^m) Multiplication for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align 5
+
+.comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+$code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
+print $code;
+close STDOUT; # enforce flush
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1555 +0,0 @@
-.explicit
-.text
-.ident "ia64.S, Version 2.1"
-.ident "IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>"
-
-//
-// ====================================================================
-// Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
-// project.
-//
-// Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
-// granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
-// disclaimed.
-// ====================================================================
-//
-// Version 2.x is Itanium2 re-tune. Few words about how Itanum2 is
-// different from Itanium to this module viewpoint. Most notably, is it
-// "wider" than Itanium? Can you experience loop scalability as
-// discussed in commentary sections? Not really:-( Itanium2 has 6
-// integer ALU ports, i.e. it's 2 ports wider, but it's not enough to
-// spin twice as fast, as I need 8 IALU ports. Amount of floating point
-// ports is the same, i.e. 2, while I need 4. In other words, to this
-// module Itanium2 remains effectively as "wide" as Itanium. Yet it's
-// essentially different in respect to this module, and a re-tune was
-// required. Well, because some intruction latencies has changed. Most
-// noticeably those intensively used:
-//
-// Itanium Itanium2
-// ldf8 9 6 L2 hit
-// ld8 2 1 L1 hit
-// getf 2 5
-// xma[->getf] 7[+1] 4[+0]
-// add[->st8] 1[+1] 1[+0]
-//
-// What does it mean? You might ratiocinate that the original code
-// should run just faster... Because sum of latencies is smaller...
-// Wrong! Note that getf latency increased. This means that if a loop is
-// scheduled for lower latency (as they were), then it will suffer from
-// stall condition and the code will therefore turn anti-scalable, e.g.
-// original bn_mul_words spun at 5*n or 2.5 times slower than expected
-// on Itanium2! What to do? Reschedule loops for Itanium2? But then
-// Itanium would exhibit anti-scalability. So I've chosen to reschedule
-// for worst latency for every instruction aiming for best *all-round*
-// performance.
-
-// Q. How much faster does it get?
-// A. Here is the output from 'openssl speed rsa dsa' for vanilla
-// 0.9.6a compiled with gcc version 2.96 20000731 (Red Hat
-// Linux 7.1 2.96-81):
-//
-// sign verify sign/s verify/s
-// rsa 512 bits 0.0036s 0.0003s 275.3 2999.2
-// rsa 1024 bits 0.0203s 0.0011s 49.3 894.1
-// rsa 2048 bits 0.1331s 0.0040s 7.5 250.9
-// rsa 4096 bits 0.9270s 0.0147s 1.1 68.1
-// sign verify sign/s verify/s
-// dsa 512 bits 0.0035s 0.0043s 288.3 234.8
-// dsa 1024 bits 0.0111s 0.0135s 90.0 74.2
-//
-// And here is similar output but for this assembler
-// implementation:-)
-//
-// sign verify sign/s verify/s
-// rsa 512 bits 0.0021s 0.0001s 549.4 9638.5
-// rsa 1024 bits 0.0055s 0.0002s 183.8 4481.1
-// rsa 2048 bits 0.0244s 0.0006s 41.4 1726.3
-// rsa 4096 bits 0.1295s 0.0018s 7.7 561.5
-// sign verify sign/s verify/s
-// dsa 512 bits 0.0012s 0.0013s 891.9 756.6
-// dsa 1024 bits 0.0023s 0.0028s 440.4 376.2
-//
-// Yes, you may argue that it's not fair comparison as it's
-// possible to craft the C implementation with BN_UMULT_HIGH
-// inline assembler macro. But of course! Here is the output
-// with the macro:
-//
-// sign verify sign/s verify/s
-// rsa 512 bits 0.0020s 0.0002s 495.0 6561.0
-// rsa 1024 bits 0.0086s 0.0004s 116.2 2235.7
-// rsa 2048 bits 0.0519s 0.0015s 19.3 667.3
-// rsa 4096 bits 0.3464s 0.0053s 2.9 187.7
-// sign verify sign/s verify/s
-// dsa 512 bits 0.0016s 0.0020s 613.1 510.5
-// dsa 1024 bits 0.0045s 0.0054s 221.0 183.9
-//
-// My code is still way faster, huh:-) And I believe that even
-// higher performance can be achieved. Note that as keys get
-// longer, performance gain is larger. Why? According to the
-// profiler there is another player in the field, namely
-// BN_from_montgomery consuming larger and larger portion of CPU
-// time as keysize decreases. I therefore consider putting effort
-// to assembler implementation of the following routine:
-//
-// void bn_mul_add_mont (BN_ULONG *rp,BN_ULONG *np,int nl,BN_ULONG n0)
-// {
-// int i,j;
-// BN_ULONG v;
-//
-// for (i=0; i<nl; i++)
-// {
-// v=bn_mul_add_words(rp,np,nl,(rp[0]*n0)&BN_MASK2);
-// nrp++;
-// rp++;
-// if (((nrp[-1]+=v)&BN_MASK2) < v)
-// for (j=0; ((++nrp[j])&BN_MASK2) == 0; j++) ;
-// }
-// }
-//
-// It might as well be beneficial to implement even combaX
-// variants, as it appears as it can literally unleash the
-// performance (see comment section to bn_mul_comba8 below).
-//
-// And finally for your reference the output for 0.9.6a compiled
-// with SGIcc version 0.01.0-12 (keep in mind that for the moment
-// of this writing it's not possible to convince SGIcc to use
-// BN_UMULT_HIGH inline assembler macro, yet the code is fast,
-// i.e. for a compiler generated one:-):
-//
-// sign verify sign/s verify/s
-// rsa 512 bits 0.0022s 0.0002s 452.7 5894.3
-// rsa 1024 bits 0.0097s 0.0005s 102.7 2002.9
-// rsa 2048 bits 0.0578s 0.0017s 17.3 600.2
-// rsa 4096 bits 0.3838s 0.0061s 2.6 164.5
-// sign verify sign/s verify/s
-// dsa 512 bits 0.0018s 0.0022s 547.3 459.6
-// dsa 1024 bits 0.0051s 0.0062s 196.6 161.3
-//
-// Oh! Benchmarks were performed on 733MHz Lion-class Itanium
-// system running Redhat Linux 7.1 (very special thanks to Ray
-// McCaffity of Williams Communications for providing an account).
-//
-// Q. What's the heck with 'rum 1<<5' at the end of every function?
-// A. Well, by clearing the "upper FP registers written" bit of the
-// User Mask I want to excuse the kernel from preserving upper
-// (f32-f128) FP register bank over process context switch, thus
-// minimizing bus bandwidth consumption during the switch (i.e.
-// after PKI opration completes and the program is off doing
-// something else like bulk symmetric encryption). Having said
-// this, I also want to point out that it might be good idea
-// to compile the whole toolkit (as well as majority of the
-// programs for that matter) with -mfixed-range=f32-f127 command
-// line option. No, it doesn't prevent the compiler from writing
-// to upper bank, but at least discourages to do so. If you don't
-// like the idea you have the option to compile the module with
-// -Drum=nop.m in command line.
-//
-
-#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
-#define ADDP addp4
-#else
-#define ADDP add
-#endif
-
-#if 1
-//
-// bn_[add|sub]_words routines.
-//
-// Loops are spinning in 2*(n+5) ticks on Itanuim (provided that the
-// data reside in L1 cache, i.e. 2 ticks away). It's possible to
-// compress the epilogue and get down to 2*n+6, but at the cost of
-// scalability (the neat feature of this implementation is that it
-// shall automagically spin in n+5 on "wider" IA-64 implementations:-)
-// I consider that the epilogue is short enough as it is to trade tiny
-// performance loss on Itanium for scalability.
-//
-// BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,int num)
-//
-.global bn_add_words#
-.proc bn_add_words#
-.align 64
-.skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
-bn_add_words:
- .prologue
- .save ar.pfs,r2
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16
- cmp4.le p6,p0=r35,r0 };;
-{ .mfb; mov r8=r0 // return value
-(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
-
-{ .mib; sub r10=r35,r0,1
- .save ar.lc,r3
- mov r3=ar.lc
- brp.loop.imp .L_bn_add_words_ctop,.L_bn_add_words_cend-16
- }
-{ .mib; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp
- .save pr,r9
- mov r9=pr };;
- .body
-{ .mii; ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap
- mov ar.lc=r10
- mov ar.ec=6 }
-{ .mib; ADDP r16=0,r34 // bp
- mov pr.rot=1<<16 };;
-
-.L_bn_add_words_ctop:
-{ .mii; (p16) ld8 r32=[r16],8 // b=*(bp++)
- (p18) add r39=r37,r34
- (p19) cmp.ltu.unc p56,p0=r40,r38 }
-{ .mfb; (p0) nop.m 0x0
- (p0) nop.f 0x0
- (p0) nop.b 0x0 }
-{ .mii; (p16) ld8 r35=[r15],8 // a=*(ap++)
- (p58) cmp.eq.or p57,p0=-1,r41 // (p20)
- (p58) add r41=1,r41 } // (p20)
-{ .mfb; (p21) st8 [r14]=r42,8 // *(rp++)=r
- (p0) nop.f 0x0
- br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_add_words_ctop };;
-.L_bn_add_words_cend:
-
-{ .mii;
-(p59) add r8=1,r8 // return value
- mov pr=r9,0x1ffff
- mov ar.lc=r3 }
-{ .mbb; nop.b 0x0
- br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
-.endp bn_add_words#
-
-//
-// BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,int num)
-//
-.global bn_sub_words#
-.proc bn_sub_words#
-.align 64
-.skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
-bn_sub_words:
- .prologue
- .save ar.pfs,r2
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16
- cmp4.le p6,p0=r35,r0 };;
-{ .mfb; mov r8=r0 // return value
-(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
-
-{ .mib; sub r10=r35,r0,1
- .save ar.lc,r3
- mov r3=ar.lc
- brp.loop.imp .L_bn_sub_words_ctop,.L_bn_sub_words_cend-16
- }
-{ .mib; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp
- .save pr,r9
- mov r9=pr };;
- .body
-{ .mii; ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap
- mov ar.lc=r10
- mov ar.ec=6 }
-{ .mib; ADDP r16=0,r34 // bp
- mov pr.rot=1<<16 };;
-
-.L_bn_sub_words_ctop:
-{ .mii; (p16) ld8 r32=[r16],8 // b=*(bp++)
- (p18) sub r39=r37,r34
- (p19) cmp.gtu.unc p56,p0=r40,r38 }
-{ .mfb; (p0) nop.m 0x0
- (p0) nop.f 0x0
- (p0) nop.b 0x0 }
-{ .mii; (p16) ld8 r35=[r15],8 // a=*(ap++)
- (p58) cmp.eq.or p57,p0=0,r41 // (p20)
- (p58) add r41=-1,r41 } // (p20)
-{ .mbb; (p21) st8 [r14]=r42,8 // *(rp++)=r
- (p0) nop.b 0x0
- br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_sub_words_ctop };;
-.L_bn_sub_words_cend:
-
-{ .mii;
-(p59) add r8=1,r8 // return value
- mov pr=r9,0x1ffff
- mov ar.lc=r3 }
-{ .mbb; nop.b 0x0
- br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
-.endp bn_sub_words#
-#endif
-
-#if 0
-#define XMA_TEMPTATION
-#endif
-
-#if 1
-//
-// BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
-//
-.global bn_mul_words#
-.proc bn_mul_words#
-.align 64
-.skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
-bn_mul_words:
- .prologue
- .save ar.pfs,r2
-#ifdef XMA_TEMPTATION
-{ .mfi; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,0,0,0 };;
-#else
-{ .mfi; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16 };;
-#endif
-{ .mib; mov r8=r0 // return value
- cmp4.le p6,p0=r34,r0
-(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
-
-{ .mii; sub r10=r34,r0,1
- .save ar.lc,r3
- mov r3=ar.lc
- .save pr,r9
- mov r9=pr };;
-
- .body
-{ .mib; setf.sig f8=r35 // w
- mov pr.rot=0x800001<<16
- // ------^----- serves as (p50) at first (p27)
- brp.loop.imp .L_bn_mul_words_ctop,.L_bn_mul_words_cend-16
- }
-
-#ifndef XMA_TEMPTATION
-
-{ .mmi; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp
- ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap
- mov ar.lc=r10 }
-{ .mmi; mov r40=0 // serves as r35 at first (p27)
- mov ar.ec=13 };;
-
-// This loop spins in 2*(n+12) ticks. It's scheduled for data in Itanium
-// L2 cache (i.e. 9 ticks away) as floating point load/store instructions
-// bypass L1 cache and L2 latency is actually best-case scenario for
-// ldf8. The loop is not scalable and shall run in 2*(n+12) even on
-// "wider" IA-64 implementations. It's a trade-off here. n+24 loop
-// would give us ~5% in *overall* performance improvement on "wider"
-// IA-64, but would hurt Itanium for about same because of longer
-// epilogue. As it's a matter of few percents in either case I've
-// chosen to trade the scalability for development time (you can see
-// this very instruction sequence in bn_mul_add_words loop which in
-// turn is scalable).
-.L_bn_mul_words_ctop:
-{ .mfi; (p25) getf.sig r36=f52 // low
- (p21) xmpy.lu f48=f37,f8
- (p28) cmp.ltu p54,p50=r41,r39 }
-{ .mfi; (p16) ldf8 f32=[r15],8
- (p21) xmpy.hu f40=f37,f8
- (p0) nop.i 0x0 };;
-{ .mii; (p25) getf.sig r32=f44 // high
- .pred.rel "mutex",p50,p54
- (p50) add r40=r38,r35 // (p27)
- (p54) add r40=r38,r35,1 } // (p27)
-{ .mfb; (p28) st8 [r14]=r41,8
- (p0) nop.f 0x0
- br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_mul_words_ctop };;
-.L_bn_mul_words_cend:
-
-{ .mii; nop.m 0x0
-.pred.rel "mutex",p51,p55
-(p51) add r8=r36,r0
-(p55) add r8=r36,r0,1 }
-{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0
- nop.f 0x0
- nop.b 0x0 }
-
-#else // XMA_TEMPTATION
-
- setf.sig f37=r0 // serves as carry at (p18) tick
- mov ar.lc=r10
- mov ar.ec=5;;
-
-// Most of you examining this code very likely wonder why in the name
-// of Intel the following loop is commented out? Indeed, it looks so
-// neat that you find it hard to believe that it's something wrong
-// with it, right? The catch is that every iteration depends on the
-// result from previous one and the latter isn't available instantly.
-// The loop therefore spins at the latency of xma minus 1, or in other
-// words at 6*(n+4) ticks:-( Compare to the "production" loop above
-// that runs in 2*(n+11) where the low latency problem is worked around
-// by moving the dependency to one-tick latent interger ALU. Note that
-// "distance" between ldf8 and xma is not latency of ldf8, but the
-// *difference* between xma and ldf8 latencies.
-.L_bn_mul_words_ctop:
-{ .mfi; (p16) ldf8 f32=[r33],8
- (p18) xma.hu f38=f34,f8,f39 }
-{ .mfb; (p20) stf8 [r32]=f37,8
- (p18) xma.lu f35=f34,f8,f39
- br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_mul_words_ctop };;
-.L_bn_mul_words_cend:
-
- getf.sig r8=f41 // the return value
-
-#endif // XMA_TEMPTATION
-
-{ .mii; nop.m 0x0
- mov pr=r9,0x1ffff
- mov ar.lc=r3 }
-{ .mfb; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh
- nop.f 0x0
- br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
-.endp bn_mul_words#
-#endif
-
-#if 1
-//
-// BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
-//
-.global bn_mul_add_words#
-.proc bn_mul_add_words#
-.align 64
-.skip 48 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
-bn_mul_add_words:
- .prologue
- .save ar.pfs,r2
-{ .mmi; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,4,0,8
- cmp4.le p6,p0=r34,r0
- .save ar.lc,r3
- mov r3=ar.lc };;
-{ .mib; mov r8=r0 // return value
- sub r10=r34,r0,1
-(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
-
-{ .mib; setf.sig f8=r35 // w
- .save pr,r9
- mov r9=pr
- brp.loop.imp .L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop,.L_bn_mul_add_words_cend-16
- }
- .body
-{ .mmi; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp
- ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap
- mov ar.lc=r10 }
-{ .mii; ADDP r16=0,r32 // rp copy
- mov pr.rot=0x2001<<16
- // ------^----- serves as (p40) at first (p27)
- mov ar.ec=11 };;
-
-// This loop spins in 3*(n+10) ticks on Itanium and in 2*(n+10) on
-// Itanium 2. Yes, unlike previous versions it scales:-) Previous
-// version was peforming *all* additions in IALU and was starving
-// for those even on Itanium 2. In this version one addition is
-// moved to FPU and is folded with multiplication. This is at cost
-// of propogating the result from previous call to this subroutine
-// to L2 cache... In other words negligible even for shorter keys.
-// *Overall* performance improvement [over previous version] varies
-// from 11 to 22 percent depending on key length.
-.L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop:
-.pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42
-{ .mfi; (p23) getf.sig r36=f45 // low
- (p20) xma.lu f42=f36,f8,f50 // low
- (p40) add r39=r39,r35 } // (p27)
-{ .mfi; (p16) ldf8 f32=[r15],8 // *(ap++)
- (p20) xma.hu f36=f36,f8,f50 // high
- (p42) add r39=r39,r35,1 };; // (p27)
-{ .mmi; (p24) getf.sig r32=f40 // high
- (p16) ldf8 f46=[r16],8 // *(rp1++)
- (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=r39,r35 } // (p27)
-{ .mib; (p26) st8 [r14]=r39,8 // *(rp2++)
- (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=r39,r35 // (p27)
- br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop};;
-.L_bn_mul_add_words_cend:
-
-{ .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42
-(p40) add r8=r35,r0
-(p42) add r8=r35,r0,1
- mov pr=r9,0x1ffff }
-{ .mib; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh
- mov ar.lc=r3
- br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
-.endp bn_mul_add_words#
-#endif
-
-#if 1
-//
-// void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num)
-//
-.global bn_sqr_words#
-.proc bn_sqr_words#
-.align 64
-.skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
-bn_sqr_words:
- .prologue
- .save ar.pfs,r2
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
- sxt4 r34=r34 };;
-{ .mii; cmp.le p6,p0=r34,r0
- mov r8=r0 } // return value
-{ .mfb; ADDP r32=0,r32
- nop.f 0x0
-(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
-
-{ .mii; sub r10=r34,r0,1
- .save ar.lc,r3
- mov r3=ar.lc
- .save pr,r9
- mov r9=pr };;
-
- .body
-{ .mib; ADDP r33=0,r33
- mov pr.rot=1<<16
- brp.loop.imp .L_bn_sqr_words_ctop,.L_bn_sqr_words_cend-16
- }
-{ .mii; add r34=8,r32
- mov ar.lc=r10
- mov ar.ec=18 };;
-
-// 2*(n+17) on Itanium, (n+17) on "wider" IA-64 implementations. It's
-// possible to compress the epilogue (I'm getting tired to write this
-// comment over and over) and get down to 2*n+16 at the cost of
-// scalability. The decision will very likely be reconsidered after the
-// benchmark program is profiled. I.e. if perfomance gain on Itanium
-// will appear larger than loss on "wider" IA-64, then the loop should
-// be explicitely split and the epilogue compressed.
-.L_bn_sqr_words_ctop:
-{ .mfi; (p16) ldf8 f32=[r33],8
- (p25) xmpy.lu f42=f41,f41
- (p0) nop.i 0x0 }
-{ .mib; (p33) stf8 [r32]=f50,16
- (p0) nop.i 0x0
- (p0) nop.b 0x0 }
-{ .mfi; (p0) nop.m 0x0
- (p25) xmpy.hu f52=f41,f41
- (p0) nop.i 0x0 }
-{ .mib; (p33) stf8 [r34]=f60,16
- (p0) nop.i 0x0
- br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_sqr_words_ctop };;
-.L_bn_sqr_words_cend:
-
-{ .mii; nop.m 0x0
- mov pr=r9,0x1ffff
- mov ar.lc=r3 }
-{ .mfb; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh
- nop.f 0x0
- br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
-.endp bn_sqr_words#
-#endif
-
-#if 1
-// Apparently we win nothing by implementing special bn_sqr_comba8.
-// Yes, it is possible to reduce the number of multiplications by
-// almost factor of two, but then the amount of additions would
-// increase by factor of two (as we would have to perform those
-// otherwise performed by xma ourselves). Normally we would trade
-// anyway as multiplications are way more expensive, but not this
-// time... Multiplication kernel is fully pipelined and as we drain
-// one 128-bit multiplication result per clock cycle multiplications
-// are effectively as inexpensive as additions. Special implementation
-// might become of interest for "wider" IA-64 implementation as you'll
-// be able to get through the multiplication phase faster (there won't
-// be any stall issues as discussed in the commentary section below and
-// you therefore will be able to employ all 4 FP units)... But these
-// Itanium days it's simply too hard to justify the effort so I just
-// drop down to bn_mul_comba8 code:-)
-//
-// void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
-//
-.global bn_sqr_comba8#
-.proc bn_sqr_comba8#
-.align 64
-bn_sqr_comba8:
- .prologue
- .save ar.pfs,r2
-#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
- addp4 r33=0,r33
- addp4 r32=0,r32 };;
-{ .mii;
-#else
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
-#endif
- mov r34=r33
- add r14=8,r33 };;
- .body
-{ .mii; add r17=8,r34
- add r15=16,r33
- add r18=16,r34 }
-{ .mfb; add r16=24,r33
- br .L_cheat_entry_point8 };;
-.endp bn_sqr_comba8#
-#endif
-
-#if 1
-// I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
-// (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
-// cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
-// clause in Itanium \xB5-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
-// highly appreciated.
-//
-// On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on
-// result from getf.sig. I do nothing about it at this point for
-// reasons depicted below.
-//
-// However! It should be noted that even 160 ticks is darn good result
-// as it's over 10 (yes, ten, spelled as t-e-n) times faster than the
-// C version (compiled with gcc with inline assembler). I really
-// kicked compiler's butt here, didn't I? Yeah! This brings us to the
-// following statement. It's damn shame that this routine isn't called
-// very often nowadays! According to the profiler most CPU time is
-// consumed by bn_mul_add_words called from BN_from_montgomery. In
-// order to estimate what we're missing, I've compared the performance
-// of this routine against "traditional" implementation, i.e. against
-// following routine:
-//
-// void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
-// { r[ 8]=bn_mul_words( &(r[0]),a,8,b[0]);
-// r[ 9]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]),a,8,b[1]);
-// r[10]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]),a,8,b[2]);
-// r[11]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]),a,8,b[3]);
-// r[12]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]),a,8,b[4]);
-// r[13]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[5]),a,8,b[5]);
-// r[14]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[6]),a,8,b[6]);
-// r[15]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[7]),a,8,b[7]);
-// }
-//
-// The one below is over 8 times faster than the one above:-( Even
-// more reasons to "combafy" bn_mul_add_mont...
-//
-// And yes, this routine really made me wish there were an optimizing
-// assembler! It also feels like it deserves a dedication.
-//
-// To my wife for being there and to my kids...
-//
-// void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
-//
-#define carry1 r14
-#define carry2 r15
-#define carry3 r34
-.global bn_mul_comba8#
-.proc bn_mul_comba8#
-.align 64
-bn_mul_comba8:
- .prologue
- .save ar.pfs,r2
-#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
- addp4 r33=0,r33
- addp4 r34=0,r34 };;
-{ .mii; addp4 r32=0,r32
-#else
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
-#endif
- add r14=8,r33
- add r17=8,r34 }
- .body
-{ .mii; add r15=16,r33
- add r18=16,r34
- add r16=24,r33 }
-.L_cheat_entry_point8:
-{ .mmi; add r19=24,r34
-
- ldf8 f32=[r33],32 };;
-
-{ .mmi; ldf8 f120=[r34],32
- ldf8 f121=[r17],32 }
-{ .mmi; ldf8 f122=[r18],32
- ldf8 f123=[r19],32 };;
-{ .mmi; ldf8 f124=[r34]
- ldf8 f125=[r17] }
-{ .mmi; ldf8 f126=[r18]
- ldf8 f127=[r19] }
-
-{ .mmi; ldf8 f33=[r14],32
- ldf8 f34=[r15],32 }
-{ .mmi; ldf8 f35=[r16],32;;
- ldf8 f36=[r33] }
-{ .mmi; ldf8 f37=[r14]
- ldf8 f38=[r15] }
-{ .mfi; ldf8 f39=[r16]
-// -------\ Entering multiplier's heaven /-------
-// ------------\ /------------
-// -----------------\ /-----------------
-// ----------------------\/----------------------
- xma.hu f41=f32,f120,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f40=f32,f120,f0 };; // (*)
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f51=f32,f121,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f50=f32,f121,f0 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f61=f32,f122,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f60=f32,f122,f0 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f71=f32,f123,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f70=f32,f123,f0 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f81=f32,f124,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f80=f32,f124,f0 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f91=f32,f125,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f90=f32,f125,f0 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f101=f32,f126,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f100=f32,f126,f0 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f111=f32,f127,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f110=f32,f127,f0 };;//
-// (*) You can argue that splitting at every second bundle would
-// prevent "wider" IA-64 implementations from achieving the peak
-// performance. Well, not really... The catch is that if you
-// intend to keep 4 FP units busy by splitting at every fourth
-// bundle and thus perform these 16 multiplications in 4 ticks,
-// the first bundle *below* would stall because the result from
-// the first xma bundle *above* won't be available for another 3
-// ticks (if not more, being an optimist, I assume that "wider"
-// implementation will have same latency:-). This stall will hold
-// you back and the performance would be as if every second bundle
-// were split *anyway*...
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f40
- xma.hu f42=f33,f120,f41
- add r33=8,r32 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f41=f33,f120,f41 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f50
- xma.hu f52=f33,f121,f51 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f51=f33,f121,f51 };;
-{ .mfi; st8 [r32]=r16,16
- xma.hu f62=f33,f122,f61 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f61=f33,f122,f61 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f72=f33,f123,f71 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f71=f33,f123,f71 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f82=f33,f124,f81 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f81=f33,f124,f81 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f92=f33,f125,f91 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f91=f33,f125,f91 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f102=f33,f126,f101 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f101=f33,f126,f101 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f112=f33,f127,f111 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f111=f33,f127,f111 };;//
-//-------------------------------------------------//
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f41
- xma.hu f43=f34,f120,f42 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f42=f34,f120,f42 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f60
- xma.hu f53=f34,f121,f52 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f52=f34,f121,f52 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r17=f51
- xma.hu f63=f34,f122,f62
- add r25=r25,r24 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f62=f34,f122,f62
- mov carry1=0 };;
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
- xma.hu f73=f34,f123,f72 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f72=f34,f123,f72 };;
-{ .mfi; st8 [r33]=r25,16
- xma.hu f83=f34,f124,f82
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f82=f34,f124,f82 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f93=f34,f125,f92 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f92=f34,f125,f92 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f103=f34,f126,f102 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f102=f34,f126,f102 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f113=f34,f127,f112 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f112=f34,f127,f112 };;//
-//-------------------------------------------------//
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r18=f42
- xma.hu f44=f35,f120,f43
- add r17=r17,r16 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f43=f35,f120,f43 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f70
- xma.hu f54=f35,f121,f53 }
-{ .mfi; mov carry2=0
- xma.lu f53=f35,f121,f53 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f61
- xma.hu f64=f35,f122,f63
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16 }
-{ .mfi; add r18=r18,r17
- xma.lu f63=f35,f122,f63 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r26=f52
- xma.hu f74=f35,f123,f73
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
- xma.lu f73=f35,f123,f73
- add r18=r18,carry1 };;
-{ .mfi;
- xma.hu f84=f35,f124,f83
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,carry1
- xma.lu f83=f35,f124,f83 };;
-{ .mfi; st8 [r32]=r18,16
- xma.hu f94=f35,f125,f93
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f93=f35,f125,f93 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f104=f35,f126,f103 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f103=f35,f126,f103 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f114=f35,f127,f113 }
-{ .mfi; mov carry1=0
- xma.lu f113=f35,f127,f113
- add r25=r25,r24 };;//
-//-------------------------------------------------//
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r27=f43
- xma.hu f45=f36,f120,f44
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f44=f36,f120,f44
- add r26=r26,r25 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f80
- xma.hu f55=f36,f121,f54
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f54=f36,f121,f54 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r17=f71
- xma.hu f65=f36,f122,f64
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f64=f36,f122,f64
- add r27=r27,r26 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r18=f62
- xma.hu f75=f36,f123,f74
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
- xma.lu f74=f36,f123,f74
- add r27=r27,carry2 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r19=f53
- xma.hu f85=f36,f124,f84
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f84=f36,f124,f84
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,carry2 };;
-{ .mfi; st8 [r33]=r27,16
- xma.hu f95=f36,f125,f94
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f94=f36,f125,f94 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f105=f36,f126,f104 }
-{ .mfi; mov carry2=0
- xma.lu f104=f36,f126,f104
- add r17=r17,r16 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f115=f36,f127,f114
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f114=f36,f127,f114
- add r18=r18,r17 };;//
-//-------------------------------------------------//
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r20=f44
- xma.hu f46=f37,f120,f45
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
- xma.lu f45=f37,f120,f45
- add r19=r19,r18 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f90
- xma.hu f56=f37,f121,f55 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f55=f37,f121,f55 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f81
- xma.hu f66=f37,f122,f65
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
- xma.lu f65=f37,f122,f65
- add r20=r20,r19 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r26=f72
- xma.hu f76=f37,f123,f75
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r20,r19
- xma.lu f75=f37,f123,f75
- add r20=r20,carry1 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r27=f63
- xma.hu f86=f37,f124,f85
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f85=f37,f124,f85
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r20,carry1 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r28=f54
- xma.hu f96=f37,f125,f95
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; st8 [r32]=r20,16
- xma.lu f95=f37,f125,f95 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f106=f37,f126,f105 }
-{ .mfi; mov carry1=0
- xma.lu f105=f37,f126,f105
- add r25=r25,r24 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f116=f37,f127,f115
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f115=f37,f127,f115
- add r26=r26,r25 };;//
-//-------------------------------------------------//
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r29=f45
- xma.hu f47=f38,f120,f46
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
- xma.lu f46=f38,f120,f46
- add r27=r27,r26 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f100
- xma.hu f57=f38,f121,f56
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
- xma.lu f56=f38,f121,f56
- add r28=r28,r27 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r17=f91
- xma.hu f67=f38,f122,f66
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r28,r27
- xma.lu f66=f38,f122,f66
- add r29=r29,r28 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r18=f82
- xma.hu f77=f38,f123,f76
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r29,r28
- xma.lu f76=f38,f123,f76
- add r29=r29,carry2 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r19=f73
- xma.hu f87=f38,f124,f86
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f86=f38,f124,f86
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r29,carry2 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r20=f64
- xma.hu f97=f38,f125,f96
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; st8 [r33]=r29,16
- xma.lu f96=f38,f125,f96 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r21=f55
- xma.hu f107=f38,f126,f106 }
-{ .mfi; mov carry2=0
- xma.lu f106=f38,f126,f106
- add r17=r17,r16 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f117=f38,f127,f116
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f116=f38,f127,f116
- add r18=r18,r17 };;//
-//-------------------------------------------------//
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r22=f46
- xma.hu f48=f39,f120,f47
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
- xma.lu f47=f39,f120,f47
- add r19=r19,r18 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f110
- xma.hu f58=f39,f121,f57
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
- xma.lu f57=f39,f121,f57
- add r20=r20,r19 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f101
- xma.hu f68=f39,f122,f67
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r20,r19
- xma.lu f67=f39,f122,f67
- add r21=r21,r20 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r26=f92
- xma.hu f78=f39,f123,f77
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r21,r20
- xma.lu f77=f39,f123,f77
- add r22=r22,r21 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r27=f83
- xma.hu f88=f39,f124,f87
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r22,r21
- xma.lu f87=f39,f124,f87
- add r22=r22,carry1 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r28=f74
- xma.hu f98=f39,f125,f97
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f97=f39,f125,f97
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r22,carry1 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r29=f65
- xma.hu f108=f39,f126,f107
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-{ .mfi; st8 [r32]=r22,16
- xma.lu f107=f39,f126,f107 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r30=f56
- xma.hu f118=f39,f127,f117 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f117=f39,f127,f117 };;//
-//-------------------------------------------------//
-// Leaving muliplier's heaven... Quite a ride, huh?
-
-{ .mii; getf.sig r31=f47
- add r25=r25,r24
- mov carry1=0 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r16=f111
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
- add r26=r26,r25 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r17=f102 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
- add r27=r27,r26 };;
-{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
- add r28=r28,r27 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r18=f93
- add r17=r17,r16
- mov carry3=0 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r28,r27
- add r29=r29,r28 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r19=f84
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r29,r28
- add r30=r30,r29 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r20=f75
- add r18=r18,r17 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r30,r29
- add r31=r31,r30 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r21=f66 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
- add r19=r19,r18 }
-{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r31,r30
- add r31=r31,carry2 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r22=f57 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
- add r20=r20,r19 }
-{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r31,carry2 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r23=f48 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r20,r19
- add r21=r21,r20 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfb; st8 [r33]=r31,16 };;
-
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r24=f112 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r21,r20
- add r22=r22,r21 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r25=f103 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r22,r21
- add r23=r23,r22 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r26=f94 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r23,r22
- add r23=r23,carry1 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r27=f85 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p8=r23,carry1};;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r28=f76
- add r25=r25,r24
- mov carry1=0 }
-{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r23,16
- (p7) add carry2=1,carry3
- (p8) add carry2=0,carry3 };;
-
-{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0 }
-{ .mii; getf.sig r29=f67
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
- add r26=r26,r25 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r30=f58 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
- add r27=r27,r26 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r16=f113 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
- add r28=r28,r27 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r17=f104 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r28,r27
- add r29=r29,r28 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r18=f95 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r29,r28
- add r30=r30,r29 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r19=f86
- add r17=r17,r16
- mov carry3=0 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r30,r29
- add r30=r30,carry2 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r20=f77
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16
- add r18=r18,r17 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r30,carry2 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r21=f68 }
-{ .mii; st8 [r33]=r30,16
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 };;
-
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r24=f114 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
- add r19=r19,r18 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r25=f105 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
- add r20=r20,r19 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r26=f96 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r20,r19
- add r21=r21,r20 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r27=f87 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r21,r20
- add r21=r21,carry1 };;
-{ .mib; getf.sig r28=f78
- add r25=r25,r24 }
-{ .mib; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
- cmp.ltu p7,p8=r21,carry1};;
-{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r21,16
- (p7) add carry2=1,carry3
- (p8) add carry2=0,carry3 }
-
-{ .mii; mov carry1=0
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
- add r26=r26,r25 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r16=f115 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
- add r27=r27,r26 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r17=f106 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
- add r28=r28,r27 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r18=f97 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r28,r27
- add r28=r28,carry2 };;
-{ .mib; getf.sig r19=f88
- add r17=r17,r16 }
-{ .mib;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r28,carry2 };;
-{ .mii; st8 [r33]=r28,16
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-
-{ .mii; mov carry2=0
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16
- add r18=r18,r17 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r24=f116 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
- add r19=r19,r18 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r25=f107 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
- add r19=r19,carry1 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r26=f98 }
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,carry1};;
-{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r19,16
- (p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-
-{ .mfb; add r25=r25,r24 };;
-
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r16=f117 }
-{ .mii; mov carry1=0
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
- add r26=r26,r25 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r17=f108 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
- add r26=r26,carry2 };;
-{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0 }
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,carry2 };;
-{ .mii; st8 [r33]=r26,16
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-
-{ .mfb; add r17=r17,r16 };;
-{ .mfb; getf.sig r24=f118 }
-{ .mii; mov carry2=0
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16
- add r17=r17,carry1 };;
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,carry1};;
-{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r17
- (p7) add carry2=1,carry2 };;
-{ .mfb; add r24=r24,carry2 };;
-{ .mib; st8 [r33]=r24 }
-
-{ .mib; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh
- br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
-.endp bn_mul_comba8#
-#undef carry3
-#undef carry2
-#undef carry1
-#endif
-
-#if 1
-// It's possible to make it faster (see comment to bn_sqr_comba8), but
-// I reckon it doesn't worth the effort. Basically because the routine
-// (actually both of them) practically never called... So I just play
-// same trick as with bn_sqr_comba8.
-//
-// void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
-//
-.global bn_sqr_comba4#
-.proc bn_sqr_comba4#
-.align 64
-bn_sqr_comba4:
- .prologue
- .save ar.pfs,r2
-#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
- addp4 r32=0,r32
- addp4 r33=0,r33 };;
-{ .mii;
-#else
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
-#endif
- mov r34=r33
- add r14=8,r33 };;
- .body
-{ .mii; add r17=8,r34
- add r15=16,r33
- add r18=16,r34 }
-{ .mfb; add r16=24,r33
- br .L_cheat_entry_point4 };;
-.endp bn_sqr_comba4#
-#endif
-
-#if 1
-// Runs in ~115 cycles and ~4.5 times faster than C. Well, whatever...
-//
-// void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
-//
-#define carry1 r14
-#define carry2 r15
-.global bn_mul_comba4#
-.proc bn_mul_comba4#
-.align 64
-bn_mul_comba4:
- .prologue
- .save ar.pfs,r2
-#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
- addp4 r33=0,r33
- addp4 r34=0,r34 };;
-{ .mii; addp4 r32=0,r32
-#else
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
-#endif
- add r14=8,r33
- add r17=8,r34 }
- .body
-{ .mii; add r15=16,r33
- add r18=16,r34
- add r16=24,r33 };;
-.L_cheat_entry_point4:
-{ .mmi; add r19=24,r34
-
- ldf8 f32=[r33] }
-
-{ .mmi; ldf8 f120=[r34]
- ldf8 f121=[r17] };;
-{ .mmi; ldf8 f122=[r18]
- ldf8 f123=[r19] }
-
-{ .mmi; ldf8 f33=[r14]
- ldf8 f34=[r15] }
-{ .mfi; ldf8 f35=[r16]
-
- xma.hu f41=f32,f120,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f40=f32,f120,f0 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f51=f32,f121,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f50=f32,f121,f0 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f61=f32,f122,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f60=f32,f122,f0 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f71=f32,f123,f0 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f70=f32,f123,f0 };;//
-// Major stall takes place here, and 3 more places below. Result from
-// first xma is not available for another 3 ticks.
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f40
- xma.hu f42=f33,f120,f41
- add r33=8,r32 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f41=f33,f120,f41 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f50
- xma.hu f52=f33,f121,f51 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f51=f33,f121,f51 };;
-{ .mfi; st8 [r32]=r16,16
- xma.hu f62=f33,f122,f61 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f61=f33,f122,f61 };;
-{ .mfi; xma.hu f72=f33,f123,f71 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f71=f33,f123,f71 };;//
-//-------------------------------------------------//
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f41
- xma.hu f43=f34,f120,f42 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f42=f34,f120,f42 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f60
- xma.hu f53=f34,f121,f52 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f52=f34,f121,f52 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r17=f51
- xma.hu f63=f34,f122,f62
- add r25=r25,r24 }
-{ .mfi; mov carry1=0
- xma.lu f62=f34,f122,f62 };;
-{ .mfi; st8 [r33]=r25,16
- xma.hu f73=f34,f123,f72
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f72=f34,f123,f72 };;//
-//-------------------------------------------------//
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r18=f42
- xma.hu f44=f35,f120,f43
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-{ .mfi; add r17=r17,r16
- xma.lu f43=f35,f120,f43
- mov carry2=0 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f70
- xma.hu f54=f35,f121,f53
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f53=f35,f121,f53 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f61
- xma.hu f64=f35,f122,f63
- add r18=r18,r17 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f63=f35,f122,f63
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 };;
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r26=f52
- xma.hu f74=f35,f123,f73
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17 }
-{ .mfi; xma.lu f73=f35,f123,f73
- add r18=r18,carry1 };;
-//-------------------------------------------------//
-{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r18,16
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,carry1 };;
-
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r27=f43 // last major stall
-(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r16=f71
- add r25=r25,r24
- mov carry1=0 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r17=f62
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
- add r26=r26,r25 };;
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
- add r27=r27,r26 };;
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
- add r27=r27,carry2 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r18=f53
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,carry2 };;
-{ .mfi; st8 [r33]=r27,16
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-
-{ .mii; getf.sig r19=f44
- add r17=r17,r16
- mov carry2=0 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r24=f72
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16
- add r18=r18,r17 };;
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
- add r19=r19,r18 };;
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
- add r19=r19,carry1 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r25=f63
- (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,carry1};;
-{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r19,16
- (p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
-
-{ .mii; getf.sig r26=f54
- add r25=r25,r24
- mov carry1=0 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r16=f73
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
- add r26=r26,r25 };;
-{ .mii;
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
- add r26=r26,carry2 };;
-{ .mii; getf.sig r17=f64
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
- cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,carry2 };;
-{ .mii; st8 [r33]=r26,16
-(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
-
-{ .mii; getf.sig r24=f74
- add r17=r17,r16
- mov carry2=0 };;
-{ .mii; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16
- add r17=r17,carry1 };;
-
-{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
- cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,carry1};;
-{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r17,16
- (p7) add carry2=1,carry2 };;
-
-{ .mii; add r24=r24,carry2 };;
-{ .mii; st8 [r33]=r24 }
-
-{ .mib; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh
- br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
-.endp bn_mul_comba4#
-#undef carry2
-#undef carry1
-#endif
-
-#if 1
-//
-// BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
-//
-// In the nutshell it's a port of my MIPS III/IV implementation.
-//
-#define AT r14
-#define H r16
-#define HH r20
-#define L r17
-#define D r18
-#define DH r22
-#define I r21
-
-#if 0
-// Some preprocessors (most notably HP-UX) appear to be allergic to
-// macros enclosed to parenthesis [as these three were].
-#define cont p16
-#define break p0 // p20
-#define equ p24
-#else
-cont=p16
-break=p0
-equ=p24
-#endif
-
-.global abort#
-.global bn_div_words#
-.proc bn_div_words#
-.align 64
-bn_div_words:
- .prologue
- .save ar.pfs,r2
-{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,5,0,8
- .save b0,r3
- mov r3=b0
- .save pr,r10
- mov r10=pr };;
-{ .mmb; cmp.eq p6,p0=r34,r0
- mov r8=-1
-(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
-
- .body
-{ .mii; mov H=r32 // save h
- mov ar.ec=0 // don't rotate at exit
- mov pr.rot=0 }
-{ .mii; mov L=r33 // save l
- mov r36=r0 };;
-
-.L_divw_shift: // -vv- note signed comparison
-{ .mfi; (p0) cmp.lt p16,p0=r0,r34 // d
- (p0) shladd r33=r34,1,r0 }
-{ .mfb; (p0) add r35=1,r36
- (p0) nop.f 0x0
-(p16) br.wtop.dpnt .L_divw_shift };;
-
-{ .mii; mov D=r34
- shr.u DH=r34,32
- sub r35=64,r36 };;
-{ .mii; setf.sig f7=DH
- shr.u AT=H,r35
- mov I=r36 };;
-{ .mib; cmp.ne p6,p0=r0,AT
- shl H=H,r36
-(p6) br.call.spnt.clr b0=abort };; // overflow, die...
-
-{ .mfi; fcvt.xuf.s1 f7=f7
- shr.u AT=L,r35 };;
-{ .mii; shl L=L,r36
- or H=H,AT };;
-
-{ .mii; nop.m 0x0
- cmp.leu p6,p0=D,H;;
-(p6) sub H=H,D }
-
-{ .mlx; setf.sig f14=D
- movl AT=0xffffffff };;
-///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-{ .mii; setf.sig f6=H
- shr.u HH=H,32;;
- cmp.eq p6,p7=HH,DH };;
-{ .mfb;
-(p6) setf.sig f8=AT
-(p7) fcvt.xuf.s1 f6=f6
-(p7) br.call.sptk b6=.L_udiv64_32_b6 };;
-
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r33=f8 // q
- xmpy.lu f9=f8,f14 }
-{ .mfi; xmpy.hu f10=f8,f14
- shrp H=H,L,32 };;
-
-{ .mmi; getf.sig r35=f9 // tl
- getf.sig r31=f10 };; // th
-
-.L_divw_1st_iter:
-{ .mii; (p0) add r32=-1,r33
- (p0) cmp.eq equ,cont=HH,r31 };;
-{ .mii; (p0) cmp.ltu p8,p0=r35,D
- (p0) sub r34=r35,D
- (equ) cmp.leu break,cont=r35,H };;
-{ .mib; (cont) cmp.leu cont,break=HH,r31
- (p8) add r31=-1,r31
-(cont) br.wtop.spnt .L_divw_1st_iter };;
-///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-{ .mii; sub H=H,r35
- shl r8=r33,32
- shl L=L,32 };;
-///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-{ .mii; setf.sig f6=H
- shr.u HH=H,32;;
- cmp.eq p6,p7=HH,DH };;
-{ .mfb;
-(p6) setf.sig f8=AT
-(p7) fcvt.xuf.s1 f6=f6
-(p7) br.call.sptk b6=.L_udiv64_32_b6 };;
-
-{ .mfi; getf.sig r33=f8 // q
- xmpy.lu f9=f8,f14 }
-{ .mfi; xmpy.hu f10=f8,f14
- shrp H=H,L,32 };;
-
-{ .mmi; getf.sig r35=f9 // tl
- getf.sig r31=f10 };; // th
-
-.L_divw_2nd_iter:
-{ .mii; (p0) add r32=-1,r33
- (p0) cmp.eq equ,cont=HH,r31 };;
-{ .mii; (p0) cmp.ltu p8,p0=r35,D
- (p0) sub r34=r35,D
- (equ) cmp.leu break,cont=r35,H };;
-{ .mib; (cont) cmp.leu cont,break=HH,r31
- (p8) add r31=-1,r31
-(cont) br.wtop.spnt .L_divw_2nd_iter };;
-///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-{ .mii; sub H=H,r35
- or r8=r8,r33
- mov ar.pfs=r2 };;
-{ .mii; shr.u r9=H,I // remainder if anybody wants it
- mov pr=r10,0x1ffff }
-{ .mfb; br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
-
-// Unsigned 64 by 32 (well, by 64 for the moment) bit integer division
-// procedure.
-//
-// inputs: f6 = (double)a, f7 = (double)b
-// output: f8 = (int)(a/b)
-// clobbered: f8,f9,f10,f11,pred
-pred=p15
-// One can argue that this snippet is copyrighted to Intel
-// Corporation, as it's essentially identical to one of those
-// found in "Divide, Square Root and Remainder" section at
-// http://www.intel.com/software/products/opensource/libraries/num.htm.
-// Yes, I admit that the referred code was used as template,
-// but after I realized that there hardly is any other instruction
-// sequence which would perform this operation. I mean I figure that
-// any independent attempt to implement high-performance division
-// will result in code virtually identical to the Intel code. It
-// should be noted though that below division kernel is 1 cycle
-// faster than Intel one (note commented splits:-), not to mention
-// original prologue (rather lack of one) and epilogue.
-.align 32
-.skip 16
-.L_udiv64_32_b6:
- frcpa.s1 f8,pred=f6,f7;; // [0] y0 = 1 / b
-
-(pred) fnma.s1 f9=f7,f8,f1 // [5] e0 = 1 - b * y0
-(pred) fmpy.s1 f10=f6,f8;; // [5] q0 = a * y0
-(pred) fmpy.s1 f11=f9,f9 // [10] e1 = e0 * e0
-(pred) fma.s1 f10=f9,f10,f10;; // [10] q1 = q0 + e0 * q0
-(pred) fma.s1 f8=f9,f8,f8 //;; // [15] y1 = y0 + e0 * y0
-(pred) fma.s1 f9=f11,f10,f10;; // [15] q2 = q1 + e1 * q1
-(pred) fma.s1 f8=f11,f8,f8 //;; // [20] y2 = y1 + e1 * y1
-(pred) fnma.s1 f10=f7,f9,f6;; // [20] r2 = a - b * q2
-(pred) fma.s1 f8=f10,f8,f9;; // [25] q3 = q2 + r2 * y2
-
- fcvt.fxu.trunc.s1 f8=f8 // [30] q = trunc(q3)
- br.ret.sptk.many b6;;
-.endp bn_div_words#
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1555 @@
+.explicit
+.text
+.ident "ia64.S, Version 2.1"
+.ident "IA-64 ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>"
+
+//
+// ====================================================================
+// Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+// project.
+//
+// Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
+// granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
+// disclaimed.
+// ====================================================================
+//
+// Version 2.x is Itanium2 re-tune. Few words about how Itanum2 is
+// different from Itanium to this module viewpoint. Most notably, is it
+// "wider" than Itanium? Can you experience loop scalability as
+// discussed in commentary sections? Not really:-( Itanium2 has 6
+// integer ALU ports, i.e. it's 2 ports wider, but it's not enough to
+// spin twice as fast, as I need 8 IALU ports. Amount of floating point
+// ports is the same, i.e. 2, while I need 4. In other words, to this
+// module Itanium2 remains effectively as "wide" as Itanium. Yet it's
+// essentially different in respect to this module, and a re-tune was
+// required. Well, because some intruction latencies has changed. Most
+// noticeably those intensively used:
+//
+// Itanium Itanium2
+// ldf8 9 6 L2 hit
+// ld8 2 1 L1 hit
+// getf 2 5
+// xma[->getf] 7[+1] 4[+0]
+// add[->st8] 1[+1] 1[+0]
+//
+// What does it mean? You might ratiocinate that the original code
+// should run just faster... Because sum of latencies is smaller...
+// Wrong! Note that getf latency increased. This means that if a loop is
+// scheduled for lower latency (as they were), then it will suffer from
+// stall condition and the code will therefore turn anti-scalable, e.g.
+// original bn_mul_words spun at 5*n or 2.5 times slower than expected
+// on Itanium2! What to do? Reschedule loops for Itanium2? But then
+// Itanium would exhibit anti-scalability. So I've chosen to reschedule
+// for worst latency for every instruction aiming for best *all-round*
+// performance.
+
+// Q. How much faster does it get?
+// A. Here is the output from 'openssl speed rsa dsa' for vanilla
+// 0.9.6a compiled with gcc version 2.96 20000731 (Red Hat
+// Linux 7.1 2.96-81):
+//
+// sign verify sign/s verify/s
+// rsa 512 bits 0.0036s 0.0003s 275.3 2999.2
+// rsa 1024 bits 0.0203s 0.0011s 49.3 894.1
+// rsa 2048 bits 0.1331s 0.0040s 7.5 250.9
+// rsa 4096 bits 0.9270s 0.0147s 1.1 68.1
+// sign verify sign/s verify/s
+// dsa 512 bits 0.0035s 0.0043s 288.3 234.8
+// dsa 1024 bits 0.0111s 0.0135s 90.0 74.2
+//
+// And here is similar output but for this assembler
+// implementation:-)
+//
+// sign verify sign/s verify/s
+// rsa 512 bits 0.0021s 0.0001s 549.4 9638.5
+// rsa 1024 bits 0.0055s 0.0002s 183.8 4481.1
+// rsa 2048 bits 0.0244s 0.0006s 41.4 1726.3
+// rsa 4096 bits 0.1295s 0.0018s 7.7 561.5
+// sign verify sign/s verify/s
+// dsa 512 bits 0.0012s 0.0013s 891.9 756.6
+// dsa 1024 bits 0.0023s 0.0028s 440.4 376.2
+//
+// Yes, you may argue that it's not fair comparison as it's
+// possible to craft the C implementation with BN_UMULT_HIGH
+// inline assembler macro. But of course! Here is the output
+// with the macro:
+//
+// sign verify sign/s verify/s
+// rsa 512 bits 0.0020s 0.0002s 495.0 6561.0
+// rsa 1024 bits 0.0086s 0.0004s 116.2 2235.7
+// rsa 2048 bits 0.0519s 0.0015s 19.3 667.3
+// rsa 4096 bits 0.3464s 0.0053s 2.9 187.7
+// sign verify sign/s verify/s
+// dsa 512 bits 0.0016s 0.0020s 613.1 510.5
+// dsa 1024 bits 0.0045s 0.0054s 221.0 183.9
+//
+// My code is still way faster, huh:-) And I believe that even
+// higher performance can be achieved. Note that as keys get
+// longer, performance gain is larger. Why? According to the
+// profiler there is another player in the field, namely
+// BN_from_montgomery consuming larger and larger portion of CPU
+// time as keysize decreases. I therefore consider putting effort
+// to assembler implementation of the following routine:
+//
+// void bn_mul_add_mont (BN_ULONG *rp,BN_ULONG *np,int nl,BN_ULONG n0)
+// {
+// int i,j;
+// BN_ULONG v;
+//
+// for (i=0; i<nl; i++)
+// {
+// v=bn_mul_add_words(rp,np,nl,(rp[0]*n0)&BN_MASK2);
+// nrp++;
+// rp++;
+// if (((nrp[-1]+=v)&BN_MASK2) < v)
+// for (j=0; ((++nrp[j])&BN_MASK2) == 0; j++) ;
+// }
+// }
+//
+// It might as well be beneficial to implement even combaX
+// variants, as it appears as it can literally unleash the
+// performance (see comment section to bn_mul_comba8 below).
+//
+// And finally for your reference the output for 0.9.6a compiled
+// with SGIcc version 0.01.0-12 (keep in mind that for the moment
+// of this writing it's not possible to convince SGIcc to use
+// BN_UMULT_HIGH inline assembler macro, yet the code is fast,
+// i.e. for a compiler generated one:-):
+//
+// sign verify sign/s verify/s
+// rsa 512 bits 0.0022s 0.0002s 452.7 5894.3
+// rsa 1024 bits 0.0097s 0.0005s 102.7 2002.9
+// rsa 2048 bits 0.0578s 0.0017s 17.3 600.2
+// rsa 4096 bits 0.3838s 0.0061s 2.6 164.5
+// sign verify sign/s verify/s
+// dsa 512 bits 0.0018s 0.0022s 547.3 459.6
+// dsa 1024 bits 0.0051s 0.0062s 196.6 161.3
+//
+// Oh! Benchmarks were performed on 733MHz Lion-class Itanium
+// system running Redhat Linux 7.1 (very special thanks to Ray
+// McCaffity of Williams Communications for providing an account).
+//
+// Q. What's the heck with 'rum 1<<5' at the end of every function?
+// A. Well, by clearing the "upper FP registers written" bit of the
+// User Mask I want to excuse the kernel from preserving upper
+// (f32-f128) FP register bank over process context switch, thus
+// minimizing bus bandwidth consumption during the switch (i.e.
+// after PKI opration completes and the program is off doing
+// something else like bulk symmetric encryption). Having said
+// this, I also want to point out that it might be good idea
+// to compile the whole toolkit (as well as majority of the
+// programs for that matter) with -mfixed-range=f32-f127 command
+// line option. No, it doesn't prevent the compiler from writing
+// to upper bank, but at least discourages to do so. If you don't
+// like the idea you have the option to compile the module with
+// -Drum=nop.m in command line.
+//
+
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+#define ADDP addp4
+#else
+#define ADDP add
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// bn_[add|sub]_words routines.
+//
+// Loops are spinning in 2*(n+5) ticks on Itanuim (provided that the
+// data reside in L1 cache, i.e. 2 ticks away). It's possible to
+// compress the epilogue and get down to 2*n+6, but at the cost of
+// scalability (the neat feature of this implementation is that it
+// shall automagically spin in n+5 on "wider" IA-64 implementations:-)
+// I consider that the epilogue is short enough as it is to trade tiny
+// performance loss on Itanium for scalability.
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,int num)
+//
+.global bn_add_words#
+.proc bn_add_words#
+.align 64
+.skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_add_words:
+ .prologue
+ .save ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16
+ cmp4.le p6,p0=r35,r0 };;
+{ .mfb; mov r8=r0 // return value
+(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
+
+{ .mib; sub r10=r35,r0,1
+ .save ar.lc,r3
+ mov r3=ar.lc
+ brp.loop.imp .L_bn_add_words_ctop,.L_bn_add_words_cend-16
+ }
+{ .mib; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp
+ .save pr,r9
+ mov r9=pr };;
+ .body
+{ .mii; ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap
+ mov ar.lc=r10
+ mov ar.ec=6 }
+{ .mib; ADDP r16=0,r34 // bp
+ mov pr.rot=1<<16 };;
+
+.L_bn_add_words_ctop:
+{ .mii; (p16) ld8 r32=[r16],8 // b=*(bp++)
+ (p18) add r39=r37,r34
+ (p19) cmp.ltu.unc p56,p0=r40,r38 }
+{ .mfb; (p0) nop.m 0x0
+ (p0) nop.f 0x0
+ (p0) nop.b 0x0 }
+{ .mii; (p16) ld8 r35=[r15],8 // a=*(ap++)
+ (p58) cmp.eq.or p57,p0=-1,r41 // (p20)
+ (p58) add r41=1,r41 } // (p20)
+{ .mfb; (p21) st8 [r14]=r42,8 // *(rp++)=r
+ (p0) nop.f 0x0
+ br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_add_words_ctop };;
+.L_bn_add_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;
+(p59) add r8=1,r8 // return value
+ mov pr=r9,0x1ffff
+ mov ar.lc=r3 }
+{ .mbb; nop.b 0x0
+ br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
+.endp bn_add_words#
+
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,int num)
+//
+.global bn_sub_words#
+.proc bn_sub_words#
+.align 64
+.skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_sub_words:
+ .prologue
+ .save ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16
+ cmp4.le p6,p0=r35,r0 };;
+{ .mfb; mov r8=r0 // return value
+(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
+
+{ .mib; sub r10=r35,r0,1
+ .save ar.lc,r3
+ mov r3=ar.lc
+ brp.loop.imp .L_bn_sub_words_ctop,.L_bn_sub_words_cend-16
+ }
+{ .mib; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp
+ .save pr,r9
+ mov r9=pr };;
+ .body
+{ .mii; ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap
+ mov ar.lc=r10
+ mov ar.ec=6 }
+{ .mib; ADDP r16=0,r34 // bp
+ mov pr.rot=1<<16 };;
+
+.L_bn_sub_words_ctop:
+{ .mii; (p16) ld8 r32=[r16],8 // b=*(bp++)
+ (p18) sub r39=r37,r34
+ (p19) cmp.gtu.unc p56,p0=r40,r38 }
+{ .mfb; (p0) nop.m 0x0
+ (p0) nop.f 0x0
+ (p0) nop.b 0x0 }
+{ .mii; (p16) ld8 r35=[r15],8 // a=*(ap++)
+ (p58) cmp.eq.or p57,p0=0,r41 // (p20)
+ (p58) add r41=-1,r41 } // (p20)
+{ .mbb; (p21) st8 [r14]=r42,8 // *(rp++)=r
+ (p0) nop.b 0x0
+ br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_sub_words_ctop };;
+.L_bn_sub_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii;
+(p59) add r8=1,r8 // return value
+ mov pr=r9,0x1ffff
+ mov ar.lc=r3 }
+{ .mbb; nop.b 0x0
+ br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
+.endp bn_sub_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+#define XMA_TEMPTATION
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+//
+.global bn_mul_words#
+.proc bn_mul_words#
+.align 64
+.skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_mul_words:
+ .prologue
+ .save ar.pfs,r2
+#ifdef XMA_TEMPTATION
+{ .mfi; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,0,0,0 };;
+#else
+{ .mfi; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,12,0,16 };;
+#endif
+{ .mib; mov r8=r0 // return value
+ cmp4.le p6,p0=r34,r0
+(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
+
+{ .mii; sub r10=r34,r0,1
+ .save ar.lc,r3
+ mov r3=ar.lc
+ .save pr,r9
+ mov r9=pr };;
+
+ .body
+{ .mib; setf.sig f8=r35 // w
+ mov pr.rot=0x800001<<16
+ // ------^----- serves as (p50) at first (p27)
+ brp.loop.imp .L_bn_mul_words_ctop,.L_bn_mul_words_cend-16
+ }
+
+#ifndef XMA_TEMPTATION
+
+{ .mmi; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp
+ ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap
+ mov ar.lc=r10 }
+{ .mmi; mov r40=0 // serves as r35 at first (p27)
+ mov ar.ec=13 };;
+
+// This loop spins in 2*(n+12) ticks. It's scheduled for data in Itanium
+// L2 cache (i.e. 9 ticks away) as floating point load/store instructions
+// bypass L1 cache and L2 latency is actually best-case scenario for
+// ldf8. The loop is not scalable and shall run in 2*(n+12) even on
+// "wider" IA-64 implementations. It's a trade-off here. n+24 loop
+// would give us ~5% in *overall* performance improvement on "wider"
+// IA-64, but would hurt Itanium for about same because of longer
+// epilogue. As it's a matter of few percents in either case I've
+// chosen to trade the scalability for development time (you can see
+// this very instruction sequence in bn_mul_add_words loop which in
+// turn is scalable).
+.L_bn_mul_words_ctop:
+{ .mfi; (p25) getf.sig r36=f52 // low
+ (p21) xmpy.lu f48=f37,f8
+ (p28) cmp.ltu p54,p50=r41,r39 }
+{ .mfi; (p16) ldf8 f32=[r15],8
+ (p21) xmpy.hu f40=f37,f8
+ (p0) nop.i 0x0 };;
+{ .mii; (p25) getf.sig r32=f44 // high
+ .pred.rel "mutex",p50,p54
+ (p50) add r40=r38,r35 // (p27)
+ (p54) add r40=r38,r35,1 } // (p27)
+{ .mfb; (p28) st8 [r14]=r41,8
+ (p0) nop.f 0x0
+ br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_mul_words_ctop };;
+.L_bn_mul_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii; nop.m 0x0
+.pred.rel "mutex",p51,p55
+(p51) add r8=r36,r0
+(p55) add r8=r36,r0,1 }
+{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0
+ nop.f 0x0
+ nop.b 0x0 }
+
+#else // XMA_TEMPTATION
+
+ setf.sig f37=r0 // serves as carry at (p18) tick
+ mov ar.lc=r10
+ mov ar.ec=5;;
+
+// Most of you examining this code very likely wonder why in the name
+// of Intel the following loop is commented out? Indeed, it looks so
+// neat that you find it hard to believe that it's something wrong
+// with it, right? The catch is that every iteration depends on the
+// result from previous one and the latter isn't available instantly.
+// The loop therefore spins at the latency of xma minus 1, or in other
+// words at 6*(n+4) ticks:-( Compare to the "production" loop above
+// that runs in 2*(n+11) where the low latency problem is worked around
+// by moving the dependency to one-tick latent interger ALU. Note that
+// "distance" between ldf8 and xma is not latency of ldf8, but the
+// *difference* between xma and ldf8 latencies.
+.L_bn_mul_words_ctop:
+{ .mfi; (p16) ldf8 f32=[r33],8
+ (p18) xma.hu f38=f34,f8,f39 }
+{ .mfb; (p20) stf8 [r32]=f37,8
+ (p18) xma.lu f35=f34,f8,f39
+ br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_mul_words_ctop };;
+.L_bn_mul_words_cend:
+
+ getf.sig r8=f41 // the return value
+
+#endif // XMA_TEMPTATION
+
+{ .mii; nop.m 0x0
+ mov pr=r9,0x1ffff
+ mov ar.lc=r3 }
+{ .mfb; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh
+ nop.f 0x0
+ br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
+.endp bn_mul_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+//
+.global bn_mul_add_words#
+.proc bn_mul_add_words#
+.align 64
+.skip 48 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_mul_add_words:
+ .prologue
+ .save ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mmi; alloc r2=ar.pfs,4,4,0,8
+ cmp4.le p6,p0=r34,r0
+ .save ar.lc,r3
+ mov r3=ar.lc };;
+{ .mib; mov r8=r0 // return value
+ sub r10=r34,r0,1
+(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
+
+{ .mib; setf.sig f8=r35 // w
+ .save pr,r9
+ mov r9=pr
+ brp.loop.imp .L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop,.L_bn_mul_add_words_cend-16
+ }
+ .body
+{ .mmi; ADDP r14=0,r32 // rp
+ ADDP r15=0,r33 // ap
+ mov ar.lc=r10 }
+{ .mii; ADDP r16=0,r32 // rp copy
+ mov pr.rot=0x2001<<16
+ // ------^----- serves as (p40) at first (p27)
+ mov ar.ec=11 };;
+
+// This loop spins in 3*(n+10) ticks on Itanium and in 2*(n+10) on
+// Itanium 2. Yes, unlike previous versions it scales:-) Previous
+// version was performing *all* additions in IALU and was starving
+// for those even on Itanium 2. In this version one addition is
+// moved to FPU and is folded with multiplication. This is at cost
+// of propogating the result from previous call to this subroutine
+// to L2 cache... In other words negligible even for shorter keys.
+// *Overall* performance improvement [over previous version] varies
+// from 11 to 22 percent depending on key length.
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop:
+.pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42
+{ .mfi; (p23) getf.sig r36=f45 // low
+ (p20) xma.lu f42=f36,f8,f50 // low
+ (p40) add r39=r39,r35 } // (p27)
+{ .mfi; (p16) ldf8 f32=[r15],8 // *(ap++)
+ (p20) xma.hu f36=f36,f8,f50 // high
+ (p42) add r39=r39,r35,1 };; // (p27)
+{ .mmi; (p24) getf.sig r32=f40 // high
+ (p16) ldf8 f46=[r16],8 // *(rp1++)
+ (p40) cmp.ltu p41,p39=r39,r35 } // (p27)
+{ .mib; (p26) st8 [r14]=r39,8 // *(rp2++)
+ (p42) cmp.leu p41,p39=r39,r35 // (p27)
+ br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_mul_add_words_ctop};;
+.L_bn_mul_add_words_cend:
+
+{ .mmi; .pred.rel "mutex",p40,p42
+(p40) add r8=r35,r0
+(p42) add r8=r35,r0,1
+ mov pr=r9,0x1ffff }
+{ .mib; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh
+ mov ar.lc=r3
+ br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
+.endp bn_mul_add_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num)
+//
+.global bn_sqr_words#
+.proc bn_sqr_words#
+.align 64
+.skip 32 // makes the loop body aligned at 64-byte boundary
+bn_sqr_words:
+ .prologue
+ .save ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+ sxt4 r34=r34 };;
+{ .mii; cmp.le p6,p0=r34,r0
+ mov r8=r0 } // return value
+{ .mfb; ADDP r32=0,r32
+ nop.f 0x0
+(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
+
+{ .mii; sub r10=r34,r0,1
+ .save ar.lc,r3
+ mov r3=ar.lc
+ .save pr,r9
+ mov r9=pr };;
+
+ .body
+{ .mib; ADDP r33=0,r33
+ mov pr.rot=1<<16
+ brp.loop.imp .L_bn_sqr_words_ctop,.L_bn_sqr_words_cend-16
+ }
+{ .mii; add r34=8,r32
+ mov ar.lc=r10
+ mov ar.ec=18 };;
+
+// 2*(n+17) on Itanium, (n+17) on "wider" IA-64 implementations. It's
+// possible to compress the epilogue (I'm getting tired to write this
+// comment over and over) and get down to 2*n+16 at the cost of
+// scalability. The decision will very likely be reconsidered after the
+// benchmark program is profiled. I.e. if perfomance gain on Itanium
+// will appear larger than loss on "wider" IA-64, then the loop should
+// be explicitely split and the epilogue compressed.
+.L_bn_sqr_words_ctop:
+{ .mfi; (p16) ldf8 f32=[r33],8
+ (p25) xmpy.lu f42=f41,f41
+ (p0) nop.i 0x0 }
+{ .mib; (p33) stf8 [r32]=f50,16
+ (p0) nop.i 0x0
+ (p0) nop.b 0x0 }
+{ .mfi; (p0) nop.m 0x0
+ (p25) xmpy.hu f52=f41,f41
+ (p0) nop.i 0x0 }
+{ .mib; (p33) stf8 [r34]=f60,16
+ (p0) nop.i 0x0
+ br.ctop.sptk .L_bn_sqr_words_ctop };;
+.L_bn_sqr_words_cend:
+
+{ .mii; nop.m 0x0
+ mov pr=r9,0x1ffff
+ mov ar.lc=r3 }
+{ .mfb; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh
+ nop.f 0x0
+ br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
+.endp bn_sqr_words#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// Apparently we win nothing by implementing special bn_sqr_comba8.
+// Yes, it is possible to reduce the number of multiplications by
+// almost factor of two, but then the amount of additions would
+// increase by factor of two (as we would have to perform those
+// otherwise performed by xma ourselves). Normally we would trade
+// anyway as multiplications are way more expensive, but not this
+// time... Multiplication kernel is fully pipelined and as we drain
+// one 128-bit multiplication result per clock cycle multiplications
+// are effectively as inexpensive as additions. Special implementation
+// might become of interest for "wider" IA-64 implementation as you'll
+// be able to get through the multiplication phase faster (there won't
+// be any stall issues as discussed in the commentary section below and
+// you therefore will be able to employ all 4 FP units)... But these
+// Itanium days it's simply too hard to justify the effort so I just
+// drop down to bn_mul_comba8 code:-)
+//
+// void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+//
+.global bn_sqr_comba8#
+.proc bn_sqr_comba8#
+.align 64
+bn_sqr_comba8:
+ .prologue
+ .save ar.pfs,r2
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
+ addp4 r33=0,r33
+ addp4 r32=0,r32 };;
+{ .mii;
+#else
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
+#endif
+ mov r34=r33
+ add r14=8,r33 };;
+ .body
+{ .mii; add r17=8,r34
+ add r15=16,r33
+ add r18=16,r34 }
+{ .mfb; add r16=24,r33
+ br .L_cheat_entry_point8 };;
+.endp bn_sqr_comba8#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
+// (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
+// cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
+// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
+// highly appreciated.
+//
+// On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on
+// result from getf.sig. I do nothing about it at this point for
+// reasons depicted below.
+//
+// However! It should be noted that even 160 ticks is darn good result
+// as it's over 10 (yes, ten, spelled as t-e-n) times faster than the
+// C version (compiled with gcc with inline assembler). I really
+// kicked compiler's butt here, didn't I? Yeah! This brings us to the
+// following statement. It's damn shame that this routine isn't called
+// very often nowadays! According to the profiler most CPU time is
+// consumed by bn_mul_add_words called from BN_from_montgomery. In
+// order to estimate what we're missing, I've compared the performance
+// of this routine against "traditional" implementation, i.e. against
+// following routine:
+//
+// void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+// { r[ 8]=bn_mul_words( &(r[0]),a,8,b[0]);
+// r[ 9]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]),a,8,b[1]);
+// r[10]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]),a,8,b[2]);
+// r[11]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]),a,8,b[3]);
+// r[12]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]),a,8,b[4]);
+// r[13]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[5]),a,8,b[5]);
+// r[14]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[6]),a,8,b[6]);
+// r[15]=bn_mul_add_words(&(r[7]),a,8,b[7]);
+// }
+//
+// The one below is over 8 times faster than the one above:-( Even
+// more reasons to "combafy" bn_mul_add_mont...
+//
+// And yes, this routine really made me wish there were an optimizing
+// assembler! It also feels like it deserves a dedication.
+//
+// To my wife for being there and to my kids...
+//
+// void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+//
+#define carry1 r14
+#define carry2 r15
+#define carry3 r34
+.global bn_mul_comba8#
+.proc bn_mul_comba8#
+.align 64
+bn_mul_comba8:
+ .prologue
+ .save ar.pfs,r2
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+ addp4 r33=0,r33
+ addp4 r34=0,r34 };;
+{ .mii; addp4 r32=0,r32
+#else
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+#endif
+ add r14=8,r33
+ add r17=8,r34 }
+ .body
+{ .mii; add r15=16,r33
+ add r18=16,r34
+ add r16=24,r33 }
+.L_cheat_entry_point8:
+{ .mmi; add r19=24,r34
+
+ ldf8 f32=[r33],32 };;
+
+{ .mmi; ldf8 f120=[r34],32
+ ldf8 f121=[r17],32 }
+{ .mmi; ldf8 f122=[r18],32
+ ldf8 f123=[r19],32 };;
+{ .mmi; ldf8 f124=[r34]
+ ldf8 f125=[r17] }
+{ .mmi; ldf8 f126=[r18]
+ ldf8 f127=[r19] }
+
+{ .mmi; ldf8 f33=[r14],32
+ ldf8 f34=[r15],32 }
+{ .mmi; ldf8 f35=[r16],32;;
+ ldf8 f36=[r33] }
+{ .mmi; ldf8 f37=[r14]
+ ldf8 f38=[r15] }
+{ .mfi; ldf8 f39=[r16]
+// -------\ Entering multiplier's heaven /-------
+// ------------\ /------------
+// -----------------\ /-----------------
+// ----------------------\/----------------------
+ xma.hu f41=f32,f120,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f40=f32,f120,f0 };; // (*)
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f51=f32,f121,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f50=f32,f121,f0 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f61=f32,f122,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f60=f32,f122,f0 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f71=f32,f123,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f70=f32,f123,f0 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f81=f32,f124,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f80=f32,f124,f0 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f91=f32,f125,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f90=f32,f125,f0 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f101=f32,f126,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f100=f32,f126,f0 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f111=f32,f127,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f110=f32,f127,f0 };;//
+// (*) You can argue that splitting at every second bundle would
+// prevent "wider" IA-64 implementations from achieving the peak
+// performance. Well, not really... The catch is that if you
+// intend to keep 4 FP units busy by splitting at every fourth
+// bundle and thus perform these 16 multiplications in 4 ticks,
+// the first bundle *below* would stall because the result from
+// the first xma bundle *above* won't be available for another 3
+// ticks (if not more, being an optimist, I assume that "wider"
+// implementation will have same latency:-). This stall will hold
+// you back and the performance would be as if every second bundle
+// were split *anyway*...
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f40
+ xma.hu f42=f33,f120,f41
+ add r33=8,r32 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f41=f33,f120,f41 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f50
+ xma.hu f52=f33,f121,f51 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f51=f33,f121,f51 };;
+{ .mfi; st8 [r32]=r16,16
+ xma.hu f62=f33,f122,f61 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f61=f33,f122,f61 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f72=f33,f123,f71 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f71=f33,f123,f71 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f82=f33,f124,f81 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f81=f33,f124,f81 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f92=f33,f125,f91 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f91=f33,f125,f91 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f102=f33,f126,f101 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f101=f33,f126,f101 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f112=f33,f127,f111 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f111=f33,f127,f111 };;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f41
+ xma.hu f43=f34,f120,f42 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f42=f34,f120,f42 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f60
+ xma.hu f53=f34,f121,f52 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f52=f34,f121,f52 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r17=f51
+ xma.hu f63=f34,f122,f62
+ add r25=r25,r24 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f62=f34,f122,f62
+ mov carry1=0 };;
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
+ xma.hu f73=f34,f123,f72 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f72=f34,f123,f72 };;
+{ .mfi; st8 [r33]=r25,16
+ xma.hu f83=f34,f124,f82
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f82=f34,f124,f82 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f93=f34,f125,f92 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f92=f34,f125,f92 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f103=f34,f126,f102 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f102=f34,f126,f102 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f113=f34,f127,f112 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f112=f34,f127,f112 };;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r18=f42
+ xma.hu f44=f35,f120,f43
+ add r17=r17,r16 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f43=f35,f120,f43 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f70
+ xma.hu f54=f35,f121,f53 }
+{ .mfi; mov carry2=0
+ xma.lu f53=f35,f121,f53 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f61
+ xma.hu f64=f35,f122,f63
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16 }
+{ .mfi; add r18=r18,r17
+ xma.lu f63=f35,f122,f63 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r26=f52
+ xma.hu f74=f35,f123,f73
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
+ xma.lu f73=f35,f123,f73
+ add r18=r18,carry1 };;
+{ .mfi;
+ xma.hu f84=f35,f124,f83
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,carry1
+ xma.lu f83=f35,f124,f83 };;
+{ .mfi; st8 [r32]=r18,16
+ xma.hu f94=f35,f125,f93
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f93=f35,f125,f93 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f104=f35,f126,f103 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f103=f35,f126,f103 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f114=f35,f127,f113 }
+{ .mfi; mov carry1=0
+ xma.lu f113=f35,f127,f113
+ add r25=r25,r24 };;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r27=f43
+ xma.hu f45=f36,f120,f44
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f44=f36,f120,f44
+ add r26=r26,r25 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f80
+ xma.hu f55=f36,f121,f54
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f54=f36,f121,f54 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r17=f71
+ xma.hu f65=f36,f122,f64
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f64=f36,f122,f64
+ add r27=r27,r26 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r18=f62
+ xma.hu f75=f36,f123,f74
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
+ xma.lu f74=f36,f123,f74
+ add r27=r27,carry2 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r19=f53
+ xma.hu f85=f36,f124,f84
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f84=f36,f124,f84
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,carry2 };;
+{ .mfi; st8 [r33]=r27,16
+ xma.hu f95=f36,f125,f94
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f94=f36,f125,f94 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f105=f36,f126,f104 }
+{ .mfi; mov carry2=0
+ xma.lu f104=f36,f126,f104
+ add r17=r17,r16 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f115=f36,f127,f114
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f114=f36,f127,f114
+ add r18=r18,r17 };;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r20=f44
+ xma.hu f46=f37,f120,f45
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
+ xma.lu f45=f37,f120,f45
+ add r19=r19,r18 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f90
+ xma.hu f56=f37,f121,f55 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f55=f37,f121,f55 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f81
+ xma.hu f66=f37,f122,f65
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
+ xma.lu f65=f37,f122,f65
+ add r20=r20,r19 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r26=f72
+ xma.hu f76=f37,f123,f75
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r20,r19
+ xma.lu f75=f37,f123,f75
+ add r20=r20,carry1 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r27=f63
+ xma.hu f86=f37,f124,f85
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f85=f37,f124,f85
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r20,carry1 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r28=f54
+ xma.hu f96=f37,f125,f95
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; st8 [r32]=r20,16
+ xma.lu f95=f37,f125,f95 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f106=f37,f126,f105 }
+{ .mfi; mov carry1=0
+ xma.lu f105=f37,f126,f105
+ add r25=r25,r24 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f116=f37,f127,f115
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f115=f37,f127,f115
+ add r26=r26,r25 };;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r29=f45
+ xma.hu f47=f38,f120,f46
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
+ xma.lu f46=f38,f120,f46
+ add r27=r27,r26 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f100
+ xma.hu f57=f38,f121,f56
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
+ xma.lu f56=f38,f121,f56
+ add r28=r28,r27 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r17=f91
+ xma.hu f67=f38,f122,f66
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r28,r27
+ xma.lu f66=f38,f122,f66
+ add r29=r29,r28 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r18=f82
+ xma.hu f77=f38,f123,f76
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p6,p0=r29,r28
+ xma.lu f76=f38,f123,f76
+ add r29=r29,carry2 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r19=f73
+ xma.hu f87=f38,f124,f86
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f86=f38,f124,f86
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r29,carry2 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r20=f64
+ xma.hu f97=f38,f125,f96
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; st8 [r33]=r29,16
+ xma.lu f96=f38,f125,f96 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r21=f55
+ xma.hu f107=f38,f126,f106 }
+{ .mfi; mov carry2=0
+ xma.lu f106=f38,f126,f106
+ add r17=r17,r16 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f117=f38,f127,f116
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f116=f38,f127,f116
+ add r18=r18,r17 };;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r22=f46
+ xma.hu f48=f39,f120,f47
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
+ xma.lu f47=f39,f120,f47
+ add r19=r19,r18 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f110
+ xma.hu f58=f39,f121,f57
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
+ xma.lu f57=f39,f121,f57
+ add r20=r20,r19 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f101
+ xma.hu f68=f39,f122,f67
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r20,r19
+ xma.lu f67=f39,f122,f67
+ add r21=r21,r20 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r26=f92
+ xma.hu f78=f39,f123,f77
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r21,r20
+ xma.lu f77=f39,f123,f77
+ add r22=r22,r21 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r27=f83
+ xma.hu f88=f39,f124,f87
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r22,r21
+ xma.lu f87=f39,f124,f87
+ add r22=r22,carry1 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r28=f74
+ xma.hu f98=f39,f125,f97
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f97=f39,f125,f97
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r22,carry1 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r29=f65
+ xma.hu f108=f39,f126,f107
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+{ .mfi; st8 [r32]=r22,16
+ xma.lu f107=f39,f126,f107 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r30=f56
+ xma.hu f118=f39,f127,f117 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f117=f39,f127,f117 };;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+// Leaving muliplier's heaven... Quite a ride, huh?
+
+{ .mii; getf.sig r31=f47
+ add r25=r25,r24
+ mov carry1=0 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r16=f111
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
+ add r26=r26,r25 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r17=f102 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
+ add r27=r27,r26 };;
+{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
+ add r28=r28,r27 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r18=f93
+ add r17=r17,r16
+ mov carry3=0 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r28,r27
+ add r29=r29,r28 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r19=f84
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r29,r28
+ add r30=r30,r29 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r20=f75
+ add r18=r18,r17 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r30,r29
+ add r31=r31,r30 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r21=f66 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
+ add r19=r19,r18 }
+{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r31,r30
+ add r31=r31,carry2 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r22=f57 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
+ add r20=r20,r19 }
+{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r31,carry2 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r23=f48 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r20,r19
+ add r21=r21,r20 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfb; st8 [r33]=r31,16 };;
+
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r24=f112 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r21,r20
+ add r22=r22,r21 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r25=f103 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r22,r21
+ add r23=r23,r22 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r26=f94 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r23,r22
+ add r23=r23,carry1 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r27=f85 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p8=r23,carry1};;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r28=f76
+ add r25=r25,r24
+ mov carry1=0 }
+{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r23,16
+ (p7) add carry2=1,carry3
+ (p8) add carry2=0,carry3 };;
+
+{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0 }
+{ .mii; getf.sig r29=f67
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
+ add r26=r26,r25 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r30=f58 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
+ add r27=r27,r26 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r16=f113 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
+ add r28=r28,r27 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r17=f104 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r28,r27
+ add r29=r29,r28 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r18=f95 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r29,r28
+ add r30=r30,r29 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r19=f86
+ add r17=r17,r16
+ mov carry3=0 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r30,r29
+ add r30=r30,carry2 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r20=f77
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16
+ add r18=r18,r17 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r30,carry2 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r21=f68 }
+{ .mii; st8 [r33]=r30,16
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 };;
+
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r24=f114 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
+ add r19=r19,r18 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r25=f105 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
+ add r20=r20,r19 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r26=f96 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r20,r19
+ add r21=r21,r20 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r27=f87 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r21,r20
+ add r21=r21,carry1 };;
+{ .mib; getf.sig r28=f78
+ add r25=r25,r24 }
+{ .mib; (p7) add carry3=1,carry3
+ cmp.ltu p7,p8=r21,carry1};;
+{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r21,16
+ (p7) add carry2=1,carry3
+ (p8) add carry2=0,carry3 }
+
+{ .mii; mov carry1=0
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
+ add r26=r26,r25 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r16=f115 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
+ add r27=r27,r26 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r17=f106 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
+ add r28=r28,r27 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r18=f97 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r28,r27
+ add r28=r28,carry2 };;
+{ .mib; getf.sig r19=f88
+ add r17=r17,r16 }
+{ .mib;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r28,carry2 };;
+{ .mii; st8 [r33]=r28,16
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+
+{ .mii; mov carry2=0
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16
+ add r18=r18,r17 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r24=f116 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
+ add r19=r19,r18 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r25=f107 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
+ add r19=r19,carry1 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r26=f98 }
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,carry1};;
+{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r19,16
+ (p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+
+{ .mfb; add r25=r25,r24 };;
+
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r16=f117 }
+{ .mii; mov carry1=0
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
+ add r26=r26,r25 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r17=f108 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
+ add r26=r26,carry2 };;
+{ .mfb; nop.m 0x0 }
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,carry2 };;
+{ .mii; st8 [r33]=r26,16
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+
+{ .mfb; add r17=r17,r16 };;
+{ .mfb; getf.sig r24=f118 }
+{ .mii; mov carry2=0
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16
+ add r17=r17,carry1 };;
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,carry1};;
+{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r17
+ (p7) add carry2=1,carry2 };;
+{ .mfb; add r24=r24,carry2 };;
+{ .mib; st8 [r33]=r24 }
+
+{ .mib; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh
+ br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
+.endp bn_mul_comba8#
+#undef carry3
+#undef carry2
+#undef carry1
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// It's possible to make it faster (see comment to bn_sqr_comba8), but
+// I reckon it doesn't worth the effort. Basically because the routine
+// (actually both of them) practically never called... So I just play
+// same trick as with bn_sqr_comba8.
+//
+// void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+//
+.global bn_sqr_comba4#
+.proc bn_sqr_comba4#
+.align 64
+bn_sqr_comba4:
+ .prologue
+ .save ar.pfs,r2
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
+ addp4 r32=0,r32
+ addp4 r33=0,r33 };;
+{ .mii;
+#else
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,2,1,0,0
+#endif
+ mov r34=r33
+ add r14=8,r33 };;
+ .body
+{ .mii; add r17=8,r34
+ add r15=16,r33
+ add r18=16,r34 }
+{ .mfb; add r16=24,r33
+ br .L_cheat_entry_point4 };;
+.endp bn_sqr_comba4#
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+// Runs in ~115 cycles and ~4.5 times faster than C. Well, whatever...
+//
+// void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+//
+#define carry1 r14
+#define carry2 r15
+.global bn_mul_comba4#
+.proc bn_mul_comba4#
+.align 64
+bn_mul_comba4:
+ .prologue
+ .save ar.pfs,r2
+#if defined(_HPUX_SOURCE) && !defined(_LP64)
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+ addp4 r33=0,r33
+ addp4 r34=0,r34 };;
+{ .mii; addp4 r32=0,r32
+#else
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,0,0,0
+#endif
+ add r14=8,r33
+ add r17=8,r34 }
+ .body
+{ .mii; add r15=16,r33
+ add r18=16,r34
+ add r16=24,r33 };;
+.L_cheat_entry_point4:
+{ .mmi; add r19=24,r34
+
+ ldf8 f32=[r33] }
+
+{ .mmi; ldf8 f120=[r34]
+ ldf8 f121=[r17] };;
+{ .mmi; ldf8 f122=[r18]
+ ldf8 f123=[r19] }
+
+{ .mmi; ldf8 f33=[r14]
+ ldf8 f34=[r15] }
+{ .mfi; ldf8 f35=[r16]
+
+ xma.hu f41=f32,f120,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f40=f32,f120,f0 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f51=f32,f121,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f50=f32,f121,f0 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f61=f32,f122,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f60=f32,f122,f0 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f71=f32,f123,f0 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f70=f32,f123,f0 };;//
+// Major stall takes place here, and 3 more places below. Result from
+// first xma is not available for another 3 ticks.
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f40
+ xma.hu f42=f33,f120,f41
+ add r33=8,r32 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f41=f33,f120,f41 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f50
+ xma.hu f52=f33,f121,f51 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f51=f33,f121,f51 };;
+{ .mfi; st8 [r32]=r16,16
+ xma.hu f62=f33,f122,f61 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f61=f33,f122,f61 };;
+{ .mfi; xma.hu f72=f33,f123,f71 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f71=f33,f123,f71 };;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f41
+ xma.hu f43=f34,f120,f42 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f42=f34,f120,f42 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r16=f60
+ xma.hu f53=f34,f121,f52 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f52=f34,f121,f52 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r17=f51
+ xma.hu f63=f34,f122,f62
+ add r25=r25,r24 }
+{ .mfi; mov carry1=0
+ xma.lu f62=f34,f122,f62 };;
+{ .mfi; st8 [r33]=r25,16
+ xma.hu f73=f34,f123,f72
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f72=f34,f123,f72 };;//
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r18=f42
+ xma.hu f44=f35,f120,f43
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+{ .mfi; add r17=r17,r16
+ xma.lu f43=f35,f120,f43
+ mov carry2=0 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r24=f70
+ xma.hu f54=f35,f121,f53
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f53=f35,f121,f53 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r25=f61
+ xma.hu f64=f35,f122,f63
+ add r18=r18,r17 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f63=f35,f122,f63
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 };;
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r26=f52
+ xma.hu f74=f35,f123,f73
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17 }
+{ .mfi; xma.lu f73=f35,f123,f73
+ add r18=r18,carry1 };;
+//-------------------------------------------------//
+{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r18,16
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,carry1 };;
+
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r27=f43 // last major stall
+(p7) add carry2=1,carry2 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r16=f71
+ add r25=r25,r24
+ mov carry1=0 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r17=f62
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
+ add r26=r26,r25 };;
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
+ add r27=r27,r26 };;
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,r26
+ add r27=r27,carry2 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r18=f53
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r27,carry2 };;
+{ .mfi; st8 [r33]=r27,16
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+
+{ .mii; getf.sig r19=f44
+ add r17=r17,r16
+ mov carry2=0 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r24=f72
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16
+ add r18=r18,r17 };;
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r18,r17
+ add r19=r19,r18 };;
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,r18
+ add r19=r19,carry1 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r25=f63
+ (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r19,carry1};;
+{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r19,16
+ (p7) add carry2=1,carry2 }
+
+{ .mii; getf.sig r26=f54
+ add r25=r25,r24
+ mov carry1=0 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r16=f73
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r25,r24
+ add r26=r26,r25 };;
+{ .mii;
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,r25
+ add r26=r26,carry2 };;
+{ .mii; getf.sig r17=f64
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1
+ cmp.ltu p6,p0=r26,carry2 };;
+{ .mii; st8 [r33]=r26,16
+(p6) add carry1=1,carry1 }
+
+{ .mii; getf.sig r24=f74
+ add r17=r17,r16
+ mov carry2=0 };;
+{ .mii; cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,r16
+ add r17=r17,carry1 };;
+
+{ .mii; (p7) add carry2=1,carry2
+ cmp.ltu p7,p0=r17,carry1};;
+{ .mii; st8 [r32]=r17,16
+ (p7) add carry2=1,carry2 };;
+
+{ .mii; add r24=r24,carry2 };;
+{ .mii; st8 [r33]=r24 }
+
+{ .mib; rum 1<<5 // clear um.mfh
+ br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
+.endp bn_mul_comba4#
+#undef carry2
+#undef carry1
+#endif
+
+#if 1
+//
+// BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
+//
+// In the nutshell it's a port of my MIPS III/IV implementation.
+//
+#define AT r14
+#define H r16
+#define HH r20
+#define L r17
+#define D r18
+#define DH r22
+#define I r21
+
+#if 0
+// Some preprocessors (most notably HP-UX) appear to be allergic to
+// macros enclosed to parenthesis [as these three were].
+#define cont p16
+#define break p0 // p20
+#define equ p24
+#else
+cont=p16
+break=p0
+equ=p24
+#endif
+
+.global abort#
+.global bn_div_words#
+.proc bn_div_words#
+.align 64
+bn_div_words:
+ .prologue
+ .save ar.pfs,r2
+{ .mii; alloc r2=ar.pfs,3,5,0,8
+ .save b0,r3
+ mov r3=b0
+ .save pr,r10
+ mov r10=pr };;
+{ .mmb; cmp.eq p6,p0=r34,r0
+ mov r8=-1
+(p6) br.ret.spnt.many b0 };;
+
+ .body
+{ .mii; mov H=r32 // save h
+ mov ar.ec=0 // don't rotate at exit
+ mov pr.rot=0 }
+{ .mii; mov L=r33 // save l
+ mov r36=r0 };;
+
+.L_divw_shift: // -vv- note signed comparison
+{ .mfi; (p0) cmp.lt p16,p0=r0,r34 // d
+ (p0) shladd r33=r34,1,r0 }
+{ .mfb; (p0) add r35=1,r36
+ (p0) nop.f 0x0
+(p16) br.wtop.dpnt .L_divw_shift };;
+
+{ .mii; mov D=r34
+ shr.u DH=r34,32
+ sub r35=64,r36 };;
+{ .mii; setf.sig f7=DH
+ shr.u AT=H,r35
+ mov I=r36 };;
+{ .mib; cmp.ne p6,p0=r0,AT
+ shl H=H,r36
+(p6) br.call.spnt.clr b0=abort };; // overflow, die...
+
+{ .mfi; fcvt.xuf.s1 f7=f7
+ shr.u AT=L,r35 };;
+{ .mii; shl L=L,r36
+ or H=H,AT };;
+
+{ .mii; nop.m 0x0
+ cmp.leu p6,p0=D,H;;
+(p6) sub H=H,D }
+
+{ .mlx; setf.sig f14=D
+ movl AT=0xffffffff };;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii; setf.sig f6=H
+ shr.u HH=H,32;;
+ cmp.eq p6,p7=HH,DH };;
+{ .mfb;
+(p6) setf.sig f8=AT
+(p7) fcvt.xuf.s1 f6=f6
+(p7) br.call.sptk b6=.L_udiv64_32_b6 };;
+
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r33=f8 // q
+ xmpy.lu f9=f8,f14 }
+{ .mfi; xmpy.hu f10=f8,f14
+ shrp H=H,L,32 };;
+
+{ .mmi; getf.sig r35=f9 // tl
+ getf.sig r31=f10 };; // th
+
+.L_divw_1st_iter:
+{ .mii; (p0) add r32=-1,r33
+ (p0) cmp.eq equ,cont=HH,r31 };;
+{ .mii; (p0) cmp.ltu p8,p0=r35,D
+ (p0) sub r34=r35,D
+ (equ) cmp.leu break,cont=r35,H };;
+{ .mib; (cont) cmp.leu cont,break=HH,r31
+ (p8) add r31=-1,r31
+(cont) br.wtop.spnt .L_divw_1st_iter };;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii; sub H=H,r35
+ shl r8=r33,32
+ shl L=L,32 };;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii; setf.sig f6=H
+ shr.u HH=H,32;;
+ cmp.eq p6,p7=HH,DH };;
+{ .mfb;
+(p6) setf.sig f8=AT
+(p7) fcvt.xuf.s1 f6=f6
+(p7) br.call.sptk b6=.L_udiv64_32_b6 };;
+
+{ .mfi; getf.sig r33=f8 // q
+ xmpy.lu f9=f8,f14 }
+{ .mfi; xmpy.hu f10=f8,f14
+ shrp H=H,L,32 };;
+
+{ .mmi; getf.sig r35=f9 // tl
+ getf.sig r31=f10 };; // th
+
+.L_divw_2nd_iter:
+{ .mii; (p0) add r32=-1,r33
+ (p0) cmp.eq equ,cont=HH,r31 };;
+{ .mii; (p0) cmp.ltu p8,p0=r35,D
+ (p0) sub r34=r35,D
+ (equ) cmp.leu break,cont=r35,H };;
+{ .mib; (cont) cmp.leu cont,break=HH,r31
+ (p8) add r31=-1,r31
+(cont) br.wtop.spnt .L_divw_2nd_iter };;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+{ .mii; sub H=H,r35
+ or r8=r8,r33
+ mov ar.pfs=r2 };;
+{ .mii; shr.u r9=H,I // remainder if anybody wants it
+ mov pr=r10,0x1ffff }
+{ .mfb; br.ret.sptk.many b0 };;
+
+// Unsigned 64 by 32 (well, by 64 for the moment) bit integer division
+// procedure.
+//
+// inputs: f6 = (double)a, f7 = (double)b
+// output: f8 = (int)(a/b)
+// clobbered: f8,f9,f10,f11,pred
+pred=p15
+// One can argue that this snippet is copyrighted to Intel
+// Corporation, as it's essentially identical to one of those
+// found in "Divide, Square Root and Remainder" section at
+// http://www.intel.com/software/products/opensource/libraries/num.htm.
+// Yes, I admit that the referred code was used as template,
+// but after I realized that there hardly is any other instruction
+// sequence which would perform this operation. I mean I figure that
+// any independent attempt to implement high-performance division
+// will result in code virtually identical to the Intel code. It
+// should be noted though that below division kernel is 1 cycle
+// faster than Intel one (note commented splits:-), not to mention
+// original prologue (rather lack of one) and epilogue.
+.align 32
+.skip 16
+.L_udiv64_32_b6:
+ frcpa.s1 f8,pred=f6,f7;; // [0] y0 = 1 / b
+
+(pred) fnma.s1 f9=f7,f8,f1 // [5] e0 = 1 - b * y0
+(pred) fmpy.s1 f10=f6,f8;; // [5] q0 = a * y0
+(pred) fmpy.s1 f11=f9,f9 // [10] e1 = e0 * e0
+(pred) fma.s1 f10=f9,f10,f10;; // [10] q1 = q0 + e0 * q0
+(pred) fma.s1 f8=f9,f8,f8 //;; // [15] y1 = y0 + e0 * y0
+(pred) fma.s1 f9=f11,f10,f10;; // [15] q2 = q1 + e1 * q1
+(pred) fma.s1 f8=f11,f8,f8 //;; // [20] y2 = y1 + e1 * y1
+(pred) fnma.s1 f10=f7,f9,f6;; // [20] r2 = a - b * q2
+(pred) fma.s1 f8=f10,f8,f9;; // [25] q3 = q2 + r2 * y2
+
+ fcvt.fxu.trunc.s1 f8=f8 // [30] q = trunc(q3)
+ br.ret.sptk.many b6;;
+.endp bn_div_words#
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,221 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# May 2011
-#
-# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used
-# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
-# the time being... gcc 4.3 appeared to generate poor code, therefore
-# the effort. And indeed, the module delivers 55%-90%(*) improvement
-# on haviest ECDSA verify and ECDH benchmarks for 163- and 571-bit
-# key lengths on z990, 30%-55%(*) - on z10, and 70%-110%(*) - on z196.
-# This is for 64-bit build. In 32-bit "highgprs" case improvement is
-# even higher, for example on z990 it was measured 80%-150%. ECDSA
-# sign is modest 9%-12% faster. Keep in mind that these coefficients
-# are not ones for bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself, as not all CPU time is
-# burnt in it...
-#
-# (*) gcc 4.1 was observed to deliver better results than gcc 4.3,
-# so that improvement coefficients can vary from one specific
-# setup to another.
-
-$flavour = shift;
-
-if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
- $SIZE_T=4;
- $g="";
-} else {
- $SIZE_T=8;
- $g="g";
-}
-
-while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
-open STDOUT,">$output";
-
-$stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8;
-
-$rp="%r2";
-$a1="%r3";
-$a0="%r4";
-$b1="%r5";
-$b0="%r6";
-
-$ra="%r14";
-$sp="%r15";
-
- at T=("%r0","%r1");
- at i=("%r12","%r13");
-
-($a1,$a2,$a4,$a8,$a12,$a48)=map("%r$_",(6..11));
-($lo,$hi,$b)=map("%r$_",(3..5)); $a=$lo; $mask=$a8;
-
-$code.=<<___;
-.text
-
-.type _mul_1x1,\@function
-.align 16
-_mul_1x1:
- lgr $a1,$a
- sllg $a2,$a,1
- sllg $a4,$a,2
- sllg $a8,$a,3
-
- srag $lo,$a1,63 # broadcast 63rd bit
- nihh $a1,0x1fff
- srag @i[0],$a2,63 # broadcast 62nd bit
- nihh $a2,0x3fff
- srag @i[1],$a4,63 # broadcast 61st bit
- nihh $a4,0x7fff
- ngr $lo,$b
- ngr @i[0],$b
- ngr @i[1],$b
-
- lghi @T[0],0
- lgr $a12,$a1
- stg @T[0],`$stdframe+0*8`($sp) # tab[0]=0
- xgr $a12,$a2
- stg $a1,`$stdframe+1*8`($sp) # tab[1]=a1
- lgr $a48,$a4
- stg $a2,`$stdframe+2*8`($sp) # tab[2]=a2
- xgr $a48,$a8
- stg $a12,`$stdframe+3*8`($sp) # tab[3]=a1^a2
- xgr $a1,$a4
-
- stg $a4,`$stdframe+4*8`($sp) # tab[4]=a4
- xgr $a2,$a4
- stg $a1,`$stdframe+5*8`($sp) # tab[5]=a1^a4
- xgr $a12,$a4
- stg $a2,`$stdframe+6*8`($sp) # tab[6]=a2^a4
- xgr $a1,$a48
- stg $a12,`$stdframe+7*8`($sp) # tab[7]=a1^a2^a4
- xgr $a2,$a48
-
- stg $a8,`$stdframe+8*8`($sp) # tab[8]=a8
- xgr $a12,$a48
- stg $a1,`$stdframe+9*8`($sp) # tab[9]=a1^a8
- xgr $a1,$a4
- stg $a2,`$stdframe+10*8`($sp) # tab[10]=a2^a8
- xgr $a2,$a4
- stg $a12,`$stdframe+11*8`($sp) # tab[11]=a1^a2^a8
-
- xgr $a12,$a4
- stg $a48,`$stdframe+12*8`($sp) # tab[12]=a4^a8
- srlg $hi,$lo,1
- stg $a1,`$stdframe+13*8`($sp) # tab[13]=a1^a4^a8
- sllg $lo,$lo,63
- stg $a2,`$stdframe+14*8`($sp) # tab[14]=a2^a4^a8
- srlg @T[0], at i[0],2
- stg $a12,`$stdframe+15*8`($sp) # tab[15]=a1^a2^a4^a8
-
- lghi $mask,`0xf<<3`
- sllg $a1, at i[0],62
- sllg @i[0],$b,3
- srlg @T[1], at i[1],3
- ngr @i[0],$mask
- sllg $a2, at i[1],61
- srlg @i[1],$b,4-3
- xgr $hi, at T[0]
- ngr @i[1],$mask
- xgr $lo,$a1
- xgr $hi, at T[1]
- xgr $lo,$a2
-
- xg $lo,$stdframe(@i[0],$sp)
- srlg @i[0],$b,8-3
- ngr @i[0],$mask
-___
-for($n=1;$n<14;$n++) {
-$code.=<<___;
- lg @T[1],$stdframe(@i[1],$sp)
- srlg @i[1],$b,`($n+2)*4`-3
- sllg @T[0], at T[1],`$n*4`
- ngr @i[1],$mask
- srlg @T[1], at T[1],`64-$n*4`
- xgr $lo, at T[0]
- xgr $hi, at T[1]
-___
- push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T));
-}
-$code.=<<___;
- lg @T[1],$stdframe(@i[1],$sp)
- sllg @T[0], at T[1],`$n*4`
- srlg @T[1], at T[1],`64-$n*4`
- xgr $lo, at T[0]
- xgr $hi, at T[1]
-
- lg @T[0],$stdframe(@i[0],$sp)
- sllg @T[1], at T[0],`($n+1)*4`
- srlg @T[0], at T[0],`64-($n+1)*4`
- xgr $lo, at T[1]
- xgr $hi, at T[0]
-
- br $ra
-.size _mul_1x1,.-_mul_1x1
-
-.globl bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
-.type bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,\@function
-.align 16
-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
- stm${g} %r3,%r15,3*$SIZE_T($sp)
-
- lghi %r1,-$stdframe-128
- la %r0,0($sp)
- la $sp,0(%r1,$sp) # alloca
- st${g} %r0,0($sp) # back chain
-___
-if ($SIZE_T==8) {
-my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
-$code.=<<___;
- bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1\xB7b1
- stmg $lo,$hi,16($rp)
-
- lg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- lg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0\xB7b0
- stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp)
-
- lg $a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- lg $b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- xg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- xg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)\xB7(b0+b1)
- lmg @r[0], at r[3],0($rp)
-
- xgr $lo,$hi
- xgr $hi, at r[1]
- xgr $lo, at r[0]
- xgr $hi, at r[2]
- xgr $lo, at r[3]
- xgr $hi, at r[3]
- xgr $lo,$hi
- stg $hi,16($rp)
- stg $lo,8($rp)
-___
-} else {
-$code.=<<___;
- sllg %r3,%r3,32
- sllg %r5,%r5,32
- or %r3,%r4
- or %r5,%r6
- bras $ra,_mul_1x1
- rllg $lo,$lo,32
- rllg $hi,$hi,32
- stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp)
-___
-}
-$code.=<<___;
- lm${g} %r6,%r15,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
- br $ra
-.size bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
-.string "GF(2^m) Multiplication for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
-___
-
-$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
-print $code;
-close STDOUT;
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# May 2011
+#
+# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used
+# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
+# the time being... gcc 4.3 appeared to generate poor code, therefore
+# the effort. And indeed, the module delivers 55%-90%(*) improvement
+# on haviest ECDSA verify and ECDH benchmarks for 163- and 571-bit
+# key lengths on z990, 30%-55%(*) - on z10, and 70%-110%(*) - on z196.
+# This is for 64-bit build. In 32-bit "highgprs" case improvement is
+# even higher, for example on z990 it was measured 80%-150%. ECDSA
+# sign is modest 9%-12% faster. Keep in mind that these coefficients
+# are not ones for bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself, as not all CPU time is
+# burnt in it...
+#
+# (*) gcc 4.1 was observed to deliver better results than gcc 4.3,
+# so that improvement coefficients can vary from one specific
+# setup to another.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+
+if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) {
+ $SIZE_T=4;
+ $g="";
+} else {
+ $SIZE_T=8;
+ $g="g";
+}
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$stdframe=16*$SIZE_T+4*8;
+
+$rp="%r2";
+$a1="%r3";
+$a0="%r4";
+$b1="%r5";
+$b0="%r6";
+
+$ra="%r14";
+$sp="%r15";
+
+ at T=("%r0","%r1");
+ at i=("%r12","%r13");
+
+($a1,$a2,$a4,$a8,$a12,$a48)=map("%r$_",(6..11));
+($lo,$hi,$b)=map("%r$_",(3..5)); $a=$lo; $mask=$a8;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.type _mul_1x1,\@function
+.align 16
+_mul_1x1:
+ lgr $a1,$a
+ sllg $a2,$a,1
+ sllg $a4,$a,2
+ sllg $a8,$a,3
+
+ srag $lo,$a1,63 # broadcast 63rd bit
+ nihh $a1,0x1fff
+ srag @i[0],$a2,63 # broadcast 62nd bit
+ nihh $a2,0x3fff
+ srag @i[1],$a4,63 # broadcast 61st bit
+ nihh $a4,0x7fff
+ ngr $lo,$b
+ ngr @i[0],$b
+ ngr @i[1],$b
+
+ lghi @T[0],0
+ lgr $a12,$a1
+ stg @T[0],`$stdframe+0*8`($sp) # tab[0]=0
+ xgr $a12,$a2
+ stg $a1,`$stdframe+1*8`($sp) # tab[1]=a1
+ lgr $a48,$a4
+ stg $a2,`$stdframe+2*8`($sp) # tab[2]=a2
+ xgr $a48,$a8
+ stg $a12,`$stdframe+3*8`($sp) # tab[3]=a1^a2
+ xgr $a1,$a4
+
+ stg $a4,`$stdframe+4*8`($sp) # tab[4]=a4
+ xgr $a2,$a4
+ stg $a1,`$stdframe+5*8`($sp) # tab[5]=a1^a4
+ xgr $a12,$a4
+ stg $a2,`$stdframe+6*8`($sp) # tab[6]=a2^a4
+ xgr $a1,$a48
+ stg $a12,`$stdframe+7*8`($sp) # tab[7]=a1^a2^a4
+ xgr $a2,$a48
+
+ stg $a8,`$stdframe+8*8`($sp) # tab[8]=a8
+ xgr $a12,$a48
+ stg $a1,`$stdframe+9*8`($sp) # tab[9]=a1^a8
+ xgr $a1,$a4
+ stg $a2,`$stdframe+10*8`($sp) # tab[10]=a2^a8
+ xgr $a2,$a4
+ stg $a12,`$stdframe+11*8`($sp) # tab[11]=a1^a2^a8
+
+ xgr $a12,$a4
+ stg $a48,`$stdframe+12*8`($sp) # tab[12]=a4^a8
+ srlg $hi,$lo,1
+ stg $a1,`$stdframe+13*8`($sp) # tab[13]=a1^a4^a8
+ sllg $lo,$lo,63
+ stg $a2,`$stdframe+14*8`($sp) # tab[14]=a2^a4^a8
+ srlg @T[0], at i[0],2
+ stg $a12,`$stdframe+15*8`($sp) # tab[15]=a1^a2^a4^a8
+
+ lghi $mask,`0xf<<3`
+ sllg $a1, at i[0],62
+ sllg @i[0],$b,3
+ srlg @T[1], at i[1],3
+ ngr @i[0],$mask
+ sllg $a2, at i[1],61
+ srlg @i[1],$b,4-3
+ xgr $hi, at T[0]
+ ngr @i[1],$mask
+ xgr $lo,$a1
+ xgr $hi, at T[1]
+ xgr $lo,$a2
+
+ xg $lo,$stdframe(@i[0],$sp)
+ srlg @i[0],$b,8-3
+ ngr @i[0],$mask
+___
+for($n=1;$n<14;$n++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ lg @T[1],$stdframe(@i[1],$sp)
+ srlg @i[1],$b,`($n+2)*4`-3
+ sllg @T[0], at T[1],`$n*4`
+ ngr @i[1],$mask
+ srlg @T[1], at T[1],`64-$n*4`
+ xgr $lo, at T[0]
+ xgr $hi, at T[1]
+___
+ push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ lg @T[1],$stdframe(@i[1],$sp)
+ sllg @T[0], at T[1],`$n*4`
+ srlg @T[1], at T[1],`64-$n*4`
+ xgr $lo, at T[0]
+ xgr $hi, at T[1]
+
+ lg @T[0],$stdframe(@i[0],$sp)
+ sllg @T[1], at T[0],`($n+1)*4`
+ srlg @T[0], at T[0],`64-($n+1)*4`
+ xgr $lo, at T[1]
+ xgr $hi, at T[0]
+
+ br $ra
+.size _mul_1x1,.-_mul_1x1
+
+.globl bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.type bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,\@function
+.align 16
+bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
+ stm${g} %r3,%r15,3*$SIZE_T($sp)
+
+ lghi %r1,-$stdframe-128
+ la %r0,0($sp)
+ la $sp,0(%r1,$sp) # alloca
+ st${g} %r0,0($sp) # back chain
+___
+if ($SIZE_T==8) {
+my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
+$code.=<<___;
+ bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1
+ stmg $lo,$hi,16($rp)
+
+ lg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ lg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0
+ stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp)
+
+ lg $a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ lg $b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ xg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ xg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+ lmg @r[0], at r[3],0($rp)
+
+ xgr $lo,$hi
+ xgr $hi, at r[1]
+ xgr $lo, at r[0]
+ xgr $hi, at r[2]
+ xgr $lo, at r[3]
+ xgr $hi, at r[3]
+ xgr $lo,$hi
+ stg $hi,16($rp)
+ stg $lo,8($rp)
+___
+} else {
+$code.=<<___;
+ sllg %r3,%r3,32
+ sllg %r5,%r5,32
+ or %r3,%r4
+ or %r5,%r6
+ bras $ra,_mul_1x1
+ rllg $lo,$lo,32
+ rllg $hi,$hi,32
+ stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp)
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ lm${g} %r6,%r15,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ br $ra
+.size bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.string "GF(2^m) Multiplication for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,313 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# May 2011
-#
-# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used
-# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
-# the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
-# code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
-# and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
-# from one benchmark and \xB5-arch to another. Below are interval values
-# for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
-# code:
-#
-# PIII 16%-30%
-# P4 12%-12%
-# Opteron 18%-40%
-# Core2 19%-44%
-# Atom 38%-64%
-# Westmere 53%-121%(PCLMULQDQ)/20%-32%(MMX)
-# Sandy Bridge 72%-127%(PCLMULQDQ)/27%-23%(MMX)
-#
-# Note that above improvement coefficients are not coefficients for
-# bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself. For example 120% ECDH improvement is result
-# of bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 being >4x faster. As it gets faster, benchmark
-# is more and more dominated by other subroutines, most notably by
-# BN_GF2m_mod[_mul]_arr...
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
-require "x86asm.pl";
-
-&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0,$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
-
-$sse2=0;
-for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
-
-&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2);
-
-$a="eax";
-$b="ebx";
-($a1,$a2,$a4)=("ecx","edx","ebp");
-
-$R="mm0";
- at T=("mm1","mm2");
-($A,$B,$B30,$B31)=("mm2","mm3","mm4","mm5");
- at i=("esi","edi");
-
- if (!$x86only) {
-&function_begin_B("_mul_1x1_mmx");
- &sub ("esp",32+4);
- &mov ($a1,$a);
- &lea ($a2,&DWP(0,$a,$a));
- &and ($a1,0x3fffffff);
- &lea ($a4,&DWP(0,$a2,$a2));
- &mov (&DWP(0*4,"esp"),0);
- &and ($a2,0x7fffffff);
- &movd ($A,$a);
- &movd ($B,$b);
- &mov (&DWP(1*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1
- &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a2
- &pxor ($B31,$B31);
- &pxor ($B30,$B30);
- &mov (&DWP(2*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2
- &xor ($a2,$a4); # a2^a4
- &mov (&DWP(3*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a2
- &pcmpgtd($B31,$A); # broadcast 31st bit
- &paddd ($A,$A); # $A<<=1
- &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a4=a1^a2^a2^a4
- &mov (&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$a4); # a4
- &xor ($a4,$a2); # a2=a4^a2^a4
- &pand ($B31,$B);
- &pcmpgtd($B30,$A); # broadcast 30th bit
- &mov (&DWP(5*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a4
- &xor ($a4,$a1); # a1^a2^a4
- &psllq ($B31,31);
- &pand ($B30,$B);
- &mov (&DWP(6*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2^a4
- &mov (@i[0],0x7);
- &mov (&DWP(7*4,"esp"),$a4); # a1^a2^a4
- &mov ($a4, at i[0]);
- &and (@i[0],$b);
- &shr ($b,3);
- &mov (@i[1],$a4);
- &psllq ($B30,30);
- &and (@i[1],$b);
- &shr ($b,3);
- &movd ($R,&DWP(0,"esp", at i[0],4));
- &mov (@i[0],$a4);
- &and (@i[0],$b);
- &shr ($b,3);
- for($n=1;$n<9;$n++) {
- &movd (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[1],4));
- &mov (@i[1],$a4);
- &psllq (@T[1],3*$n);
- &and (@i[1],$b);
- &shr ($b,3);
- &pxor ($R, at T[1]);
-
- push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T));
- }
- &movd (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[1],4));
- &pxor ($R,$B30);
- &psllq (@T[1],3*$n++);
- &pxor ($R, at T[1]);
-
- &movd (@T[0],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[0],4));
- &pxor ($R,$B31);
- &psllq (@T[0],3*$n);
- &add ("esp",32+4);
- &pxor ($R, at T[0]);
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("_mul_1x1_mmx");
- }
-
-($lo,$hi)=("eax","edx");
- at T=("ecx","ebp");
-
-&function_begin_B("_mul_1x1_ialu");
- &sub ("esp",32+4);
- &mov ($a1,$a);
- &lea ($a2,&DWP(0,$a,$a));
- &lea ($a4,&DWP(0,"",$a,4));
- &and ($a1,0x3fffffff);
- &lea (@i[1],&DWP(0,$lo,$lo));
- &sar ($lo,31); # broadcast 31st bit
- &mov (&DWP(0*4,"esp"),0);
- &and ($a2,0x7fffffff);
- &mov (&DWP(1*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1
- &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a2
- &mov (&DWP(2*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2
- &xor ($a2,$a4); # a2^a4
- &mov (&DWP(3*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a2
- &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a4=a1^a2^a2^a4
- &mov (&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$a4); # a4
- &xor ($a4,$a2); # a2=a4^a2^a4
- &mov (&DWP(5*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a4
- &xor ($a4,$a1); # a1^a2^a4
- &sar (@i[1],31); # broardcast 30th bit
- &and ($lo,$b);
- &mov (&DWP(6*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2^a4
- &and (@i[1],$b);
- &mov (&DWP(7*4,"esp"),$a4); # a1^a2^a4
- &mov ($hi,$lo);
- &shl ($lo,31);
- &mov (@T[0], at i[1]);
- &shr ($hi,1);
-
- &mov (@i[0],0x7);
- &shl (@i[1],30);
- &and (@i[0],$b);
- &shr (@T[0],2);
- &xor ($lo, at i[1]);
-
- &shr ($b,3);
- &mov (@i[1],0x7); # 5-byte instruction!?
- &and (@i[1],$b);
- &shr ($b,3);
- &xor ($hi, at T[0]);
- &xor ($lo,&DWP(0,"esp", at i[0],4));
- &mov (@i[0],0x7);
- &and (@i[0],$b);
- &shr ($b,3);
- for($n=1;$n<9;$n++) {
- &mov (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[1],4));
- &mov (@i[1],0x7);
- &mov (@T[0], at T[1]);
- &shl (@T[1],3*$n);
- &and (@i[1],$b);
- &shr (@T[0],32-3*$n);
- &xor ($lo, at T[1]);
- &shr ($b,3);
- &xor ($hi, at T[0]);
-
- push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T));
- }
- &mov (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[1],4));
- &mov (@T[0], at T[1]);
- &shl (@T[1],3*$n);
- &mov (@i[1],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[0],4));
- &shr (@T[0],32-3*$n); $n++;
- &mov (@i[0], at i[1]);
- &xor ($lo, at T[1]);
- &shl (@i[1],3*$n);
- &xor ($hi, at T[0]);
- &shr (@i[0],32-3*$n);
- &xor ($lo, at i[1]);
- &xor ($hi, at i[0]);
-
- &add ("esp",32+4);
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("_mul_1x1_ialu");
-
-# void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG a1, BN_ULONG a0, BN_ULONG b1, BN_ULONG b0);
-&function_begin_B("bn_GF2m_mul_2x2");
-if (!$x86only) {
- &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edx"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(4,"edx"));
- &test ("eax",1<<23); # check MMX bit
- &jz (&label("ialu"));
-if ($sse2) {
- &test ("eax",1<<24); # check FXSR bit
- &jz (&label("mmx"));
- &test ("edx",1<<1); # check PCLMULQDQ bit
- &jz (&label("mmx"));
-
- &movups ("xmm0",&QWP(8,"esp"));
- &shufps ("xmm0","xmm0",0b10110001);
- &pclmulqdq ("xmm0","xmm0",1);
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,"esp"));
- &movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),"xmm0");
- &ret ();
-
-&set_label("mmx",16);
-}
- &push ("ebp");
- &push ("ebx");
- &push ("esi");
- &push ("edi");
- &mov ($a,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($b,&wparam(3));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1\xB7b1
- &movq ("mm7",$R);
-
- &mov ($a,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($b,&wparam(4));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0\xB7b0
- &movq ("mm6",$R);
-
- &mov ($a,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($b,&wparam(3));
- &xor ($a,&wparam(2));
- &xor ($b,&wparam(4));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)\xB7(b0+b1)
- &pxor ($R,"mm7");
- &mov ($a,&wparam(0));
- &pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)\xB7(b0+b1)-a1\xB7b1-a0\xB7b0
-
- &movq ($A,$R);
- &psllq ($R,32);
- &pop ("edi");
- &psrlq ($A,32);
- &pop ("esi");
- &pxor ($R,"mm6");
- &pop ("ebx");
- &pxor ($A,"mm7");
- &movq (&QWP(0,$a),$R);
- &pop ("ebp");
- &movq (&QWP(8,$a),$A);
- &emms ();
- &ret ();
-&set_label("ialu",16);
-}
- &push ("ebp");
- &push ("ebx");
- &push ("esi");
- &push ("edi");
- &stack_push(4+1);
-
- &mov ($a,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($b,&wparam(3));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1\xB7b1
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);
-
- &mov ($a,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($b,&wparam(4));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0\xB7b0
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);
-
- &mov ($a,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($b,&wparam(3));
- &xor ($a,&wparam(2));
- &xor ($b,&wparam(4));
- &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)\xB7(b0+b1)
-
- &mov ("ebp",&wparam(0));
- @r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");
- &mov (@r[0],&DWP(0,"esp"));
- &mov (@r[1],&DWP(4,"esp"));
- &mov (@r[2],&DWP(8,"esp"));
- &mov (@r[3],&DWP(12,"esp"));
-
- &xor ($lo,$hi);
- &xor ($hi, at r[1]);
- &xor ($lo, at r[0]);
- &mov (&DWP(0,"ebp"), at r[0]);
- &xor ($hi, at r[2]);
- &mov (&DWP(12,"ebp"), at r[3]);
- &xor ($lo, at r[3]);
- &stack_pop(4+1);
- &xor ($hi, at r[3]);
- &pop ("edi");
- &xor ($lo,$hi);
- &pop ("esi");
- &mov (&DWP(8,"ebp"),$hi);
- &pop ("ebx");
- &mov (&DWP(4,"ebp"),$lo);
- &pop ("ebp");
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("bn_GF2m_mul_2x2");
-
-&asciz ("GF(2^m) Multiplication for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
-
-&asm_finish();
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# May 2011
+#
+# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used
+# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
+# the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
+# code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
+# and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
+# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values
+# for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
+# code:
+#
+# PIII 16%-30%
+# P4 12%-12%
+# Opteron 18%-40%
+# Core2 19%-44%
+# Atom 38%-64%
+# Westmere 53%-121%(PCLMULQDQ)/20%-32%(MMX)
+# Sandy Bridge 72%-127%(PCLMULQDQ)/27%-23%(MMX)
+#
+# Note that above improvement coefficients are not coefficients for
+# bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself. For example 120% ECDH improvement is result
+# of bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 being >4x faster. As it gets faster, benchmark
+# is more and more dominated by other subroutines, most notably by
+# BN_GF2m_mod[_mul]_arr...
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0,$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$sse2=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2);
+
+$a="eax";
+$b="ebx";
+($a1,$a2,$a4)=("ecx","edx","ebp");
+
+$R="mm0";
+ at T=("mm1","mm2");
+($A,$B,$B30,$B31)=("mm2","mm3","mm4","mm5");
+ at i=("esi","edi");
+
+ if (!$x86only) {
+&function_begin_B("_mul_1x1_mmx");
+ &sub ("esp",32+4);
+ &mov ($a1,$a);
+ &lea ($a2,&DWP(0,$a,$a));
+ &and ($a1,0x3fffffff);
+ &lea ($a4,&DWP(0,$a2,$a2));
+ &mov (&DWP(0*4,"esp"),0);
+ &and ($a2,0x7fffffff);
+ &movd ($A,$a);
+ &movd ($B,$b);
+ &mov (&DWP(1*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1
+ &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a2
+ &pxor ($B31,$B31);
+ &pxor ($B30,$B30);
+ &mov (&DWP(2*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2
+ &xor ($a2,$a4); # a2^a4
+ &mov (&DWP(3*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a2
+ &pcmpgtd($B31,$A); # broadcast 31st bit
+ &paddd ($A,$A); # $A<<=1
+ &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a4=a1^a2^a2^a4
+ &mov (&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$a4); # a4
+ &xor ($a4,$a2); # a2=a4^a2^a4
+ &pand ($B31,$B);
+ &pcmpgtd($B30,$A); # broadcast 30th bit
+ &mov (&DWP(5*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a4
+ &xor ($a4,$a1); # a1^a2^a4
+ &psllq ($B31,31);
+ &pand ($B30,$B);
+ &mov (&DWP(6*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2^a4
+ &mov (@i[0],0x7);
+ &mov (&DWP(7*4,"esp"),$a4); # a1^a2^a4
+ &mov ($a4, at i[0]);
+ &and (@i[0],$b);
+ &shr ($b,3);
+ &mov (@i[1],$a4);
+ &psllq ($B30,30);
+ &and (@i[1],$b);
+ &shr ($b,3);
+ &movd ($R,&DWP(0,"esp", at i[0],4));
+ &mov (@i[0],$a4);
+ &and (@i[0],$b);
+ &shr ($b,3);
+ for($n=1;$n<9;$n++) {
+ &movd (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[1],4));
+ &mov (@i[1],$a4);
+ &psllq (@T[1],3*$n);
+ &and (@i[1],$b);
+ &shr ($b,3);
+ &pxor ($R, at T[1]);
+
+ push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T));
+ }
+ &movd (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[1],4));
+ &pxor ($R,$B30);
+ &psllq (@T[1],3*$n++);
+ &pxor ($R, at T[1]);
+
+ &movd (@T[0],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[0],4));
+ &pxor ($R,$B31);
+ &psllq (@T[0],3*$n);
+ &add ("esp",32+4);
+ &pxor ($R, at T[0]);
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("_mul_1x1_mmx");
+ }
+
+($lo,$hi)=("eax","edx");
+ at T=("ecx","ebp");
+
+&function_begin_B("_mul_1x1_ialu");
+ &sub ("esp",32+4);
+ &mov ($a1,$a);
+ &lea ($a2,&DWP(0,$a,$a));
+ &lea ($a4,&DWP(0,"",$a,4));
+ &and ($a1,0x3fffffff);
+ &lea (@i[1],&DWP(0,$lo,$lo));
+ &sar ($lo,31); # broadcast 31st bit
+ &mov (&DWP(0*4,"esp"),0);
+ &and ($a2,0x7fffffff);
+ &mov (&DWP(1*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1
+ &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a2
+ &mov (&DWP(2*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2
+ &xor ($a2,$a4); # a2^a4
+ &mov (&DWP(3*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a2
+ &xor ($a1,$a2); # a1^a4=a1^a2^a2^a4
+ &mov (&DWP(4*4,"esp"),$a4); # a4
+ &xor ($a4,$a2); # a2=a4^a2^a4
+ &mov (&DWP(5*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a4
+ &xor ($a4,$a1); # a1^a2^a4
+ &sar (@i[1],31); # broardcast 30th bit
+ &and ($lo,$b);
+ &mov (&DWP(6*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2^a4
+ &and (@i[1],$b);
+ &mov (&DWP(7*4,"esp"),$a4); # a1^a2^a4
+ &mov ($hi,$lo);
+ &shl ($lo,31);
+ &mov (@T[0], at i[1]);
+ &shr ($hi,1);
+
+ &mov (@i[0],0x7);
+ &shl (@i[1],30);
+ &and (@i[0],$b);
+ &shr (@T[0],2);
+ &xor ($lo, at i[1]);
+
+ &shr ($b,3);
+ &mov (@i[1],0x7); # 5-byte instruction!?
+ &and (@i[1],$b);
+ &shr ($b,3);
+ &xor ($hi, at T[0]);
+ &xor ($lo,&DWP(0,"esp", at i[0],4));
+ &mov (@i[0],0x7);
+ &and (@i[0],$b);
+ &shr ($b,3);
+ for($n=1;$n<9;$n++) {
+ &mov (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[1],4));
+ &mov (@i[1],0x7);
+ &mov (@T[0], at T[1]);
+ &shl (@T[1],3*$n);
+ &and (@i[1],$b);
+ &shr (@T[0],32-3*$n);
+ &xor ($lo, at T[1]);
+ &shr ($b,3);
+ &xor ($hi, at T[0]);
+
+ push(@i,shift(@i)); push(@T,shift(@T));
+ }
+ &mov (@T[1],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[1],4));
+ &mov (@T[0], at T[1]);
+ &shl (@T[1],3*$n);
+ &mov (@i[1],&DWP(0,"esp", at i[0],4));
+ &shr (@T[0],32-3*$n); $n++;
+ &mov (@i[0], at i[1]);
+ &xor ($lo, at T[1]);
+ &shl (@i[1],3*$n);
+ &xor ($hi, at T[0]);
+ &shr (@i[0],32-3*$n);
+ &xor ($lo, at i[1]);
+ &xor ($hi, at i[0]);
+
+ &add ("esp",32+4);
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("_mul_1x1_ialu");
+
+# void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG a1, BN_ULONG a0, BN_ULONG b1, BN_ULONG b0);
+&function_begin_B("bn_GF2m_mul_2x2");
+if (!$x86only) {
+ &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edx"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(4,"edx"));
+ &test ("eax",1<<23); # check MMX bit
+ &jz (&label("ialu"));
+if ($sse2) {
+ &test ("eax",1<<24); # check FXSR bit
+ &jz (&label("mmx"));
+ &test ("edx",1<<1); # check PCLMULQDQ bit
+ &jz (&label("mmx"));
+
+ &movups ("xmm0",&QWP(8,"esp"));
+ &shufps ("xmm0","xmm0",0b10110001);
+ &pclmulqdq ("xmm0","xmm0",1);
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+ &movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),"xmm0");
+ &ret ();
+
+&set_label("mmx",16);
+}
+ &push ("ebp");
+ &push ("ebx");
+ &push ("esi");
+ &push ("edi");
+ &mov ($a,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($b,&wparam(3));
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1
+ &movq ("mm7",$R);
+
+ &mov ($a,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($b,&wparam(4));
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0
+ &movq ("mm6",$R);
+
+ &mov ($a,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($b,&wparam(3));
+ &xor ($a,&wparam(2));
+ &xor ($b,&wparam(4));
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+ &pxor ($R,"mm7");
+ &mov ($a,&wparam(0));
+ &pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0
+
+ &movq ($A,$R);
+ &psllq ($R,32);
+ &pop ("edi");
+ &psrlq ($A,32);
+ &pop ("esi");
+ &pxor ($R,"mm6");
+ &pop ("ebx");
+ &pxor ($A,"mm7");
+ &movq (&QWP(0,$a),$R);
+ &pop ("ebp");
+ &movq (&QWP(8,$a),$A);
+ &emms ();
+ &ret ();
+&set_label("ialu",16);
+}
+ &push ("ebp");
+ &push ("ebx");
+ &push ("esi");
+ &push ("edi");
+ &stack_push(4+1);
+
+ &mov ($a,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($b,&wparam(3));
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);
+
+ &mov ($a,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($b,&wparam(4));
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);
+
+ &mov ($a,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($b,&wparam(3));
+ &xor ($a,&wparam(2));
+ &xor ($b,&wparam(4));
+ &call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+
+ &mov ("ebp",&wparam(0));
+ @r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");
+ &mov (@r[0],&DWP(0,"esp"));
+ &mov (@r[1],&DWP(4,"esp"));
+ &mov (@r[2],&DWP(8,"esp"));
+ &mov (@r[3],&DWP(12,"esp"));
+
+ &xor ($lo,$hi);
+ &xor ($hi, at r[1]);
+ &xor ($lo, at r[0]);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"ebp"), at r[0]);
+ &xor ($hi, at r[2]);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"ebp"), at r[3]);
+ &xor ($lo, at r[3]);
+ &stack_pop(4+1);
+ &xor ($hi, at r[3]);
+ &pop ("edi");
+ &xor ($lo,$hi);
+ &pop ("esi");
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"ebp"),$hi);
+ &pop ("ebx");
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"ebp"),$lo);
+ &pop ("ebp");
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("bn_GF2m_mul_2x2");
+
+&asciz ("GF(2^m) Multiplication for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,636 +0,0 @@
-#include "../bn_lcl.h"
-#if !(defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2)
-# include "../bn_asm.c" /* kind of dirty hack for Sun Studio */
-#else
-/*-
- * x86_64 BIGNUM accelerator version 0.1, December 2002.
- *
- * Implemented by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
- * project.
- *
- * Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
- * granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
- * disclaimed.
- *
- * Q. Version 0.1? It doesn't sound like Andy, he used to assign real
- * versions, like 1.0...
- * A. Well, that's because this code is basically a quick-n-dirty
- * proof-of-concept hack. As you can see it's implemented with
- * inline assembler, which means that you're bound to GCC and that
- * there might be enough room for further improvement.
- *
- * Q. Why inline assembler?
- * A. x86_64 features own ABI which I'm not familiar with. This is
- * why I decided to let the compiler take care of subroutine
- * prologue/epilogue as well as register allocation. For reference.
- * Win64 implements different ABI for AMD64, different from Linux.
- *
- * Q. How much faster does it get?
- * A. 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with no-asm:
- *
- * sign verify sign/s verify/s
- * rsa 512 bits 0.0006s 0.0001s 1683.8 18456.2
- * rsa 1024 bits 0.0028s 0.0002s 356.0 6407.0
- * rsa 2048 bits 0.0172s 0.0005s 58.0 1957.8
- * rsa 4096 bits 0.1155s 0.0018s 8.7 555.6
- * sign verify sign/s verify/s
- * dsa 512 bits 0.0005s 0.0006s 2100.8 1768.3
- * dsa 1024 bits 0.0014s 0.0018s 692.3 559.2
- * dsa 2048 bits 0.0049s 0.0061s 204.7 165.0
- *
- * 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with this module:
- *
- * sign verify sign/s verify/s
- * rsa 512 bits 0.0004s 0.0000s 2767.1 33297.9
- * rsa 1024 bits 0.0012s 0.0001s 867.4 14674.7
- * rsa 2048 bits 0.0061s 0.0002s 164.0 5270.0
- * rsa 4096 bits 0.0384s 0.0006s 26.1 1650.8
- * sign verify sign/s verify/s
- * dsa 512 bits 0.0002s 0.0003s 4442.2 3786.3
- * dsa 1024 bits 0.0005s 0.0007s 1835.1 1497.4
- * dsa 2048 bits 0.0016s 0.0020s 620.4 504.6
- *
- * For the reference. IA-32 assembler implementation performs
- * very much like 64-bit code compiled with no-asm on the same
- * machine.
- */
-
-# ifdef _WIN64
-# define BN_ULONG unsigned long long
-# else
-# define BN_ULONG unsigned long
-# endif
-
-# undef mul
-# undef mul_add
-# undef sqr
-
-/*-
- * "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath \xB5-code;
- * "g"(0) let the compiler to decide where does it
- * want to keep the value of zero;
- */
-# define mul_add(r,a,word,carry) do { \
- register BN_ULONG high,low; \
- asm ("mulq %3" \
- : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \
- : "a"(word),"m"(a) \
- : "cc"); \
- asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
- : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\
- : "a"(low),"g"(0) \
- : "cc"); \
- asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
- : "+m"(r),"+d"(high) \
- : "r"(carry),"g"(0) \
- : "cc"); \
- carry=high; \
- } while (0)
-
-# define mul(r,a,word,carry) do { \
- register BN_ULONG high,low; \
- asm ("mulq %3" \
- : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \
- : "a"(word),"g"(a) \
- : "cc"); \
- asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
- : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\
- : "a"(low),"g"(0) \
- : "cc"); \
- (r)=carry, carry=high; \
- } while (0)
-
-# define sqr(r0,r1,a) \
- asm ("mulq %2" \
- : "=a"(r0),"=d"(r1) \
- : "a"(a) \
- : "cc");
-
-BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num,
- BN_ULONG w)
-{
- BN_ULONG c1 = 0;
-
- if (num <= 0)
- return (c1);
-
- while (num & ~3) {
- mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
- mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
- mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
- mul_add(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1);
- ap += 4;
- rp += 4;
- num -= 4;
- }
- if (num) {
- mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
- if (--num == 0)
- return c1;
- mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
- if (--num == 0)
- return c1;
- mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
- return c1;
- }
-
- return (c1);
-}
-
-BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
-{
- BN_ULONG c1 = 0;
-
- if (num <= 0)
- return (c1);
-
- while (num & ~3) {
- mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
- mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
- mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
- mul(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1);
- ap += 4;
- rp += 4;
- num -= 4;
- }
- if (num) {
- mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
- if (--num == 0)
- return c1;
- mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
- if (--num == 0)
- return c1;
- mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
- }
- return (c1);
-}
-
-void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n)
-{
- if (n <= 0)
- return;
-
- while (n & ~3) {
- sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]);
- sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]);
- sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]);
- sqr(r[6], r[7], a[3]);
- a += 4;
- r += 8;
- n -= 4;
- }
- if (n) {
- sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]);
- if (--n == 0)
- return;
- sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]);
- if (--n == 0)
- return;
- sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]);
- }
-}
-
-BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
-{
- BN_ULONG ret, waste;
-
- asm("divq %4":"=a"(ret), "=d"(waste)
- : "a"(l), "d"(h), "g"(d)
- : "cc");
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
- int n)
-{
- BN_ULONG ret = 0, i = 0;
-
- if (n <= 0)
- return 0;
-
- asm volatile (" subq %2,%2 \n"
- ".p2align 4 \n"
- "1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n"
- " adcq (%5,%2,8),%0 \n"
- " movq %0,(%3,%2,8) \n"
- " leaq 1(%2),%2 \n"
- " loop 1b \n"
- " sbbq %0,%0 \n":"=&a" (ret), "+c"(n),
- "=&r"(i)
- :"r"(rp), "r"(ap), "r"(bp)
- :"cc", "memory");
-
- return ret & 1;
-}
-
-# ifndef SIMICS
-BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
- int n)
-{
- BN_ULONG ret = 0, i = 0;
-
- if (n <= 0)
- return 0;
-
- asm volatile (" subq %2,%2 \n"
- ".p2align 4 \n"
- "1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n"
- " sbbq (%5,%2,8),%0 \n"
- " movq %0,(%3,%2,8) \n"
- " leaq 1(%2),%2 \n"
- " loop 1b \n"
- " sbbq %0,%0 \n":"=&a" (ret), "+c"(n),
- "=&r"(i)
- :"r"(rp), "r"(ap), "r"(bp)
- :"cc", "memory");
-
- return ret & 1;
-}
-# else
-/* Simics 1.4<7 has buggy sbbq:-( */
-# define BN_MASK2 0xffffffffffffffffL
-BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
-{
- BN_ULONG t1, t2;
- int c = 0;
-
- if (n <= 0)
- return ((BN_ULONG)0);
-
- for (;;) {
- t1 = a[0];
- t2 = b[0];
- r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
- if (t1 != t2)
- c = (t1 < t2);
- if (--n <= 0)
- break;
-
- t1 = a[1];
- t2 = b[1];
- r[1] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
- if (t1 != t2)
- c = (t1 < t2);
- if (--n <= 0)
- break;
-
- t1 = a[2];
- t2 = b[2];
- r[2] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
- if (t1 != t2)
- c = (t1 < t2);
- if (--n <= 0)
- break;
-
- t1 = a[3];
- t2 = b[3];
- r[3] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
- if (t1 != t2)
- c = (t1 < t2);
- if (--n <= 0)
- break;
-
- a += 4;
- b += 4;
- r += 4;
- }
- return (c);
-}
-# endif
-
-/* mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
-/* mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
-/* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
-/*
- * sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number
- * c=(c2,c1,c0)
- */
-
-/*
- * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
- * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
- */
-# if 0
-/* original macros are kept for reference purposes */
-# define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) { \
- BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b); \
- t1 = ta * tb; \
- t2 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb); \
- c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0; \
- c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0; \
- }
-
-# define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) { \
- BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0; \
- t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb); \
- t0 = ta * tb; \
- c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
- c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0; \
- c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0; \
- c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0; \
- }
-# else
-# define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \
- asm ("mulq %3" \
- : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2) \
- : "a"(a),"m"(b) \
- : "cc"); \
- asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
- : "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2) \
- : "a"(t1),"g"(0) \
- : "cc"); \
- asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
- : "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
- : "d"(t2),"g"(0) \
- : "cc"); \
- } while (0)
-
-# define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) do { \
- asm ("mulq %2" \
- : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2) \
- : "a"(a[i]) \
- : "cc"); \
- asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
- : "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2) \
- : "a"(t1),"g"(0) \
- : "cc"); \
- asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
- : "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
- : "d"(t2),"g"(0) \
- : "cc"); \
- } while (0)
-
-# define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \
- asm ("mulq %3" \
- : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2) \
- : "a"(a),"m"(b) \
- : "cc"); \
- asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2" \
- : "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
- : "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0) \
- : "cc"); \
- asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2" \
- : "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
- : "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0) \
- : "cc"); \
- } while (0)
-# endif
-
-# define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \
- mul_add_c2((a)[i],(a)[j],c0,c1,c2)
-
-void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
-{
- BN_ULONG t1, t2;
- BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
-
- c1 = 0;
- c2 = 0;
- c3 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
- r[0] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
- r[1] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
- r[2] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
- r[3] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[4], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
- r[4] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[4], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[5], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
- r[5] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[6], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[5], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[4], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[4], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
- r[6] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[5], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[4], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[5], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[6], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[7], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
- r[7] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[7], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[6], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[5], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[4], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[6], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
- r[8] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[7], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[4], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[5], b[4], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[6], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[7], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
- r[9] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[7], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[6], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[5], b[5], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[4], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
- r[10] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[4], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[5], b[6], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[6], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[7], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
- r[11] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[7], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[6], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[5], b[7], c1, c2, c3);
- r[12] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[6], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[7], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
- r[13] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[7], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
- r[14] = c3;
- r[15] = c1;
-}
-
-void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
-{
- BN_ULONG t1, t2;
- BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
-
- c1 = 0;
- c2 = 0;
- c3 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
- r[0] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
- r[1] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
- r[2] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[0], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
- r[3] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
- mul_add_c(a[1], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
- r[4] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[2], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
- r[5] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- mul_add_c(a[3], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
- r[6] = c1;
- r[7] = c2;
-}
-
-void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
-{
- BN_ULONG t1, t2;
- BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
-
- c1 = 0;
- c2 = 0;
- c3 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 0, c1, c2, c3);
- r[0] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- sqr_add_c2(a, 1, 0, c2, c3, c1);
- r[1] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 1, c3, c1, c2);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 0, c3, c1, c2);
- r[2] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 0, c1, c2, c3);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 1, c1, c2, c3);
- r[3] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 2, c2, c3, c1);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 1, c2, c3, c1);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 0, c2, c3, c1);
- r[4] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 0, c3, c1, c2);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 1, c3, c1, c2);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 2, c3, c1, c2);
- r[5] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 3, c1, c2, c3);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 2, c1, c2, c3);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 1, c1, c2, c3);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 0, c1, c2, c3);
- r[6] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 0, c2, c3, c1);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 1, c2, c3, c1);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 2, c2, c3, c1);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 3, c2, c3, c1);
- r[7] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 4, c3, c1, c2);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 3, c3, c1, c2);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 2, c3, c1, c2);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 1, c3, c1, c2);
- r[8] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 2, c1, c2, c3);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 3, c1, c2, c3);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 4, c1, c2, c3);
- r[9] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 5, c2, c3, c1);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 4, c2, c3, c1);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 3, c2, c3, c1);
- r[10] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 4, c3, c1, c2);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 5, c3, c1, c2);
- r[11] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 6, c1, c2, c3);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 5, c1, c2, c3);
- r[12] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 6, c2, c3, c1);
- r[13] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 7, c3, c1, c2);
- r[14] = c3;
- r[15] = c1;
-}
-
-void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
-{
- BN_ULONG t1, t2;
- BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
-
- c1 = 0;
- c2 = 0;
- c3 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 0, c1, c2, c3);
- r[0] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- sqr_add_c2(a, 1, 0, c2, c3, c1);
- r[1] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 1, c3, c1, c2);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 0, c3, c1, c2);
- r[2] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 0, c1, c2, c3);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 1, c1, c2, c3);
- r[3] = c1;
- c1 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 2, c2, c3, c1);
- sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 1, c2, c3, c1);
- r[4] = c2;
- c2 = 0;
- sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 2, c3, c1, c2);
- r[5] = c3;
- c3 = 0;
- sqr_add_c(a, 3, c1, c2, c3);
- r[6] = c1;
- r[7] = c2;
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,636 @@
+#include "../bn_lcl.h"
+#if !(defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2)
+# include "../bn_asm.c" /* kind of dirty hack for Sun Studio */
+#else
+/*-
+ * x86_64 BIGNUM accelerator version 0.1, December 2002.
+ *
+ * Implemented by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ *
+ * Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
+ * granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
+ * disclaimed.
+ *
+ * Q. Version 0.1? It doesn't sound like Andy, he used to assign real
+ * versions, like 1.0...
+ * A. Well, that's because this code is basically a quick-n-dirty
+ * proof-of-concept hack. As you can see it's implemented with
+ * inline assembler, which means that you're bound to GCC and that
+ * there might be enough room for further improvement.
+ *
+ * Q. Why inline assembler?
+ * A. x86_64 features own ABI which I'm not familiar with. This is
+ * why I decided to let the compiler take care of subroutine
+ * prologue/epilogue as well as register allocation. For reference.
+ * Win64 implements different ABI for AMD64, different from Linux.
+ *
+ * Q. How much faster does it get?
+ * A. 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with no-asm:
+ *
+ * sign verify sign/s verify/s
+ * rsa 512 bits 0.0006s 0.0001s 1683.8 18456.2
+ * rsa 1024 bits 0.0028s 0.0002s 356.0 6407.0
+ * rsa 2048 bits 0.0172s 0.0005s 58.0 1957.8
+ * rsa 4096 bits 0.1155s 0.0018s 8.7 555.6
+ * sign verify sign/s verify/s
+ * dsa 512 bits 0.0005s 0.0006s 2100.8 1768.3
+ * dsa 1024 bits 0.0014s 0.0018s 692.3 559.2
+ * dsa 2048 bits 0.0049s 0.0061s 204.7 165.0
+ *
+ * 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with this module:
+ *
+ * sign verify sign/s verify/s
+ * rsa 512 bits 0.0004s 0.0000s 2767.1 33297.9
+ * rsa 1024 bits 0.0012s 0.0001s 867.4 14674.7
+ * rsa 2048 bits 0.0061s 0.0002s 164.0 5270.0
+ * rsa 4096 bits 0.0384s 0.0006s 26.1 1650.8
+ * sign verify sign/s verify/s
+ * dsa 512 bits 0.0002s 0.0003s 4442.2 3786.3
+ * dsa 1024 bits 0.0005s 0.0007s 1835.1 1497.4
+ * dsa 2048 bits 0.0016s 0.0020s 620.4 504.6
+ *
+ * For the reference. IA-32 assembler implementation performs
+ * very much like 64-bit code compiled with no-asm on the same
+ * machine.
+ */
+
+# ifdef _WIN64
+# define BN_ULONG unsigned long long
+# else
+# define BN_ULONG unsigned long
+# endif
+
+# undef mul
+# undef mul_add
+# undef sqr
+
+/*-
+ * "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code;
+ * "g"(0) let the compiler to decide where does it
+ * want to keep the value of zero;
+ */
+# define mul_add(r,a,word,carry) do { \
+ register BN_ULONG high,low; \
+ asm ("mulq %3" \
+ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \
+ : "a"(word),"m"(a) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
+ : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\
+ : "a"(low),"g"(0) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
+ : "+m"(r),"+d"(high) \
+ : "r"(carry),"g"(0) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ carry=high; \
+ } while (0)
+
+# define mul(r,a,word,carry) do { \
+ register BN_ULONG high,low; \
+ asm ("mulq %3" \
+ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \
+ : "a"(word),"g"(a) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
+ : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\
+ : "a"(low),"g"(0) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ (r)=carry, carry=high; \
+ } while (0)
+
+# define sqr(r0,r1,a) \
+ asm ("mulq %2" \
+ : "=a"(r0),"=d"(r1) \
+ : "a"(a) \
+ : "cc");
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num,
+ BN_ULONG w)
+{
+ BN_ULONG c1 = 0;
+
+ if (num <= 0)
+ return (c1);
+
+ while (num & ~3) {
+ mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+ mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
+ mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
+ mul_add(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1);
+ ap += 4;
+ rp += 4;
+ num -= 4;
+ }
+ if (num) {
+ mul_add(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+ if (--num == 0)
+ return c1;
+ mul_add(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
+ if (--num == 0)
+ return c1;
+ mul_add(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
+ return c1;
+ }
+
+ return (c1);
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+ BN_ULONG c1 = 0;
+
+ if (num <= 0)
+ return (c1);
+
+ while (num & ~3) {
+ mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+ mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
+ mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
+ mul(rp[3], ap[3], w, c1);
+ ap += 4;
+ rp += 4;
+ num -= 4;
+ }
+ if (num) {
+ mul(rp[0], ap[0], w, c1);
+ if (--num == 0)
+ return c1;
+ mul(rp[1], ap[1], w, c1);
+ if (--num == 0)
+ return c1;
+ mul(rp[2], ap[2], w, c1);
+ }
+ return (c1);
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n)
+{
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ while (n & ~3) {
+ sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]);
+ sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]);
+ sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]);
+ sqr(r[6], r[7], a[3]);
+ a += 4;
+ r += 8;
+ n -= 4;
+ }
+ if (n) {
+ sqr(r[0], r[1], a[0]);
+ if (--n == 0)
+ return;
+ sqr(r[2], r[3], a[1]);
+ if (--n == 0)
+ return;
+ sqr(r[4], r[5], a[2]);
+ }
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
+{
+ BN_ULONG ret, waste;
+
+ asm("divq %4":"=a"(ret), "=d"(waste)
+ : "a"(l), "d"(h), "g"(d)
+ : "cc");
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+ int n)
+{
+ BN_ULONG ret = 0, i = 0;
+
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ asm volatile (" subq %2,%2 \n"
+ ".p2align 4 \n"
+ "1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n"
+ " adcq (%5,%2,8),%0 \n"
+ " movq %0,(%3,%2,8) \n"
+ " leaq 1(%2),%2 \n"
+ " loop 1b \n"
+ " sbbq %0,%0 \n":"=&a" (ret), "+c"(n),
+ "=&r"(i)
+ :"r"(rp), "r"(ap), "r"(bp)
+ :"cc", "memory");
+
+ return ret & 1;
+}
+
+# ifndef SIMICS
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+ int n)
+{
+ BN_ULONG ret = 0, i = 0;
+
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ asm volatile (" subq %2,%2 \n"
+ ".p2align 4 \n"
+ "1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n"
+ " sbbq (%5,%2,8),%0 \n"
+ " movq %0,(%3,%2,8) \n"
+ " leaq 1(%2),%2 \n"
+ " loop 1b \n"
+ " sbbq %0,%0 \n":"=&a" (ret), "+c"(n),
+ "=&r"(i)
+ :"r"(rp), "r"(ap), "r"(bp)
+ :"cc", "memory");
+
+ return ret & 1;
+}
+# else
+/* Simics 1.4<7 has buggy sbbq:-( */
+# define BN_MASK2 0xffffffffffffffffL
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+{
+ BN_ULONG t1, t2;
+ int c = 0;
+
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return ((BN_ULONG)0);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ t1 = a[0];
+ t2 = b[0];
+ r[0] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+ if (t1 != t2)
+ c = (t1 < t2);
+ if (--n <= 0)
+ break;
+
+ t1 = a[1];
+ t2 = b[1];
+ r[1] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+ if (t1 != t2)
+ c = (t1 < t2);
+ if (--n <= 0)
+ break;
+
+ t1 = a[2];
+ t2 = b[2];
+ r[2] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+ if (t1 != t2)
+ c = (t1 < t2);
+ if (--n <= 0)
+ break;
+
+ t1 = a[3];
+ t2 = b[3];
+ r[3] = (t1 - t2 - c) & BN_MASK2;
+ if (t1 != t2)
+ c = (t1 < t2);
+ if (--n <= 0)
+ break;
+
+ a += 4;
+ b += 4;
+ r += 4;
+ }
+ return (c);
+}
+# endif
+
+/* mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/* mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/*
+ * sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number
+ * c=(c2,c1,c0)
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
+ * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
+ */
+# if 0
+/* original macros are kept for reference purposes */
+# define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) { \
+ BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b); \
+ t1 = ta * tb; \
+ t2 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb); \
+ c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0; \
+ c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0; \
+ }
+
+# define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) { \
+ BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0; \
+ t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb); \
+ t0 = ta * tb; \
+ c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
+ c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0; \
+ c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0; \
+ c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0; \
+ }
+# else
+# define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \
+ asm ("mulq %3" \
+ : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2) \
+ : "a"(a),"m"(b) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
+ : "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2) \
+ : "a"(t1),"g"(0) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
+ : "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
+ : "d"(t2),"g"(0) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ } while (0)
+
+# define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) do { \
+ asm ("mulq %2" \
+ : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2) \
+ : "a"(a[i]) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
+ : "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2) \
+ : "a"(t1),"g"(0) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
+ : "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
+ : "d"(t2),"g"(0) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ } while (0)
+
+# define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \
+ asm ("mulq %3" \
+ : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2) \
+ : "a"(a),"m"(b) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2" \
+ : "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
+ : "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2" \
+ : "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
+ : "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0) \
+ : "cc"); \
+ } while (0)
+# endif
+
+# define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \
+ mul_add_c2((a)[i],(a)[j],c0,c1,c2)
+
+void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+{
+ BN_ULONG t1, t2;
+ BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+ c1 = 0;
+ c2 = 0;
+ c3 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+ r[0] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+ r[1] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+ r[2] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+ r[3] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[4], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
+ r[4] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[4], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[5], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
+ r[5] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[6], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[5], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[4], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[4], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
+ r[6] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[5], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[4], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[5], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[6], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[7], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+ r[7] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[7], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[6], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[5], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[4], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[6], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
+ r[8] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[7], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[4], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[5], b[4], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[6], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[7], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+ r[9] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[7], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[6], b[4], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[5], b[5], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[4], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
+ r[10] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[4], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[5], b[6], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[6], b[5], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[7], b[4], c3, c1, c2);
+ r[11] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[7], b[5], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[6], b[6], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[5], b[7], c1, c2, c3);
+ r[12] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[6], b[7], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[7], b[6], c2, c3, c1);
+ r[13] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[7], b[7], c3, c1, c2);
+ r[14] = c3;
+ r[15] = c1;
+}
+
+void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+{
+ BN_ULONG t1, t2;
+ BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+ c1 = 0;
+ c2 = 0;
+ c3 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+ r[0] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[0], c2, c3, c1);
+ r[1] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[0], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[1], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+ r[2] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[0], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[2], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[1], c1, c2, c3);
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[0], c1, c2, c3);
+ r[3] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[1], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[2], c2, c3, c1);
+ mul_add_c(a[1], b[3], c2, c3, c1);
+ r[4] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[2], b[3], c3, c1, c2);
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[2], c3, c1, c2);
+ r[5] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ mul_add_c(a[3], b[3], c1, c2, c3);
+ r[6] = c1;
+ r[7] = c2;
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
+{
+ BN_ULONG t1, t2;
+ BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+ c1 = 0;
+ c2 = 0;
+ c3 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+ r[0] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 1, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+ r[1] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 0, c3, c1, c2);
+ r[2] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 1, c1, c2, c3);
+ r[3] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 2, c2, c3, c1);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 1, c2, c3, c1);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+ r[4] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 0, c3, c1, c2);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 2, c3, c1, c2);
+ r[5] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 3, c1, c2, c3);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 2, c1, c2, c3);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 1, c1, c2, c3);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+ r[6] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 1, c2, c3, c1);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 2, c2, c3, c1);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 4, 3, c2, c3, c1);
+ r[7] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 4, c3, c1, c2);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 3, c3, c1, c2);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 2, c3, c1, c2);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+ r[8] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 2, c1, c2, c3);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 3, c1, c2, c3);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 5, 4, c1, c2, c3);
+ r[9] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 5, c2, c3, c1);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 4, c2, c3, c1);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 3, c2, c3, c1);
+ r[10] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 4, c3, c1, c2);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 6, 5, c3, c1, c2);
+ r[11] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 6, c1, c2, c3);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 5, c1, c2, c3);
+ r[12] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 7, 6, c2, c3, c1);
+ r[13] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 7, c3, c1, c2);
+ r[14] = c3;
+ r[15] = c1;
+}
+
+void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
+{
+ BN_ULONG t1, t2;
+ BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
+
+ c1 = 0;
+ c2 = 0;
+ c3 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+ r[0] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 1, 0, c2, c3, c1);
+ r[1] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 1, c3, c1, c2);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 0, c3, c1, c2);
+ r[2] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 0, c1, c2, c3);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 2, 1, c1, c2, c3);
+ r[3] = c1;
+ c1 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 2, c2, c3, c1);
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 1, c2, c3, c1);
+ r[4] = c2;
+ c2 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c2(a, 3, 2, c3, c1, c2);
+ r[5] = c3;
+ c3 = 0;
+ sqr_add_c(a, 3, c1, c2, c3);
+ r[6] = c1;
+ r[7] = c2;
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,390 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# May 2011
-#
-# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used
-# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
-# the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable
-# for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and
-# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and \xB5-arch to another.
-# Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code
-# [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on
-# 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that
-# these coefficients are not ones for bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself, as not
-# all CPU time is burnt in it...
-
-$flavour = shift;
-$output = shift;
-if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
-
-$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
-( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
-die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
-
-open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
-*STDOUT=*OUT;
-
-($lo,$hi)=("%rax","%rdx"); $a=$lo;
-($i0,$i1)=("%rsi","%rdi");
-($t0,$t1)=("%rbx","%rcx");
-($b,$mask)=("%rbp","%r8");
-($a1,$a2,$a4,$a8,$a12,$a48)=map("%r$_",(9..15));
-($R,$Tx)=("%xmm0","%xmm1");
-
-$code.=<<___;
-.text
-
-.type _mul_1x1,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align 16
-_mul_1x1:
- sub \$128+8,%rsp
- mov \$-1,$a1
- lea ($a,$a),$i0
- shr \$3,$a1
- lea (,$a,4),$i1
- and $a,$a1 # a1=a&0x1fffffffffffffff
- lea (,$a,8),$a8
- sar \$63,$a # broadcast 63rd bit
- lea ($a1,$a1),$a2
- sar \$63,$i0 # broadcast 62nd bit
- lea (,$a1,4),$a4
- and $b,$a
- sar \$63,$i1 # boardcast 61st bit
- mov $a,$hi # $a is $lo
- shl \$63,$lo
- and $b,$i0
- shr \$1,$hi
- mov $i0,$t1
- shl \$62,$i0
- and $b,$i1
- shr \$2,$t1
- xor $i0,$lo
- mov $i1,$t0
- shl \$61,$i1
- xor $t1,$hi
- shr \$3,$t0
- xor $i1,$lo
- xor $t0,$hi
-
- mov $a1,$a12
- movq \$0,0(%rsp) # tab[0]=0
- xor $a2,$a12 # a1^a2
- mov $a1,8(%rsp) # tab[1]=a1
- mov $a4,$a48
- mov $a2,16(%rsp) # tab[2]=a2
- xor $a8,$a48 # a4^a8
- mov $a12,24(%rsp) # tab[3]=a1^a2
-
- xor $a4,$a1
- mov $a4,32(%rsp) # tab[4]=a4
- xor $a4,$a2
- mov $a1,40(%rsp) # tab[5]=a1^a4
- xor $a4,$a12
- mov $a2,48(%rsp) # tab[6]=a2^a4
- xor $a48,$a1 # a1^a4^a4^a8=a1^a8
- mov $a12,56(%rsp) # tab[7]=a1^a2^a4
- xor $a48,$a2 # a2^a4^a4^a8=a1^a8
-
- mov $a8,64(%rsp) # tab[8]=a8
- xor $a48,$a12 # a1^a2^a4^a4^a8=a1^a2^a8
- mov $a1,72(%rsp) # tab[9]=a1^a8
- xor $a4,$a1 # a1^a8^a4
- mov $a2,80(%rsp) # tab[10]=a2^a8
- xor $a4,$a2 # a2^a8^a4
- mov $a12,88(%rsp) # tab[11]=a1^a2^a8
-
- xor $a4,$a12 # a1^a2^a8^a4
- mov $a48,96(%rsp) # tab[12]=a4^a8
- mov $mask,$i0
- mov $a1,104(%rsp) # tab[13]=a1^a4^a8
- and $b,$i0
- mov $a2,112(%rsp) # tab[14]=a2^a4^a8
- shr \$4,$b
- mov $a12,120(%rsp) # tab[15]=a1^a2^a4^a8
- mov $mask,$i1
- and $b,$i1
- shr \$4,$b
-
- movq (%rsp,$i0,8),$R # half of calculations is done in SSE2
- mov $mask,$i0
- and $b,$i0
- shr \$4,$b
-___
- for ($n=1;$n<8;$n++) {
- $code.=<<___;
- mov (%rsp,$i1,8),$t1
- mov $mask,$i1
- mov $t1,$t0
- shl \$`8*$n-4`,$t1
- and $b,$i1
- movq (%rsp,$i0,8),$Tx
- shr \$`64-(8*$n-4)`,$t0
- xor $t1,$lo
- pslldq \$$n,$Tx
- mov $mask,$i0
- shr \$4,$b
- xor $t0,$hi
- and $b,$i0
- shr \$4,$b
- pxor $Tx,$R
-___
- }
-$code.=<<___;
- mov (%rsp,$i1,8),$t1
- mov $t1,$t0
- shl \$`8*$n-4`,$t1
- movq $R,$i0
- shr \$`64-(8*$n-4)`,$t0
- xor $t1,$lo
- psrldq \$8,$R
- xor $t0,$hi
- movq $R,$i1
- xor $i0,$lo
- xor $i1,$hi
-
- add \$128+8,%rsp
- ret
-.Lend_mul_1x1:
-.size _mul_1x1,.-_mul_1x1
-___
-
-($rp,$a1,$a0,$b1,$b0) = $win64? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9","%r10") : # Win64 order
- ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8"); # Unix order
-
-$code.=<<___;
-.extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
-.globl bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
-.type bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align 16
-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
- mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%rax
- bt \$33,%rax
- jnc .Lvanilla_mul_2x2
-
- movq $a1,%xmm0
- movq $b1,%xmm1
- movq $a0,%xmm2
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movq 40(%rsp),%xmm3
-___
-$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
- movq $b0,%xmm3
-___
-$code.=<<___;
- movdqa %xmm0,%xmm4
- movdqa %xmm1,%xmm5
- pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1\xB7b1
- pxor %xmm2,%xmm4
- pxor %xmm3,%xmm5
- pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0\xB7b0
- pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)\xB7(b0+b1)
- xorps %xmm0,%xmm4
- xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)\xB7(b0+b1)-a0\xB7b0-a1\xB7b1
- movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
- pslldq \$8,%xmm4
- psrldq \$8,%xmm5
- pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
- pxor %xmm5,%xmm0
- movdqu %xmm2,0($rp)
- movdqu %xmm0,16($rp)
- ret
-
-.align 16
-.Lvanilla_mul_2x2:
- lea -8*17(%rsp),%rsp
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- mov `8*17+40`(%rsp),$b0
- mov %rdi,8*15(%rsp)
- mov %rsi,8*16(%rsp)
-___
-$code.=<<___;
- mov %r14,8*10(%rsp)
- mov %r13,8*11(%rsp)
- mov %r12,8*12(%rsp)
- mov %rbp,8*13(%rsp)
- mov %rbx,8*14(%rsp)
-.Lbody_mul_2x2:
- mov $rp,32(%rsp) # save the arguments
- mov $a1,40(%rsp)
- mov $a0,48(%rsp)
- mov $b1,56(%rsp)
- mov $b0,64(%rsp)
-
- mov \$0xf,$mask
- mov $a1,$a
- mov $b1,$b
- call _mul_1x1 # a1\xB7b1
- mov $lo,16(%rsp)
- mov $hi,24(%rsp)
-
- mov 48(%rsp),$a
- mov 64(%rsp),$b
- call _mul_1x1 # a0\xB7b0
- mov $lo,0(%rsp)
- mov $hi,8(%rsp)
-
- mov 40(%rsp),$a
- mov 56(%rsp),$b
- xor 48(%rsp),$a
- xor 64(%rsp),$b
- call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)\xB7(b0+b1)
-___
- @r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi");
-$code.=<<___;
- mov 0(%rsp), at r[0]
- mov 8(%rsp), at r[1]
- mov 16(%rsp), at r[2]
- mov 24(%rsp), at r[3]
- mov 32(%rsp),%rbp
-
- xor $hi,$lo
- xor @r[1],$hi
- xor @r[0],$lo
- mov @r[0],0(%rbp)
- xor @r[2],$hi
- mov @r[3],24(%rbp)
- xor @r[3],$lo
- xor @r[3],$hi
- xor $hi,$lo
- mov $hi,16(%rbp)
- mov $lo,8(%rbp)
-
- mov 8*10(%rsp),%r14
- mov 8*11(%rsp),%r13
- mov 8*12(%rsp),%r12
- mov 8*13(%rsp),%rbp
- mov 8*14(%rsp),%rbx
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- mov 8*15(%rsp),%rdi
- mov 8*16(%rsp),%rsi
-___
-$code.=<<___;
- lea 8*17(%rsp),%rsp
- ret
-.Lend_mul_2x2:
-.size bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
-.asciz "GF(2^m) Multiplication for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
-.align 16
-___
-
-# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
-# CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
-if ($win64) {
-$rec="%rcx";
-$frame="%rdx";
-$context="%r8";
-$disp="%r9";
-
-$code.=<<___;
-.extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
-
-.type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align 16
-se_handler:
- push %rsi
- push %rdi
- push %rbx
- push %rbp
- push %r12
- push %r13
- push %r14
- push %r15
- pushfq
- sub \$64,%rsp
-
- mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp
- mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip
-
- lea .Lbody_mul_2x2(%rip),%r10
- cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<"prologue" label
- jb .Lin_prologue
-
- mov 8*10(%rax),%r14 # mimic epilogue
- mov 8*11(%rax),%r13
- mov 8*12(%rax),%r12
- mov 8*13(%rax),%rbp
- mov 8*14(%rax),%rbx
- mov 8*15(%rax),%rdi
- mov 8*16(%rax),%rsi
-
- mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx
- mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp
- mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi
- mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi
- mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12
- mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
- mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14
-
-.Lin_prologue:
- lea 8*17(%rax),%rax
- mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp
-
- mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord
- mov $context,%rsi # context
- mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT)
- .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq
-
- mov $disp,%rsi
- xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
- mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase
- mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc
- mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
- mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord
- lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData
- lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame
- mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5
- mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6
- mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7
- mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL)
- call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
-
- mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch
- add \$64,%rsp
- popfq
- pop %r15
- pop %r14
- pop %r13
- pop %r12
- pop %rbp
- pop %rbx
- pop %rdi
- pop %rsi
- ret
-.size se_handler,.-se_handler
-
-.section .pdata
-.align 4
- .rva _mul_1x1
- .rva .Lend_mul_1x1
- .rva .LSEH_info_1x1
-
- .rva .Lvanilla_mul_2x2
- .rva .Lend_mul_2x2
- .rva .LSEH_info_2x2
-.section .xdata
-.align 8
-.LSEH_info_1x1:
- .byte 0x01,0x07,0x02,0x00
- .byte 0x07,0x01,0x11,0x00 # sub rsp,128+8
-.LSEH_info_2x2:
- .byte 9,0,0,0
- .rva se_handler
-___
-}
-
-$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
-print $code;
-close STDOUT;
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# May 2011
+#
+# The module implements bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 polynomial multiplication used
+# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
+# the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable
+# for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and
+# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another.
+# Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code
+# [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on
+# 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that
+# these coefficients are not ones for bn_GF2m_mul_2x2 itself, as not
+# all CPU time is burnt in it...
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+($lo,$hi)=("%rax","%rdx"); $a=$lo;
+($i0,$i1)=("%rsi","%rdi");
+($t0,$t1)=("%rbx","%rcx");
+($b,$mask)=("%rbp","%r8");
+($a1,$a2,$a4,$a8,$a12,$a48)=map("%r$_",(9..15));
+($R,$Tx)=("%xmm0","%xmm1");
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.text
+
+.type _mul_1x1,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align 16
+_mul_1x1:
+ sub \$128+8,%rsp
+ mov \$-1,$a1
+ lea ($a,$a),$i0
+ shr \$3,$a1
+ lea (,$a,4),$i1
+ and $a,$a1 # a1=a&0x1fffffffffffffff
+ lea (,$a,8),$a8
+ sar \$63,$a # broadcast 63rd bit
+ lea ($a1,$a1),$a2
+ sar \$63,$i0 # broadcast 62nd bit
+ lea (,$a1,4),$a4
+ and $b,$a
+ sar \$63,$i1 # boardcast 61st bit
+ mov $a,$hi # $a is $lo
+ shl \$63,$lo
+ and $b,$i0
+ shr \$1,$hi
+ mov $i0,$t1
+ shl \$62,$i0
+ and $b,$i1
+ shr \$2,$t1
+ xor $i0,$lo
+ mov $i1,$t0
+ shl \$61,$i1
+ xor $t1,$hi
+ shr \$3,$t0
+ xor $i1,$lo
+ xor $t0,$hi
+
+ mov $a1,$a12
+ movq \$0,0(%rsp) # tab[0]=0
+ xor $a2,$a12 # a1^a2
+ mov $a1,8(%rsp) # tab[1]=a1
+ mov $a4,$a48
+ mov $a2,16(%rsp) # tab[2]=a2
+ xor $a8,$a48 # a4^a8
+ mov $a12,24(%rsp) # tab[3]=a1^a2
+
+ xor $a4,$a1
+ mov $a4,32(%rsp) # tab[4]=a4
+ xor $a4,$a2
+ mov $a1,40(%rsp) # tab[5]=a1^a4
+ xor $a4,$a12
+ mov $a2,48(%rsp) # tab[6]=a2^a4
+ xor $a48,$a1 # a1^a4^a4^a8=a1^a8
+ mov $a12,56(%rsp) # tab[7]=a1^a2^a4
+ xor $a48,$a2 # a2^a4^a4^a8=a1^a8
+
+ mov $a8,64(%rsp) # tab[8]=a8
+ xor $a48,$a12 # a1^a2^a4^a4^a8=a1^a2^a8
+ mov $a1,72(%rsp) # tab[9]=a1^a8
+ xor $a4,$a1 # a1^a8^a4
+ mov $a2,80(%rsp) # tab[10]=a2^a8
+ xor $a4,$a2 # a2^a8^a4
+ mov $a12,88(%rsp) # tab[11]=a1^a2^a8
+
+ xor $a4,$a12 # a1^a2^a8^a4
+ mov $a48,96(%rsp) # tab[12]=a4^a8
+ mov $mask,$i0
+ mov $a1,104(%rsp) # tab[13]=a1^a4^a8
+ and $b,$i0
+ mov $a2,112(%rsp) # tab[14]=a2^a4^a8
+ shr \$4,$b
+ mov $a12,120(%rsp) # tab[15]=a1^a2^a4^a8
+ mov $mask,$i1
+ and $b,$i1
+ shr \$4,$b
+
+ movq (%rsp,$i0,8),$R # half of calculations is done in SSE2
+ mov $mask,$i0
+ and $b,$i0
+ shr \$4,$b
+___
+ for ($n=1;$n<8;$n++) {
+ $code.=<<___;
+ mov (%rsp,$i1,8),$t1
+ mov $mask,$i1
+ mov $t1,$t0
+ shl \$`8*$n-4`,$t1
+ and $b,$i1
+ movq (%rsp,$i0,8),$Tx
+ shr \$`64-(8*$n-4)`,$t0
+ xor $t1,$lo
+ pslldq \$$n,$Tx
+ mov $mask,$i0
+ shr \$4,$b
+ xor $t0,$hi
+ and $b,$i0
+ shr \$4,$b
+ pxor $Tx,$R
+___
+ }
+$code.=<<___;
+ mov (%rsp,$i1,8),$t1
+ mov $t1,$t0
+ shl \$`8*$n-4`,$t1
+ movq $R,$i0
+ shr \$`64-(8*$n-4)`,$t0
+ xor $t1,$lo
+ psrldq \$8,$R
+ xor $t0,$hi
+ movq $R,$i1
+ xor $i0,$lo
+ xor $i1,$hi
+
+ add \$128+8,%rsp
+ ret
+.Lend_mul_1x1:
+.size _mul_1x1,.-_mul_1x1
+___
+
+($rp,$a1,$a0,$b1,$b0) = $win64? ("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9","%r10") : # Win64 order
+ ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8"); # Unix order
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+.globl bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.type bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align 16
+bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
+ mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%rax
+ bt \$33,%rax
+ jnc .Lvanilla_mul_2x2
+
+ movq $a1,%xmm0
+ movq $b1,%xmm1
+ movq $a0,%xmm2
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+ movq 40(%rsp),%xmm3
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
+ movq $b0,%xmm3
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+ movdqa %xmm0,%xmm4
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm5
+ pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1·b1
+ pxor %xmm2,%xmm4
+ pxor %xmm3,%xmm5
+ pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0·b0
+ pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+ xorps %xmm0,%xmm4
+ xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
+ pslldq \$8,%xmm4
+ psrldq \$8,%xmm5
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm5,%xmm0
+ movdqu %xmm2,0($rp)
+ movdqu %xmm0,16($rp)
+ ret
+
+.align 16
+.Lvanilla_mul_2x2:
+ lea -8*17(%rsp),%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+ mov `8*17+40`(%rsp),$b0
+ mov %rdi,8*15(%rsp)
+ mov %rsi,8*16(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+ mov %r14,8*10(%rsp)
+ mov %r13,8*11(%rsp)
+ mov %r12,8*12(%rsp)
+ mov %rbp,8*13(%rsp)
+ mov %rbx,8*14(%rsp)
+.Lbody_mul_2x2:
+ mov $rp,32(%rsp) # save the arguments
+ mov $a1,40(%rsp)
+ mov $a0,48(%rsp)
+ mov $b1,56(%rsp)
+ mov $b0,64(%rsp)
+
+ mov \$0xf,$mask
+ mov $a1,$a
+ mov $b1,$b
+ call _mul_1x1 # a1·b1
+ mov $lo,16(%rsp)
+ mov $hi,24(%rsp)
+
+ mov 48(%rsp),$a
+ mov 64(%rsp),$b
+ call _mul_1x1 # a0·b0
+ mov $lo,0(%rsp)
+ mov $hi,8(%rsp)
+
+ mov 40(%rsp),$a
+ mov 56(%rsp),$b
+ xor 48(%rsp),$a
+ xor 64(%rsp),$b
+ call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
+___
+ @r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi");
+$code.=<<___;
+ mov 0(%rsp), at r[0]
+ mov 8(%rsp), at r[1]
+ mov 16(%rsp), at r[2]
+ mov 24(%rsp), at r[3]
+ mov 32(%rsp),%rbp
+
+ xor $hi,$lo
+ xor @r[1],$hi
+ xor @r[0],$lo
+ mov @r[0],0(%rbp)
+ xor @r[2],$hi
+ mov @r[3],24(%rbp)
+ xor @r[3],$lo
+ xor @r[3],$hi
+ xor $hi,$lo
+ mov $hi,16(%rbp)
+ mov $lo,8(%rbp)
+
+ mov 8*10(%rsp),%r14
+ mov 8*11(%rsp),%r13
+ mov 8*12(%rsp),%r12
+ mov 8*13(%rsp),%rbp
+ mov 8*14(%rsp),%rbx
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+ mov 8*15(%rsp),%rdi
+ mov 8*16(%rsp),%rsi
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+ lea 8*17(%rsp),%rsp
+ ret
+.Lend_mul_2x2:
+.size bn_GF2m_mul_2x2,.-bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
+.asciz "GF(2^m) Multiplication for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align 16
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+# CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+
+.type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align 16
+se_handler:
+ push %rsi
+ push %rdi
+ push %rbx
+ push %rbp
+ push %r12
+ push %r13
+ push %r14
+ push %r15
+ pushfq
+ sub \$64,%rsp
+
+ mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp
+ mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip
+
+ lea .Lbody_mul_2x2(%rip),%r10
+ cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<"prologue" label
+ jb .Lin_prologue
+
+ mov 8*10(%rax),%r14 # mimic epilogue
+ mov 8*11(%rax),%r13
+ mov 8*12(%rax),%r12
+ mov 8*13(%rax),%rbp
+ mov 8*14(%rax),%rbx
+ mov 8*15(%rax),%rdi
+ mov 8*16(%rax),%rsi
+
+ mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx
+ mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp
+ mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi
+ mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi
+ mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12
+ mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
+ mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+ lea 8*17(%rax),%rax
+ mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp
+
+ mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord
+ mov $context,%rsi # context
+ mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT)
+ .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq
+
+ mov $disp,%rsi
+ xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+ mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase
+ mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc
+ mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+ mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord
+ lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData
+ lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame
+ mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5
+ mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6
+ mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7
+ mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL)
+ call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+ mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch
+ add \$64,%rsp
+ popfq
+ pop %r15
+ pop %r14
+ pop %r13
+ pop %r12
+ pop %rbp
+ pop %rbx
+ pop %rdi
+ pop %rsi
+ ret
+.size se_handler,.-se_handler
+
+.section .pdata
+.align 4
+ .rva _mul_1x1
+ .rva .Lend_mul_1x1
+ .rva .LSEH_info_1x1
+
+ .rva .Lvanilla_mul_2x2
+ .rva .Lend_mul_2x2
+ .rva .LSEH_info_2x2
+.section .xdata
+.align 8
+.LSEH_info_1x1:
+ .byte 0x01,0x07,0x02,0x00
+ .byte 0x07,0x01,0x11,0x00 # sub rsp,128+8
+.LSEH_info_2x2:
+ .byte 9,0,0,0
+ .rva se_handler
+___
+}
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+print $code;
+close STDOUT;
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1120 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/bn/bn_exp.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bn_lcl.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#ifdef _WIN32
-# include <malloc.h>
-# ifndef alloca
-# define alloca _alloca
-# endif
-#elif defined(__GNUC__)
-# ifndef alloca
-# define alloca(s) __builtin_alloca((s))
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/* maximum precomputation table size for *variable* sliding windows */
-#define TABLE_SIZE 32
-
-/* this one works - simple but works */
-int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int i, bits, ret = 0;
- BIGNUM *v, *rr;
-
- if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
- /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((r == a) || (r == p))
- rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- else
- rr = r;
- v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (rr == NULL || v == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_copy(v, a) == NULL)
- goto err;
- bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-
- if (BN_is_odd(p)) {
- if (BN_copy(rr, a) == NULL)
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!BN_one(rr))
- goto err;
- }
-
- for (i = 1; i < bits; i++) {
- if (!BN_sqr(v, v, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_bit_set(p, i)) {
- if (!BN_mul(rr, rr, v, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (r != rr)
- BN_copy(r, rr);
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(p);
- bn_check_top(m);
-
- /*-
- * For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
- * a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery
- * exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
- * reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
- *
- * For now, we use Montgomery only if the modulus is odd; otherwise,
- * exponentiation using the reciprocal-based quick remaindering
- * algorithm is used.
- *
- * (Timing obtained with expspeed.c [computations a^p mod m
- * where a, p, m are of the same length: 256, 512, 1024, 2048,
- * 4096, 8192 bits], compared to the running time of the
- * standard algorithm:
- *
- * BN_mod_exp_mont 33 .. 40 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
- * 55 .. 77 % [UltraSparc processor, but
- * debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc conf.]
- *
- * BN_mod_exp_recp 50 .. 70 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
- * 62 .. 118 % [UltraSparc, debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc]
- *
- * On the Sparc, BN_mod_exp_recp was faster than BN_mod_exp_mont
- * at 2048 and more bits, but at 512 and 1024 bits, it was
- * slower even than the standard algorithm!
- *
- * "Real" timings [linux-elf, solaris-sparcv9-gcc configurations]
- * should be obtained when the new Montgomery reduction code
- * has been integrated into OpenSSL.)
- */
-
-#define MONT_MUL_MOD
-#define MONT_EXP_WORD
-#define RECP_MUL_MOD
-
-#ifdef MONT_MUL_MOD
- /*
- * I have finally been able to take out this pre-condition of the top bit
- * being set. It was caused by an error in BN_div with negatives. There
- * was also another problem when for a^b%m a >= m. eay 07-May-97
- */
- /* if ((m->d[m->top-1]&BN_TBIT) && BN_is_odd(m)) */
-
- if (BN_is_odd(m)) {
-# ifdef MONT_EXP_WORD
- if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg
- && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) {
- BN_ULONG A = a->d[0];
- ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, A, p, m, ctx, NULL);
- } else
-# endif
- ret = BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, NULL);
- } else
-#endif
-#ifdef RECP_MUL_MOD
- {
- ret = BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
- }
-#else
- {
- ret = BN_mod_exp_simple(r, a, p, m, ctx);
- }
-#endif
-
- bn_check_top(r);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue;
- int start = 1;
- BIGNUM *aa;
- /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
- BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
- BN_RECP_CTX recp;
-
- if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
- /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-
- if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(r);
- return ret;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- aa = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (!aa || !val[0])
- goto err;
-
- BN_RECP_CTX_init(&recp);
- if (m->neg) {
- /* ignore sign of 'm' */
- if (!BN_copy(aa, m))
- goto err;
- aa->neg = 0;
- if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, aa, ctx) <= 0)
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, m, ctx) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx))
- goto err; /* 1 */
- if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) {
- BN_zero(r);
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
- if (window > 1) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(aa, val[0], val[0], &recp, ctx))
- goto err; /* 2 */
- j = 1 << (window - 1);
- for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
- if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
- !BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(val[i], val[i - 1], aa, &recp, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc
- * when there is only the value '1' in the
- * buffer. */
- wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */
- wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */
- wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */
-
- if (!BN_one(r))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
- if (!start)
- if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (wstart == 0)
- break;
- wstart--;
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit
- * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last
- * set bit before the end of the window
- */
- j = wstart;
- wvalue = 1;
- wend = 0;
- for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
- if (wstart - i < 0)
- break;
- if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
- wvalue <<= (i - wend);
- wvalue |= 1;
- wend = i;
- }
- }
-
- /* wend is the size of the current window */
- j = wend + 1;
- /* add the 'bytes above' */
- if (!start)
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
- if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], &recp, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* move the 'window' down further */
- wstart -= wend + 1;
- wvalue = 0;
- start = 0;
- if (wstart < 0)
- break;
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_RECP_CTX_free(&recp);
- bn_check_top(r);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
-{
- int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue;
- int start = 1;
- BIGNUM *d, *r;
- const BIGNUM *aa;
- /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
- BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
- BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
-
- if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
- return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
- }
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(p);
- bn_check_top(m);
-
- if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
- return (0);
- }
- bits = BN_num_bits(p);
- if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(rr);
- return ret;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (!d || !r || !val[0])
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * If this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part
- */
-
- if (in_mont != NULL)
- mont = in_mont;
- else {
- if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
- if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx))
- goto err;
- aa = val[0];
- } else
- aa = a;
- if (BN_is_zero(aa)) {
- BN_zero(rr);
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_to_montgomery(val[0], aa, mont, ctx))
- goto err; /* 1 */
-
- window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
- if (window > 1) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx))
- goto err; /* 2 */
- j = 1 << (window - 1);
- for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
- if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
- !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc
- * when there is only the value '1' in the
- * buffer. */
- wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */
- wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */
- wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */
-
- if (!BN_to_montgomery(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- for (;;) {
- if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
- if (!start) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- if (wstart == 0)
- break;
- wstart--;
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit
- * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last
- * set bit before the end of the window
- */
- j = wstart;
- wvalue = 1;
- wend = 0;
- for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
- if (wstart - i < 0)
- break;
- if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
- wvalue <<= (i - wend);
- wvalue |= 1;
- wend = i;
- }
- }
-
- /* wend is the size of the current window */
- j = wend + 1;
- /* add the 'bytes above' */
- if (!start)
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* move the 'window' down further */
- wstart -= wend + 1;
- wvalue = 0;
- start = 0;
- if (wstart < 0)
- break;
- }
- if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL))
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- bn_check_top(rr);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() stores the precomputed powers in a specific
- * layout so that accessing any of these table values shows the same access
- * pattern as far as cache lines are concerned. The following functions are
- * used to transfer a BIGNUM from/to that table.
- */
-
-static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top,
- unsigned char *buf, int idx,
- int width)
-{
- size_t i, j;
-
- if (top > b->top)
- top = b->top; /* this works because 'buf' is explicitly
- * zeroed */
- for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
- buf[j] = ((unsigned char *)b->d)[i];
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
- unsigned char *buf, int idx,
- int width)
-{
- size_t i, j;
-
- if (bn_wexpand(b, top) == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
- ((unsigned char *)b->d)[i] = buf[j];
- }
-
- b->top = top;
- bn_correct_top(b);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a pointer value, compute the next address that is a cache line
- * multiple.
- */
-#define MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(x_) \
- ((unsigned char*)(x_) + (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH - (((size_t)(x_)) & (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_MASK))))
-
-/*
- * This variant of BN_mod_exp_mont() uses fixed windows and the special
- * precomputation memory layout to limit data-dependency to a minimum to
- * protect secret exponents (cf. the hyper-threading timing attacks pointed
- * out by Colin Percival,
- * http://www.daemong-consideredperthreading-considered-harmful/)
- */
-int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
-{
- int i, bits, ret = 0, window, wvalue;
- int top;
- BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
-
- int numPowers;
- unsigned char *powerbufFree = NULL;
- int powerbufLen = 0;
- unsigned char *powerbuf = NULL;
- BIGNUM tmp, am;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(p);
- bn_check_top(m);
-
- top = m->top;
-
- if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
- return (0);
- }
- bits = BN_num_bits(p);
- if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(rr);
- return ret;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
- /*
- * Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. If
- * this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part.
- */
- if (in_mont != NULL)
- mont = in_mont;
- else {
- if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Get the window size to use with size of p. */
- window = BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(bits);
-#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
- if (window == 6 && bits <= 1024)
- window = 5; /* ~5% improvement of 2048-bit RSA sign */
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Allocate a buffer large enough to hold all of the pre-computed powers
- * of am, am itself and tmp.
- */
- numPowers = 1 << window;
- powerbufLen = sizeof(m->d[0]) * (top * numPowers +
- ((2 * top) >
- numPowers ? (2 * top) : numPowers));
-#ifdef alloca
- if (powerbufLen < 3072)
- powerbufFree =
- alloca(powerbufLen + MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH);
- else
-#endif
- if ((powerbufFree =
- (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(powerbufLen +
- MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH))
- == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- powerbuf = MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(powerbufFree);
- memset(powerbuf, 0, powerbufLen);
-
-#ifdef alloca
- if (powerbufLen < 3072)
- powerbufFree = NULL;
-#endif
-
- /* lay down tmp and am right after powers table */
- tmp.d = (BN_ULONG *)(powerbuf + sizeof(m->d[0]) * top * numPowers);
- am.d = tmp.d + top;
- tmp.top = am.top = 0;
- tmp.dmax = am.dmax = top;
- tmp.neg = am.neg = 0;
- tmp.flags = am.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
-
- /* prepare a^0 in Montgomery domain */
-#if 1
- if (!BN_to_montgomery(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
- goto err;
-#else
- tmp.d[0] = (0 - m->d[0]) & BN_MASK2; /* 2^(top*BN_BITS2) - m */
- for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
- tmp.d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2;
- tmp.top = top;
-#endif
-
- /* prepare a^1 in Montgomery domain */
- if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
- if (!BN_mod(&am, a, m, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, &am, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, a, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
- if (window == 5 && top > 1) {
- /*
- * This optimization uses ideas from http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/239,
- * specifically optimization of cache-timing attack countermeasures
- * and pre-computation optimization.
- */
-
- /*
- * Dedicated window==4 case improves 512-bit RSA sign by ~15%, but as
- * 512-bit RSA is hardly relevant, we omit it to spare size...
- */
- void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
- const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
- const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
- void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num,
- void *table, size_t power);
- void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, void *table, size_t power);
-
- BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0;
-
- /*
- * BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in
- * BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]...
- */
- for (i = am.top; i < top; i++)
- am.d[i] = 0;
- for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++)
- tmp.d[i] = 0;
-
- bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
- bn_scatter5(am.d, am.top, powerbuf, 1);
- bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
- bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2);
-
-# if 0
- for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) {
- /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
- bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
- bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
- }
-# else
- /* same as above, but uses squaring for 1/2 of operations */
- for (i = 4; i < 32; i *= 2) {
- bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
- bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
- }
- for (i = 3; i < 8; i += 2) {
- int j;
- bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
- bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
- for (j = 2 * i; j < 32; j *= 2) {
- bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
- bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, j);
- }
- }
- for (; i < 16; i += 2) {
- bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
- bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
- bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
- bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2 * i);
- }
- for (; i < 32; i += 2) {
- bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
- bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
- }
-# endif
- bits--;
- for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
- wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
- bn_gather5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue);
-
- /*
- * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
- * significant bits.
- */
- while (bits >= 0) {
- for (wvalue = 0, i = 0; i < 5; i++, bits--)
- wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
-
- bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
- bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
- bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
- bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
- bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
- bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue);
- }
-
- tmp.top = top;
- bn_correct_top(&tmp);
- } else
-#endif
- {
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, numPowers))
- goto err;
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, numPowers))
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * If the window size is greater than 1, then calculate
- * val[i=2..2^winsize-1]. Powers are computed as a*a^(i-1) (even
- * powers could instead be computed as (a^(i/2))^2 to use the slight
- * performance advantage of sqr over mul).
- */
- if (window > 1) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
- (&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, numPowers))
- goto err;
- for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
- /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
- (&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, numPowers))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- bits--;
- for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
- wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
- (&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
- * significant bits.
- */
- while (bits >= 0) {
- wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */
-
- /* Scan the window, squaring the result as we go */
- for (i = 0; i < window; i++, bits--) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
- }
-
- /*
- * Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
- */
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
- (&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
- goto err;
-
- /* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Convert the final result from montgomery to standard format */
- if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL))
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
- if (powerbuf != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(powerbuf, powerbufLen);
- if (powerbufFree)
- OPENSSL_free(powerbufFree);
- }
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
-{
- BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
- int b, bits, ret = 0;
- int r_is_one;
- BN_ULONG w, next_w;
- BIGNUM *d, *r, *t;
- BIGNUM *swap_tmp;
-#define BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m) \
- (BN_mul_word(r, (w)) && \
- (/* BN_ucmp(r, (m)) < 0 ? 1 :*/ \
- (BN_mod(t, r, m, ctx) && (swap_tmp = r, r = t, t = swap_tmp, 1))))
- /*
- * BN_MOD_MUL_WORD is only used with 'w' large, so the BN_ucmp test is
- * probably more overhead than always using BN_mod (which uses BN_copy if
- * a similar test returns true).
- */
- /*
- * We can use BN_mod and do not need BN_nnmod because our accumulator is
- * never negative (the result of BN_mod does not depend on the sign of
- * the modulus).
- */
-#define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \
- (BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx))
-
- if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
- /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- bn_check_top(p);
- bn_check_top(m);
-
- if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
- return (0);
- }
- if (m->top == 1)
- a %= m->d[0]; /* make sure that 'a' is reduced */
-
- bits = BN_num_bits(p);
- if (bits == 0) {
- /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
- if (BN_is_one(m)) {
- ret = 1;
- BN_zero(rr);
- } else
- ret = BN_one(rr);
- return ret;
- }
- if (a == 0) {
- BN_zero(rr);
- ret = 1;
- return ret;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (d == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (in_mont != NULL)
- mont = in_mont;
- else {
- if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- r_is_one = 1; /* except for Montgomery factor */
-
- /* bits-1 >= 0 */
-
- /* The result is accumulated in the product r*w. */
- w = a; /* bit 'bits-1' of 'p' is always set */
- for (b = bits - 2; b >= 0; b--) {
- /* First, square r*w. */
- next_w = w * w;
- if ((next_w / w) != w) { /* overflow */
- if (r_is_one) {
- if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
- goto err;
- r_is_one = 0;
- } else {
- if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
- goto err;
- }
- next_w = 1;
- }
- w = next_w;
- if (!r_is_one) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Second, multiply r*w by 'a' if exponent bit is set. */
- if (BN_is_bit_set(p, b)) {
- next_w = w * a;
- if ((next_w / a) != w) { /* overflow */
- if (r_is_one) {
- if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
- goto err;
- r_is_one = 0;
- } else {
- if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
- goto err;
- }
- next_w = a;
- }
- w = next_w;
- }
- }
-
- /* Finally, set r:=r*w. */
- if (w != 1) {
- if (r_is_one) {
- if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
- goto err;
- r_is_one = 0;
- } else {
- if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (r_is_one) { /* can happen only if a == 1 */
- if (!BN_one(rr))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL))
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- bn_check_top(rr);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/* The old fallback, simple version :-) */
-int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue;
- int start = 1;
- BIGNUM *d;
- /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
- BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
-
- if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
- /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-
- if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(r);
- return ret;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (!d || !val[0])
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx))
- goto err; /* 1 */
- if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) {
- BN_zero(r);
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
- if (window > 1) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul(d, val[0], val[0], m, ctx))
- goto err; /* 2 */
- j = 1 << (window - 1);
- for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
- if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
- !BN_mod_mul(val[i], val[i - 1], d, m, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc
- * when there is only the value '1' in the
- * buffer. */
- wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */
- wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */
- wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */
-
- if (!BN_one(r))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
- if (!start)
- if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, r, m, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (wstart == 0)
- break;
- wstart--;
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit
- * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last
- * set bit before the end of the window
- */
- j = wstart;
- wvalue = 1;
- wend = 0;
- for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
- if (wstart - i < 0)
- break;
- if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
- wvalue <<= (i - wend);
- wvalue |= 1;
- wend = i;
- }
- }
-
- /* wend is the size of the current window */
- j = wend + 1;
- /* add the 'bytes above' */
- if (!start)
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, r, m, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], m, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* move the 'window' down further */
- wstart -= wend + 1;
- wvalue = 0;
- start = 0;
- if (wstart < 0)
- break;
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
- return (ret);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1121 @@
+/* crypto/bn/bn_exp.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef _WIN32
+# include <malloc.h>
+# ifndef alloca
+# define alloca _alloca
+# endif
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+# ifndef alloca
+# define alloca(s) __builtin_alloca((s))
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* maximum precomputation table size for *variable* sliding windows */
+#define TABLE_SIZE 32
+
+/* this one works - simple but works */
+int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i, bits, ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *v, *rr;
+
+ if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+ /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((r == a) || (r == p))
+ rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ else
+ rr = r;
+ v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (rr == NULL || v == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_copy(v, a) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+
+ if (BN_is_odd(p)) {
+ if (BN_copy(rr, a) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_one(rr))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1; i < bits; i++) {
+ if (!BN_sqr(v, v, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(p, i)) {
+ if (!BN_mul(rr, rr, v, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (r != rr)
+ BN_copy(r, rr);
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ bn_check_top(m);
+
+ /*-
+ * For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
+ * a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery
+ * exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
+ * reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
+ *
+ * For now, we use Montgomery only if the modulus is odd; otherwise,
+ * exponentiation using the reciprocal-based quick remaindering
+ * algorithm is used.
+ *
+ * (Timing obtained with expspeed.c [computations a^p mod m
+ * where a, p, m are of the same length: 256, 512, 1024, 2048,
+ * 4096, 8192 bits], compared to the running time of the
+ * standard algorithm:
+ *
+ * BN_mod_exp_mont 33 .. 40 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
+ * 55 .. 77 % [UltraSparc processor, but
+ * debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc conf.]
+ *
+ * BN_mod_exp_recp 50 .. 70 % [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
+ * 62 .. 118 % [UltraSparc, debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc]
+ *
+ * On the Sparc, BN_mod_exp_recp was faster than BN_mod_exp_mont
+ * at 2048 and more bits, but at 512 and 1024 bits, it was
+ * slower even than the standard algorithm!
+ *
+ * "Real" timings [linux-elf, solaris-sparcv9-gcc configurations]
+ * should be obtained when the new Montgomery reduction code
+ * has been integrated into OpenSSL.)
+ */
+
+#define MONT_MUL_MOD
+#define MONT_EXP_WORD
+#define RECP_MUL_MOD
+
+#ifdef MONT_MUL_MOD
+ /*
+ * I have finally been able to take out this pre-condition of the top bit
+ * being set. It was caused by an error in BN_div with negatives. There
+ * was also another problem when for a^b%m a >= m. eay 07-May-97
+ */
+ /* if ((m->d[m->top-1]&BN_TBIT) && BN_is_odd(m)) */
+
+ if (BN_is_odd(m)) {
+# ifdef MONT_EXP_WORD
+ if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg
+ && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) {
+ BN_ULONG A = a->d[0];
+ ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, A, p, m, ctx, NULL);
+ } else
+# endif
+ ret = BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, NULL);
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifdef RECP_MUL_MOD
+ {
+ ret = BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+ }
+#else
+ {
+ ret = BN_mod_exp_simple(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue;
+ int start = 1;
+ BIGNUM *aa;
+ /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
+ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
+ BN_RECP_CTX recp;
+
+ if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+ /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ ret = BN_one(r);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ aa = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (!aa || !val[0])
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_RECP_CTX_init(&recp);
+ if (m->neg) {
+ /* ignore sign of 'm' */
+ if (!BN_copy(aa, m))
+ goto err;
+ aa->neg = 0;
+ if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, aa, ctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, m, ctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx))
+ goto err; /* 1 */
+ if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) {
+ BN_zero(r);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
+ if (window > 1) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(aa, val[0], val[0], &recp, ctx))
+ goto err; /* 2 */
+ j = 1 << (window - 1);
+ for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
+ if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+ !BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(val[i], val[i - 1], aa, &recp, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc
+ * when there is only the value '1' in the
+ * buffer. */
+ wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */
+ wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */
+ wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */
+
+ if (!BN_one(r))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
+ if (!start)
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (wstart == 0)
+ break;
+ wstart--;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit
+ * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last
+ * set bit before the end of the window
+ */
+ j = wstart;
+ wvalue = 1;
+ wend = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
+ if (wstart - i < 0)
+ break;
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
+ wvalue <<= (i - wend);
+ wvalue |= 1;
+ wend = i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* wend is the size of the current window */
+ j = wend + 1;
+ /* add the 'bytes above' */
+ if (!start)
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, r, &recp, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], &recp, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* move the 'window' down further */
+ wstart -= wend + 1;
+ wvalue = 0;
+ start = 0;
+ if (wstart < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_RECP_CTX_free(&recp);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+ int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue;
+ int start = 1;
+ BIGNUM *d, *r;
+ const BIGNUM *aa;
+ /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
+ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+
+ if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+ return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
+ }
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ bn_check_top(m);
+
+ if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ ret = BN_one(rr);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (!d || !r || !val[0])
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * If this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part
+ */
+
+ if (in_mont != NULL)
+ mont = in_mont;
+ else {
+ if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
+ if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ aa = val[0];
+ } else
+ aa = a;
+ if (BN_is_zero(aa)) {
+ BN_zero(rr);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_to_montgomery(val[0], aa, mont, ctx))
+ goto err; /* 1 */
+
+ window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
+ if (window > 1) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val[0], val[0], mont, ctx))
+ goto err; /* 2 */
+ j = 1 << (window - 1);
+ for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
+ if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+ !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val[i], val[i - 1], d, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc
+ * when there is only the value '1' in the
+ * buffer. */
+ wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */
+ wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */
+ wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */
+
+ if (!BN_to_montgomery(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
+ if (!start) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (wstart == 0)
+ break;
+ wstart--;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit
+ * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last
+ * set bit before the end of the window
+ */
+ j = wstart;
+ wvalue = 1;
+ wend = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
+ if (wstart - i < 0)
+ break;
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
+ wvalue <<= (i - wend);
+ wvalue |= 1;
+ wend = i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* wend is the size of the current window */
+ j = wend + 1;
+ /* add the 'bytes above' */
+ if (!start)
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* move the 'window' down further */
+ wstart -= wend + 1;
+ wvalue = 0;
+ start = 0;
+ if (wstart < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL))
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ bn_check_top(rr);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() stores the precomputed powers in a specific
+ * layout so that accessing any of these table values shows the same access
+ * pattern as far as cache lines are concerned. The following functions are
+ * used to transfer a BIGNUM from/to that table.
+ */
+
+static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top,
+ unsigned char *buf, int idx,
+ int width)
+{
+ size_t i, j;
+
+ if (top > b->top)
+ top = b->top; /* this works because 'buf' is explicitly
+ * zeroed */
+ for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
+ buf[j] = ((unsigned char *)b->d)[i];
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
+ unsigned char *buf, int idx,
+ int width)
+{
+ size_t i, j;
+
+ if (bn_wexpand(b, top) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
+ ((unsigned char *)b->d)[i] = buf[j];
+ }
+
+ b->top = top;
+ bn_correct_top(b);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a pointer value, compute the next address that is a cache line
+ * multiple.
+ */
+#define MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(x_) \
+ ((unsigned char*)(x_) + (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH - (((size_t)(x_)) & (MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_MASK))))
+
+/*
+ * This variant of BN_mod_exp_mont() uses fixed windows and the special
+ * precomputation memory layout to limit data-dependency to a minimum to
+ * protect secret exponents (cf. the hyper-threading timing attacks pointed
+ * out by Colin Percival,
+ * http://www.daemong-consideredperthreading-considered-harmful/)
+ */
+int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+ int i, bits, ret = 0, window, wvalue;
+ int top;
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+
+ int numPowers;
+ unsigned char *powerbufFree = NULL;
+ int powerbufLen = 0;
+ unsigned char *powerbuf = NULL;
+ BIGNUM tmp, am;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ bn_check_top(m);
+
+ if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ top = m->top;
+
+ bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ ret = BN_one(rr);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. If
+ * this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part.
+ */
+ if (in_mont != NULL)
+ mont = in_mont;
+ else {
+ if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the window size to use with size of p. */
+ window = BN_window_bits_for_ctime_exponent_size(bits);
+#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
+ if (window == 6 && bits <= 1024)
+ window = 5; /* ~5% improvement of 2048-bit RSA sign */
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate a buffer large enough to hold all of the pre-computed powers
+ * of am, am itself and tmp.
+ */
+ numPowers = 1 << window;
+ powerbufLen = sizeof(m->d[0]) * (top * numPowers +
+ ((2 * top) >
+ numPowers ? (2 * top) : numPowers));
+#ifdef alloca
+ if (powerbufLen < 3072)
+ powerbufFree =
+ alloca(powerbufLen + MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH);
+ else
+#endif
+ if ((powerbufFree =
+ (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(powerbufLen +
+ MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH))
+ == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ powerbuf = MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN(powerbufFree);
+ memset(powerbuf, 0, powerbufLen);
+
+#ifdef alloca
+ if (powerbufLen < 3072)
+ powerbufFree = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ /* lay down tmp and am right after powers table */
+ tmp.d = (BN_ULONG *)(powerbuf + sizeof(m->d[0]) * top * numPowers);
+ am.d = tmp.d + top;
+ tmp.top = am.top = 0;
+ tmp.dmax = am.dmax = top;
+ tmp.neg = am.neg = 0;
+ tmp.flags = am.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
+
+ /* prepare a^0 in Montgomery domain */
+#if 1
+ if (!BN_to_montgomery(&tmp, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+#else
+ tmp.d[0] = (0 - m->d[0]) & BN_MASK2; /* 2^(top*BN_BITS2) - m */
+ for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
+ tmp.d[i] = (~m->d[i]) & BN_MASK2;
+ tmp.top = top;
+#endif
+
+ /* prepare a^1 in Montgomery domain */
+ if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
+ if (!BN_mod(&am, a, m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, &am, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (!BN_to_montgomery(&am, a, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5)
+ if (window == 5 && top > 1) {
+ /*
+ * This optimization uses ideas from http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/239,
+ * specifically optimization of cache-timing attack countermeasures
+ * and pre-computation optimization.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Dedicated window==4 case improves 512-bit RSA sign by ~15%, but as
+ * 512-bit RSA is hardly relevant, we omit it to spare size...
+ */
+ void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+ const void *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
+ const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
+ void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num,
+ void *table, size_t power);
+ void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, void *table, size_t power);
+
+ BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0;
+
+ /*
+ * BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in
+ * BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]...
+ */
+ for (i = am.top; i < top; i++)
+ am.d[i] = 0;
+ for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++)
+ tmp.d[i] = 0;
+
+ bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
+ bn_scatter5(am.d, am.top, powerbuf, 1);
+ bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, am.d, am.d, np, n0, top);
+ bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2);
+
+# if 0
+ for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) {
+ /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
+ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
+ bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+ }
+# else
+ /* same as above, but uses squaring for 1/2 of operations */
+ for (i = 4; i < 32; i *= 2) {
+ bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+ bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+ }
+ for (i = 3; i < 8; i += 2) {
+ int j;
+ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
+ bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+ for (j = 2 * i; j < 32; j *= 2) {
+ bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+ bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, j);
+ }
+ }
+ for (; i < 16; i += 2) {
+ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
+ bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+ bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+ bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2 * i);
+ }
+ for (; i < 32; i += 2) {
+ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
+ bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
+ }
+# endif
+ bits--;
+ for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % 5; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
+ wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
+ bn_gather5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, wvalue);
+
+ /*
+ * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
+ * significant bits.
+ */
+ while (bits >= 0) {
+ for (wvalue = 0, i = 0; i < 5; i++, bits--)
+ wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
+
+ bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+ bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+ bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+ bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+ bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
+ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue);
+ }
+
+ tmp.top = top;
+ bn_correct_top(&tmp);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, numPowers))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, numPowers))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * If the window size is greater than 1, then calculate
+ * val[i=2..2^winsize-1]. Powers are computed as a*a^(i-1) (even
+ * powers could instead be computed as (a^(i/2))^2 to use the slight
+ * performance advantage of sqr over mul).
+ */
+ if (window > 1) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
+ (&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, numPowers))
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
+ /* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
+ (&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, numPowers))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ bits--;
+ for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
+ wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
+ (&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Scan the exponent one window at a time starting from the most
+ * significant bits.
+ */
+ while (bits >= 0) {
+ wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */
+
+ /* Scan the window, squaring the result as we go */
+ for (i = 0; i < window; i++, bits--) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
+ */
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
+ (&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Convert the final result from montgomery to standard format */
+ if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL))
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+ if (powerbuf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(powerbuf, powerbufLen);
+ if (powerbufFree)
+ OPENSSL_free(powerbufFree);
+ }
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+ int b, bits, ret = 0;
+ int r_is_one;
+ BN_ULONG w, next_w;
+ BIGNUM *d, *r, *t;
+ BIGNUM *swap_tmp;
+#define BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m) \
+ (BN_mul_word(r, (w)) && \
+ (/* BN_ucmp(r, (m)) < 0 ? 1 :*/ \
+ (BN_mod(t, r, m, ctx) && (swap_tmp = r, r = t, t = swap_tmp, 1))))
+ /*
+ * BN_MOD_MUL_WORD is only used with 'w' large, so the BN_ucmp test is
+ * probably more overhead than always using BN_mod (which uses BN_copy if
+ * a similar test returns true).
+ */
+ /*
+ * We can use BN_mod and do not need BN_nnmod because our accumulator is
+ * never negative (the result of BN_mod does not depend on the sign of
+ * the modulus).
+ */
+#define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \
+ (BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx))
+
+ if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+ /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ bn_check_top(m);
+
+ if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (m->top == 1)
+ a %= m->d[0]; /* make sure that 'a' is reduced */
+
+ bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ BN_zero(rr);
+ } else
+ ret = BN_one(rr);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (a == 0) {
+ BN_zero(rr);
+ ret = 1;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (d == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (in_mont != NULL)
+ mont = in_mont;
+ else {
+ if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ r_is_one = 1; /* except for Montgomery factor */
+
+ /* bits-1 >= 0 */
+
+ /* The result is accumulated in the product r*w. */
+ w = a; /* bit 'bits-1' of 'p' is always set */
+ for (b = bits - 2; b >= 0; b--) {
+ /* First, square r*w. */
+ next_w = w * w;
+ if ((next_w / w) != w) { /* overflow */
+ if (r_is_one) {
+ if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
+ goto err;
+ r_is_one = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ next_w = 1;
+ }
+ w = next_w;
+ if (!r_is_one) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Second, multiply r*w by 'a' if exponent bit is set. */
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(p, b)) {
+ next_w = w * a;
+ if ((next_w / a) != w) { /* overflow */
+ if (r_is_one) {
+ if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
+ goto err;
+ r_is_one = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ next_w = a;
+ }
+ w = next_w;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Finally, set r:=r*w. */
+ if (w != 1) {
+ if (r_is_one) {
+ if (!BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont))
+ goto err;
+ r_is_one = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_MOD_MUL_WORD(r, w, m))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (r_is_one) { /* can happen only if a == 1 */
+ if (!BN_one(rr))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL))
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ bn_check_top(rr);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/* The old fallback, simple version :-) */
+int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue;
+ int start = 1;
+ BIGNUM *d;
+ /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
+ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
+
+ if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
+ /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ ret = BN_one(r);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ val[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (!d || !val[0])
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_nnmod(val[0], a, m, ctx))
+ goto err; /* 1 */
+ if (BN_is_zero(val[0])) {
+ BN_zero(r);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ window = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits);
+ if (window > 1) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(d, val[0], val[0], m, ctx))
+ goto err; /* 2 */
+ j = 1 << (window - 1);
+ for (i = 1; i < j; i++) {
+ if (((val[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) ||
+ !BN_mod_mul(val[i], val[i - 1], d, m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ start = 1; /* This is used to avoid multiplication etc
+ * when there is only the value '1' in the
+ * buffer. */
+ wvalue = 0; /* The 'value' of the window */
+ wstart = bits - 1; /* The top bit of the window */
+ wend = 0; /* The bottom bit of the window */
+
+ if (!BN_one(r))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart) == 0) {
+ if (!start)
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, r, m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (wstart == 0)
+ break;
+ wstart--;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We now have wstart on a 'set' bit, we now need to work out how bit
+ * a window to do. To do this we need to scan forward until the last
+ * set bit before the end of the window
+ */
+ j = wstart;
+ wvalue = 1;
+ wend = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i < window; i++) {
+ if (wstart - i < 0)
+ break;
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(p, wstart - i)) {
+ wvalue <<= (i - wend);
+ wvalue |= 1;
+ wend = i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* wend is the size of the current window */
+ j = wend + 1;
+ /* add the 'bytes above' */
+ if (!start)
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, r, m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* wvalue will be an odd number < 2^window */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(r, r, val[wvalue >> 1], m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* move the 'window' down further */
+ wstart -= wend + 1;
+ wvalue = 0;
+ start = 0;
+ if (wstart < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ return (ret);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,700 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bn_lcl.h"
-
-static BIGNUM *euclid(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
-
-int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *in_a, const BIGNUM *in_b, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *t;
- int ret = 0;
-
- bn_check_top(in_a);
- bn_check_top(in_b);
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_copy(a, in_a) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (BN_copy(b, in_b) == NULL)
- goto err;
- a->neg = 0;
- b->neg = 0;
-
- if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
- t = a;
- a = b;
- b = t;
- }
- t = euclid(a, b);
- if (t == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_copy(r, t) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static BIGNUM *euclid(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b)
-{
- BIGNUM *t;
- int shifts = 0;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(b);
-
- /* 0 <= b <= a */
- while (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
- /* 0 < b <= a */
-
- if (BN_is_odd(a)) {
- if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
- if (!BN_sub(a, a, b))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
- goto err;
- if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
- t = a;
- a = b;
- b = t;
- }
- } else { /* a odd - b even */
-
- if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
- goto err;
- if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
- t = a;
- a = b;
- b = t;
- }
- }
- } else { /* a is even */
-
- if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
- if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
- goto err;
- if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
- t = a;
- a = b;
- b = t;
- }
- } else { /* a even - b even */
-
- if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
- goto err;
- shifts++;
- }
- }
- /* 0 <= b <= a */
- }
-
- if (shifts) {
- if (!BN_lshift(a, a, shifts))
- goto err;
- }
- bn_check_top(a);
- return (a);
- err:
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */
-static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
- const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
- const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL;
- BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
- int sign;
-
- if ((BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
- || (BN_get_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)) {
- return BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(in, a, n, ctx);
- }
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(n);
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- D = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- M = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- T = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (T == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (in == NULL)
- R = BN_new();
- else
- R = in;
- if (R == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- BN_one(X);
- BN_zero(Y);
- if (BN_copy(B, a) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (BN_copy(A, n) == NULL)
- goto err;
- A->neg = 0;
- if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) {
- if (!BN_nnmod(B, B, A, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- sign = -1;
- /*-
- * From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that
- *
- * 0 <= B < A,
- * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
- * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
- */
-
- if (BN_is_odd(n) && (BN_num_bits(n) <= (BN_BITS <= 32 ? 450 : 2048))) {
- /*
- * Binary inversion algorithm; requires odd modulus. This is faster
- * than the general algorithm if the modulus is sufficiently small
- * (about 400 .. 500 bits on 32-bit sytems, but much more on 64-bit
- * systems)
- */
- int shift;
-
- while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
- /*-
- * 0 < B < |n|,
- * 0 < A <= |n|,
- * (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
- * (2) sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
- */
-
- /*
- * Now divide B by the maximum possible power of two in the
- * integers, and divide X by the same value mod |n|. When we're
- * done, (1) still holds.
- */
- shift = 0;
- while (!BN_is_bit_set(B, shift)) { /* note that 0 < B */
- shift++;
-
- if (BN_is_odd(X)) {
- if (!BN_uadd(X, X, n))
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * now X is even, so we can easily divide it by two
- */
- if (!BN_rshift1(X, X))
- goto err;
- }
- if (shift > 0) {
- if (!BN_rshift(B, B, shift))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Same for A and Y. Afterwards, (2) still holds.
- */
- shift = 0;
- while (!BN_is_bit_set(A, shift)) { /* note that 0 < A */
- shift++;
-
- if (BN_is_odd(Y)) {
- if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, n))
- goto err;
- }
- /* now Y is even */
- if (!BN_rshift1(Y, Y))
- goto err;
- }
- if (shift > 0) {
- if (!BN_rshift(A, A, shift))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*-
- * We still have (1) and (2).
- * Both A and B are odd.
- * The following computations ensure that
- *
- * 0 <= B < |n|,
- * 0 < A < |n|,
- * (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
- * (2) sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
- *
- * and that either A or B is even in the next iteration.
- */
- if (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0) {
- /* -sign*(X + Y)*a == B - A (mod |n|) */
- if (!BN_uadd(X, X, Y))
- goto err;
- /*
- * NB: we could use BN_mod_add_quick(X, X, Y, n), but that
- * actually makes the algorithm slower
- */
- if (!BN_usub(B, B, A))
- goto err;
- } else {
- /* sign*(X + Y)*a == A - B (mod |n|) */
- if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, X))
- goto err;
- /*
- * as above, BN_mod_add_quick(Y, Y, X, n) would slow things
- * down
- */
- if (!BN_usub(A, A, B))
- goto err;
- }
- }
- } else {
- /* general inversion algorithm */
-
- while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
- BIGNUM *tmp;
-
- /*-
- * 0 < B < A,
- * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
- * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
- */
-
- /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
- if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B)) {
- if (!BN_one(D))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(M, A, B))
- goto err;
- } else if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B) + 1) {
- /* A/B is 1, 2, or 3 */
- if (!BN_lshift1(T, B))
- goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(A, T) < 0) {
- /* A < 2*B, so D=1 */
- if (!BN_one(D))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(M, A, B))
- goto err;
- } else {
- /* A >= 2*B, so D=2 or D=3 */
- if (!BN_sub(M, A, T))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_add(D, T, B))
- goto err; /* use D (:= 3*B) as temp */
- if (BN_ucmp(A, D) < 0) {
- /* A < 3*B, so D=2 */
- if (!BN_set_word(D, 2))
- goto err;
- /*
- * M (= A - 2*B) already has the correct value
- */
- } else {
- /* only D=3 remains */
- if (!BN_set_word(D, 3))
- goto err;
- /*
- * currently M = A - 2*B, but we need M = A - 3*B
- */
- if (!BN_sub(M, M, B))
- goto err;
- }
- }
- } else {
- if (!BN_div(D, M, A, B, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*-
- * Now
- * A = D*B + M;
- * thus we have
- * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|).
- */
-
- tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
- * matter */
-
- /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */
- A = B;
- B = M;
- /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */
-
- /*-
- * Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A,
- * (**) translates into
- * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|),
- * i.e.
- * sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|).
- * Similarly, (*) translates into
- * -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|).
- *
- * Thus,
- * sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
- * i.e.
- * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
- *
- * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
- * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
- * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
- * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
- */
-
- /*
- * most of the time D is very small, so we can optimize tmp :=
- * D*X+Y
- */
- if (BN_is_one(D)) {
- if (!BN_add(tmp, X, Y))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (BN_is_word(D, 2)) {
- if (!BN_lshift1(tmp, X))
- goto err;
- } else if (BN_is_word(D, 4)) {
- if (!BN_lshift(tmp, X, 2))
- goto err;
- } else if (D->top == 1) {
- if (!BN_copy(tmp, X))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mul_word(tmp, D->d[0]))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y))
- goto err;
- }
-
- M = Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
- * matter */
- Y = X;
- X = tmp;
- sign = -sign;
- }
- }
-
- /*-
- * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
- * A == gcd(a,n);
- * we have
- * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
- * where Y is non-negative.
- */
-
- if (sign < 0) {
- if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))
- goto err;
- }
- /* Now Y*a == A (mod |n|). */
-
- if (BN_is_one(A)) {
- /* Y*a == 1 (mod |n|) */
- if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) {
- if (!BN_copy(R, Y))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = R;
- err:
- if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL))
- BN_free(R);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- bn_check_top(ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse. It does
- * not contain branches that may leak sensitive information.
- */
-static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
- const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL;
- BIGNUM local_A, local_B;
- BIGNUM *pA, *pB;
- BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
- int sign;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(n);
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- D = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- M = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- T = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (T == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (in == NULL)
- R = BN_new();
- else
- R = in;
- if (R == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- BN_one(X);
- BN_zero(Y);
- if (BN_copy(B, a) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (BN_copy(A, n) == NULL)
- goto err;
- A->neg = 0;
-
- if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) {
- /*
- * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
- * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
- */
- pB = &local_B;
- BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- sign = -1;
- /*-
- * From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that
- *
- * 0 <= B < A,
- * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
- * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
- */
-
- while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
- BIGNUM *tmp;
-
- /*-
- * 0 < B < A,
- * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
- * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
- */
-
- /*
- * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
- * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
- */
- pA = &local_A;
- BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
- /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
- if (!BN_div(D, M, pA, B, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /*-
- * Now
- * A = D*B + M;
- * thus we have
- * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|).
- */
-
- tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
- * matter */
-
- /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */
- A = B;
- B = M;
- /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */
-
- /*-
- * Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A,
- * (**) translates into
- * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|),
- * i.e.
- * sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|).
- * Similarly, (*) translates into
- * -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|).
- *
- * Thus,
- * sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
- * i.e.
- * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
- *
- * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
- * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
- * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
- * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
- */
-
- if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y))
- goto err;
-
- M = Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
- * matter */
- Y = X;
- X = tmp;
- sign = -sign;
- }
-
- /*-
- * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
- * A == gcd(a,n);
- * we have
- * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
- * where Y is non-negative.
- */
-
- if (sign < 0) {
- if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))
- goto err;
- }
- /* Now Y*a == A (mod |n|). */
-
- if (BN_is_one(A)) {
- /* Y*a == 1 (mod |n|) */
- if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) {
- if (!BN_copy(R, Y))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE_NO_BRANCH, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = R;
- err:
- if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL))
- BN_free(R);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- bn_check_top(ret);
- return (ret);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,702 @@
+/* crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+static BIGNUM *euclid(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
+
+int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *in_a, const BIGNUM *in_b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *t;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bn_check_top(in_a);
+ bn_check_top(in_b);
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_copy(a, in_a) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_copy(b, in_b) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ a->neg = 0;
+ b->neg = 0;
+
+ if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
+ t = a;
+ a = b;
+ b = t;
+ }
+ t = euclid(a, b);
+ if (t == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_copy(r, t) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *euclid(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b)
+{
+ BIGNUM *t;
+ int shifts = 0;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(b);
+
+ /* 0 <= b <= a */
+ while (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
+ /* 0 < b <= a */
+
+ if (BN_is_odd(a)) {
+ if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
+ if (!BN_sub(a, a, b))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
+ t = a;
+ a = b;
+ b = t;
+ }
+ } else { /* a odd - b even */
+
+ if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
+ t = a;
+ a = b;
+ b = t;
+ }
+ }
+ } else { /* a is even */
+
+ if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
+ if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_cmp(a, b) < 0) {
+ t = a;
+ a = b;
+ b = t;
+ }
+ } else { /* a even - b even */
+
+ if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
+ goto err;
+ shifts++;
+ }
+ }
+ /* 0 <= b <= a */
+ }
+
+ if (shifts) {
+ if (!BN_lshift(a, a, shifts))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ return (a);
+ err:
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */
+static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
+ const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
+ const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
+ int sign;
+
+ if ((BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+ || (BN_get_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)) {
+ return BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(in, a, n, ctx);
+ }
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(n);
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ D = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ M = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ T = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (T == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (in == NULL)
+ R = BN_new();
+ else
+ R = in;
+ if (R == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_one(X);
+ BN_zero(Y);
+ if (BN_copy(B, a) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_copy(A, n) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ A->neg = 0;
+ if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) {
+ if (!BN_nnmod(B, B, A, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sign = -1;
+ /*-
+ * From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that
+ *
+ * 0 <= B < A,
+ * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
+ */
+
+ if (BN_is_odd(n) && (BN_num_bits(n) <= (BN_BITS <= 32 ? 450 : 2048))) {
+ /*
+ * Binary inversion algorithm; requires odd modulus. This is faster
+ * than the general algorithm if the modulus is sufficiently small
+ * (about 400 .. 500 bits on 32-bit sytems, but much more on 64-bit
+ * systems)
+ */
+ int shift;
+
+ while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
+ /*-
+ * 0 < B < |n|,
+ * 0 < A <= |n|,
+ * (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * (2) sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Now divide B by the maximum possible power of two in the
+ * integers, and divide X by the same value mod |n|. When we're
+ * done, (1) still holds.
+ */
+ shift = 0;
+ while (!BN_is_bit_set(B, shift)) { /* note that 0 < B */
+ shift++;
+
+ if (BN_is_odd(X)) {
+ if (!BN_uadd(X, X, n))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * now X is even, so we can easily divide it by two
+ */
+ if (!BN_rshift1(X, X))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (shift > 0) {
+ if (!BN_rshift(B, B, shift))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Same for A and Y. Afterwards, (2) still holds.
+ */
+ shift = 0;
+ while (!BN_is_bit_set(A, shift)) { /* note that 0 < A */
+ shift++;
+
+ if (BN_is_odd(Y)) {
+ if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, n))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* now Y is even */
+ if (!BN_rshift1(Y, Y))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (shift > 0) {
+ if (!BN_rshift(A, A, shift))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * We still have (1) and (2).
+ * Both A and B are odd.
+ * The following computations ensure that
+ *
+ * 0 <= B < |n|,
+ * 0 < A < |n|,
+ * (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * (2) sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
+ *
+ * and that either A or B is even in the next iteration.
+ */
+ if (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0) {
+ /* -sign*(X + Y)*a == B - A (mod |n|) */
+ if (!BN_uadd(X, X, Y))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * NB: we could use BN_mod_add_quick(X, X, Y, n), but that
+ * actually makes the algorithm slower
+ */
+ if (!BN_usub(B, B, A))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ /* sign*(X + Y)*a == A - B (mod |n|) */
+ if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, X))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * as above, BN_mod_add_quick(Y, Y, X, n) would slow things
+ * down
+ */
+ if (!BN_usub(A, A, B))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* general inversion algorithm */
+
+ while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
+ BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+ /*-
+ * 0 < B < A,
+ * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
+ */
+
+ /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
+ if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B)) {
+ if (!BN_one(D))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(M, A, B))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B) + 1) {
+ /* A/B is 1, 2, or 3 */
+ if (!BN_lshift1(T, B))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_ucmp(A, T) < 0) {
+ /* A < 2*B, so D=1 */
+ if (!BN_one(D))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(M, A, B))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ /* A >= 2*B, so D=2 or D=3 */
+ if (!BN_sub(M, A, T))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(D, T, B))
+ goto err; /* use D (:= 3*B) as temp */
+ if (BN_ucmp(A, D) < 0) {
+ /* A < 3*B, so D=2 */
+ if (!BN_set_word(D, 2))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * M (= A - 2*B) already has the correct value
+ */
+ } else {
+ /* only D=3 remains */
+ if (!BN_set_word(D, 3))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * currently M = A - 2*B, but we need M = A - 3*B
+ */
+ if (!BN_sub(M, M, B))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_div(D, M, A, B, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * Now
+ * A = D*B + M;
+ * thus we have
+ * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|).
+ */
+
+ tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
+ * matter */
+
+ /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */
+ A = B;
+ B = M;
+ /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */
+
+ /*-
+ * Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A,
+ * (**) translates into
+ * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|),
+ * i.e.
+ * sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|).
+ * Similarly, (*) translates into
+ * -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|).
+ *
+ * Thus,
+ * sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * i.e.
+ * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
+ *
+ * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
+ * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
+ * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * most of the time D is very small, so we can optimize tmp :=
+ * D*X+Y
+ */
+ if (BN_is_one(D)) {
+ if (!BN_add(tmp, X, Y))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (BN_is_word(D, 2)) {
+ if (!BN_lshift1(tmp, X))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BN_is_word(D, 4)) {
+ if (!BN_lshift(tmp, X, 2))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (D->top == 1) {
+ if (!BN_copy(tmp, X))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul_word(tmp, D->d[0]))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ M = Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
+ * matter */
+ Y = X;
+ X = tmp;
+ sign = -sign;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
+ * A == gcd(a,n);
+ * we have
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
+ * where Y is non-negative.
+ */
+
+ if (sign < 0) {
+ if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Now Y*a == A (mod |n|). */
+
+ if (BN_is_one(A)) {
+ /* Y*a == 1 (mod |n|) */
+ if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) {
+ if (!BN_copy(R, Y))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = R;
+ err:
+ if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL))
+ BN_free(R);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ bn_check_top(ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse. It does
+ * not contain branches that may leak sensitive information.
+ */
+static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
+ const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL;
+ BIGNUM local_A, local_B;
+ BIGNUM *pA, *pB;
+ BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
+ int sign;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(n);
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ D = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ M = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ T = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (T == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (in == NULL)
+ R = BN_new();
+ else
+ R = in;
+ if (R == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_one(X);
+ BN_zero(Y);
+ if (BN_copy(B, a) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_copy(A, n) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ A->neg = 0;
+
+ if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0)) {
+ /*
+ * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
+ * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
+ */
+ pB = &local_B;
+ local_B.flags = 0;
+ BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sign = -1;
+ /*-
+ * From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that
+ *
+ * 0 <= B < A,
+ * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
+ */
+
+ while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
+ BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+ /*-
+ * 0 < B < A,
+ * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
+ * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
+ */
+ pA = &local_A;
+ local_A.flags = 0;
+ BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
+ if (!BN_div(D, M, pA, B, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*-
+ * Now
+ * A = D*B + M;
+ * thus we have
+ * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|).
+ */
+
+ tmp = A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
+ * matter */
+
+ /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */
+ A = B;
+ B = M;
+ /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */
+
+ /*-
+ * Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A,
+ * (**) translates into
+ * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|),
+ * i.e.
+ * sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|).
+ * Similarly, (*) translates into
+ * -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|).
+ *
+ * Thus,
+ * sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * i.e.
+ * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
+ *
+ * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
+ * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
+ * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
+ */
+
+ if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(tmp, tmp, Y))
+ goto err;
+
+ M = Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
+ * matter */
+ Y = X;
+ X = tmp;
+ sign = -sign;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
+ * A == gcd(a,n);
+ * we have
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
+ * where Y is non-negative.
+ */
+
+ if (sign < 0) {
+ if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Now Y*a == A (mod |n|). */
+
+ if (BN_is_one(A)) {
+ /* Y*a == 1 (mod |n|) */
+ if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) {
+ if (!BN_copy(R, Y))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE_NO_BRANCH, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = R;
+ err:
+ if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL))
+ BN_free(R);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ bn_check_top(ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1298 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included
- * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed
- * to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided below.
- *
- * In addition, Sun covenants to all licensees who provide a reciprocal
- * covenant with respect to their own patents if any, not to sue under
- * current and future patent claims necessarily infringed by the making,
- * using, practicing, selling, offering for sale and/or otherwise
- * disposing of the ECC Code as delivered hereunder (or portions thereof),
- * provided that such covenant shall not apply:
- * 1) for code that a licensee deletes from the ECC Code;
- * 2) separates from the ECC Code; or
- * 3) for infringements caused by:
- * i) the modification of the ECC Code or
- * ii) the combination of the ECC Code with other software or
- * devices where such combination causes the infringement.
- *
- * The software is originally written by Sheueling Chang Shantz and
- * Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * NOTE: This file is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL license below and may
- * be modified; but after modifications, the above covenant may no longer
- * apply! In such cases, the corresponding paragraph ["In addition, Sun
- * covenants ... causes the infringement."] and this note can be edited out;
- * but please keep the Sun copyright notice and attribution.
- */
-
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bn_lcl.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-
-/*
- * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should
- * fail.
- */
-# define MAX_ITERATIONS 50
-
-static const BN_ULONG SQR_tb[16] = { 0, 1, 4, 5, 16, 17, 20, 21,
- 64, 65, 68, 69, 80, 81, 84, 85
-};
-
-/* Platform-specific macros to accelerate squaring. */
-# if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
-# define SQR1(w) \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 60 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 56 & 0xF] << 48 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 52 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 48 & 0xF] << 32 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 44 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 40 & 0xF] << 16 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 36 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 32 & 0xF]
-# define SQR0(w) \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 48 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] << 32 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF]
-# endif
-# ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-# define SQR1(w) \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 16 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF]
-# define SQR0(w) \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
- SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF]
-# endif
-
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m)
-/*
- * Product of two polynomials a, b each with degree < BN_BITS2 - 1, result is
- * a polynomial r with degree < 2 * BN_BITS - 1 The caller MUST ensure that
- * the variables have the right amount of space allocated.
- */
-# ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a,
- const BN_ULONG b)
-{
- register BN_ULONG h, l, s;
- BN_ULONG tab[8], top2b = a >> 30;
- register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4;
-
- a1 = a & (0x3FFFFFFF);
- a2 = a1 << 1;
- a4 = a2 << 1;
-
- tab[0] = 0;
- tab[1] = a1;
- tab[2] = a2;
- tab[3] = a1 ^ a2;
- tab[4] = a4;
- tab[5] = a1 ^ a4;
- tab[6] = a2 ^ a4;
- tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4;
-
- s = tab[b & 0x7];
- l = s;
- s = tab[b >> 3 & 0x7];
- l ^= s << 3;
- h = s >> 29;
- s = tab[b >> 6 & 0x7];
- l ^= s << 6;
- h ^= s >> 26;
- s = tab[b >> 9 & 0x7];
- l ^= s << 9;
- h ^= s >> 23;
- s = tab[b >> 12 & 0x7];
- l ^= s << 12;
- h ^= s >> 20;
- s = tab[b >> 15 & 0x7];
- l ^= s << 15;
- h ^= s >> 17;
- s = tab[b >> 18 & 0x7];
- l ^= s << 18;
- h ^= s >> 14;
- s = tab[b >> 21 & 0x7];
- l ^= s << 21;
- h ^= s >> 11;
- s = tab[b >> 24 & 0x7];
- l ^= s << 24;
- h ^= s >> 8;
- s = tab[b >> 27 & 0x7];
- l ^= s << 27;
- h ^= s >> 5;
- s = tab[b >> 30];
- l ^= s << 30;
- h ^= s >> 2;
-
- /* compensate for the top two bits of a */
-
- if (top2b & 01) {
- l ^= b << 30;
- h ^= b >> 2;
- }
- if (top2b & 02) {
- l ^= b << 31;
- h ^= b >> 1;
- }
-
- *r1 = h;
- *r0 = l;
-}
-# endif
-# if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
-static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a,
- const BN_ULONG b)
-{
- register BN_ULONG h, l, s;
- BN_ULONG tab[16], top3b = a >> 61;
- register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4, a8;
-
- a1 = a & (0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
- a2 = a1 << 1;
- a4 = a2 << 1;
- a8 = a4 << 1;
-
- tab[0] = 0;
- tab[1] = a1;
- tab[2] = a2;
- tab[3] = a1 ^ a2;
- tab[4] = a4;
- tab[5] = a1 ^ a4;
- tab[6] = a2 ^ a4;
- tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4;
- tab[8] = a8;
- tab[9] = a1 ^ a8;
- tab[10] = a2 ^ a8;
- tab[11] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a8;
- tab[12] = a4 ^ a8;
- tab[13] = a1 ^ a4 ^ a8;
- tab[14] = a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
- tab[15] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
-
- s = tab[b & 0xF];
- l = s;
- s = tab[b >> 4 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 4;
- h = s >> 60;
- s = tab[b >> 8 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 8;
- h ^= s >> 56;
- s = tab[b >> 12 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 12;
- h ^= s >> 52;
- s = tab[b >> 16 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 16;
- h ^= s >> 48;
- s = tab[b >> 20 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 20;
- h ^= s >> 44;
- s = tab[b >> 24 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 24;
- h ^= s >> 40;
- s = tab[b >> 28 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 28;
- h ^= s >> 36;
- s = tab[b >> 32 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 32;
- h ^= s >> 32;
- s = tab[b >> 36 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 36;
- h ^= s >> 28;
- s = tab[b >> 40 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 40;
- h ^= s >> 24;
- s = tab[b >> 44 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 44;
- h ^= s >> 20;
- s = tab[b >> 48 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 48;
- h ^= s >> 16;
- s = tab[b >> 52 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 52;
- h ^= s >> 12;
- s = tab[b >> 56 & 0xF];
- l ^= s << 56;
- h ^= s >> 8;
- s = tab[b >> 60];
- l ^= s << 60;
- h ^= s >> 4;
-
- /* compensate for the top three bits of a */
-
- if (top3b & 01) {
- l ^= b << 61;
- h ^= b >> 3;
- }
- if (top3b & 02) {
- l ^= b << 62;
- h ^= b >> 2;
- }
- if (top3b & 04) {
- l ^= b << 63;
- h ^= b >> 1;
- }
-
- *r1 = h;
- *r0 = l;
-}
-# endif
-
-/*
- * Product of two polynomials a, b each with degree < 2 * BN_BITS2 - 1,
- * result is a polynomial r with degree < 4 * BN_BITS2 - 1 The caller MUST
- * ensure that the variables have the right amount of space allocated.
- */
-static void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG a1, const BN_ULONG a0,
- const BN_ULONG b1, const BN_ULONG b0)
-{
- BN_ULONG m1, m0;
- /* r[3] = h1, r[2] = h0; r[1] = l1; r[0] = l0 */
- bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(r + 3, r + 2, a1, b1);
- bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(r + 1, r, a0, b0);
- bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(&m1, &m0, a0 ^ a1, b0 ^ b1);
- /* Correction on m1 ^= l1 ^ h1; m0 ^= l0 ^ h0; */
- r[2] ^= m1 ^ r[1] ^ r[3]; /* h0 ^= m1 ^ l1 ^ h1; */
- r[1] = r[3] ^ r[2] ^ r[0] ^ m1 ^ m0; /* l1 ^= l0 ^ h0 ^ m0; */
-}
-# else
-void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG a1, BN_ULONG a0, BN_ULONG b1,
- BN_ULONG b0);
-# endif
-
-/*
- * Add polynomials a and b and store result in r; r could be a or b, a and b
- * could be equal; r is the bitwise XOR of a and b.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
-{
- int i;
- const BIGNUM *at, *bt;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(b);
-
- if (a->top < b->top) {
- at = b;
- bt = a;
- } else {
- at = a;
- bt = b;
- }
-
- if (bn_wexpand(r, at->top) == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- for (i = 0; i < bt->top; i++) {
- r->d[i] = at->d[i] ^ bt->d[i];
- }
- for (; i < at->top; i++) {
- r->d[i] = at->d[i];
- }
-
- r->top = at->top;
- bn_correct_top(r);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*-
- * Some functions allow for representation of the irreducible polynomials
- * as an int[], say p. The irreducible f(t) is then of the form:
- * t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k]
- * where m = p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0.
- */
-
-/* Performs modular reduction of a and store result in r. r could be a. */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[])
-{
- int j, k;
- int n, dN, d0, d1;
- BN_ULONG zz, *z;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
-
- if (!p[0]) {
- /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */
- BN_zero(r);
- return 1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Since the algorithm does reduction in the r value, if a != r, copy the
- * contents of a into r so we can do reduction in r.
- */
- if (a != r) {
- if (!bn_wexpand(r, a->top))
- return 0;
- for (j = 0; j < a->top; j++) {
- r->d[j] = a->d[j];
- }
- r->top = a->top;
- }
- z = r->d;
-
- /* start reduction */
- dN = p[0] / BN_BITS2;
- for (j = r->top - 1; j > dN;) {
- zz = z[j];
- if (z[j] == 0) {
- j--;
- continue;
- }
- z[j] = 0;
-
- for (k = 1; p[k] != 0; k++) {
- /* reducing component t^p[k] */
- n = p[0] - p[k];
- d0 = n % BN_BITS2;
- d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
- n /= BN_BITS2;
- z[j - n] ^= (zz >> d0);
- if (d0)
- z[j - n - 1] ^= (zz << d1);
- }
-
- /* reducing component t^0 */
- n = dN;
- d0 = p[0] % BN_BITS2;
- d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
- z[j - n] ^= (zz >> d0);
- if (d0)
- z[j - n - 1] ^= (zz << d1);
- }
-
- /* final round of reduction */
- while (j == dN) {
-
- d0 = p[0] % BN_BITS2;
- zz = z[dN] >> d0;
- if (zz == 0)
- break;
- d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
-
- /* clear up the top d1 bits */
- if (d0)
- z[dN] = (z[dN] << d1) >> d1;
- else
- z[dN] = 0;
- z[0] ^= zz; /* reduction t^0 component */
-
- for (k = 1; p[k] != 0; k++) {
- BN_ULONG tmp_ulong;
-
- /* reducing component t^p[k] */
- n = p[k] / BN_BITS2;
- d0 = p[k] % BN_BITS2;
- d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
- z[n] ^= (zz << d0);
- tmp_ulong = zz >> d1;
- if (d0 && tmp_ulong)
- z[n + 1] ^= tmp_ulong;
- }
-
- }
-
- bn_correct_top(r);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Performs modular reduction of a by p and store result in r. r could be a.
- * This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_arr implementation; this wrapper
- * function is only provided for convenience; for best performance, use the
- * BN_GF2m_mod_arr function.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- int arr[6];
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(p);
- ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, sizeof(arr) / sizeof(arr[0]));
- if (!ret || ret > (int)(sizeof(arr) / sizeof(arr[0]))) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- ret = BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, a, arr);
- bn_check_top(r);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute the product of two polynomials a and b, reduce modulo p, and store
- * the result in r. r could be a or b; a could be b.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
- const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int zlen, i, j, k, ret = 0;
- BIGNUM *s;
- BN_ULONG x1, x0, y1, y0, zz[4];
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(b);
-
- if (a == b) {
- return BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, p, ctx);
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- zlen = a->top + b->top + 4;
- if (!bn_wexpand(s, zlen))
- goto err;
- s->top = zlen;
-
- for (i = 0; i < zlen; i++)
- s->d[i] = 0;
-
- for (j = 0; j < b->top; j += 2) {
- y0 = b->d[j];
- y1 = ((j + 1) == b->top) ? 0 : b->d[j + 1];
- for (i = 0; i < a->top; i += 2) {
- x0 = a->d[i];
- x1 = ((i + 1) == a->top) ? 0 : a->d[i + 1];
- bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(zz, x1, x0, y1, y0);
- for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
- s->d[i + j + k] ^= zz[k];
- }
- }
-
- bn_correct_top(s);
- if (BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, s, p))
- ret = 1;
- bn_check_top(r);
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute the product of two polynomials a and b, reduce modulo p, and store
- * the result in r. r could be a or b; a could equal b. This function calls
- * down to the BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr implementation; this wrapper function is
- * only provided for convenience; for best performance, use the
- * BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr function.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
- const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
- int *arr = NULL;
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(b);
- bn_check_top(p);
- if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
- if (!ret || ret > max) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
- err:
- if (arr)
- OPENSSL_free(arr);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* Square a, reduce the result mod p, and store it in a. r could be a. */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int i, ret = 0;
- BIGNUM *s;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top))
- goto err;
-
- for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- s->d[2 * i + 1] = SQR1(a->d[i]);
- s->d[2 * i] = SQR0(a->d[i]);
- }
-
- s->top = 2 * a->top;
- bn_correct_top(s);
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, s, p))
- goto err;
- bn_check_top(r);
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Square a, reduce the result mod p, and store it in a. r could be a. This
- * function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr implementation; this
- * wrapper function is only provided for convenience; for best performance,
- * use the BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr function.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
- int *arr = NULL;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(p);
- if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
- if (!ret || ret > max) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, arr, ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
- err:
- if (arr)
- OPENSSL_free(arr);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Invert a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be a. Uses
- * Modified Almost Inverse Algorithm (Algorithm 10) from Hankerson, D.,
- * Hernandez, J.L., and Menezes, A. "Software Implementation of Elliptic
- * Curve Cryptography Over Binary Fields".
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *b, *c = NULL, *u = NULL, *v = NULL, *tmp;
- int ret = 0;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(p);
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
- if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((c = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, a, p))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_zero(u))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_copy(v, p))
- goto err;
-# if 0
- if (!BN_one(b))
- goto err;
-
- while (1) {
- while (!BN_is_odd(u)) {
- if (BN_is_zero(u))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, p))
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_abs_is_word(u, 1))
- break;
-
- if (BN_num_bits(u) < BN_num_bits(v)) {
- tmp = u;
- u = v;
- v = tmp;
- tmp = b;
- b = c;
- c = tmp;
- }
-
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, c))
- goto err;
- }
-# else
- {
- int i;
- int ubits = BN_num_bits(u);
- int vbits = BN_num_bits(v); /* v is copy of p */
- int top = p->top;
- BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
-
- bn_wexpand(u, top);
- udp = u->d;
- for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
- udp[i] = 0;
- u->top = top;
- bn_wexpand(b, top);
- bdp = b->d;
- bdp[0] = 1;
- for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
- bdp[i] = 0;
- b->top = top;
- bn_wexpand(c, top);
- cdp = c->d;
- for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
- cdp[i] = 0;
- c->top = top;
- vdp = v->d; /* It pays off to "cache" *->d pointers,
- * because it allows optimizer to be more
- * aggressive. But we don't have to "cache"
- * p->d, because *p is declared 'const'... */
- while (1) {
- while (ubits && !(udp[0] & 1)) {
- BN_ULONG u0, u1, b0, b1, mask;
-
- u0 = udp[0];
- b0 = bdp[0];
- mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - (b0 & 1);
- b0 ^= p->d[0] & mask;
- for (i = 0; i < top - 1; i++) {
- u1 = udp[i + 1];
- udp[i] = ((u0 >> 1) | (u1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2;
- u0 = u1;
- b1 = bdp[i + 1] ^ (p->d[i + 1] & mask);
- bdp[i] = ((b0 >> 1) | (b1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2;
- b0 = b1;
- }
- udp[i] = u0 >> 1;
- bdp[i] = b0 >> 1;
- ubits--;
- }
-
- if (ubits <= BN_BITS2) {
- if (udp[0] == 0) /* poly was reducible */
- goto err;
- if (udp[0] == 1)
- break;
- }
-
- if (ubits < vbits) {
- i = ubits;
- ubits = vbits;
- vbits = i;
- tmp = u;
- u = v;
- v = tmp;
- tmp = b;
- b = c;
- c = tmp;
- udp = vdp;
- vdp = v->d;
- bdp = cdp;
- cdp = c->d;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < top; i++) {
- udp[i] ^= vdp[i];
- bdp[i] ^= cdp[i];
- }
- if (ubits == vbits) {
- BN_ULONG ul;
- int utop = (ubits - 1) / BN_BITS2;
-
- while ((ul = udp[utop]) == 0 && utop)
- utop--;
- ubits = utop * BN_BITS2 + BN_num_bits_word(ul);
- }
- }
- bn_correct_top(b);
- }
-# endif
-
- if (!BN_copy(r, b))
- goto err;
- bn_check_top(r);
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
-# ifdef BN_DEBUG /* BN_CTX_end would complain about the
- * expanded form */
- bn_correct_top(c);
- bn_correct_top(u);
- bn_correct_top(v);
-# endif
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Invert xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx.
- * This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_inv implementation; this
- * wrapper function is only provided for convenience; for best performance,
- * use the BN_GF2m_mod_inv function.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *xx, const int p[],
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *field;
- int ret = 0;
-
- bn_check_top(xx);
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((field = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p, field))
- goto err;
-
- ret = BN_GF2m_mod_inv(r, xx, field, ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV
-/*
- * Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x
- * or y, x could equal y.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x,
- const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *xinv = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
-
- bn_check_top(y);
- bn_check_top(x);
- bn_check_top(p);
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- xinv = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (xinv == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_inv(xinv, x, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul(r, y, xinv, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- bn_check_top(r);
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-# else
-/*
- * Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x
- * or y, x could equal y. Uses algorithm Modular_Division_GF(2^m) from
- * Chang-Shantz, S. "From Euclid's GCD to Montgomery Multiplication to the
- * Great Divide".
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x,
- const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *u, *v;
- int ret = 0;
-
- bn_check_top(y);
- bn_check_top(x);
- bn_check_top(p);
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
- a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- u = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (v == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* reduce x and y mod p */
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, y, p))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod(a, x, p))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_copy(b, p))
- goto err;
-
- while (!BN_is_odd(a)) {
- if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_odd(u))
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
- goto err;
- }
-
- do {
- if (BN_GF2m_cmp(b, a) > 0) {
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, a))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, u))
- goto err;
- do {
- if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_odd(v))
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, p))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_rshift1(v, v))
- goto err;
- } while (!BN_is_odd(b));
- } else if (BN_abs_is_word(a, 1))
- break;
- else {
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(a, a, b))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
- goto err;
- do {
- if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_odd(u))
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
- goto err;
- } while (!BN_is_odd(a));
- }
- } while (1);
-
- if (!BN_copy(r, u))
- goto err;
- bn_check_top(r);
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-# endif
-
-/*
- * Divide yy by xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx
- * * or yy, xx could equal yy. This function calls down to the
- * BN_GF2m_mod_div implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for
- * convenience; for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_div function.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *yy, const BIGNUM *xx,
- const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *field;
- int ret = 0;
-
- bn_check_top(yy);
- bn_check_top(xx);
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((field = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p, field))
- goto err;
-
- ret = BN_GF2m_mod_div(r, yy, xx, field, ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute the bth power of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r
- * could be a. Uses simple square-and-multiply algorithm A.5.1 from IEEE
- * P1363.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
- const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0, i, n;
- BIGNUM *u;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(b);
-
- if (BN_is_zero(b))
- return (BN_one(r));
-
- if (BN_abs_is_word(b, 1))
- return (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL);
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(u, a, p))
- goto err;
-
- n = BN_num_bits(b) - 1;
- for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(u, u, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_bit_set(b, i)) {
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(u, u, a, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (!BN_copy(r, u))
- goto err;
- bn_check_top(r);
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute the bth power of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r
- * could be a. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr
- * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience;
- * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr function.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
- const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
- int *arr = NULL;
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(b);
- bn_check_top(p);
- if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
- if (!ret || ret > max) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_EXP, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
- err:
- if (arr)
- OPENSSL_free(arr);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute the square root of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r.
- * r could be a. Uses exponentiation as in algorithm A.4.1 from IEEE P1363.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- BIGNUM *u;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
-
- if (!p[0]) {
- /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */
- BN_zero(r);
- return 1;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_set_bit(u, p[0] - 1))
- goto err;
- ret = BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(r, a, u, p, ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compute the square root of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r.
- * r could be a. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr
- * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience;
- * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr function.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
- int *arr = NULL;
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(p);
- if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
- if (!ret || ret > max) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(r, a, arr, ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
- err:
- if (arr)
- OPENSSL_free(arr);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Find r such that r^2 + r = a mod p. r could be a. If no r exists returns
- * 0. Uses algorithms A.4.7 and A.4.6 from IEEE P1363.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a_, const int p[],
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0, count = 0, j;
- BIGNUM *a, *z, *rho, *w, *w2, *tmp;
-
- bn_check_top(a_);
-
- if (!p[0]) {
- /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */
- BN_zero(r);
- return 1;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- w = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (w == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(a, a_, p))
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
- BN_zero(r);
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (p[0] & 0x1) { /* m is odd */
- /* compute half-trace of a */
- if (!BN_copy(z, a))
- goto err;
- for (j = 1; j <= (p[0] - 1) / 2; j++) {
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, a))
- goto err;
- }
-
- } else { /* m is even */
-
- rho = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- w2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (tmp == NULL)
- goto err;
- do {
- if (!BN_rand(rho, p[0], 0, 0))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(rho, rho, p))
- goto err;
- BN_zero(z);
- if (!BN_copy(w, rho))
- goto err;
- for (j = 1; j <= p[0] - 1; j++) {
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w2, w, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(tmp, w2, a, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, tmp))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, w2, rho))
- goto err;
- }
- count++;
- } while (BN_is_zero(w) && (count < MAX_ITERATIONS));
- if (BN_is_zero(w)) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w, z, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, z, w))
- goto err;
- if (BN_GF2m_cmp(w, a)) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_NO_SOLUTION);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!BN_copy(r, z))
- goto err;
- bn_check_top(r);
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Find r such that r^2 + r = a mod p. r could be a. If no r exists returns
- * 0. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr
- * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience;
- * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr function.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
- int *arr = NULL;
- bn_check_top(a);
- bn_check_top(p);
- if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
- if (!ret || ret > max) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(r, a, arr, ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
- err:
- if (arr)
- OPENSSL_free(arr);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i *
- * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero
- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array
- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would
- * be filled if array was large enough.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
-{
- int i, j, k = 0;
- BN_ULONG mask;
-
- if (BN_is_zero(a))
- return 0;
-
- for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- if (!a->d[i])
- /* skip word if a->d[i] == 0 */
- continue;
- mask = BN_TBIT;
- for (j = BN_BITS2 - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
- if (a->d[i] & mask) {
- if (k < max)
- p[k] = BN_BITS2 * i + j;
- k++;
- }
- mask >>= 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (k < max) {
- p[k] = -1;
- k++;
- }
-
- return k;
-}
-
-/*
- * Convert the coefficient array representation of a polynomial to a
- * bit-string. The array must be terminated by -1.
- */
-int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const int p[], BIGNUM *a)
-{
- int i;
-
- bn_check_top(a);
- BN_zero(a);
- for (i = 0; p[i] != -1; i++) {
- if (BN_set_bit(a, p[i]) == 0)
- return 0;
- }
- bn_check_top(a);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1301 @@
+/* crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * The Elliptic Curve Public-Key Crypto Library (ECC Code) included
+ * herein is developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and is contributed
+ * to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The ECC Code is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided below.
+ *
+ * In addition, Sun covenants to all licensees who provide a reciprocal
+ * covenant with respect to their own patents if any, not to sue under
+ * current and future patent claims necessarily infringed by the making,
+ * using, practicing, selling, offering for sale and/or otherwise
+ * disposing of the ECC Code as delivered hereunder (or portions thereof),
+ * provided that such covenant shall not apply:
+ * 1) for code that a licensee deletes from the ECC Code;
+ * 2) separates from the ECC Code; or
+ * 3) for infringements caused by:
+ * i) the modification of the ECC Code or
+ * ii) the combination of the ECC Code with other software or
+ * devices where such combination causes the infringement.
+ *
+ * The software is originally written by Sheueling Chang Shantz and
+ * Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: This file is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL license below and may
+ * be modified; but after modifications, the above covenant may no longer
+ * apply! In such cases, the corresponding paragraph ["In addition, Sun
+ * covenants ... causes the infringement."] and this note can be edited out;
+ * but please keep the Sun copyright notice and attribution.
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should
+ * fail.
+ */
+# define MAX_ITERATIONS 50
+
+static const BN_ULONG SQR_tb[16] = { 0, 1, 4, 5, 16, 17, 20, 21,
+ 64, 65, 68, 69, 80, 81, 84, 85
+};
+
+/* Platform-specific macros to accelerate squaring. */
+# if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
+# define SQR1(w) \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 60 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 56 & 0xF] << 48 | \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 52 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 48 & 0xF] << 32 | \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 44 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 40 & 0xF] << 16 | \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 36 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 32 & 0xF]
+# define SQR0(w) \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 48 | \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] << 32 | \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF]
+# endif
+# ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+# define SQR1(w) \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 16 | \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF]
+# define SQR0(w) \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
+ SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF]
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m)
+/*
+ * Product of two polynomials a, b each with degree < BN_BITS2 - 1, result is
+ * a polynomial r with degree < 2 * BN_BITS - 1 The caller MUST ensure that
+ * the variables have the right amount of space allocated.
+ */
+# ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a,
+ const BN_ULONG b)
+{
+ register BN_ULONG h, l, s;
+ BN_ULONG tab[8], top2b = a >> 30;
+ register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4;
+
+ a1 = a & (0x3FFFFFFF);
+ a2 = a1 << 1;
+ a4 = a2 << 1;
+
+ tab[0] = 0;
+ tab[1] = a1;
+ tab[2] = a2;
+ tab[3] = a1 ^ a2;
+ tab[4] = a4;
+ tab[5] = a1 ^ a4;
+ tab[6] = a2 ^ a4;
+ tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4;
+
+ s = tab[b & 0x7];
+ l = s;
+ s = tab[b >> 3 & 0x7];
+ l ^= s << 3;
+ h = s >> 29;
+ s = tab[b >> 6 & 0x7];
+ l ^= s << 6;
+ h ^= s >> 26;
+ s = tab[b >> 9 & 0x7];
+ l ^= s << 9;
+ h ^= s >> 23;
+ s = tab[b >> 12 & 0x7];
+ l ^= s << 12;
+ h ^= s >> 20;
+ s = tab[b >> 15 & 0x7];
+ l ^= s << 15;
+ h ^= s >> 17;
+ s = tab[b >> 18 & 0x7];
+ l ^= s << 18;
+ h ^= s >> 14;
+ s = tab[b >> 21 & 0x7];
+ l ^= s << 21;
+ h ^= s >> 11;
+ s = tab[b >> 24 & 0x7];
+ l ^= s << 24;
+ h ^= s >> 8;
+ s = tab[b >> 27 & 0x7];
+ l ^= s << 27;
+ h ^= s >> 5;
+ s = tab[b >> 30];
+ l ^= s << 30;
+ h ^= s >> 2;
+
+ /* compensate for the top two bits of a */
+
+ if (top2b & 01) {
+ l ^= b << 30;
+ h ^= b >> 2;
+ }
+ if (top2b & 02) {
+ l ^= b << 31;
+ h ^= b >> 1;
+ }
+
+ *r1 = h;
+ *r0 = l;
+}
+# endif
+# if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
+static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a,
+ const BN_ULONG b)
+{
+ register BN_ULONG h, l, s;
+ BN_ULONG tab[16], top3b = a >> 61;
+ register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4, a8;
+
+ a1 = a & (0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
+ a2 = a1 << 1;
+ a4 = a2 << 1;
+ a8 = a4 << 1;
+
+ tab[0] = 0;
+ tab[1] = a1;
+ tab[2] = a2;
+ tab[3] = a1 ^ a2;
+ tab[4] = a4;
+ tab[5] = a1 ^ a4;
+ tab[6] = a2 ^ a4;
+ tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4;
+ tab[8] = a8;
+ tab[9] = a1 ^ a8;
+ tab[10] = a2 ^ a8;
+ tab[11] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a8;
+ tab[12] = a4 ^ a8;
+ tab[13] = a1 ^ a4 ^ a8;
+ tab[14] = a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
+ tab[15] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
+
+ s = tab[b & 0xF];
+ l = s;
+ s = tab[b >> 4 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 4;
+ h = s >> 60;
+ s = tab[b >> 8 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 8;
+ h ^= s >> 56;
+ s = tab[b >> 12 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 12;
+ h ^= s >> 52;
+ s = tab[b >> 16 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 16;
+ h ^= s >> 48;
+ s = tab[b >> 20 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 20;
+ h ^= s >> 44;
+ s = tab[b >> 24 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 24;
+ h ^= s >> 40;
+ s = tab[b >> 28 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 28;
+ h ^= s >> 36;
+ s = tab[b >> 32 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 32;
+ h ^= s >> 32;
+ s = tab[b >> 36 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 36;
+ h ^= s >> 28;
+ s = tab[b >> 40 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 40;
+ h ^= s >> 24;
+ s = tab[b >> 44 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 44;
+ h ^= s >> 20;
+ s = tab[b >> 48 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 48;
+ h ^= s >> 16;
+ s = tab[b >> 52 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 52;
+ h ^= s >> 12;
+ s = tab[b >> 56 & 0xF];
+ l ^= s << 56;
+ h ^= s >> 8;
+ s = tab[b >> 60];
+ l ^= s << 60;
+ h ^= s >> 4;
+
+ /* compensate for the top three bits of a */
+
+ if (top3b & 01) {
+ l ^= b << 61;
+ h ^= b >> 3;
+ }
+ if (top3b & 02) {
+ l ^= b << 62;
+ h ^= b >> 2;
+ }
+ if (top3b & 04) {
+ l ^= b << 63;
+ h ^= b >> 1;
+ }
+
+ *r1 = h;
+ *r0 = l;
+}
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Product of two polynomials a, b each with degree < 2 * BN_BITS2 - 1,
+ * result is a polynomial r with degree < 4 * BN_BITS2 - 1 The caller MUST
+ * ensure that the variables have the right amount of space allocated.
+ */
+static void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG a1, const BN_ULONG a0,
+ const BN_ULONG b1, const BN_ULONG b0)
+{
+ BN_ULONG m1, m0;
+ /* r[3] = h1, r[2] = h0; r[1] = l1; r[0] = l0 */
+ bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(r + 3, r + 2, a1, b1);
+ bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(r + 1, r, a0, b0);
+ bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(&m1, &m0, a0 ^ a1, b0 ^ b1);
+ /* Correction on m1 ^= l1 ^ h1; m0 ^= l0 ^ h0; */
+ r[2] ^= m1 ^ r[1] ^ r[3]; /* h0 ^= m1 ^ l1 ^ h1; */
+ r[1] = r[3] ^ r[2] ^ r[0] ^ m1 ^ m0; /* l1 ^= l0 ^ h0 ^ m0; */
+}
+# else
+void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG a1, BN_ULONG a0, BN_ULONG b1,
+ BN_ULONG b0);
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Add polynomials a and b and store result in r; r could be a or b, a and b
+ * could be equal; r is the bitwise XOR of a and b.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
+{
+ int i;
+ const BIGNUM *at, *bt;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(b);
+
+ if (a->top < b->top) {
+ at = b;
+ bt = a;
+ } else {
+ at = a;
+ bt = b;
+ }
+
+ if (bn_wexpand(r, at->top) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < bt->top; i++) {
+ r->d[i] = at->d[i] ^ bt->d[i];
+ }
+ for (; i < at->top; i++) {
+ r->d[i] = at->d[i];
+ }
+
+ r->top = at->top;
+ bn_correct_top(r);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Some functions allow for representation of the irreducible polynomials
+ * as an int[], say p. The irreducible f(t) is then of the form:
+ * t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k]
+ * where m = p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0.
+ */
+
+/* Performs modular reduction of a and store result in r. r could be a. */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[])
+{
+ int j, k;
+ int n, dN, d0, d1;
+ BN_ULONG zz, *z;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+
+ if (!p[0]) {
+ /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */
+ BN_zero(r);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Since the algorithm does reduction in the r value, if a != r, copy the
+ * contents of a into r so we can do reduction in r.
+ */
+ if (a != r) {
+ if (!bn_wexpand(r, a->top))
+ return 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < a->top; j++) {
+ r->d[j] = a->d[j];
+ }
+ r->top = a->top;
+ }
+ z = r->d;
+
+ /* start reduction */
+ dN = p[0] / BN_BITS2;
+ for (j = r->top - 1; j > dN;) {
+ zz = z[j];
+ if (z[j] == 0) {
+ j--;
+ continue;
+ }
+ z[j] = 0;
+
+ for (k = 1; p[k] != 0; k++) {
+ /* reducing component t^p[k] */
+ n = p[0] - p[k];
+ d0 = n % BN_BITS2;
+ d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
+ n /= BN_BITS2;
+ z[j - n] ^= (zz >> d0);
+ if (d0)
+ z[j - n - 1] ^= (zz << d1);
+ }
+
+ /* reducing component t^0 */
+ n = dN;
+ d0 = p[0] % BN_BITS2;
+ d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
+ z[j - n] ^= (zz >> d0);
+ if (d0)
+ z[j - n - 1] ^= (zz << d1);
+ }
+
+ /* final round of reduction */
+ while (j == dN) {
+
+ d0 = p[0] % BN_BITS2;
+ zz = z[dN] >> d0;
+ if (zz == 0)
+ break;
+ d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
+
+ /* clear up the top d1 bits */
+ if (d0)
+ z[dN] = (z[dN] << d1) >> d1;
+ else
+ z[dN] = 0;
+ z[0] ^= zz; /* reduction t^0 component */
+
+ for (k = 1; p[k] != 0; k++) {
+ BN_ULONG tmp_ulong;
+
+ /* reducing component t^p[k] */
+ n = p[k] / BN_BITS2;
+ d0 = p[k] % BN_BITS2;
+ d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
+ z[n] ^= (zz << d0);
+ tmp_ulong = zz >> d1;
+ if (d0 && tmp_ulong)
+ z[n + 1] ^= tmp_ulong;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ bn_correct_top(r);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs modular reduction of a by p and store result in r. r could be a.
+ * This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_arr implementation; this wrapper
+ * function is only provided for convenience; for best performance, use the
+ * BN_GF2m_mod_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int arr[6];
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, sizeof(arr) / sizeof(arr[0]));
+ if (!ret || ret > (int)(sizeof(arr) / sizeof(arr[0]))) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, a, arr);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the product of two polynomials a and b, reduce modulo p, and store
+ * the result in r. r could be a or b; a could be b.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+ const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int zlen, i, j, k, ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *s;
+ BN_ULONG x1, x0, y1, y0, zz[4];
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(b);
+
+ if (a == b) {
+ return BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, p, ctx);
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ zlen = a->top + b->top + 4;
+ if (!bn_wexpand(s, zlen))
+ goto err;
+ s->top = zlen;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < zlen; i++)
+ s->d[i] = 0;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < b->top; j += 2) {
+ y0 = b->d[j];
+ y1 = ((j + 1) == b->top) ? 0 : b->d[j + 1];
+ for (i = 0; i < a->top; i += 2) {
+ x0 = a->d[i];
+ x1 = ((i + 1) == a->top) ? 0 : a->d[i + 1];
+ bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(zz, x1, x0, y1, y0);
+ for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+ s->d[i + j + k] ^= zz[k];
+ }
+ }
+
+ bn_correct_top(s);
+ if (BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, s, p))
+ ret = 1;
+ bn_check_top(r);
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the product of two polynomials a and b, reduce modulo p, and store
+ * the result in r. r could be a or b; a could equal b. This function calls
+ * down to the BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr implementation; this wrapper function is
+ * only provided for convenience; for best performance, use the
+ * BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+ const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
+ int *arr = NULL;
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(b);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
+ if (!ret || ret > max) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ err:
+ if (arr)
+ OPENSSL_free(arr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Square a, reduce the result mod p, and store it in a. r could be a. */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *s;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ s->d[2 * i + 1] = SQR1(a->d[i]);
+ s->d[2 * i] = SQR0(a->d[i]);
+ }
+
+ s->top = 2 * a->top;
+ bn_correct_top(s);
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(r, s, p))
+ goto err;
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Square a, reduce the result mod p, and store it in a. r could be a. This
+ * function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr implementation; this
+ * wrapper function is only provided for convenience; for best performance,
+ * use the BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
+ int *arr = NULL;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
+ if (!ret || ret > max) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(r, a, arr, ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ err:
+ if (arr)
+ OPENSSL_free(arr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invert a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be a. Uses
+ * Modified Almost Inverse Algorithm (Algorithm 10) from Hankerson, D.,
+ * Hernandez, J.L., and Menezes, A. "Software Implementation of Elliptic
+ * Curve Cryptography Over Binary Fields".
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *b, *c = NULL, *u = NULL, *v = NULL, *tmp;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((c = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((v = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, a, p))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_zero(u))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_copy(v, p))
+ goto err;
+# if 0
+ if (!BN_one(b))
+ goto err;
+
+ while (1) {
+ while (!BN_is_odd(u)) {
+ if (BN_is_zero(u))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_odd(b)) {
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, p))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_abs_is_word(u, 1))
+ break;
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(u) < BN_num_bits(v)) {
+ tmp = u;
+ u = v;
+ v = tmp;
+ tmp = b;
+ b = c;
+ c = tmp;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, c))
+ goto err;
+ }
+# else
+ {
+ int i;
+ int ubits = BN_num_bits(u);
+ int vbits = BN_num_bits(v); /* v is copy of p */
+ int top = p->top;
+ BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
+
+ if (!bn_wexpand(u, top))
+ goto err;
+ udp = u->d;
+ for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
+ udp[i] = 0;
+ u->top = top;
+ if (!bn_wexpand(b, top))
+ goto err;
+ bdp = b->d;
+ bdp[0] = 1;
+ for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
+ bdp[i] = 0;
+ b->top = top;
+ if (!bn_wexpand(c, top))
+ goto err;
+ cdp = c->d;
+ for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
+ cdp[i] = 0;
+ c->top = top;
+ vdp = v->d; /* It pays off to "cache" *->d pointers,
+ * because it allows optimizer to be more
+ * aggressive. But we don't have to "cache"
+ * p->d, because *p is declared 'const'... */
+ while (1) {
+ while (ubits && !(udp[0] & 1)) {
+ BN_ULONG u0, u1, b0, b1, mask;
+
+ u0 = udp[0];
+ b0 = bdp[0];
+ mask = (BN_ULONG)0 - (b0 & 1);
+ b0 ^= p->d[0] & mask;
+ for (i = 0; i < top - 1; i++) {
+ u1 = udp[i + 1];
+ udp[i] = ((u0 >> 1) | (u1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2;
+ u0 = u1;
+ b1 = bdp[i + 1] ^ (p->d[i + 1] & mask);
+ bdp[i] = ((b0 >> 1) | (b1 << (BN_BITS2 - 1))) & BN_MASK2;
+ b0 = b1;
+ }
+ udp[i] = u0 >> 1;
+ bdp[i] = b0 >> 1;
+ ubits--;
+ }
+
+ if (ubits <= BN_BITS2) {
+ if (udp[0] == 0) /* poly was reducible */
+ goto err;
+ if (udp[0] == 1)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ubits < vbits) {
+ i = ubits;
+ ubits = vbits;
+ vbits = i;
+ tmp = u;
+ u = v;
+ v = tmp;
+ tmp = b;
+ b = c;
+ c = tmp;
+ udp = vdp;
+ vdp = v->d;
+ bdp = cdp;
+ cdp = c->d;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < top; i++) {
+ udp[i] ^= vdp[i];
+ bdp[i] ^= cdp[i];
+ }
+ if (ubits == vbits) {
+ BN_ULONG ul;
+ int utop = (ubits - 1) / BN_BITS2;
+
+ while ((ul = udp[utop]) == 0 && utop)
+ utop--;
+ ubits = utop * BN_BITS2 + BN_num_bits_word(ul);
+ }
+ }
+ bn_correct_top(b);
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if (!BN_copy(r, b))
+ goto err;
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+# ifdef BN_DEBUG /* BN_CTX_end would complain about the
+ * expanded form */
+ bn_correct_top(c);
+ bn_correct_top(u);
+ bn_correct_top(v);
+# endif
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Invert xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx.
+ * This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_inv implementation; this
+ * wrapper function is only provided for convenience; for best performance,
+ * use the BN_GF2m_mod_inv function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *xx, const int p[],
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *field;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bn_check_top(xx);
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((field = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p, field))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = BN_GF2m_mod_inv(r, xx, field, ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV
+/*
+ * Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x
+ * or y, x could equal y.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x,
+ const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *xinv = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bn_check_top(y);
+ bn_check_top(x);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ xinv = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (xinv == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_inv(xinv, x, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul(r, y, xinv, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+# else
+/*
+ * Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x
+ * or y, x could equal y. Uses algorithm Modular_Division_GF(2^m) from
+ * Chang-Shantz, S. "From Euclid's GCD to Montgomery Multiplication to the
+ * Great Divide".
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x,
+ const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *u, *v;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bn_check_top(y);
+ bn_check_top(x);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ u = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (v == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* reduce x and y mod p */
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, y, p))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod(a, x, p))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_copy(b, p))
+ goto err;
+
+ while (!BN_is_odd(a)) {
+ if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_odd(u))
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ if (BN_GF2m_cmp(b, a) > 0) {
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, a))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, u))
+ goto err;
+ do {
+ if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_odd(v))
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, p))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rshift1(v, v))
+ goto err;
+ } while (!BN_is_odd(b));
+ } else if (BN_abs_is_word(a, 1))
+ break;
+ else {
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(a, a, b))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
+ goto err;
+ do {
+ if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_odd(u))
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
+ goto err;
+ } while (!BN_is_odd(a));
+ }
+ } while (1);
+
+ if (!BN_copy(r, u))
+ goto err;
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Divide yy by xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx
+ * * or yy, xx could equal yy. This function calls down to the
+ * BN_GF2m_mod_div implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for
+ * convenience; for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_div function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *yy, const BIGNUM *xx,
+ const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *field;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ bn_check_top(yy);
+ bn_check_top(xx);
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((field = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p, field))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = BN_GF2m_mod_div(r, yy, xx, field, ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the bth power of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r
+ * could be a. Uses simple square-and-multiply algorithm A.5.1 from IEEE
+ * P1363.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+ const int p[], BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0, i, n;
+ BIGNUM *u;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(b);
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(b))
+ return (BN_one(r));
+
+ if (BN_abs_is_word(b, 1))
+ return (BN_copy(r, a) != NULL);
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(u, a, p))
+ goto err;
+
+ n = BN_num_bits(b) - 1;
+ for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(u, u, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(b, i)) {
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(u, u, a, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!BN_copy(r, u))
+ goto err;
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the bth power of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r
+ * could be a. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr
+ * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience;
+ * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+ const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
+ int *arr = NULL;
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(b);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
+ if (!ret || ret > max) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_EXP, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ err:
+ if (arr)
+ OPENSSL_free(arr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the square root of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r.
+ * r could be a. Uses exponentiation as in algorithm A.4.1 from IEEE P1363.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *u;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+
+ if (!p[0]) {
+ /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */
+ BN_zero(r);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((u = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_set_bit(u, p[0] - 1))
+ goto err;
+ ret = BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr(r, a, u, p, ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the square root of a, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r.
+ * r could be a. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr
+ * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience;
+ * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
+ int *arr = NULL;
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
+ if (!ret || ret > max) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(r, a, arr, ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ err:
+ if (arr)
+ OPENSSL_free(arr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find r such that r^2 + r = a mod p. r could be a. If no r exists returns
+ * 0. Uses algorithms A.4.7 and A.4.6 from IEEE P1363.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a_, const int p[],
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0, count = 0, j;
+ BIGNUM *a, *z, *rho, *w, *w2, *tmp;
+
+ bn_check_top(a_);
+
+ if (!p[0]) {
+ /* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */
+ BN_zero(r);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ w = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (w == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(a, a_, p))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
+ BN_zero(r);
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (p[0] & 0x1) { /* m is odd */
+ /* compute half-trace of a */
+ if (!BN_copy(z, a))
+ goto err;
+ for (j = 1; j <= (p[0] - 1) / 2; j++) {
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, a))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ } else { /* m is even */
+
+ rho = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ w2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ do {
+ if (!BN_rand(rho, p[0], 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(rho, rho, p))
+ goto err;
+ BN_zero(z);
+ if (!BN_copy(w, rho))
+ goto err;
+ for (j = 1; j <= p[0] - 1; j++) {
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w2, w, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(tmp, w2, a, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, tmp))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, w2, rho))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ count++;
+ } while (BN_is_zero(w) && (count < MAX_ITERATIONS));
+ if (BN_is_zero(w)) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w, z, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, z, w))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_GF2m_cmp(w, a)) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_NO_SOLUTION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_copy(r, z))
+ goto err;
+ bn_check_top(r);
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find r such that r^2 + r = a mod p. r could be a. If no r exists returns
+ * 0. This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr
+ * implementation; this wrapper function is only provided for convenience;
+ * for best performance, use the BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr function.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
+ int *arr = NULL;
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(p);
+ if ((arr = (int *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(int) * max)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
+ if (!ret || ret > max) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(r, a, arr, ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ err:
+ if (arr)
+ OPENSSL_free(arr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i *
+ * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero
+ * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array
+ * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would
+ * be filled if array was large enough.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
+{
+ int i, j, k = 0;
+ BN_ULONG mask;
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(a))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (!a->d[i])
+ /* skip word if a->d[i] == 0 */
+ continue;
+ mask = BN_TBIT;
+ for (j = BN_BITS2 - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+ if (a->d[i] & mask) {
+ if (k < max)
+ p[k] = BN_BITS2 * i + j;
+ k++;
+ }
+ mask >>= 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (k < max) {
+ p[k] = -1;
+ k++;
+ }
+
+ return k;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the coefficient array representation of a polynomial to a
+ * bit-string. The array must be terminated by -1.
+ */
+int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const int p[], BIGNUM *a)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ BN_zero(a);
+ for (i = 0; p[i] != -1; i++) {
+ if (BN_set_bit(a, p[i]) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ bn_check_top(a);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,555 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/bn/bn_mont.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * Details about Montgomery multiplication algorithms can be found at
- * http://security.ece.orst.edu/publications.html, e.g.
- * http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/j37acmon.pdf and
- * sections 3.8 and 4.2 in http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/r01rsasw.pdf
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bn_lcl.h"
-
-#define MONT_WORD /* use the faster word-based algorithm */
-
-#ifdef MONT_WORD
-static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
-#endif
-
-int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
- BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *tmp;
- int ret = 0;
-#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && defined(MONT_WORD)
- int num = mont->N.top;
-
- if (num > 1 && a->top == num && b->top == num) {
- if (bn_wexpand(r, num) == NULL)
- return (0);
- if (bn_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) {
- r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg;
- r->top = num;
- bn_correct_top(r);
- return (1);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (tmp == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- bn_check_top(tmp);
- if (a == b) {
- if (!BN_sqr(tmp, a, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!BN_mul(tmp, a, b, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- /* reduce from aRR to aR */
-#ifdef MONT_WORD
- if (!BN_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont))
- goto err;
-#else
- if (!BN_from_montgomery(r, tmp, mont, ctx))
- goto err;
-#endif
- bn_check_top(r);
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#ifdef MONT_WORD
-static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
-{
- BIGNUM *n;
- BN_ULONG *ap, *np, *rp, n0, v, carry;
- int nl, max, i;
-
- n = &(mont->N);
- nl = n->top;
- if (nl == 0) {
- ret->top = 0;
- return (1);
- }
-
- max = (2 * nl); /* carry is stored separately */
- if (bn_wexpand(r, max) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- r->neg ^= n->neg;
- np = n->d;
- rp = r->d;
-
- /* clear the top words of T */
-# if 1
- for (i = r->top; i < max; i++) /* memset? XXX */
- rp[i] = 0;
-# else
- memset(&(rp[r->top]), 0, (max - r->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-# endif
-
- r->top = max;
- n0 = mont->n0[0];
-
-# ifdef BN_COUNT
- fprintf(stderr, "word BN_from_montgomery_word %d * %d\n", nl, nl);
-# endif
- for (carry = 0, i = 0; i < nl; i++, rp++) {
-# ifdef __TANDEM
- {
- long long t1;
- long long t2;
- long long t3;
- t1 = rp[0] * (n0 & 0177777);
- t2 = 037777600000l;
- t2 = n0 & t2;
- t3 = rp[0] & 0177777;
- t2 = (t3 * t2) & BN_MASK2;
- t1 = t1 + t2;
- v = bn_mul_add_words(rp, np, nl, (BN_ULONG)t1);
- }
-# else
- v = bn_mul_add_words(rp, np, nl, (rp[0] * n0) & BN_MASK2);
-# endif
- v = (v + carry + rp[nl]) & BN_MASK2;
- carry |= (v != rp[nl]);
- carry &= (v <= rp[nl]);
- rp[nl] = v;
- }
-
- if (bn_wexpand(ret, nl) == NULL)
- return (0);
- ret->top = nl;
- ret->neg = r->neg;
-
- rp = ret->d;
- ap = &(r->d[nl]);
-
-# define BRANCH_FREE 1
-# if BRANCH_FREE
- {
- BN_ULONG *nrp;
- size_t m;
-
- v = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry;
- /*
- * if subtraction result is real, then trick unconditional memcpy
- * below to perform in-place "refresh" instead of actual copy.
- */
- m = (0 - (size_t)v);
- nrp =
- (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) rp & ~m) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) ap & m));
-
- for (i = 0, nl -= 4; i < nl; i += 4) {
- BN_ULONG t1, t2, t3, t4;
-
- t1 = nrp[i + 0];
- t2 = nrp[i + 1];
- t3 = nrp[i + 2];
- ap[i + 0] = 0;
- t4 = nrp[i + 3];
- ap[i + 1] = 0;
- rp[i + 0] = t1;
- ap[i + 2] = 0;
- rp[i + 1] = t2;
- ap[i + 3] = 0;
- rp[i + 2] = t3;
- rp[i + 3] = t4;
- }
- for (nl += 4; i < nl; i++)
- rp[i] = nrp[i], ap[i] = 0;
- }
-# else
- if (bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry)
- memcpy(rp, ap, nl * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-# endif
- bn_correct_top(r);
- bn_correct_top(ret);
- bn_check_top(ret);
-
- return (1);
-}
-#endif /* MONT_WORD */
-
-int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int retn = 0;
-#ifdef MONT_WORD
- BIGNUM *t;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a))
- retn = BN_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-#else /* !MONT_WORD */
- BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_copy(t1, a))
- goto err;
- BN_mask_bits(t1, mont->ri);
-
- if (!BN_mul(t2, t1, &mont->Ni, ctx))
- goto err;
- BN_mask_bits(t2, mont->ri);
-
- if (!BN_mul(t1, t2, &mont->N, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_add(t2, a, t1))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_rshift(ret, t2, mont->ri))
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(ret, &(mont->N)) >= 0) {
- if (!BN_usub(ret, ret, &(mont->N)))
- goto err;
- }
- retn = 1;
- bn_check_top(ret);
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-#endif /* MONT_WORD */
- return (retn);
-}
-
-BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void)
-{
- BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
-
- if ((ret = (BN_MONT_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_MONT_CTX))) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- BN_MONT_CTX_init(ret);
- ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx)
-{
- ctx->ri = 0;
- BN_init(&(ctx->RR));
- BN_init(&(ctx->N));
- BN_init(&(ctx->Ni));
- ctx->n0[0] = ctx->n0[1] = 0;
- ctx->flags = 0;
-}
-
-void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
-{
- if (mont == NULL)
- return;
-
- BN_free(&(mont->RR));
- BN_free(&(mont->N));
- BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
- if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
- OPENSSL_free(mont);
-}
-
-int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- BIGNUM *Ri, *R;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- R = &(mont->RR); /* grab RR as a temp */
- if (!BN_copy(&(mont->N), mod))
- goto err; /* Set N */
- mont->N.neg = 0;
-
-#ifdef MONT_WORD
- {
- BIGNUM tmod;
- BN_ULONG buf[2];
-
- BN_init(&tmod);
- tmod.d = buf;
- tmod.dmax = 2;
- tmod.neg = 0;
-
- mont->ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2;
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (BN_BITS2<=32)
- /*
- * Only certain BN_BITS2<=32 platforms actually make use of n0[1],
- * and we could use the #else case (with a shorter R value) for the
- * others. However, currently only the assembler files do know which
- * is which.
- */
-
- BN_zero(R);
- if (!(BN_set_bit(R, 2 * BN_BITS2)))
- goto err;
-
- tmod.top = 0;
- if ((buf[0] = mod->d[0]))
- tmod.top = 1;
- if ((buf[1] = mod->top > 1 ? mod->d[1] : 0))
- tmod.top = 2;
-
- if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, 2 * BN_BITS2))
- goto err; /* R*Ri */
- if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) {
- if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1))
- goto err;
- } else { /* if N mod word size == 1 */
-
- if (bn_expand(Ri, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 2) == NULL)
- goto err;
- /* Ri-- (mod double word size) */
- Ri->neg = 0;
- Ri->d[0] = BN_MASK2;
- Ri->d[1] = BN_MASK2;
- Ri->top = 2;
- }
- if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx))
- goto err;
- /*
- * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only couple of least significant words:
- */
- mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0;
- mont->n0[1] = (Ri->top > 1) ? Ri->d[1] : 0;
-# else
- BN_zero(R);
- if (!(BN_set_bit(R, BN_BITS2)))
- goto err; /* R */
-
- buf[0] = mod->d[0]; /* tmod = N mod word size */
- buf[1] = 0;
- tmod.top = buf[0] != 0 ? 1 : 0;
- /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */
- if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, BN_BITS2))
- goto err; /* R*Ri */
- if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) {
- if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1))
- goto err;
- } else { /* if N mod word size == 1 */
-
- if (!BN_set_word(Ri, BN_MASK2))
- goto err; /* Ri-- (mod word size) */
- }
- if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx))
- goto err;
- /*
- * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only least significant word:
- */
- mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0;
- mont->n0[1] = 0;
-# endif
- }
-#else /* !MONT_WORD */
- { /* bignum version */
- mont->ri = BN_num_bits(&mont->N);
- BN_zero(R);
- if (!BN_set_bit(R, mont->ri))
- goto err; /* R = 2^ri */
- /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */
- if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &mont->N, ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, mont->ri))
- goto err; /* R*Ri */
- if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1))
- goto err;
- /*
- * Ni = (R*Ri-1) / N
- */
- if (!BN_div(&(mont->Ni), NULL, Ri, &mont->N, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-#endif
-
- /* setup RR for conversions */
- BN_zero(&(mont->RR));
- if (!BN_set_bit(&(mont->RR), mont->ri * 2))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx))
- goto err;
-
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from)
-{
- if (to == from)
- return (to);
-
- if (!BN_copy(&(to->RR), &(from->RR)))
- return NULL;
- if (!BN_copy(&(to->N), &(from->N)))
- return NULL;
- if (!BN_copy(&(to->Ni), &(from->Ni)))
- return NULL;
- to->ri = from->ri;
- to->n0[0] = from->n0[0];
- to->n0[1] = from->n0[1];
- return (to);
-}
-
-BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock,
- const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(lock);
- ret = *pmont;
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- /*
- * We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in
- * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent
- * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to
- * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work
- * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race
- * (the losers throw away the work they've done).
- */
- ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
- if (!ret)
- return NULL;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx)) {
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
- if (*pmont) {
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
- ret = *pmont;
- } else
- *pmont = ret;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
- return ret;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,558 @@
+/* crypto/bn/bn_mont.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Details about Montgomery multiplication algorithms can be found at
+ * http://security.ece.orst.edu/publications.html, e.g.
+ * http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/j37acmon.pdf and
+ * sections 3.8 and 4.2 in http://security.ece.orst.edu/koc/papers/r01rsasw.pdf
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+#define MONT_WORD /* use the faster word-based algorithm */
+
+#ifdef MONT_WORD
+static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+#endif
+
+int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *tmp;
+ int ret = 0;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && defined(MONT_WORD)
+ int num = mont->N.top;
+
+ if (num > 1 && a->top == num && b->top == num) {
+ if (bn_wexpand(r, num) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ if (bn_mul_mont(r->d, a->d, b->d, mont->N.d, mont->n0, num)) {
+ r->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg;
+ r->top = num;
+ bn_correct_top(r);
+ return (1);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ bn_check_top(tmp);
+ if (a == b) {
+ if (!BN_sqr(tmp, a, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_mul(tmp, a, b, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* reduce from aRR to aR */
+#ifdef MONT_WORD
+ if (!BN_from_montgomery_word(r, tmp, mont))
+ goto err;
+#else
+ if (!BN_from_montgomery(r, tmp, mont, ctx))
+ goto err;
+#endif
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifdef MONT_WORD
+static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
+{
+ BIGNUM *n;
+ BN_ULONG *ap, *np, *rp, n0, v, carry;
+ int nl, max, i;
+
+ n = &(mont->N);
+ nl = n->top;
+ if (nl == 0) {
+ ret->top = 0;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ max = (2 * nl); /* carry is stored separately */
+ if (bn_wexpand(r, max) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ r->neg ^= n->neg;
+ np = n->d;
+ rp = r->d;
+
+ /* clear the top words of T */
+# if 1
+ for (i = r->top; i < max; i++) /* memset? XXX */
+ rp[i] = 0;
+# else
+ memset(&(rp[r->top]), 0, (max - r->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+# endif
+
+ r->top = max;
+ n0 = mont->n0[0];
+
+# ifdef BN_COUNT
+ fprintf(stderr, "word BN_from_montgomery_word %d * %d\n", nl, nl);
+# endif
+ for (carry = 0, i = 0; i < nl; i++, rp++) {
+# ifdef __TANDEM
+ {
+ long long t1;
+ long long t2;
+ long long t3;
+ t1 = rp[0] * (n0 & 0177777);
+ t2 = 037777600000l;
+ t2 = n0 & t2;
+ t3 = rp[0] & 0177777;
+ t2 = (t3 * t2) & BN_MASK2;
+ t1 = t1 + t2;
+ v = bn_mul_add_words(rp, np, nl, (BN_ULONG)t1);
+ }
+# else
+ v = bn_mul_add_words(rp, np, nl, (rp[0] * n0) & BN_MASK2);
+# endif
+ v = (v + carry + rp[nl]) & BN_MASK2;
+ carry |= (v != rp[nl]);
+ carry &= (v <= rp[nl]);
+ rp[nl] = v;
+ }
+
+ if (bn_wexpand(ret, nl) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ ret->top = nl;
+ ret->neg = r->neg;
+
+ rp = ret->d;
+ ap = &(r->d[nl]);
+
+# define BRANCH_FREE 1
+# if BRANCH_FREE
+ {
+ BN_ULONG *nrp;
+ size_t m;
+
+ v = bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry;
+ /*
+ * if subtraction result is real, then trick unconditional memcpy
+ * below to perform in-place "refresh" instead of actual copy.
+ */
+ m = (0 - (size_t)v);
+ nrp =
+ (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT) rp & ~m) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT) ap & m));
+
+ for (i = 0, nl -= 4; i < nl; i += 4) {
+ BN_ULONG t1, t2, t3, t4;
+
+ t1 = nrp[i + 0];
+ t2 = nrp[i + 1];
+ t3 = nrp[i + 2];
+ ap[i + 0] = 0;
+ t4 = nrp[i + 3];
+ ap[i + 1] = 0;
+ rp[i + 0] = t1;
+ ap[i + 2] = 0;
+ rp[i + 1] = t2;
+ ap[i + 3] = 0;
+ rp[i + 2] = t3;
+ rp[i + 3] = t4;
+ }
+ for (nl += 4; i < nl; i++)
+ rp[i] = nrp[i], ap[i] = 0;
+ }
+# else
+ if (bn_sub_words(rp, ap, np, nl) - carry)
+ memcpy(rp, ap, nl * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+# endif
+ bn_correct_top(r);
+ bn_correct_top(ret);
+ bn_check_top(ret);
+
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif /* MONT_WORD */
+
+int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int retn = 0;
+#ifdef MONT_WORD
+ BIGNUM *t;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) && BN_copy(t, a))
+ retn = BN_from_montgomery_word(ret, t, mont);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+#else /* !MONT_WORD */
+ BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_copy(t1, a))
+ goto err;
+ BN_mask_bits(t1, mont->ri);
+
+ if (!BN_mul(t2, t1, &mont->Ni, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ BN_mask_bits(t2, mont->ri);
+
+ if (!BN_mul(t1, t2, &mont->N, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(t2, a, t1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rshift(ret, t2, mont->ri))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(ret, &(mont->N)) >= 0) {
+ if (!BN_usub(ret, ret, &(mont->N)))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ retn = 1;
+ bn_check_top(ret);
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+#endif /* MONT_WORD */
+ return (retn);
+}
+
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void)
+{
+ BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = (BN_MONT_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_MONT_CTX))) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ BN_MONT_CTX_init(ret);
+ ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->ri = 0;
+ BN_init(&(ctx->RR));
+ BN_init(&(ctx->N));
+ BN_init(&(ctx->Ni));
+ ctx->n0[0] = ctx->n0[1] = 0;
+ ctx->flags = 0;
+}
+
+void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
+{
+ if (mont == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
+ BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
+ BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
+ if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
+ OPENSSL_free(mont);
+}
+
+int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *Ri, *R;
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(mod))
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ R = &(mont->RR); /* grab RR as a temp */
+ if (!BN_copy(&(mont->N), mod))
+ goto err; /* Set N */
+ mont->N.neg = 0;
+
+#ifdef MONT_WORD
+ {
+ BIGNUM tmod;
+ BN_ULONG buf[2];
+
+ BN_init(&tmod);
+ tmod.d = buf;
+ tmod.dmax = 2;
+ tmod.neg = 0;
+
+ mont->ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2;
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (BN_BITS2<=32)
+ /*
+ * Only certain BN_BITS2<=32 platforms actually make use of n0[1],
+ * and we could use the #else case (with a shorter R value) for the
+ * others. However, currently only the assembler files do know which
+ * is which.
+ */
+
+ BN_zero(R);
+ if (!(BN_set_bit(R, 2 * BN_BITS2)))
+ goto err;
+
+ tmod.top = 0;
+ if ((buf[0] = mod->d[0]))
+ tmod.top = 1;
+ if ((buf[1] = mod->top > 1 ? mod->d[1] : 0))
+ tmod.top = 2;
+
+ if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, 2 * BN_BITS2))
+ goto err; /* R*Ri */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) {
+ if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1))
+ goto err;
+ } else { /* if N mod word size == 1 */
+
+ if (bn_expand(Ri, (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 2) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* Ri-- (mod double word size) */
+ Ri->neg = 0;
+ Ri->d[0] = BN_MASK2;
+ Ri->d[1] = BN_MASK2;
+ Ri->top = 2;
+ }
+ if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only couple of least significant words:
+ */
+ mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0;
+ mont->n0[1] = (Ri->top > 1) ? Ri->d[1] : 0;
+# else
+ BN_zero(R);
+ if (!(BN_set_bit(R, BN_BITS2)))
+ goto err; /* R */
+
+ buf[0] = mod->d[0]; /* tmod = N mod word size */
+ buf[1] = 0;
+ tmod.top = buf[0] != 0 ? 1 : 0;
+ /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */
+ if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, BN_BITS2))
+ goto err; /* R*Ri */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) {
+ if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1))
+ goto err;
+ } else { /* if N mod word size == 1 */
+
+ if (!BN_set_word(Ri, BN_MASK2))
+ goto err; /* Ri-- (mod word size) */
+ }
+ if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri, &tmod, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * Ni = (R*Ri-1)/N, keep only least significant word:
+ */
+ mont->n0[0] = (Ri->top > 0) ? Ri->d[0] : 0;
+ mont->n0[1] = 0;
+# endif
+ }
+#else /* !MONT_WORD */
+ { /* bignum version */
+ mont->ri = BN_num_bits(&mont->N);
+ BN_zero(R);
+ if (!BN_set_bit(R, mont->ri))
+ goto err; /* R = 2^ri */
+ /* Ri = R^-1 mod N */
+ if ((BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &mont->N, ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, mont->ri))
+ goto err; /* R*Ri */
+ if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * Ni = (R*Ri-1) / N
+ */
+ if (!BN_div(&(mont->Ni), NULL, Ri, &mont->N, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* setup RR for conversions */
+ BN_zero(&(mont->RR));
+ if (!BN_set_bit(&(mont->RR), mont->ri * 2))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from)
+{
+ if (to == from)
+ return (to);
+
+ if (!BN_copy(&(to->RR), &(from->RR)))
+ return NULL;
+ if (!BN_copy(&(to->N), &(from->N)))
+ return NULL;
+ if (!BN_copy(&(to->Ni), &(from->Ni)))
+ return NULL;
+ to->ri = from->ri;
+ to->n0[0] = from->n0[0];
+ to->n0[1] = from->n0[1];
+ return (to);
+}
+
+BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock,
+ const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(lock);
+ ret = *pmont;
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in
+ * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent
+ * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to
+ * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work
+ * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race
+ * (the losers throw away the work they've done).
+ */
+ ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+ if (!ret)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx)) {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
+ if (*pmont) {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+ ret = *pmont;
+ } else
+ *pmont = ret;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
+ return ret;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/bn/bn_recp.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bn_lcl.h"
-
-void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp)
-{
- BN_init(&(recp->N));
- BN_init(&(recp->Nr));
- recp->num_bits = 0;
- recp->flags = 0;
-}
-
-BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void)
-{
- BN_RECP_CTX *ret;
-
- if ((ret = (BN_RECP_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_RECP_CTX))) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- BN_RECP_CTX_init(ret);
- ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp)
-{
- if (recp == NULL)
- return;
-
- BN_free(&(recp->N));
- BN_free(&(recp->Nr));
- if (recp->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
- OPENSSL_free(recp);
-}
-
-int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (!BN_copy(&(recp->N), d))
- return 0;
- BN_zero(&(recp->Nr));
- recp->num_bits = BN_num_bits(d);
- recp->shift = 0;
- return (1);
-}
-
-int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
- BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- BIGNUM *a;
- const BIGNUM *ca;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (y != NULL) {
- if (x == y) {
- if (!BN_sqr(a, x, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!BN_mul(a, x, y, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- ca = a;
- } else
- ca = x; /* Just do the mod */
-
- ret = BN_div_recp(NULL, r, ca, recp, ctx);
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- bn_check_top(r);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
- BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int i, j, ret = 0;
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *d, *r;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (dv != NULL)
- d = dv;
- else
- d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (rem != NULL)
- r = rem;
- else
- r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (a == NULL || b == NULL || d == NULL || r == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) {
- BN_zero(d);
- if (!BN_copy(r, m))
- return 0;
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return (1);
- }
-
- /*
- * We want the remainder Given input of ABCDEF / ab we need multiply
- * ABCDEF by 3 digests of the reciprocal of ab
- */
-
- /* i := max(BN_num_bits(m), 2*BN_num_bits(N)) */
- i = BN_num_bits(m);
- j = recp->num_bits << 1;
- if (j > i)
- i = j;
-
- /* Nr := round(2^i / N) */
- if (i != recp->shift)
- recp->shift = BN_reciprocal(&(recp->Nr), &(recp->N), i, ctx);
- /* BN_reciprocal could have returned -1 for an error */
- if (recp->shift == -1)
- goto err;
-
- /*-
- * d := |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * recp->Nr / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))|
- * = |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * round(2^i / N) / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))|
- * <= |(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * (2^i / N) * (2^BN_num_bits(N) / 2^i)|
- * = |m/N|
- */
- if (!BN_rshift(a, m, recp->num_bits))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(b, a, &(recp->Nr), ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_rshift(d, b, i - recp->num_bits))
- goto err;
- d->neg = 0;
-
- if (!BN_mul(b, &(recp->N), d, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_usub(r, m, b))
- goto err;
- r->neg = 0;
-
-#if 1
- j = 0;
- while (BN_ucmp(r, &(recp->N)) >= 0) {
- if (j++ > 2) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV_RECP, BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_usub(r, r, &(recp->N)))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_add_word(d, 1))
- goto err;
- }
-#endif
-
- r->neg = BN_is_zero(r) ? 0 : m->neg;
- d->neg = m->neg ^ recp->N.neg;
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- bn_check_top(dv);
- bn_check_top(rem);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * len is the expected size of the result We actually calculate with an extra
- * word of precision, so we can do faster division if the remainder is not
- * required.
- */
-/* r := 2^len / m */
-int BN_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, int len, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = -1;
- BIGNUM *t;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_set_bit(t, len))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_div(r, NULL, t, m, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- ret = len;
- err:
- bn_check_top(r);
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return (ret);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/* crypto/bn/bn_recp.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_lcl.h"
+
+void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp)
+{
+ BN_init(&(recp->N));
+ BN_init(&(recp->Nr));
+ recp->num_bits = 0;
+ recp->flags = 0;
+}
+
+BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void)
+{
+ BN_RECP_CTX *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = (BN_RECP_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_RECP_CTX))) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ BN_RECP_CTX_init(ret);
+ ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp)
+{
+ if (recp == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ BN_free(&(recp->N));
+ BN_free(&(recp->Nr));
+ if (recp->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
+ OPENSSL_free(recp);
+}
+
+int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (!BN_copy(&(recp->N), d))
+ return 0;
+ BN_zero(&(recp->Nr));
+ recp->num_bits = BN_num_bits(d);
+ recp->shift = 0;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+ BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *a;
+ const BIGNUM *ca;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (y != NULL) {
+ if (x == y) {
+ if (!BN_sqr(a, x, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_mul(a, x, y, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ca = a;
+ } else
+ ca = x; /* Just do the mod */
+
+ ret = BN_div_recp(NULL, r, ca, recp, ctx);
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
+ BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i, j, ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *d, *r;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (dv != NULL)
+ d = dv;
+ else
+ d = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (rem != NULL)
+ r = rem;
+ else
+ r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL || d == NULL || r == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) {
+ BN_zero(d);
+ if (!BN_copy(r, m)) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We want the remainder Given input of ABCDEF / ab we need multiply
+ * ABCDEF by 3 digests of the reciprocal of ab
+ */
+
+ /* i := max(BN_num_bits(m), 2*BN_num_bits(N)) */
+ i = BN_num_bits(m);
+ j = recp->num_bits << 1;
+ if (j > i)
+ i = j;
+
+ /* Nr := round(2^i / N) */
+ if (i != recp->shift)
+ recp->shift = BN_reciprocal(&(recp->Nr), &(recp->N), i, ctx);
+ /* BN_reciprocal could have returned -1 for an error */
+ if (recp->shift == -1)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*-
+ * d := |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * recp->Nr / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))|
+ * = |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * round(2^i / N) / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))|
+ * <= |(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * (2^i / N) * (2^BN_num_bits(N) / 2^i)|
+ * = |m/N|
+ */
+ if (!BN_rshift(a, m, recp->num_bits))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(b, a, &(recp->Nr), ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rshift(d, b, i - recp->num_bits))
+ goto err;
+ d->neg = 0;
+
+ if (!BN_mul(b, &(recp->N), d, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_usub(r, m, b))
+ goto err;
+ r->neg = 0;
+
+#if 1
+ j = 0;
+ while (BN_ucmp(r, &(recp->N)) >= 0) {
+ if (j++ > 2) {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV_RECP, BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_usub(r, r, &(recp->N)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add_word(d, 1))
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ r->neg = BN_is_zero(r) ? 0 : m->neg;
+ d->neg = m->neg ^ recp->N.neg;
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ bn_check_top(dv);
+ bn_check_top(rem);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * len is the expected size of the result We actually calculate with an extra
+ * word of precision, so we can do faster division if the remainder is not
+ * required.
+ */
+/* r := 2^len / m */
+int BN_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, int len, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ BIGNUM *t;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((t = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_set_bit(t, len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_div(r, NULL, t, m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = len;
+ err:
+ bn_check_top(r);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return (ret);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
-/* bn_x931p.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-/* X9.31 routines for prime derivation */
-
-/*
- * X9.31 prime derivation. This is used to generate the primes pi (p1, p2,
- * q1, q2) from a parameter Xpi by checking successive odd integers.
- */
-
-static int bn_x931_derive_pi(BIGNUM *pi, const BIGNUM *Xpi, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_GENCB *cb)
-{
- int i = 0;
- if (!BN_copy(pi, Xpi))
- return 0;
- if (!BN_is_odd(pi) && !BN_add_word(pi, 1))
- return 0;
- for (;;) {
- i++;
- BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i);
- /* NB 27 MR is specificed in X9.31 */
- if (BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(pi, 27, ctx, 1, cb))
- break;
- if (!BN_add_word(pi, 2))
- return 0;
- }
- BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, i);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * This is the main X9.31 prime derivation function. From parameters Xp1, Xp2
- * and Xp derive the prime p. If the parameters p1 or p2 are not NULL they
- * will be returned too: this is needed for testing.
- */
-
-int BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2,
- const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xp1,
- const BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_GENCB *cb)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- BIGNUM *t, *p1p2, *pm1;
-
- /* Only even e supported */
- if (!BN_is_odd(e))
- return 0;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if (!p1)
- p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- if (!p2)
- p2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- p1p2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- pm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- if (!bn_x931_derive_pi(p1, Xp1, ctx, cb))
- goto err;
-
- if (!bn_x931_derive_pi(p2, Xp2, ctx, cb))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_mul(p1p2, p1, p2, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* First set p to value of Rp */
-
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(p, p2, p1, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_mul(p, p, p2, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(t, p1, p2, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_mul(t, t, p1, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_sub(p, p, t))
- goto err;
-
- if (p->neg && !BN_add(p, p, p1p2))
- goto err;
-
- /* p now equals Rp */
-
- if (!BN_mod_sub(p, p, Xp, p1p2, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_add(p, p, Xp))
- goto err;
-
- /* p now equals Yp0 */
-
- for (;;) {
- int i = 1;
- BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i++);
- if (!BN_copy(pm1, p))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_sub_word(pm1, 1))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_gcd(t, pm1, e, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_one(t)
- /*
- * X9.31 specifies 8 MR and 1 Lucas test or any prime test
- * offering similar or better guarantees 50 MR is considerably
- * better.
- */
- && BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, 50, ctx, 1, cb))
- break;
- if (!BN_add(p, p, p1p2))
- goto err;
- }
-
- BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0);
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
-
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate pair of paramters Xp, Xq for X9.31 prime generation. Note: nbits
- * paramter is sum of number of bits in both.
- */
-
-int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *t;
- int i;
- /*
- * Number of bits for each prime is of the form 512+128s for s = 0, 1,
- * ...
- */
- if ((nbits < 1024) || (nbits & 0xff))
- return 0;
- nbits >>= 1;
- /*
- * The random value Xp must be between sqrt(2) * 2^(nbits-1) and 2^nbits
- * - 1. By setting the top two bits we ensure that the lower bound is
- * exceeded.
- */
- if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, 1, 0))
- return 0;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
- if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
- return 0;
- /* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
- BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
- if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
- break;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-
- if (i < 1000)
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate primes using X9.31 algorithm. Of the values p, p1, p2, Xp1 and
- * Xp2 only 'p' needs to be non-NULL. If any of the others are not NULL the
- * relevant parameter will be stored in it. Due to the fact that |Xp - Xq| >
- * 2^(nbits - 100) must be satisfied Xp and Xq are generated using the
- * previous function and supplied as input.
- */
-
-int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2,
- BIGNUM *Xp1, BIGNUM *Xp2,
- const BIGNUM *Xp,
- const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- if (!Xp1)
- Xp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (!Xp2)
- Xp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- if (!BN_rand(Xp1, 101, 0, 0))
- goto error;
- if (!BN_rand(Xp2, 101, 0, 0))
- goto error;
- if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(p, p1, p2, Xp, Xp1, Xp2, e, ctx, cb))
- goto error;
-
- ret = 1;
-
- error:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-
- return ret;
-
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+/* bn_x931p.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/* X9.31 routines for prime derivation */
+
+/*
+ * X9.31 prime derivation. This is used to generate the primes pi (p1, p2,
+ * q1, q2) from a parameter Xpi by checking successive odd integers.
+ */
+
+static int bn_x931_derive_pi(BIGNUM *pi, const BIGNUM *Xpi, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ if (!BN_copy(pi, Xpi))
+ return 0;
+ if (!BN_is_odd(pi) && !BN_add_word(pi, 1))
+ return 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ i++;
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i);
+ /* NB 27 MR is specificed in X9.31 */
+ if (BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(pi, 27, ctx, 1, cb))
+ break;
+ if (!BN_add_word(pi, 2))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, i);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the main X9.31 prime derivation function. From parameters Xp1, Xp2
+ * and Xp derive the prime p. If the parameters p1 or p2 are not NULL they
+ * will be returned too: this is needed for testing.
+ */
+
+int BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2,
+ const BIGNUM *Xp, const BIGNUM *Xp1,
+ const BIGNUM *Xp2, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ BIGNUM *t, *p1p2, *pm1;
+
+ /* Only even e supported */
+ if (!BN_is_odd(e))
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if (!p1)
+ p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ if (!p2)
+ p2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ p1p2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ pm1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ if (!bn_x931_derive_pi(p1, Xp1, ctx, cb))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!bn_x931_derive_pi(p2, Xp2, ctx, cb))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mul(p1p2, p1, p2, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* First set p to value of Rp */
+
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(p, p2, p1, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mul(p, p, p2, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(t, p1, p2, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mul(t, t, p1, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_sub(p, p, t))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (p->neg && !BN_add(p, p, p1p2))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* p now equals Rp */
+
+ if (!BN_mod_sub(p, p, Xp, p1p2, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_add(p, p, Xp))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* p now equals Yp0 */
+
+ for (;;) {
+ int i = 1;
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i++);
+ if (!BN_copy(pm1, p))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub_word(pm1, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_gcd(t, pm1, e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_one(t)
+ /*
+ * X9.31 specifies 8 MR and 1 Lucas test or any prime test
+ * offering similar or better guarantees 50 MR is considerably
+ * better.
+ */
+ && BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, 50, ctx, 1, cb))
+ break;
+ if (!BN_add(p, p, p1p2))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0);
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate pair of paramters Xp, Xq for X9.31 prime generation. Note: nbits
+ * paramter is sum of number of bits in both.
+ */
+
+int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *t;
+ int i;
+ /*
+ * Number of bits for each prime is of the form 512+128s for s = 0, 1,
+ * ...
+ */
+ if ((nbits < 1024) || (nbits & 0xff))
+ return 0;
+ nbits >>= 1;
+ /*
+ * The random value Xp must be between sqrt(2) * 2^(nbits-1) and 2^nbits
+ * - 1. By setting the top two bits we ensure that the lower bound is
+ * exceeded.
+ */
+ if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, 1, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
+ if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
+ goto err;
+ /* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
+ BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
+ if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+
+ if (i < 1000)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate primes using X9.31 algorithm. Of the values p, p1, p2, Xp1 and
+ * Xp2 only 'p' needs to be non-NULL. If any of the others are not NULL the
+ * relevant parameter will be stored in it. Due to the fact that |Xp - Xq| >
+ * 2^(nbits - 100) must be satisfied Xp and Xq are generated using the
+ * previous function and supplied as input.
+ */
+
+int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2,
+ BIGNUM *Xp1, BIGNUM *Xp2,
+ const BIGNUM *Xp,
+ const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if (!Xp1)
+ Xp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (!Xp2)
+ Xp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ if (!BN_rand(Xp1, 101, 0, 0))
+ goto error;
+ if (!BN_rand(Xp2, 101, 0, 0))
+ goto error;
+ if (!BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(p, p1, p2, Xp, Xp1, Xp2, e, ctx, cb))
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ error:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bntest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bntest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bntest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2085 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/bn/bntest.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the Eric Young open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * The binary polynomial arithmetic software is originally written by
- * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * Until the key-gen callbacks are modified to use newer prototypes, we allow
- * deprecated functions for openssl-internal code
- */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-# undef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-#endif
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-const int num0 = 100; /* number of tests */
-const int num1 = 50; /* additional tests for some functions */
-const int num2 = 5; /* number of tests for slow functions */
-
-int test_add(BIO *bp);
-int test_sub(BIO *bp);
-int test_lshift1(BIO *bp);
-int test_lshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *a_);
-int test_rshift1(BIO *bp);
-int test_rshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_div_word(BIO *bp);
-int test_div_recp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_mul(BIO *bp);
-int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_mod(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_gf2m_add(BIO *bp);
-int test_gf2m_mod(BIO *bp);
-int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_gf2m_mod_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_gf2m_mod_inv(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_gf2m_mod_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_gf2m_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_kron(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int rand_neg(void);
-static int results = 0;
-
-static unsigned char lst[] =
- "\xC6\x4F\x43\x04\x2A\xEA\xCA\x6E\x58\x36\x80\x5B\xE8\xC9"
- "\x9B\x04\x5D\x48\x36\xC2\xFD\x16\xC9\x64\xF0";
-
-static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
-
-static void message(BIO *out, char *m)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "test %s\n", m);
- BIO_puts(out, "print \"test ");
- BIO_puts(out, m);
- BIO_puts(out, "\\n\"\n");
-}
-
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-{
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- BIO *out;
- char *outfile = NULL;
-
- results = 0;
-
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
-
- argc--;
- argv++;
- while (argc >= 1) {
- if (strcmp(*argv, "-results") == 0)
- results = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- break;
- outfile = *(++argv);
- }
- argc--;
- argv++;
- }
-
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL)
- EXIT(1);
-
- out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
- if (out == NULL)
- EXIT(1);
- if (outfile == NULL) {
- BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- } else {
- if (!BIO_write_filename(out, outfile)) {
- perror(outfile);
- EXIT(1);
- }
- }
-
- if (!results)
- BIO_puts(out, "obase=16\nibase=16\n");
-
- message(out, "BN_add");
- if (!test_add(out))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_sub");
- if (!test_sub(out))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_lshift1");
- if (!test_lshift1(out))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_lshift (fixed)");
- if (!test_lshift(out, ctx, BN_bin2bn(lst, sizeof(lst) - 1, NULL)))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_lshift");
- if (!test_lshift(out, ctx, NULL))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_rshift1");
- if (!test_rshift1(out))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_rshift");
- if (!test_rshift(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_sqr");
- if (!test_sqr(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_mul");
- if (!test_mul(out))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_div");
- if (!test_div(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_div_word");
- if (!test_div_word(out))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_div_recp");
- if (!test_div_recp(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_mod");
- if (!test_mod(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_mod_mul");
- if (!test_mod_mul(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_mont");
- if (!test_mont(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_mod_exp");
- if (!test_mod_exp(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime");
- if (!test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!test_mod_exp_mont5(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_exp");
- if (!test_exp(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_kronecker");
- if (!test_kron(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_mod_sqrt");
- if (!test_sqrt(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- message(out, "BN_GF2m_add");
- if (!test_gf2m_add(out))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod");
- if (!test_gf2m_mod(out))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_mul");
- if (!test_gf2m_mod_mul(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr");
- if (!test_gf2m_mod_sqr(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_inv");
- if (!test_gf2m_mod_inv(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_div");
- if (!test_gf2m_mod_div(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_exp");
- if (!test_gf2m_mod_exp(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt");
- if (!test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-
- message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad");
- if (!test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(out, ctx))
- goto err;
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
-#endif
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BIO_free(out);
-
- EXIT(0);
- err:
- BIO_puts(out, "1\n"); /* make sure the Perl script fed by bc
- * notices the failure, see test_bn in
- * test/Makefile.ssl */
- (void)BIO_flush(out);
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- EXIT(1);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_add(BIO *bp)
-{
- BIGNUM a, b, c;
- int i;
-
- BN_init(&a);
- BN_init(&b);
- BN_init(&c);
-
- BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, 0, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(&b, 450 + i, 0, 0);
- a.neg = rand_neg();
- b.neg = rand_neg();
- BN_add(&c, &a, &b);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " + ");
- BN_print(bp, &b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, &c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- a.neg = !a.neg;
- b.neg = !b.neg;
- BN_add(&c, &c, &b);
- BN_add(&c, &c, &a);
- if (!BN_is_zero(&c)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Add test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(&a);
- BN_free(&b);
- BN_free(&c);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_sub(BIO *bp)
-{
- BIGNUM a, b, c;
- int i;
-
- BN_init(&a);
- BN_init(&b);
- BN_init(&c);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
- if (i < num1) {
- BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, 0, 0);
- BN_copy(&b, &a);
- if (BN_set_bit(&a, i) == 0)
- return (0);
- BN_add_word(&b, i);
- } else {
- BN_bntest_rand(&b, 400 + i - num1, 0, 0);
- a.neg = rand_neg();
- b.neg = rand_neg();
- }
- BN_sub(&c, &a, &b);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- BN_print(bp, &b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, &c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_add(&c, &c, &b);
- BN_sub(&c, &c, &a);
- if (!BN_is_zero(&c)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Subtract test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(&a);
- BN_free(&b);
- BN_free(&c);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM a, b, c, d, e;
- int i;
-
- BN_init(&a);
- BN_init(&b);
- BN_init(&c);
- BN_init(&d);
- BN_init(&e);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
- if (i < num1) {
- BN_bntest_rand(&a, 400, 0, 0);
- BN_copy(&b, &a);
- BN_lshift(&a, &a, i);
- BN_add_word(&a, i);
- } else
- BN_bntest_rand(&b, 50 + 3 * (i - num1), 0, 0);
- a.neg = rand_neg();
- b.neg = rand_neg();
- BN_div(&d, &c, &a, &b, ctx);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
- BN_print(bp, &b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, &d);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
-
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, &b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, &c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_mul(&e, &d, &b, ctx);
- BN_add(&d, &e, &c);
- BN_sub(&d, &d, &a);
- if (!BN_is_zero(&d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Division test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(&a);
- BN_free(&b);
- BN_free(&c);
- BN_free(&d);
- BN_free(&e);
- return (1);
-}
-
-static void print_word(BIO *bp, BN_ULONG w)
-{
-#ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
- if (sizeof(w) > sizeof(unsigned long)) {
- unsigned long h = (unsigned long)(w >> 32), l = (unsigned long)(w);
-
- if (h)
- BIO_printf(bp, "%lX%08lX", h, l);
- else
- BIO_printf(bp, "%lX", l);
- return;
- }
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bp, BN_HEX_FMT1, w);
-}
-
-int test_div_word(BIO *bp)
-{
- BIGNUM a, b;
- BN_ULONG r, s;
- int i;
-
- BN_init(&a);
- BN_init(&b);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- do {
- BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, -1, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(&b, BN_BITS2, -1, 0);
- s = b.d[0];
- } while (!s);
-
- BN_copy(&b, &a);
- r = BN_div_word(&b, s);
-
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
- print_word(bp, s);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, &b);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
-
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- print_word(bp, s);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- print_word(bp, r);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_mul_word(&b, s);
- BN_add_word(&b, r);
- BN_sub(&b, &a, &b);
- if (!BN_is_zero(&b)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Division (word) test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(&a);
- BN_free(&b);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_div_recp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM a, b, c, d, e;
- BN_RECP_CTX recp;
- int i;
-
- BN_RECP_CTX_init(&recp);
- BN_init(&a);
- BN_init(&b);
- BN_init(&c);
- BN_init(&d);
- BN_init(&e);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
- if (i < num1) {
- BN_bntest_rand(&a, 400, 0, 0);
- BN_copy(&b, &a);
- BN_lshift(&a, &a, i);
- BN_add_word(&a, i);
- } else
- BN_bntest_rand(&b, 50 + 3 * (i - num1), 0, 0);
- a.neg = rand_neg();
- b.neg = rand_neg();
- BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, &b, ctx);
- BN_div_recp(&d, &c, &a, &recp, ctx);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
- BN_print(bp, &b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, &d);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
-
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, &b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, &c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_mul(&e, &d, &b, ctx);
- BN_add(&d, &e, &c);
- BN_sub(&d, &d, &a);
- if (!BN_is_zero(&d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Reciprocal division test failed!\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "a=");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, &a);
- fprintf(stderr, "\nb=");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, &b);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(&a);
- BN_free(&b);
- BN_free(&c);
- BN_free(&d);
- BN_free(&e);
- BN_RECP_CTX_free(&recp);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_mul(BIO *bp)
-{
- BIGNUM a, b, c, d, e;
- int i;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
-
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL)
- EXIT(1);
-
- BN_init(&a);
- BN_init(&b);
- BN_init(&c);
- BN_init(&d);
- BN_init(&e);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
- if (i <= num1) {
- BN_bntest_rand(&a, 100, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(&b, 100, 0, 0);
- } else
- BN_bntest_rand(&b, i - num1, 0, 0);
- a.neg = rand_neg();
- b.neg = rand_neg();
- BN_mul(&c, &a, &b, ctx);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
- BN_print(bp, &b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, &c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_div(&d, &e, &c, &a, ctx);
- BN_sub(&d, &d, &b);
- if (!BN_is_zero(&d) || !BN_is_zero(&e)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Multiplication test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(&a);
- BN_free(&b);
- BN_free(&c);
- BN_free(&d);
- BN_free(&e);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *c, *d, *e;
- int i, ret = 0;
-
- a = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
- if (a == NULL || c == NULL || d == NULL || e == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 40 + i * 10, 0, 0);
- a->neg = rand_neg();
- BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_div(d, e, c, a, ctx);
- BN_sub(d, d, a);
- if (!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
- BN_hex2bn(&a,
- "80000000000000008000000000000001"
- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0000000000000000");
- BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
- if (BN_cmp(c, d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
- "different results!\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
- BN_hex2bn(&a,
- "80000000000000000000000080000001"
- "FFFFFFFE000000000000000000000000");
- BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
- if (BN_cmp(c, d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
- "different results!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (a != NULL)
- BN_free(a);
- if (c != NULL)
- BN_free(c);
- if (d != NULL)
- BN_free(d);
- if (e != NULL)
- BN_free(e);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM a, b, c, d, A, B;
- BIGNUM n;
- int i;
- BN_MONT_CTX *mont;
-
- BN_init(&a);
- BN_init(&b);
- BN_init(&c);
- BN_init(&d);
- BN_init(&A);
- BN_init(&B);
- BN_init(&n);
-
- mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
- if (mont == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- BN_bntest_rand(&a, 100, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(&b, 100, 0, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
- int bits = (200 * (i + 1)) / num2;
-
- if (bits == 0)
- continue;
- BN_bntest_rand(&n, bits, 0, 1);
- BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx);
-
- BN_nnmod(&a, &a, &n, ctx);
- BN_nnmod(&b, &b, &n, ctx);
-
- BN_to_montgomery(&A, &a, mont, ctx);
- BN_to_montgomery(&B, &b, mont, ctx);
-
- BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&c, &A, &B, mont, ctx);
- BN_from_montgomery(&A, &c, mont, ctx);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
-#ifdef undef
- fprintf(stderr, "%d * %d %% %d\n",
- BN_num_bits(&a),
- BN_num_bits(&b), BN_num_bits(mont->N));
-#endif
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
- BN_print(bp, &b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, &(mont->N));
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, &A);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_mod_mul(&d, &a, &b, &n, ctx);
- BN_sub(&d, &d, &A);
- if (!BN_is_zero(&d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Montgomery multiplication test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
- BN_free(&a);
- BN_free(&b);
- BN_free(&c);
- BN_free(&d);
- BN_free(&A);
- BN_free(&B);
- BN_free(&n);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_mod(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
- int i;
-
- a = BN_new();
- b = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
-
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(b, 450 + i * 10, 0, 0);
- a->neg = rand_neg();
- b->neg = rand_neg();
- BN_mod(c, a, b, ctx);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_div(d, e, a, b, ctx);
- BN_sub(e, e, c);
- if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Modulo test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
- int i, j;
-
- a = BN_new();
- b = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
-
- for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 475 + i * 10, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(b, 425 + i * 11, 0, 0);
- a->neg = rand_neg();
- b->neg = rand_neg();
- if (!BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
- unsigned long l;
-
- while ((l = ERR_get_error()))
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR:%s\n", ERR_error_string(l, NULL));
- EXIT(1);
- }
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
- BN_print(bp, b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- if ((a->neg ^ b->neg) && !BN_is_zero(e)) {
- /*
- * If (a*b) % c is negative, c must be added in order
- * to obtain the normalized remainder (new with
- * OpenSSL 0.9.7, previous versions of BN_mod_mul
- * could generate negative results)
- */
- BIO_puts(bp, " + ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- }
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, e);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_mul(d, a, b, ctx);
- BN_sub(d, d, e);
- BN_div(a, b, d, c, ctx);
- if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Modulo multiply test failed!\n");
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
- int i;
-
- a = BN_new();
- b = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
-
- BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
- for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
-
- if (!BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx))
- return (0);
-
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
- BN_print(bp, b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, d);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
- BN_sub(e, e, d);
- BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
- if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
- int i;
-
- a = BN_new();
- b = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
-
- BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
- for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
-
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL))
- return (00);
-
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
- BN_print(bp, b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, d);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
- BN_sub(e, e, d);
- BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
- if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- return (1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Test constant-time modular exponentiation with 1024-bit inputs, which on
- * x86_64 cause a different code branch to be taken.
- */
-int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *p, *m, *d, *e;
-
- BN_MONT_CTX *mont;
-
- a = BN_new();
- p = BN_new();
- m = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
-
- mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
-
- BN_bntest_rand(m, 1024, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
- /* Zero exponent */
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
- BN_zero(p);
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, p, m, ctx, NULL))
- return 0;
- if (!BN_is_one(d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- /* Zero input */
- BN_bntest_rand(p, 1024, 0, 0);
- BN_zero(a);
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, p, m, ctx, NULL))
- return 0;
- if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Craft an input whose Montgomery representation is 1, i.e., shorter
- * than the modulus m, in order to test the const time precomputation
- * scattering/gathering.
- */
- BN_one(a);
- BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx);
- if (!BN_from_montgomery(e, a, mont, ctx))
- return 0;
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, e, p, m, ctx, NULL))
- return 0;
- if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(a, e, p, m, ctx))
- return 0;
- if (BN_cmp(a, d) != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- /* Finally, some regular test vectors. */
- BN_bntest_rand(e, 1024, 0, 0);
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, e, p, m, ctx, NULL))
- return 0;
- if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(a, e, p, m, ctx))
- return 0;
- if (BN_cmp(a, d) != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(p);
- BN_free(m);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *d, *e, *one;
- int i;
-
- a = BN_new();
- b = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
- one = BN_new();
- BN_one(one);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
-
- if (BN_exp(d, a, b, ctx) <= 0)
- return (0);
-
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
- BN_print(bp, b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, d);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_one(e);
- for (; !BN_is_zero(b); BN_sub(b, b, one))
- BN_mul(e, e, a, ctx);
- BN_sub(e, e, d);
- if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Exponentiation test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- BN_free(one);
- return (1);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-int test_gf2m_add(BIO *bp)
-{
- BIGNUM a, b, c;
- int i, ret = 0;
-
- BN_init(&a);
- BN_init(&b);
- BN_init(&c);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_rand(&a, 512, 0, 0);
- BN_copy(&b, BN_value_one());
- a.neg = rand_neg();
- b.neg = rand_neg();
- BN_GF2m_add(&c, &a, &b);
-# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
- * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, &a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
- BN_print(bp, &b);
- BIO_puts(bp, " = ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, &c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
-# endif
- /* Test that two added values have the correct parity. */
- if ((BN_is_odd(&a) && BN_is_odd(&c))
- || (!BN_is_odd(&a) && !BN_is_odd(&c))) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) addition test (a) failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- BN_GF2m_add(&c, &c, &c);
- /* Test that c + c = 0. */
- if (!BN_is_zero(&c)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) addition test (b) failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(&a);
- BN_free(&b);
- BN_free(&c);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_gf2m_mod(BIO *bp)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e;
- int i, j, ret = 0;
- int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
- int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
-
- a = BN_new();
- b[0] = BN_new();
- b[1] = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
-
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- BN_GF2m_mod(c, a, b[j]);
-# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
- * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, b[j]);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- }
-# endif
- BN_GF2m_add(d, a, c);
- BN_GF2m_mod(e, d, b[j]);
- /* Test that a + (a mod p) mod p == 0. */
- if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modulo test failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b[0]);
- BN_free(b[1]);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f, *g, *h;
- int i, j, ret = 0;
- int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
- int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
-
- a = BN_new();
- b[0] = BN_new();
- b[1] = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
- f = BN_new();
- g = BN_new();
- h = BN_new();
-
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(d, 1024, 0, 0);
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, a, c, b[j], ctx);
-# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
- * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, b[j]);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- BN_print(bp, e);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- }
-# endif
- BN_GF2m_add(f, a, d);
- BN_GF2m_mod_mul(g, f, c, b[j], ctx);
- BN_GF2m_mod_mul(h, d, c, b[j], ctx);
- BN_GF2m_add(f, e, g);
- BN_GF2m_add(f, f, h);
- /* Test that (a+d)*c = a*c + d*c. */
- if (!BN_is_zero(f)) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "GF(2^m) modular multiplication test failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b[0]);
- BN_free(b[1]);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- BN_free(f);
- BN_free(g);
- BN_free(h);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_gf2m_mod_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d;
- int i, j, ret = 0;
- int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
- int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
-
- a = BN_new();
- b[0] = BN_new();
- b[1] = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
-
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(c, a, b[j], ctx);
- BN_copy(d, a);
- BN_GF2m_mod_mul(d, a, d, b[j], ctx);
-# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
- * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " ^ 2 % ");
- BN_print(bp, b[j]);
- BIO_puts(bp, " = ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, "; a * a = ");
- BN_print(bp, d);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- }
-# endif
- BN_GF2m_add(d, c, d);
- /* Test that a*a = a^2. */
- if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular squaring test failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b[0]);
- BN_free(b[1]);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_gf2m_mod_inv(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d;
- int i, j, ret = 0;
- int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
- int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
-
- a = BN_new();
- b[0] = BN_new();
- b[1] = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
-
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- BN_GF2m_mod_inv(c, a, b[j], ctx);
- BN_GF2m_mod_mul(d, a, c, b[j], ctx);
-# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
- * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - 1 % ");
- BN_print(bp, b[j]);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- }
-# endif
- /* Test that ((1/a)*a) = 1. */
- if (!BN_is_one(d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular inversion test failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b[0]);
- BN_free(b[1]);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_gf2m_mod_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f;
- int i, j, ret = 0;
- int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
- int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
-
- a = BN_new();
- b[0] = BN_new();
- b[1] = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
- f = BN_new();
-
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(c, 512, 0, 0);
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- BN_GF2m_mod_div(d, a, c, b[j], ctx);
- BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, d, c, b[j], ctx);
- BN_GF2m_mod_div(f, a, e, b[j], ctx);
-# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
- * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " = ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
- BN_print(bp, d);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, b[j]);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- }
-# endif
- /* Test that ((a/c)*c)/a = 1. */
- if (!BN_is_one(f)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular division test failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b[0]);
- BN_free(b[1]);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- BN_free(f);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_gf2m_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f;
- int i, j, ret = 0;
- int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
- int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
-
- a = BN_new();
- b[0] = BN_new();
- b[1] = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
- f = BN_new();
-
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(c, 512, 0, 0);
- BN_bntest_rand(d, 512, 0, 0);
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- BN_GF2m_mod_exp(e, a, c, b[j], ctx);
- BN_GF2m_mod_exp(f, a, d, b[j], ctx);
- BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, e, f, b[j], ctx);
- BN_add(f, c, d);
- BN_GF2m_mod_exp(f, a, f, b[j], ctx);
-# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
- * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " ^ (");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, " + ");
- BN_print(bp, d);
- BIO_puts(bp, ") = ");
- BN_print(bp, e);
- BIO_puts(bp, "; - ");
- BN_print(bp, f);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, b[j]);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- }
-# endif
- BN_GF2m_add(f, e, f);
- /* Test that a^(c+d)=a^c*a^d. */
- if (!BN_is_zero(f)) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "GF(2^m) modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b[0]);
- BN_free(b[1]);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- BN_free(f);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f;
- int i, j, ret = 0;
- int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
- int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
-
- a = BN_new();
- b[0] = BN_new();
- b[1] = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
- f = BN_new();
-
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- BN_GF2m_mod(c, a, b[j]);
- BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(d, a, b[j], ctx);
- BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(e, d, b[j], ctx);
-# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
- * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, d);
- BIO_puts(bp, " ^ 2 - ");
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- }
-# endif
- BN_GF2m_add(f, c, e);
- /* Test that d^2 = a, where d = sqrt(a). */
- if (!BN_is_zero(f)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular square root test failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b[0]);
- BN_free(b[1]);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- BN_free(f);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e;
- int i, j, s = 0, t, ret = 0;
- int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
- int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
-
- a = BN_new();
- b[0] = BN_new();
- b[1] = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
-
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
- BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
- for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
- t = BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(c, a, b[j], ctx);
- if (t) {
- s++;
- BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(d, c, b[j], ctx);
- BN_GF2m_add(d, c, d);
- BN_GF2m_mod(e, a, b[j]);
-# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
- * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, " is root of z^2 + z = ");
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, b[j]);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- }
-# endif
- BN_GF2m_add(e, e, d);
- /*
- * Test that solution of quadratic c satisfies c^2 + c = a.
- */
- if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "GF(2^m) modular solve quadratic test failed!\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- } else {
-# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
- * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BIO_puts(bp, "There are no roots of z^2 + z = ");
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
- BN_print(bp, b[j]);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- }
-# endif
- }
- }
- }
- if (s == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "All %i tests of GF(2^m) modular solve quadratic resulted in no roots;\n",
- num0);
- fprintf(stderr,
- "this is very unlikely and probably indicates an error.\n");
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b[0]);
- BN_free(b[1]);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
-static int genprime_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg)
-{
- char c = '*';
-
- if (p == 0)
- c = '.';
- if (p == 1)
- c = '+';
- if (p == 2)
- c = '*';
- if (p == 3)
- c = '\n';
- putc(c, stderr);
- fflush(stderr);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int test_kron(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BN_GENCB cb;
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *r, *t;
- int i;
- int legendre, kronecker;
- int ret = 0;
-
- a = BN_new();
- b = BN_new();
- r = BN_new();
- t = BN_new();
- if (a == NULL || b == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- BN_GENCB_set(&cb, genprime_cb, NULL);
-
- /*
- * We test BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx) just for b odd (Jacobi symbol). In
- * this case we know that if b is prime, then BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx) is
- * congruent to $a^{(b-1)/2}$, modulo $b$ (Legendre symbol). So we
- * generate a random prime b and compare these values for a number of
- * random a's. (That is, we run the Solovay-Strassen primality test to
- * confirm that b is prime, except that we don't want to test whether b
- * is prime but whether BN_kronecker works.)
- */
-
- if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(b, 512, 0, NULL, NULL, &cb))
- goto err;
- b->neg = rand_neg();
- putc('\n', stderr);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- if (!BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0))
- goto err;
- a->neg = rand_neg();
-
- /* t := (|b|-1)/2 (note that b is odd) */
- if (!BN_copy(t, b))
- goto err;
- t->neg = 0;
- if (!BN_sub_word(t, 1))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_rshift1(t, t))
- goto err;
- /* r := a^t mod b */
- b->neg = 0;
-
- if (!BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, t, b, ctx))
- goto err;
- b->neg = 1;
-
- if (BN_is_word(r, 1))
- legendre = 1;
- else if (BN_is_zero(r))
- legendre = 0;
- else {
- if (!BN_add_word(r, 1))
- goto err;
- if (0 != BN_ucmp(r, b)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Legendre symbol computation failed\n");
- goto err;
- }
- legendre = -1;
- }
-
- kronecker = BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx);
- if (kronecker < -1)
- goto err;
- /* we actually need BN_kronecker(a, |b|) */
- if (a->neg && b->neg)
- kronecker = -kronecker;
-
- if (legendre != kronecker) {
- fprintf(stderr, "legendre != kronecker; a = ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
- fprintf(stderr, ", b = ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, b);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- putc('.', stderr);
- fflush(stderr);
- }
-
- putc('\n', stderr);
- fflush(stderr);
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (a != NULL)
- BN_free(a);
- if (b != NULL)
- BN_free(b);
- if (r != NULL)
- BN_free(r);
- if (t != NULL)
- BN_free(t);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BN_GENCB cb;
- BIGNUM *a, *p, *r;
- int i, j;
- int ret = 0;
-
- a = BN_new();
- p = BN_new();
- r = BN_new();
- if (a == NULL || p == NULL || r == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- BN_GENCB_set(&cb, genprime_cb, NULL);
-
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
- if (i < 8) {
- unsigned primes[8] = { 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19 };
-
- if (!BN_set_word(p, primes[i]))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!BN_set_word(a, 32))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_set_word(r, 2 * i + 1))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(p, 256, 0, a, r, &cb))
- goto err;
- putc('\n', stderr);
- }
- p->neg = rand_neg();
-
- for (j = 0; j < num2; j++) {
- /*
- * construct 'a' such that it is a square modulo p, but in
- * general not a proper square and not reduced modulo p
- */
- if (!BN_bntest_rand(r, 256, 0, 3))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_nnmod(r, r, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mod_sqr(r, r, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_bntest_rand(a, 256, 0, 3))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_nnmod(a, a, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mod_sqr(a, a, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(a, a, r, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (rand_neg())
- if (!BN_sub(a, a, p))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_mod_sqrt(r, a, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mod_sqr(r, r, p, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_nnmod(a, a, p, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_cmp(a, r) != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_sqrt failed: a = ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
- fprintf(stderr, ", r = ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, r);
- fprintf(stderr, ", p = ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, p);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- putc('.', stderr);
- fflush(stderr);
- }
-
- putc('\n', stderr);
- fflush(stderr);
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (a != NULL)
- BN_free(a);
- if (p != NULL)
- BN_free(p);
- if (r != NULL)
- BN_free(r);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int test_lshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *a_)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d;
- int i;
-
- b = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- BN_one(c);
-
- if (a_)
- a = a_;
- else {
- a = BN_new();
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
- a->neg = rand_neg();
- }
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_lshift(b, a, i + 1);
- BN_add(c, c, c);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, b);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_mul(d, a, c, ctx);
- BN_sub(d, d, b);
- if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Left shift test failed!\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "a=");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
- fprintf(stderr, "\nb=");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, b);
- fprintf(stderr, "\nc=");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, c);
- fprintf(stderr, "\nd=");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, d);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_lshift1(BIO *bp)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
- int i;
-
- a = BN_new();
- b = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
-
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
- a->neg = rand_neg();
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_lshift1(b, a);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " * 2");
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, b);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_add(c, a, a);
- BN_sub(a, b, c);
- if (!BN_is_zero(a)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Left shift one test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
-
- BN_copy(a, b);
- }
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b);
- BN_free(c);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_rshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
- int i;
-
- a = BN_new();
- b = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
- d = BN_new();
- e = BN_new();
- BN_one(c);
-
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
- a->neg = rand_neg();
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_rshift(b, a, i + 1);
- BN_add(c, c, c);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
- BN_print(bp, c);
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, b);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_div(d, e, a, c, ctx);
- BN_sub(d, d, b);
- if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Right shift test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- }
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b);
- BN_free(c);
- BN_free(d);
- BN_free(e);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int test_rshift1(BIO *bp)
-{
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
- int i;
-
- a = BN_new();
- b = BN_new();
- c = BN_new();
-
- BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
- a->neg = rand_neg();
- for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
- BN_rshift1(b, a);
- if (bp != NULL) {
- if (!results) {
- BN_print(bp, a);
- BIO_puts(bp, " / 2");
- BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
- }
- BN_print(bp, b);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- BN_sub(c, a, b);
- BN_sub(c, c, b);
- if (!BN_is_zero(c) && !BN_abs_is_word(c, 1)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Right shift one test failed!\n");
- return 0;
- }
- BN_copy(a, b);
- }
- BN_free(a);
- BN_free(b);
- BN_free(c);
- return (1);
-}
-
-int rand_neg(void)
-{
- static unsigned int neg = 0;
- static int sign[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1 };
-
- return (sign[(neg++) % 8]);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bntest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/bn/bntest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bntest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/bn/bntest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2137 @@
+/* crypto/bn/bntest.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the Eric Young open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The binary polynomial arithmetic software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Until the key-gen callbacks are modified to use newer prototypes, we allow
+ * deprecated functions for openssl-internal code
+ */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+# undef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+const int num0 = 100; /* number of tests */
+const int num1 = 50; /* additional tests for some functions */
+const int num2 = 5; /* number of tests for slow functions */
+
+int test_add(BIO *bp);
+int test_sub(BIO *bp);
+int test_lshift1(BIO *bp);
+int test_lshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *a_);
+int test_rshift1(BIO *bp);
+int test_rshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_div_word(BIO *bp);
+int test_div_recp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mul(BIO *bp);
+int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_add(BIO *bp);
+int test_gf2m_mod(BIO *bp);
+int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_inv(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_kron(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int rand_neg(void);
+static int results = 0;
+
+static unsigned char lst[] =
+ "\xC6\x4F\x43\x04\x2A\xEA\xCA\x6E\x58\x36\x80\x5B\xE8\xC9"
+ "\x9B\x04\x5D\x48\x36\xC2\xFD\x16\xC9\x64\xF0";
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+ "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+static void message(BIO *out, char *m)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "test %s\n", m);
+ BIO_puts(out, "print \"test ");
+ BIO_puts(out, m);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\\n\"\n");
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ BIO *out;
+ char *outfile = NULL;
+
+ results = 0;
+
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
+
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ while (argc >= 1) {
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "-results") == 0)
+ results = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ break;
+ outfile = *(++argv);
+ }
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ EXIT(1);
+
+ out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if (out == NULL)
+ EXIT(1);
+ if (outfile == NULL) {
+ BIO_set_fp(out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ } else {
+ if (!BIO_write_filename(out, outfile)) {
+ perror(outfile);
+ EXIT(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!results)
+ BIO_puts(out, "obase=16\nibase=16\n");
+
+ message(out, "BN_add");
+ if (!test_add(out))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_sub");
+ if (!test_sub(out))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_lshift1");
+ if (!test_lshift1(out))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_lshift (fixed)");
+ if (!test_lshift(out, ctx, BN_bin2bn(lst, sizeof(lst) - 1, NULL)))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_lshift");
+ if (!test_lshift(out, ctx, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_rshift1");
+ if (!test_rshift1(out))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_rshift");
+ if (!test_rshift(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_sqr");
+ if (!test_sqr(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_mul");
+ if (!test_mul(out))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_div");
+ if (!test_div(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_div_word");
+ if (!test_div_word(out))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_div_recp");
+ if (!test_div_recp(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_mod");
+ if (!test_mod(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_mod_mul");
+ if (!test_mod_mul(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_mont");
+ if (!test_mont(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_mod_exp");
+ if (!test_mod_exp(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime");
+ if (!test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!test_mod_exp_mont5(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_exp");
+ if (!test_exp(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_kronecker");
+ if (!test_kron(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_mod_sqrt");
+ if (!test_sqrt(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ message(out, "BN_GF2m_add");
+ if (!test_gf2m_add(out))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod");
+ if (!test_gf2m_mod(out))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_mul");
+ if (!test_gf2m_mod_mul(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr");
+ if (!test_gf2m_mod_sqr(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_inv");
+ if (!test_gf2m_mod_inv(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_div");
+ if (!test_gf2m_mod_div(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_exp");
+ if (!test_gf2m_mod_exp(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt");
+ if (!test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+ message(out, "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad");
+ if (!test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(out, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+#endif
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BIO_free(out);
+
+ EXIT(0);
+ err:
+ BIO_puts(out, "1\n"); /* make sure the Perl script fed by bc
+ * notices the failure, see test_bn in
+ * test/Makefile.ssl */
+ (void)BIO_flush(out);
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ EXIT(1);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_add(BIO *bp)
+{
+ BIGNUM a, b, c;
+ int i;
+
+ BN_init(&a);
+ BN_init(&b);
+ BN_init(&c);
+
+ BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, 0, 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(&b, 450 + i, 0, 0);
+ a.neg = rand_neg();
+ b.neg = rand_neg();
+ BN_add(&c, &a, &b);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " + ");
+ BN_print(bp, &b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, &c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ a.neg = !a.neg;
+ b.neg = !b.neg;
+ BN_add(&c, &c, &b);
+ BN_add(&c, &c, &a);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&c)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Add test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(&a);
+ BN_free(&b);
+ BN_free(&c);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_sub(BIO *bp)
+{
+ BIGNUM a, b, c;
+ int i;
+
+ BN_init(&a);
+ BN_init(&b);
+ BN_init(&c);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
+ if (i < num1) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, 0, 0);
+ BN_copy(&b, &a);
+ if (BN_set_bit(&a, i) == 0)
+ return (0);
+ BN_add_word(&b, i);
+ } else {
+ BN_bntest_rand(&b, 400 + i - num1, 0, 0);
+ a.neg = rand_neg();
+ b.neg = rand_neg();
+ }
+ BN_sub(&c, &a, &b);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ BN_print(bp, &b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, &c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_add(&c, &c, &b);
+ BN_sub(&c, &c, &a);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&c)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Subtract test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(&a);
+ BN_free(&b);
+ BN_free(&c);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM a, b, c, d, e;
+ int i;
+
+ BN_init(&a);
+ BN_init(&b);
+ BN_init(&c);
+ BN_init(&d);
+ BN_init(&e);
+
+ BN_one(&a);
+ BN_zero(&b);
+
+ if (BN_div(&d, &c, &a, &b, ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Division by zero succeeded!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
+ if (i < num1) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(&a, 400, 0, 0);
+ BN_copy(&b, &a);
+ BN_lshift(&a, &a, i);
+ BN_add_word(&a, i);
+ } else
+ BN_bntest_rand(&b, 50 + 3 * (i - num1), 0, 0);
+ a.neg = rand_neg();
+ b.neg = rand_neg();
+ BN_div(&d, &c, &a, &b, ctx);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
+ BN_print(bp, &b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, &d);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, &b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, &c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_mul(&e, &d, &b, ctx);
+ BN_add(&d, &e, &c);
+ BN_sub(&d, &d, &a);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Division test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(&a);
+ BN_free(&b);
+ BN_free(&c);
+ BN_free(&d);
+ BN_free(&e);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static void print_word(BIO *bp, BN_ULONG w)
+{
+#ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
+ if (sizeof(w) > sizeof(unsigned long)) {
+ unsigned long h = (unsigned long)(w >> 32), l = (unsigned long)(w);
+
+ if (h)
+ BIO_printf(bp, "%lX%08lX", h, l);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bp, "%lX", l);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ BIO_printf(bp, BN_HEX_FMT1, w);
+}
+
+int test_div_word(BIO *bp)
+{
+ BIGNUM a, b;
+ BN_ULONG r, s;
+ int i;
+
+ BN_init(&a);
+ BN_init(&b);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ do {
+ BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, -1, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(&b, BN_BITS2, -1, 0);
+ } while (BN_is_zero(&b));
+
+ s = b.d[0];
+ BN_copy(&b, &a);
+ r = BN_div_word(&b, s);
+
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
+ print_word(bp, s);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, &b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ print_word(bp, s);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ print_word(bp, r);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_mul_word(&b, s);
+ BN_add_word(&b, r);
+ BN_sub(&b, &a, &b);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&b)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Division (word) test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(&a);
+ BN_free(&b);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_div_recp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM a, b, c, d, e;
+ BN_RECP_CTX recp;
+ int i;
+
+ BN_RECP_CTX_init(&recp);
+ BN_init(&a);
+ BN_init(&b);
+ BN_init(&c);
+ BN_init(&d);
+ BN_init(&e);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
+ if (i < num1) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(&a, 400, 0, 0);
+ BN_copy(&b, &a);
+ BN_lshift(&a, &a, i);
+ BN_add_word(&a, i);
+ } else
+ BN_bntest_rand(&b, 50 + 3 * (i - num1), 0, 0);
+ a.neg = rand_neg();
+ b.neg = rand_neg();
+ BN_RECP_CTX_set(&recp, &b, ctx);
+ BN_div_recp(&d, &c, &a, &recp, ctx);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
+ BN_print(bp, &b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, &d);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, &b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, &c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_mul(&e, &d, &b, ctx);
+ BN_add(&d, &e, &c);
+ BN_sub(&d, &d, &a);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Reciprocal division test failed!\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "a=");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, &a);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nb=");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, &b);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(&a);
+ BN_free(&b);
+ BN_free(&c);
+ BN_free(&d);
+ BN_free(&e);
+ BN_RECP_CTX_free(&recp);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_mul(BIO *bp)
+{
+ BIGNUM a, b, c, d, e;
+ int i;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ EXIT(1);
+
+ BN_init(&a);
+ BN_init(&b);
+ BN_init(&c);
+ BN_init(&d);
+ BN_init(&e);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
+ if (i <= num1) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(&a, 100, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(&b, 100, 0, 0);
+ } else
+ BN_bntest_rand(&b, i - num1, 0, 0);
+ a.neg = rand_neg();
+ b.neg = rand_neg();
+ BN_mul(&c, &a, &b, ctx);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+ BN_print(bp, &b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, &c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_div(&d, &e, &c, &a, ctx);
+ BN_sub(&d, &d, &b);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&d) || !BN_is_zero(&e)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Multiplication test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(&a);
+ BN_free(&b);
+ BN_free(&c);
+ BN_free(&d);
+ BN_free(&e);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *c, *d, *e;
+ int i, ret = 0;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+ if (a == NULL || c == NULL || d == NULL || e == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 40 + i * 10, 0, 0);
+ a->neg = rand_neg();
+ BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_div(d, e, c, a, ctx);
+ BN_sub(d, d, a);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
+ BN_hex2bn(&a,
+ "80000000000000008000000000000001"
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0000000000000000");
+ BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
+ if (BN_cmp(c, d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
+ "different results!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
+ BN_hex2bn(&a,
+ "80000000000000000000000080000001"
+ "FFFFFFFE000000000000000000000000");
+ BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
+ if (BN_cmp(c, d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
+ "different results!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (a != NULL)
+ BN_free(a);
+ if (c != NULL)
+ BN_free(c);
+ if (d != NULL)
+ BN_free(d);
+ if (e != NULL)
+ BN_free(e);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM a, b, c, d, A, B;
+ BIGNUM n;
+ int i;
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont;
+
+ BN_init(&a);
+ BN_init(&b);
+ BN_init(&c);
+ BN_init(&d);
+ BN_init(&A);
+ BN_init(&B);
+ BN_init(&n);
+
+ mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+ if (mont == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_zero(&n);
+ if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for zero modulus!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_set_word(&n, 16);
+ if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for even modulus!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_bntest_rand(&a, 100, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(&b, 100, 0, 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
+ int bits = (200 * (i + 1)) / num2;
+
+ if (bits == 0)
+ continue;
+ BN_bntest_rand(&n, bits, 0, 1);
+ BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx);
+
+ BN_nnmod(&a, &a, &n, ctx);
+ BN_nnmod(&b, &b, &n, ctx);
+
+ BN_to_montgomery(&A, &a, mont, ctx);
+ BN_to_montgomery(&B, &b, mont, ctx);
+
+ BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&c, &A, &B, mont, ctx);
+ BN_from_montgomery(&A, &c, mont, ctx);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+#ifdef undef
+ fprintf(stderr, "%d * %d %% %d\n",
+ BN_num_bits(&a),
+ BN_num_bits(&b), BN_num_bits(mont->N));
+#endif
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+ BN_print(bp, &b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, &(mont->N));
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, &A);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_mod_mul(&d, &a, &b, &n, ctx);
+ BN_sub(&d, &d, &A);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Montgomery multiplication test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+ BN_free(&a);
+ BN_free(&b);
+ BN_free(&c);
+ BN_free(&d);
+ BN_free(&A);
+ BN_free(&B);
+ BN_free(&n);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_mod(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+ int i;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(b, 450 + i * 10, 0, 0);
+ a->neg = rand_neg();
+ b->neg = rand_neg();
+ BN_mod(c, a, b, ctx);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_div(d, e, a, b, ctx);
+ BN_sub(e, e, c);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Modulo test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+ int i, j;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+
+ BN_one(a);
+ BN_one(b);
+ BN_zero(c);
+ if (BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_mul with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 475 + i * 10, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(b, 425 + i * 11, 0, 0);
+ a->neg = rand_neg();
+ b->neg = rand_neg();
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ while ((l = ERR_get_error()))
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR:%s\n", ERR_error_string(l, NULL));
+ EXIT(1);
+ }
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+ BN_print(bp, b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ if ((a->neg ^ b->neg) && !BN_is_zero(e)) {
+ /*
+ * If (a*b) % c is negative, c must be added in order
+ * to obtain the normalized remainder (new with
+ * OpenSSL 0.9.7, previous versions of BN_mod_mul
+ * could generate negative results)
+ */
+ BIO_puts(bp, " + ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ }
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, e);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_mul(d, a, b, ctx);
+ BN_sub(d, d, e);
+ BN_div(a, b, d, c, ctx);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Modulo multiply test failed!\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+ int i;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+
+ BN_one(a);
+ BN_one(b);
+ BN_zero(c);
+ if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
+ for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx))
+ return (0);
+
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
+ BN_print(bp, b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, d);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
+ BN_sub(e, e, d);
+ BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+ int i;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+
+ BN_one(a);
+ BN_one(b);
+ BN_zero(c);
+ if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus "
+ "succeeded\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_set_word(c, 16);
+ if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus "
+ "succeeded\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
+ for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL))
+ return (00);
+
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
+ BN_print(bp, b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, d);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_exp(e, a, b, ctx);
+ BN_sub(e, e, d);
+ BN_div(a, b, e, c, ctx);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test constant-time modular exponentiation with 1024-bit inputs, which on
+ * x86_64 cause a different code branch to be taken.
+ */
+int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *p, *m, *d, *e;
+
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ p = BN_new();
+ m = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+
+ mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+
+ BN_bntest_rand(m, 1024, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
+ /* Zero exponent */
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
+ BN_zero(p);
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, p, m, ctx, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ if (!BN_is_one(d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Zero input */
+ BN_bntest_rand(p, 1024, 0, 0);
+ BN_zero(a);
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, p, m, ctx, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Craft an input whose Montgomery representation is 1, i.e., shorter
+ * than the modulus m, in order to test the const time precomputation
+ * scattering/gathering.
+ */
+ BN_one(a);
+ BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx);
+ if (!BN_from_montgomery(e, a, mont, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, e, p, m, ctx, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(a, e, p, m, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ if (BN_cmp(a, d) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Finally, some regular test vectors. */
+ BN_bntest_rand(e, 1024, 0, 0);
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, e, p, m, ctx, NULL))
+ return 0;
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(a, e, p, m, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ if (BN_cmp(a, d) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(m);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *d, *e, *one;
+ int i;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+ one = BN_new();
+ BN_one(one);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(b, 2 + i, 0, 0);
+
+ if (BN_exp(d, a, b, ctx) <= 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
+ BN_print(bp, b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, d);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_one(e);
+ for (; !BN_is_zero(b); BN_sub(b, b, one))
+ BN_mul(e, e, a, ctx);
+ BN_sub(e, e, d);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Exponentiation test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(one);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+int test_gf2m_add(BIO *bp)
+{
+ BIGNUM a, b, c;
+ int i, ret = 0;
+
+ BN_init(&a);
+ BN_init(&b);
+ BN_init(&c);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_rand(&a, 512, 0, 0);
+ BN_copy(&b, BN_value_one());
+ a.neg = rand_neg();
+ b.neg = rand_neg();
+ BN_GF2m_add(&c, &a, &b);
+# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
+ * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, &a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " ^ ");
+ BN_print(bp, &b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " = ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, &c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+# endif
+ /* Test that two added values have the correct parity. */
+ if ((BN_is_odd(&a) && BN_is_odd(&c))
+ || (!BN_is_odd(&a) && !BN_is_odd(&c))) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) addition test (a) failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_GF2m_add(&c, &c, &c);
+ /* Test that c + c = 0. */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&c)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) addition test (b) failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(&a);
+ BN_free(&b);
+ BN_free(&c);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod(BIO *bp)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e;
+ int i, j, ret = 0;
+ int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+ int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b[0] = BN_new();
+ b[1] = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ BN_GF2m_mod(c, a, b[j]);
+# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
+ * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, b[j]);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ BN_GF2m_add(d, a, c);
+ BN_GF2m_mod(e, d, b[j]);
+ /* Test that a + (a mod p) mod p == 0. */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modulo test failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b[0]);
+ BN_free(b[1]);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f, *g, *h;
+ int i, j, ret = 0;
+ int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+ int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b[0] = BN_new();
+ b[1] = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+ f = BN_new();
+ g = BN_new();
+ h = BN_new();
+
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(d, 1024, 0, 0);
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, a, c, b[j], ctx);
+# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
+ * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, b[j]);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ BN_print(bp, e);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ BN_GF2m_add(f, a, d);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_mul(g, f, c, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_mul(h, d, c, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_GF2m_add(f, e, g);
+ BN_GF2m_add(f, f, h);
+ /* Test that (a+d)*c = a*c + d*c. */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(f)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "GF(2^m) modular multiplication test failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b[0]);
+ BN_free(b[1]);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(f);
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(h);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d;
+ int i, j, ret = 0;
+ int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+ int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b[0] = BN_new();
+ b[1] = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(c, a, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_copy(d, a);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_mul(d, a, d, b[j], ctx);
+# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
+ * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " ^ 2 % ");
+ BN_print(bp, b[j]);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " = ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "; a * a = ");
+ BN_print(bp, d);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ BN_GF2m_add(d, c, d);
+ /* Test that a*a = a^2. */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular squaring test failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b[0]);
+ BN_free(b[1]);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_inv(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d;
+ int i, j, ret = 0;
+ int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+ int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b[0] = BN_new();
+ b[1] = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ BN_GF2m_mod_inv(c, a, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_mul(d, a, c, b[j], ctx);
+# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
+ * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - 1 % ");
+ BN_print(bp, b[j]);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ /* Test that ((1/a)*a) = 1. */
+ if (!BN_is_one(d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular inversion test failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b[0]);
+ BN_free(b[1]);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f;
+ int i, j, ret = 0;
+ int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+ int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b[0] = BN_new();
+ b[1] = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+ f = BN_new();
+
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(c, 512, 0, 0);
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ BN_GF2m_mod_div(d, a, c, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, d, c, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_div(f, a, e, b[j], ctx);
+# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
+ * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " = ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+ BN_print(bp, d);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, b[j]);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ /* Test that ((a/c)*c)/a = 1. */
+ if (!BN_is_one(f)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular division test failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b[0]);
+ BN_free(b[1]);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(f);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f;
+ int i, j, ret = 0;
+ int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+ int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b[0] = BN_new();
+ b[1] = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+ f = BN_new();
+
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(c, 512, 0, 0);
+ BN_bntest_rand(d, 512, 0, 0);
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ BN_GF2m_mod_exp(e, a, c, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_exp(f, a, d, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, e, f, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_add(f, c, d);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_exp(f, a, f, b[j], ctx);
+# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
+ * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " ^ (");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " + ");
+ BN_print(bp, d);
+ BIO_puts(bp, ") = ");
+ BN_print(bp, e);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "; - ");
+ BN_print(bp, f);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, b[j]);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ BN_GF2m_add(f, e, f);
+ /* Test that a^(c+d)=a^c*a^d. */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(f)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "GF(2^m) modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b[0]);
+ BN_free(b[1]);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(f);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f;
+ int i, j, ret = 0;
+ int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+ int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b[0] = BN_new();
+ b[1] = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+ f = BN_new();
+
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ BN_GF2m_mod(c, a, b[j]);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt(d, a, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(e, d, b[j], ctx);
+# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
+ * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, d);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " ^ 2 - ");
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ BN_GF2m_add(f, c, e);
+ /* Test that d^2 = a, where d = sqrt(a). */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(f)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular square root test failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b[0]);
+ BN_free(b[1]);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(f);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e;
+ int i, j, s = 0, t, ret = 0;
+ int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
+ int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b[0] = BN_new();
+ b[1] = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
+ BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0);
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ t = BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(c, a, b[j], ctx);
+ if (t) {
+ s++;
+ BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(d, c, b[j], ctx);
+ BN_GF2m_add(d, c, d);
+ BN_GF2m_mod(e, a, b[j]);
+# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
+ * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " is root of z^2 + z = ");
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, b[j]);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ BN_GF2m_add(e, e, d);
+ /*
+ * Test that solution of quadratic c satisfies c^2 + c = a.
+ */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(e)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "GF(2^m) modular solve quadratic test failed!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
+ * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BIO_puts(bp, "There are no roots of z^2 + z = ");
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
+ BN_print(bp, b[j]);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (s == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "All %i tests of GF(2^m) modular solve quadratic resulted in no roots;\n",
+ num0);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "this is very unlikely and probably indicates an error.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b[0]);
+ BN_free(b[1]);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+static int genprime_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg)
+{
+ char c = '*';
+
+ if (p == 0)
+ c = '.';
+ if (p == 1)
+ c = '+';
+ if (p == 2)
+ c = '*';
+ if (p == 3)
+ c = '\n';
+ putc(c, stderr);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int test_kron(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BN_GENCB cb;
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *r, *t;
+ int i;
+ int legendre, kronecker;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b = BN_new();
+ r = BN_new();
+ t = BN_new();
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL || r == NULL || t == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_GENCB_set(&cb, genprime_cb, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * We test BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx) just for b odd (Jacobi symbol). In
+ * this case we know that if b is prime, then BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx) is
+ * congruent to $a^{(b-1)/2}$, modulo $b$ (Legendre symbol). So we
+ * generate a random prime b and compare these values for a number of
+ * random a's. (That is, we run the Solovay-Strassen primality test to
+ * confirm that b is prime, except that we don't want to test whether b
+ * is prime but whether BN_kronecker works.)
+ */
+
+ if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(b, 512, 0, NULL, NULL, &cb))
+ goto err;
+ b->neg = rand_neg();
+ putc('\n', stderr);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ if (!BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+ a->neg = rand_neg();
+
+ /* t := (|b|-1)/2 (note that b is odd) */
+ if (!BN_copy(t, b))
+ goto err;
+ t->neg = 0;
+ if (!BN_sub_word(t, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rshift1(t, t))
+ goto err;
+ /* r := a^t mod b */
+ b->neg = 0;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, t, b, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ b->neg = 1;
+
+ if (BN_is_word(r, 1))
+ legendre = 1;
+ else if (BN_is_zero(r))
+ legendre = 0;
+ else {
+ if (!BN_add_word(r, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (0 != BN_ucmp(r, b)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Legendre symbol computation failed\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ legendre = -1;
+ }
+
+ kronecker = BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx);
+ if (kronecker < -1)
+ goto err;
+ /* we actually need BN_kronecker(a, |b|) */
+ if (a->neg && b->neg)
+ kronecker = -kronecker;
+
+ if (legendre != kronecker) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "legendre != kronecker; a = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
+ fprintf(stderr, ", b = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, b);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ putc('.', stderr);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ }
+
+ putc('\n', stderr);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (a != NULL)
+ BN_free(a);
+ if (b != NULL)
+ BN_free(b);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BN_free(r);
+ if (t != NULL)
+ BN_free(t);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BN_GENCB cb;
+ BIGNUM *a, *p, *r;
+ int i, j;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ p = BN_new();
+ r = BN_new();
+ if (a == NULL || p == NULL || r == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_GENCB_set(&cb, genprime_cb, NULL);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ if (i < 8) {
+ unsigned primes[8] = { 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19 };
+
+ if (!BN_set_word(p, primes[i]))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_set_word(a, 32))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_set_word(r, 2 * i + 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(p, 256, 0, a, r, &cb))
+ goto err;
+ putc('\n', stderr);
+ }
+ p->neg = rand_neg();
+
+ for (j = 0; j < num2; j++) {
+ /*
+ * construct 'a' such that it is a square modulo p, but in
+ * general not a proper square and not reduced modulo p
+ */
+ if (!BN_bntest_rand(r, 256, 0, 3))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_nnmod(r, r, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_sqr(r, r, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_bntest_rand(a, 256, 0, 3))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_nnmod(a, a, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_sqr(a, a, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(a, a, r, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (rand_neg())
+ if (!BN_sub(a, a, p))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_sqrt(r, a, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_sqr(r, r, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_nnmod(a, a, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_cmp(a, r) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_sqrt failed: a = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
+ fprintf(stderr, ", r = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, r);
+ fprintf(stderr, ", p = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, p);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ putc('.', stderr);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ }
+
+ putc('\n', stderr);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (a != NULL)
+ BN_free(a);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ BN_free(p);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BN_free(r);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int test_lshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *a_)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d;
+ int i;
+
+ b = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ BN_one(c);
+
+ if (a_)
+ a = a_;
+ else {
+ a = BN_new();
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
+ a->neg = rand_neg();
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_lshift(b, a, i + 1);
+ BN_add(c, c, c);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_mul(d, a, c, ctx);
+ BN_sub(d, d, b);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Left shift test failed!\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "a=");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nb=");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, b);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nc=");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, c);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nd=");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, d);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_lshift1(BIO *bp)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
+ int i;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
+ a->neg = rand_neg();
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_lshift1(b, a);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " * 2");
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_add(c, a, a);
+ BN_sub(a, b, c);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(a)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Left shift one test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_copy(a, b);
+ }
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b);
+ BN_free(c);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_rshift(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
+ int i;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+ d = BN_new();
+ e = BN_new();
+ BN_one(c);
+
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
+ a->neg = rand_neg();
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_rshift(b, a, i + 1);
+ BN_add(c, c, c);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " / ");
+ BN_print(bp, c);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_div(d, e, a, c, ctx);
+ BN_sub(d, d, b);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(d)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Right shift test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b);
+ BN_free(c);
+ BN_free(d);
+ BN_free(e);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int test_rshift1(BIO *bp)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
+ int i;
+
+ a = BN_new();
+ b = BN_new();
+ c = BN_new();
+
+ BN_bntest_rand(a, 200, 0, 0);
+ a->neg = rand_neg();
+ for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
+ BN_rshift1(b, a);
+ if (bp != NULL) {
+ if (!results) {
+ BN_print(bp, a);
+ BIO_puts(bp, " / 2");
+ BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
+ }
+ BN_print(bp, b);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ BN_sub(c, a, b);
+ BN_sub(c, c, b);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(c) && !BN_abs_is_word(c, 1)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Right shift one test failed!\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BN_copy(a, b);
+ }
+ BN_free(a);
+ BN_free(b);
+ BN_free(c);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int rand_neg(void)
+{
+ static unsigned int neg = 0;
+ static int sign[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1 };
+
+ return (sign[(neg++) % 8]);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/buffer/buffer.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-
-char *BUF_strdup(const char *str)
-{
- if (str == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- return BUF_strndup(str, strlen(str));
-}
-
-char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz)
-{
- char *ret;
-
- if (str == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1);
- if (ret == NULL) {
- BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
- }
- BUF_strlcpy(ret, str, siz + 1);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz)
-{
- void *ret;
-
- if (data == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz);
- if (ret == NULL) {
- BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
- }
- return memcpy(ret, data, siz);
-}
-
-size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size)
-{
- size_t l = 0;
- for (; size > 1 && *src; size--) {
- *dst++ = *src++;
- l++;
- }
- if (size)
- *dst = '\0';
- return l + strlen(src);
-}
-
-size_t BUF_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size)
-{
- size_t l = 0;
- for (; size > 0 && *dst; size--, dst++)
- l++;
- return l + BUF_strlcpy(dst, src, size);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/* crypto/buffer/buffer.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+char *BUF_strdup(const char *str)
+{
+ if (str == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return BUF_strndup(str, strlen(str));
+}
+
+char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ if (str == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (siz >= INT_MAX)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ret, str, siz);
+ ret[siz] = '\0';
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz)
+{
+ void *ret;
+
+ if (data == NULL || siz >= INT_MAX)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return memcpy(ret, data, siz);
+}
+
+size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t l = 0;
+ for (; size > 1 && *src; size--) {
+ *dst++ = *src++;
+ l++;
+ }
+ if (size)
+ *dst = '\0';
+ return l + strlen(src);
+}
+
+size_t BUF_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t l = 0;
+ for (; size > 0 && *dst; size--, dst++)
+ l++;
+ return l + BUF_strlcpy(dst, src, size);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/buffer/buffer.h 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buffer.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/buffer/buffer.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_BUFFER_H
-# define HEADER_BUFFER_H
-
-# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-# include <stddef.h>
-
-# if !defined(NO_SYS_TYPES_H)
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# endif
-
-/* Already declared in ossl_typ.h */
-/* typedef struct buf_mem_st BUF_MEM; */
-
-struct buf_mem_st {
- size_t length; /* current number of bytes */
- char *data;
- size_t max; /* size of buffer */
-};
-
-BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void);
-void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a);
-int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
-int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
-char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
-char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
-void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
-void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
-
-/* safe string functions */
-size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
-size_t BUF_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
-
-/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-/*
- * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
- * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
- */
-void ERR_load_BUF_strings(void);
-
-/* Error codes for the BUF functions. */
-
-/* Function codes. */
-# define BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP 103
-# define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW 100
-# define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN 105
-# define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW 101
-# define BUF_F_BUF_STRDUP 102
-# define BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP 104
-
-/* Reason codes. */
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buffer.h (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/buffer/buffer.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buffer.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/buffer/buffer.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/* crypto/buffer/buffer.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_BUFFER_H
+# define HEADER_BUFFER_H
+
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# include <stddef.h>
+
+# if !defined(NO_SYS_TYPES_H)
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# endif
+
+/* Already declared in ossl_typ.h */
+/* typedef struct buf_mem_st BUF_MEM; */
+
+struct buf_mem_st {
+ size_t length; /* current number of bytes */
+ char *data;
+ size_t max; /* size of buffer */
+};
+
+BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void);
+void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a);
+int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
+int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
+char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
+
+/*
+ * Like strndup, but in addition, explicitly guarantees to never read past the
+ * first |siz| bytes of |str|.
+ */
+char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
+
+void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
+void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
+
+/* safe string functions */
+size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+size_t BUF_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+void ERR_load_BUF_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the BUF functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP 103
+# define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW 100
+# define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN 105
+# define BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW 101
+# define BUF_F_BUF_STRDUP 102
+# define BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP 104
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/cms/cms_enc.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- */
-
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/cms.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "cms_lcl.h"
-
-/* CMS EncryptedData Utilities */
-
-DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_EncryptedData)
-
-/* Return BIO based on EncryptedContentInfo and key */
-
-BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
-{
- BIO *b;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
- X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
- unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
- size_t tkeylen = 0;
-
- int ok = 0;
-
- int enc, keep_key = 0;
-
- enc = ec->cipher ? 1 : 0;
-
- b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher());
- if (!b) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- BIO_get_cipher_ctx(b, &ctx);
-
- if (enc) {
- ciph = ec->cipher;
- /*
- * If not keeping key set cipher to NULL so subsequent calls decrypt.
- */
- if (ec->key)
- ec->cipher = NULL;
- } else {
- ciph = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(calg->algorithm);
-
- if (!ciph) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc) <= 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
- CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (enc) {
- int ivlen;
- calg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx));
- /* Generate a random IV if we need one */
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
- if (ivlen > 0) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
- goto err;
- piv = iv;
- }
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, calg->parameter) <= 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
- CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
- /* Generate random session key */
- if (!enc || !ec->key) {
- tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
- if (!tkey) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!ec->key) {
- ec->key = tkey;
- ec->keylen = tkeylen;
- tkey = NULL;
- if (enc)
- keep_key = 1;
- else
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- }
-
- if (ec->keylen != tkeylen) {
- /* If necessary set key length */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0) {
- /*
- * Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't leak information
- * which may be useful in MMA.
- */
- if (enc || ec->debug) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
- CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- } else {
- /* Use random key */
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
- OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
- ec->key = tkey;
- ec->keylen = tkeylen;
- tkey = NULL;
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, ec->key, piv, enc) <= 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
- CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (piv) {
- calg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
- if (!calg->parameter) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, calg->parameter) <= 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
- CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ok = 1;
-
- err:
- if (ec->key && !keep_key) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
- OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
- ec->key = NULL;
- }
- if (tkey) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
- OPENSSL_free(tkey);
- }
- if (ok)
- return b;
- BIO_free(b);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int cms_EncryptedContent_init(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec,
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
-{
- ec->cipher = cipher;
- if (key) {
- ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
- if (!ec->key)
- return 0;
- memcpy(ec->key, key, keylen);
- }
- ec->keylen = keylen;
- if (cipher)
- ec->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
-{
- CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
- if (!key || !keylen) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NO_KEY);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ciph) {
- cms->d.encryptedData = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_EncryptedData);
- if (!cms->d.encryptedData) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_encrypted);
- cms->d.encryptedData->version = 0;
- } else if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
- ec = cms->d.encryptedData->encryptedContentInfo;
- return cms_EncryptedContent_init(ec, ciph, key, keylen);
-}
-
-BIO *cms_EncryptedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
-{
- CMS_EncryptedData *enc = cms->d.encryptedData;
- if (enc->encryptedContentInfo->cipher && enc->unprotectedAttrs)
- enc->version = 2;
- return cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(enc->encryptedContentInfo);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+/* crypto/cms/cms_enc.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ */
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+
+/* CMS EncryptedData Utilities */
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_EncryptedData)
+
+/* Return BIO based on EncryptedContentInfo and key */
+
+BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
+{
+ BIO *b;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
+ X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
+ unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+ size_t tkeylen = 0;
+
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ int enc, keep_key = 0;
+
+ enc = ec->cipher ? 1 : 0;
+
+ b = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher());
+ if (!b) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ BIO_get_cipher_ctx(b, &ctx);
+
+ if (enc) {
+ ciph = ec->cipher;
+ /*
+ * If not keeping key set cipher to NULL so subsequent calls decrypt.
+ */
+ if (ec->key)
+ ec->cipher = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ciph = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(calg->algorithm);
+
+ if (!ciph) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+ CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (enc) {
+ int ivlen;
+ calg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx));
+ /* Generate a random IV if we need one */
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ if (ivlen > 0) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ piv = iv;
+ }
+ } else if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, calg->parameter) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+ CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ /* Generate random session key */
+ if (!enc || !ec->key) {
+ tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+ if (!tkey) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ec->key) {
+ ec->key = tkey;
+ ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+ tkey = NULL;
+ if (enc)
+ keep_key = 1;
+ else
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ }
+
+ if (ec->keylen != tkeylen) {
+ /* If necessary set key length */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't leak information
+ * which may be useful in MMA.
+ */
+ if (enc || ec->debug) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+ CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ /* Use random key */
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+ ec->key = tkey;
+ ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+ tkey = NULL;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, ec->key, piv, enc) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+ CMS_R_CIPHER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (piv) {
+ calg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+ if (!calg->parameter) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, calg->parameter) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+ CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (ec->key && (!keep_key || !ok)) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+ ec->key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (tkey) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+ }
+ if (ok)
+ return b;
+ BIO_free(b);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int cms_EncryptedContent_init(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+ ec->cipher = cipher;
+ if (key) {
+ ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
+ if (!ec->key)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(ec->key, key, keylen);
+ }
+ ec->keylen = keylen;
+ if (cipher)
+ ec->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+ if (!key || !keylen) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NO_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ciph) {
+ cms->d.encryptedData = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_EncryptedData);
+ if (!cms->d.encryptedData) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_encrypted);
+ cms->d.encryptedData->version = 0;
+ } else if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ec = cms->d.encryptedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+ return cms_EncryptedContent_init(ec, ciph, key, keylen);
+}
+
+BIO *cms_EncryptedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+ CMS_EncryptedData *enc = cms->d.encryptedData;
+ if (enc->encryptedContentInfo->cipher && enc->unprotectedAttrs)
+ enc->version = 2;
+ return cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(enc->encryptedContentInfo);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,432 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- */
-
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/cms.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/aes.h>
-#include "cms_lcl.h"
-#include "asn1_locl.h"
-
-int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
- unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen)
-{
- CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
- if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NOT_PWRI);
- return 0;
- }
-
- pwri = ri->d.pwri;
- pwri->pass = pass;
- if (pass && passlen < 0)
- passlen = strlen((char *)pass);
- pwri->passlen = passlen;
- return 1;
-}
-
-CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
- int iter, int wrap_nid,
- int pbe_nid,
- unsigned char *pass,
- ossl_ssize_t passlen,
- const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph)
-{
- CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
- CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
- CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- X509_ALGOR *encalg = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int ivlen;
-
- env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
- if (!env)
- return NULL;
-
- if (wrap_nid <= 0)
- wrap_nid = NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK;
-
- if (pbe_nid <= 0)
- pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2;
-
- /* Get from enveloped data */
- if (kekciph == NULL)
- kekciph = env->encryptedContentInfo->cipher;
-
- if (kekciph == NULL) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (wrap_nid != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
- CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
- encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
- if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
-
- if (ivlen > 0) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- encalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
- if (!encalg->parameter) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(&ctx, encalg->parameter) <= 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
- CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- encalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(&ctx));
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- /* Initialize recipient info */
- ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
- if (!ri)
- goto merr;
-
- ri->d.pwri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo);
- if (!ri->d.pwri)
- goto merr;
- ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS;
-
- pwri = ri->d.pwri;
- /* Since this is overwritten, free up empty structure already there */
- X509_ALGOR_free(pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm);
- pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
- if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm)
- goto merr;
- pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
- pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
- if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter)
- goto merr;
-
- if (!ASN1_item_pack(encalg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
- &pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->
- value.sequence))
- goto merr;
- pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
-
- X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
- encalg = NULL;
-
- /* Setup PBE algorithm */
-
- pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, NULL, 0, -1, -1);
-
- if (!pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm)
- goto err;
-
- CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
- pwri->version = 0;
-
- if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
- goto merr;
-
- return ri;
-
- merr:
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- err:
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- if (ri)
- M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
- if (encalg)
- X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
- return NULL;
-
-}
-
-/*
- * This is an implementation of the key wrapping mechanism in RFC3211, at
- * some point this should go into EVP.
- */
-
-static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
- unsigned char *tmp;
- int outl, rv = 0;
- if (inlen < 2 * blocklen) {
- /* too small */
- return 0;
- }
- if (inlen % blocklen) {
- /* Invalid size */
- return 0;
- }
- tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
- if (!tmp)
- return 0;
- /* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
- in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2);
- /*
- * Do a decrypt of last decrypted block to set IV to correct value output
- * it to start of buffer so we don't corrupt decrypted block this works
- * because buffer is at least two block lengths long.
- */
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp + inlen - blocklen, blocklen);
- /* Can now decrypt first n - 1 blocks */
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, in, inlen - blocklen);
-
- /* Reset IV to original value */
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- /* Decrypt again */
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp, inlen);
- /* Check check bytes */
- if (((tmp[1] ^ tmp[4]) & (tmp[2] ^ tmp[5]) & (tmp[3] ^ tmp[6])) != 0xff) {
- /* Check byte failure */
- goto err;
- }
- if (inlen < (size_t)(tmp[0] - 4)) {
- /* Invalid length value */
- goto err;
- }
- *outlen = (size_t)tmp[0];
- memcpy(out, tmp + 4, *outlen);
- rv = 1;
- err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, inlen);
- OPENSSL_free(tmp);
- return rv;
-
-}
-
-static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
- size_t olen;
- int dummy;
- /*
- * First decide length of output buffer: need header and round up to
- * multiple of block length.
- */
- olen = (inlen + 4 + blocklen - 1) / blocklen;
- olen *= blocklen;
- if (olen < 2 * blocklen) {
- /* Key too small */
- return 0;
- }
- if (inlen > 0xFF) {
- /* Key too large */
- return 0;
- }
- if (out) {
- /* Set header */
- out[0] = (unsigned char)inlen;
- out[1] = in[0] ^ 0xFF;
- out[2] = in[1] ^ 0xFF;
- out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF;
- memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
- /* Add random padding to end */
- if (olen > inlen + 4
- && RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) < 0)
- return 0;
- /* Encrypt twice */
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
- }
-
- *outlen = olen;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Encrypt/Decrypt content key in PWRI recipient info */
-
-int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
- int en_de)
-{
- CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
- CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
- const unsigned char *p = NULL;
- int plen;
- int r = 0;
- X509_ALGOR *algtmp, *kekalg = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX kekctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
- unsigned char *key = NULL;
- size_t keylen;
-
- ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
-
- pwri = ri->d.pwri;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&kekctx);
-
- if (!pwri->pass) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD);
- return 0;
- }
- algtmp = pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
-
- if (!algtmp || OBJ_obj2nid(algtmp->algorithm) != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
- CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (algtmp->parameter->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
- p = algtmp->parameter->value.sequence->data;
- plen = algtmp->parameter->value.sequence->length;
- kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
- }
- if (kekalg == NULL) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
- CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
-
- kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm);
-
- if (!kekcipher) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier to set IV etc */
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
- goto err;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&kekctx, 0);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(&kekctx, kekalg->parameter) < 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
- CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- algtmp = pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm;
-
- /* Finish password based key derivation to setup key in "ctx" */
-
- if (EVP_PBE_CipherInit(algtmp->algorithm,
- (char *)pwri->pass, pwri->passlen,
- algtmp->parameter, &kekctx, en_de) < 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Finally wrap/unwrap the key */
-
- if (en_de) {
-
- if (!kek_wrap_key(NULL, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, &kekctx))
- goto err;
-
- key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
-
- if (!key)
- goto err;
-
- if (!kek_wrap_key(key, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, &kekctx))
- goto err;
- pwri->encryptedKey->data = key;
- pwri->encryptedKey->length = keylen;
- } else {
- key = OPENSSL_malloc(pwri->encryptedKey->length);
-
- if (!key) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!kek_unwrap_key(key, &keylen,
- pwri->encryptedKey->data,
- pwri->encryptedKey->length, &kekctx)) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ec->key = key;
- ec->keylen = keylen;
-
- }
-
- r = 1;
-
- err:
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kekctx);
-
- if (!r && key)
- OPENSSL_free(key);
- X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
-
- return r;
-
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,435 @@
+/* crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ */
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen)
+{
+ CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NOT_PWRI);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+ pwri->pass = pass;
+ if (pass && passlen < 0)
+ passlen = strlen((char *)pass);
+ pwri->passlen = passlen;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+ int iter, int wrap_nid,
+ int pbe_nid,
+ unsigned char *pass,
+ ossl_ssize_t passlen,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph)
+{
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
+ CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
+ CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ X509_ALGOR *encalg = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int ivlen;
+
+ env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
+ if (!env)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (wrap_nid <= 0)
+ wrap_nid = NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK;
+
+ if (pbe_nid <= 0)
+ pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2;
+
+ /* Get from enveloped data */
+ if (kekciph == NULL)
+ kekciph = env->encryptedContentInfo->cipher;
+
+ if (kekciph == NULL) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (wrap_nid != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
+ CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
+ encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (encalg == NULL) {
+ goto merr;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+
+ if (ivlen > 0) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ encalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+ if (!encalg->parameter) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(&ctx, encalg->parameter) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
+ CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ encalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(&ctx));
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ /* Initialize recipient info */
+ ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
+ if (!ri)
+ goto merr;
+
+ ri->d.pwri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo);
+ if (!ri->d.pwri)
+ goto merr;
+ ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS;
+
+ pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+ /* Since this is overwritten, free up empty structure already there */
+ X509_ALGOR_free(pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm);
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm)
+ goto merr;
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+ if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter)
+ goto merr;
+
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(encalg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
+ &pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->
+ value.sequence))
+ goto merr;
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+
+ X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
+ encalg = NULL;
+
+ /* Setup PBE algorithm */
+
+ pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, NULL, 0, -1, -1);
+
+ if (!pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm)
+ goto err;
+
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
+ pwri->version = 0;
+
+ if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
+ goto merr;
+
+ return ri;
+
+ merr:
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ if (ri)
+ M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
+ if (encalg)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
+ return NULL;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an implementation of the key wrapping mechanism in RFC3211, at
+ * some point this should go into EVP.
+ */
+
+static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+ int outl, rv = 0;
+ if (inlen < 2 * blocklen) {
+ /* too small */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (inlen % blocklen) {
+ /* Invalid size */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
+ if (!tmp)
+ return 0;
+ /* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
+ in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2);
+ /*
+ * Do a decrypt of last decrypted block to set IV to correct value output
+ * it to start of buffer so we don't corrupt decrypted block this works
+ * because buffer is at least two block lengths long.
+ */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp + inlen - blocklen, blocklen);
+ /* Can now decrypt first n - 1 blocks */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, in, inlen - blocklen);
+
+ /* Reset IV to original value */
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ /* Decrypt again */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp, inlen);
+ /* Check check bytes */
+ if (((tmp[1] ^ tmp[4]) & (tmp[2] ^ tmp[5]) & (tmp[3] ^ tmp[6])) != 0xff) {
+ /* Check byte failure */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (inlen < (size_t)(tmp[0] - 4)) {
+ /* Invalid length value */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *outlen = (size_t)tmp[0];
+ memcpy(out, tmp + 4, *outlen);
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, inlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ return rv;
+
+}
+
+static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+ size_t olen;
+ int dummy;
+ /*
+ * First decide length of output buffer: need header and round up to
+ * multiple of block length.
+ */
+ olen = (inlen + 4 + blocklen - 1) / blocklen;
+ olen *= blocklen;
+ if (olen < 2 * blocklen) {
+ /* Key too small */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (inlen > 0xFF) {
+ /* Key too large */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (out) {
+ /* Set header */
+ out[0] = (unsigned char)inlen;
+ out[1] = in[0] ^ 0xFF;
+ out[2] = in[1] ^ 0xFF;
+ out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF;
+ memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
+ /* Add random padding to end */
+ if (olen > inlen + 4
+ && RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Encrypt twice */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
+ }
+
+ *outlen = olen;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Encrypt/Decrypt content key in PWRI recipient info */
+
+int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ int en_de)
+{
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+ CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+ const unsigned char *p = NULL;
+ int plen;
+ int r = 0;
+ X509_ALGOR *algtmp, *kekalg = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX kekctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
+ unsigned char *key = NULL;
+ size_t keylen;
+
+ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+
+ pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&kekctx);
+
+ if (!pwri->pass) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ algtmp = pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+
+ if (!algtmp || OBJ_obj2nid(algtmp->algorithm) != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (algtmp->parameter->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+ p = algtmp->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = algtmp->parameter->value.sequence->length;
+ kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
+ }
+ if (kekalg == NULL) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm);
+
+ if (!kekcipher) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier to set IV etc */
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
+ goto err;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&kekctx, 0);
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(&kekctx, kekalg->parameter) < 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ algtmp = pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm;
+
+ /* Finish password based key derivation to setup key in "ctx" */
+
+ if (EVP_PBE_CipherInit(algtmp->algorithm,
+ (char *)pwri->pass, pwri->passlen,
+ algtmp->parameter, &kekctx, en_de) < 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Finally wrap/unwrap the key */
+
+ if (en_de) {
+
+ if (!kek_wrap_key(NULL, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, &kekctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
+
+ if (!key)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!kek_wrap_key(key, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, &kekctx))
+ goto err;
+ pwri->encryptedKey->data = key;
+ pwri->encryptedKey->length = keylen;
+ } else {
+ key = OPENSSL_malloc(pwri->encryptedKey->length);
+
+ if (!key) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!kek_unwrap_key(key, &keylen,
+ pwri->encryptedKey->data,
+ pwri->encryptedKey->length, &kekctx)) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ec->key = key;
+ ec->keylen = keylen;
+
+ }
+
+ r = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kekctx);
+
+ if (!r && key)
+ OPENSSL_free(key);
+ X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
+
+ return r;
+
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,796 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/cms/cms_smime.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- */
-
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/cms.h>
-#include "cms_lcl.h"
-
-static int cms_copy_content(BIO *out, BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
-{
- unsigned char buf[4096];
- int r = 0, i;
- BIO *tmpout = NULL;
-
- if (out == NULL)
- tmpout = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
- else if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
- tmpout = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(tmpout, 0);
- } else
- tmpout = out;
-
- if (!tmpout) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Read all content through chain to process digest, decrypt etc */
- for (;;) {
- i = BIO_read(in, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (i <= 0) {
- if (BIO_method_type(in) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) {
- if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(in))
- goto err;
- }
- if (i < 0)
- goto err;
- break;
- }
-
- if (tmpout && (BIO_write(tmpout, buf, i) != i))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
- if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- r = 1;
-
- err:
- if (tmpout && (tmpout != out))
- BIO_free(tmpout);
- return r;
-
-}
-
-static int check_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
-{
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
- if (!pos || !*pos) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CHECK_CONTENT, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
-{
- if (upto) {
- BIO *tbio;
- do {
- tbio = BIO_pop(f);
- BIO_free(f);
- f = tbio;
- }
- while (f && f != upto);
- } else
- BIO_free_all(f);
-}
-
-int CMS_data(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
-{
- BIO *cont;
- int r;
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_data) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATA, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
- cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, NULL);
- if (!cont)
- return 0;
- r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
- BIO_free_all(cont);
- return r;
-}
-
-CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_data_create(BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
-{
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
- cms = cms_Data_create();
- if (!cms)
- return NULL;
-
- if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
- return cms;
-
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int CMS_digest_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
- unsigned int flags)
-{
- BIO *cont;
- int r;
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_digest) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGEST_VERIFY, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DIGESTED_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
- return 0;
-
- cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
- if (!cont)
- return 0;
- r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
- if (r)
- r = cms_DigestedData_do_final(cms, cont, 1);
- do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
- return r;
-}
-
-CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_digest_create(BIO *in, const EVP_MD *md,
- unsigned int flags)
-{
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
- if (!md)
- md = EVP_sha1();
- cms = cms_DigestedData_create(md);
- if (!cms)
- return NULL;
-
- if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
- CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
-
- if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
- return cms;
-
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
- BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
-{
- BIO *cont;
- int r;
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_DECRYPT,
- CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
- return 0;
-
- if (CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(cms, NULL, key, keylen) <= 0)
- return 0;
- cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
- if (!cont)
- return 0;
- r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
- do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
- return r;
-}
-
-CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt(BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
- const unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen, unsigned int flags)
-{
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
- if (!cipher) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
- return NULL;
- }
- cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new();
- if (!cms)
- return NULL;
- if (!CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(cms, cipher, key, keylen))
- return NULL;
-
- if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
- CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
-
- if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL))
- || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
- return cms;
-
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
- X509_STORE *store,
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
- unsigned int flags)
-{
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
- X509 *signer;
- int i, j, r = 0;
- CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, certs)) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, "smime_sign");
- if (crls)
- X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&ctx, crls);
-
- i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
- if (i <= 0) {
- j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT,
- CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
- goto err;
- }
- r = 1;
- err:
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return r;
-
-}
-
-int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- X509_STORE *store, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
-{
- CMS_SignerInfo *si;
- STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos;
- STACK_OF(X509) *cms_certs = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
- X509 *signer;
- int i, scount = 0, ret = 0;
- BIO *cmsbio = NULL, *tmpin = NULL;
-
- if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
- return 0;
-
- /* Attempt to find all signer certificates */
-
- sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
-
- if (sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos) <= 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
- si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
- CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
- if (signer)
- scount++;
- }
-
- if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos))
- scount += CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, certs, flags);
-
- if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos)) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Attempt to verify all signers certs */
-
- if (!(flags & CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY)) {
- cms_certs = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
- if (!(flags & CMS_NOCRL))
- crls = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
- si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
- if (!cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(si, store,
- cms_certs, crls, flags))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Attempt to verify all SignerInfo signed attribute signatures */
-
- if (!(flags & CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY)) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
- si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
- if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) < 0)
- continue;
- if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify(si) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Performance optimization: if the content is a memory BIO then store
- * its contents in a temporary read only memory BIO. This avoids
- * potentially large numbers of slow copies of data which will occur when
- * reading from a read write memory BIO when signatures are calculated.
- */
-
- if (dcont && (BIO_method_type(dcont) == BIO_TYPE_MEM)) {
- char *ptr;
- long len;
- len = BIO_get_mem_data(dcont, &ptr);
- tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
- if (tmpin == NULL) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- } else
- tmpin = dcont;
-
- cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpin);
- if (!cmsbio)
- goto err;
-
- if (!cms_copy_content(out, cmsbio, flags))
- goto err;
-
- if (!(flags & CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY)) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
- si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
- if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio) <= 0) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
-
- if (dcont && (tmpin == dcont))
- do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
- else
- BIO_free_all(cmsbio);
-
- if (cms_certs)
- sk_X509_pop_free(cms_certs, X509_free);
- if (crls)
- sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-int CMS_verify_receipt(CMS_ContentInfo *rcms, CMS_ContentInfo *ocms,
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- X509_STORE *store, unsigned int flags)
-{
- int r;
- flags &= ~(CMS_DETACHED | CMS_TEXT);
- r = CMS_verify(rcms, certs, store, NULL, NULL, flags);
- if (r <= 0)
- return r;
- return cms_Receipt_verify(rcms, ocms);
-}
-
-CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data,
- unsigned int flags)
-{
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
- int i;
-
- cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new();
- if (!cms || !CMS_SignedData_init(cms))
- goto merr;
-
- if (pkey && !CMS_add1_signer(cms, signcert, pkey, NULL, flags)) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN, CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
- X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- if (!CMS_add1_cert(cms, x))
- goto merr;
- }
-
- if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
- CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
-
- if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL))
- || CMS_final(cms, data, NULL, flags))
- return cms;
- else
- goto err;
-
- merr:
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-
- err:
- if (cms)
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign_receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
- X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags)
-{
- CMS_SignerInfo *rct_si;
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos, *os;
- BIO *rct_cont = NULL;
- int r = 0;
-
- flags &= ~(CMS_STREAM | CMS_TEXT);
- /* Not really detached but avoids content being allocated */
- flags |= CMS_PARTIAL | CMS_BINARY | CMS_DETACHED;
- if (!pkey || !signcert) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY_OR_CERT);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* Initialize signed data */
-
- cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, certs, NULL, flags);
- if (!cms)
- goto err;
-
- /* Set inner content type to signed receipt */
- if (!CMS_set1_eContentType(cms, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ct_receipt)))
- goto err;
-
- rct_si = CMS_add1_signer(cms, signcert, pkey, NULL, flags);
- if (!rct_si) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT, CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- os = cms_encode_Receipt(si);
-
- if (!os)
- goto err;
-
- /* Set content to digest */
- rct_cont = BIO_new_mem_buf(os->data, os->length);
- if (!rct_cont)
- goto err;
-
- /* Add msgSigDigest attribute */
-
- if (!cms_msgSigDigest_add1(rct_si, si))
- goto err;
-
- /* Finalize structure */
- if (!CMS_final(cms, rct_cont, NULL, flags))
- goto err;
-
- /* Set embedded content */
- pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
- *pos = os;
-
- r = 1;
-
- err:
- if (rct_cont)
- BIO_free(rct_cont);
- if (r)
- return cms;
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
- return NULL;
-
-}
-
-CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data,
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned int flags)
-{
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
- int i;
- X509 *recip;
- cms = CMS_EnvelopedData_create(cipher);
- if (!cms)
- goto merr;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
- recip = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- if (!CMS_add1_recipient_cert(cms, recip, flags)) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_RECIPIENT_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
- CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
-
- if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL))
- || CMS_final(cms, data, NULL, flags))
- return cms;
- else
- goto err;
-
- merr:
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- err:
- if (cms)
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
-{
- STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
- CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
- int i, r;
- int debug = 0, ri_match = 0;
- ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
- if (ris)
- debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) {
- ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
- if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
- continue;
- ri_match = 1;
- /*
- * If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo otherwise try them
- * all.
- */
- if (!cert || (CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(ri, cert) == 0)) {
- CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
- r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
- CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
- if (cert) {
- /*
- * If not debugging clear any error and return success to
- * avoid leaking of information useful to MMA
- */
- if (!debug) {
- ERR_clear_error();
- return 1;
- }
- if (r > 0)
- return 1;
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop after first
- * successful decrypt. Always attempt to decrypt all recipients
- * to avoid leaking timing of a successful decrypt.
- */
- else if (r > 0 && debug)
- return 1;
- }
- }
- /* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
- if (ri_match && !cert && !debug) {
- ERR_clear_error();
- return 1;
- }
-
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-int CMS_decrypt_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
- unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
- unsigned char *id, size_t idlen)
-{
- STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
- CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
- int i, r;
- ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) {
- ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
- if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK)
- continue;
-
- /*
- * If we have an id try matching RecipientInfo otherwise try them
- * all.
- */
- if (!id || (CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(ri, id, idlen) == 0)) {
- CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(ri, key, keylen);
- r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
- CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(ri, NULL, 0);
- if (r > 0)
- return 1;
- if (id) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- }
-
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-int CMS_decrypt_set1_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
- unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen)
-{
- STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
- CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
- int i, r;
- ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) {
- ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
- if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS)
- continue;
- CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
- r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
- CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, NULL, 0);
- if (r > 0)
- return 1;
- }
-
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
- BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
-{
- int r;
- BIO *cont;
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
- return 0;
- if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
- cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
- else
- cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
- if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
- return 1;
- if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
- return 0;
- cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
- if (!cont)
- return 0;
- r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
- do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
- return r;
-}
-
-int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
-{
- BIO *cmsbio;
- int ret = 0;
- if (!(cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont))) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- SMIME_crlf_copy(data, cmsbio, flags);
-
- (void)BIO_flush(cmsbio);
-
- if (!CMS_dataFinal(cms, cmsbio)) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_DATAFINAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
-
- return ret;
-
-}
-
-#ifdef ZLIB
-
-int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
- unsigned int flags)
-{
- BIO *cont;
- int r;
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData) {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
- return 0;
-
- cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
- if (!cont)
- return 0;
- r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
- do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
- return r;
-}
-
-CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags)
-{
- CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
- if (comp_nid <= 0)
- comp_nid = NID_zlib_compression;
- cms = cms_CompressedData_create(comp_nid);
- if (!cms)
- return NULL;
-
- if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
- CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
-
- if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
- return cms;
-
- CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-#else
-
-int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
- unsigned int flags)
-{
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- return 0;
-}
-
-CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags)
-{
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,796 @@
+/* crypto/cms/cms_smime.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ */
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+
+static int cms_copy_content(BIO *out, BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[4096];
+ int r = 0, i;
+ BIO *tmpout = NULL;
+
+ if (out == NULL)
+ tmpout = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+ else if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
+ tmpout = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(tmpout, 0);
+ } else
+ tmpout = out;
+
+ if (!tmpout) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Read all content through chain to process digest, decrypt etc */
+ for (;;) {
+ i = BIO_read(in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ if (BIO_method_type(in) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) {
+ if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(in))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i < 0)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (tmpout && (BIO_write(tmpout, buf, i) != i))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
+ if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (tmpout && (tmpout != out))
+ BIO_free(tmpout);
+ return r;
+
+}
+
+static int check_content(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+ if (!pos || !*pos) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CHECK_CONTENT, CMS_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
+{
+ if (upto) {
+ BIO *tbio;
+ do {
+ tbio = BIO_pop(f);
+ BIO_free(f);
+ f = tbio;
+ }
+ while (f && f != upto);
+ } else
+ BIO_free_all(f);
+}
+
+int CMS_data(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ BIO *cont;
+ int r;
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_data) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DATA, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, NULL);
+ if (!cont)
+ return 0;
+ r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
+ BIO_free_all(cont);
+ return r;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_data_create(BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+ cms = cms_Data_create();
+ if (!cms)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
+ return cms;
+
+ CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int CMS_digest_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ BIO *cont;
+ int r;
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_digest) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGEST_VERIFY, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DIGESTED_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
+ return 0;
+
+ cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
+ if (!cont)
+ return 0;
+ r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
+ if (r)
+ r = cms_DigestedData_do_final(cms, cont, 1);
+ do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
+ return r;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_digest_create(BIO *in, const EVP_MD *md,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+ if (!md)
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ cms = cms_DigestedData_create(md);
+ if (!cms)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
+ CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+
+ if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
+ return cms;
+
+ CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ BIO *cont;
+ int r;
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_DECRYPT,
+ CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(cms, NULL, key, keylen) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
+ if (!cont)
+ return 0;
+ r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
+ do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
+ return r;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt(BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+ if (!cipher) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDDATA_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new();
+ if (!cms)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key(cms, cipher, key, keylen))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
+ CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+
+ if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL))
+ || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
+ return cms;
+
+ CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+ X509_STORE *store,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+ X509 *signer;
+ int i, j, r = 0;
+ CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, certs)) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, "smime_sign");
+ if (crls)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&ctx, crls);
+
+ i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT,
+ CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ r = 1;
+ err:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return r;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ X509_STORE *store, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMS_SignerInfo *si;
+ STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *sinfos;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cms_certs = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
+ X509 *signer;
+ int i, scount = 0, ret = 0;
+ BIO *cmsbio = NULL, *tmpin = NULL;
+
+ if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Attempt to find all signer certificates */
+
+ sinfos = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms);
+
+ if (sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_NO_SIGNERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+ si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+ CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
+ if (signer)
+ scount++;
+ }
+
+ if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos))
+ scount += CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, certs, flags);
+
+ if (scount != sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos)) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Attempt to verify all signers certs */
+
+ if (!(flags & CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY)) {
+ cms_certs = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
+ if (!(flags & CMS_NOCRL))
+ crls = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+ si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+ if (!cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(si, store,
+ cms_certs, crls, flags))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Attempt to verify all SignerInfo signed attribute signatures */
+
+ if (!(flags & CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY)) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+ si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+ if (CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si) < 0)
+ continue;
+ if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify(si) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Performance optimization: if the content is a memory BIO then store
+ * its contents in a temporary read only memory BIO. This avoids
+ * potentially large numbers of slow copies of data which will occur when
+ * reading from a read write memory BIO when signatures are calculated.
+ */
+
+ if (dcont && (BIO_method_type(dcont) == BIO_TYPE_MEM)) {
+ char *ptr;
+ long len;
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(dcont, &ptr);
+ tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
+ if (tmpin == NULL) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else
+ tmpin = dcont;
+
+ cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, tmpin);
+ if (!cmsbio)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!cms_copy_content(out, cmsbio, flags))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!(flags & CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY)) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++) {
+ si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
+ if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio) <= 0) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+ if (dcont && (tmpin == dcont))
+ do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
+ else
+ BIO_free_all(cmsbio);
+
+ if (cms_certs)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cms_certs, X509_free);
+ if (crls)
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int CMS_verify_receipt(CMS_ContentInfo *rcms, CMS_ContentInfo *ocms,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ X509_STORE *store, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int r;
+ flags &= ~(CMS_DETACHED | CMS_TEXT);
+ r = CMS_verify(rcms, certs, store, NULL, NULL, flags);
+ if (r <= 0)
+ return r;
+ return cms_Receipt_verify(rcms, ocms);
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+ int i;
+
+ cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new();
+ if (!cms || !CMS_SignedData_init(cms))
+ goto merr;
+
+ if (pkey && !CMS_add1_signer(cms, signcert, pkey, NULL, flags)) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN, CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!CMS_add1_cert(cms, x))
+ goto merr;
+ }
+
+ if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
+ CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+
+ if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL))
+ || CMS_final(cms, data, NULL, flags))
+ return cms;
+ else
+ goto err;
+
+ merr:
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+ if (cms)
+ CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_sign_receipt(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
+ X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMS_SignerInfo *rct_si;
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pos, *os;
+ BIO *rct_cont = NULL;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ flags &= ~(CMS_STREAM | CMS_TEXT);
+ /* Not really detached but avoids content being allocated */
+ flags |= CMS_PARTIAL | CMS_BINARY | CMS_DETACHED;
+ if (!pkey || !signcert) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY_OR_CERT);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize signed data */
+
+ cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, certs, NULL, flags);
+ if (!cms)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Set inner content type to signed receipt */
+ if (!CMS_set1_eContentType(cms, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ct_receipt)))
+ goto err;
+
+ rct_si = CMS_add1_signer(cms, signcert, pkey, NULL, flags);
+ if (!rct_si) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGN_RECEIPT, CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ os = cms_encode_Receipt(si);
+
+ if (!os)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Set content to digest */
+ rct_cont = BIO_new_mem_buf(os->data, os->length);
+ if (!rct_cont)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Add msgSigDigest attribute */
+
+ if (!cms_msgSigDigest_add1(rct_si, si))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Finalize structure */
+ if (!CMS_final(cms, rct_cont, NULL, flags))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Set embedded content */
+ pos = CMS_get0_content(cms);
+ *pos = os;
+
+ r = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (rct_cont)
+ BIO_free(rct_cont);
+ if (r)
+ return cms;
+ CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+ return NULL;
+
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+ int i;
+ X509 *recip;
+ cms = CMS_EnvelopedData_create(cipher);
+ if (!cms)
+ goto merr;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ recip = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!CMS_add1_recipient_cert(cms, recip, flags)) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_RECIPIENT_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
+ CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+
+ if ((flags & (CMS_STREAM | CMS_PARTIAL))
+ || CMS_final(cms, data, NULL, flags))
+ return cms;
+ else
+ goto err;
+
+ merr:
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+ if (cms)
+ CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
+{
+ STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
+ int i, r;
+ int debug = 0, ri_match = 0;
+ ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+ if (ris)
+ debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) {
+ ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
+ if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
+ continue;
+ ri_match = 1;
+ /*
+ * If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo otherwise try them
+ * all.
+ */
+ if (!cert || (CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(ri, cert) == 0)) {
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
+ r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
+ if (cert) {
+ /*
+ * If not debugging clear any error and return success to
+ * avoid leaking of information useful to MMA
+ */
+ if (!debug) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (r > 0)
+ return 1;
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop after first
+ * successful decrypt. Always attempt to decrypt all recipients
+ * to avoid leaking timing of a successful decrypt.
+ */
+ else if (r > 0 && debug)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
+ if (ri_match && !cert && !debug) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_decrypt_set1_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *id, size_t idlen)
+{
+ STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
+ int i, r;
+ ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) {
+ ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
+ if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have an id try matching RecipientInfo otherwise try them
+ * all.
+ */
+ if (!id || (CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(ri, id, idlen) == 0)) {
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(ri, key, keylen);
+ r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(ri, NULL, 0);
+ if (r > 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (id) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_KEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_decrypt_set1_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+ unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen)
+{
+ STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
+ int i, r;
+ ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++) {
+ ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
+ if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS)
+ continue;
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
+ r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, NULL, 0);
+ if (r > 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
+ BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int r;
+ BIO *cont;
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
+ return 0;
+ if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+ cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
+ else
+ cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+ if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
+ return 1;
+ if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
+ return 0;
+ cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
+ if (!cont)
+ return 0;
+ r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
+ do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ BIO *cmsbio;
+ int ret = 0;
+ if (!(cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont))) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ SMIME_crlf_copy(data, cmsbio, flags);
+
+ (void)BIO_flush(cmsbio);
+
+ if (!CMS_dataFinal(cms, cmsbio)) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_DATAFINAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
+
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+#ifdef ZLIB
+
+int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ BIO *cont;
+ int r;
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
+ return 0;
+
+ cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
+ if (!cont)
+ return 0;
+ r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
+ do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
+ return r;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
+ if (comp_nid <= 0)
+ comp_nid = NID_zlib_compression;
+ cms = cms_CompressedData_create(comp_nid);
+ if (!cms)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
+ CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
+
+ if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
+ return cms;
+
+ CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#else
+
+int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_compress(BIO *in, int comp_nid, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COMPRESS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,762 +0,0 @@
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/comp.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void);
-
-static COMP_METHOD zlib_method_nozlib = {
- NID_undef,
- "(undef)",
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
-};
-
-#ifndef ZLIB
-# undef ZLIB_SHARED
-#else
-
-# include <zlib.h>
-
-static int zlib_stateful_init(COMP_CTX *ctx);
-static void zlib_stateful_finish(COMP_CTX *ctx);
-static int zlib_stateful_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int ilen);
-static int zlib_stateful_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int ilen);
-
-/* memory allocations functions for zlib intialization */
-static void *zlib_zalloc(void *opaque, unsigned int no, unsigned int size)
-{
- void *p;
-
- p = OPENSSL_malloc(no * size);
- if (p)
- memset(p, 0, no * size);
- return p;
-}
-
-static void zlib_zfree(void *opaque, void *address)
-{
- OPENSSL_free(address);
-}
-
-# if 0
-static int zlib_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int ilen);
-static int zlib_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int ilen);
-
-static int zz_uncompress(Bytef *dest, uLongf * destLen, const Bytef *source,
- uLong sourceLen);
-
-static COMP_METHOD zlib_stateless_method = {
- NID_zlib_compression,
- LN_zlib_compression,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- zlib_compress_block,
- zlib_expand_block,
- NULL,
- NULL,
-};
-# endif
-
-static COMP_METHOD zlib_stateful_method = {
- NID_zlib_compression,
- LN_zlib_compression,
- zlib_stateful_init,
- zlib_stateful_finish,
- zlib_stateful_compress_block,
- zlib_stateful_expand_block,
- NULL,
- NULL,
-};
-
-/*
- * When OpenSSL is built on Windows, we do not want to require that
- * the ZLIB.DLL be available in order for the OpenSSL DLLs to
- * work. Therefore, all ZLIB routines are loaded at run time
- * and we do not link to a .LIB file when ZLIB_SHARED is set.
- */
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
-# include <windows.h>
-# endif /* !(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS ||
- * OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) */
-
-# ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
-# include <openssl/dso.h>
-
-/* Function pointers */
-typedef int (*compress_ft) (Bytef *dest, uLongf * destLen,
- const Bytef *source, uLong sourceLen);
-typedef int (*inflateEnd_ft) (z_streamp strm);
-typedef int (*inflate_ft) (z_streamp strm, int flush);
-typedef int (*inflateInit__ft) (z_streamp strm,
- const char *version, int stream_size);
-typedef int (*deflateEnd_ft) (z_streamp strm);
-typedef int (*deflate_ft) (z_streamp strm, int flush);
-typedef int (*deflateInit__ft) (z_streamp strm, int level,
- const char *version, int stream_size);
-typedef const char *(*zError__ft) (int err);
-static compress_ft p_compress = NULL;
-static inflateEnd_ft p_inflateEnd = NULL;
-static inflate_ft p_inflate = NULL;
-static inflateInit__ft p_inflateInit_ = NULL;
-static deflateEnd_ft p_deflateEnd = NULL;
-static deflate_ft p_deflate = NULL;
-static deflateInit__ft p_deflateInit_ = NULL;
-static zError__ft p_zError = NULL;
-
-static int zlib_loaded = 0; /* only attempt to init func pts once */
-static DSO *zlib_dso = NULL;
-
-# define compress p_compress
-# define inflateEnd p_inflateEnd
-# define inflate p_inflate
-# define inflateInit_ p_inflateInit_
-# define deflateEnd p_deflateEnd
-# define deflate p_deflate
-# define deflateInit_ p_deflateInit_
-# define zError p_zError
-# endif /* ZLIB_SHARED */
-
-struct zlib_state {
- z_stream istream;
- z_stream ostream;
-};
-
-static int zlib_stateful_ex_idx = -1;
-
-static int zlib_stateful_init(COMP_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int err;
- struct zlib_state *state =
- (struct zlib_state *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct zlib_state));
-
- if (state == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- state->istream.zalloc = zlib_zalloc;
- state->istream.zfree = zlib_zfree;
- state->istream.opaque = Z_NULL;
- state->istream.next_in = Z_NULL;
- state->istream.next_out = Z_NULL;
- state->istream.avail_in = 0;
- state->istream.avail_out = 0;
- err = inflateInit_(&state->istream, ZLIB_VERSION, sizeof(z_stream));
- if (err != Z_OK)
- goto err;
-
- state->ostream.zalloc = zlib_zalloc;
- state->ostream.zfree = zlib_zfree;
- state->ostream.opaque = Z_NULL;
- state->ostream.next_in = Z_NULL;
- state->ostream.next_out = Z_NULL;
- state->ostream.avail_in = 0;
- state->ostream.avail_out = 0;
- err = deflateInit_(&state->ostream, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION,
- ZLIB_VERSION, sizeof(z_stream));
- if (err != Z_OK)
- goto err;
-
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_COMP, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
- CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, zlib_stateful_ex_idx, state);
- return 1;
- err:
- if (state)
- OPENSSL_free(state);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void zlib_stateful_finish(COMP_CTX *ctx)
-{
- struct zlib_state *state =
- (struct zlib_state *)CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,
- zlib_stateful_ex_idx);
- inflateEnd(&state->istream);
- deflateEnd(&state->ostream);
- OPENSSL_free(state);
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_COMP, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
-}
-
-static int zlib_stateful_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int ilen)
-{
- int err = Z_OK;
- struct zlib_state *state =
- (struct zlib_state *)CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,
- zlib_stateful_ex_idx);
-
- if (state == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- state->ostream.next_in = in;
- state->ostream.avail_in = ilen;
- state->ostream.next_out = out;
- state->ostream.avail_out = olen;
- if (ilen > 0)
- err = deflate(&state->ostream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
- if (err != Z_OK)
- return -1;
-# ifdef DEBUG_ZLIB
- fprintf(stderr, "compress(%4d)->%4d %s\n",
- ilen, olen - state->ostream.avail_out,
- (ilen != olen - state->ostream.avail_out) ? "zlib" : "clear");
-# endif
- return olen - state->ostream.avail_out;
-}
-
-static int zlib_stateful_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int ilen)
-{
- int err = Z_OK;
-
- struct zlib_state *state =
- (struct zlib_state *)CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,
- zlib_stateful_ex_idx);
-
- if (state == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- state->istream.next_in = in;
- state->istream.avail_in = ilen;
- state->istream.next_out = out;
- state->istream.avail_out = olen;
- if (ilen > 0)
- err = inflate(&state->istream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
- if (err != Z_OK)
- return -1;
-# ifdef DEBUG_ZLIB
- fprintf(stderr, "expand(%4d)->%4d %s\n",
- ilen, olen - state->istream.avail_out,
- (ilen != olen - state->istream.avail_out) ? "zlib" : "clear");
-# endif
- return olen - state->istream.avail_out;
-}
-
-# if 0
-static int zlib_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int ilen)
-{
- unsigned long l;
- int i;
- int clear = 1;
-
- if (ilen > 128) {
- out[0] = 1;
- l = olen - 1;
- i = compress(&(out[1]), &l, in, (unsigned long)ilen);
- if (i != Z_OK)
- return (-1);
- if (ilen > l) {
- clear = 0;
- l++;
- }
- }
- if (clear) {
- out[0] = 0;
- memcpy(&(out[1]), in, ilen);
- l = ilen + 1;
- }
-# ifdef DEBUG_ZLIB
- fprintf(stderr, "compress(%4d)->%4d %s\n",
- ilen, (int)l, (clear) ? "clear" : "zlib");
-# endif
- return ((int)l);
-}
-
-static int zlib_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int ilen)
-{
- unsigned long l;
- int i;
-
- if (in[0]) {
- l = olen;
- i = zz_uncompress(out, &l, &(in[1]), (unsigned long)ilen - 1);
- if (i != Z_OK)
- return (-1);
- } else {
- memcpy(out, &(in[1]), ilen - 1);
- l = ilen - 1;
- }
-# ifdef DEBUG_ZLIB
- fprintf(stderr, "expand (%4d)->%4d %s\n",
- ilen, (int)l, in[0] ? "zlib" : "clear");
-# endif
- return ((int)l);
-}
-
-static int zz_uncompress(Bytef *dest, uLongf * destLen, const Bytef *source,
- uLong sourceLen)
-{
- z_stream stream;
- int err;
-
- stream.next_in = (Bytef *)source;
- stream.avail_in = (uInt) sourceLen;
- /* Check for source > 64K on 16-bit machine: */
- if ((uLong) stream.avail_in != sourceLen)
- return Z_BUF_ERROR;
-
- stream.next_out = dest;
- stream.avail_out = (uInt) * destLen;
- if ((uLong) stream.avail_out != *destLen)
- return Z_BUF_ERROR;
-
- stream.zalloc = (alloc_func) 0;
- stream.zfree = (free_func) 0;
-
- err = inflateInit_(&stream, ZLIB_VERSION, sizeof(z_stream));
- if (err != Z_OK)
- return err;
-
- err = inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH);
- if (err != Z_STREAM_END) {
- inflateEnd(&stream);
- return err;
- }
- *destLen = stream.total_out;
-
- err = inflateEnd(&stream);
- return err;
-}
-# endif
-
-#endif
-
-COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void)
-{
- COMP_METHOD *meth = &zlib_method_nozlib;
-
-#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
- if (!zlib_loaded) {
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
- zlib_dso = DSO_load(NULL, "ZLIB1", NULL, 0);
-# else
- zlib_dso = DSO_load(NULL, "z", NULL, 0);
-# endif
- if (zlib_dso != NULL) {
- p_compress = (compress_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "compress");
- p_inflateEnd
- = (inflateEnd_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflateEnd");
- p_inflate = (inflate_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflate");
- p_inflateInit_
- = (inflateInit__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflateInit_");
- p_deflateEnd
- = (deflateEnd_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflateEnd");
- p_deflate = (deflate_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflate");
- p_deflateInit_
- = (deflateInit__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflateInit_");
- p_zError = (zError__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "zError");
-
- if (p_compress && p_inflateEnd && p_inflate
- && p_inflateInit_ && p_deflateEnd
- && p_deflate && p_deflateInit_ && p_zError)
- zlib_loaded++;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
- if (zlib_loaded)
-#endif
-#if defined(ZLIB) || defined(ZLIB_SHARED)
- {
- /*
- * init zlib_stateful_ex_idx here so that in a multi-process
- * application it's enough to intialize openssl before forking (idx
- * will be inherited in all the children)
- */
- if (zlib_stateful_ex_idx == -1) {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_COMP);
- if (zlib_stateful_ex_idx == -1)
- zlib_stateful_ex_idx =
- CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_COMP,
- 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_COMP);
- if (zlib_stateful_ex_idx == -1)
- goto err;
- }
-
- meth = &zlib_stateful_method;
- }
- err:
-#endif
-
- return (meth);
-}
-
-void COMP_zlib_cleanup(void)
-{
-#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
- if (zlib_dso)
- DSO_free(zlib_dso);
-#endif
-}
-
-#ifdef ZLIB
-
-/* Zlib based compression/decompression filter BIO */
-
-typedef struct {
- unsigned char *ibuf; /* Input buffer */
- int ibufsize; /* Buffer size */
- z_stream zin; /* Input decompress context */
- unsigned char *obuf; /* Output buffer */
- int obufsize; /* Output buffer size */
- unsigned char *optr; /* Position in output buffer */
- int ocount; /* Amount of data in output buffer */
- int odone; /* deflate EOF */
- int comp_level; /* Compression level to use */
- z_stream zout; /* Output compression context */
-} BIO_ZLIB_CTX;
-
-# define ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE 1024
-
-static int bio_zlib_new(BIO *bi);
-static int bio_zlib_free(BIO *bi);
-static int bio_zlib_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl);
-static int bio_zlib_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl);
-static long bio_zlib_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr);
-static long bio_zlib_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp);
-
-static BIO_METHOD bio_meth_zlib = {
- BIO_TYPE_COMP,
- "zlib",
- bio_zlib_write,
- bio_zlib_read,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- bio_zlib_ctrl,
- bio_zlib_new,
- bio_zlib_free,
- bio_zlib_callback_ctrl
-};
-
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_zlib(void)
-{
- return &bio_meth_zlib;
-}
-
-static int bio_zlib_new(BIO *bi)
-{
- BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
-# ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
- (void)COMP_zlib();
- if (!zlib_loaded) {
- COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW, COMP_R_ZLIB_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return 0;
- }
-# endif
- ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_ZLIB_CTX));
- if (!ctx) {
- COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->ibuf = NULL;
- ctx->obuf = NULL;
- ctx->ibufsize = ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE;
- ctx->obufsize = ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE;
- ctx->zin.zalloc = Z_NULL;
- ctx->zin.zfree = Z_NULL;
- ctx->zin.next_in = NULL;
- ctx->zin.avail_in = 0;
- ctx->zin.next_out = NULL;
- ctx->zin.avail_out = 0;
- ctx->zout.zalloc = Z_NULL;
- ctx->zout.zfree = Z_NULL;
- ctx->zout.next_in = NULL;
- ctx->zout.avail_in = 0;
- ctx->zout.next_out = NULL;
- ctx->zout.avail_out = 0;
- ctx->odone = 0;
- ctx->comp_level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
- bi->init = 1;
- bi->ptr = (char *)ctx;
- bi->flags = 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int bio_zlib_free(BIO *bi)
-{
- BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
- if (!bi)
- return 0;
- ctx = (BIO_ZLIB_CTX *) bi->ptr;
- if (ctx->ibuf) {
- /* Destroy decompress context */
- inflateEnd(&ctx->zin);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf);
- }
- if (ctx->obuf) {
- /* Destroy compress context */
- deflateEnd(&ctx->zout);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
- bi->ptr = NULL;
- bi->init = 0;
- bi->flags = 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int bio_zlib_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
-{
- BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
- int ret;
- z_stream *zin;
- if (!out || !outl)
- return 0;
- ctx = (BIO_ZLIB_CTX *) b->ptr;
- zin = &ctx->zin;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
- if (!ctx->ibuf) {
- ctx->ibuf = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->ibufsize);
- if (!ctx->ibuf) {
- COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- inflateInit(zin);
- zin->next_in = ctx->ibuf;
- zin->avail_in = 0;
- }
-
- /* Copy output data directly to supplied buffer */
- zin->next_out = (unsigned char *)out;
- zin->avail_out = (unsigned int)outl;
- for (;;) {
- /* Decompress while data available */
- while (zin->avail_in) {
- ret = inflate(zin, 0);
- if ((ret != Z_OK) && (ret != Z_STREAM_END)) {
- COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ, COMP_R_ZLIB_INFLATE_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret));
- return 0;
- }
- /* If EOF or we've read everything then return */
- if ((ret == Z_STREAM_END) || !zin->avail_out)
- return outl - zin->avail_out;
- }
-
- /*
- * No data in input buffer try to read some in, if an error then
- * return the total data read.
- */
- ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, ctx->ibuf, ctx->ibufsize);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- /* Total data read */
- int tot = outl - zin->avail_out;
- BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
- if (ret < 0)
- return (tot > 0) ? tot : ret;
- return tot;
- }
- zin->avail_in = ret;
- zin->next_in = ctx->ibuf;
- }
-}
-
-static int bio_zlib_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
-{
- BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
- int ret;
- z_stream *zout;
- if (!in || !inl)
- return 0;
- ctx = (BIO_ZLIB_CTX *) b->ptr;
- if (ctx->odone)
- return 0;
- zout = &ctx->zout;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
- if (!ctx->obuf) {
- ctx->obuf = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->obufsize);
- /* Need error here */
- if (!ctx->obuf) {
- COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->optr = ctx->obuf;
- ctx->ocount = 0;
- deflateInit(zout, ctx->comp_level);
- zout->next_out = ctx->obuf;
- zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize;
- }
- /* Obtain input data directly from supplied buffer */
- zout->next_in = (void *)in;
- zout->avail_in = inl;
- for (;;) {
- /* If data in output buffer write it first */
- while (ctx->ocount) {
- ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, ctx->optr, ctx->ocount);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- /* Total data written */
- int tot = inl - zout->avail_in;
- BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
- if (ret < 0)
- return (tot > 0) ? tot : ret;
- return tot;
- }
- ctx->optr += ret;
- ctx->ocount -= ret;
- }
-
- /* Have we consumed all supplied data? */
- if (!zout->avail_in)
- return inl;
-
- /* Compress some more */
-
- /* Reset buffer */
- ctx->optr = ctx->obuf;
- zout->next_out = ctx->obuf;
- zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize;
- /* Compress some more */
- ret = deflate(zout, 0);
- if (ret != Z_OK) {
- COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE, COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret));
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->ocount = ctx->obufsize - zout->avail_out;
- }
-}
-
-static int bio_zlib_flush(BIO *b)
-{
- BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
- int ret;
- z_stream *zout;
- ctx = (BIO_ZLIB_CTX *) b->ptr;
- /* If no data written or already flush show success */
- if (!ctx->obuf || (ctx->odone && !ctx->ocount))
- return 1;
- zout = &ctx->zout;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
- /* No more input data */
- zout->next_in = NULL;
- zout->avail_in = 0;
- for (;;) {
- /* If data in output buffer write it first */
- while (ctx->ocount) {
- ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, ctx->optr, ctx->ocount);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
- return ret;
- }
- ctx->optr += ret;
- ctx->ocount -= ret;
- }
- if (ctx->odone)
- return 1;
-
- /* Compress some more */
-
- /* Reset buffer */
- ctx->optr = ctx->obuf;
- zout->next_out = ctx->obuf;
- zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize;
- /* Compress some more */
- ret = deflate(zout, Z_FINISH);
- if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
- ctx->odone = 1;
- else if (ret != Z_OK) {
- COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_FLUSH, COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret));
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->ocount = ctx->obufsize - zout->avail_out;
- }
-}
-
-static long bio_zlib_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
-{
- BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
- int ret, *ip;
- int ibs, obs;
- if (!b->next_bio)
- return 0;
- ctx = (BIO_ZLIB_CTX *) b->ptr;
- switch (cmd) {
-
- case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
- ctx->ocount = 0;
- ctx->odone = 0;
- ret = 1;
- break;
-
- case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
- ret = bio_zlib_flush(b);
- if (ret > 0)
- ret = BIO_flush(b->next_bio);
- break;
-
- case BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE:
- ibs = -1;
- obs = -1;
- if (ptr != NULL) {
- ip = ptr;
- if (*ip == 0)
- ibs = (int)num;
- else
- obs = (int)num;
- } else {
- ibs = (int)num;
- obs = ibs;
- }
-
- if (ibs != -1) {
- if (ctx->ibuf) {
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf);
- ctx->ibuf = NULL;
- }
- ctx->ibufsize = ibs;
- }
-
- if (obs != -1) {
- if (ctx->obuf) {
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf);
- ctx->obuf = NULL;
- }
- ctx->obufsize = obs;
- }
- ret = 1;
- break;
-
- case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
- ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
- BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
- break;
-
- default:
- ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
- break;
-
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static long bio_zlib_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp)
-{
- if (!b->next_bio)
- return 0;
- return BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, fp);
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,763 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void);
+
+static COMP_METHOD zlib_method_nozlib = {
+ NID_undef,
+ "(undef)",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+#ifndef ZLIB
+# undef ZLIB_SHARED
+#else
+
+# include <zlib.h>
+
+static int zlib_stateful_init(COMP_CTX *ctx);
+static void zlib_stateful_finish(COMP_CTX *ctx);
+static int zlib_stateful_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int ilen);
+static int zlib_stateful_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int ilen);
+
+/* memory allocations functions for zlib intialization */
+static void *zlib_zalloc(void *opaque, unsigned int no, unsigned int size)
+{
+ void *p;
+
+ p = OPENSSL_malloc(no * size);
+ if (p)
+ memset(p, 0, no * size);
+ return p;
+}
+
+static void zlib_zfree(void *opaque, void *address)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(address);
+}
+
+# if 0
+static int zlib_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int ilen);
+static int zlib_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int ilen);
+
+static int zz_uncompress(Bytef *dest, uLongf * destLen, const Bytef *source,
+ uLong sourceLen);
+
+static COMP_METHOD zlib_stateless_method = {
+ NID_zlib_compression,
+ LN_zlib_compression,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ zlib_compress_block,
+ zlib_expand_block,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+};
+# endif
+
+static COMP_METHOD zlib_stateful_method = {
+ NID_zlib_compression,
+ LN_zlib_compression,
+ zlib_stateful_init,
+ zlib_stateful_finish,
+ zlib_stateful_compress_block,
+ zlib_stateful_expand_block,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+/*
+ * When OpenSSL is built on Windows, we do not want to require that
+ * the ZLIB.DLL be available in order for the OpenSSL DLLs to
+ * work. Therefore, all ZLIB routines are loaded at run time
+ * and we do not link to a .LIB file when ZLIB_SHARED is set.
+ */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+# include <windows.h>
+# endif /* !(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS ||
+ * OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) */
+
+# ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
+# include <openssl/dso.h>
+
+/* Function pointers */
+typedef int (*compress_ft) (Bytef *dest, uLongf * destLen,
+ const Bytef *source, uLong sourceLen);
+typedef int (*inflateEnd_ft) (z_streamp strm);
+typedef int (*inflate_ft) (z_streamp strm, int flush);
+typedef int (*inflateInit__ft) (z_streamp strm,
+ const char *version, int stream_size);
+typedef int (*deflateEnd_ft) (z_streamp strm);
+typedef int (*deflate_ft) (z_streamp strm, int flush);
+typedef int (*deflateInit__ft) (z_streamp strm, int level,
+ const char *version, int stream_size);
+typedef const char *(*zError__ft) (int err);
+static compress_ft p_compress = NULL;
+static inflateEnd_ft p_inflateEnd = NULL;
+static inflate_ft p_inflate = NULL;
+static inflateInit__ft p_inflateInit_ = NULL;
+static deflateEnd_ft p_deflateEnd = NULL;
+static deflate_ft p_deflate = NULL;
+static deflateInit__ft p_deflateInit_ = NULL;
+static zError__ft p_zError = NULL;
+
+static int zlib_loaded = 0; /* only attempt to init func pts once */
+static DSO *zlib_dso = NULL;
+
+# define compress p_compress
+# define inflateEnd p_inflateEnd
+# define inflate p_inflate
+# define inflateInit_ p_inflateInit_
+# define deflateEnd p_deflateEnd
+# define deflate p_deflate
+# define deflateInit_ p_deflateInit_
+# define zError p_zError
+# endif /* ZLIB_SHARED */
+
+struct zlib_state {
+ z_stream istream;
+ z_stream ostream;
+};
+
+static int zlib_stateful_ex_idx = -1;
+
+static int zlib_stateful_init(COMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct zlib_state *state =
+ (struct zlib_state *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct zlib_state));
+
+ if (state == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ state->istream.zalloc = zlib_zalloc;
+ state->istream.zfree = zlib_zfree;
+ state->istream.opaque = Z_NULL;
+ state->istream.next_in = Z_NULL;
+ state->istream.next_out = Z_NULL;
+ state->istream.avail_in = 0;
+ state->istream.avail_out = 0;
+ err = inflateInit_(&state->istream, ZLIB_VERSION, sizeof(z_stream));
+ if (err != Z_OK)
+ goto err;
+
+ state->ostream.zalloc = zlib_zalloc;
+ state->ostream.zfree = zlib_zfree;
+ state->ostream.opaque = Z_NULL;
+ state->ostream.next_in = Z_NULL;
+ state->ostream.next_out = Z_NULL;
+ state->ostream.avail_in = 0;
+ state->ostream.avail_out = 0;
+ err = deflateInit_(&state->ostream, Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION,
+ ZLIB_VERSION, sizeof(z_stream));
+ if (err != Z_OK)
+ goto err;
+
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_COMP, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, zlib_stateful_ex_idx, state);
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (state)
+ OPENSSL_free(state);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void zlib_stateful_finish(COMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct zlib_state *state =
+ (struct zlib_state *)CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,
+ zlib_stateful_ex_idx);
+ inflateEnd(&state->istream);
+ deflateEnd(&state->ostream);
+ OPENSSL_free(state);
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_COMP, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
+}
+
+static int zlib_stateful_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int ilen)
+{
+ int err = Z_OK;
+ struct zlib_state *state =
+ (struct zlib_state *)CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,
+ zlib_stateful_ex_idx);
+
+ if (state == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ state->ostream.next_in = in;
+ state->ostream.avail_in = ilen;
+ state->ostream.next_out = out;
+ state->ostream.avail_out = olen;
+ if (ilen > 0)
+ err = deflate(&state->ostream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
+ if (err != Z_OK)
+ return -1;
+# ifdef DEBUG_ZLIB
+ fprintf(stderr, "compress(%4d)->%4d %s\n",
+ ilen, olen - state->ostream.avail_out,
+ (ilen != olen - state->ostream.avail_out) ? "zlib" : "clear");
+# endif
+ return olen - state->ostream.avail_out;
+}
+
+static int zlib_stateful_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int ilen)
+{
+ int err = Z_OK;
+
+ struct zlib_state *state =
+ (struct zlib_state *)CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,
+ zlib_stateful_ex_idx);
+
+ if (state == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ state->istream.next_in = in;
+ state->istream.avail_in = ilen;
+ state->istream.next_out = out;
+ state->istream.avail_out = olen;
+ if (ilen > 0)
+ err = inflate(&state->istream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
+ if (err != Z_OK)
+ return -1;
+# ifdef DEBUG_ZLIB
+ fprintf(stderr, "expand(%4d)->%4d %s\n",
+ ilen, olen - state->istream.avail_out,
+ (ilen != olen - state->istream.avail_out) ? "zlib" : "clear");
+# endif
+ return olen - state->istream.avail_out;
+}
+
+# if 0
+static int zlib_compress_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int ilen)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ int i;
+ int clear = 1;
+
+ if (ilen > 128) {
+ out[0] = 1;
+ l = olen - 1;
+ i = compress(&(out[1]), &l, in, (unsigned long)ilen);
+ if (i != Z_OK)
+ return (-1);
+ if (ilen > l) {
+ clear = 0;
+ l++;
+ }
+ }
+ if (clear) {
+ out[0] = 0;
+ memcpy(&(out[1]), in, ilen);
+ l = ilen + 1;
+ }
+# ifdef DEBUG_ZLIB
+ fprintf(stderr, "compress(%4d)->%4d %s\n",
+ ilen, (int)l, (clear) ? "clear" : "zlib");
+# endif
+ return ((int)l);
+}
+
+static int zlib_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned int olen, unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int ilen)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ int i;
+
+ if (in[0]) {
+ l = olen;
+ i = zz_uncompress(out, &l, &(in[1]), (unsigned long)ilen - 1);
+ if (i != Z_OK)
+ return (-1);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(out, &(in[1]), ilen - 1);
+ l = ilen - 1;
+ }
+# ifdef DEBUG_ZLIB
+ fprintf(stderr, "expand (%4d)->%4d %s\n",
+ ilen, (int)l, in[0] ? "zlib" : "clear");
+# endif
+ return ((int)l);
+}
+
+static int zz_uncompress(Bytef *dest, uLongf * destLen, const Bytef *source,
+ uLong sourceLen)
+{
+ z_stream stream;
+ int err;
+
+ stream.next_in = (Bytef *)source;
+ stream.avail_in = (uInt) sourceLen;
+ /* Check for source > 64K on 16-bit machine: */
+ if ((uLong) stream.avail_in != sourceLen)
+ return Z_BUF_ERROR;
+
+ stream.next_out = dest;
+ stream.avail_out = (uInt) * destLen;
+ if ((uLong) stream.avail_out != *destLen)
+ return Z_BUF_ERROR;
+
+ stream.zalloc = (alloc_func) 0;
+ stream.zfree = (free_func) 0;
+
+ err = inflateInit_(&stream, ZLIB_VERSION, sizeof(z_stream));
+ if (err != Z_OK)
+ return err;
+
+ err = inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH);
+ if (err != Z_STREAM_END) {
+ inflateEnd(&stream);
+ return err;
+ }
+ *destLen = stream.total_out;
+
+ err = inflateEnd(&stream);
+ return err;
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif
+
+COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void)
+{
+ COMP_METHOD *meth = &zlib_method_nozlib;
+
+#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
+ if (!zlib_loaded) {
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+ zlib_dso = DSO_load(NULL, "ZLIB1", NULL, 0);
+# else
+ zlib_dso = DSO_load(NULL, "z", NULL, 0);
+# endif
+ if (zlib_dso != NULL) {
+ p_compress = (compress_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "compress");
+ p_inflateEnd
+ = (inflateEnd_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflateEnd");
+ p_inflate = (inflate_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflate");
+ p_inflateInit_
+ = (inflateInit__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "inflateInit_");
+ p_deflateEnd
+ = (deflateEnd_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflateEnd");
+ p_deflate = (deflate_ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflate");
+ p_deflateInit_
+ = (deflateInit__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "deflateInit_");
+ p_zError = (zError__ft) DSO_bind_func(zlib_dso, "zError");
+
+ if (p_compress && p_inflateEnd && p_inflate
+ && p_inflateInit_ && p_deflateEnd
+ && p_deflate && p_deflateInit_ && p_zError)
+ zlib_loaded++;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
+ if (zlib_loaded)
+#endif
+#if defined(ZLIB) || defined(ZLIB_SHARED)
+ {
+ /*
+ * init zlib_stateful_ex_idx here so that in a multi-process
+ * application it's enough to intialize openssl before forking (idx
+ * will be inherited in all the children)
+ */
+ if (zlib_stateful_ex_idx == -1) {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_COMP);
+ if (zlib_stateful_ex_idx == -1)
+ zlib_stateful_ex_idx =
+ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_COMP,
+ 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_COMP);
+ if (zlib_stateful_ex_idx == -1)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ meth = &zlib_stateful_method;
+ }
+ err:
+#endif
+
+ return (meth);
+}
+
+void COMP_zlib_cleanup(void)
+{
+#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
+ if (zlib_dso != NULL)
+ DSO_free(zlib_dso);
+ zlib_dso = NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef ZLIB
+
+/* Zlib based compression/decompression filter BIO */
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char *ibuf; /* Input buffer */
+ int ibufsize; /* Buffer size */
+ z_stream zin; /* Input decompress context */
+ unsigned char *obuf; /* Output buffer */
+ int obufsize; /* Output buffer size */
+ unsigned char *optr; /* Position in output buffer */
+ int ocount; /* Amount of data in output buffer */
+ int odone; /* deflate EOF */
+ int comp_level; /* Compression level to use */
+ z_stream zout; /* Output compression context */
+} BIO_ZLIB_CTX;
+
+# define ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE 1024
+
+static int bio_zlib_new(BIO *bi);
+static int bio_zlib_free(BIO *bi);
+static int bio_zlib_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl);
+static int bio_zlib_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl);
+static long bio_zlib_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr);
+static long bio_zlib_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp);
+
+static BIO_METHOD bio_meth_zlib = {
+ BIO_TYPE_COMP,
+ "zlib",
+ bio_zlib_write,
+ bio_zlib_read,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ bio_zlib_ctrl,
+ bio_zlib_new,
+ bio_zlib_free,
+ bio_zlib_callback_ctrl
+};
+
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_zlib(void)
+{
+ return &bio_meth_zlib;
+}
+
+static int bio_zlib_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+ BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+# ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
+ (void)COMP_zlib();
+ if (!zlib_loaded) {
+ COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW, COMP_R_ZLIB_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
+ ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_ZLIB_CTX));
+ if (!ctx) {
+ COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->ibuf = NULL;
+ ctx->obuf = NULL;
+ ctx->ibufsize = ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE;
+ ctx->obufsize = ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE;
+ ctx->zin.zalloc = Z_NULL;
+ ctx->zin.zfree = Z_NULL;
+ ctx->zin.next_in = NULL;
+ ctx->zin.avail_in = 0;
+ ctx->zin.next_out = NULL;
+ ctx->zin.avail_out = 0;
+ ctx->zout.zalloc = Z_NULL;
+ ctx->zout.zfree = Z_NULL;
+ ctx->zout.next_in = NULL;
+ ctx->zout.avail_in = 0;
+ ctx->zout.next_out = NULL;
+ ctx->zout.avail_out = 0;
+ ctx->odone = 0;
+ ctx->comp_level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
+ bi->init = 1;
+ bi->ptr = (char *)ctx;
+ bi->flags = 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int bio_zlib_free(BIO *bi)
+{
+ BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+ if (!bi)
+ return 0;
+ ctx = (BIO_ZLIB_CTX *) bi->ptr;
+ if (ctx->ibuf) {
+ /* Destroy decompress context */
+ inflateEnd(&ctx->zin);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf);
+ }
+ if (ctx->obuf) {
+ /* Destroy compress context */
+ deflateEnd(&ctx->zout);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ bi->ptr = NULL;
+ bi->init = 0;
+ bi->flags = 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int bio_zlib_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+ BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+ int ret;
+ z_stream *zin;
+ if (!out || !outl)
+ return 0;
+ ctx = (BIO_ZLIB_CTX *) b->ptr;
+ zin = &ctx->zin;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ if (!ctx->ibuf) {
+ ctx->ibuf = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->ibufsize);
+ if (!ctx->ibuf) {
+ COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ inflateInit(zin);
+ zin->next_in = ctx->ibuf;
+ zin->avail_in = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy output data directly to supplied buffer */
+ zin->next_out = (unsigned char *)out;
+ zin->avail_out = (unsigned int)outl;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Decompress while data available */
+ while (zin->avail_in) {
+ ret = inflate(zin, 0);
+ if ((ret != Z_OK) && (ret != Z_STREAM_END)) {
+ COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_READ, COMP_R_ZLIB_INFLATE_ERROR);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* If EOF or we've read everything then return */
+ if ((ret == Z_STREAM_END) || !zin->avail_out)
+ return outl - zin->avail_out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * No data in input buffer try to read some in, if an error then
+ * return the total data read.
+ */
+ ret = BIO_read(b->next_bio, ctx->ibuf, ctx->ibufsize);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ /* Total data read */
+ int tot = outl - zin->avail_out;
+ BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return (tot > 0) ? tot : ret;
+ return tot;
+ }
+ zin->avail_in = ret;
+ zin->next_in = ctx->ibuf;
+ }
+}
+
+static int bio_zlib_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
+{
+ BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+ int ret;
+ z_stream *zout;
+ if (!in || !inl)
+ return 0;
+ ctx = (BIO_ZLIB_CTX *) b->ptr;
+ if (ctx->odone)
+ return 0;
+ zout = &ctx->zout;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ if (!ctx->obuf) {
+ ctx->obuf = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->obufsize);
+ /* Need error here */
+ if (!ctx->obuf) {
+ COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->optr = ctx->obuf;
+ ctx->ocount = 0;
+ deflateInit(zout, ctx->comp_level);
+ zout->next_out = ctx->obuf;
+ zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize;
+ }
+ /* Obtain input data directly from supplied buffer */
+ zout->next_in = (void *)in;
+ zout->avail_in = inl;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If data in output buffer write it first */
+ while (ctx->ocount) {
+ ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, ctx->optr, ctx->ocount);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ /* Total data written */
+ int tot = inl - zout->avail_in;
+ BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return (tot > 0) ? tot : ret;
+ return tot;
+ }
+ ctx->optr += ret;
+ ctx->ocount -= ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Have we consumed all supplied data? */
+ if (!zout->avail_in)
+ return inl;
+
+ /* Compress some more */
+
+ /* Reset buffer */
+ ctx->optr = ctx->obuf;
+ zout->next_out = ctx->obuf;
+ zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize;
+ /* Compress some more */
+ ret = deflate(zout, 0);
+ if (ret != Z_OK) {
+ COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_WRITE, COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->ocount = ctx->obufsize - zout->avail_out;
+ }
+}
+
+static int bio_zlib_flush(BIO *b)
+{
+ BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+ int ret;
+ z_stream *zout;
+ ctx = (BIO_ZLIB_CTX *) b->ptr;
+ /* If no data written or already flush show success */
+ if (!ctx->obuf || (ctx->odone && !ctx->ocount))
+ return 1;
+ zout = &ctx->zout;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ /* No more input data */
+ zout->next_in = NULL;
+ zout->avail_in = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If data in output buffer write it first */
+ while (ctx->ocount) {
+ ret = BIO_write(b->next_bio, ctx->optr, ctx->ocount);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ctx->optr += ret;
+ ctx->ocount -= ret;
+ }
+ if (ctx->odone)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Compress some more */
+
+ /* Reset buffer */
+ ctx->optr = ctx->obuf;
+ zout->next_out = ctx->obuf;
+ zout->avail_out = ctx->obufsize;
+ /* Compress some more */
+ ret = deflate(zout, Z_FINISH);
+ if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
+ ctx->odone = 1;
+ else if (ret != Z_OK) {
+ COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_FLUSH, COMP_R_ZLIB_DEFLATE_ERROR);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "zlib error:", zError(ret));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->ocount = ctx->obufsize - zout->avail_out;
+ }
+}
+
+static long bio_zlib_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+ BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
+ int ret, *ip;
+ int ibs, obs;
+ if (!b->next_bio)
+ return 0;
+ ctx = (BIO_ZLIB_CTX *) b->ptr;
+ switch (cmd) {
+
+ case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+ ctx->ocount = 0;
+ ctx->odone = 0;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+ ret = bio_zlib_flush(b);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ ret = BIO_flush(b->next_bio);
+ break;
+
+ case BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE:
+ ibs = -1;
+ obs = -1;
+ if (ptr != NULL) {
+ ip = ptr;
+ if (*ip == 0)
+ ibs = (int)num;
+ else
+ obs = (int)num;
+ } else {
+ ibs = (int)num;
+ obs = ibs;
+ }
+
+ if (ibs != -1) {
+ if (ctx->ibuf) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->ibuf);
+ ctx->ibuf = NULL;
+ }
+ ctx->ibufsize = ibs;
+ }
+
+ if (obs != -1) {
+ if (ctx->obuf) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->obuf);
+ ctx->obuf = NULL;
+ }
+ ctx->obufsize = obs;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+ BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+ break;
+
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static long bio_zlib_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp)
+{
+ if (!b->next_bio)
+ return 0;
+ return BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, fp);
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/conf/conf_def.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_def.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,707 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/conf/conf.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-/* Part of the code in here was originally in conf.c, which is now removed */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/stack.h>
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/conf_api.h>
-#include "conf_def.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-static char *eat_ws(CONF *conf, char *p);
-static char *eat_alpha_numeric(CONF *conf, char *p);
-static void clear_comments(CONF *conf, char *p);
-static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **to, char *from);
-static char *scan_quote(CONF *conf, char *p);
-static char *scan_dquote(CONF *conf, char *p);
-#define scan_esc(conf,p) (((IS_EOF((conf),(p)[1]))?((p)+1):((p)+2)))
-
-static CONF *def_create(CONF_METHOD *meth);
-static int def_init_default(CONF *conf);
-static int def_init_WIN32(CONF *conf);
-static int def_destroy(CONF *conf);
-static int def_destroy_data(CONF *conf);
-static int def_load(CONF *conf, const char *name, long *eline);
-static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline);
-static int def_dump(const CONF *conf, BIO *bp);
-static int def_is_number(const CONF *conf, char c);
-static int def_to_int(const CONF *conf, char c);
-
-const char CONF_def_version[] = "CONF_def" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
-static CONF_METHOD default_method = {
- "OpenSSL default",
- def_create,
- def_init_default,
- def_destroy,
- def_destroy_data,
- def_load_bio,
- def_dump,
- def_is_number,
- def_to_int,
- def_load
-};
-
-static CONF_METHOD WIN32_method = {
- "WIN32",
- def_create,
- def_init_WIN32,
- def_destroy,
- def_destroy_data,
- def_load_bio,
- def_dump,
- def_is_number,
- def_to_int,
- def_load
-};
-
-CONF_METHOD *NCONF_default()
-{
- return &default_method;
-}
-
-CONF_METHOD *NCONF_WIN32()
-{
- return &WIN32_method;
-}
-
-static CONF *def_create(CONF_METHOD *meth)
-{
- CONF *ret;
-
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF) + sizeof(unsigned short *));
- if (ret)
- if (meth->init(ret) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int def_init_default(CONF *conf)
-{
- if (conf == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- conf->meth = &default_method;
- conf->meth_data = CONF_type_default;
- conf->data = NULL;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int def_init_WIN32(CONF *conf)
-{
- if (conf == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- conf->meth = &WIN32_method;
- conf->meth_data = (void *)CONF_type_win32;
- conf->data = NULL;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int def_destroy(CONF *conf)
-{
- if (def_destroy_data(conf)) {
- OPENSSL_free(conf);
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int def_destroy_data(CONF *conf)
-{
- if (conf == NULL)
- return 0;
- _CONF_free_data(conf);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int def_load(CONF *conf, const char *name, long *line)
-{
- int ret;
- BIO *in = NULL;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- in = BIO_new_file(name, "r");
-#else
- in = BIO_new_file(name, "rb");
-#endif
- if (in == NULL) {
- if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE)
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD, CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
- else
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
-
- ret = def_load_bio(conf, in, line);
- BIO_free(in);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
-{
-/* The macro BUFSIZE conflicts with a system macro in VxWorks */
-#define CONFBUFSIZE 512
- int bufnum = 0, i, ii;
- BUF_MEM *buff = NULL;
- char *s, *p, *end;
- int again;
- long eline = 0;
- char btmp[DECIMAL_SIZE(eline) + 1];
- CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *tv;
- CONF_VALUE *sv = NULL;
- char *section = NULL, *buf;
- char *start, *psection, *pname;
- void *h = (void *)(conf->data);
-
- if ((buff = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- section = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(10);
- if (section == NULL) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- BUF_strlcpy(section, "default", 10);
-
- if (_CONF_new_data(conf) == 0) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- sv = _CONF_new_section(conf, section);
- if (sv == NULL) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
- goto err;
- }
-
- bufnum = 0;
- again = 0;
- for (;;) {
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buff, bufnum + CONFBUFSIZE)) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p = &(buff->data[bufnum]);
- *p = '\0';
- BIO_gets(in, p, CONFBUFSIZE - 1);
- p[CONFBUFSIZE - 1] = '\0';
- ii = i = strlen(p);
- if (i == 0 && !again)
- break;
- again = 0;
- while (i > 0) {
- if ((p[i - 1] != '\r') && (p[i - 1] != '\n'))
- break;
- else
- i--;
- }
- /*
- * we removed some trailing stuff so there is a new line on the end.
- */
- if (ii && i == ii)
- again = 1; /* long line */
- else {
- p[i] = '\0';
- eline++; /* another input line */
- }
-
- /* we now have a line with trailing \r\n removed */
-
- /* i is the number of bytes */
- bufnum += i;
-
- v = NULL;
- /* check for line continuation */
- if (bufnum >= 1) {
- /*
- * If we have bytes and the last char '\\' and second last char
- * is not '\\'
- */
- p = &(buff->data[bufnum - 1]);
- if (IS_ESC(conf, p[0]) && ((bufnum <= 1) || !IS_ESC(conf, p[-1]))) {
- bufnum--;
- again = 1;
- }
- }
- if (again)
- continue;
- bufnum = 0;
- buf = buff->data;
-
- clear_comments(conf, buf);
- s = eat_ws(conf, buf);
- if (IS_EOF(conf, *s))
- continue; /* blank line */
- if (*s == '[') {
- char *ss;
-
- s++;
- start = eat_ws(conf, s);
- ss = start;
- again:
- end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, ss);
- p = eat_ws(conf, end);
- if (*p != ']') {
- if (*p != '\0' && ss != p) {
- ss = p;
- goto again;
- }
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO,
- CONF_R_MISSING_CLOSE_SQUARE_BRACKET);
- goto err;
- }
- *end = '\0';
- if (!str_copy(conf, NULL, §ion, start))
- goto err;
- if ((sv = _CONF_get_section(conf, section)) == NULL)
- sv = _CONF_new_section(conf, section);
- if (sv == NULL) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO,
- CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
- goto err;
- }
- continue;
- } else {
- pname = s;
- psection = NULL;
- end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, s);
- if ((end[0] == ':') && (end[1] == ':')) {
- *end = '\0';
- end += 2;
- psection = pname;
- pname = end;
- end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, end);
- }
- p = eat_ws(conf, end);
- if (*p != '=') {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN);
- goto err;
- }
- *end = '\0';
- p++;
- start = eat_ws(conf, p);
- while (!IS_EOF(conf, *p))
- p++;
- p--;
- while ((p != start) && (IS_WS(conf, *p)))
- p--;
- p++;
- *p = '\0';
-
- if (!(v = (CONF_VALUE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE)))) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (psection == NULL)
- psection = section;
- v->name = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(pname) + 1);
- v->value = NULL;
- if (v->name == NULL) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- BUF_strlcpy(v->name, pname, strlen(pname) + 1);
- if (!str_copy(conf, psection, &(v->value), start))
- goto err;
-
- if (strcmp(psection, section) != 0) {
- if ((tv = _CONF_get_section(conf, psection))
- == NULL)
- tv = _CONF_new_section(conf, psection);
- if (tv == NULL) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO,
- CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- tv = sv;
-#if 1
- if (_CONF_add_string(conf, tv, v) == 0) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-#else
- v->section = tv->section;
- if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(ts, v)) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- vv = (CONF_VALUE *)lh_insert(conf->data, v);
- if (vv != NULL) {
- sk_CONF_VALUE_delete_ptr(ts, vv);
- OPENSSL_free(vv->name);
- OPENSSL_free(vv->value);
- OPENSSL_free(vv);
- }
-#endif
- v = NULL;
- }
- }
- if (buff != NULL)
- BUF_MEM_free(buff);
- if (section != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(section);
- return (1);
- err:
- if (buff != NULL)
- BUF_MEM_free(buff);
- if (section != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(section);
- if (line != NULL)
- *line = eline;
- BIO_snprintf(btmp, sizeof btmp, "%ld", eline);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "line ", btmp);
- if ((h != conf->data) && (conf->data != NULL)) {
- CONF_free(conf->data);
- conf->data = NULL;
- }
- if (v != NULL) {
- if (v->name != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(v->name);
- if (v->value != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(v->value);
- if (v != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(v);
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-static void clear_comments(CONF *conf, char *p)
-{
- for (;;) {
- if (IS_FCOMMENT(conf, *p)) {
- *p = '\0';
- return;
- }
- if (!IS_WS(conf, *p)) {
- break;
- }
- p++;
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- if (IS_COMMENT(conf, *p)) {
- *p = '\0';
- return;
- }
- if (IS_DQUOTE(conf, *p)) {
- p = scan_dquote(conf, p);
- continue;
- }
- if (IS_QUOTE(conf, *p)) {
- p = scan_quote(conf, p);
- continue;
- }
- if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
- p = scan_esc(conf, p);
- continue;
- }
- if (IS_EOF(conf, *p))
- return;
- else
- p++;
- }
-}
-
-static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from)
-{
- int q, r, rr = 0, to = 0, len = 0;
- char *s, *e, *rp, *p, *rrp, *np, *cp, v;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
-
- if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- len = strlen(from) + 1;
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, len))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- if (IS_QUOTE(conf, *from)) {
- q = *from;
- from++;
- while (!IS_EOF(conf, *from) && (*from != q)) {
- if (IS_ESC(conf, *from)) {
- from++;
- if (IS_EOF(conf, *from))
- break;
- }
- buf->data[to++] = *(from++);
- }
- if (*from == q)
- from++;
- } else if (IS_DQUOTE(conf, *from)) {
- q = *from;
- from++;
- while (!IS_EOF(conf, *from)) {
- if (*from == q) {
- if (*(from + 1) == q) {
- from++;
- } else {
- break;
- }
- }
- buf->data[to++] = *(from++);
- }
- if (*from == q)
- from++;
- } else if (IS_ESC(conf, *from)) {
- from++;
- v = *(from++);
- if (IS_EOF(conf, v))
- break;
- else if (v == 'r')
- v = '\r';
- else if (v == 'n')
- v = '\n';
- else if (v == 'b')
- v = '\b';
- else if (v == 't')
- v = '\t';
- buf->data[to++] = v;
- } else if (IS_EOF(conf, *from))
- break;
- else if (*from == '$') {
- /* try to expand it */
- rrp = NULL;
- s = &(from[1]);
- if (*s == '{')
- q = '}';
- else if (*s == '(')
- q = ')';
- else
- q = 0;
-
- if (q)
- s++;
- cp = section;
- e = np = s;
- while (IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(conf, *e))
- e++;
- if ((e[0] == ':') && (e[1] == ':')) {
- cp = np;
- rrp = e;
- rr = *e;
- *rrp = '\0';
- e += 2;
- np = e;
- while (IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(conf, *e))
- e++;
- }
- r = *e;
- *e = '\0';
- rp = e;
- if (q) {
- if (r != q) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_NO_CLOSE_BRACE);
- goto err;
- }
- e++;
- }
- /*-
- * So at this point we have
- * np which is the start of the name string which is
- * '\0' terminated.
- * cp which is the start of the section string which is
- * '\0' terminated.
- * e is the 'next point after'.
- * r and rr are the chars replaced by the '\0'
- * rp and rrp is where 'r' and 'rr' came from.
- */
- p = _CONF_get_string(conf, cp, np);
- if (rrp != NULL)
- *rrp = rr;
- *rp = r;
- if (p == NULL) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,
- (strlen(p) + buf->length - (e - from)))) {
- CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- while (*p)
- buf->data[to++] = *(p++);
-
- /*
- * Since we change the pointer 'from', we also have to change the
- * perceived length of the string it points at. /RL
- */
- len -= e - from;
- from = e;
-
- /*
- * In case there were no braces or parenthesis around the
- * variable reference, we have to put back the character that was
- * replaced with a '\0'. /RL
- */
- *rp = r;
- } else
- buf->data[to++] = *(from++);
- }
- buf->data[to] = '\0';
- if (*pto != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(*pto);
- *pto = buf->data;
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- return (1);
- err:
- if (buf != NULL)
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- return (0);
-}
-
-static char *eat_ws(CONF *conf, char *p)
-{
- while (IS_WS(conf, *p) && (!IS_EOF(conf, *p)))
- p++;
- return (p);
-}
-
-static char *eat_alpha_numeric(CONF *conf, char *p)
-{
- for (;;) {
- if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
- p = scan_esc(conf, p);
- continue;
- }
- if (!IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(conf, *p))
- return (p);
- p++;
- }
-}
-
-static char *scan_quote(CONF *conf, char *p)
-{
- int q = *p;
-
- p++;
- while (!(IS_EOF(conf, *p)) && (*p != q)) {
- if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
- p++;
- if (IS_EOF(conf, *p))
- return (p);
- }
- p++;
- }
- if (*p == q)
- p++;
- return (p);
-}
-
-static char *scan_dquote(CONF *conf, char *p)
-{
- int q = *p;
-
- p++;
- while (!(IS_EOF(conf, *p))) {
- if (*p == q) {
- if (*(p + 1) == q) {
- p++;
- } else {
- break;
- }
- }
- p++;
- }
- if (*p == q)
- p++;
- return (p);
-}
-
-static void dump_value_doall_arg(CONF_VALUE *a, BIO *out)
-{
- if (a->name)
- BIO_printf(out, "[%s] %s=%s\n", a->section, a->name, a->value);
- else
- BIO_printf(out, "[[%s]]\n", a->section);
-}
-
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(dump_value, CONF_VALUE, BIO)
-
-static int def_dump(const CONF *conf, BIO *out)
-{
- lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_arg(conf->data, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(dump_value),
- BIO, out);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int def_is_number(const CONF *conf, char c)
-{
- return IS_NUMBER(conf, c);
-}
-
-static int def_to_int(const CONF *conf, char c)
-{
- return c - '0';
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_def.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/conf/conf_def.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_def.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_def.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,706 @@
+/* crypto/conf/conf.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+/* Part of the code in here was originally in conf.c, which is now removed */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/conf_api.h>
+#include "conf_def.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+static char *eat_ws(CONF *conf, char *p);
+static char *eat_alpha_numeric(CONF *conf, char *p);
+static void clear_comments(CONF *conf, char *p);
+static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **to, char *from);
+static char *scan_quote(CONF *conf, char *p);
+static char *scan_dquote(CONF *conf, char *p);
+#define scan_esc(conf,p) (((IS_EOF((conf),(p)[1]))?((p)+1):((p)+2)))
+
+static CONF *def_create(CONF_METHOD *meth);
+static int def_init_default(CONF *conf);
+static int def_init_WIN32(CONF *conf);
+static int def_destroy(CONF *conf);
+static int def_destroy_data(CONF *conf);
+static int def_load(CONF *conf, const char *name, long *eline);
+static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *bp, long *eline);
+static int def_dump(const CONF *conf, BIO *bp);
+static int def_is_number(const CONF *conf, char c);
+static int def_to_int(const CONF *conf, char c);
+
+const char CONF_def_version[] = "CONF_def" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+static CONF_METHOD default_method = {
+ "OpenSSL default",
+ def_create,
+ def_init_default,
+ def_destroy,
+ def_destroy_data,
+ def_load_bio,
+ def_dump,
+ def_is_number,
+ def_to_int,
+ def_load
+};
+
+static CONF_METHOD WIN32_method = {
+ "WIN32",
+ def_create,
+ def_init_WIN32,
+ def_destroy,
+ def_destroy_data,
+ def_load_bio,
+ def_dump,
+ def_is_number,
+ def_to_int,
+ def_load
+};
+
+CONF_METHOD *NCONF_default()
+{
+ return &default_method;
+}
+
+CONF_METHOD *NCONF_WIN32()
+{
+ return &WIN32_method;
+}
+
+static CONF *def_create(CONF_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ CONF *ret;
+
+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF) + sizeof(unsigned short *));
+ if (ret)
+ if (meth->init(ret) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int def_init_default(CONF *conf)
+{
+ if (conf == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ conf->meth = &default_method;
+ conf->meth_data = CONF_type_default;
+ conf->data = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int def_init_WIN32(CONF *conf)
+{
+ if (conf == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ conf->meth = &WIN32_method;
+ conf->meth_data = (void *)CONF_type_win32;
+ conf->data = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int def_destroy(CONF *conf)
+{
+ if (def_destroy_data(conf)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(conf);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int def_destroy_data(CONF *conf)
+{
+ if (conf == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ _CONF_free_data(conf);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int def_load(CONF *conf, const char *name, long *line)
+{
+ int ret;
+ BIO *in = NULL;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ in = BIO_new_file(name, "r");
+#else
+ in = BIO_new_file(name, "rb");
+#endif
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE)
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD, CONF_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
+ else
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = def_load_bio(conf, in, line);
+ BIO_free(in);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
+{
+/* The macro BUFSIZE conflicts with a system macro in VxWorks */
+#define CONFBUFSIZE 512
+ int bufnum = 0, i, ii;
+ BUF_MEM *buff = NULL;
+ char *s, *p, *end;
+ int again;
+ long eline = 0;
+ char btmp[DECIMAL_SIZE(eline) + 1];
+ CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *tv;
+ CONF_VALUE *sv = NULL;
+ char *section = NULL, *buf;
+ char *start, *psection, *pname;
+ void *h = (void *)(conf->data);
+
+ if ((buff = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ section = BUF_strdup("default");
+ if (section == NULL) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (_CONF_new_data(conf) == 0) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ sv = _CONF_new_section(conf, section);
+ if (sv == NULL) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ bufnum = 0;
+ again = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buff, bufnum + CONFBUFSIZE)) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = &(buff->data[bufnum]);
+ *p = '\0';
+ BIO_gets(in, p, CONFBUFSIZE - 1);
+ p[CONFBUFSIZE - 1] = '\0';
+ ii = i = strlen(p);
+ if (i == 0 && !again)
+ break;
+ again = 0;
+ while (i > 0) {
+ if ((p[i - 1] != '\r') && (p[i - 1] != '\n'))
+ break;
+ else
+ i--;
+ }
+ /*
+ * we removed some trailing stuff so there is a new line on the end.
+ */
+ if (ii && i == ii)
+ again = 1; /* long line */
+ else {
+ p[i] = '\0';
+ eline++; /* another input line */
+ }
+
+ /* we now have a line with trailing \r\n removed */
+
+ /* i is the number of bytes */
+ bufnum += i;
+
+ v = NULL;
+ /* check for line continuation */
+ if (bufnum >= 1) {
+ /*
+ * If we have bytes and the last char '\\' and second last char
+ * is not '\\'
+ */
+ p = &(buff->data[bufnum - 1]);
+ if (IS_ESC(conf, p[0]) && ((bufnum <= 1) || !IS_ESC(conf, p[-1]))) {
+ bufnum--;
+ again = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (again)
+ continue;
+ bufnum = 0;
+ buf = buff->data;
+
+ clear_comments(conf, buf);
+ s = eat_ws(conf, buf);
+ if (IS_EOF(conf, *s))
+ continue; /* blank line */
+ if (*s == '[') {
+ char *ss;
+
+ s++;
+ start = eat_ws(conf, s);
+ ss = start;
+ again:
+ end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, ss);
+ p = eat_ws(conf, end);
+ if (*p != ']') {
+ if (*p != '\0' && ss != p) {
+ ss = p;
+ goto again;
+ }
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO,
+ CONF_R_MISSING_CLOSE_SQUARE_BRACKET);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *end = '\0';
+ if (!str_copy(conf, NULL, §ion, start))
+ goto err;
+ if ((sv = _CONF_get_section(conf, section)) == NULL)
+ sv = _CONF_new_section(conf, section);
+ if (sv == NULL) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO,
+ CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ pname = s;
+ psection = NULL;
+ end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, s);
+ if ((end[0] == ':') && (end[1] == ':')) {
+ *end = '\0';
+ end += 2;
+ psection = pname;
+ pname = end;
+ end = eat_alpha_numeric(conf, end);
+ }
+ p = eat_ws(conf, end);
+ if (*p != '=') {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *end = '\0';
+ p++;
+ start = eat_ws(conf, p);
+ while (!IS_EOF(conf, *p))
+ p++;
+ p--;
+ while ((p != start) && (IS_WS(conf, *p)))
+ p--;
+ p++;
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ if (!(v = (CONF_VALUE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE)))) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (psection == NULL)
+ psection = section;
+ v->name = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(pname) + 1);
+ v->value = NULL;
+ if (v->name == NULL) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BUF_strlcpy(v->name, pname, strlen(pname) + 1);
+ if (!str_copy(conf, psection, &(v->value), start))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (strcmp(psection, section) != 0) {
+ if ((tv = _CONF_get_section(conf, psection))
+ == NULL)
+ tv = _CONF_new_section(conf, psection);
+ if (tv == NULL) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO,
+ CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ tv = sv;
+#if 1
+ if (_CONF_add_string(conf, tv, v) == 0) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#else
+ v->section = tv->section;
+ if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(ts, v)) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ vv = (CONF_VALUE *)lh_insert(conf->data, v);
+ if (vv != NULL) {
+ sk_CONF_VALUE_delete_ptr(ts, vv);
+ OPENSSL_free(vv->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(vv->value);
+ OPENSSL_free(vv);
+ }
+#endif
+ v = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (buff != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buff);
+ if (section != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(section);
+ return (1);
+ err:
+ if (buff != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buff);
+ if (section != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(section);
+ if (line != NULL)
+ *line = eline;
+ BIO_snprintf(btmp, sizeof btmp, "%ld", eline);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "line ", btmp);
+ if ((h != conf->data) && (conf->data != NULL)) {
+ CONF_free(conf->data);
+ conf->data = NULL;
+ }
+ if (v != NULL) {
+ if (v->name != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(v->name);
+ if (v->value != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(v->value);
+ if (v != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(v);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static void clear_comments(CONF *conf, char *p)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ if (IS_FCOMMENT(conf, *p)) {
+ *p = '\0';
+ return;
+ }
+ if (!IS_WS(conf, *p)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (IS_COMMENT(conf, *p)) {
+ *p = '\0';
+ return;
+ }
+ if (IS_DQUOTE(conf, *p)) {
+ p = scan_dquote(conf, p);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (IS_QUOTE(conf, *p)) {
+ p = scan_quote(conf, p);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
+ p = scan_esc(conf, p);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (IS_EOF(conf, *p))
+ return;
+ else
+ p++;
+ }
+}
+
+static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from)
+{
+ int q, r, rr = 0, to = 0, len = 0;
+ char *s, *e, *rp, *p, *rrp, *np, *cp, v;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ len = strlen(from) + 1;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, len))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (IS_QUOTE(conf, *from)) {
+ q = *from;
+ from++;
+ while (!IS_EOF(conf, *from) && (*from != q)) {
+ if (IS_ESC(conf, *from)) {
+ from++;
+ if (IS_EOF(conf, *from))
+ break;
+ }
+ buf->data[to++] = *(from++);
+ }
+ if (*from == q)
+ from++;
+ } else if (IS_DQUOTE(conf, *from)) {
+ q = *from;
+ from++;
+ while (!IS_EOF(conf, *from)) {
+ if (*from == q) {
+ if (*(from + 1) == q) {
+ from++;
+ } else {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ buf->data[to++] = *(from++);
+ }
+ if (*from == q)
+ from++;
+ } else if (IS_ESC(conf, *from)) {
+ from++;
+ v = *(from++);
+ if (IS_EOF(conf, v))
+ break;
+ else if (v == 'r')
+ v = '\r';
+ else if (v == 'n')
+ v = '\n';
+ else if (v == 'b')
+ v = '\b';
+ else if (v == 't')
+ v = '\t';
+ buf->data[to++] = v;
+ } else if (IS_EOF(conf, *from))
+ break;
+ else if (*from == '$') {
+ /* try to expand it */
+ rrp = NULL;
+ s = &(from[1]);
+ if (*s == '{')
+ q = '}';
+ else if (*s == '(')
+ q = ')';
+ else
+ q = 0;
+
+ if (q)
+ s++;
+ cp = section;
+ e = np = s;
+ while (IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(conf, *e))
+ e++;
+ if ((e[0] == ':') && (e[1] == ':')) {
+ cp = np;
+ rrp = e;
+ rr = *e;
+ *rrp = '\0';
+ e += 2;
+ np = e;
+ while (IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC(conf, *e))
+ e++;
+ }
+ r = *e;
+ *e = '\0';
+ rp = e;
+ if (q) {
+ if (r != q) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_NO_CLOSE_BRACE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ e++;
+ }
+ /*-
+ * So at this point we have
+ * np which is the start of the name string which is
+ * '\0' terminated.
+ * cp which is the start of the section string which is
+ * '\0' terminated.
+ * e is the 'next point after'.
+ * r and rr are the chars replaced by the '\0'
+ * rp and rrp is where 'r' and 'rr' came from.
+ */
+ p = _CONF_get_string(conf, cp, np);
+ if (rrp != NULL)
+ *rrp = rr;
+ *rp = r;
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,
+ (strlen(p) + buf->length - (e - from)))) {
+ CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ while (*p)
+ buf->data[to++] = *(p++);
+
+ /*
+ * Since we change the pointer 'from', we also have to change the
+ * perceived length of the string it points at. /RL
+ */
+ len -= e - from;
+ from = e;
+
+ /*
+ * In case there were no braces or parenthesis around the
+ * variable reference, we have to put back the character that was
+ * replaced with a '\0'. /RL
+ */
+ *rp = r;
+ } else
+ buf->data[to++] = *(from++);
+ }
+ buf->data[to] = '\0';
+ if (*pto != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(*pto);
+ *pto = buf->data;
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return (1);
+ err:
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static char *eat_ws(CONF *conf, char *p)
+{
+ while (IS_WS(conf, *p) && (!IS_EOF(conf, *p)))
+ p++;
+ return (p);
+}
+
+static char *eat_alpha_numeric(CONF *conf, char *p)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
+ p = scan_esc(conf, p);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!IS_ALPHA_NUMERIC_PUNCT(conf, *p))
+ return (p);
+ p++;
+ }
+}
+
+static char *scan_quote(CONF *conf, char *p)
+{
+ int q = *p;
+
+ p++;
+ while (!(IS_EOF(conf, *p)) && (*p != q)) {
+ if (IS_ESC(conf, *p)) {
+ p++;
+ if (IS_EOF(conf, *p))
+ return (p);
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+ if (*p == q)
+ p++;
+ return (p);
+}
+
+static char *scan_dquote(CONF *conf, char *p)
+{
+ int q = *p;
+
+ p++;
+ while (!(IS_EOF(conf, *p))) {
+ if (*p == q) {
+ if (*(p + 1) == q) {
+ p++;
+ } else {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+ if (*p == q)
+ p++;
+ return (p);
+}
+
+static void dump_value_doall_arg(CONF_VALUE *a, BIO *out)
+{
+ if (a->name)
+ BIO_printf(out, "[%s] %s=%s\n", a->section, a->name, a->value);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(out, "[[%s]]\n", a->section);
+}
+
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(dump_value, CONF_VALUE, BIO)
+
+static int def_dump(const CONF *conf, BIO *out)
+{
+ lh_CONF_VALUE_doall_arg(conf->data, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(dump_value),
+ BIO, out);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int def_is_number(const CONF *conf, char c)
+{
+ return IS_NUMBER(conf, c);
+}
+
+static int def_to_int(const CONF *conf, char c)
+{
+ return c - '0';
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-/* conf_sap.c */
-/*
- * Written by Stephen Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2001.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/dso.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-
-/*
- * This is the automatic configuration loader: it is called automatically by
- * OpenSSL when any of a number of standard initialisation functions are
- * called, unless this is overridden by calling OPENSSL_no_config()
- */
-
-static int openssl_configured = 0;
-
-void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)
-{
- if (openssl_configured)
- return;
-
- OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- /* Need to load ENGINEs */
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
-#endif
- ERR_clear_error();
- CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
- CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
- CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
-}
-
-void OPENSSL_no_config()
-{
- openssl_configured = 1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/* conf_sap.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Stephen Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2001.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This is the automatic configuration loader: it is called automatically by
+ * OpenSSL when any of a number of standard initialisation functions are
+ * called, unless this is overridden by calling OPENSSL_no_config()
+ */
+
+static int openssl_configured = 0;
+
+void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)
+{
+ if (openssl_configured)
+ return;
+
+ OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ /* Need to load ENGINEs */
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+#endif
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
+ CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
+ CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
+ openssl_configured = 1;
+}
+
+void OPENSSL_no_config()
+{
+ openssl_configured = 1;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cryptlib.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/cryptlib.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cryptlib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,989 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/cryptlib.c */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/safestack.h>
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
-static double SSLeay_MSVC5_hack = 0.0; /* and for VC1.5 */
-#endif
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(CRYPTO_dynlock)
-
-/* real #defines in crypto.h, keep these upto date */
-static const char *const lock_names[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS] = {
- "<<ERROR>>",
- "err",
- "ex_data",
- "x509",
- "x509_info",
- "x509_pkey",
- "x509_crl",
- "x509_req",
- "dsa",
- "rsa",
- "evp_pkey",
- "x509_store",
- "ssl_ctx",
- "ssl_cert",
- "ssl_session",
- "ssl_sess_cert",
- "ssl",
- "ssl_method",
- "rand",
- "rand2",
- "debug_malloc",
- "BIO",
- "gethostbyname",
- "getservbyname",
- "readdir",
- "RSA_blinding",
- "dh",
- "debug_malloc2",
- "dso",
- "dynlock",
- "engine",
- "ui",
- "ecdsa",
- "ec",
- "ecdh",
- "bn",
- "ec_pre_comp",
- "store",
- "comp",
- "fips",
- "fips2",
-#if CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS != 41
-# error "Inconsistency between crypto.h and cryptlib.c"
-#endif
-};
-
-/*
- * This is for applications to allocate new type names in the non-dynamic
- * array of lock names. These are numbered with positive numbers.
- */
-static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *app_locks = NULL;
-
-/*
- * For applications that want a more dynamic way of handling threads, the
- * following stack is used. These are externally numbered with negative
- * numbers.
- */
-static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_dynlock) *dyn_locks = NULL;
-
-static void (MS_FAR *locking_callback) (int mode, int type,
- const char *file, int line) = 0;
-static int (MS_FAR *add_lock_callback) (int *pointer, int amount,
- int type, const char *file,
- int line) = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-static unsigned long (MS_FAR *id_callback) (void) = 0;
-#endif
-static void (MS_FAR *threadid_callback) (CRYPTO_THREADID *) = 0;
-static struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *(MS_FAR *dynlock_create_callback)
- (const char *file, int line) = 0;
-static void (MS_FAR *dynlock_lock_callback) (int mode,
- struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l,
- const char *file, int line) = 0;
-static void (MS_FAR *dynlock_destroy_callback) (struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value
- *l, const char *file,
- int line) = 0;
-
-int CRYPTO_get_new_lockid(char *name)
-{
- char *str;
- int i;
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
- /*
- * A hack to make Visual C++ 5.0 work correctly when linking as a DLL
- * using /MT. Without this, the application cannot use any floating point
- * printf's. It also seems to be needed for Visual C 1.5 (win16)
- */
- SSLeay_MSVC5_hack = (double)name[0] * (double)name[1];
-#endif
-
- if ((app_locks == NULL)
- && ((app_locks = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)) {
- CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_LOCKID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- if ((str = BUF_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
- CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_LOCKID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- i = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(app_locks, str);
- if (!i)
- OPENSSL_free(str);
- else
- i += CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS; /* gap of one :-) */
- return (i);
-}
-
-int CRYPTO_num_locks(void)
-{
- return CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS;
-}
-
-int CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid(void)
-{
- int i = 0;
- CRYPTO_dynlock *pointer = NULL;
-
- if (dynlock_create_callback == NULL) {
- CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_DYNLOCKID,
- CRYPTO_R_NO_DYNLOCK_CREATE_CALLBACK);
- return (0);
- }
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
- if ((dyn_locks == NULL)
- && ((dyn_locks = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_new_null()) == NULL)) {
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
- CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_DYNLOCKID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
-
- pointer = (CRYPTO_dynlock *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CRYPTO_dynlock));
- if (pointer == NULL) {
- CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_DYNLOCKID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- pointer->references = 1;
- pointer->data = dynlock_create_callback(__FILE__, __LINE__);
- if (pointer->data == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(pointer);
- CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_DYNLOCKID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
- /* First, try to find an existing empty slot */
- i = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_find(dyn_locks, NULL);
- /* If there was none, push, thereby creating a new one */
- if (i == -1)
- /*
- * Since sk_push() returns the number of items on the stack, not the
- * location of the pushed item, we need to transform the returned
- * number into a position, by decreasing it.
- */
- i = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_push(dyn_locks, pointer) - 1;
- else
- /*
- * If we found a place with a NULL pointer, put our pointer in it.
- */
- (void)sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_set(dyn_locks, i, pointer);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
-
- if (i == -1) {
- dynlock_destroy_callback(pointer->data, __FILE__, __LINE__);
- OPENSSL_free(pointer);
- } else
- i += 1; /* to avoid 0 */
- return -i;
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid(int i)
-{
- CRYPTO_dynlock *pointer = NULL;
- if (i)
- i = -i - 1;
- if (dynlock_destroy_callback == NULL)
- return;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
-
- if (dyn_locks == NULL || i >= sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_num(dyn_locks)) {
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
- return;
- }
- pointer = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_value(dyn_locks, i);
- if (pointer != NULL) {
- --pointer->references;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (pointer->references < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid, bad reference count\n");
- abort();
- } else
-#endif
- if (pointer->references <= 0) {
- (void)sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_set(dyn_locks, i, NULL);
- } else
- pointer = NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
-
- if (pointer) {
- dynlock_destroy_callback(pointer->data, __FILE__, __LINE__);
- OPENSSL_free(pointer);
- }
-}
-
-struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *CRYPTO_get_dynlock_value(int i)
-{
- CRYPTO_dynlock *pointer = NULL;
- if (i)
- i = -i - 1;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
-
- if (dyn_locks != NULL && i < sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_num(dyn_locks))
- pointer = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_value(dyn_locks, i);
- if (pointer)
- pointer->references++;
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
-
- if (pointer)
- return pointer->data;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *(*CRYPTO_get_dynlock_create_callback(void))
- (const char *file, int line) {
- return (dynlock_create_callback);
-}
-
-void (*CRYPTO_get_dynlock_lock_callback(void)) (int mode,
- struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value
- *l, const char *file,
- int line) {
- return (dynlock_lock_callback);
-}
-
-void (*CRYPTO_get_dynlock_destroy_callback(void))
- (struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l, const char *file, int line) {
- return (dynlock_destroy_callback);
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *(*func)
- (const char *file, int line))
-{
- dynlock_create_callback = func;
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(void (*func) (int mode,
- struct
- CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l,
- const char *file,
- int line))
-{
- dynlock_lock_callback = func;
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(void (*func)
- (struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l,
- const char *file, int line))
-{
- dynlock_destroy_callback = func;
-}
-
-void (*CRYPTO_get_locking_callback(void)) (int mode, int type,
- const char *file, int line) {
- return (locking_callback);
-}
-
-int (*CRYPTO_get_add_lock_callback(void)) (int *num, int mount, int type,
- const char *file, int line) {
- return (add_lock_callback);
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(void (*func) (int mode, int type,
- const char *file, int line))
-{
- /*
- * Calling this here ensures initialisation before any threads are
- * started.
- */
- OPENSSL_init();
- locking_callback = func;
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_set_add_lock_callback(int (*func) (int *num, int mount, int type,
- const char *file, int line))
-{
- add_lock_callback = func;
-}
-
-/*
- * the memset() here and in set_pointer() seem overkill, but for the sake of
- * CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp() this avoids any platform silliness that might cause
- * two "equal" THREADID structs to not be memcmp()-identical.
- */
-void CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(CRYPTO_THREADID *id, unsigned long val)
-{
- memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
- id->val = val;
-}
-
-static const unsigned char hash_coeffs[] = { 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23 };
-
-void CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(CRYPTO_THREADID *id, void *ptr)
-{
- unsigned char *dest = (void *)&id->val;
- unsigned int accum = 0;
- unsigned char dnum = sizeof(id->val);
-
- memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
- id->ptr = ptr;
- if (sizeof(id->val) >= sizeof(id->ptr)) {
- /*
- * 'ptr' can be embedded in 'val' without loss of uniqueness
- */
- id->val = (unsigned long)id->ptr;
- return;
- }
- /*
- * hash ptr ==> val. Each byte of 'val' gets the mod-256 total of a
- * linear function over the bytes in 'ptr', the co-efficients of which
- * are a sequence of low-primes (hash_coeffs is an 8-element cycle) - the
- * starting prime for the sequence varies for each byte of 'val' (unique
- * polynomials unless pointers are >64-bit). For added spice, the totals
- * accumulate rather than restarting from zero, and the index of the
- * 'val' byte is added each time (position dependence). If I was a
- * black-belt, I'd scan big-endian pointers in reverse to give low-order
- * bits more play, but this isn't crypto and I'd prefer nobody mistake it
- * as such. Plus I'm lazy.
- */
- while (dnum--) {
- const unsigned char *src = (void *)&id->ptr;
- unsigned char snum = sizeof(id->ptr);
- while (snum--)
- accum += *(src++) * hash_coeffs[(snum + dnum) & 7];
- accum += dnum;
- *(dest++) = accum & 255;
- }
-}
-
-int CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(void (*func) (CRYPTO_THREADID *))
-{
- if (threadid_callback)
- return 0;
- threadid_callback = func;
- return 1;
-}
-
-void (*CRYPTO_THREADID_get_callback(void)) (CRYPTO_THREADID *) {
- return threadid_callback;
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_THREADID_current(CRYPTO_THREADID *id)
-{
- if (threadid_callback) {
- threadid_callback(id);
- return;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
- /* If the deprecated callback was set, fall back to that */
- if (id_callback) {
- CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, id_callback());
- return;
- }
-#endif
- /* Else pick a backup */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
- CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, (unsigned long)GetCurrentTask());
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
- CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, (unsigned long)GetCurrentThreadId());
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS)
- CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, (unsigned long)find_thread(NULL));
-#else
- /* For everything else, default to using the address of 'errno' */
- CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(id, (void *)&errno);
-#endif
-}
-
-int CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(const CRYPTO_THREADID *a, const CRYPTO_THREADID *b)
-{
- return memcmp(a, b, sizeof(*a));
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(CRYPTO_THREADID *dest, const CRYPTO_THREADID *src)
-{
- memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*src));
-}
-
-unsigned long CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(const CRYPTO_THREADID *id)
-{
- return id->val;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-unsigned long (*CRYPTO_get_id_callback(void)) (void) {
- return (id_callback);
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_set_id_callback(unsigned long (*func) (void))
-{
- id_callback = func;
-}
-
-unsigned long CRYPTO_thread_id(void)
-{
- unsigned long ret = 0;
-
- if (id_callback == NULL) {
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
- ret = (unsigned long)GetCurrentTask();
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
- ret = (unsigned long)GetCurrentThreadId();
-# elif defined(GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS)
- ret = 1L;
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS)
- ret = (unsigned long)find_thread(NULL);
-# else
- ret = (unsigned long)getpid();
-# endif
- } else
- ret = id_callback();
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-void CRYPTO_lock(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
-{
-#ifdef LOCK_DEBUG
- {
- CRYPTO_THREADID id;
- char *rw_text, *operation_text;
-
- if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK)
- operation_text = "lock ";
- else if (mode & CRYPTO_UNLOCK)
- operation_text = "unlock";
- else
- operation_text = "ERROR ";
-
- if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
- rw_text = "r";
- else if (mode & CRYPTO_WRITE)
- rw_text = "w";
- else
- rw_text = "ERROR";
-
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&id);
- fprintf(stderr, "lock:%08lx:(%s)%s %-18s %s:%d\n",
- CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&id), rw_text, operation_text,
- CRYPTO_get_lock_name(type), file, line);
- }
-#endif
- if (type < 0) {
- if (dynlock_lock_callback != NULL) {
- struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *pointer
- = CRYPTO_get_dynlock_value(type);
-
- OPENSSL_assert(pointer != NULL);
-
- dynlock_lock_callback(mode, pointer, file, line);
-
- CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid(type);
- }
- } else if (locking_callback != NULL)
- locking_callback(mode, type, file, line);
-}
-
-int CRYPTO_add_lock(int *pointer, int amount, int type, const char *file,
- int line)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (add_lock_callback != NULL) {
-#ifdef LOCK_DEBUG
- int before = *pointer;
-#endif
-
- ret = add_lock_callback(pointer, amount, type, file, line);
-#ifdef LOCK_DEBUG
- {
- CRYPTO_THREADID id;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&id);
- fprintf(stderr, "ladd:%08lx:%2d+%2d->%2d %-18s %s:%d\n",
- CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&id), before, amount, ret,
- CRYPTO_get_lock_name(type), file, line);
- }
-#endif
- } else {
- CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK | CRYPTO_WRITE, type, file, line);
-
- ret = *pointer + amount;
-#ifdef LOCK_DEBUG
- {
- CRYPTO_THREADID id;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&id);
- fprintf(stderr, "ladd:%08lx:%2d+%2d->%2d %-18s %s:%d\n",
- CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&id),
- *pointer, amount, ret,
- CRYPTO_get_lock_name(type), file, line);
- }
-#endif
- *pointer = ret;
- CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_UNLOCK | CRYPTO_WRITE, type, file, line);
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-const char *CRYPTO_get_lock_name(int type)
-{
- if (type < 0)
- return ("dynamic");
- else if (type < CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS)
- return (lock_names[type]);
- else if (type - CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS > sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(app_locks))
- return ("ERROR");
- else
- return (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(app_locks, type - CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS));
-}
-
-#if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
- defined(__INTEL__) || \
- defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
- defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)
-
-unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
-unsigned long *OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(void)
-{
- if (sizeof(long) == 4)
- /*
- * If 32-bit application pulls address of OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0]
- * clear second element to maintain the illusion that vector
- * is 32-bit.
- */
- OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] = 0;
- return (unsigned long *)OPENSSL_ia32cap_P;
-}
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY)
-# define OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP
-# if defined(_WIN32)
-typedef unsigned __int64 IA32CAP;
-# else
-typedef unsigned long long IA32CAP;
-# endif
-void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
-{
- static int trigger = 0;
- IA32CAP OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(void);
- IA32CAP vec;
- char *env;
-
- if (trigger)
- return;
-
- trigger = 1;
- if ((env = getenv("OPENSSL_ia32cap"))) {
- int off = (env[0] == '~') ? 1 : 0;
-# if defined(_WIN32)
- if (!sscanf(env + off, "%I64i", &vec))
- vec = strtoul(env + off, NULL, 0);
-# else
- if (!sscanf(env + off, "%lli", (long long *)&vec))
- vec = strtoul(env + off, NULL, 0);
-# endif
- if (off)
- vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid() & ~vec;
- } else
- vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid();
-
- /*
- * |(1<<10) sets a reserved bit to signal that variable
- * was initialized already... This is to avoid interference
- * with cpuid snippets in ELF .init segment.
- */
- OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] = (unsigned int)vec | (1 << 10);
- OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] = (unsigned int)(vec >> 32);
-}
-# endif
-
-#else
-unsigned long *OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(void)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-#endif
-int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated = 0;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP) && !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
-void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)) && defined(_WINDLL)
-# ifdef __CYGWIN__
-/* pick DLL_[PROCESS|THREAD]_[ATTACH|DETACH] definitions */
-# include <windows.h>
-/*
- * this has side-effect of _WIN32 getting defined, which otherwise is
- * mutually exclusive with __CYGWIN__...
- */
-# endif
-
-/*
- * All we really need to do is remove the 'error' state when a thread
- * detaches
- */
-
-BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
-{
- switch (fdwReason) {
- case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
- OPENSSL_cpuid_setup();
-# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT)
- {
- IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos_header = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) hinstDLL;
- IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *nt_headers;
-
- if (dos_header->e_magic == IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
- nt_headers = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *) ((char *)dos_header
- + dos_header->e_lfanew);
- if (nt_headers->Signature == IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE &&
- hinstDLL !=
- (HINSTANCE) (nt_headers->OptionalHeader.ImageBase))
- OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated = 1;
- }
- }
-# endif
- break;
- case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
- break;
- case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
- break;
- case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
- break;
- }
- return (TRUE);
-}
-#endif
-
-#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
-# include <tchar.h>
-# include <signal.h>
-# ifdef __WATCOMC__
-# if defined(_UNICODE) || defined(__UNICODE__)
-# define _vsntprintf _vsnwprintf
-# else
-# define _vsntprintf _vsnprintf
-# endif
-# endif
-# ifdef _MSC_VER
-# define alloca _alloca
-# endif
-
-# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
-int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
-{
- HWINSTA h;
- DWORD len;
- WCHAR *name;
- static union {
- void *p;
- int (*f) (void);
- } _OPENSSL_isservice = {
- NULL
- };
-
- if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p == NULL) {
- HANDLE h = GetModuleHandle(NULL);
- if (h != NULL)
- _OPENSSL_isservice.p = GetProcAddress(h, "_OPENSSL_isservice");
- if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p == NULL)
- _OPENSSL_isservice.p = (void *)-1;
- }
-
- if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p != (void *)-1)
- return (*_OPENSSL_isservice.f) ();
-
- h = GetProcessWindowStation();
- if (h == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- if (GetUserObjectInformationW(h, UOI_NAME, NULL, 0, &len) ||
- GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
- return -1;
-
- if (len > 512)
- return -1; /* paranoia */
- len++, len &= ~1; /* paranoia */
- name = (WCHAR *)alloca(len + sizeof(WCHAR));
- if (!GetUserObjectInformationW(h, UOI_NAME, name, len, &len))
- return -1;
-
- len++, len &= ~1; /* paranoia */
- name[len / sizeof(WCHAR)] = L'\0'; /* paranoia */
-# if 1
- /*
- * This doesn't cover "interactive" services [working with real
- * WinSta0's] nor programs started non-interactively by Task Scheduler
- * [those are working with SAWinSta].
- */
- if (wcsstr(name, L"Service-0x"))
- return 1;
-# else
- /* This covers all non-interactive programs such as services. */
- if (!wcsstr(name, L"WinSta0"))
- return 1;
-# endif
- else
- return 0;
-}
-# else
-int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-# endif
-
-void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
- TCHAR buf[256];
- const TCHAR *fmt;
-# ifdef STD_ERROR_HANDLE /* what a dirty trick! */
- HANDLE h;
-
- if ((h = GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE)) != NULL &&
- GetFileType(h) != FILE_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
- /* must be console application */
- va_start(ap, fmta);
- vfprintf(stderr, fmta, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- return;
- }
-# endif
-
- if (sizeof(TCHAR) == sizeof(char))
- fmt = (const TCHAR *)fmta;
- else
- do {
- int keepgoing;
- size_t len_0 = strlen(fmta) + 1, i;
- WCHAR *fmtw;
-
- fmtw = (WCHAR *)alloca(len_0 * sizeof(WCHAR));
- if (fmtw == NULL) {
- fmt = (const TCHAR *)L"no stack?";
- break;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBYTE
- if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, fmta, len_0, fmtw, len_0))
-# endif
- for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++)
- fmtw[i] = (WCHAR)fmta[i];
-
- for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++) {
- if (fmtw[i] == L'%')
- do {
- keepgoing = 0;
- switch (fmtw[i + 1]) {
- case L'0':
- case L'1':
- case L'2':
- case L'3':
- case L'4':
- case L'5':
- case L'6':
- case L'7':
- case L'8':
- case L'9':
- case L'.':
- case L'*':
- case L'-':
- i++;
- keepgoing = 1;
- break;
- case L's':
- fmtw[i + 1] = L'S';
- break;
- case L'S':
- fmtw[i + 1] = L's';
- break;
- case L'c':
- fmtw[i + 1] = L'C';
- break;
- case L'C':
- fmtw[i + 1] = L'c';
- break;
- }
- } while (keepgoing);
- }
- fmt = (const TCHAR *)fmtw;
- } while (0);
-
- va_start(ap, fmta);
- _vsntprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) / sizeof(TCHAR) - 1, fmt, ap);
- buf[sizeof(buf) / sizeof(TCHAR) - 1] = _T('\0');
- va_end(ap);
-
-# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
- /* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
- if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0) {
- HANDLE h = RegisterEventSource(0, _T("OPENSSL"));
- const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
- ReportEvent(h, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, &pmsg, 0);
- DeregisterEventSource(h);
- } else
-# endif
- MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONSTOP);
-}
-#else
-void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
-
- va_start(ap, fmta);
- vfprintf(stderr, fmta, ap);
- va_end(ap);
-}
-
-int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-void OpenSSLDie(const char *file, int line, const char *assertion)
-{
- OPENSSL_showfatal
- ("%s(%d): OpenSSL internal error, assertion failed: %s\n", file, line,
- assertion);
-#if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
- abort();
-#else
- /*
- * Win32 abort() customarily shows a dialog, but we just did that...
- */
- raise(SIGABRT);
- _exit(3);
-#endif
-}
-
-void *OPENSSL_stderr(void)
-{
- return stderr;
-}
-
-int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
-{
- size_t i;
- const unsigned char *a = in_a;
- const unsigned char *b = in_b;
- unsigned char x = 0;
-
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
-
- return x;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cryptlib.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/cryptlib.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cryptlib.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/cryptlib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1005 @@
+/* crypto/cryptlib.c */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
+static double SSLeay_MSVC5_hack = 0.0; /* and for VC1.5 */
+#endif
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(CRYPTO_dynlock)
+
+/* real #defines in crypto.h, keep these upto date */
+static const char *const lock_names[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS] = {
+ "<<ERROR>>",
+ "err",
+ "ex_data",
+ "x509",
+ "x509_info",
+ "x509_pkey",
+ "x509_crl",
+ "x509_req",
+ "dsa",
+ "rsa",
+ "evp_pkey",
+ "x509_store",
+ "ssl_ctx",
+ "ssl_cert",
+ "ssl_session",
+ "ssl_sess_cert",
+ "ssl",
+ "ssl_method",
+ "rand",
+ "rand2",
+ "debug_malloc",
+ "BIO",
+ "gethostbyname",
+ "getservbyname",
+ "readdir",
+ "RSA_blinding",
+ "dh",
+ "debug_malloc2",
+ "dso",
+ "dynlock",
+ "engine",
+ "ui",
+ "ecdsa",
+ "ec",
+ "ecdh",
+ "bn",
+ "ec_pre_comp",
+ "store",
+ "comp",
+ "fips",
+ "fips2",
+#if CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS != 41
+# error "Inconsistency between crypto.h and cryptlib.c"
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is for applications to allocate new type names in the non-dynamic
+ * array of lock names. These are numbered with positive numbers.
+ */
+static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *app_locks = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * For applications that want a more dynamic way of handling threads, the
+ * following stack is used. These are externally numbered with negative
+ * numbers.
+ */
+static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_dynlock) *dyn_locks = NULL;
+
+static void (MS_FAR *locking_callback) (int mode, int type,
+ const char *file, int line) = 0;
+static int (MS_FAR *add_lock_callback) (int *pointer, int amount,
+ int type, const char *file,
+ int line) = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+static unsigned long (MS_FAR *id_callback) (void) = 0;
+#endif
+static void (MS_FAR *threadid_callback) (CRYPTO_THREADID *) = 0;
+static struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *(MS_FAR *dynlock_create_callback)
+ (const char *file, int line) = 0;
+static void (MS_FAR *dynlock_lock_callback) (int mode,
+ struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l,
+ const char *file, int line) = 0;
+static void (MS_FAR *dynlock_destroy_callback) (struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value
+ *l, const char *file,
+ int line) = 0;
+
+int CRYPTO_get_new_lockid(char *name)
+{
+ char *str;
+ int i;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
+ /*
+ * A hack to make Visual C++ 5.0 work correctly when linking as a DLL
+ * using /MT. Without this, the application cannot use any floating point
+ * printf's. It also seems to be needed for Visual C 1.5 (win16)
+ */
+ SSLeay_MSVC5_hack = (double)name[0] * (double)name[1];
+#endif
+
+ if ((app_locks == NULL)
+ && ((app_locks = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)) {
+ CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_LOCKID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if ((str = BUF_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
+ CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_LOCKID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ i = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(app_locks, str);
+ if (!i)
+ OPENSSL_free(str);
+ else
+ i += CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS; /* gap of one :-) */
+ return (i);
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_num_locks(void)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid(void)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ CRYPTO_dynlock *pointer = NULL;
+
+ if (dynlock_create_callback == NULL) {
+ CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_DYNLOCKID,
+ CRYPTO_R_NO_DYNLOCK_CREATE_CALLBACK);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
+ if ((dyn_locks == NULL)
+ && ((dyn_locks = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_new_null()) == NULL)) {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
+ CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_DYNLOCKID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
+
+ pointer = (CRYPTO_dynlock *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CRYPTO_dynlock));
+ if (pointer == NULL) {
+ CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_DYNLOCKID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ pointer->references = 1;
+ pointer->data = dynlock_create_callback(__FILE__, __LINE__);
+ if (pointer->data == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(pointer);
+ CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_DYNLOCKID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
+ /* First, try to find an existing empty slot */
+ i = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_find(dyn_locks, NULL);
+ /* If there was none, push, thereby creating a new one */
+ if (i == -1)
+ /*
+ * Since sk_push() returns the number of items on the stack, not the
+ * location of the pushed item, we need to transform the returned
+ * number into a position, by decreasing it.
+ */
+ i = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_push(dyn_locks, pointer) - 1;
+ else
+ /*
+ * If we found a place with a NULL pointer, put our pointer in it.
+ */
+ (void)sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_set(dyn_locks, i, pointer);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
+
+ if (i == -1) {
+ dynlock_destroy_callback(pointer->data, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ OPENSSL_free(pointer);
+ } else
+ i += 1; /* to avoid 0 */
+ return -i;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid(int i)
+{
+ CRYPTO_dynlock *pointer = NULL;
+ if (i)
+ i = -i - 1;
+ if (dynlock_destroy_callback == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
+
+ if (dyn_locks == NULL || i >= sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_num(dyn_locks)) {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
+ return;
+ }
+ pointer = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_value(dyn_locks, i);
+ if (pointer != NULL) {
+ --pointer->references;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (pointer->references < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid, bad reference count\n");
+ abort();
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (pointer->references <= 0) {
+ (void)sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_set(dyn_locks, i, NULL);
+ } else
+ pointer = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
+
+ if (pointer) {
+ dynlock_destroy_callback(pointer->data, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ OPENSSL_free(pointer);
+ }
+}
+
+struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *CRYPTO_get_dynlock_value(int i)
+{
+ CRYPTO_dynlock *pointer = NULL;
+ if (i)
+ i = -i - 1;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
+
+ if (dyn_locks != NULL && i < sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_num(dyn_locks))
+ pointer = sk_CRYPTO_dynlock_value(dyn_locks, i);
+ if (pointer)
+ pointer->references++;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK);
+
+ if (pointer)
+ return pointer->data;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *(*CRYPTO_get_dynlock_create_callback(void))
+ (const char *file, int line) {
+ return (dynlock_create_callback);
+}
+
+void (*CRYPTO_get_dynlock_lock_callback(void)) (int mode,
+ struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value
+ *l, const char *file,
+ int line) {
+ return (dynlock_lock_callback);
+}
+
+void (*CRYPTO_get_dynlock_destroy_callback(void))
+ (struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l, const char *file, int line) {
+ return (dynlock_destroy_callback);
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *(*func)
+ (const char *file, int line))
+{
+ dynlock_create_callback = func;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(void (*func) (int mode,
+ struct
+ CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l,
+ const char *file,
+ int line))
+{
+ dynlock_lock_callback = func;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(void (*func)
+ (struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l,
+ const char *file, int line))
+{
+ dynlock_destroy_callback = func;
+}
+
+void (*CRYPTO_get_locking_callback(void)) (int mode, int type,
+ const char *file, int line) {
+ return (locking_callback);
+}
+
+int (*CRYPTO_get_add_lock_callback(void)) (int *num, int mount, int type,
+ const char *file, int line) {
+ return (add_lock_callback);
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(void (*func) (int mode, int type,
+ const char *file, int line))
+{
+ /*
+ * Calling this here ensures initialisation before any threads are
+ * started.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_init();
+ locking_callback = func;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_set_add_lock_callback(int (*func) (int *num, int mount, int type,
+ const char *file, int line))
+{
+ add_lock_callback = func;
+}
+
+/*
+ * the memset() here and in set_pointer() seem overkill, but for the sake of
+ * CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp() this avoids any platform silliness that might cause
+ * two "equal" THREADID structs to not be memcmp()-identical.
+ */
+void CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(CRYPTO_THREADID *id, unsigned long val)
+{
+ memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+ id->val = val;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char hash_coeffs[] = { 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23 };
+
+void CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(CRYPTO_THREADID *id, void *ptr)
+{
+ unsigned char *dest = (void *)&id->val;
+ unsigned int accum = 0;
+ unsigned char dnum = sizeof(id->val);
+
+ memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+ id->ptr = ptr;
+ if (sizeof(id->val) >= sizeof(id->ptr)) {
+ /*
+ * 'ptr' can be embedded in 'val' without loss of uniqueness
+ */
+ id->val = (unsigned long)id->ptr;
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * hash ptr ==> val. Each byte of 'val' gets the mod-256 total of a
+ * linear function over the bytes in 'ptr', the co-efficients of which
+ * are a sequence of low-primes (hash_coeffs is an 8-element cycle) - the
+ * starting prime for the sequence varies for each byte of 'val' (unique
+ * polynomials unless pointers are >64-bit). For added spice, the totals
+ * accumulate rather than restarting from zero, and the index of the
+ * 'val' byte is added each time (position dependence). If I was a
+ * black-belt, I'd scan big-endian pointers in reverse to give low-order
+ * bits more play, but this isn't crypto and I'd prefer nobody mistake it
+ * as such. Plus I'm lazy.
+ */
+ while (dnum--) {
+ const unsigned char *src = (void *)&id->ptr;
+ unsigned char snum = sizeof(id->ptr);
+ while (snum--)
+ accum += *(src++) * hash_coeffs[(snum + dnum) & 7];
+ accum += dnum;
+ *(dest++) = accum & 255;
+ }
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(void (*func) (CRYPTO_THREADID *))
+{
+ if (threadid_callback)
+ return 0;
+ threadid_callback = func;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void (*CRYPTO_THREADID_get_callback(void)) (CRYPTO_THREADID *) {
+ return threadid_callback;
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_THREADID_current(CRYPTO_THREADID *id)
+{
+ if (threadid_callback) {
+ threadid_callback(id);
+ return;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+ /* If the deprecated callback was set, fall back to that */
+ if (id_callback) {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, id_callback());
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Else pick a backup */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, (unsigned long)GetCurrentTask());
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, (unsigned long)GetCurrentThreadId());
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS)
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(id, (unsigned long)find_thread(NULL));
+#else
+ /* For everything else, default to using the address of 'errno' */
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(id, (void *)&errno);
+#endif
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(const CRYPTO_THREADID *a, const CRYPTO_THREADID *b)
+{
+ return memcmp(a, b, sizeof(*a));
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(CRYPTO_THREADID *dest, const CRYPTO_THREADID *src)
+{
+ memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*src));
+}
+
+unsigned long CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(const CRYPTO_THREADID *id)
+{
+ return id->val;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+unsigned long (*CRYPTO_get_id_callback(void)) (void) {
+ return (id_callback);
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_set_id_callback(unsigned long (*func) (void))
+{
+ id_callback = func;
+}
+
+unsigned long CRYPTO_thread_id(void)
+{
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+
+ if (id_callback == NULL) {
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
+ ret = (unsigned long)GetCurrentTask();
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+ ret = (unsigned long)GetCurrentThreadId();
+# elif defined(GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS)
+ ret = 1L;
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS)
+ ret = (unsigned long)find_thread(NULL);
+# else
+ ret = (unsigned long)getpid();
+# endif
+ } else
+ ret = id_callback();
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+void CRYPTO_lock(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
+{
+#ifdef LOCK_DEBUG
+ {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID id;
+ char *rw_text, *operation_text;
+
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK)
+ operation_text = "lock ";
+ else if (mode & CRYPTO_UNLOCK)
+ operation_text = "unlock";
+ else
+ operation_text = "ERROR ";
+
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
+ rw_text = "r";
+ else if (mode & CRYPTO_WRITE)
+ rw_text = "w";
+ else
+ rw_text = "ERROR";
+
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&id);
+ fprintf(stderr, "lock:%08lx:(%s)%s %-18s %s:%d\n",
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&id), rw_text, operation_text,
+ CRYPTO_get_lock_name(type), file, line);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (type < 0) {
+ if (dynlock_lock_callback != NULL) {
+ struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *pointer
+ = CRYPTO_get_dynlock_value(type);
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(pointer != NULL);
+
+ dynlock_lock_callback(mode, pointer, file, line);
+
+ CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid(type);
+ }
+ } else if (locking_callback != NULL)
+ locking_callback(mode, type, file, line);
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_add_lock(int *pointer, int amount, int type, const char *file,
+ int line)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (add_lock_callback != NULL) {
+#ifdef LOCK_DEBUG
+ int before = *pointer;
+#endif
+
+ ret = add_lock_callback(pointer, amount, type, file, line);
+#ifdef LOCK_DEBUG
+ {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID id;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&id);
+ fprintf(stderr, "ladd:%08lx:%2d+%2d->%2d %-18s %s:%d\n",
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&id), before, amount, ret,
+ CRYPTO_get_lock_name(type), file, line);
+ }
+#endif
+ } else {
+ CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK | CRYPTO_WRITE, type, file, line);
+
+ ret = *pointer + amount;
+#ifdef LOCK_DEBUG
+ {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID id;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&id);
+ fprintf(stderr, "ladd:%08lx:%2d+%2d->%2d %-18s %s:%d\n",
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&id),
+ *pointer, amount, ret,
+ CRYPTO_get_lock_name(type), file, line);
+ }
+#endif
+ *pointer = ret;
+ CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_UNLOCK | CRYPTO_WRITE, type, file, line);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+const char *CRYPTO_get_lock_name(int type)
+{
+ if (type < 0)
+ return ("dynamic");
+ else if (type < CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS)
+ return (lock_names[type]);
+ else if (type - CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS > sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(app_locks))
+ return ("ERROR");
+ else
+ return (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(app_locks, type - CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS));
+}
+
+#if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
+ defined(__INTEL__) || \
+ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)
+
+unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
+unsigned long *OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(void)
+{
+ if (sizeof(long) == 4)
+ /*
+ * If 32-bit application pulls address of OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0]
+ * clear second element to maintain the illusion that vector
+ * is 32-bit.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] = 0;
+ return (unsigned long *)OPENSSL_ia32cap_P;
+}
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY)
+# define OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP
+# if defined(_WIN32)
+typedef unsigned __int64 IA32CAP;
+# else
+typedef unsigned long long IA32CAP;
+# endif
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+{
+ static int trigger = 0;
+ IA32CAP OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid(void);
+ IA32CAP vec;
+ char *env;
+
+ if (trigger)
+ return;
+
+ trigger = 1;
+ if ((env = getenv("OPENSSL_ia32cap"))) {
+ int off = (env[0] == '~') ? 1 : 0;
+# if defined(_WIN32)
+ if (!sscanf(env + off, "%I64i", &vec))
+ vec = strtoul(env + off, NULL, 0);
+# else
+ if (!sscanf(env + off, "%lli", (long long *)&vec))
+ vec = strtoul(env + off, NULL, 0);
+# endif
+ if (off)
+ vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid() & ~vec;
+ } else
+ vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid();
+
+ /*
+ * |(1<<10) sets a reserved bit to signal that variable
+ * was initialized already... This is to avoid interference
+ * with cpuid snippets in ELF .init segment.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] = (unsigned int)vec | (1 << 10);
+ OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] = (unsigned int)(vec >> 32);
+}
+# endif
+
+#else
+unsigned long *OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated = 0;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_SETUP) && !defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
+void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)) && defined(_WINDLL)
+# ifdef __CYGWIN__
+/* pick DLL_[PROCESS|THREAD]_[ATTACH|DETACH] definitions */
+# include <windows.h>
+/*
+ * this has side-effect of _WIN32 getting defined, which otherwise is
+ * mutually exclusive with __CYGWIN__...
+ */
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * All we really need to do is remove the 'error' state when a thread
+ * detaches
+ */
+
+BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
+{
+ switch (fdwReason) {
+ case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
+ OPENSSL_cpuid_setup();
+# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT)
+ {
+ IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos_header = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) hinstDLL;
+ IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *nt_headers;
+
+ if (dos_header->e_magic == IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
+ nt_headers = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS *) ((char *)dos_header
+ + dos_header->e_lfanew);
+ if (nt_headers->Signature == IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE &&
+ hinstDLL !=
+ (HINSTANCE) (nt_headers->OptionalHeader.ImageBase))
+ OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated = 1;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ break;
+ case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
+ break;
+ case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
+ break;
+ case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
+ break;
+ }
+ return (TRUE);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+# include <tchar.h>
+# include <signal.h>
+# ifdef __WATCOMC__
+# if defined(_UNICODE) || defined(__UNICODE__)
+# define _vsntprintf _vsnwprintf
+# else
+# define _vsntprintf _vsnprintf
+# endif
+# endif
+# ifdef _MSC_VER
+# define alloca _alloca
+# endif
+
+# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
+int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
+{
+ HWINSTA h;
+ DWORD len;
+ WCHAR *name;
+ static union {
+ void *p;
+ int (*f) (void);
+ } _OPENSSL_isservice = {
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p == NULL) {
+ HANDLE h = GetModuleHandle(NULL);
+ if (h != NULL)
+ _OPENSSL_isservice.p = GetProcAddress(h, "_OPENSSL_isservice");
+ if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p == NULL)
+ _OPENSSL_isservice.p = (void *)-1;
+ }
+
+ if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p != (void *)-1)
+ return (*_OPENSSL_isservice.f) ();
+
+ h = GetProcessWindowStation();
+ if (h == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (GetUserObjectInformationW(h, UOI_NAME, NULL, 0, &len) ||
+ GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (len > 512)
+ return -1; /* paranoia */
+ len++, len &= ~1; /* paranoia */
+ name = (WCHAR *)alloca(len + sizeof(WCHAR));
+ if (!GetUserObjectInformationW(h, UOI_NAME, name, len, &len))
+ return -1;
+
+ len++, len &= ~1; /* paranoia */
+ name[len / sizeof(WCHAR)] = L'\0'; /* paranoia */
+# if 1
+ /*
+ * This doesn't cover "interactive" services [working with real
+ * WinSta0's] nor programs started non-interactively by Task Scheduler
+ * [those are working with SAWinSta].
+ */
+ if (wcsstr(name, L"Service-0x"))
+ return 1;
+# else
+ /* This covers all non-interactive programs such as services. */
+ if (!wcsstr(name, L"WinSta0"))
+ return 1;
+# endif
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+# else
+int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+# endif
+
+void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ TCHAR buf[256];
+ const TCHAR *fmt;
+# ifdef STD_ERROR_HANDLE /* what a dirty trick! */
+ HANDLE h;
+
+ if ((h = GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE)) != NULL &&
+ GetFileType(h) != FILE_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
+ /* must be console application */
+ va_start(ap, fmta);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmta, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if (sizeof(TCHAR) == sizeof(char))
+ fmt = (const TCHAR *)fmta;
+ else
+ do {
+ int keepgoing;
+ size_t len_0 = strlen(fmta) + 1, i;
+ WCHAR *fmtw;
+
+ fmtw = (WCHAR *)alloca(len_0 * sizeof(WCHAR));
+ if (fmtw == NULL) {
+ fmt = (const TCHAR *)L"no stack?";
+ break;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBYTE
+ if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, fmta, len_0, fmtw, len_0))
+# endif
+ for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++)
+ fmtw[i] = (WCHAR)fmta[i];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++) {
+ if (fmtw[i] == L'%')
+ do {
+ keepgoing = 0;
+ switch (fmtw[i + 1]) {
+ case L'0':
+ case L'1':
+ case L'2':
+ case L'3':
+ case L'4':
+ case L'5':
+ case L'6':
+ case L'7':
+ case L'8':
+ case L'9':
+ case L'.':
+ case L'*':
+ case L'-':
+ i++;
+ keepgoing = 1;
+ break;
+ case L's':
+ fmtw[i + 1] = L'S';
+ break;
+ case L'S':
+ fmtw[i + 1] = L's';
+ break;
+ case L'c':
+ fmtw[i + 1] = L'C';
+ break;
+ case L'C':
+ fmtw[i + 1] = L'c';
+ break;
+ }
+ } while (keepgoing);
+ }
+ fmt = (const TCHAR *)fmtw;
+ } while (0);
+
+ va_start(ap, fmta);
+ _vsntprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) / sizeof(TCHAR) - 1, fmt, ap);
+ buf[sizeof(buf) / sizeof(TCHAR) - 1] = _T('\0');
+ va_end(ap);
+
+# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
+ /* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
+ if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0) {
+ HANDLE hEventLog = RegisterEventSource(NULL, _T("OpenSSL"));
+
+ if (hEventLog != NULL) {
+ const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
+
+ if (!ReportEvent(hEventLog, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, NULL,
+ 1, 0, &pmsg, NULL)) {
+#if defined(DEBUG)
+ /*
+ * We are in a situation where we tried to report a critical
+ * error and this failed for some reason. As a last resort,
+ * in debug builds, send output to the debugger or any other
+ * tool like DebugView which can monitor the output.
+ */
+ OutputDebugString(pmsg);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ (void)DeregisterEventSource(hEventLog);
+ }
+ } else
+# endif
+ MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
+}
+#else
+void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmta);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmta, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+}
+
+int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+void OpenSSLDie(const char *file, int line, const char *assertion)
+{
+ OPENSSL_showfatal
+ ("%s(%d): OpenSSL internal error, assertion failed: %s\n", file, line,
+ assertion);
+#if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ abort();
+#else
+ /*
+ * Win32 abort() customarily shows a dialog, but we just did that...
+ */
+ raise(SIGABRT);
+ _exit(3);
+#endif
+}
+
+void *OPENSSL_stderr(void)
+{
+ return stderr;
+}
+
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ const unsigned char *a = in_a;
+ const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+ unsigned char x = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+ return x;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/des/t/test
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/des/t/test 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/des/t/test 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-#!./perl
-
-BEGIN { push(@INC, qw(../../../lib ../../lib ../lib lib)); }
-
-use DES;
-
-$key='00000000';
-$ks=DES::set_key($key);
- at a=split(//,$ks);
-foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); }
-print "\n";
-
-
-$key=DES::random_key();
-print "($_)\n";
- at a=split(//,$key);
-foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); }
-print "\n";
-$str="this is and again into the breach";
-($k1,$k2)=DES::string_to_2keys($str);
- at a=split(//,$k1);
-foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); }
-print "\n";
- at a=split(//,$k2);
-foreach (@a) { printf "%02x-",ord($_); }
-print "\n";
-
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,673 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2006.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
-# include <openssl/cms.h>
-#endif
-#include "asn1_locl.h"
-
-static int dsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
-{
- const unsigned char *p, *pm;
- int pklen, pmlen;
- int ptype;
- void *pval;
- ASN1_STRING *pstr;
- X509_ALGOR *palg;
- ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
-
- DSA *dsa = NULL;
-
- if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey))
- return 0;
- X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
-
- if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
- pstr = pval;
- pm = pstr->data;
- pmlen = pstr->length;
-
- if (!(dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen))) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- } else if ((ptype == V_ASN1_NULL) || (ptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)) {
- if (!(dsa = DSA_new())) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen))) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(dsa->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL))) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
- EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
- return 1;
-
- err:
- if (public_key)
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
- if (dsa)
- DSA_free(dsa);
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- DSA *dsa;
- int ptype;
- unsigned char *penc = NULL;
- int penclen;
- ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
-
- dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
- if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
- str = ASN1_STRING_new();
- if (!str) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- str->length = i2d_DSAparams(dsa, &str->data);
- if (str->length <= 0) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
- } else
- ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
-
- dsa->write_params = 0;
-
- penclen = i2d_DSAPublicKey(dsa, &penc);
-
- if (penclen <= 0) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA),
- ptype, str, penc, penclen))
- return 1;
-
- err:
- if (penc)
- OPENSSL_free(penc);
- if (str)
- ASN1_STRING_free(str);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * In PKCS#8 DSA: you just get a private key integer and parameters in the
- * AlgorithmIdentifier the pubkey must be recalculated.
- */
-
-static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
-{
- const unsigned char *p, *pm;
- int pklen, pmlen;
- int ptype;
- void *pval;
- ASN1_STRING *pstr;
- X509_ALGOR *palg;
- ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
- STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *ndsa = NULL;
- DSA *dsa = NULL;
-
- if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
- return 0;
- X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
-
- /* Check for broken DSA PKCS#8, UGH! */
- if (*p == (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) {
- ASN1_TYPE *t1, *t2;
- if (!(ndsa = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, pklen)))
- goto decerr;
- if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(ndsa) != 2)
- goto decerr;
- /*-
- * Handle Two broken types:
- * SEQUENCE {parameters, priv_key}
- * SEQUENCE {pub_key, priv_key}
- */
-
- t1 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 0);
- t2 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 1);
- if (t1->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
- p8->broken = PKCS8_EMBEDDED_PARAM;
- pval = t1->value.ptr;
- } else if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- p8->broken = PKCS8_NS_DB;
- else
- goto decerr;
-
- if (t2->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER)
- goto decerr;
-
- privkey = t2->value.integer;
- } else {
- const unsigned char *q = p;
- if (!(privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)))
- goto decerr;
- if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
- p8->broken = PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY;
- ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
- if (!(privkey = d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(NULL, &q, pklen)))
- goto decerr;
- }
- if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- goto decerr;
- }
-
- pstr = pval;
- pm = pstr->data;
- pmlen = pstr->length;
- if (!(dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)))
- goto decerr;
- /* We have parameters now set private key */
- if (!(dsa->priv_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, NULL))) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
- goto dsaerr;
- }
- /* Calculate public key */
- if (!(dsa->pub_key = BN_new())) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto dsaerr;
- }
- if (!(ctx = BN_CTX_new())) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto dsaerr;
- }
-
- if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
- goto dsaerr;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (ndsa)
- sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
- else
- ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
-
- return 1;
-
- decerr:
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- dsaerr:
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (privkey)
- ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
- sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
- DSA_free(dsa);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- ASN1_STRING *params = NULL;
- ASN1_INTEGER *prkey = NULL;
- unsigned char *dp = NULL;
- int dplen;
-
- if (!pkey->pkey.dsa || !pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- params = ASN1_STRING_new();
-
- if (!params) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- params->length = i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, ¶ms->data);
- if (params->length <= 0) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- params->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
-
- /* Get private key into integer */
- prkey = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key, NULL);
-
- if (!prkey) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
-
- ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
-
- if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
- V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
- goto err;
-
- return 1;
-
- err:
- if (dp != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(dp);
- if (params != NULL)
- ASN1_STRING_free(params);
- if (prkey != NULL)
- ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int int_dsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- return (DSA_size(pkey->pkey.dsa));
-}
-
-static int dsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa->p);
-}
-
-static int dsa_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- DSA *dsa;
- dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
- if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int dsa_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
-{
- BIGNUM *a;
-
- if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->p)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (to->pkey.dsa->p != NULL)
- BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->p);
- to->pkey.dsa->p = a;
-
- if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->q)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (to->pkey.dsa->q != NULL)
- BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->q);
- to->pkey.dsa->q = a;
-
- if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->g)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (to->pkey.dsa->g != NULL)
- BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->g);
- to->pkey.dsa->g = a;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int dsa_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
-{
- if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->p, b->pkey.dsa->p) ||
- BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->q, b->pkey.dsa->q) ||
- BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->g, b->pkey.dsa->g))
- return 0;
- else
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int dsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
-{
- if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.dsa->pub_key, a->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0)
- return 0;
- else
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void int_dsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- DSA_free(pkey->pkey.dsa);
-}
-
-static void update_buflen(const BIGNUM *b, size_t *pbuflen)
-{
- size_t i;
- if (!b)
- return;
- if (*pbuflen < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(b)))
- *pbuflen = i;
-}
-
-static int do_dsa_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off, int ptype)
-{
- unsigned char *m = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
- size_t buf_len = 0;
- const char *ktype = NULL;
-
- const BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key;
-
- if (ptype == 2)
- priv_key = x->priv_key;
- else
- priv_key = NULL;
-
- if (ptype > 0)
- pub_key = x->pub_key;
- else
- pub_key = NULL;
-
- if (ptype == 2)
- ktype = "Private-Key";
- else if (ptype == 1)
- ktype = "Public-Key";
- else
- ktype = "DSA-Parameters";
-
- update_buflen(x->p, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->q, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->g, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(priv_key, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(pub_key, &buf_len);
-
- m = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len + 10);
- if (m == NULL) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DO_DSA_PRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (priv_key) {
- if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
- goto err;
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ktype, BN_num_bits(x->p))
- <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "priv:", priv_key, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "pub: ", pub_key, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "P: ", x->p, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Q: ", x->q, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "G: ", x->g, m, off))
- goto err;
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (m != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(m);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int dsa_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
-{
- DSA *dsa;
- if (!(dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, pder, derlen))) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int dsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
-{
- return i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder);
-}
-
-static int dsa_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
- ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
-{
- return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 0);
-}
-
-static int dsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
- ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
-{
- return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 1);
-}
-
-static int dsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
- ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
-{
- return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 2);
-}
-
-static int old_dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
-{
- DSA *dsa;
- if (!(dsa = d2i_DSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen))) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int old_dsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
-{
- return i2d_DSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder);
-}
-
-static int dsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
- const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
-{
- DSA_SIG *dsa_sig;
- const unsigned char *p;
- if (!sig) {
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
- return 0;
- else
- return 1;
- }
- p = sig->data;
- dsa_sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &p, sig->length);
- if (dsa_sig) {
- int rv = 0;
- size_t buf_len = 0;
- unsigned char *m = NULL;
- update_buflen(dsa_sig->r, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(dsa_sig->s, &buf_len);
- m = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len + 10);
- if (m == NULL) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_PRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)
- goto err;
-
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "r: ", dsa_sig->r, m, indent))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "s: ", dsa_sig->s, m, indent))
- goto err;
- rv = 1;
- err:
- if (m)
- OPENSSL_free(m);
- DSA_SIG_free(dsa_sig);
- return rv;
- }
- return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
-}
-
-static int dsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
-{
- switch (op) {
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
- if (arg1 == 0) {
- int snid, hnid;
- X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2;
- PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, &alg1, &alg2);
- if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL)
- return -1;
- hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm);
- if (hnid == NID_undef)
- return -1;
- if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)))
- return -1;
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0);
- }
- return 1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
- if (arg1 == 0) {
- int snid, hnid;
- X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2;
- CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg1, &alg2);
- if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL)
- return -1;
- hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm);
- if (hnid == NID_undef)
- return -1;
- if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)))
- return -1;
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0);
- }
- return 1;
-#endif
-
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
- *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha1;
- return 2;
-
- default:
- return -2;
-
- }
-
-}
-
-/* NB these are sorted in pkey_id order, lowest first */
-
-const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[] = {
-
- {
- EVP_PKEY_DSA2,
- EVP_PKEY_DSA,
- ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
-
- {
- EVP_PKEY_DSA1,
- EVP_PKEY_DSA,
- ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
-
- {
- EVP_PKEY_DSA4,
- EVP_PKEY_DSA,
- ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
-
- {
- EVP_PKEY_DSA3,
- EVP_PKEY_DSA,
- ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
-
- {
- EVP_PKEY_DSA,
- EVP_PKEY_DSA,
- 0,
-
- "DSA",
- "OpenSSL DSA method",
-
- dsa_pub_decode,
- dsa_pub_encode,
- dsa_pub_cmp,
- dsa_pub_print,
-
- dsa_priv_decode,
- dsa_priv_encode,
- dsa_priv_print,
-
- int_dsa_size,
- dsa_bits,
-
- dsa_param_decode,
- dsa_param_encode,
- dsa_missing_parameters,
- dsa_copy_parameters,
- dsa_cmp_parameters,
- dsa_param_print,
- dsa_sig_print,
-
- int_dsa_free,
- dsa_pkey_ctrl,
- old_dsa_priv_decode,
- old_dsa_priv_encode}
-};
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,674 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2006.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+# include <openssl/cms.h>
+#endif
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+static int dsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p, *pm;
+ int pklen, pmlen;
+ int ptype;
+ void *pval;
+ ASN1_STRING *pstr;
+ X509_ALGOR *palg;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
+
+ DSA *dsa = NULL;
+
+ if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey))
+ return 0;
+ X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+
+ if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+ pstr = pval;
+ pm = pstr->data;
+ pmlen = pstr->length;
+
+ if (!(dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen))) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ } else if ((ptype == V_ASN1_NULL) || (ptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)) {
+ if (!(dsa = DSA_new())) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen))) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(dsa->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL))) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (public_key)
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
+ if (dsa)
+ DSA_free(dsa);
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ DSA *dsa;
+ int ptype;
+ unsigned char *penc = NULL;
+ int penclen;
+ ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
+
+ dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
+ if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
+ str = ASN1_STRING_new();
+ if (!str) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ str->length = i2d_DSAparams(dsa, &str->data);
+ if (str->length <= 0) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+ } else
+ ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
+
+ dsa->write_params = 0;
+
+ penclen = i2d_DSAPublicKey(dsa, &penc);
+
+ if (penclen <= 0) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA),
+ ptype, str, penc, penclen))
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (penc)
+ OPENSSL_free(penc);
+ if (str)
+ ASN1_STRING_free(str);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * In PKCS#8 DSA: you just get a private key integer and parameters in the
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier the pubkey must be recalculated.
+ */
+
+static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p, *pm;
+ int pklen, pmlen;
+ int ptype;
+ void *pval;
+ ASN1_STRING *pstr;
+ X509_ALGOR *palg;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *ndsa = NULL;
+ DSA *dsa = NULL;
+
+ if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
+ return 0;
+ X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+
+ /* Check for broken DSA PKCS#8, UGH! */
+ if (*p == (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) {
+ ASN1_TYPE *t1, *t2;
+ if (!(ndsa = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, pklen)))
+ goto decerr;
+ if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(ndsa) != 2)
+ goto decerr;
+ /*-
+ * Handle Two broken types:
+ * SEQUENCE {parameters, priv_key}
+ * SEQUENCE {pub_key, priv_key}
+ */
+
+ t1 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 0);
+ t2 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 1);
+ if (t1->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+ p8->broken = PKCS8_EMBEDDED_PARAM;
+ pval = t1->value.ptr;
+ } else if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ p8->broken = PKCS8_NS_DB;
+ else
+ goto decerr;
+
+ if (t2->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER)
+ goto decerr;
+
+ privkey = t2->value.integer;
+ } else {
+ const unsigned char *q = p;
+ if (!(privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)))
+ goto decerr;
+ if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
+ p8->broken = PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY;
+ ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
+ if (!(privkey = d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(NULL, &q, pklen)))
+ goto decerr;
+ }
+ if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ goto decerr;
+ }
+
+ pstr = pval;
+ pm = pstr->data;
+ pmlen = pstr->length;
+ if (!(dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)))
+ goto decerr;
+ /* We have parameters now set private key */
+ if (!(dsa->priv_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, NULL))) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
+ goto dsaerr;
+ }
+ /* Calculate public key */
+ if (!(dsa->pub_key = BN_new())) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto dsaerr;
+ }
+ if (!(ctx = BN_CTX_new())) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto dsaerr;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
+ goto dsaerr;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (ndsa)
+ sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+ else
+ ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
+
+ return 1;
+
+ decerr:
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ dsaerr:
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (privkey)
+ ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
+ sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+ DSA_free(dsa);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ ASN1_STRING *params = NULL;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *prkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *dp = NULL;
+ int dplen;
+
+ if (!pkey->pkey.dsa || !pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ params = ASN1_STRING_new();
+
+ if (!params) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ params->length = i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, ¶ms->data);
+ if (params->length <= 0) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ params->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+
+ /* Get private key into integer */
+ prkey = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key, NULL);
+
+ if (!prkey) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
+
+ ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+ prkey = NULL;
+
+ if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
+ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
+ goto err;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (dp != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(dp);
+ if (params != NULL)
+ ASN1_STRING_free(params);
+ if (prkey != NULL)
+ ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int int_dsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return (DSA_size(pkey->pkey.dsa));
+}
+
+static int dsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa->p);
+}
+
+static int dsa_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ DSA *dsa;
+ dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int dsa_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a;
+
+ if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->p)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (to->pkey.dsa->p != NULL)
+ BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->p);
+ to->pkey.dsa->p = a;
+
+ if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->q)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (to->pkey.dsa->q != NULL)
+ BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->q);
+ to->pkey.dsa->q = a;
+
+ if ((a = BN_dup(from->pkey.dsa->g)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (to->pkey.dsa->g != NULL)
+ BN_free(to->pkey.dsa->g);
+ to->pkey.dsa->g = a;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+ if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->p, b->pkey.dsa->p) ||
+ BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->q, b->pkey.dsa->q) ||
+ BN_cmp(a->pkey.dsa->g, b->pkey.dsa->g))
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+ if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.dsa->pub_key, a->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void int_dsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ DSA_free(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+}
+
+static void update_buflen(const BIGNUM *b, size_t *pbuflen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ if (!b)
+ return;
+ if (*pbuflen < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(b)))
+ *pbuflen = i;
+}
+
+static int do_dsa_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off, int ptype)
+{
+ unsigned char *m = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t buf_len = 0;
+ const char *ktype = NULL;
+
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key;
+
+ if (ptype == 2)
+ priv_key = x->priv_key;
+ else
+ priv_key = NULL;
+
+ if (ptype > 0)
+ pub_key = x->pub_key;
+ else
+ pub_key = NULL;
+
+ if (ptype == 2)
+ ktype = "Private-Key";
+ else if (ptype == 1)
+ ktype = "Public-Key";
+ else
+ ktype = "DSA-Parameters";
+
+ update_buflen(x->p, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->q, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->g, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(priv_key, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(pub_key, &buf_len);
+
+ m = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len + 10);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DO_DSA_PRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (priv_key) {
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ktype, BN_num_bits(x->p))
+ <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "priv:", priv_key, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "pub: ", pub_key, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "P: ", x->p, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "Q: ", x->q, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "G: ", x->g, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (m != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(m);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int dsa_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+ DSA *dsa;
+ if (!(dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, pder, derlen))) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+ return i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder);
+}
+
+static int dsa_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+ ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+ return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 0);
+}
+
+static int dsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+ ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+ return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 1);
+}
+
+static int dsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+ ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+ return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 2);
+}
+
+static int old_dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+ DSA *dsa;
+ if (!(dsa = d2i_DSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen))) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_OLD_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int old_dsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+ return i2d_DSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder);
+}
+
+static int dsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+ const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ if (!sig) {
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return 1;
+ }
+ p = sig->data;
+ dsa_sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &p, sig->length);
+ if (dsa_sig) {
+ int rv = 0;
+ size_t buf_len = 0;
+ unsigned char *m = NULL;
+ update_buflen(dsa_sig->r, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(dsa_sig->s, &buf_len);
+ m = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len + 10);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_PRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "r: ", dsa_sig->r, m, indent))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "s: ", dsa_sig->s, m, indent))
+ goto err;
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (m)
+ OPENSSL_free(m);
+ DSA_SIG_free(dsa_sig);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
+}
+
+static int dsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+ switch (op) {
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+ if (arg1 == 0) {
+ int snid, hnid;
+ X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2;
+ PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, &alg1, &alg2);
+ if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm);
+ if (hnid == NID_undef)
+ return -1;
+ if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)))
+ return -1;
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0);
+ }
+ return 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+ if (arg1 == 0) {
+ int snid, hnid;
+ X509_ALGOR *alg1, *alg2;
+ CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg1, &alg2);
+ if (alg1 == NULL || alg1->algorithm == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ hnid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg1->algorithm);
+ if (hnid == NID_undef)
+ return -1;
+ if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&snid, hnid, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)))
+ return -1;
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(snid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, 0);
+ }
+ return 1;
+#endif
+
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+ *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha1;
+ return 2;
+
+ default:
+ return -2;
+
+ }
+
+}
+
+/* NB these are sorted in pkey_id order, lowest first */
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[] = {
+
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_DSA2,
+ EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+ ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_DSA1,
+ EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+ ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_DSA4,
+ EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+ ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_DSA3,
+ EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+ ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
+
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+ EVP_PKEY_DSA,
+ 0,
+
+ "DSA",
+ "OpenSSL DSA method",
+
+ dsa_pub_decode,
+ dsa_pub_encode,
+ dsa_pub_cmp,
+ dsa_pub_print,
+
+ dsa_priv_decode,
+ dsa_priv_encode,
+ dsa_priv_print,
+
+ int_dsa_size,
+ dsa_bits,
+
+ dsa_param_decode,
+ dsa_param_encode,
+ dsa_missing_parameters,
+ dsa_copy_parameters,
+ dsa_cmp_parameters,
+ dsa_param_print,
+ dsa_sig_print,
+
+ int_dsa_free,
+ dsa_pkey_ctrl,
+ old_dsa_priv_decode,
+ old_dsa_priv_encode}
+};
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,386 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#undef GENUINE_DSA
-
-#ifdef GENUINE_DSA
-/*
- * Parameter generation follows the original release of FIPS PUB 186,
- * Appendix 2.2 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB 180)
- */
-# define HASH EVP_sha()
-#else
-/*
- * Parameter generation follows the updated Appendix 2.2 for FIPS PUB 186,
- * also Appendix 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186-1 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB
- * 180-1)
- */
-# define HASH EVP_sha1()
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_SHA is defined */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-
-# include <stdio.h>
-# include "cryptlib.h"
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/bn.h>
-# include <openssl/rand.h>
-# include <openssl/sha.h>
-# include "dsa_locl.h"
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# include <openssl/fips.h>
-# endif
-
-int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits,
- const unsigned char *seed_in, int seed_len,
- int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
- BN_GENCB *cb)
-{
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(ret->meth->flags & DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(ret->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX, DSA_R_NON_FIPS_DSA_METHOD);
- return 0;
- }
-# endif
- if (ret->meth->dsa_paramgen)
- return ret->meth->dsa_paramgen(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len,
- counter_ret, h_ret, cb);
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- else if (FIPS_mode()) {
- return FIPS_dsa_generate_parameters_ex(ret, bits,
- seed_in, seed_len,
- counter_ret, h_ret, cb);
- }
-# endif
- else {
- const EVP_MD *evpmd;
- size_t qbits = bits >= 2048 ? 256 : 160;
-
- if (bits >= 2048) {
- qbits = 256;
- evpmd = EVP_sha256();
- } else {
- qbits = 160;
- evpmd = EVP_sha1();
- }
-
- return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd,
- seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret,
- h_ret, cb);
- }
-}
-
-int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
- const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in,
- size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out,
- int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb)
-{
- int ok = 0;
- unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test;
- BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
- BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
- int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = qbits >> 3;
- int counter = 0;
- int r = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned int h = 2;
-
- if (qsize != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH &&
- qsize != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
- /* invalid q size */
- return 0;
-
- if (evpmd == NULL)
- /* use SHA1 as default */
- evpmd = EVP_sha1();
-
- if (bits < 512)
- bits = 512;
-
- bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64;
-
- /*
- * NB: seed_len == 0 is special case: copy generated seed to seed_in if
- * it is not NULL.
- */
- if (seed_len && (seed_len < (size_t)qsize))
- seed_in = NULL; /* seed buffer too small -- ignore */
- if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize)
- seed_len = qsize; /* App. 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186 allows larger
- * SEED, but our internal buffers are
- * restricted to 160 bits */
- if (seed_in != NULL)
- memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
-
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- c = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- for (;;) { /* find q */
- int seed_is_random;
-
- /* step 1 */
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
- goto err;
-
- if (!seed_len) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
- goto err;
- seed_is_random = 1;
- } else {
- seed_is_random = 0;
- seed_len = 0; /* use random seed if 'seed_in' turns out to
- * be bad */
- }
- memcpy(buf, seed, qsize);
- memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize);
- /* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */
- for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- buf[i]++;
- if (buf[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
-
- /* step 2 */
- if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
- goto err;
- for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++)
- md[i] ^= buf2[i];
-
- /* step 3 */
- md[0] |= 0x80;
- md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
- if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q))
- goto err;
-
- /* step 4 */
- r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx,
- seed_is_random, cb);
- if (r > 0)
- break;
- if (r != 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* do a callback call */
- /* step 5 */
- }
-
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
- goto err;
-
- /* step 6 */
- counter = 0;
- /* "offset = 2" */
-
- n = (bits - 1) / 160;
-
- for (;;) {
- if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter))
- goto err;
-
- /* step 7 */
- BN_zero(W);
- /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
- for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) {
- /*
- * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing:
- */
- for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- buf[i]++;
- if (buf[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- /* step 8 */
- if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_add(W, W, r0))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* more of step 8 */
- if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_copy(X, W))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_add(X, X, test))
- goto err;
-
- /* step 9 */
- if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0))
- goto err;
-
- /* step 10 */
- if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) {
- /* step 11 */
- r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb);
- if (r > 0)
- goto end; /* found it */
- if (r != 0)
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* step 13 */
- counter++;
- /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */
-
- /* step 14 */
- if (counter >= 4096)
- break;
- }
- }
- end:
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1))
- goto err;
-
- /* We now need to generate g */
- /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
- if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_set_word(test, h))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- /* g=test^r0%p */
- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_is_one(g))
- break;
- if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one()))
- goto err;
- h++;
- }
-
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
- goto err;
-
- ok = 1;
- err:
- if (ok) {
- if (ret->p)
- BN_free(ret->p);
- if (ret->q)
- BN_free(ret->q);
- if (ret->g)
- BN_free(ret->g);
- ret->p = BN_dup(p);
- ret->q = BN_dup(q);
- ret->g = BN_dup(g);
- if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) {
- ok = 0;
- goto err;
- }
- if (counter_ret != NULL)
- *counter_ret = counter;
- if (h_ret != NULL)
- *h_ret = h;
- if (seed_out)
- memcpy(seed_out, seed, qsize);
- }
- if (ctx) {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (mont != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
- return ok;
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+/* crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#undef GENUINE_DSA
+
+#ifdef GENUINE_DSA
+/*
+ * Parameter generation follows the original release of FIPS PUB 186,
+ * Appendix 2.2 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB 180)
+ */
+# define HASH EVP_sha()
+#else
+/*
+ * Parameter generation follows the updated Appendix 2.2 for FIPS PUB 186,
+ * also Appendix 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186-1 (i.e. use SHA as defined in FIPS PUB
+ * 180-1)
+ */
+# define HASH EVP_sha1()
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_SHA is defined */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include "cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+# include "dsa_locl.h"
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+# endif
+
+int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits,
+ const unsigned char *seed_in, int seed_len,
+ int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+ BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(ret->meth->flags & DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(ret->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX, DSA_R_NON_FIPS_DSA_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
+ if (ret->meth->dsa_paramgen)
+ return ret->meth->dsa_paramgen(ret, bits, seed_in, seed_len,
+ counter_ret, h_ret, cb);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ else if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ return FIPS_dsa_generate_parameters_ex(ret, bits,
+ seed_in, seed_len,
+ counter_ret, h_ret, cb);
+ }
+# endif
+ else {
+ const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
+ size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8;
+
+ return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd,
+ seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret,
+ h_ret, cb);
+ }
+}
+
+int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
+ const EVP_MD *evpmd, const unsigned char *seed_in,
+ size_t seed_len, unsigned char *seed_out,
+ int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test;
+ BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+ int i, k, n = 0, m = 0, qsize = qbits >> 3;
+ int counter = 0;
+ int r = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned int h = 2;
+
+ if (qsize != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH && qsize != SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH &&
+ qsize != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ /* invalid q size */
+ return 0;
+
+ if (evpmd == NULL)
+ /* use SHA1 as default */
+ evpmd = EVP_sha1();
+
+ if (bits < 512)
+ bits = 512;
+
+ bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64;
+
+ /*
+ * NB: seed_len == 0 is special case: copy generated seed to seed_in if
+ * it is not NULL.
+ */
+ if (seed_len && (seed_len < (size_t)qsize))
+ seed_in = NULL; /* seed buffer too small -- ignore */
+ if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize)
+ seed_len = qsize; /* App. 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186 allows larger
+ * SEED, but our internal buffers are
+ * restricted to 160 bits */
+ if (seed_in != NULL)
+ memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
+
+ if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ c = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ for (;;) { /* find q */
+ int seed_is_random;
+
+ /* step 1 */
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!seed_len || !seed_in) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ seed_is_random = 1;
+ } else {
+ seed_is_random = 0;
+ seed_len = 0; /* use random seed if 'seed_in' turns out to
+ * be bad */
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, seed, qsize);
+ memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize);
+ /* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */
+ for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ buf[i]++;
+ if (buf[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* step 2 */
+ if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++)
+ md[i] ^= buf2[i];
+
+ /* step 3 */
+ md[0] |= 0x80;
+ md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
+ if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* step 4 */
+ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx,
+ seed_is_random, cb);
+ if (r > 0)
+ break;
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* do a callback call */
+ /* step 5 */
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* step 6 */
+ counter = 0;
+ /* "offset = 2" */
+
+ n = (bits - 1) / 160;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, counter))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* step 7 */
+ BN_zero(W);
+ /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */
+ for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) {
+ /*
+ * obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing:
+ */
+ for (i = qsize - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ buf[i]++;
+ if (buf[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* step 8 */
+ if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(W, W, r0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* more of step 8 */
+ if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_copy(X, W))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(X, X, test))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* step 9 */
+ if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(p, X, r0))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* step 10 */
+ if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) {
+ /* step 11 */
+ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb);
+ if (r > 0)
+ goto end; /* found it */
+ if (r != 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* step 13 */
+ counter++;
+ /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */
+
+ /* step 14 */
+ if (counter >= 4096)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ end:
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* We now need to generate g */
+ /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */
+ if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_set_word(test, h))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* g=test^r0%p */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_one(g))
+ break;
+ if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ h++;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ if (ok) {
+ if (ret->p)
+ BN_free(ret->p);
+ if (ret->q)
+ BN_free(ret->q);
+ if (ret->g)
+ BN_free(ret->g);
+ ret->p = BN_dup(p);
+ ret->q = BN_dup(q);
+ ret->g = BN_dup(g);
+ if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) {
+ ok = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (counter_ret != NULL)
+ *counter_ret = counter;
+ if (h_ret != NULL)
+ *h_ret = h;
+ if (seed_out)
+ memcpy(seed_out, seed, qsize);
+ }
+ if (ctx) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (mont != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+ return ok;
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ec/ec.h 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1193 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/ec/ec.h */
-/*
- * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/**
- * \file crypto/ec/ec.h Include file for the OpenSSL EC functions
- * \author Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
- * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_EC_H
-# define HEADER_EC_H
-
-# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-# error EC is disabled.
-# endif
-
-# include <openssl/asn1.h>
-# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-# include <openssl/bn.h>
-# endif
-
-# ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-# elif defined(__SUNPRO_C)
-# if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520
-# pragma error_messages (off,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE_NONAME,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE)
-# endif
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS
-# define OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS 661
-# endif
-
-/** Enum for the point conversion form as defined in X9.62 (ECDSA)
- * for the encoding of a elliptic curve point (x,y) */
-typedef enum {
- /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies
- * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */
- POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2,
- /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x02 */
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4,
- /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies
- * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */
- POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID = 6
-} point_conversion_form_t;
-
-typedef struct ec_method_st EC_METHOD;
-
-typedef struct ec_group_st
- /*-
- EC_METHOD *meth;
- -- field definition
- -- curve coefficients
- -- optional generator with associated information (order, cofactor)
- -- optional extra data (precomputed table for fast computation of multiples of generator)
- -- ASN1 stuff
- */
- EC_GROUP;
-
-typedef struct ec_point_st EC_POINT;
-
-/********************************************************************/
-/* EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p) */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-/** Returns the basic GFp ec methods which provides the basis for the
- * optimized methods.
- * \return EC_METHOD object
- */
-const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void);
-
-/** Returns GFp methods using montgomery multiplication.
- * \return EC_METHOD object
- */
-const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void);
-
-/** Returns GFp methods using optimized methods for NIST recommended curves
- * \return EC_METHOD object
- */
-const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-/** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp224
- * \return EC_METHOD object
- */
-const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void);
-
-/** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp256
- * \return EC_METHOD object
- */
-const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void);
-
-/** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp521
- * \return EC_METHOD object
- */
-const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void);
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-/********************************************************************/
-/* EC_METHOD for curves over GF(2^m) */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-/** Returns the basic GF2m ec method
- * \return EC_METHOD object
- */
-const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void);
-
-# endif
-
-/********************************************************************/
-/* EC_GROUP functions */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object
- * \param meth EC_METHOD to use
- * \return newly created EC_GROUP object or NULL in case of an error.
- */
-EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth);
-
-/** Frees a EC_GROUP object
- * \param group EC_GROUP object to be freed.
- */
-void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group);
-
-/** Clears and frees a EC_GROUP object
- * \param group EC_GROUP object to be cleared and freed.
- */
-void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group);
-
-/** Copies EC_GROUP objects. Note: both EC_GROUPs must use the same EC_METHOD.
- * \param dst destination EC_GROUP object
- * \param src source EC_GROUP object
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
- */
-int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dst, const EC_GROUP *src);
-
-/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object and copies the copies the content
- * form src to the newly created EC_KEY object
- * \param src source EC_GROUP object
- * \return newly created EC_GROUP object or NULL in case of an error.
- */
-EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *src);
-
-/** Returns the EC_METHOD of the EC_GROUP object.
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \return EC_METHOD used in this EC_GROUP object.
- */
-const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group);
-
-/** Returns the field type of the EC_METHOD.
- * \param meth EC_METHOD object
- * \return NID of the underlying field type OID.
- */
-int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth);
-
-/** Sets the generator and it's order/cofactor of a EC_GROUP object.
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param generator EC_POINT object with the generator.
- * \param order the order of the group generated by the generator.
- * \param cofactor the index of the sub-group generated by the generator
- * in the group of all points on the elliptic curve.
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
- const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor);
-
-/** Returns the generator of a EC_GROUP object.
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \return the currently used generator (possibly NULL).
- */
-const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group);
-
-/** Gets the order of a EC_GROUP
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param order BIGNUM to which the order is copied
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Gets the cofactor of a EC_GROUP
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param cofactor BIGNUM to which the cofactor is copied
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Sets the name of a EC_GROUP object
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param nid NID of the curve name OID
- */
-void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid);
-
-/** Returns the curve name of a EC_GROUP object
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \return NID of the curve name OID or 0 if not set.
- */
-int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group);
-
-void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag);
-int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group);
-
-void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group,
- point_conversion_form_t form);
-point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *);
-
-unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *x);
-size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *);
-size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *, const unsigned char *, size_t len);
-
-/** Sets the parameter of a ec over GFp defined by y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number
- * \param a BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation
- * \param b BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Gets the parameter of the ec over GFp defined by y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param p BIGNUM for the prime number
- * \param a BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation
- * \param b BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
- BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-/** Sets the parameter of a ec over GF2m defined by y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param p BIGNUM with the polynomial defining the underlying field
- * \param a BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation
- * \param b BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Gets the parameter of the ec over GF2m defined by y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param p BIGNUM for the polynomial defining the underlying field
- * \param a BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation
- * \param b BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
- BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
-# endif
-/** Returns the number of bits needed to represent a field element
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \return number of bits needed to represent a field element
- */
-int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group);
-
-/** Checks whether the parameter in the EC_GROUP define a valid ec group
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 if group is a valid ec group and 0 otherwise
- */
-int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Checks whether the discriminant of the elliptic curve is zero or not
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 if the discriminant is not zero and 0 otherwise
- */
-int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Compares two EC_GROUP objects
- * \param a first EC_GROUP object
- * \param b second EC_GROUP object
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 0 if both groups are equal and 1 otherwise
- */
-int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/*
- * EC_GROUP_new_GF*() calls EC_GROUP_new() and EC_GROUP_set_GF*() after
- * choosing an appropriate EC_METHOD
- */
-
-/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters defined
- * over GFp (defined by the equation y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b)
- * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number
- * \param a BIGNUM with the parameter a of the equation
- * \param b BIGNUM with the parameter b of the equation
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters
- */
-EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters defined
- * over GF2m (defined by the equation y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b)
- * \param p BIGNUM with the polynomial defining the underlying field
- * \param a BIGNUM with the parameter a of the equation
- * \param b BIGNUM with the parameter b of the equation
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters
- */
-EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
-# endif
-/** Creates a EC_GROUP object with a curve specified by a NID
- * \param nid NID of the OID of the curve name
- * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve or NULL
- * if an error occurred
- */
-EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid);
-
-/********************************************************************/
-/* handling of internal curves */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-typedef struct {
- int nid;
- const char *comment;
-} EC_builtin_curve;
-
-/*
- * EC_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t size) returns number of all
- * available curves or zero if a error occurred. In case r ist not zero
- * nitems EC_builtin_curve structures are filled with the data of the first
- * nitems internal groups
- */
-size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems);
-
-/********************************************************************/
-/* EC_POINT functions */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-/** Creates a new EC_POINT object for the specified EC_GROUP
- * \param group EC_GROUP the underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \return newly created EC_POINT object or NULL if an error occurred
- */
-EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group);
-
-/** Frees a EC_POINT object
- * \param point EC_POINT object to be freed
- */
-void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point);
-
-/** Clears and frees a EC_POINT object
- * \param point EC_POINT object to be cleared and freed
- */
-void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point);
-
-/** Copies EC_POINT object
- * \param dst destination EC_POINT object
- * \param src source EC_POINT object
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dst, const EC_POINT *src);
-
-/** Creates a new EC_POINT object and copies the content of the supplied
- * EC_POINT
- * \param src source EC_POINT object
- * \param group underlying the EC_GROUP object
- * \return newly created EC_POINT object or NULL if an error occurred
- */
-EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *src, const EC_GROUP *group);
-
-/** Returns the EC_METHOD used in EC_POINT object
- * \param point EC_POINT object
- * \return the EC_METHOD used
- */
-const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point);
-
-/** Sets a point to infinity (neutral element)
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param point EC_POINT to set to infinity
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point);
-
-/** Sets the jacobian projective coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate
- * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate
- * \param z BIGNUM with the z-coordinate
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
- EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x,
- const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Gets the jacobian projective coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate
- * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate
- * \param z BIGNUM for the z-coordinate
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
- const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x,
- BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Sets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate
- * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
- const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Gets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate
- * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
- const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x,
- BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \param x BIGNUM with x-coordinate
- * \param y_bit integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1)
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
- EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x,
- int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-/** Sets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate
- * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
- const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Gets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate
- * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
- const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x,
- BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \param x BIGNUM with x-coordinate
- * \param y_bit integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1)
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
- EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x,
- int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx);
-# endif
-/** Encodes a EC_POINT object to a octet string
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \param form point conversion form
- * \param buf memory buffer for the result. If NULL the function returns
- * required buffer size.
- * \param len length of the memory buffer
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred
- */
-size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p,
- point_conversion_form_t form,
- unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Decodes a EC_POINT from a octet string
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \param buf memory buffer with the encoded ec point
- * \param len length of the encoded ec point
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
- const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/* other interfaces to point2oct/oct2point: */
-BIGNUM *EC_POINT_point2bn(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *,
- point_conversion_form_t form, BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
-EC_POINT *EC_POINT_bn2point(const EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *,
- EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
-char *EC_POINT_point2hex(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *,
- point_conversion_form_t form, BN_CTX *);
-EC_POINT *EC_POINT_hex2point(const EC_GROUP *, const char *,
- EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
-
-/********************************************************************/
-/* functions for doing EC_POINT arithmetic */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-/** Computes the sum of two EC_POINT
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param r EC_POINT object for the result (r = a + b)
- * \param a EC_POINT object with the first summand
- * \param b EC_POINT object with the second summand
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
- const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Computes the double of a EC_POINT
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param r EC_POINT object for the result (r = 2 * a)
- * \param a EC_POINT object
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Computes the inverse of a EC_POINT
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param a EC_POINT object to be inverted (it's used for the result as well)
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Checks whether the point is the neutral element of the group
- * \param group the underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param p EC_POINT object
- * \return 1 if the point is the neutral element and 0 otherwise
- */
-int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p);
-
-/** Checks whether the point is on the curve
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param point EC_POINT object to check
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 if point if on the curve and 0 otherwise
- */
-int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Compares two EC_POINTs
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param a first EC_POINT object
- * \param b second EC_POINT object
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 0 if both points are equal and a value != 0 otherwise
- */
-int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
- EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Computes r = generator * n sum_{i=0}^{num-1} p[i] * m[i]
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param r EC_POINT object for the result
- * \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional)
- * \param num number futher summands
- * \param p array of size num of EC_POINT objects
- * \param m array of size num of BIGNUM objects
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n,
- size_t num, const EC_POINT *p[], const BIGNUM *m[],
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Computes r = generator * n + q * m
- * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
- * \param r EC_POINT object for the result
- * \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional)
- * \param q EC_POINT object with the first factor of the second summand
- * \param m BIGNUM with the second factor of the second summand
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n,
- const EC_POINT *q, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Stores multiples of generator for faster point multiplication
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
- */
-int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Reports whether a precomputation has been done
- * \param group EC_GROUP object
- * \return 1 if a pre-computation has been done and 0 otherwise
- */
-int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
-
-/********************************************************************/
-/* ASN1 stuff */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * EC_GROUP_get_basis_type() returns the NID of the basis type used to
- * represent the field elements
- */
-int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k);
-int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k1,
- unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3);
-# endif
-
-# define OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE 0x001
-
-typedef struct ecpk_parameters_st ECPKPARAMETERS;
-
-EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **, const unsigned char **in, long len);
-int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned char **out);
-
-# define d2i_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_GROUP,NULL,d2i_ECPKParameters,bp,x)
-# define i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(EC_GROUP,i2d_ECPKParameters,bp,x)
-# define d2i_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) (EC_GROUP *)ASN1_d2i_fp(NULL, \
- (char *(*)())d2i_ECPKParameters,(fp),(unsigned char **)(x))
-# define i2d_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_ECPKParameters,(fp), \
- (unsigned char *)(x))
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-int ECPKParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off);
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-int ECPKParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off);
-# endif
-
-/********************************************************************/
-/* EC_KEY functions */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY;
-
-/* some values for the encoding_flag */
-# define EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS 0x001
-# define EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY 0x002
-
-/* some values for the flags field */
-# define EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x1
-# define EC_FLAG_FIPS_CHECKED 0x2
-
-/** Creates a new EC_KEY object.
- * \return EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred.
- */
-EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void);
-
-int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
-
-void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags);
-
-void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags);
-
-/** Creates a new EC_KEY object using a named curve as underlying
- * EC_GROUP object.
- * \param nid NID of the named curve.
- * \return EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred.
- */
-EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid);
-
-/** Frees a EC_KEY object.
- * \param key EC_KEY object to be freed.
- */
-void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *key);
-
-/** Copies a EC_KEY object.
- * \param dst destination EC_KEY object
- * \param src src EC_KEY object
- * \return dst or NULL if an error occurred.
- */
-EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dst, const EC_KEY *src);
-
-/** Creates a new EC_KEY object and copies the content from src to it.
- * \param src the source EC_KEY object
- * \return newly created EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred.
- */
-EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *src);
-
-/** Increases the internal reference count of a EC_KEY object.
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
- */
-int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *key);
-
-/** Returns the EC_GROUP object of a EC_KEY object
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \return the EC_GROUP object (possibly NULL).
- */
-const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key);
-
-/** Sets the EC_GROUP of a EC_KEY object.
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \param group EC_GROUP to use in the EC_KEY object (note: the EC_KEY
- * object will use an own copy of the EC_GROUP).
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
- */
-int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group);
-
-/** Returns the private key of a EC_KEY object.
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \return a BIGNUM with the private key (possibly NULL).
- */
-const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key);
-
-/** Sets the private key of a EC_KEY object.
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \param prv BIGNUM with the private key (note: the EC_KEY object
- * will use an own copy of the BIGNUM).
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
- */
-int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *prv);
-
-/** Returns the public key of a EC_KEY object.
- * \param key the EC_KEY object
- * \return a EC_POINT object with the public key (possibly NULL)
- */
-const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key);
-
-/** Sets the public key of a EC_KEY object.
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \param pub EC_POINT object with the public key (note: the EC_KEY object
- * will use an own copy of the EC_POINT object).
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
- */
-int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub);
-
-unsigned EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
-void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags);
-point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key);
-void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform);
-/* functions to set/get method specific data */
-void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key,
- void *(*dup_func) (void *),
- void (*free_func) (void *),
- void (*clear_free_func) (void *));
-/** Sets the key method data of an EC_KEY object, if none has yet been set.
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \param data opaque data to install.
- * \param dup_func a function that duplicates |data|.
- * \param free_func a function that frees |data|.
- * \param clear_free_func a function that wipes and frees |data|.
- * \return the previously set data pointer, or NULL if |data| was inserted.
- */
-void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
- void *(*dup_func) (void *),
- void (*free_func) (void *),
- void (*clear_free_func) (void *));
-/* wrapper functions for the underlying EC_GROUP object */
-void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *eckey, int asn1_flag);
-
-/** Creates a table of pre-computed multiples of the generator to
- * accelerate further EC_KEY operations.
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
- */
-int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/** Creates a new ec private (and optional a new public) key.
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
- */
-int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key);
-
-/** Verifies that a private and/or public key is valid.
- * \param key the EC_KEY object
- * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise.
- */
-int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *key);
-
-/** Sets a public key from affine coordindates performing
- * neccessary NIST PKV tests.
- * \param key the EC_KEY object
- * \param x public key x coordinate
- * \param y public key y coordinate
- * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise.
- */
-int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
- BIGNUM *y);
-
-/********************************************************************/
-/* de- and encoding functions for SEC1 ECPrivateKey */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-/** Decodes a private key from a memory buffer.
- * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used (or NULL)
- * \param in pointer to memory with the DER encoded private key
- * \param len length of the DER encoded private key
- * \return the decoded private key or NULL if an error occurred.
- */
-EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len);
-
-/** Encodes a private key object and stores the result in a buffer.
- * \param key the EC_KEY object to encode
- * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number
- * of bytes needed).
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
- */
-int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out);
-
-/********************************************************************/
-/* de- and encoding functions for EC parameters */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-/** Decodes ec parameter from a memory buffer.
- * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used (or NULL)
- * \param in pointer to memory with the DER encoded ec parameters
- * \param len length of the DER encoded ec parameters
- * \return a EC_KEY object with the decoded parameters or NULL if an error
- * occurred.
- */
-EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len);
-
-/** Encodes ec parameter and stores the result in a buffer.
- * \param key the EC_KEY object with ec paramters to encode
- * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number
- * of bytes needed).
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
- */
-int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out);
-
-/********************************************************************/
-/* de- and encoding functions for EC public key */
-/* (octet string, not DER -- hence 'o2i' and 'i2o') */
-/********************************************************************/
-
-/** Decodes a ec public key from a octet string.
- * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used
- * \param in memory buffer with the encoded public key
- * \param len length of the encoded public key
- * \return EC_KEY object with decoded public key or NULL if an error
- * occurred.
- */
-EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len);
-
-/** Encodes a ec public key in an octet string.
- * \param key the EC_KEY object with the public key
- * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number
- * of bytes needed).
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
- */
-int i2o_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-/** Prints out the ec parameters on human readable form.
- * \param bp BIO object to which the information is printed
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
- */
-int ECParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *key);
-
-/** Prints out the contents of a EC_KEY object
- * \param bp BIO object to which the information is printed
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \param off line offset
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
- */
-int EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *key, int off);
-
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-/** Prints out the ec parameters on human readable form.
- * \param fp file descriptor to which the information is printed
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
- */
-int ECParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key);
-
-/** Prints out the contents of a EC_KEY object
- * \param fp file descriptor to which the information is printed
- * \param key EC_KEY object
- * \param off line offset
- * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
- */
-int EC_KEY_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key, int off);
-
-# endif
-
-# define ECParameters_dup(x) ASN1_dup_of(EC_KEY,i2d_ECParameters,d2i_ECParameters,x)
-
-# ifndef __cplusplus
-# if defined(__SUNPRO_C)
-# if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520
-# pragma error_messages (default,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE_NONAME,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE)
-# endif
-# endif
-# endif
-
-# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid) \
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID, nid, NULL)
-
-# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
-
-/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-/*
- * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
- * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
- */
-void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
-
-/* Error codes for the EC functions. */
-
-/* Function codes. */
-# define EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM 224
-# define EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF 143
-# define EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS 144
-# define EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS 145
-# define EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY 146
-# define EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT 221
-# define EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE 223
-# define EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM_DECODE 212
-# define EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE 213
-# define EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE 214
-# define EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE 215
-# define EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_ENCODE 216
-# define EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM 220
-# define EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT 147
-# define EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP 148
-# define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT 149
-# define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP 150
-# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_192 203
-# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_224 204
-# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_256 205
-# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_521 206
-# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE 153
-# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID 154
-# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS 155
-# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS 156
-# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP 157
-# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP 158
-# define EC_F_EC_EX_DATA_SET_DATA 211
-# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY 208
-# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 159
-# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE 195
-# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT 160
-# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT 161
-# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 162
-# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 163
-# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES 164
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE 133
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE 134
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL 131
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE 209
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR 132
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_GROUP_SET_CURVE 189
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP 135
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_GROUP_SET_CURVE 225
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL 228
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 226
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_GROUP_SET_CURVE 230
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL 231
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 232
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_GROUP_SET_CURVE 233
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL 234
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 235
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL 200
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR 201
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE 202
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 165
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE 166
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP 100
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR 101
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_MAKE_AFFINE 102
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT 103
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT 104
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE 137
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 167
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP 105
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 168
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP 128
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES 169
-# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP 129
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK 170
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 171
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY 106
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET0_GENERATOR 139
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_COFACTOR 140
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GF2M 172
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GFP 130
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_DEGREE 173
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ORDER 141
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS 193
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS 194
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW 108
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME 174
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA 175
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_PRECOMPUTE_MULT 142
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GF2M 176
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP 109
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_EXTRA_DATA 110
-# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR 111
-# define EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY 177
-# define EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY 178
-# define EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY 179
-# define EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW 182
-# define EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT 180
-# define EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT_FP 181
-# define EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES 229
-# define EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE 136
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD 112
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP 113
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY 114
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL 115
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M 183
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP 116
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP 117
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT 210
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY 118
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE 119
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE 120
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_MUL 184
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW 121
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT 122
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT 123
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M 185
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP 124
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M 186
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP 125
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP 126
-# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY 127
-# define EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_DUP 207
-# define EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW 196
-# define EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL 187
-# define EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT 188
-# define EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS 190
-# define EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS 191
-# define EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY 192
-# define EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY 151
-# define EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW 227
-# define EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW 236
-# define EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW 237
-# define EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY 152
-# define EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE 222
-# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL 197
-# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR 198
-# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_DERIVE 217
-# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_KEYGEN 199
-# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_PARAMGEN 219
-# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_SIGN 218
-
-/* Reason codes. */
-# define EC_R_ASN1_ERROR 115
-# define EC_R_ASN1_UNKNOWN_FIELD 116
-# define EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE 144
-# define EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 100
-# define EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE 146
-# define EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE 117
-# define EC_R_DECODE_ERROR 142
-# define EC_R_DISCRIMINANT_IS_ZERO 118
-# define EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE 119
-# define EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE 143
-# define EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED 147
-# define EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE 120
-# define EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE 121
-# define EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS 101
-# define EC_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT 112
-# define EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT 110
-# define EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT 109
-# define EC_R_INVALID_CURVE 141
-# define EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE 138
-# define EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING 102
-# define EC_R_INVALID_FIELD 103
-# define EC_R_INVALID_FORM 104
-# define EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER 122
-# define EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS 132
-# define EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY 123
-# define EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS 137
-# define EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET 140
-# define EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 124
-# define EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY 125
-# define EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME 135
-# define EC_R_NOT_A_SUPPORTED_NIST_PRIME 136
-# define EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 126
-# define EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 111
-# define EC_R_NO_FIELD_MOD 133
-# define EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET 139
-# define EC_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 134
-# define EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE 127
-# define EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY 106
-# define EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE 107
-# define EC_R_SLOT_FULL 108
-# define EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR 113
-# define EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER 128
-# define EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP 129
-# define EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER 114
-# define EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD 131
-# define EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS 145
-# define EC_R_WRONG_ORDER 130
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec.h (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ec/ec.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1193 @@
+/* crypto/ec/ec.h */
+/*
+ * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/**
+ * \file crypto/ec/ec.h Include file for the OpenSSL EC functions
+ * \author Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_EC_H
+# define HEADER_EC_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# error EC is disabled.
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/asn1.h>
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# elif defined(__SUNPRO_C)
+# if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520
+# pragma error_messages (off,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE_NONAME,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE)
+# endif
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS 661
+# endif
+
+/** Enum for the point conversion form as defined in X9.62 (ECDSA)
+ * for the encoding of a elliptic curve point (x,y) */
+typedef enum {
+ /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies
+ * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */
+ POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2,
+ /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04 */
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4,
+ /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies
+ * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */
+ POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID = 6
+} point_conversion_form_t;
+
+typedef struct ec_method_st EC_METHOD;
+
+typedef struct ec_group_st
+ /*-
+ EC_METHOD *meth;
+ -- field definition
+ -- curve coefficients
+ -- optional generator with associated information (order, cofactor)
+ -- optional extra data (precomputed table for fast computation of multiples of generator)
+ -- ASN1 stuff
+ */
+ EC_GROUP;
+
+typedef struct ec_point_st EC_POINT;
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/* EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p) */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Returns the basic GFp ec methods which provides the basis for the
+ * optimized methods.
+ * \return EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void);
+
+/** Returns GFp methods using montgomery multiplication.
+ * \return EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void);
+
+/** Returns GFp methods using optimized methods for NIST recommended curves
+ * \return EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+/** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp224
+ * \return EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void);
+
+/** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp256
+ * \return EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void);
+
+/** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp521
+ * \return EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/********************************************************************/
+/* EC_METHOD for curves over GF(2^m) */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Returns the basic GF2m ec method
+ * \return EC_METHOD object
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void);
+
+# endif
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/* EC_GROUP functions */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object
+ * \param meth EC_METHOD to use
+ * \return newly created EC_GROUP object or NULL in case of an error.
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth);
+
+/** Frees a EC_GROUP object
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object to be freed.
+ */
+void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Clears and frees a EC_GROUP object
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object to be cleared and freed.
+ */
+void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Copies EC_GROUP objects. Note: both EC_GROUPs must use the same EC_METHOD.
+ * \param dst destination EC_GROUP object
+ * \param src source EC_GROUP object
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dst, const EC_GROUP *src);
+
+/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object and copies the copies the content
+ * form src to the newly created EC_KEY object
+ * \param src source EC_GROUP object
+ * \return newly created EC_GROUP object or NULL in case of an error.
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *src);
+
+/** Returns the EC_METHOD of the EC_GROUP object.
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \return EC_METHOD used in this EC_GROUP object.
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Returns the field type of the EC_METHOD.
+ * \param meth EC_METHOD object
+ * \return NID of the underlying field type OID.
+ */
+int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth);
+
+/** Sets the generator and it's order/cofactor of a EC_GROUP object.
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param generator EC_POINT object with the generator.
+ * \param order the order of the group generated by the generator.
+ * \param cofactor the index of the sub-group generated by the generator
+ * in the group of all points on the elliptic curve.
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
+ const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor);
+
+/** Returns the generator of a EC_GROUP object.
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \return the currently used generator (possibly NULL).
+ */
+const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Gets the order of a EC_GROUP
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param order BIGNUM to which the order is copied
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the cofactor of a EC_GROUP
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param cofactor BIGNUM to which the cofactor is copied
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Sets the name of a EC_GROUP object
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param nid NID of the curve name OID
+ */
+void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid);
+
+/** Returns the curve name of a EC_GROUP object
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \return NID of the curve name OID or 0 if not set.
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag);
+int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group,
+ point_conversion_form_t form);
+point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *);
+
+unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *x);
+size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *);
+size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *, const unsigned char *, size_t len);
+
+/** Sets the parameter of a ec over GFp defined by y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number
+ * \param a BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation
+ * \param b BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the parameter of the ec over GFp defined by y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p BIGNUM for the prime number
+ * \param a BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation
+ * \param b BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+ BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/** Sets the parameter of a ec over GF2m defined by y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p BIGNUM with the polynomial defining the underlying field
+ * \param a BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation
+ * \param b BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the parameter of the ec over GF2m defined by y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p BIGNUM for the polynomial defining the underlying field
+ * \param a BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation
+ * \param b BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+ BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+# endif
+/** Returns the number of bits needed to represent a field element
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \return number of bits needed to represent a field element
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Checks whether the parameter in the EC_GROUP define a valid ec group
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 if group is a valid ec group and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Checks whether the discriminant of the elliptic curve is zero or not
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 if the discriminant is not zero and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Compares two EC_GROUP objects
+ * \param a first EC_GROUP object
+ * \param b second EC_GROUP object
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 0 if both groups are equal and 1 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * EC_GROUP_new_GF*() calls EC_GROUP_new() and EC_GROUP_set_GF*() after
+ * choosing an appropriate EC_METHOD
+ */
+
+/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters defined
+ * over GFp (defined by the equation y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b)
+ * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number
+ * \param a BIGNUM with the parameter a of the equation
+ * \param b BIGNUM with the parameter b of the equation
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/** Creates a new EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters defined
+ * over GF2m (defined by the equation y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b)
+ * \param p BIGNUM with the polynomial defining the underlying field
+ * \param a BIGNUM with the parameter a of the equation
+ * \param b BIGNUM with the parameter b of the equation
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+# endif
+/** Creates a EC_GROUP object with a curve specified by a NID
+ * \param nid NID of the OID of the curve name
+ * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve or NULL
+ * if an error occurred
+ */
+EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/* handling of internal curves */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+typedef struct {
+ int nid;
+ const char *comment;
+} EC_builtin_curve;
+
+/*
+ * EC_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t size) returns number of all
+ * available curves or zero if a error occurred. In case r ist not zero
+ * nitems EC_builtin_curve structures are filled with the data of the first
+ * nitems internal groups
+ */
+size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/* EC_POINT functions */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Creates a new EC_POINT object for the specified EC_GROUP
+ * \param group EC_GROUP the underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \return newly created EC_POINT object or NULL if an error occurred
+ */
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Frees a EC_POINT object
+ * \param point EC_POINT object to be freed
+ */
+void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point);
+
+/** Clears and frees a EC_POINT object
+ * \param point EC_POINT object to be cleared and freed
+ */
+void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point);
+
+/** Copies EC_POINT object
+ * \param dst destination EC_POINT object
+ * \param src source EC_POINT object
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dst, const EC_POINT *src);
+
+/** Creates a new EC_POINT object and copies the content of the supplied
+ * EC_POINT
+ * \param src source EC_POINT object
+ * \param group underlying the EC_GROUP object
+ * \return newly created EC_POINT object or NULL if an error occurred
+ */
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *src, const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Returns the EC_METHOD used in EC_POINT object
+ * \param point EC_POINT object
+ * \return the EC_METHOD used
+ */
+const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point);
+
+/** Sets a point to infinity (neutral element)
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param point EC_POINT to set to infinity
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point);
+
+/** Sets the jacobian projective coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate
+ * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate
+ * \param z BIGNUM with the z-coordinate
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x,
+ const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the jacobian projective coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate
+ * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate
+ * \param z BIGNUM for the z-coordinate
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x,
+ BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Sets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate
+ * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
+ const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate
+ * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x,
+ BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \param x BIGNUM with x-coordinate
+ * \param y_bit integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1)
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x,
+ int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/** Sets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate
+ * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
+ const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Gets the affine coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate
+ * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x,
+ BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT over GF2m
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \param x BIGNUM with x-coordinate
+ * \param y_bit integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1)
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x,
+ int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx);
+# endif
+/** Encodes a EC_POINT object to a octet string
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \param form point conversion form
+ * \param buf memory buffer for the result. If NULL the function returns
+ * required buffer size.
+ * \param len length of the memory buffer
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p,
+ point_conversion_form_t form,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Decodes a EC_POINT from a octet string
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \param buf memory buffer with the encoded ec point
+ * \param len length of the encoded ec point
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* other interfaces to point2oct/oct2point: */
+BIGNUM *EC_POINT_point2bn(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *,
+ point_conversion_form_t form, BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_bn2point(const EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *,
+ EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+char *EC_POINT_point2hex(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *,
+ point_conversion_form_t form, BN_CTX *);
+EC_POINT *EC_POINT_hex2point(const EC_GROUP *, const char *,
+ EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/* functions for doing EC_POINT arithmetic */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Computes the sum of two EC_POINT
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param r EC_POINT object for the result (r = a + b)
+ * \param a EC_POINT object with the first summand
+ * \param b EC_POINT object with the second summand
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+ const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Computes the double of a EC_POINT
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param r EC_POINT object for the result (r = 2 * a)
+ * \param a EC_POINT object
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Computes the inverse of a EC_POINT
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param a EC_POINT object to be inverted (it's used for the result as well)
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Checks whether the point is the neutral element of the group
+ * \param group the underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param p EC_POINT object
+ * \return 1 if the point is the neutral element and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p);
+
+/** Checks whether the point is on the curve
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param point EC_POINT object to check
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 if point if on the curve and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Compares two EC_POINTs
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param a first EC_POINT object
+ * \param b second EC_POINT object
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 0 if both points are equal and a value != 0 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
+ EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Computes r = generator * n sum_{i=0}^{num-1} p[i] * m[i]
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param r EC_POINT object for the result
+ * \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional)
+ * \param num number futher summands
+ * \param p array of size num of EC_POINT objects
+ * \param m array of size num of BIGNUM objects
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n,
+ size_t num, const EC_POINT *p[], const BIGNUM *m[],
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Computes r = generator * n + q * m
+ * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
+ * \param r EC_POINT object for the result
+ * \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional)
+ * \param q EC_POINT object with the first factor of the second summand
+ * \param m BIGNUM with the second factor of the second summand
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n,
+ const EC_POINT *q, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Stores multiples of generator for faster point multiplication
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occured
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Reports whether a precomputation has been done
+ * \param group EC_GROUP object
+ * \return 1 if a pre-computation has been done and 0 otherwise
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/* ASN1 stuff */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * EC_GROUP_get_basis_type() returns the NID of the basis type used to
+ * represent the field elements
+ */
+int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k);
+int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k1,
+ unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3);
+# endif
+
+# define OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE 0x001
+
+typedef struct ecpk_parameters_st ECPKPARAMETERS;
+
+EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned char **out);
+
+# define d2i_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_GROUP,NULL,d2i_ECPKParameters,bp,x)
+# define i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(EC_GROUP,i2d_ECPKParameters,bp,x)
+# define d2i_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) (EC_GROUP *)ASN1_d2i_fp(NULL, \
+ (char *(*)())d2i_ECPKParameters,(fp),(unsigned char **)(x))
+# define i2d_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_ECPKParameters,(fp), \
+ (unsigned char *)(x))
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+int ECPKParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+int ECPKParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off);
+# endif
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/* EC_KEY functions */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY;
+
+/* some values for the encoding_flag */
+# define EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS 0x001
+# define EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY 0x002
+
+/* some values for the flags field */
+# define EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x1
+# define EC_FLAG_FIPS_CHECKED 0x2
+
+/** Creates a new EC_KEY object.
+ * \return EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void);
+
+int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
+
+void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags);
+
+void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags);
+
+/** Creates a new EC_KEY object using a named curve as underlying
+ * EC_GROUP object.
+ * \param nid NID of the named curve.
+ * \return EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid);
+
+/** Frees a EC_KEY object.
+ * \param key EC_KEY object to be freed.
+ */
+void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Copies a EC_KEY object.
+ * \param dst destination EC_KEY object
+ * \param src src EC_KEY object
+ * \return dst or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dst, const EC_KEY *src);
+
+/** Creates a new EC_KEY object and copies the content from src to it.
+ * \param src the source EC_KEY object
+ * \return newly created EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *src);
+
+/** Increases the internal reference count of a EC_KEY object.
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Returns the EC_GROUP object of a EC_KEY object
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \return the EC_GROUP object (possibly NULL).
+ */
+const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Sets the EC_GROUP of a EC_KEY object.
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \param group EC_GROUP to use in the EC_KEY object (note: the EC_KEY
+ * object will use an own copy of the EC_GROUP).
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group);
+
+/** Returns the private key of a EC_KEY object.
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \return a BIGNUM with the private key (possibly NULL).
+ */
+const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Sets the private key of a EC_KEY object.
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \param prv BIGNUM with the private key (note: the EC_KEY object
+ * will use an own copy of the BIGNUM).
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *prv);
+
+/** Returns the public key of a EC_KEY object.
+ * \param key the EC_KEY object
+ * \return a EC_POINT object with the public key (possibly NULL)
+ */
+const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Sets the public key of a EC_KEY object.
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \param pub EC_POINT object with the public key (note: the EC_KEY object
+ * will use an own copy of the EC_POINT object).
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub);
+
+unsigned EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key);
+void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags);
+point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key);
+void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform);
+/* functions to set/get method specific data */
+void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key,
+ void *(*dup_func) (void *),
+ void (*free_func) (void *),
+ void (*clear_free_func) (void *));
+/** Sets the key method data of an EC_KEY object, if none has yet been set.
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \param data opaque data to install.
+ * \param dup_func a function that duplicates |data|.
+ * \param free_func a function that frees |data|.
+ * \param clear_free_func a function that wipes and frees |data|.
+ * \return the previously set data pointer, or NULL if |data| was inserted.
+ */
+void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
+ void *(*dup_func) (void *),
+ void (*free_func) (void *),
+ void (*clear_free_func) (void *));
+/* wrapper functions for the underlying EC_GROUP object */
+void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *eckey, int asn1_flag);
+
+/** Creates a table of pre-computed multiples of the generator to
+ * accelerate further EC_KEY operations.
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional)
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/** Creates a new ec private (and optional a new public) key.
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Verifies that a private and/or public key is valid.
+ * \param key the EC_KEY object
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Sets a public key from affine coordindates performing
+ * neccessary NIST PKV tests.
+ * \param key the EC_KEY object
+ * \param x public key x coordinate
+ * \param y public key y coordinate
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
+ BIGNUM *y);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/* de- and encoding functions for SEC1 ECPrivateKey */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Decodes a private key from a memory buffer.
+ * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used (or NULL)
+ * \param in pointer to memory with the DER encoded private key
+ * \param len length of the DER encoded private key
+ * \return the decoded private key or NULL if an error occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+
+/** Encodes a private key object and stores the result in a buffer.
+ * \param key the EC_KEY object to encode
+ * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number
+ * of bytes needed).
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/* de- and encoding functions for EC parameters */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Decodes ec parameter from a memory buffer.
+ * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used (or NULL)
+ * \param in pointer to memory with the DER encoded ec parameters
+ * \param len length of the DER encoded ec parameters
+ * \return a EC_KEY object with the decoded parameters or NULL if an error
+ * occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+
+/** Encodes ec parameter and stores the result in a buffer.
+ * \param key the EC_KEY object with ec paramters to encode
+ * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number
+ * of bytes needed).
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
+ */
+int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out);
+
+/********************************************************************/
+/* de- and encoding functions for EC public key */
+/* (octet string, not DER -- hence 'o2i' and 'i2o') */
+/********************************************************************/
+
+/** Decodes a ec public key from a octet string.
+ * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used
+ * \param in memory buffer with the encoded public key
+ * \param len length of the encoded public key
+ * \return EC_KEY object with decoded public key or NULL if an error
+ * occurred.
+ */
+EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len);
+
+/** Encodes a ec public key in an octet string.
+ * \param key the EC_KEY object with the public key
+ * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number
+ * of bytes needed).
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int i2o_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+/** Prints out the ec parameters on human readable form.
+ * \param bp BIO object to which the information is printed
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int ECParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Prints out the contents of a EC_KEY object
+ * \param bp BIO object to which the information is printed
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \param off line offset
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *key, int off);
+
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+/** Prints out the ec parameters on human readable form.
+ * \param fp file descriptor to which the information is printed
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int ECParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key);
+
+/** Prints out the contents of a EC_KEY object
+ * \param fp file descriptor to which the information is printed
+ * \param key EC_KEY object
+ * \param off line offset
+ * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred
+ */
+int EC_KEY_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key, int off);
+
+# endif
+
+# define ECParameters_dup(x) ASN1_dup_of(EC_KEY,i2d_ECParameters,d2i_ECParameters,x)
+
+# ifndef __cplusplus
+# if defined(__SUNPRO_C)
+# if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520
+# pragma error_messages (default,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE_NONAME,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE)
+# endif
+# endif
+# endif
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid) \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID, nid, NULL)
+
+# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1)
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the EC functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM 224
+# define EC_F_COMPUTE_WNAF 143
+# define EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS 144
+# define EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS 145
+# define EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY 146
+# define EC_F_DO_EC_KEY_PRINT 221
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM2TYPE 223
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PARAM_DECODE 212
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_DECODE 213
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE 214
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_DECODE 215
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_PUB_ENCODE 216
+# define EC_F_ECKEY_TYPE2PARAM 220
+# define EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT 147
+# define EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP 148
+# define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT 149
+# define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP 150
+# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_192 203
+# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_224 204
+# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_256 205
+# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_521 206
+# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE 153
+# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID 154
+# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS 155
+# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS 156
+# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP 157
+# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP 158
+# define EC_F_EC_EX_DATA_SET_DATA 211
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY 208
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 159
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE 195
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT 160
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT 161
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 162
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 163
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES 164
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE 133
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE 134
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL 131
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE 209
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR 132
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_GROUP_SET_CURVE 189
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP 135
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_GROUP_SET_CURVE 225
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL 228
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 226
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_GROUP_SET_CURVE 230
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL 231
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 232
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_GROUP_SET_CURVE 233
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL 234
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 235
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL 200
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR 201
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE 202
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 165
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE 166
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP 100
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR 101
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_MAKE_AFFINE 102
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT 103
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT 104
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE 137
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 167
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP 105
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES 168
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP 128
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES 169
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP 129
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK 170
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 171
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY 106
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET0_GENERATOR 139
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_COFACTOR 140
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GF2M 172
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_CURVE_GFP 130
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_DEGREE 173
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ORDER 141
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS 193
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS 194
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW 108
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME 174
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA 175
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_PRECOMPUTE_MULT 142
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GF2M 176
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_CURVE_GFP 109
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_EXTRA_DATA 110
+# define EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR 111
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY 177
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY 178
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY 179
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW 182
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT 180
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_PRINT_FP 181
+# define EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES 229
+# define EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE 136
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD 112
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP 113
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY 114
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL 115
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M 183
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP 116
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP 117
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT 210
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY 118
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE 119
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE 120
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_MUL 184
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_NEW 121
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT 122
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT 123
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M 185
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP 124
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M 186
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP 125
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP 126
+# define EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_TO_INFINITY 127
+# define EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_DUP 207
+# define EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW 196
+# define EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL 187
+# define EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT 188
+# define EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS 190
+# define EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS 191
+# define EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY 192
+# define EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY 151
+# define EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW 227
+# define EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW 236
+# define EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW 237
+# define EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY 152
+# define EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE 222
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL 197
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR 198
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_DERIVE 217
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_KEYGEN 199
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_PARAMGEN 219
+# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_SIGN 218
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define EC_R_ASN1_ERROR 115
+# define EC_R_ASN1_UNKNOWN_FIELD 116
+# define EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE 144
+# define EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 100
+# define EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE 146
+# define EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE 117
+# define EC_R_DECODE_ERROR 142
+# define EC_R_DISCRIMINANT_IS_ZERO 118
+# define EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE 119
+# define EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE 143
+# define EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED 147
+# define EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE 120
+# define EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE 121
+# define EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS 101
+# define EC_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT 112
+# define EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT 110
+# define EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT 109
+# define EC_R_INVALID_CURVE 141
+# define EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE 138
+# define EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING 102
+# define EC_R_INVALID_FIELD 103
+# define EC_R_INVALID_FORM 104
+# define EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER 122
+# define EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS 132
+# define EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY 123
+# define EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS 137
+# define EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET 140
+# define EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 124
+# define EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY 125
+# define EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME 135
+# define EC_R_NOT_A_SUPPORTED_NIST_PRIME 136
+# define EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 126
+# define EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 111
+# define EC_R_NO_FIELD_MOD 133
+# define EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET 139
+# define EC_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 134
+# define EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE 127
+# define EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY 106
+# define EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE 107
+# define EC_R_SLOT_FULL 108
+# define EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR 113
+# define EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER 128
+# define EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP 129
+# define EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER 114
+# define EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD 131
+# define EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS 145
+# define EC_R_WRONG_ORDER 130
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1322 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c */
-/*
- * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include "ec_lcl.h"
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-
-int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *group)
-{
- int i = 0;
-
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
- NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
- /* everything else is currently not supported */
- return 0;
-
- while (group->poly[i] != 0)
- i++;
-
- if (i == 4)
- return NID_X9_62_ppBasis;
- else if (i == 2)
- return NID_X9_62_tpBasis;
- else
- /* everything else is currently not supported */
- return 0;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k)
-{
- if (group == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
- NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
- || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0)
- && (group->poly[2] == 0))) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS,
- ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (k)
- *k = group->poly[1];
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k1,
- unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3)
-{
- if (group == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
- NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
- || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0)
- && (group->poly[2] != 0) && (group->poly[3] != 0)
- && (group->poly[4] == 0))) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS,
- ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (k1)
- *k1 = group->poly[3];
- if (k2)
- *k2 = group->poly[2];
- if (k3)
- *k3 = group->poly[1];
-
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-/* some structures needed for the asn1 encoding */
-typedef struct x9_62_pentanomial_st {
- long k1;
- long k2;
- long k3;
-} X9_62_PENTANOMIAL;
-
-typedef struct x9_62_characteristic_two_st {
- long m;
- ASN1_OBJECT *type;
- union {
- char *ptr;
- /* NID_X9_62_onBasis */
- ASN1_NULL *onBasis;
- /* NID_X9_62_tpBasis */
- ASN1_INTEGER *tpBasis;
- /* NID_X9_62_ppBasis */
- X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *ppBasis;
- /* anything else */
- ASN1_TYPE *other;
- } p;
-} X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO;
-
-typedef struct x9_62_fieldid_st {
- ASN1_OBJECT *fieldType;
- union {
- char *ptr;
- /* NID_X9_62_prime_field */
- ASN1_INTEGER *prime;
- /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
- X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
- /* anything else */
- ASN1_TYPE *other;
- } p;
-} X9_62_FIELDID;
-
-typedef struct x9_62_curve_st {
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *seed;
-} X9_62_CURVE;
-
-typedef struct ec_parameters_st {
- long version;
- X9_62_FIELDID *fieldID;
- X9_62_CURVE *curve;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base;
- ASN1_INTEGER *order;
- ASN1_INTEGER *cofactor;
-} ECPARAMETERS;
-
-struct ecpk_parameters_st {
- int type;
- union {
- ASN1_OBJECT *named_curve;
- ECPARAMETERS *parameters;
- ASN1_NULL *implicitlyCA;
- } value;
-} /* ECPKPARAMETERS */ ;
-
-/* SEC1 ECPrivateKey */
-typedef struct ec_privatekey_st {
- long version;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privateKey;
- ECPKPARAMETERS *parameters;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *publicKey;
-} EC_PRIVATEKEY;
-
-/* the OpenSSL ASN.1 definitions */
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k1, LONG),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k2, LONG),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k3, LONG)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
-
-DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
-
-ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(char_two_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.other, ASN1_ANY);
-
-ASN1_ADB(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = {
- ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_onBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.onBasis, ASN1_NULL)),
- ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_tpBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.tpBasis, ASN1_INTEGER)),
- ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_ppBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.ppBasis, X9_62_PENTANOMIAL))
-} ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, 0, type, 0, &char_two_def_tt, NULL);
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, m, LONG),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
- ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
-
-DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
-
-ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(fieldID_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.other, ASN1_ANY);
-
-ASN1_ADB(X9_62_FIELDID) = {
- ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_prime_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.prime, ASN1_INTEGER)),
- ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.char_two, X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO))
-} ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_FIELDID, 0, fieldType, 0, &fieldID_def_tt, NULL);
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_FIELDID) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, fieldType, ASN1_OBJECT),
- ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_FIELDID)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_FIELDID)
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CURVE) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, a, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, b, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
- ASN1_OPT(X9_62_CURVE, seed, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CURVE)
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECPARAMETERS) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, version, LONG),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, fieldID, X9_62_FIELDID),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, curve, X9_62_CURVE),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, base, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, order, ASN1_INTEGER),
- ASN1_OPT(ECPARAMETERS, cofactor, ASN1_INTEGER)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECPARAMETERS)
-
-DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS)
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS)
-
-ASN1_CHOICE(ECPKPARAMETERS) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.named_curve, ASN1_OBJECT),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.parameters, ECPARAMETERS),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.implicitlyCA, ASN1_NULL)
-} ASN1_CHOICE_END(ECPKPARAMETERS)
-
-DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS)
-DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS, ECPKPARAMETERS)
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS)
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(EC_PRIVATEKEY) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, version, LONG),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, privateKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, parameters, ECPKPARAMETERS, 0),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
-
-DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
-DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY, EC_PRIVATEKEY)
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
-
-/* some declarations of internal function */
-
-/* ec_asn1_group2field() sets the values in a X9_62_FIELDID object */
-static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_FIELDID *);
-/* ec_asn1_group2curve() sets the values in a X9_62_CURVE object */
-static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_CURVE *);
-/*
- * ec_asn1_parameters2group() creates a EC_GROUP object from a ECPARAMETERS
- * object
- */
-static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *);
-/*
- * ec_asn1_group2parameters() creates a ECPARAMETERS object from a EC_GROUP
- * object
- */
-static ECPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2parameters(const EC_GROUP *,
- ECPARAMETERS *);
-/*
- * ec_asn1_pkparameters2group() creates a EC_GROUP object from a
- * ECPKPARAMETERS object
- */
-static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(const ECPKPARAMETERS *);
-/*
- * ec_asn1_group2pkparameters() creates a ECPKPARAMETERS object from a
- * EC_GROUP object
- */
-static ECPKPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(const EC_GROUP *,
- ECPKPARAMETERS *);
-
-/* the function definitions */
-
-static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_FIELDID *field)
-{
- int ok = 0, nid;
- BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
-
- if (group == NULL || field == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- /* clear the old values (if necessary) */
- if (field->fieldType != NULL)
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(field->fieldType);
- if (field->p.other != NULL)
- ASN1_TYPE_free(field->p.other);
-
- nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
- /* set OID for the field */
- if ((field->fieldType = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
- if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* the parameters are specified by the prime number p */
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* set the prime number */
- field->p.prime = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, NULL);
- if (field->p.prime == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else /* nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- goto err;
- }
-#else
- {
- int field_type;
- X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
-
- field->p.char_two = X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO_new();
- char_two = field->p.char_two;
-
- if (char_two == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- char_two->m = (long)EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
-
- field_type = EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(group);
-
- if (field_type == 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* set base type OID */
- if ((char_two->type = OBJ_nid2obj(field_type)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (field_type == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) {
- unsigned int k;
-
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(group, &k))
- goto err;
-
- char_two->p.tpBasis = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
- if (!char_two->p.tpBasis) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(char_two->p.tpBasis, (long)k)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) {
- unsigned int k1, k2, k3;
-
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(group, &k1, &k2, &k3))
- goto err;
-
- char_two->p.ppBasis = X9_62_PENTANOMIAL_new();
- if (!char_two->p.ppBasis) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* set k? values */
- char_two->p.ppBasis->k1 = (long)k1;
- char_two->p.ppBasis->k2 = (long)k2;
- char_two->p.ppBasis->k3 = (long)k3;
- } else { /* field_type == NID_X9_62_onBasis */
-
- /* for ONB the parameters are (asn1) NULL */
- char_two->p.onBasis = ASN1_NULL_new();
- if (!char_two->p.onBasis) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- ok = 1;
-
- err:if (tmp)
- BN_free(tmp);
- return (ok);
-}
-
-static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_CURVE *curve)
-{
- int ok = 0, nid;
- BIGNUM *tmp_1 = NULL, *tmp_2 = NULL;
- unsigned char *buffer_1 = NULL, *buffer_2 = NULL,
- *a_buf = NULL, *b_buf = NULL;
- size_t len_1, len_2;
- unsigned char char_zero = 0;
-
- if (!group || !curve || !curve->a || !curve->b)
- return 0;
-
- if ((tmp_1 = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp_2 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
-
- /* get a and b */
- if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, NULL, tmp_1, tmp_2, NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- else { /* nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
-
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(group, NULL, tmp_1, tmp_2, NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
- len_1 = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(tmp_1);
- len_2 = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(tmp_2);
-
- if (len_1 == 0) {
- /* len_1 == 0 => a == 0 */
- a_buf = &char_zero;
- len_1 = 1;
- } else {
- if ((buffer_1 = OPENSSL_malloc(len_1)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((len_1 = BN_bn2bin(tmp_1, buffer_1)) == 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- a_buf = buffer_1;
- }
-
- if (len_2 == 0) {
- /* len_2 == 0 => b == 0 */
- b_buf = &char_zero;
- len_2 = 1;
- } else {
- if ((buffer_2 = OPENSSL_malloc(len_2)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((len_2 = BN_bn2bin(tmp_2, buffer_2)) == 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- b_buf = buffer_2;
- }
-
- /* set a and b */
- if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->a, a_buf, len_1) ||
- !M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->b, b_buf, len_2)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* set the seed (optional) */
- if (group->seed) {
- if (!curve->seed)
- if ((curve->seed = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- curve->seed->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
- curve->seed->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
- if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(curve->seed, group->seed,
- (int)group->seed_len)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (curve->seed) {
- ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(curve->seed);
- curve->seed = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- ok = 1;
-
- err:if (buffer_1)
- OPENSSL_free(buffer_1);
- if (buffer_2)
- OPENSSL_free(buffer_2);
- if (tmp_1)
- BN_free(tmp_1);
- if (tmp_2)
- BN_free(tmp_2);
- return (ok);
-}
-
-static ECPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2parameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
- ECPARAMETERS *param)
-{
- int ok = 0;
- size_t len = 0;
- ECPARAMETERS *ret = NULL;
- BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
- unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
- const EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- point_conversion_form_t form;
-
- if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (param == NULL) {
- if ((ret = ECPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- ret = param;
-
- /* set the version (always one) */
- ret->version = (long)0x1;
-
- /* set the fieldID */
- if (!ec_asn1_group2fieldid(group, ret->fieldID)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* set the curve */
- if (!ec_asn1_group2curve(group, ret->curve)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* set the base point */
- if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- form = EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(group);
-
- len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, NULL, len, NULL);
- if (len == 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, buffer, len, NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (ret->base == NULL && (ret->base = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ret->base, buffer, len)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* set the order */
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, tmp, NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->order = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->order);
- if (ret->order == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* set the cofactor (optional) */
- if (EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, tmp, NULL)) {
- ret->cofactor = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->cofactor);
- if (ret->cofactor == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- ok = 1;
-
- err:if (!ok) {
- if (ret && !param)
- ECPARAMETERS_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
- }
- if (tmp)
- BN_free(tmp);
- if (buffer)
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-ECPKPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
- ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
-{
- int ok = 1, tmp;
- ECPKPARAMETERS *ret = params;
-
- if (ret == NULL) {
- if ((ret = ECPKPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- } else {
- if (ret->type == 0 && ret->value.named_curve)
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret->value.named_curve);
- else if (ret->type == 1 && ret->value.parameters)
- ECPARAMETERS_free(ret->value.parameters);
- }
-
- if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group)) {
- /*
- * use the asn1 OID to describe the the elliptic curve parameters
- */
- tmp = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
- if (tmp) {
- ret->type = 0;
- if ((ret->value.named_curve = OBJ_nid2obj(tmp)) == NULL)
- ok = 0;
- } else
- /* we don't kmow the nid => ERROR */
- ok = 0;
- } else {
- /* use the ECPARAMETERS structure */
- ret->type = 1;
- if ((ret->value.parameters =
- ec_asn1_group2parameters(group, NULL)) == NULL)
- ok = 0;
- }
-
- if (!ok) {
- ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
-{
- int ok = 0, tmp;
- EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
- BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
- EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- long field_bits;
-
- if (!params->fieldID || !params->fieldID->fieldType ||
- !params->fieldID->p.ptr) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* now extract the curve parameters a and b */
- if (!params->curve || !params->curve->a ||
- !params->curve->a->data || !params->curve->b ||
- !params->curve->b->data) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- a = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->a->data, params->curve->a->length, NULL);
- if (a == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- b = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->b->data, params->curve->b->length, NULL);
- if (b == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* get the field parameters */
- tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->fieldID->fieldType);
- if (tmp == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- goto err;
- }
-#else
- {
- X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
-
- char_two = params->fieldID->p.char_two;
-
- field_bits = char_two->m;
- if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* get the base type */
- tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(char_two->type);
-
- if (tmp == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) {
- long tmp_long;
-
- if (!char_two->p.tpBasis) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- tmp_long = ASN1_INTEGER_get(char_two->p.tpBasis);
-
- if (!(char_two->m > tmp_long && tmp_long > 0)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP,
- EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* create the polynomial */
- if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)tmp_long))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0))
- goto err;
- } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) {
- X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *penta;
-
- penta = char_two->p.ppBasis;
- if (!penta) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!
- (char_two->m > penta->k3 && penta->k3 > penta->k2
- && penta->k2 > penta->k1 && penta->k1 > 0)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP,
- EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* create the polynomial */
- if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k1))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k2))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k3))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0))
- goto err;
- } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_onBasis) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
- goto err;
- } else { /* error */
-
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* create the EC_GROUP structure */
- ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, NULL);
- }
-#endif
- else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
- /* we have a curve over a prime field */
- /* extract the prime number */
- if (!params->fieldID->p.prime) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- p = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->fieldID->p.prime, NULL);
- if (p == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_is_negative(p) || BN_is_zero(p)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
- goto err;
- }
-
- field_bits = BN_num_bits(p);
- if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* create the EC_GROUP structure */
- ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, NULL);
- } else {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (ret == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* extract seed (optional) */
- if (params->curve->seed != NULL) {
- if (ret->seed != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ret->seed);
- if (!(ret->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(params->curve->seed->length))) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(ret->seed, params->curve->seed->data,
- params->curve->seed->length);
- ret->seed_len = params->curve->seed->length;
- }
-
- if (!params->order || !params->base || !params->base->data) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((point = EC_POINT_new(ret)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* set the point conversion form */
- EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(ret, (point_conversion_form_t)
- (params->base->data[0] & ~0x01));
-
- /* extract the ec point */
- if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret, point, params->base->data,
- params->base->length, NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* extract the order */
- if ((a = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->order, a)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_is_zero(a)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
- if (BN_num_bits(a) > (int)field_bits + 1) { /* Hasse bound */
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* extract the cofactor (optional) */
- if (params->cofactor == NULL) {
- if (b) {
- BN_free(b);
- b = NULL;
- }
- } else if ((b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->cofactor, b)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* set the generator, order and cofactor (if present) */
- if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(ret, point, a, b)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ok = 1;
-
- err:if (!ok) {
- if (ret)
- EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
- }
-
- if (p)
- BN_free(p);
- if (a)
- BN_free(a);
- if (b)
- BN_free(b);
- if (point)
- EC_POINT_free(point);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
-{
- EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
- int tmp = 0;
-
- if (params == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (params->type == 0) { /* the curve is given by an OID */
- tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->value.named_curve);
- if ((ret = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(tmp)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP,
- EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
- } else if (params->type == 1) { /* the parameters are given by a
- * ECPARAMETERS structure */
- ret = ec_asn1_parameters2group(params->value.parameters);
- if (!ret) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- return NULL;
- }
- EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, 0x0);
- } else if (params->type == 2) { /* implicitlyCA */
- return NULL;
- } else {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* EC_GROUP <-> DER encoding of ECPKPARAMETERS */
-
-EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
-{
- EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
- ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL;
-
- if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
- ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if ((group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(params)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE);
- ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (a && *a)
- EC_GROUP_clear_free(*a);
- if (a)
- *a = group;
-
- ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
- return (group);
-}
-
-int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *a, unsigned char **out)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- ECPKPARAMETERS *tmp = ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(a, NULL);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((ret = i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS(tmp, out)) == 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
- ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp);
- return 0;
- }
- ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/* some EC_KEY functions */
-
-EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
-{
- int ok = 0;
- EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
- EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
-
- if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
- if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- ret = *a;
-
- if (priv_key->parameters) {
- if (ret->group)
- EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret->group);
- ret->group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(priv_key->parameters);
- }
-
- if (ret->group == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret->version = priv_key->version;
-
- if (priv_key->privateKey) {
- ret->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->privateKey),
- M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->privateKey),
- ret->priv_key);
- if (ret->priv_key == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (ret->pub_key)
- EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
- ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
- if (ret->pub_key == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (priv_key->publicKey) {
- const unsigned char *pub_oct;
- int pub_oct_len;
-
- pub_oct = M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->publicKey);
- pub_oct_len = M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
- /*
- * The first byte - point conversion form - must be present.
- */
- if (pub_oct_len <= 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Save the point conversion form. */
- ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t) (pub_oct[0] & ~0x01);
- if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key,
- pub_oct, (size_t)(pub_oct_len), NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (!EC_POINT_mul
- (ret->group, ret->pub_key, ret->priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Remember the original private-key-only encoding. */
- ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY;
- }
-
- if (a)
- *a = ret;
- ok = 1;
- err:
- if (!ok) {
- if (ret && (a == NULL || *a != ret))
- EC_KEY_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
- }
-
- if (priv_key)
- EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
-{
- int ret = 0, ok = 0;
- unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
- size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len, bn_len;
- EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
-
- if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL ||
- (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) && a->pub_key == NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- priv_key->version = a->version;
-
- bn_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(a->priv_key);
-
- /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
-
- buf_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(a->group) + 7) / 8;
-
- if (bn_len > buf_len) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
- goto err;
- }
-
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len);
- if (buffer == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!BN_bn2bin(a->priv_key, buffer + buf_len - bn_len)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (buf_len - bn_len > 0) {
- memset(buffer, 0, buf_len - bn_len);
- }
-
- if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(priv_key->privateKey, buffer, buf_len)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS)) {
- if ((priv_key->parameters =
- ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(a->group,
- priv_key->parameters)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY)) {
- priv_key->publicKey = M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new();
- if (priv_key->publicKey == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- tmp_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key,
- a->conv_form, NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- if (tmp_len > buf_len) {
- unsigned char *tmp_buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(buffer, tmp_len);
- if (!tmp_buffer) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- buffer = tmp_buffer;
- buf_len = tmp_len;
- }
-
- if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key,
- a->conv_form, buffer, buf_len, NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- priv_key->publicKey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
- priv_key->publicKey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
- if (!M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(priv_key->publicKey, buffer, buf_len)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if ((ret = i2d_EC_PRIVATEKEY(priv_key, out)) == 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ok = 1;
- err:
- if (buffer)
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
- if (priv_key)
- EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
- return (ok ? ret : 0);
-}
-
-int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
-{
- if (a == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- return i2d_ECPKParameters(a->group, out);
-}
-
-EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
-{
- EC_KEY *ret;
-
- if (in == NULL || *in == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
- if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- } else
- ret = *a;
-
- if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
- EC_KEY_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (a)
- *a = ret;
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
-{
- EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
-
- if (a == NULL || (*a) == NULL || (*a)->group == NULL) {
- /*
- * sorry, but a EC_GROUP-structur is necessary to set the public key
- */
- ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- ret = *a;
- if (ret->pub_key == NULL &&
- (ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key, *in, len, NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- /* save the point conversion form */
- ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t) (*in[0] & ~0x01);
- *in += len;
- return ret;
-}
-
-int i2o_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
-{
- size_t buf_len = 0;
- int new_buffer = 0;
-
- if (a == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
-
- buf_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key,
- a->conv_form, NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- if (out == NULL || buf_len == 0)
- /* out == NULL => just return the length of the octet string */
- return buf_len;
-
- if (*out == NULL) {
- if ((*out = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- new_buffer = 1;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key, a->conv_form,
- *out, buf_len, NULL)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- if (new_buffer) {
- OPENSSL_free(*out);
- *out = NULL;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- if (!new_buffer)
- *out += buf_len;
- return buf_len;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1326 @@
+/* crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+ /* everything else is currently not supported */
+ return 0;
+
+ while (group->poly[i] != 0)
+ i++;
+
+ if (i == 4)
+ return NID_X9_62_ppBasis;
+ else if (i == 2)
+ return NID_X9_62_tpBasis;
+ else
+ /* everything else is currently not supported */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k)
+{
+ if (group == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
+ || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0)
+ && (group->poly[2] == 0))) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS,
+ ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (k)
+ *k = group->poly[1];
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k1,
+ unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3)
+{
+ if (group == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
+ || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0)
+ && (group->poly[2] != 0) && (group->poly[3] != 0)
+ && (group->poly[4] == 0))) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS,
+ ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (k1)
+ *k1 = group->poly[3];
+ if (k2)
+ *k2 = group->poly[2];
+ if (k3)
+ *k3 = group->poly[1];
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* some structures needed for the asn1 encoding */
+typedef struct x9_62_pentanomial_st {
+ long k1;
+ long k2;
+ long k3;
+} X9_62_PENTANOMIAL;
+
+typedef struct x9_62_characteristic_two_st {
+ long m;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *type;
+ union {
+ char *ptr;
+ /* NID_X9_62_onBasis */
+ ASN1_NULL *onBasis;
+ /* NID_X9_62_tpBasis */
+ ASN1_INTEGER *tpBasis;
+ /* NID_X9_62_ppBasis */
+ X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *ppBasis;
+ /* anything else */
+ ASN1_TYPE *other;
+ } p;
+} X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO;
+
+typedef struct x9_62_fieldid_st {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *fieldType;
+ union {
+ char *ptr;
+ /* NID_X9_62_prime_field */
+ ASN1_INTEGER *prime;
+ /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+ X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
+ /* anything else */
+ ASN1_TYPE *other;
+ } p;
+} X9_62_FIELDID;
+
+typedef struct x9_62_curve_st {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *seed;
+} X9_62_CURVE;
+
+typedef struct ec_parameters_st {
+ long version;
+ X9_62_FIELDID *fieldID;
+ X9_62_CURVE *curve;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *order;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *cofactor;
+} ECPARAMETERS;
+
+struct ecpk_parameters_st {
+ int type;
+ union {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *named_curve;
+ ECPARAMETERS *parameters;
+ ASN1_NULL *implicitlyCA;
+ } value;
+} /* ECPKPARAMETERS */ ;
+
+/* SEC1 ECPrivateKey */
+typedef struct ec_privatekey_st {
+ long version;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privateKey;
+ ECPKPARAMETERS *parameters;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *publicKey;
+} EC_PRIVATEKEY;
+
+/* the OpenSSL ASN.1 definitions */
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k1, LONG),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k2, LONG),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k3, LONG)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(char_two_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.other, ASN1_ANY);
+
+ASN1_ADB(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = {
+ ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_onBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.onBasis, ASN1_NULL)),
+ ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_tpBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.tpBasis, ASN1_INTEGER)),
+ ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_ppBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.ppBasis, X9_62_PENTANOMIAL))
+} ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, 0, type, 0, &char_two_def_tt, NULL);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, m, LONG),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(fieldID_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.other, ASN1_ANY);
+
+ASN1_ADB(X9_62_FIELDID) = {
+ ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_prime_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.prime, ASN1_INTEGER)),
+ ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.char_two, X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO))
+} ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_FIELDID, 0, fieldType, 0, &fieldID_def_tt, NULL);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_FIELDID) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, fieldType, ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_FIELDID)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_FIELDID)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CURVE) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, a, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, b, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ ASN1_OPT(X9_62_CURVE, seed, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CURVE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECPARAMETERS) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, version, LONG),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, fieldID, X9_62_FIELDID),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, curve, X9_62_CURVE),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, base, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, order, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_OPT(ECPARAMETERS, cofactor, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECPARAMETERS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS)
+
+ASN1_CHOICE(ECPKPARAMETERS) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.named_curve, ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.parameters, ECPARAMETERS),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.implicitlyCA, ASN1_NULL)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END(ECPKPARAMETERS)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS, ECPKPARAMETERS)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(EC_PRIVATEKEY) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, version, LONG),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, privateKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, parameters, ECPKPARAMETERS, 0),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY, EC_PRIVATEKEY)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY)
+
+/* some declarations of internal function */
+
+/* ec_asn1_group2field() sets the values in a X9_62_FIELDID object */
+static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_FIELDID *);
+/* ec_asn1_group2curve() sets the values in a X9_62_CURVE object */
+static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_CURVE *);
+/*
+ * ec_asn1_parameters2group() creates a EC_GROUP object from a ECPARAMETERS
+ * object
+ */
+static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *);
+/*
+ * ec_asn1_group2parameters() creates a ECPARAMETERS object from a EC_GROUP
+ * object
+ */
+static ECPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2parameters(const EC_GROUP *,
+ ECPARAMETERS *);
+/*
+ * ec_asn1_pkparameters2group() creates a EC_GROUP object from a
+ * ECPKPARAMETERS object
+ */
+static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(const ECPKPARAMETERS *);
+/*
+ * ec_asn1_group2pkparameters() creates a ECPKPARAMETERS object from a
+ * EC_GROUP object
+ */
+static ECPKPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(const EC_GROUP *,
+ ECPKPARAMETERS *);
+
+/* the function definitions */
+
+static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_FIELDID *field)
+{
+ int ok = 0, nid;
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (group == NULL || field == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* clear the old values (if necessary) */
+ if (field->fieldType != NULL)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(field->fieldType);
+ if (field->p.other != NULL)
+ ASN1_TYPE_free(field->p.other);
+
+ nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
+ /* set OID for the field */
+ if ((field->fieldType = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* the parameters are specified by the prime number p */
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* set the prime number */
+ field->p.prime = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, NULL);
+ if (field->p.prime == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else /* nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#else
+ {
+ int field_type;
+ X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
+
+ field->p.char_two = X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO_new();
+ char_two = field->p.char_two;
+
+ if (char_two == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ char_two->m = (long)EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+
+ field_type = EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(group);
+
+ if (field_type == 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* set base type OID */
+ if ((char_two->type = OBJ_nid2obj(field_type)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (field_type == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) {
+ unsigned int k;
+
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(group, &k))
+ goto err;
+
+ char_two->p.tpBasis = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+ if (!char_two->p.tpBasis) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(char_two->p.tpBasis, (long)k)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) {
+ unsigned int k1, k2, k3;
+
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(group, &k1, &k2, &k3))
+ goto err;
+
+ char_two->p.ppBasis = X9_62_PENTANOMIAL_new();
+ if (!char_two->p.ppBasis) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* set k? values */
+ char_two->p.ppBasis->k1 = (long)k1;
+ char_two->p.ppBasis->k2 = (long)k2;
+ char_two->p.ppBasis->k3 = (long)k3;
+ } else { /* field_type == NID_X9_62_onBasis */
+
+ /* for ONB the parameters are (asn1) NULL */
+ char_two->p.onBasis = ASN1_NULL_new();
+ if (!char_two->p.onBasis) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:if (tmp)
+ BN_free(tmp);
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_CURVE *curve)
+{
+ int ok = 0, nid;
+ BIGNUM *tmp_1 = NULL, *tmp_2 = NULL;
+ unsigned char *buffer_1 = NULL, *buffer_2 = NULL,
+ *a_buf = NULL, *b_buf = NULL;
+ size_t len_1, len_2;
+ unsigned char char_zero = 0;
+
+ if (!group || !curve || !curve->a || !curve->b)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((tmp_1 = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp_2 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
+
+ /* get a and b */
+ if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, NULL, tmp_1, tmp_2, NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ else { /* nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
+
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(group, NULL, tmp_1, tmp_2, NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ len_1 = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(tmp_1);
+ len_2 = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(tmp_2);
+
+ if (len_1 == 0) {
+ /* len_1 == 0 => a == 0 */
+ a_buf = &char_zero;
+ len_1 = 1;
+ } else {
+ if ((buffer_1 = OPENSSL_malloc(len_1)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((len_1 = BN_bn2bin(tmp_1, buffer_1)) == 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ a_buf = buffer_1;
+ }
+
+ if (len_2 == 0) {
+ /* len_2 == 0 => b == 0 */
+ b_buf = &char_zero;
+ len_2 = 1;
+ } else {
+ if ((buffer_2 = OPENSSL_malloc(len_2)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((len_2 = BN_bn2bin(tmp_2, buffer_2)) == 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ b_buf = buffer_2;
+ }
+
+ /* set a and b */
+ if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->a, a_buf, len_1) ||
+ !M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->b, b_buf, len_2)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* set the seed (optional) */
+ if (group->seed) {
+ if (!curve->seed)
+ if ((curve->seed = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ curve->seed->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+ curve->seed->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+ if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(curve->seed, group->seed,
+ (int)group->seed_len)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (curve->seed) {
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(curve->seed);
+ curve->seed = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:if (buffer_1)
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer_1);
+ if (buffer_2)
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer_2);
+ if (tmp_1)
+ BN_free(tmp_1);
+ if (tmp_2)
+ BN_free(tmp_2);
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+static ECPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2parameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ ECPARAMETERS *param)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ ECPARAMETERS *ret = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+ unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
+ const EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ point_conversion_form_t form;
+
+ if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ if ((ret = ECPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = param;
+
+ /* set the version (always one) */
+ ret->version = (long)0x1;
+
+ /* set the fieldID */
+ if (!ec_asn1_group2fieldid(group, ret->fieldID)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* set the curve */
+ if (!ec_asn1_group2curve(group, ret->curve)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* set the base point */
+ if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ form = EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(group);
+
+ len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, NULL, len, NULL);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, buffer, len, NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ret->base == NULL && (ret->base = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ret->base, buffer, len)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* set the order */
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, tmp, NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->order = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->order);
+ if (ret->order == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* set the cofactor (optional) */
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, tmp, NULL)) {
+ ret->cofactor = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, ret->cofactor);
+ if (ret->cofactor == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:if (!ok) {
+ if (ret && !param)
+ ECPARAMETERS_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ if (tmp)
+ BN_free(tmp);
+ if (buffer)
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+ECPKPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
+{
+ int ok = 1, tmp;
+ ECPKPARAMETERS *ret = params;
+
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ if ((ret = ECPKPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ret->type == 0 && ret->value.named_curve)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret->value.named_curve);
+ else if (ret->type == 1 && ret->value.parameters)
+ ECPARAMETERS_free(ret->value.parameters);
+ }
+
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group)) {
+ /*
+ * use the asn1 OID to describe the the elliptic curve parameters
+ */
+ tmp = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
+ if (tmp) {
+ ret->type = 0;
+ if ((ret->value.named_curve = OBJ_nid2obj(tmp)) == NULL)
+ ok = 0;
+ } else
+ /* we don't kmow the nid => ERROR */
+ ok = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* use the ECPARAMETERS structure */
+ ret->type = 1;
+ if ((ret->value.parameters =
+ ec_asn1_group2parameters(group, NULL)) == NULL)
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
+{
+ int ok = 0, tmp;
+ EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ long field_bits;
+
+ if (!params->fieldID || !params->fieldID->fieldType ||
+ !params->fieldID->p.ptr) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* now extract the curve parameters a and b */
+ if (!params->curve || !params->curve->a ||
+ !params->curve->a->data || !params->curve->b ||
+ !params->curve->b->data) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ a = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->a->data, params->curve->a->length, NULL);
+ if (a == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ b = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->b->data, params->curve->b->length, NULL);
+ if (b == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* get the field parameters */
+ tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->fieldID->fieldType);
+ if (tmp == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#else
+ {
+ X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two;
+
+ char_two = params->fieldID->p.char_two;
+
+ field_bits = char_two->m;
+ if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* get the base type */
+ tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(char_two->type);
+
+ if (tmp == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) {
+ long tmp_long;
+
+ if (!char_two->p.tpBasis) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tmp_long = ASN1_INTEGER_get(char_two->p.tpBasis);
+
+ if (!(char_two->m > tmp_long && tmp_long > 0)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP,
+ EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* create the polynomial */
+ if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)tmp_long))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) {
+ X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *penta;
+
+ penta = char_two->p.ppBasis;
+ if (!penta) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!
+ (char_two->m > penta->k3 && penta->k3 > penta->k2
+ && penta->k2 > penta->k1 && penta->k1 > 0)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP,
+ EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* create the polynomial */
+ if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k2))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k3))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_onBasis) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ goto err;
+ } else { /* error */
+
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* create the EC_GROUP structure */
+ ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ /* we have a curve over a prime field */
+ /* extract the prime number */
+ if (!params->fieldID->p.prime) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->fieldID->p.prime, NULL);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_is_negative(p) || BN_is_zero(p)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ field_bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+ if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* create the EC_GROUP structure */
+ ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, NULL);
+ } else {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* extract seed (optional) */
+ if (params->curve->seed != NULL) {
+ if (ret->seed != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->seed);
+ if (!(ret->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(params->curve->seed->length))) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(ret->seed, params->curve->seed->data,
+ params->curve->seed->length);
+ ret->seed_len = params->curve->seed->length;
+ }
+
+ if (!params->order || !params->base || !params->base->data) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((point = EC_POINT_new(ret)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* set the point conversion form */
+ EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(ret, (point_conversion_form_t)
+ (params->base->data[0] & ~0x01));
+
+ /* extract the ec point */
+ if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret, point, params->base->data,
+ params->base->length, NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* extract the order */
+ if ((a = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->order, a)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_is_zero(a)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bits(a) > (int)field_bits + 1) { /* Hasse bound */
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* extract the cofactor (optional) */
+ if (params->cofactor == NULL) {
+ if (b) {
+ BN_free(b);
+ b = NULL;
+ }
+ } else if ((b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->cofactor, b)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* set the generator, order and cofactor (if present) */
+ if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(ret, point, a, b)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:if (!ok) {
+ if (ret)
+ EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (p)
+ BN_free(p);
+ if (a)
+ BN_free(a);
+ if (b)
+ BN_free(b);
+ if (point)
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
+{
+ EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
+ int tmp = 0;
+
+ if (params == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (params->type == 0) { /* the curve is given by an OID */
+ tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->value.named_curve);
+ if ((ret = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(tmp)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP,
+ EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+ } else if (params->type == 1) { /* the parameters are given by a
+ * ECPARAMETERS structure */
+ ret = ec_asn1_parameters2group(params->value.parameters);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, 0x0);
+ } else if (params->type == 2) { /* implicitlyCA */
+ return NULL;
+ } else {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* EC_GROUP <-> DER encoding of ECPKPARAMETERS */
+
+EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+ EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+ ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
+
+ if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
+ ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if ((group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(params)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE);
+ ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (a && *a)
+ EC_GROUP_clear_free(*a);
+ if (a)
+ *a = group;
+
+ ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
+ *in = p;
+ return (group);
+}
+
+int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ ECPKPARAMETERS *tmp = ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(a, NULL);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((ret = i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS(tmp, out)) == 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
+ ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/* some EC_KEY functions */
+
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
+ EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
+
+ if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
+ if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = *a;
+
+ if (priv_key->parameters) {
+ if (ret->group)
+ EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret->group);
+ ret->group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(priv_key->parameters);
+ }
+
+ if (ret->group == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret->version = priv_key->version;
+
+ if (priv_key->privateKey) {
+ ret->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->privateKey),
+ M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->privateKey),
+ ret->priv_key);
+ if (ret->priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->pub_key)
+ EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
+ ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
+ if (ret->pub_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (priv_key->publicKey) {
+ const unsigned char *pub_oct;
+ int pub_oct_len;
+
+ pub_oct = M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->publicKey);
+ pub_oct_len = M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
+ /*
+ * The first byte - point conversion form - must be present.
+ */
+ if (pub_oct_len <= 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Save the point conversion form. */
+ ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t) (pub_oct[0] & ~0x01);
+ if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key,
+ pub_oct, (size_t)(pub_oct_len), NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul
+ (ret->group, ret->pub_key, ret->priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Remember the original private-key-only encoding. */
+ ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY;
+ }
+
+ if (a)
+ *a = ret;
+ *in = p;
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ if (!ok) {
+ if (ret && (a == NULL || *a != ret))
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (priv_key)
+ EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+ int ret = 0, ok = 0;
+ unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
+ size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len, bn_len;
+ EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
+
+ if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL ||
+ (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) && a->pub_key == NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ priv_key->version = a->version;
+
+ bn_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(a->priv_key);
+
+ /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
+
+ buf_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(a->group) + 7) / 8;
+
+ if (bn_len > buf_len) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_bn2bin(a->priv_key, buffer + buf_len - bn_len)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (buf_len - bn_len > 0) {
+ memset(buffer, 0, buf_len - bn_len);
+ }
+
+ if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(priv_key->privateKey, buffer, buf_len)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS)) {
+ if ((priv_key->parameters =
+ ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(a->group,
+ priv_key->parameters)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY)) {
+ priv_key->publicKey = M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new();
+ if (priv_key->publicKey == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tmp_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key,
+ a->conv_form, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ if (tmp_len > buf_len) {
+ unsigned char *tmp_buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(buffer, tmp_len);
+ if (!tmp_buffer) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ buffer = tmp_buffer;
+ buf_len = tmp_len;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key,
+ a->conv_form, buffer, buf_len, NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ priv_key->publicKey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+ priv_key->publicKey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+ if (!M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(priv_key->publicKey, buffer, buf_len)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = i2d_EC_PRIVATEKEY(priv_key, out)) == 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ if (buffer)
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+ if (priv_key)
+ EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
+ return (ok ? ret : 0);
+}
+
+int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+ if (a == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return i2d_ECPKParameters(a->group, out);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ret;
+
+ if (in == NULL || *in == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) {
+ if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = *a;
+
+ if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (a)
+ *a = ret;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
+
+ if (a == NULL || (*a) == NULL || (*a)->group == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * sorry, but a EC_GROUP-structur is necessary to set the public key
+ */
+ ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = *a;
+ if (ret->pub_key == NULL &&
+ (ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key, *in, len, NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* save the point conversion form */
+ ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t) (*in[0] & ~0x01);
+ *in += len;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int i2o_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
+{
+ size_t buf_len = 0;
+ int new_buffer = 0;
+
+ if (a == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ buf_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key,
+ a->conv_form, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ if (out == NULL || buf_len == 0)
+ /* out == NULL => just return the length of the octet string */
+ return buf_len;
+
+ if (*out == NULL) {
+ if ((*out = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ new_buffer = 1;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key, a->conv_form,
+ *out, buf_len, NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ if (new_buffer) {
+ OPENSSL_free(*out);
+ *out = NULL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!new_buffer)
+ *out += buf_len;
+ return buf_len;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ec/ec_key.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_key.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,559 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/ec/ec_key.c */
-/*
- * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * Portions originally developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and
- * contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include "ec_lcl.h"
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# include <openssl/fips.h>
-#endif
-
-EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
-{
- EC_KEY *ret;
-
- ret = (EC_KEY *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_KEY));
- if (ret == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- ret->version = 1;
- ret->flags = 0;
- ret->group = NULL;
- ret->pub_key = NULL;
- ret->priv_key = NULL;
- ret->enc_flag = 0;
- ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
- ret->references = 1;
- ret->method_data = NULL;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
-{
- EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
- if (ret == NULL)
- return NULL;
- ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- if (ret->group == NULL) {
- EC_KEY_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (r == NULL)
- return;
-
- i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("EC_KEY", r);
-#endif
- if (i > 0)
- return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "EC_KEY_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort();
- }
-#endif
-
- if (r->group != NULL)
- EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
- if (r->pub_key != NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
- if (r->priv_key != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
-
- EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&r->method_data);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
-
- OPENSSL_free(r);
-}
-
-EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
-{
- EC_EXTRA_DATA *d;
-
- if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return NULL;
- }
- /* copy the parameters */
- if (src->group) {
- const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group);
- /* clear the old group */
- if (dest->group)
- EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
- dest->group = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
- if (dest->group == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
- return NULL;
- }
- /* copy the public key */
- if (src->pub_key && src->group) {
- if (dest->pub_key)
- EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
- dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
- if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
- return NULL;
- }
- /* copy the private key */
- if (src->priv_key) {
- if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
- dest->priv_key = BN_new();
- if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
- return NULL;
- }
- if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
- return NULL;
- }
- /* copy method/extra data */
- EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&dest->method_data);
-
- for (d = src->method_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) {
- void *t = d->dup_func(d->data);
-
- if (t == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data
- (&dest->method_data, t, d->dup_func, d->free_func,
- d->clear_free_func))
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* copy the rest */
- dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
- dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
- dest->version = src->version;
- dest->flags = src->flags;
-
- return dest;
-}
-
-EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
-{
- EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
- if (ret == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
- EC_KEY_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
-{
- int i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("EC_KEY", r);
-#endif
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 2) {
- fprintf(stderr, "EC_KEY_up, bad reference count\n");
- abort();
- }
-#endif
- return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
-}
-
-int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
- int ok = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL, *order = NULL;
- EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return FIPS_ec_key_generate_key(eckey);
-#endif
-
- if (!eckey || !eckey->group) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
- priv_key = BN_new();
- if (priv_key == NULL)
- goto err;
- } else
- priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
-
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(eckey->group, order, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- do
- if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, order))
- goto err;
- while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
-
- if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
- pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
- if (pub_key == NULL)
- goto err;
- } else
- pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
-
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
- eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
-
- ok = 1;
-
- err:
- if (order)
- BN_free(order);
- if (pub_key != NULL && eckey->pub_key == NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
- if (priv_key != NULL && eckey->priv_key == NULL)
- BN_free(priv_key);
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return (ok);
-}
-
-int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
-{
- int ok = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
- EC_POINT *point = NULL;
-
- if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
- if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */
- order = &eckey->group->order;
- if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * in case the priv_key is present : check if generator * priv_key ==
- * pub_key
- */
- if (eckey->priv_key) {
- if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
- NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ok = 1;
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (point != NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(point);
- return (ok);
-}
-
-int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
- BIGNUM *y)
-{
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
- EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- int ok = 0, tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
-
- if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
- ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (!ctx)
- goto err;
-
- point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
-
- if (!point)
- goto err;
-
- tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
-
- if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
- is_char_two = 1;
-
- tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- if (is_char_two) {
- if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
- x, y, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
- tx, ty, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point,
- x, y, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point,
- tx, ty, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals: if not values are out
- * of range.
- */
- if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
- EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
- goto err;
-
- if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- ok = 1;
-
- err:
- if (ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (point)
- EC_POINT_free(point);
- return ok;
-
-}
-
-const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
-{
- return key->group;
-}
-
-int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
-{
- if (key->group != NULL)
- EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
- key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
- return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
-}
-
-const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
-{
- return key->priv_key;
-}
-
-int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
-{
- if (key->priv_key)
- BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
- key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
- return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
-}
-
-const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
-{
- return key->pub_key;
-}
-
-int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
-{
- if (key->pub_key != NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
- key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
- return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
-}
-
-unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
-{
- return key->enc_flag;
-}
-
-void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags)
-{
- key->enc_flag = flags;
-}
-
-point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key)
-{
- return key->conv_form;
-}
-
-void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
-{
- key->conv_form = cform;
- if (key->group != NULL)
- EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
-}
-
-void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key,
- void *(*dup_func) (void *),
- void (*free_func) (void *),
- void (*clear_free_func) (void *))
-{
- void *ret;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
- ret =
- EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func,
- clear_free_func);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
- void *(*dup_func) (void *),
- void (*free_func) (void *),
- void (*clear_free_func) (void *))
-{
- EC_EXTRA_DATA *ex_data;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
- ex_data =
- EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func,
- clear_free_func);
- if (ex_data == NULL)
- EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&key->method_data, data, dup_func, free_func,
- clear_free_func);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
-
- return ex_data;
-}
-
-void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
-{
- if (key->group != NULL)
- EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
-}
-
-int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (key->group == NULL)
- return 0;
- return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
-}
-
-int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
-{
- return key->flags;
-}
-
-void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
-{
- key->flags |= flags;
-}
-
-void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
-{
- key->flags &= ~flags;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_key.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ec/ec_key.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_key.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ec/ec_key.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+/* crypto/ec/ec_key.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * Portions originally developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and
+ * contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ret;
+
+ ret = (EC_KEY *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_KEY));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ ret->version = 1;
+ ret->flags = 0;
+ ret->group = NULL;
+ ret->pub_key = NULL;
+ ret->priv_key = NULL;
+ ret->enc_flag = 0;
+ ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->method_data = NULL;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ if (ret->group == NULL) {
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (r == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("EC_KEY", r);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "EC_KEY_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort();
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (r->group != NULL)
+ EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
+ if (r->pub_key != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
+ if (r->priv_key != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
+
+ EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&r->method_data);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
+
+ OPENSSL_free(r);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
+{
+ EC_EXTRA_DATA *d;
+
+ if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* copy the parameters */
+ if (src->group) {
+ const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group);
+ /* clear the old group */
+ if (dest->group)
+ EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
+ dest->group = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
+ if (dest->group == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* copy the public key */
+ if (src->pub_key && src->group) {
+ if (dest->pub_key)
+ EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
+ dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
+ if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* copy the private key */
+ if (src->priv_key) {
+ if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
+ dest->priv_key = BN_new();
+ if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* copy method/extra data */
+ EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&dest->method_data);
+
+ for (d = src->method_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) {
+ void *t = d->dup_func(d->data);
+
+ if (t == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data
+ (&dest->method_data, t, d->dup_func, d->free_func,
+ d->clear_free_func))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* copy the rest */
+ dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
+ dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
+ dest->version = src->version;
+ dest->flags = src->flags;
+
+ return dest;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
+{
+ int i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("EC_KEY", r);
+#endif
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 2) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "EC_KEY_up, bad reference count\n");
+ abort();
+ }
+#endif
+ return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL, *order = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return FIPS_ec_key_generate_key(eckey);
+#endif
+
+ if (!eckey || !eckey->group) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ priv_key = BN_new();
+ if (priv_key == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
+
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(eckey->group, order, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ do
+ if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, order))
+ goto err;
+ while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
+
+ if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+ pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+ if (pub_key == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
+ eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (order)
+ BN_free(order);
+ if (pub_key != NULL && eckey->pub_key == NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
+ if (priv_key != NULL && eckey->priv_key == NULL)
+ BN_free(priv_key);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+
+ if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */
+ order = &eckey->group->order;
+ if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * in case the priv_key is present : check if generator * priv_key ==
+ * pub_key
+ */
+ if (eckey->priv_key) {
+ if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
+ NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (point != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
+ BIGNUM *y)
+{
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ int ok = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ int tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
+#endif
+
+ if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+ ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto err;
+
+ point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
+
+ if (!point)
+ goto err;
+
+ tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
+
+ if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
+ is_char_two = 1;
+
+ if (is_char_two) {
+ if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
+ x, y, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
+ tx, ty, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point,
+ x, y, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point,
+ tx, ty, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals: if not values are out
+ * of range.
+ */
+ if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
+ EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (ctx)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (point)
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ok;
+
+}
+
+const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->group;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+ if (key->group != NULL)
+ EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
+ key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
+ return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->priv_key;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+ if (key->priv_key)
+ BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
+ key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
+ return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->pub_key;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
+{
+ if (key->pub_key != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
+ key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
+ return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->enc_flag;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ key->enc_flag = flags;
+}
+
+point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->conv_form;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
+{
+ key->conv_form = cform;
+ if (key->group != NULL)
+ EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
+}
+
+void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key,
+ void *(*dup_func) (void *),
+ void (*free_func) (void *),
+ void (*clear_free_func) (void *))
+{
+ void *ret;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+ ret =
+ EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func,
+ clear_free_func);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
+ void *(*dup_func) (void *),
+ void (*free_func) (void *),
+ void (*clear_free_func) (void *))
+{
+ EC_EXTRA_DATA *ex_data;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+ ex_data =
+ EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func,
+ clear_free_func);
+ if (ex_data == NULL)
+ EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&key->method_data, data, dup_func, free_func,
+ clear_free_func);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+
+ return ex_data;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
+{
+ if (key->group != NULL)
+ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (key->group == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->flags;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
+{
+ key->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
+{
+ key->flags &= ~flags;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1470 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Bob Beck <beck at openbsd.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Theo de Raadt
- * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
- * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
- * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
- * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
- * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- */
-
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#if (defined(__unix__) || defined(unix)) && !defined(USG) && \
- (defined(OpenBSD) || defined(__FreeBSD__))
-# include <sys/param.h>
-# if (OpenBSD >= 200112) || ((__FreeBSD_version >= 470101 && __FreeBSD_version < 500000) || __FreeBSD_version >= 500041)
-# define HAVE_CRYPTODEV
-# endif
-# if (OpenBSD >= 200110)
-# define HAVE_SYSLOG_R
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_CRYPTODEV
-
-void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void)
-{
- /* This is a NOP on platforms without /dev/crypto */
- return;
-}
-
-#else
-
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <crypto/cryptodev.h>
-# include <crypto/dh/dh.h>
-# include <crypto/dsa/dsa.h>
-# include <crypto/err/err.h>
-# include <crypto/rsa/rsa.h>
-# include <sys/ioctl.h>
-# include <errno.h>
-# include <stdio.h>
-# include <unistd.h>
-# include <fcntl.h>
-# include <stdarg.h>
-# include <syslog.h>
-# include <errno.h>
-# include <string.h>
-
-struct dev_crypto_state {
- struct session_op d_sess;
- int d_fd;
-# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
- char dummy_mac_key[HASH_MAX_LEN];
- unsigned char digest_res[HASH_MAX_LEN];
- char *mac_data;
- int mac_len;
-# endif
-};
-
-static u_int32_t cryptodev_asymfeat = 0;
-
-static int get_asym_dev_crypto(void);
-static int open_dev_crypto(void);
-static int get_dev_crypto(void);
-static int get_cryptodev_ciphers(const int **cnids);
-# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
-static int get_cryptodev_digests(const int **cnids);
-# endif
-static int cryptodev_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
-static int cryptodev_usable_digests(const int **nids);
-static int cryptodev_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
-static int cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-static int cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-static int cryptodev_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
- const int **nids, int nid);
-static int cryptodev_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
- const int **nids, int nid);
-static int bn2crparam(const BIGNUM *a, struct crparam *crp);
-static int crparam2bn(struct crparam *crp, BIGNUM *a);
-static void zapparams(struct crypt_kop *kop);
-static int cryptodev_asym(struct crypt_kop *kop, int rlen, BIGNUM *r,
- int slen, BIGNUM *s);
-
-static int cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-static int cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-static int cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-static int cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
- BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-static int cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *t1, BIGNUM *g,
- BIGNUM *u1, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *u2,
- BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
-static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
- DSA *dsa);
-static int cryptodev_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
-static int cryptodev_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-static int cryptodev_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
- DH *dh);
-static int cryptodev_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p,
- void (*f) (void));
-void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
-
-static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN cryptodev_defns[] = {
- {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-};
-
-static struct {
- int id;
- int nid;
- int ivmax;
- int keylen;
-} ciphers[] = {
- {
- CRYPTO_ARC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16,
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8,
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_3DES_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24,
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16,
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24,
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32,
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_BLF_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16,
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_CAST_CBC, NID_cast5_cbc, 8, 16,
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_SKIPJACK_CBC, NID_undef, 0, 0,
- },
- {
- 0, NID_undef, 0, 0,
- },
-};
-
-# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
-static struct {
- int id;
- int nid;
- int keylen;
-} digests[] = {
- {
- CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC, NID_hmacWithMD5, 16
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, NID_hmacWithSHA1, 20
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC, NID_ripemd160, 16
- /* ? */
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK, NID_undef, 0
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK, NID_undef, 0
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_MD5, NID_md5, 16
- },
- {
- CRYPTO_SHA1, NID_sha1, 20
- },
- {
- 0, NID_undef, 0
- },
-};
-# endif
-
-/*
- * Return a fd if /dev/crypto seems usable, 0 otherwise.
- */
-static int open_dev_crypto(void)
-{
- static int fd = -1;
-
- if (fd == -1) {
- if ((fd = open("/dev/crypto", O_RDWR, 0)) == -1)
- return (-1);
- /* close on exec */
- if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
- close(fd);
- fd = -1;
- return (-1);
- }
- }
- return (fd);
-}
-
-static int get_dev_crypto(void)
-{
- int fd, retfd;
-
- if ((fd = open_dev_crypto()) == -1)
- return (-1);
-# ifndef CRIOGET_NOT_NEEDED
- if (ioctl(fd, CRIOGET, &retfd) == -1)
- return (-1);
-
- /* close on exec */
- if (fcntl(retfd, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
- close(retfd);
- return (-1);
- }
-# else
- retfd = fd;
-# endif
- return (retfd);
-}
-
-static void put_dev_crypto(int fd)
-{
-# ifndef CRIOGET_NOT_NEEDED
- close(fd);
-# endif
-}
-
-/* Caching version for asym operations */
-static int get_asym_dev_crypto(void)
-{
- static int fd = -1;
-
- if (fd == -1)
- fd = get_dev_crypto();
- return fd;
-}
-
-/*
- * Find out what ciphers /dev/crypto will let us have a session for.
- * XXX note, that some of these openssl doesn't deal with yet!
- * returning them here is harmless, as long as we return NULL
- * when asked for a handler in the cryptodev_engine_ciphers routine
- */
-static int get_cryptodev_ciphers(const int **cnids)
-{
- static int nids[CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX];
- struct session_op sess;
- int fd, i, count = 0;
-
- if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
- *cnids = NULL;
- return (0);
- }
- memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess));
- sess.key = (caddr_t) "123456789abcdefghijklmno";
-
- for (i = 0; ciphers[i].id && count < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX; i++) {
- if (ciphers[i].nid == NID_undef)
- continue;
- sess.cipher = ciphers[i].id;
- sess.keylen = ciphers[i].keylen;
- sess.mac = 0;
- if (ioctl(fd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) != -1 &&
- ioctl(fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) != -1)
- nids[count++] = ciphers[i].nid;
- }
- put_dev_crypto(fd);
-
- if (count > 0)
- *cnids = nids;
- else
- *cnids = NULL;
- return (count);
-}
-
-# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
-/*
- * Find out what digests /dev/crypto will let us have a session for.
- * XXX note, that some of these openssl doesn't deal with yet!
- * returning them here is harmless, as long as we return NULL
- * when asked for a handler in the cryptodev_engine_digests routine
- */
-static int get_cryptodev_digests(const int **cnids)
-{
- static int nids[CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX];
- struct session_op sess;
- int fd, i, count = 0;
-
- if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
- *cnids = NULL;
- return (0);
- }
- memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess));
- sess.mackey = (caddr_t) "123456789abcdefghijklmno";
- for (i = 0; digests[i].id && count < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX; i++) {
- if (digests[i].nid == NID_undef)
- continue;
- sess.mac = digests[i].id;
- sess.mackeylen = digests[i].keylen;
- sess.cipher = 0;
- if (ioctl(fd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) != -1 &&
- ioctl(fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) != -1)
- nids[count++] = digests[i].nid;
- }
- put_dev_crypto(fd);
-
- if (count > 0)
- *cnids = nids;
- else
- *cnids = NULL;
- return (count);
-}
-# endif /* 0 */
-
-/*
- * Find the useable ciphers|digests from dev/crypto - this is the first
- * thing called by the engine init crud which determines what it
- * can use for ciphers from this engine. We want to return
- * only what we can do, anythine else is handled by software.
- *
- * If we can't initialize the device to do anything useful for
- * any reason, we want to return a NULL array, and 0 length,
- * which forces everything to be done is software. By putting
- * the initalization of the device in here, we ensure we can
- * use this engine as the default, and if for whatever reason
- * /dev/crypto won't do what we want it will just be done in
- * software
- *
- * This can (should) be greatly expanded to perhaps take into
- * account speed of the device, and what we want to do.
- * (although the disabling of particular alg's could be controlled
- * by the device driver with sysctl's.) - this is where we
- * want most of the decisions made about what we actually want
- * to use from /dev/crypto.
- */
-static int cryptodev_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
-{
- return (get_cryptodev_ciphers(nids));
-}
-
-static int cryptodev_usable_digests(const int **nids)
-{
-# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
- return (get_cryptodev_digests(nids));
-# else
- /*
- * XXXX just disable all digests for now, because it sucks.
- * we need a better way to decide this - i.e. I may not
- * want digests on slow cards like hifn on fast machines,
- * but might want them on slow or loaded machines, etc.
- * will also want them when using crypto cards that don't
- * suck moose gonads - would be nice to be able to decide something
- * as reasonable default without having hackery that's card dependent.
- * of course, the default should probably be just do everything,
- * with perhaps a sysctl to turn algoritms off (or have them off
- * by default) on cards that generally suck like the hifn.
- */
- *nids = NULL;
- return (0);
-# endif
-}
-
-static int
-cryptodev_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-{
- struct crypt_op cryp;
- struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->cipher_data;
- struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
- const void *iiv;
- unsigned char save_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-
- if (state->d_fd < 0)
- return (0);
- if (!inl)
- return (1);
- if ((inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
- return (0);
-
- memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
-
- cryp.ses = sess->ses;
- cryp.flags = 0;
- cryp.len = inl;
- cryp.src = (caddr_t) in;
- cryp.dst = (caddr_t) out;
- cryp.mac = 0;
-
- cryp.op = ctx->encrypt ? COP_ENCRYPT : COP_DECRYPT;
-
- if (ctx->cipher->iv_len) {
- cryp.iv = (caddr_t) ctx->iv;
- if (!ctx->encrypt) {
- iiv = in + inl - ctx->cipher->iv_len;
- memcpy(save_iv, iiv, ctx->cipher->iv_len);
- }
- } else
- cryp.iv = NULL;
-
- if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) == -1) {
- /*
- * XXX need better errror handling this can fail for a number of
- * different reasons.
- */
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (ctx->cipher->iv_len) {
- if (ctx->encrypt)
- iiv = out + inl - ctx->cipher->iv_len;
- else
- iiv = save_iv;
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iiv, ctx->cipher->iv_len);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->cipher_data;
- struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
- int cipher = -1, i;
-
- for (i = 0; ciphers[i].id; i++)
- if (ctx->cipher->nid == ciphers[i].nid &&
- ctx->cipher->iv_len <= ciphers[i].ivmax &&
- ctx->key_len == ciphers[i].keylen) {
- cipher = ciphers[i].id;
- break;
- }
-
- if (!ciphers[i].id) {
- state->d_fd = -1;
- return (0);
- }
-
- memset(sess, 0, sizeof(struct session_op));
-
- if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0)
- return (0);
-
- sess->key = (caddr_t) key;
- sess->keylen = ctx->key_len;
- sess->cipher = cipher;
-
- if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) == -1) {
- put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
- state->d_fd = -1;
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-/*
- * free anything we allocated earlier when initting a
- * session, and close the session.
- */
-static int cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->cipher_data;
- struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
-
- if (state->d_fd < 0)
- return (0);
-
- /*
- * XXX if this ioctl fails, someting's wrong. the invoker may have called
- * us with a bogus ctx, or we could have a device that for whatever
- * reason just doesn't want to play ball - it's not clear what's right
- * here - should this be an error? should it just increase a counter,
- * hmm. For right now, we return 0 - I don't believe that to be "right".
- * we could call the gorpy openssl lib error handlers that print messages
- * to users of the library. hmm..
- */
-
- if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess->ses) == -1) {
- ret = 0;
- } else {
- ret = 1;
- }
- put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
- state->d_fd = -1;
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine
- * gets called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
- */
-
-/* RC4 */
-const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_rc4 = {
- NID_rc4,
- 1, 16, 0,
- EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
- cryptodev_init_key,
- cryptodev_cipher,
- cryptodev_cleanup,
- sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
-};
-
-/* DES CBC EVP */
-const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_des_cbc = {
- NID_des_cbc,
- 8, 8, 8,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- cryptodev_init_key,
- cryptodev_cipher,
- cryptodev_cleanup,
- sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
-};
-
-/* 3DES CBC EVP */
-const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_3des_cbc = {
- NID_des_ede3_cbc,
- 8, 24, 8,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- cryptodev_init_key,
- cryptodev_cipher,
- cryptodev_cleanup,
- sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
-};
-
-const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_bf_cbc = {
- NID_bf_cbc,
- 8, 16, 8,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- cryptodev_init_key,
- cryptodev_cipher,
- cryptodev_cleanup,
- sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
-};
-
-const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_cast_cbc = {
- NID_cast5_cbc,
- 8, 16, 8,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- cryptodev_init_key,
- cryptodev_cipher,
- cryptodev_cleanup,
- sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
-};
-
-const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_aes_cbc = {
- NID_aes_128_cbc,
- 16, 16, 16,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- cryptodev_init_key,
- cryptodev_cipher,
- cryptodev_cleanup,
- sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
-};
-
-const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_aes_192_cbc = {
- NID_aes_192_cbc,
- 16, 24, 16,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- cryptodev_init_key,
- cryptodev_cipher,
- cryptodev_cleanup,
- sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
-};
-
-const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_aes_256_cbc = {
- NID_aes_256_cbc,
- 16, 32, 16,
- EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- cryptodev_init_key,
- cryptodev_cipher,
- cryptodev_cleanup,
- sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL
-};
-
-/*
- * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
- * a particular NID in the ENGINE. this says what we'll do at the
- * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
- */
-static int
-cryptodev_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
- const int **nids, int nid)
-{
- if (!cipher)
- return (cryptodev_usable_ciphers(nids));
-
- switch (nid) {
- case NID_rc4:
- *cipher = &cryptodev_rc4;
- break;
- case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
- *cipher = &cryptodev_3des_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_des_cbc:
- *cipher = &cryptodev_des_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_bf_cbc:
- *cipher = &cryptodev_bf_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_cast5_cbc:
- *cipher = &cryptodev_cast_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_aes_128_cbc:
- *cipher = &cryptodev_aes_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_aes_192_cbc:
- *cipher = &cryptodev_aes_192_cbc;
- break;
- case NID_aes_256_cbc:
- *cipher = &cryptodev_aes_256_cbc;
- break;
- default:
- *cipher = NULL;
- break;
- }
- return (*cipher != NULL);
-}
-
-# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
-
-/* convert digest type to cryptodev */
-static int digest_nid_to_cryptodev(int nid)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; digests[i].id; i++)
- if (digests[i].nid == nid)
- return (digests[i].id);
- return (0);
-}
-
-static int digest_key_length(int nid)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; digests[i].id; i++)
- if (digests[i].nid == nid)
- return digests[i].keylen;
- return (0);
-}
-
-static int cryptodev_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
- struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->md_data;
- struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
- int digest;
-
- if ((digest = digest_nid_to_cryptodev(ctx->digest->type)) == NID_undef) {
- printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Can't get digest \n");
- return (0);
- }
-
- memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state));
-
- if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
- printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Can't get Dev \n");
- return (0);
- }
-
- sess->mackey = state->dummy_mac_key;
- sess->mackeylen = digest_key_length(ctx->digest->type);
- sess->mac = digest;
-
- if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) < 0) {
- put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
- state->d_fd = -1;
- printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Open session failed\n");
- return (0);
- }
-
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int cryptodev_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
- size_t count)
-{
- struct crypt_op cryp;
- struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->md_data;
- struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
-
- if (!data || state->d_fd < 0) {
- printf("cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs \n");
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (!count) {
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT)) {
- /* if application doesn't support one buffer */
- state->mac_data =
- OPENSSL_realloc(state->mac_data, state->mac_len + count);
-
- if (!state->mac_data) {
- printf("cryptodev_digest_update: realloc failed\n");
- return (0);
- }
-
- memcpy(state->mac_data + state->mac_len, data, count);
- state->mac_len += count;
-
- return (1);
- }
-
- memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
-
- cryp.ses = sess->ses;
- cryp.flags = 0;
- cryp.len = count;
- cryp.src = (caddr_t) data;
- cryp.dst = NULL;
- cryp.mac = (caddr_t) state->digest_res;
- if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) {
- printf("cryptodev_digest_update: digest failed\n");
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int cryptodev_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
-{
- struct crypt_op cryp;
- struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->md_data;
- struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
-
- int ret = 1;
-
- if (!md || state->d_fd < 0) {
- printf("cryptodev_digest_final: illegal input\n");
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT)) {
- /* if application doesn't support one buffer */
- memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
- cryp.ses = sess->ses;
- cryp.flags = 0;
- cryp.len = state->mac_len;
- cryp.src = state->mac_data;
- cryp.dst = NULL;
- cryp.mac = (caddr_t) md;
- if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) {
- printf("cryptodev_digest_final: digest failed\n");
- return (0);
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- memcpy(md, state->digest_res, ctx->digest->md_size);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int cryptodev_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret = 1;
- struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->md_data;
- struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
-
- if (state == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (state->d_fd < 0) {
- printf("cryptodev_digest_cleanup: illegal input\n");
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (state->mac_data) {
- OPENSSL_free(state->mac_data);
- state->mac_data = NULL;
- state->mac_len = 0;
- }
-
- if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess->ses) < 0) {
- printf("cryptodev_digest_cleanup: failed to close session\n");
- ret = 0;
- } else {
- ret = 1;
- }
- put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
- state->d_fd = -1;
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int cryptodev_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
-{
- struct dev_crypto_state *fstate = from->md_data;
- struct dev_crypto_state *dstate = to->md_data;
- struct session_op *sess;
- int digest;
-
- if (dstate == NULL || fstate == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- memcpy(dstate, fstate, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state));
-
- sess = &dstate->d_sess;
-
- digest = digest_nid_to_cryptodev(to->digest->type);
-
- sess->mackey = dstate->dummy_mac_key;
- sess->mackeylen = digest_key_length(to->digest->type);
- sess->mac = digest;
-
- dstate->d_fd = get_dev_crypto();
-
- if (ioctl(dstate->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) < 0) {
- put_dev_crypto(dstate->d_fd);
- dstate->d_fd = -1;
- printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Open session failed\n");
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (fstate->mac_len != 0) {
- if (fstate->mac_data != NULL) {
- dstate->mac_data = OPENSSL_malloc(fstate->mac_len);
- memcpy(dstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_len);
- dstate->mac_len = fstate->mac_len;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-const EVP_MD cryptodev_sha1 = {
- NID_sha1,
- NID_undef,
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT,
- cryptodev_digest_init,
- cryptodev_digest_update,
- cryptodev_digest_final,
- cryptodev_digest_copy,
- cryptodev_digest_cleanup,
- EVP_PKEY_NULL_method,
- SHA_CBLOCK,
- sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
-};
-
-const EVP_MD cryptodev_md5 = {
- NID_md5,
- NID_undef,
- 16 /* MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH */ ,
- EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT,
- cryptodev_digest_init,
- cryptodev_digest_update,
- cryptodev_digest_final,
- cryptodev_digest_copy,
- cryptodev_digest_cleanup,
- EVP_PKEY_NULL_method,
- 64 /* MD5_CBLOCK */ ,
- sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
-};
-
-# endif /* USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS */
-
-static int
-cryptodev_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
- const int **nids, int nid)
-{
- if (!digest)
- return (cryptodev_usable_digests(nids));
-
- switch (nid) {
-# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
- case NID_md5:
- *digest = &cryptodev_md5;
- break;
- case NID_sha1:
- *digest = &cryptodev_sha1;
- break;
- default:
-# endif /* USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS */
- *digest = NULL;
- break;
- }
- return (*digest != NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Convert a BIGNUM to the representation that /dev/crypto needs.
- * Upon completion of use, the caller is responsible for freeing
- * crp->crp_p.
- */
-static int bn2crparam(const BIGNUM *a, struct crparam *crp)
-{
- int i, j, k;
- ssize_t bytes, bits;
- u_char *b;
-
- crp->crp_p = NULL;
- crp->crp_nbits = 0;
-
- bits = BN_num_bits(a);
- bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
-
- b = malloc(bytes);
- if (b == NULL)
- return (1);
- memset(b, 0, bytes);
-
- crp->crp_p = (caddr_t) b;
- crp->crp_nbits = bits;
-
- for (i = 0, j = 0; i < a->top; i++) {
- for (k = 0; k < BN_BITS2 / 8; k++) {
- if ((j + k) >= bytes)
- return (0);
- b[j + k] = a->d[i] >> (k * 8);
- }
- j += BN_BITS2 / 8;
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-/* Convert a /dev/crypto parameter to a BIGNUM */
-static int crparam2bn(struct crparam *crp, BIGNUM *a)
-{
- u_int8_t *pd;
- int i, bytes;
-
- bytes = (crp->crp_nbits + 7) / 8;
-
- if (bytes == 0)
- return (-1);
-
- if ((pd = (u_int8_t *) malloc(bytes)) == NULL)
- return (-1);
-
- for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++)
- pd[i] = crp->crp_p[bytes - i - 1];
-
- BN_bin2bn(pd, bytes, a);
- free(pd);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-static void zapparams(struct crypt_kop *kop)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < kop->crk_iparams + kop->crk_oparams; i++) {
- if (kop->crk_param[i].crp_p)
- free(kop->crk_param[i].crp_p);
- kop->crk_param[i].crp_p = NULL;
- kop->crk_param[i].crp_nbits = 0;
- }
-}
-
-static int
-cryptodev_asym(struct crypt_kop *kop, int rlen, BIGNUM *r, int slen,
- BIGNUM *s)
-{
- int fd, ret = -1;
-
- if ((fd = get_asym_dev_crypto()) < 0)
- return (ret);
-
- if (r) {
- kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_p = calloc(rlen, sizeof(char));
- kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_nbits = rlen * 8;
- kop->crk_oparams++;
- }
- if (s) {
- kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_p =
- calloc(slen, sizeof(char));
- kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_nbits = slen * 8;
- kop->crk_oparams++;
- }
-
- if (ioctl(fd, CIOCKEY, kop) == 0) {
- if (r)
- crparam2bn(&kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams], r);
- if (s)
- crparam2bn(&kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1], s);
- ret = 0;
- }
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int
-cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
-{
- struct crypt_kop kop;
- int ret = 1;
-
- /*
- * Currently, we know we can do mod exp iff we can do any asymmetric
- * operations at all.
- */
- if (cryptodev_asymfeat == 0) {
- ret = BN_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
- return (ret);
- }
-
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
- kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP;
-
- /* inputs: a^p % m */
- if (bn2crparam(a, &kop.crk_param[0]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(p, &kop.crk_param[1]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(m, &kop.crk_param[2]))
- goto err;
- kop.crk_iparams = 3;
-
- if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(m), r, 0, NULL)) {
- const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
- printf("OCF asym process failed, Running in software\n");
- ret = meth->bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
-
- } else if (ECANCELED == kop.crk_status) {
- const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
- printf("OCF hardware operation cancelled. Running in Software\n");
- ret = meth->bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
- }
- /* else cryptodev operation worked ok ==> ret = 1 */
-
- err:
- zapparams(&kop);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int
-cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int r;
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- r = cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r0, I, rsa->d, rsa->n, ctx, NULL);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return (r);
-}
-
-static int
-cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- struct crypt_kop kop;
- int ret = 1;
-
- if (!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp) {
- /* XXX 0 means failure?? */
- return (0);
- }
-
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
- kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP_CRT;
- /* inputs: rsa->p rsa->q I rsa->dmp1 rsa->dmq1 rsa->iqmp */
- if (bn2crparam(rsa->p, &kop.crk_param[0]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(rsa->q, &kop.crk_param[1]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(I, &kop.crk_param[2]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(rsa->dmp1, &kop.crk_param[3]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(rsa->dmq1, &kop.crk_param[4]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(rsa->iqmp, &kop.crk_param[5]))
- goto err;
- kop.crk_iparams = 6;
-
- if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(rsa->n), r0, 0, NULL)) {
- const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
- printf("OCF asym process failed, running in Software\n");
- ret = (*meth->rsa_mod_exp) (r0, I, rsa, ctx);
-
- } else if (ECANCELED == kop.crk_status) {
- const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
- printf("OCF hardware operation cancelled. Running in Software\n");
- ret = (*meth->rsa_mod_exp) (r0, I, rsa, ctx);
- }
- /* else cryptodev operation worked ok ==> ret = 1 */
-
- err:
- zapparams(&kop);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static RSA_METHOD cryptodev_rsa = {
- "cryptodev RSA method",
- NULL, /* rsa_pub_enc */
- NULL, /* rsa_pub_dec */
- NULL, /* rsa_priv_enc */
- NULL, /* rsa_priv_dec */
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL, /* init */
- NULL, /* finish */
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL, /* app_data */
- NULL, /* rsa_sign */
- NULL /* rsa_verify */
-};
-
-static int
-cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
-{
- return (cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx));
-}
-
-static int
-cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *t1, BIGNUM *g,
- BIGNUM *u1, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *u2, BIGNUM *p,
- BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
-{
- BIGNUM t2;
- int ret = 0;
-
- BN_init(&t2);
-
- /* v = ( g^u1 * y^u2 mod p ) mod q */
- /* let t1 = g ^ u1 mod p */
- ret = 0;
-
- if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->p, ctx, mont))
- goto err;
-
- /* let t2 = y ^ u2 mod p */
- if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, &t2, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont))
- goto err;
- /* let u1 = t1 * t2 mod p */
- if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, t1, &t2, dsa->p, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- BN_copy(t1, u1);
-
- ret = 1;
- err:
- BN_free(&t2);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
- DSA *dsa)
-{
- struct crypt_kop kop;
- BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
- DSA_SIG *dsaret = NULL;
-
- if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- BN_free(r);
- goto err;
- }
-
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
- kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_SIGN;
-
- /* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->priv_key */
- kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = (caddr_t) dgst;
- kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = dlen * 8;
- if (bn2crparam(dsa->p, &kop.crk_param[1]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(dsa->q, &kop.crk_param[2]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(dsa->g, &kop.crk_param[3]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(dsa->priv_key, &kop.crk_param[4]))
- goto err;
- kop.crk_iparams = 5;
-
- if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), r,
- BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), s) == 0) {
- dsaret = DSA_SIG_new();
- dsaret->r = r;
- dsaret->s = s;
- } else {
- const DSA_METHOD *meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
- BN_free(r);
- BN_free(s);
- dsaret = (meth->dsa_do_sign) (dgst, dlen, dsa);
- }
- err:
- kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL;
- zapparams(&kop);
- return (dsaret);
-}
-
-static int
-cryptodev_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
- DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
-{
- struct crypt_kop kop;
- int dsaret = 1;
-
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
- kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_VERIFY;
-
- /* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->pub_key sig->r sig->s */
- kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = (caddr_t) dgst;
- kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = dlen * 8;
- if (bn2crparam(dsa->p, &kop.crk_param[1]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(dsa->q, &kop.crk_param[2]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(dsa->g, &kop.crk_param[3]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(dsa->pub_key, &kop.crk_param[4]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(sig->r, &kop.crk_param[5]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(sig->s, &kop.crk_param[6]))
- goto err;
- kop.crk_iparams = 7;
-
- if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, 0, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0) {
- /*
- * OCF success value is 0, if not zero, change dsaret to fail
- */
- if (0 != kop.crk_status)
- dsaret = 0;
- } else {
- const DSA_METHOD *meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
-
- dsaret = (meth->dsa_do_verify) (dgst, dlen, sig, dsa);
- }
- err:
- kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL;
- zapparams(&kop);
- return (dsaret);
-}
-
-static DSA_METHOD cryptodev_dsa = {
- "cryptodev DSA method",
- NULL,
- NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
- NULL,
- NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
- NULL,
- NULL, /* init */
- NULL, /* finish */
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL /* app_data */
-};
-
-static int
-cryptodev_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
-{
- return (cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx));
-}
-
-static int
-cryptodev_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
-{
- struct crypt_kop kop;
- int dhret = 1;
- int fd, keylen;
-
- if ((fd = get_asym_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
- const DH_METHOD *meth = DH_OpenSSL();
-
- return ((meth->compute_key) (key, pub_key, dh));
- }
-
- keylen = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
-
- memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
- kop.crk_op = CRK_DH_COMPUTE_KEY;
-
- /* inputs: dh->priv_key pub_key dh->p key */
- if (bn2crparam(dh->priv_key, &kop.crk_param[0]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(pub_key, &kop.crk_param[1]))
- goto err;
- if (bn2crparam(dh->p, &kop.crk_param[2]))
- goto err;
- kop.crk_iparams = 3;
-
- kop.crk_param[3].crp_p = (caddr_t) key;
- kop.crk_param[3].crp_nbits = keylen * 8;
- kop.crk_oparams = 1;
-
- if (ioctl(fd, CIOCKEY, &kop) == -1) {
- const DH_METHOD *meth = DH_OpenSSL();
-
- dhret = (meth->compute_key) (key, pub_key, dh);
- }
- err:
- kop.crk_param[3].crp_p = NULL;
- zapparams(&kop);
- return (dhret);
-}
-
-static DH_METHOD cryptodev_dh = {
- "cryptodev DH method",
- NULL, /* cryptodev_dh_generate_key */
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL /* app_data */
-};
-
-/*
- * ctrl right now is just a wrapper that doesn't do much
- * but I expect we'll want some options soon.
- */
-static int
-cryptodev_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
-{
-# ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_R
- struct syslog_data sd = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
-# endif
-
- switch (cmd) {
- default:
-# ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_R
- syslog_r(LOG_ERR, &sd, "cryptodev_ctrl: unknown command %d", cmd);
-# else
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "cryptodev_ctrl: unknown command %d", cmd);
-# endif
- break;
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void)
-{
- ENGINE *engine = ENGINE_new();
- int fd;
-
- if (engine == NULL)
- return;
- if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
- ENGINE_free(engine);
- return;
- }
-
- /*
- * find out what asymmetric crypto algorithms we support
- */
- if (ioctl(fd, CIOCASYMFEAT, &cryptodev_asymfeat) == -1) {
- put_dev_crypto(fd);
- ENGINE_free(engine);
- return;
- }
- put_dev_crypto(fd);
-
- if (!ENGINE_set_id(engine, "cryptodev") ||
- !ENGINE_set_name(engine, "BSD cryptodev engine") ||
- !ENGINE_set_ciphers(engine, cryptodev_engine_ciphers) ||
- !ENGINE_set_digests(engine, cryptodev_engine_digests) ||
- !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(engine, cryptodev_ctrl) ||
- !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(engine, cryptodev_defns)) {
- ENGINE_free(engine);
- return;
- }
-
- if (ENGINE_set_RSA(engine, &cryptodev_rsa)) {
- const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-
- cryptodev_rsa.bn_mod_exp = rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
- cryptodev_rsa.rsa_mod_exp = rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp;
- cryptodev_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc;
- cryptodev_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec;
- cryptodev_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = rsa_meth->rsa_priv_enc;
- cryptodev_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = rsa_meth->rsa_priv_dec;
- if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) {
- cryptodev_rsa.bn_mod_exp = cryptodev_bn_mod_exp;
- if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP_CRT)
- cryptodev_rsa.rsa_mod_exp = cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp;
- else
- cryptodev_rsa.rsa_mod_exp = cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp;
- }
- }
-
- if (ENGINE_set_DSA(engine, &cryptodev_dsa)) {
- const DSA_METHOD *meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
-
- memcpy(&cryptodev_dsa, meth, sizeof(DSA_METHOD));
- if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DSA_SIGN)
- cryptodev_dsa.dsa_do_sign = cryptodev_dsa_do_sign;
- if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) {
- cryptodev_dsa.bn_mod_exp = cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp;
- cryptodev_dsa.dsa_mod_exp = cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp;
- }
- if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DSA_VERIFY)
- cryptodev_dsa.dsa_do_verify = cryptodev_dsa_verify;
- }
-
- if (ENGINE_set_DH(engine, &cryptodev_dh)) {
- const DH_METHOD *dh_meth = DH_OpenSSL();
-
- cryptodev_dh.generate_key = dh_meth->generate_key;
- cryptodev_dh.compute_key = dh_meth->compute_key;
- cryptodev_dh.bn_mod_exp = dh_meth->bn_mod_exp;
- if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) {
- cryptodev_dh.bn_mod_exp = cryptodev_mod_exp_dh;
- if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DH_COMPUTE_KEY)
- cryptodev_dh.compute_key = cryptodev_dh_compute_key;
- }
- }
-
- ENGINE_add(engine);
- ENGINE_free(engine);
- ERR_clear_error();
-}
-
-#endif /* HAVE_CRYPTODEV */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1473 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Bob Beck <beck at openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Theo de Raadt
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
+ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#if (defined(__unix__) || defined(unix)) && !defined(USG) && \
+ (defined(OpenBSD) || defined(__FreeBSD__))
+# include <sys/param.h>
+# if (OpenBSD >= 200112) || ((__FreeBSD_version >= 470101 && __FreeBSD_version < 500000) || __FreeBSD_version >= 500041)
+# define HAVE_CRYPTODEV
+# endif
+# if (OpenBSD >= 200110)
+# define HAVE_SYSLOG_R
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CRYPTODEV
+
+void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void)
+{
+ /* This is a NOP on platforms without /dev/crypto */
+ return;
+}
+
+#else
+
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <crypto/cryptodev.h>
+# include <crypto/dh/dh.h>
+# include <crypto/dsa/dsa.h>
+# include <crypto/err/err.h>
+# include <crypto/rsa/rsa.h>
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# include <stdarg.h>
+# include <syslog.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+# include <string.h>
+
+struct dev_crypto_state {
+ struct session_op d_sess;
+ int d_fd;
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+ char dummy_mac_key[HASH_MAX_LEN];
+ unsigned char digest_res[HASH_MAX_LEN];
+ char *mac_data;
+ int mac_len;
+# endif
+};
+
+static u_int32_t cryptodev_asymfeat = 0;
+
+static int get_asym_dev_crypto(void);
+static int open_dev_crypto(void);
+static int get_dev_crypto(void);
+static int get_cryptodev_ciphers(const int **cnids);
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+static int get_cryptodev_digests(const int **cnids);
+# endif
+static int cryptodev_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
+static int cryptodev_usable_digests(const int **nids);
+static int cryptodev_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+static int cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+static int cryptodev_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+ const int **nids, int nid);
+static int cryptodev_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+ const int **nids, int nid);
+static int bn2crparam(const BIGNUM *a, struct crparam *crp);
+static int crparam2bn(struct crparam *crp, BIGNUM *a);
+static void zapparams(struct crypt_kop *kop);
+static int cryptodev_asym(struct crypt_kop *kop, int rlen, BIGNUM *r,
+ int slen, BIGNUM *s);
+
+static int cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+static int cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+static int cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+static int cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
+ BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+static int cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *t1, BIGNUM *g,
+ BIGNUM *u1, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *u2,
+ BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+ DSA *dsa);
+static int cryptodev_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+static int cryptodev_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+static int cryptodev_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+ DH *dh);
+static int cryptodev_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p,
+ void (*f) (void));
+void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
+
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN cryptodev_defns[] = {
+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+};
+
+static struct {
+ int id;
+ int nid;
+ int ivmax;
+ int keylen;
+} ciphers[] = {
+ {
+ CRYPTO_ARC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16,
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8,
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_3DES_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24,
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16,
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24,
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_AES_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32,
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_BLF_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16,
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_CAST_CBC, NID_cast5_cbc, 8, 16,
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_SKIPJACK_CBC, NID_undef, 0, 0,
+ },
+ {
+ 0, NID_undef, 0, 0,
+ },
+};
+
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+static struct {
+ int id;
+ int nid;
+ int keylen;
+} digests[] = {
+ {
+ CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC, NID_hmacWithMD5, 16
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, NID_hmacWithSHA1, 20
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC, NID_ripemd160, 16
+ /* ? */
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK, NID_undef, 0
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK, NID_undef, 0
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_MD5, NID_md5, 16
+ },
+ {
+ CRYPTO_SHA1, NID_sha1, 20
+ },
+ {
+ 0, NID_undef, 0
+ },
+};
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Return a fd if /dev/crypto seems usable, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int open_dev_crypto(void)
+{
+ static int fd = -1;
+
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ if ((fd = open("/dev/crypto", O_RDWR, 0)) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ /* close on exec */
+ if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ fd = -1;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ return (fd);
+}
+
+static int get_dev_crypto(void)
+{
+ int fd, retfd;
+
+ if ((fd = open_dev_crypto()) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+# ifndef CRIOGET_NOT_NEEDED
+ if (ioctl(fd, CRIOGET, &retfd) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+
+ /* close on exec */
+ if (fcntl(retfd, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
+ close(retfd);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+# else
+ retfd = fd;
+# endif
+ return (retfd);
+}
+
+static void put_dev_crypto(int fd)
+{
+# ifndef CRIOGET_NOT_NEEDED
+ close(fd);
+# endif
+}
+
+/* Caching version for asym operations */
+static int get_asym_dev_crypto(void)
+{
+ static int fd = -1;
+
+ if (fd == -1)
+ fd = get_dev_crypto();
+ return fd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find out what ciphers /dev/crypto will let us have a session for.
+ * XXX note, that some of these openssl doesn't deal with yet!
+ * returning them here is harmless, as long as we return NULL
+ * when asked for a handler in the cryptodev_engine_ciphers routine
+ */
+static int get_cryptodev_ciphers(const int **cnids)
+{
+ static int nids[CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX];
+ struct session_op sess;
+ int fd, i, count = 0;
+
+ if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
+ *cnids = NULL;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess));
+ sess.key = (caddr_t) "123456789abcdefghijklmno";
+
+ for (i = 0; ciphers[i].id && count < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX; i++) {
+ if (ciphers[i].nid == NID_undef)
+ continue;
+ sess.cipher = ciphers[i].id;
+ sess.keylen = ciphers[i].keylen;
+ sess.mac = 0;
+ if (ioctl(fd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) != -1 &&
+ ioctl(fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) != -1)
+ nids[count++] = ciphers[i].nid;
+ }
+ put_dev_crypto(fd);
+
+ if (count > 0)
+ *cnids = nids;
+ else
+ *cnids = NULL;
+ return (count);
+}
+
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+/*
+ * Find out what digests /dev/crypto will let us have a session for.
+ * XXX note, that some of these openssl doesn't deal with yet!
+ * returning them here is harmless, as long as we return NULL
+ * when asked for a handler in the cryptodev_engine_digests routine
+ */
+static int get_cryptodev_digests(const int **cnids)
+{
+ static int nids[CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX];
+ struct session_op sess;
+ int fd, i, count = 0;
+
+ if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
+ *cnids = NULL;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ memset(&sess, 0, sizeof(sess));
+ sess.mackey = (caddr_t) "123456789abcdefghijklmno";
+ for (i = 0; digests[i].id && count < CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX; i++) {
+ if (digests[i].nid == NID_undef)
+ continue;
+ sess.mac = digests[i].id;
+ sess.mackeylen = digests[i].keylen;
+ sess.cipher = 0;
+ if (ioctl(fd, CIOCGSESSION, &sess) != -1 &&
+ ioctl(fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) != -1)
+ nids[count++] = digests[i].nid;
+ }
+ put_dev_crypto(fd);
+
+ if (count > 0)
+ *cnids = nids;
+ else
+ *cnids = NULL;
+ return (count);
+}
+# endif /* 0 */
+
+/*
+ * Find the useable ciphers|digests from dev/crypto - this is the first
+ * thing called by the engine init crud which determines what it
+ * can use for ciphers from this engine. We want to return
+ * only what we can do, anythine else is handled by software.
+ *
+ * If we can't initialize the device to do anything useful for
+ * any reason, we want to return a NULL array, and 0 length,
+ * which forces everything to be done is software. By putting
+ * the initalization of the device in here, we ensure we can
+ * use this engine as the default, and if for whatever reason
+ * /dev/crypto won't do what we want it will just be done in
+ * software
+ *
+ * This can (should) be greatly expanded to perhaps take into
+ * account speed of the device, and what we want to do.
+ * (although the disabling of particular alg's could be controlled
+ * by the device driver with sysctl's.) - this is where we
+ * want most of the decisions made about what we actually want
+ * to use from /dev/crypto.
+ */
+static int cryptodev_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
+{
+ return (get_cryptodev_ciphers(nids));
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_usable_digests(const int **nids)
+{
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+ return (get_cryptodev_digests(nids));
+# else
+ /*
+ * XXXX just disable all digests for now, because it sucks.
+ * we need a better way to decide this - i.e. I may not
+ * want digests on slow cards like hifn on fast machines,
+ * but might want them on slow or loaded machines, etc.
+ * will also want them when using crypto cards that don't
+ * suck moose gonads - would be nice to be able to decide something
+ * as reasonable default without having hackery that's card dependent.
+ * of course, the default should probably be just do everything,
+ * with perhaps a sysctl to turn algoritms off (or have them off
+ * by default) on cards that generally suck like the hifn.
+ */
+ *nids = NULL;
+ return (0);
+# endif
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+ struct crypt_op cryp;
+ struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->cipher_data;
+ struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+ const void *iiv;
+ unsigned char save_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+ if (state->d_fd < 0)
+ return (0);
+ if (!inl)
+ return (1);
+ if ((inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
+
+ cryp.ses = sess->ses;
+ cryp.flags = 0;
+ cryp.len = inl;
+ cryp.src = (caddr_t) in;
+ cryp.dst = (caddr_t) out;
+ cryp.mac = 0;
+
+ cryp.op = ctx->encrypt ? COP_ENCRYPT : COP_DECRYPT;
+
+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len) {
+ cryp.iv = (caddr_t) ctx->iv;
+ if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+ iiv = in + inl - ctx->cipher->iv_len;
+ memcpy(save_iv, iiv, ctx->cipher->iv_len);
+ }
+ } else
+ cryp.iv = NULL;
+
+ if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) == -1) {
+ /*
+ * XXX need better errror handling this can fail for a number of
+ * different reasons.
+ */
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len) {
+ if (ctx->encrypt)
+ iiv = out + inl - ctx->cipher->iv_len;
+ else
+ iiv = save_iv;
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, iiv, ctx->cipher->iv_len);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->cipher_data;
+ struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+ int cipher = -1, i;
+
+ for (i = 0; ciphers[i].id; i++)
+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == ciphers[i].nid &&
+ ctx->cipher->iv_len <= ciphers[i].ivmax &&
+ ctx->key_len == ciphers[i].keylen) {
+ cipher = ciphers[i].id;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!ciphers[i].id) {
+ state->d_fd = -1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ memset(sess, 0, sizeof(struct session_op));
+
+ if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ sess->key = (caddr_t) key;
+ sess->keylen = ctx->key_len;
+ sess->cipher = cipher;
+
+ if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) == -1) {
+ put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
+ state->d_fd = -1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * free anything we allocated earlier when initting a
+ * session, and close the session.
+ */
+static int cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->cipher_data;
+ struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+
+ if (state->d_fd < 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ /*
+ * XXX if this ioctl fails, someting's wrong. the invoker may have called
+ * us with a bogus ctx, or we could have a device that for whatever
+ * reason just doesn't want to play ball - it's not clear what's right
+ * here - should this be an error? should it just increase a counter,
+ * hmm. For right now, we return 0 - I don't believe that to be "right".
+ * we could call the gorpy openssl lib error handlers that print messages
+ * to users of the library. hmm..
+ */
+
+ if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess->ses) == -1) {
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
+ state->d_fd = -1;
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine
+ * gets called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
+ */
+
+/* RC4 */
+const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_rc4 = {
+ NID_rc4,
+ 1, 16, 0,
+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+ cryptodev_init_key,
+ cryptodev_cipher,
+ cryptodev_cleanup,
+ sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+};
+
+/* DES CBC EVP */
+const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_des_cbc = {
+ NID_des_cbc,
+ 8, 8, 8,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ cryptodev_init_key,
+ cryptodev_cipher,
+ cryptodev_cleanup,
+ sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
+const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_3des_cbc = {
+ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
+ 8, 24, 8,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ cryptodev_init_key,
+ cryptodev_cipher,
+ cryptodev_cleanup,
+ sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_bf_cbc = {
+ NID_bf_cbc,
+ 8, 16, 8,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ cryptodev_init_key,
+ cryptodev_cipher,
+ cryptodev_cleanup,
+ sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_cast_cbc = {
+ NID_cast5_cbc,
+ 8, 16, 8,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ cryptodev_init_key,
+ cryptodev_cipher,
+ cryptodev_cleanup,
+ sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_aes_cbc = {
+ NID_aes_128_cbc,
+ 16, 16, 16,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ cryptodev_init_key,
+ cryptodev_cipher,
+ cryptodev_cleanup,
+ sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_aes_192_cbc = {
+ NID_aes_192_cbc,
+ 16, 24, 16,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ cryptodev_init_key,
+ cryptodev_cipher,
+ cryptodev_cleanup,
+ sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+const EVP_CIPHER cryptodev_aes_256_cbc = {
+ NID_aes_256_cbc,
+ 16, 32, 16,
+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ cryptodev_init_key,
+ cryptodev_cipher,
+ cryptodev_cleanup,
+ sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. this says what we'll do at the
+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
+ */
+static int
+cryptodev_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+ const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+ if (!cipher)
+ return (cryptodev_usable_ciphers(nids));
+
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_rc4:
+ *cipher = &cryptodev_rc4;
+ break;
+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
+ *cipher = &cryptodev_3des_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_des_cbc:
+ *cipher = &cryptodev_des_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_bf_cbc:
+ *cipher = &cryptodev_bf_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_cast5_cbc:
+ *cipher = &cryptodev_cast_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+ *cipher = &cryptodev_aes_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+ *cipher = &cryptodev_aes_192_cbc;
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+ *cipher = &cryptodev_aes_256_cbc;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *cipher = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ return (*cipher != NULL);
+}
+
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+
+/* convert digest type to cryptodev */
+static int digest_nid_to_cryptodev(int nid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; digests[i].id; i++)
+ if (digests[i].nid == nid)
+ return (digests[i].id);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int digest_key_length(int nid)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; digests[i].id; i++)
+ if (digests[i].nid == nid)
+ return digests[i].keylen;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->md_data;
+ struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+ int digest;
+
+ if ((digest = digest_nid_to_cryptodev(ctx->digest->type)) == NID_undef) {
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Can't get digest \n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state));
+
+ if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Can't get Dev \n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ sess->mackey = state->dummy_mac_key;
+ sess->mackeylen = digest_key_length(ctx->digest->type);
+ sess->mac = digest;
+
+ if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) < 0) {
+ put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
+ state->d_fd = -1;
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Open session failed\n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ struct crypt_op cryp;
+ struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->md_data;
+ struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+
+ if (!data || state->d_fd < 0) {
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_update: illegal inputs \n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (!count) {
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT)) {
+ /* if application doesn't support one buffer */
+ state->mac_data =
+ OPENSSL_realloc(state->mac_data, state->mac_len + count);
+
+ if (!state->mac_data) {
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_update: realloc failed\n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(state->mac_data + state->mac_len, data, count);
+ state->mac_len += count;
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
+
+ cryp.ses = sess->ses;
+ cryp.flags = 0;
+ cryp.len = count;
+ cryp.src = (caddr_t) data;
+ cryp.dst = NULL;
+ cryp.mac = (caddr_t) state->digest_res;
+ if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) {
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_update: digest failed\n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+ struct crypt_op cryp;
+ struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->md_data;
+ struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (!md || state->d_fd < 0) {
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_final: illegal input\n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT)) {
+ /* if application doesn't support one buffer */
+ memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
+ cryp.ses = sess->ses;
+ cryp.flags = 0;
+ cryp.len = state->mac_len;
+ cryp.src = state->mac_data;
+ cryp.dst = NULL;
+ cryp.mac = (caddr_t) md;
+ if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) {
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_final: digest failed\n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(md, state->digest_res, ctx->digest->md_size);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+ struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->md_data;
+ struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
+
+ if (state == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (state->d_fd < 0) {
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_cleanup: illegal input\n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (state->mac_data) {
+ OPENSSL_free(state->mac_data);
+ state->mac_data = NULL;
+ state->mac_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess->ses) < 0) {
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_cleanup: failed to close session\n");
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
+ state->d_fd = -1;
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int cryptodev_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
+{
+ struct dev_crypto_state *fstate = from->md_data;
+ struct dev_crypto_state *dstate = to->md_data;
+ struct session_op *sess;
+ int digest;
+
+ if (dstate == NULL || fstate == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ memcpy(dstate, fstate, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state));
+
+ sess = &dstate->d_sess;
+
+ digest = digest_nid_to_cryptodev(to->digest->type);
+
+ sess->mackey = dstate->dummy_mac_key;
+ sess->mackeylen = digest_key_length(to->digest->type);
+ sess->mac = digest;
+
+ dstate->d_fd = get_dev_crypto();
+
+ if (ioctl(dstate->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) < 0) {
+ put_dev_crypto(dstate->d_fd);
+ dstate->d_fd = -1;
+ printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Open session failed\n");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (fstate->mac_len != 0) {
+ if (fstate->mac_data != NULL) {
+ dstate->mac_data = OPENSSL_malloc(fstate->mac_len);
+ memcpy(dstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_len);
+ dstate->mac_len = fstate->mac_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD cryptodev_sha1 = {
+ NID_sha1,
+ NID_undef,
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT,
+ cryptodev_digest_init,
+ cryptodev_digest_update,
+ cryptodev_digest_final,
+ cryptodev_digest_copy,
+ cryptodev_digest_cleanup,
+ EVP_PKEY_NULL_method,
+ SHA_CBLOCK,
+ sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
+};
+
+const EVP_MD cryptodev_md5 = {
+ NID_md5,
+ NID_undef,
+ 16 /* MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH */ ,
+ EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT,
+ cryptodev_digest_init,
+ cryptodev_digest_update,
+ cryptodev_digest_final,
+ cryptodev_digest_copy,
+ cryptodev_digest_cleanup,
+ EVP_PKEY_NULL_method,
+ 64 /* MD5_CBLOCK */ ,
+ sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state),
+};
+
+# endif /* USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS */
+
+static int
+cryptodev_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+ const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+ if (!digest)
+ return (cryptodev_usable_digests(nids));
+
+ switch (nid) {
+# ifdef USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS
+ case NID_md5:
+ *digest = &cryptodev_md5;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha1:
+ *digest = &cryptodev_sha1;
+ break;
+ default:
+# endif /* USE_CRYPTODEV_DIGESTS */
+ *digest = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ return (*digest != NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a BIGNUM to the representation that /dev/crypto needs.
+ * Upon completion of use, the caller is responsible for freeing
+ * crp->crp_p.
+ */
+static int bn2crparam(const BIGNUM *a, struct crparam *crp)
+{
+ int i, j, k;
+ ssize_t bytes, bits;
+ u_char *b;
+
+ crp->crp_p = NULL;
+ crp->crp_nbits = 0;
+
+ bits = BN_num_bits(a);
+ bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+
+ b = malloc(bytes);
+ if (b == NULL)
+ return (1);
+ memset(b, 0, bytes);
+
+ crp->crp_p = (caddr_t) b;
+ crp->crp_nbits = bits;
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < a->top; i++) {
+ for (k = 0; k < BN_BITS2 / 8; k++) {
+ if ((j + k) >= bytes)
+ return (0);
+ b[j + k] = a->d[i] >> (k * 8);
+ }
+ j += BN_BITS2 / 8;
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* Convert a /dev/crypto parameter to a BIGNUM */
+static int crparam2bn(struct crparam *crp, BIGNUM *a)
+{
+ u_int8_t *pd;
+ int i, bytes;
+
+ bytes = (crp->crp_nbits + 7) / 8;
+
+ if (bytes == 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ if ((pd = (u_int8_t *) malloc(bytes)) == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++)
+ pd[i] = crp->crp_p[bytes - i - 1];
+
+ BN_bin2bn(pd, bytes, a);
+ free(pd);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static void zapparams(struct crypt_kop *kop)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < kop->crk_iparams + kop->crk_oparams; i++) {
+ if (kop->crk_param[i].crp_p)
+ free(kop->crk_param[i].crp_p);
+ kop->crk_param[i].crp_p = NULL;
+ kop->crk_param[i].crp_nbits = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_asym(struct crypt_kop *kop, int rlen, BIGNUM *r, int slen,
+ BIGNUM *s)
+{
+ int fd, ret = -1;
+
+ if ((fd = get_asym_dev_crypto()) < 0)
+ return (ret);
+
+ if (r) {
+ kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_p = calloc(rlen, sizeof(char));
+ kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams].crp_nbits = rlen * 8;
+ kop->crk_oparams++;
+ }
+ if (s) {
+ kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_p =
+ calloc(slen, sizeof(char));
+ kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1].crp_nbits = slen * 8;
+ kop->crk_oparams++;
+ }
+
+ if (ioctl(fd, CIOCKEY, kop) == 0) {
+ if (r)
+ crparam2bn(&kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams], r);
+ if (s)
+ crparam2bn(&kop->crk_param[kop->crk_iparams + 1], s);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+ struct crypt_kop kop;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Currently, we know we can do mod exp iff we can do any asymmetric
+ * operations at all.
+ */
+ if (cryptodev_asymfeat == 0) {
+ ret = BN_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP;
+
+ /* inputs: a^p % m */
+ if (bn2crparam(a, &kop.crk_param[0]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(p, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(m, &kop.crk_param[2]))
+ goto err;
+ kop.crk_iparams = 3;
+
+ if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(m), r, 0, NULL)) {
+ const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+ printf("OCF asym process failed, Running in software\n");
+ ret = meth->bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
+
+ } else if (ECANCELED == kop.crk_status) {
+ const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+ printf("OCF hardware operation cancelled. Running in Software\n");
+ ret = meth->bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
+ }
+ /* else cryptodev operation worked ok ==> ret = 1 */
+
+ err:
+ zapparams(&kop);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int r;
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ r = cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r0, I, rsa->d, rsa->n, ctx, NULL);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return (r);
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct crypt_kop kop;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp) {
+ /* XXX 0 means failure?? */
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP_CRT;
+ /* inputs: rsa->p rsa->q I rsa->dmp1 rsa->dmq1 rsa->iqmp */
+ if (bn2crparam(rsa->p, &kop.crk_param[0]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(rsa->q, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(I, &kop.crk_param[2]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(rsa->dmp1, &kop.crk_param[3]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(rsa->dmq1, &kop.crk_param[4]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(rsa->iqmp, &kop.crk_param[5]))
+ goto err;
+ kop.crk_iparams = 6;
+
+ if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(rsa->n), r0, 0, NULL)) {
+ const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+ printf("OCF asym process failed, running in Software\n");
+ ret = (*meth->rsa_mod_exp) (r0, I, rsa, ctx);
+
+ } else if (ECANCELED == kop.crk_status) {
+ const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+ printf("OCF hardware operation cancelled. Running in Software\n");
+ ret = (*meth->rsa_mod_exp) (r0, I, rsa, ctx);
+ }
+ /* else cryptodev operation worked ok ==> ret = 1 */
+
+ err:
+ zapparams(&kop);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static RSA_METHOD cryptodev_rsa = {
+ "cryptodev RSA method",
+ NULL, /* rsa_pub_enc */
+ NULL, /* rsa_pub_dec */
+ NULL, /* rsa_priv_enc */
+ NULL, /* rsa_priv_dec */
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL, /* init */
+ NULL, /* finish */
+ 0, /* flags */
+ NULL, /* app_data */
+ NULL, /* rsa_sign */
+ NULL /* rsa_verify */
+};
+
+static int
+cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+ return (cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx));
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *t1, BIGNUM *g,
+ BIGNUM *u1, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *u2, BIGNUM *p,
+ BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
+{
+ BIGNUM t2;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ BN_init(&t2);
+
+ /* v = ( g^u1 * y^u2 mod p ) mod q */
+ /* let t1 = g ^ u1 mod p */
+ ret = 0;
+
+ if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->p, ctx, mont))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* let t2 = y ^ u2 mod p */
+ if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, &t2, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont))
+ goto err;
+ /* let u1 = t1 * t2 mod p */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, t1, &t2, dsa->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_copy(t1, u1);
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_free(&t2);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+ DSA *dsa)
+{
+ struct crypt_kop kop;
+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+ DSA_SIG *dsaret = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ BN_free(r);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_SIGN;
+
+ /* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->priv_key */
+ kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = (caddr_t) dgst;
+ kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = dlen * 8;
+ if (bn2crparam(dsa->p, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(dsa->q, &kop.crk_param[2]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(dsa->g, &kop.crk_param[3]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(dsa->priv_key, &kop.crk_param[4]))
+ goto err;
+ kop.crk_iparams = 5;
+
+ if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), r,
+ BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), s) == 0) {
+ dsaret = DSA_SIG_new();
+ if (dsaret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ dsaret->r = r;
+ dsaret->s = s;
+ r = s = NULL;
+ } else {
+ const DSA_METHOD *meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
+ dsaret = (meth->dsa_do_sign) (dgst, dlen, dsa);
+ }
+ err:
+ BN_free(r);
+ BN_free(s);
+ kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL;
+ zapparams(&kop);
+ return (dsaret);
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
+{
+ struct crypt_kop kop;
+ int dsaret = 1;
+
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_VERIFY;
+
+ /* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->pub_key sig->r sig->s */
+ kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = (caddr_t) dgst;
+ kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = dlen * 8;
+ if (bn2crparam(dsa->p, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(dsa->q, &kop.crk_param[2]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(dsa->g, &kop.crk_param[3]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(dsa->pub_key, &kop.crk_param[4]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(sig->r, &kop.crk_param[5]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(sig->s, &kop.crk_param[6]))
+ goto err;
+ kop.crk_iparams = 7;
+
+ if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, 0, NULL, 0, NULL) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * OCF success value is 0, if not zero, change dsaret to fail
+ */
+ if (0 != kop.crk_status)
+ dsaret = 0;
+ } else {
+ const DSA_METHOD *meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
+
+ dsaret = (meth->dsa_do_verify) (dgst, dlen, sig, dsa);
+ }
+ err:
+ kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL;
+ zapparams(&kop);
+ return (dsaret);
+}
+
+static DSA_METHOD cryptodev_dsa = {
+ "cryptodev DSA method",
+ NULL,
+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */
+ NULL,
+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */
+ NULL,
+ NULL, /* init */
+ NULL, /* finish */
+ 0, /* flags */
+ NULL /* app_data */
+};
+
+static int
+cryptodev_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+ return (cryptodev_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx));
+}
+
+static int
+cryptodev_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+{
+ struct crypt_kop kop;
+ int dhret = 1;
+ int fd, keylen;
+
+ if ((fd = get_asym_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
+ const DH_METHOD *meth = DH_OpenSSL();
+
+ return ((meth->compute_key) (key, pub_key, dh));
+ }
+
+ keylen = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
+
+ memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
+ kop.crk_op = CRK_DH_COMPUTE_KEY;
+
+ /* inputs: dh->priv_key pub_key dh->p key */
+ if (bn2crparam(dh->priv_key, &kop.crk_param[0]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(pub_key, &kop.crk_param[1]))
+ goto err;
+ if (bn2crparam(dh->p, &kop.crk_param[2]))
+ goto err;
+ kop.crk_iparams = 3;
+
+ kop.crk_param[3].crp_p = (caddr_t) key;
+ kop.crk_param[3].crp_nbits = keylen * 8;
+ kop.crk_oparams = 1;
+
+ if (ioctl(fd, CIOCKEY, &kop) == -1) {
+ const DH_METHOD *meth = DH_OpenSSL();
+
+ dhret = (meth->compute_key) (key, pub_key, dh);
+ }
+ err:
+ kop.crk_param[3].crp_p = NULL;
+ zapparams(&kop);
+ return (dhret);
+}
+
+static DH_METHOD cryptodev_dh = {
+ "cryptodev DH method",
+ NULL, /* cryptodev_dh_generate_key */
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ 0, /* flags */
+ NULL /* app_data */
+};
+
+/*
+ * ctrl right now is just a wrapper that doesn't do much
+ * but I expect we'll want some options soon.
+ */
+static int
+cryptodev_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_R
+ struct syslog_data sd = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+# endif
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ default:
+# ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_R
+ syslog_r(LOG_ERR, &sd, "cryptodev_ctrl: unknown command %d", cmd);
+# else
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "cryptodev_ctrl: unknown command %d", cmd);
+# endif
+ break;
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void)
+{
+ ENGINE *engine = ENGINE_new();
+ int fd;
+
+ if (engine == NULL)
+ return;
+ if ((fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) {
+ ENGINE_free(engine);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * find out what asymmetric crypto algorithms we support
+ */
+ if (ioctl(fd, CIOCASYMFEAT, &cryptodev_asymfeat) == -1) {
+ put_dev_crypto(fd);
+ ENGINE_free(engine);
+ return;
+ }
+ put_dev_crypto(fd);
+
+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(engine, "cryptodev") ||
+ !ENGINE_set_name(engine, "BSD cryptodev engine") ||
+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(engine, cryptodev_engine_ciphers) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_digests(engine, cryptodev_engine_digests) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(engine, cryptodev_ctrl) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(engine, cryptodev_defns)) {
+ ENGINE_free(engine);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ENGINE_set_RSA(engine, &cryptodev_rsa)) {
+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+
+ cryptodev_rsa.bn_mod_exp = rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
+ cryptodev_rsa.rsa_mod_exp = rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp;
+ cryptodev_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc;
+ cryptodev_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec;
+ cryptodev_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = rsa_meth->rsa_priv_enc;
+ cryptodev_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = rsa_meth->rsa_priv_dec;
+ if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) {
+ cryptodev_rsa.bn_mod_exp = cryptodev_bn_mod_exp;
+ if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP_CRT)
+ cryptodev_rsa.rsa_mod_exp = cryptodev_rsa_mod_exp;
+ else
+ cryptodev_rsa.rsa_mod_exp = cryptodev_rsa_nocrt_mod_exp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ENGINE_set_DSA(engine, &cryptodev_dsa)) {
+ const DSA_METHOD *meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
+
+ memcpy(&cryptodev_dsa, meth, sizeof(DSA_METHOD));
+ if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DSA_SIGN)
+ cryptodev_dsa.dsa_do_sign = cryptodev_dsa_do_sign;
+ if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) {
+ cryptodev_dsa.bn_mod_exp = cryptodev_dsa_bn_mod_exp;
+ cryptodev_dsa.dsa_mod_exp = cryptodev_dsa_dsa_mod_exp;
+ }
+ if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DSA_VERIFY)
+ cryptodev_dsa.dsa_do_verify = cryptodev_dsa_verify;
+ }
+
+ if (ENGINE_set_DH(engine, &cryptodev_dh)) {
+ const DH_METHOD *dh_meth = DH_OpenSSL();
+
+ cryptodev_dh.generate_key = dh_meth->generate_key;
+ cryptodev_dh.compute_key = dh_meth->compute_key;
+ cryptodev_dh.bn_mod_exp = dh_meth->bn_mod_exp;
+ if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_MOD_EXP) {
+ cryptodev_dh.bn_mod_exp = cryptodev_mod_exp_dh;
+ if (cryptodev_asymfeat & CRF_DH_COMPUTE_KEY)
+ cryptodev_dh.compute_key = cryptodev_dh_compute_key;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ENGINE_add(engine);
+ ENGINE_free(engine);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CRYPTODEV */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/engine/eng_list.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_list.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,404 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/engine/eng_list.c */
-/*
- * Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff at geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-
-#include "eng_int.h"
-
-/*
- * The linked-list of pointers to engine types. engine_list_head incorporates
- * an implicit structural reference but engine_list_tail does not - the
- * latter is a computational niceity and only points to something that is
- * already pointed to by its predecessor in the list (or engine_list_head
- * itself). In the same way, the use of the "prev" pointer in each ENGINE is
- * to save excessive list iteration, it doesn't correspond to an extra
- * structural reference. Hence, engine_list_head, and each non-null "next"
- * pointer account for the list itself assuming exactly 1 structural
- * reference on each list member.
- */
-static ENGINE *engine_list_head = NULL;
-static ENGINE *engine_list_tail = NULL;
-
-/*
- * This cleanup function is only needed internally. If it should be called,
- * we register it with the "ENGINE_cleanup()" stack to be called during
- * cleanup.
- */
-
-static void engine_list_cleanup(void)
-{
- ENGINE *iterator = engine_list_head;
-
- while (iterator != NULL) {
- ENGINE_remove(iterator);
- iterator = engine_list_head;
- }
- return;
-}
-
-/*
- * These static functions starting with a lower case "engine_" always take
- * place when CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE has been locked up.
- */
-static int engine_list_add(ENGINE *e)
-{
- int conflict = 0;
- ENGINE *iterator = NULL;
-
- if (e == NULL) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- iterator = engine_list_head;
- while (iterator && !conflict) {
- conflict = (strcmp(iterator->id, e->id) == 0);
- iterator = iterator->next;
- }
- if (conflict) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID);
- return 0;
- }
- if (engine_list_head == NULL) {
- /* We are adding to an empty list. */
- if (engine_list_tail) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- engine_list_head = e;
- e->prev = NULL;
- /*
- * The first time the list allocates, we should register the cleanup.
- */
- engine_cleanup_add_last(engine_list_cleanup);
- } else {
- /* We are adding to the tail of an existing list. */
- if ((engine_list_tail == NULL) || (engine_list_tail->next != NULL)) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- engine_list_tail->next = e;
- e->prev = engine_list_tail;
- }
- /*
- * Having the engine in the list assumes a structural reference.
- */
- e->struct_ref++;
- engine_ref_debug(e, 0, 1)
- /* However it came to be, e is the last item in the list. */
- engine_list_tail = e;
- e->next = NULL;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int engine_list_remove(ENGINE *e)
-{
- ENGINE *iterator;
-
- if (e == NULL) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- /* We need to check that e is in our linked list! */
- iterator = engine_list_head;
- while (iterator && (iterator != e))
- iterator = iterator->next;
- if (iterator == NULL) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE,
- ENGINE_R_ENGINE_IS_NOT_IN_LIST);
- return 0;
- }
- /* un-link e from the chain. */
- if (e->next)
- e->next->prev = e->prev;
- if (e->prev)
- e->prev->next = e->next;
- /* Correct our head/tail if necessary. */
- if (engine_list_head == e)
- engine_list_head = e->next;
- if (engine_list_tail == e)
- engine_list_tail = e->prev;
- engine_free_util(e, 0);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Get the first/last "ENGINE" type available. */
-ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void)
-{
- ENGINE *ret;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- ret = engine_list_head;
- if (ret) {
- ret->struct_ref++;
- engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1)
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- return ret;
-}
-
-ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void)
-{
- ENGINE *ret;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- ret = engine_list_tail;
- if (ret) {
- ret->struct_ref++;
- engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1)
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* Iterate to the next/previous "ENGINE" type (NULL = end of the list). */
-ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e)
-{
- ENGINE *ret = NULL;
- if (e == NULL) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_NEXT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- ret = e->next;
- if (ret) {
- /* Return a valid structural refernce to the next ENGINE */
- ret->struct_ref++;
- engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1)
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */
- ENGINE_free(e);
- return ret;
-}
-
-ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e)
-{
- ENGINE *ret = NULL;
- if (e == NULL) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PREV, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- ret = e->prev;
- if (ret) {
- /* Return a valid structural reference to the next ENGINE */
- ret->struct_ref++;
- engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1)
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */
- ENGINE_free(e);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* Add another "ENGINE" type into the list. */
-int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e)
-{
- int to_return = 1;
- if (e == NULL) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING);
- }
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- if (!engine_list_add(e)) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
- to_return = 0;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- return to_return;
-}
-
-/* Remove an existing "ENGINE" type from the array. */
-int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e)
-{
- int to_return = 1;
- if (e == NULL) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- if (!engine_list_remove(e)) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
- to_return = 0;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static void engine_cpy(ENGINE *dest, const ENGINE *src)
-{
- dest->id = src->id;
- dest->name = src->name;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- dest->rsa_meth = src->rsa_meth;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- dest->dsa_meth = src->dsa_meth;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- dest->dh_meth = src->dh_meth;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- dest->ecdh_meth = src->ecdh_meth;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- dest->ecdsa_meth = src->ecdsa_meth;
-#endif
- dest->rand_meth = src->rand_meth;
- dest->store_meth = src->store_meth;
- dest->ciphers = src->ciphers;
- dest->digests = src->digests;
- dest->pkey_meths = src->pkey_meths;
- dest->destroy = src->destroy;
- dest->init = src->init;
- dest->finish = src->finish;
- dest->ctrl = src->ctrl;
- dest->load_privkey = src->load_privkey;
- dest->load_pubkey = src->load_pubkey;
- dest->cmd_defns = src->cmd_defns;
- dest->flags = src->flags;
-}
-
-ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id)
-{
- ENGINE *iterator;
- char *load_dir = NULL;
- if (id == NULL) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- iterator = engine_list_head;
- while (iterator && (strcmp(id, iterator->id) != 0))
- iterator = iterator->next;
- if (iterator) {
- /*
- * We need to return a structural reference. If this is an ENGINE
- * type that returns copies, make a duplicate - otherwise increment
- * the existing ENGINE's reference count.
- */
- if (iterator->flags & ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY) {
- ENGINE *cp = ENGINE_new();
- if (!cp)
- iterator = NULL;
- else {
- engine_cpy(cp, iterator);
- iterator = cp;
- }
- } else {
- iterator->struct_ref++;
- engine_ref_debug(iterator, 0, 1)
- }
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
-#if 0
- if (iterator == NULL) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "id=", id);
- }
- return iterator;
-#else
- /* EEK! Experimental code starts */
- if (iterator)
- return iterator;
- /*
- * Prevent infinite recusrion if we're looking for the dynamic engine.
- */
- if (strcmp(id, "dynamic")) {
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
- load_dir = "SSLROOT:[ENGINES]";
-# else
- if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
- load_dir = ENGINESDIR;
-# endif
- iterator = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
- if (!iterator || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "ID", id, 0) ||
- !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_LOAD", "2", 0) ||
- !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_ADD",
- load_dir, 0) ||
- !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LIST_ADD", "1", 0) ||
- !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LOAD", NULL, 0))
- goto notfound;
- return iterator;
- }
- notfound:
- ENGINE_free(iterator);
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "id=", id);
- return NULL;
- /* EEK! Experimental code ends */
-#endif
-}
-
-int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e)
-{
- if (e == NULL) {
- ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UP_REF, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- CRYPTO_add(&e->struct_ref, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- return 1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_list.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/engine/eng_list.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_list.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/engine/eng_list.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
+/* crypto/engine/eng_list.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff at geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include "eng_int.h"
+
+/*
+ * The linked-list of pointers to engine types. engine_list_head incorporates
+ * an implicit structural reference but engine_list_tail does not - the
+ * latter is a computational niceity and only points to something that is
+ * already pointed to by its predecessor in the list (or engine_list_head
+ * itself). In the same way, the use of the "prev" pointer in each ENGINE is
+ * to save excessive list iteration, it doesn't correspond to an extra
+ * structural reference. Hence, engine_list_head, and each non-null "next"
+ * pointer account for the list itself assuming exactly 1 structural
+ * reference on each list member.
+ */
+static ENGINE *engine_list_head = NULL;
+static ENGINE *engine_list_tail = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This cleanup function is only needed internally. If it should be called,
+ * we register it with the "ENGINE_cleanup()" stack to be called during
+ * cleanup.
+ */
+
+static void engine_list_cleanup(void)
+{
+ ENGINE *iterator = engine_list_head;
+
+ while (iterator != NULL) {
+ ENGINE_remove(iterator);
+ iterator = engine_list_head;
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * These static functions starting with a lower case "engine_" always take
+ * place when CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE has been locked up.
+ */
+static int engine_list_add(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ int conflict = 0;
+ ENGINE *iterator = NULL;
+
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ iterator = engine_list_head;
+ while (iterator && !conflict) {
+ conflict = (strcmp(iterator->id, e->id) == 0);
+ iterator = iterator->next;
+ }
+ if (conflict) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (engine_list_head == NULL) {
+ /* We are adding to an empty list. */
+ if (engine_list_tail) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ engine_list_head = e;
+ e->prev = NULL;
+ /*
+ * The first time the list allocates, we should register the cleanup.
+ */
+ engine_cleanup_add_last(engine_list_cleanup);
+ } else {
+ /* We are adding to the tail of an existing list. */
+ if ((engine_list_tail == NULL) || (engine_list_tail->next != NULL)) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ engine_list_tail->next = e;
+ e->prev = engine_list_tail;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Having the engine in the list assumes a structural reference.
+ */
+ e->struct_ref++;
+ engine_ref_debug(e, 0, 1)
+ /* However it came to be, e is the last item in the list. */
+ engine_list_tail = e;
+ e->next = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int engine_list_remove(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ ENGINE *iterator;
+
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* We need to check that e is in our linked list! */
+ iterator = engine_list_head;
+ while (iterator && (iterator != e))
+ iterator = iterator->next;
+ if (iterator == NULL) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE,
+ ENGINE_R_ENGINE_IS_NOT_IN_LIST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* un-link e from the chain. */
+ if (e->next)
+ e->next->prev = e->prev;
+ if (e->prev)
+ e->prev->next = e->next;
+ /* Correct our head/tail if necessary. */
+ if (engine_list_head == e)
+ engine_list_head = e->next;
+ if (engine_list_tail == e)
+ engine_list_tail = e->prev;
+ engine_free_util(e, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Get the first/last "ENGINE" type available. */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void)
+{
+ ENGINE *ret;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ ret = engine_list_head;
+ if (ret) {
+ ret->struct_ref++;
+ engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1)
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void)
+{
+ ENGINE *ret;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ ret = engine_list_tail;
+ if (ret) {
+ ret->struct_ref++;
+ engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1)
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Iterate to the next/previous "ENGINE" type (NULL = end of the list). */
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ ENGINE *ret = NULL;
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_NEXT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ ret = e->next;
+ if (ret) {
+ /* Return a valid structural refernce to the next ENGINE */
+ ret->struct_ref++;
+ engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1)
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ ENGINE *ret = NULL;
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PREV, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ ret = e->prev;
+ if (ret) {
+ /* Return a valid structural reference to the next ENGINE */
+ ret->struct_ref++;
+ engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1)
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Add another "ENGINE" type into the list. */
+int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ int to_return = 1;
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ if (!engine_list_add(e)) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+ to_return = 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+/* Remove an existing "ENGINE" type from the array. */
+int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ int to_return = 1;
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ if (!engine_list_remove(e)) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR);
+ to_return = 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static void engine_cpy(ENGINE *dest, const ENGINE *src)
+{
+ dest->id = src->id;
+ dest->name = src->name;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ dest->rsa_meth = src->rsa_meth;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ dest->dsa_meth = src->dsa_meth;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dest->dh_meth = src->dh_meth;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ dest->ecdh_meth = src->ecdh_meth;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ dest->ecdsa_meth = src->ecdsa_meth;
+#endif
+ dest->rand_meth = src->rand_meth;
+ dest->store_meth = src->store_meth;
+ dest->ciphers = src->ciphers;
+ dest->digests = src->digests;
+ dest->pkey_meths = src->pkey_meths;
+ dest->destroy = src->destroy;
+ dest->init = src->init;
+ dest->finish = src->finish;
+ dest->ctrl = src->ctrl;
+ dest->load_privkey = src->load_privkey;
+ dest->load_pubkey = src->load_pubkey;
+ dest->cmd_defns = src->cmd_defns;
+ dest->flags = src->flags;
+}
+
+ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id)
+{
+ ENGINE *iterator;
+ char *load_dir = NULL;
+ if (id == NULL) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ iterator = engine_list_head;
+ while (iterator && (strcmp(id, iterator->id) != 0))
+ iterator = iterator->next;
+ if (iterator) {
+ /*
+ * We need to return a structural reference. If this is an ENGINE
+ * type that returns copies, make a duplicate - otherwise increment
+ * the existing ENGINE's reference count.
+ */
+ if (iterator->flags & ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY) {
+ ENGINE *cp = ENGINE_new();
+ if (!cp)
+ iterator = NULL;
+ else {
+ engine_cpy(cp, iterator);
+ iterator = cp;
+ }
+ } else {
+ iterator->struct_ref++;
+ engine_ref_debug(iterator, 0, 1)
+ }
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+#if 0
+ if (iterator == NULL) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "id=", id);
+ }
+ return iterator;
+#else
+ /* EEK! Experimental code starts */
+ if (iterator)
+ return iterator;
+ /*
+ * Prevent infinite recusrion if we're looking for the dynamic engine.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(id, "dynamic")) {
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
+ load_dir = "SSLROOT:[ENGINES]";
+# else
+ if ((load_dir = getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == 0)
+ load_dir = ENGINESDIR;
+# endif
+ iterator = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
+ if (!iterator || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "ID", id, 0) ||
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_LOAD", "2", 0) ||
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_ADD",
+ load_dir, 0) ||
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LIST_ADD", "1", 0) ||
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LOAD", NULL, 0))
+ goto notfound;
+ return iterator;
+ }
+ notfound:
+ ENGINE_free(iterator);
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "id=", id);
+ return NULL;
+ /* EEK! Experimental code ends */
+#endif
+}
+
+int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ if (e == NULL) {
+ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UP_REF, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_add(&e->struct_ref, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ return 1;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/e_aes.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_aes.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1286 +0,0 @@
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- */
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/err.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# include <assert.h>
-# include <openssl/aes.h>
-# include "evp_locl.h"
-# ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# include "modes_lcl.h"
-# include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-typedef struct {
- AES_KEY ks;
- block128_f block;
- union {
- cbc128_f cbc;
- ctr128_f ctr;
- } stream;
-} EVP_AES_KEY;
-
-typedef struct {
- AES_KEY ks; /* AES key schedule to use */
- int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
- int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */
- GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
- unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */
- int ivlen; /* IV length */
- int taglen;
- int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */
- int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
- ctr128_f ctr;
-} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
-
-typedef struct {
- AES_KEY ks1, ks2; /* AES key schedules to use */
- XTS128_CONTEXT xts;
- void (*stream) (const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned char *out, size_t length,
- const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
- const unsigned char iv[16]);
-} EVP_AES_XTS_CTX;
-
-typedef struct {
- AES_KEY ks; /* AES key schedule to use */
- int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
- int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */
- int tag_set; /* Set if tag is valid */
- int len_set; /* Set if message length set */
- int L, M; /* L and M parameters from RFC3610 */
- CCM128_CONTEXT ccm;
- ccm128_f str;
-} EVP_AES_CCM_CTX;
-
-# define MAXBITCHUNK ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-4))
-
-# ifdef VPAES_ASM
-int vpaes_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
- AES_KEY *key);
-int vpaes_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
- AES_KEY *key);
-
-void vpaes_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
- const AES_KEY *key);
-void vpaes_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
- const AES_KEY *key);
-
-void vpaes_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned char *out,
- size_t length,
- const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
-# endif
-# ifdef BSAES_ASM
-void bsaes_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
- size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
- unsigned char ivec[16], int enc);
-void bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
- size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
- const unsigned char ivec[16]);
-void bsaes_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
- size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
- const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
-void bsaes_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
- size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
- const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
-# endif
-# ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
-void AES_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
- size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
- const unsigned char ivec[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
-# endif
-# ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
-void AES_xts_encrypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len,
- const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
- const unsigned char iv[16]);
-void AES_xts_decrypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len,
- const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
- const unsigned char iv[16]);
-# endif
-
-# if defined(AES_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY) && ( \
- ((defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \
- defined(_M_IX86)) && defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2))|| \
- defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
- defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
- defined(__INTEL__) )
-
-extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
-
-# ifdef VPAES_ASM
-# define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
-# endif
-# ifdef BSAES_ASM
-# define BSAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
-# endif
-/*
- * AES-NI section
- */
-# define AESNI_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(57-32)))
-
-int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
- AES_KEY *key);
-int aesni_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
- AES_KEY *key);
-
-void aesni_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
- const AES_KEY *key);
-void aesni_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
- const AES_KEY *key);
-
-void aesni_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned char *out,
- size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, int enc);
-void aesni_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned char *out,
- size_t length,
- const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
-
-void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned char *out,
- size_t blocks,
- const void *key, const unsigned char *ivec);
-
-void aesni_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned char *out,
- size_t length,
- const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
- const unsigned char iv[16]);
-
-void aesni_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned char *out,
- size_t length,
- const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
- const unsigned char iv[16]);
-
-void aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned char *out,
- size_t blocks,
- const void *key,
- const unsigned char ivec[16],
- unsigned char cmac[16]);
-
-void aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned char *out,
- size_t blocks,
- const void *key,
- const unsigned char ivec[16],
- unsigned char cmac[16]);
-
-static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- int ret, mode;
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
-
- mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE;
- if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- && !enc) {
- ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, ctx->cipher_data);
- dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
- dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
- (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
- } else {
- ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, ctx->cipher_data);
- dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
- if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt;
- else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
- dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
- else
- dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
- }
-
- if (ret < 0) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aesni_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, ctx->cipher_data, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aesni_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
-
- if (len < bl)
- return 1;
-
- aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, ctx->cipher_data, ctx->encrypt);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-# define aesni_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
-static int aesni_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-
-# define aesni_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
-static int aesni_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-
-# define aesni_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
-static int aesni_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-
-# define aesni_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
-static int aesni_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-
-# define aesni_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
-static int aesni_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-
-static int aesni_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- if (!iv && !key)
- return 1;
- if (key) {
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
- CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt);
- gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
- /*
- * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
- */
- if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
- iv = gctx->iv;
- if (iv) {
- CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
- gctx->iv_set = 1;
- }
- gctx->key_set = 1;
- } else {
- /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
- if (gctx->key_set)
- CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
- else
- memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
- gctx->iv_set = 1;
- gctx->iv_gen = 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-# define aesni_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher
-static int aesni_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-
-static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- if (!iv && !key)
- return 1;
-
- if (key) {
- /* key_len is two AES keys */
- if (enc) {
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
- xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
- xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt;
- } else {
- aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
- xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
- xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt;
- }
-
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
- ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2);
- xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
-
- xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
- }
-
- if (iv) {
- xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-# define aesni_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
-static int aesni_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-
-static int aesni_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- if (!iv && !key)
- return 1;
- if (key) {
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &cctx->ks);
- CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
- &cctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt);
- cctx->str = enc ? (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks :
- (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks;
- cctx->key_set = 1;
- }
- if (iv) {
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L);
- cctx->iv_set = 1;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-# define aesni_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
-static int aesni_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
-static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
- nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
- flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
- aesni_init_key, \
- aesni_##mode##_cipher, \
- NULL, \
- sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
- NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
-static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
- nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \
- keylen/8,ivlen, \
- flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
- aes_init_key, \
- aes_##mode##_cipher, \
- NULL, \
- sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
- NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
-{ return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
-
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
-static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
- nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
- flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
- aesni_##mode##_init_key, \
- aesni_##mode##_cipher, \
- aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
- sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
- NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
-static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
- nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
- flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
- aes_##mode##_init_key, \
- aes_##mode##_cipher, \
- aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
- sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
- NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
-{ return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
-
-# else
-
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
-static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
- nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
- flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
- aes_init_key, \
- aes_##mode##_cipher, \
- NULL, \
- sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
- NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
-{ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
-
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
-static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
- nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
- flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
- aes_##mode##_init_key, \
- aes_##mode##_cipher, \
- aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
- sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
- NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
-{ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
-# endif
-
-# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid,keylen,flags) \
- BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,16,cbc,cbc,CBC,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
- BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,0,ecb,ecb,ECB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
- BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ofb128,ofb,OFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
- BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb128,cfb,CFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
- BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb1,cfb1,CFB,flags) \
- BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb8,cfb8,CFB,flags) \
- BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ctr,ctr,CTR,flags)
-
-static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- int ret, mode;
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
-
- mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE;
- if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- && !enc)
-# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
- if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
- ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
- dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
- dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) bsaes_cbc_encrypt;
- } else
-# endif
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
- if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
- dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
- dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
- (cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
- } else
-# endif
- {
- ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
- dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
- dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
- (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
- } else
-# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
- if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
- ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
- dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
- dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
- } else
-# endif
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
- if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
- dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
- dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
- (cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
- } else
-# endif
- {
- ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
- dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
- dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
- (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
-# ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
- if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
- dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
-# endif
- }
-
- if (ret < 0) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
-
- if (dat->stream.cbc)
- (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
- else if (ctx->encrypt)
- CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, dat->block);
- else
- CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, dat->block);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
- size_t i;
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
-
- if (len < bl)
- return 1;
-
- for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl)
- (*dat->block) (in + i, out + i, &dat->ks);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
-
- CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, dat->block);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
-
- CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
-
- CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
-
- if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS) {
- CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
- return 1;
- }
-
- while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) {
- CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
- len -= MAXBITCHUNK;
- }
- if (len)
- CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- unsigned int num = ctx->num;
- EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
-
- if (dat->stream.ctr)
- CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, ctx->buf, &num, dat->stream.ctr);
- else
- CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
- ctx->iv, ctx->buf, &num, dat->block);
- ctx->num = (size_t)num;
- return 1;
-}
-
-BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 128, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS)
- BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 192, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS)
- BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 256, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS)
-
-static int aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
-{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = c->cipher_data;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
- if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
- OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
-static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
-{
- int n = 8;
- unsigned char c;
-
- do {
- --n;
- c = counter[n];
- ++c;
- counter[n] = c;
- if (c)
- return;
- } while (n);
-}
-
-static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
-{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = c->cipher_data;
- switch (type) {
- case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
- gctx->key_set = 0;
- gctx->iv_set = 0;
- gctx->ivlen = c->cipher->iv_len;
- gctx->iv = c->iv;
- gctx->taglen = -1;
- gctx->iv_gen = 0;
- gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN:
- if (arg <= 0)
- return 0;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(c->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
- && arg < 12)
- return 0;
-# endif
- /* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
- if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
- if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
- OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
- gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
- if (!gctx->iv)
- return 0;
- }
- gctx->ivlen = arg;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG:
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt)
- return 0;
- memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
- gctx->taglen = arg;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG:
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt || gctx->taglen < 0)
- return 0;
- memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg);
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
- /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */
- if (arg == -1) {
- memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
- gctx->iv_gen = 1;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least
- * 8.
- */
- if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8)
- return 0;
- if (arg)
- memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
- if (c->encrypt && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
- return 0;
- gctx->iv_gen = 1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
- if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
- return 0;
- CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
- arg = gctx->ivlen;
- memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
- /*
- * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
- * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
- */
- ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
- gctx->iv_set = 1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
- if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt)
- return 0;
- memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
- CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
- gctx->iv_set = 1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
- /* Save the AAD for later use */
- if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
- return 0;
- memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
- gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
- {
- unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
- /* Correct length for explicit IV */
- len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- /* If decrypting correct for tag too */
- if (!c->encrypt)
- len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
- c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
- }
- /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
- return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = out->cipher_data;
- if (gctx->gcm.key) {
- if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks)
- return 0;
- gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
- }
- if (gctx->iv == c->iv)
- gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
- else {
- gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
- if (!gctx_out->iv)
- return 0;
- memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- default:
- return -1;
-
- }
-}
-
-static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- if (!iv && !key)
- return 1;
- if (key) {
- do {
-# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
- if (BSAES_CAPABLE) {
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
- CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
- (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
- gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
- break;
- } else
-# endif
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
- if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
- CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
- (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
- gctx->ctr = NULL;
- break;
- } else
-# endif
- (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
-
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
- CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
- (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
-# ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
- gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
-# else
- gctx->ctr = NULL;
-# endif
- } while (0);
-
- /*
- * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
- */
- if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
- iv = gctx->iv;
- if (iv) {
- CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
- gctx->iv_set = 1;
- }
- gctx->key_set = 1;
- } else {
- /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
- if (gctx->key_set)
- CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
- else
- memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
- gctx->iv_set = 1;
- gctx->iv_gen = 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV
- * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV,
- * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload
- * and verify tag.
- */
-
-static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- int rv = -1;
- /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */
- if (out != in
- || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
- return -1;
- /*
- * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
- * buffer.
- */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, ctx->encrypt ?
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
- EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
- goto err;
- /* Use saved AAD */
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->tls_aad_len))
- goto err;
- /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */
- in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- if (ctx->encrypt) {
- /* Encrypt payload */
- if (gctx->ctr) {
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
- in, out, len, gctx->ctr))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, len))
- goto err;
- }
- out += len;
- /* Finally write tag */
- CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, out, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
- rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- } else {
- /* Decrypt */
- if (gctx->ctr) {
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
- in, out, len, gctx->ctr))
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, len))
- goto err;
- }
- /* Retrieve tag */
- CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
- /* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
- goto err;
- }
- rv = len;
- }
-
- err:
- gctx->iv_set = 0;
- gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
- return rv;
-}
-
-static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- /* If not set up, return error */
- if (!gctx->key_set)
- return -1;
-
- if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
- return aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
-
- if (!gctx->iv_set)
- return -1;
- if (in) {
- if (out == NULL) {
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len))
- return -1;
- } else if (ctx->encrypt) {
- if (gctx->ctr) {
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
- in, out, len, gctx->ctr))
- return -1;
- } else {
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, len))
- return -1;
- }
- } else {
- if (gctx->ctr) {
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
- in, out, len, gctx->ctr))
- return -1;
- } else {
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, len))
- return -1;
- }
- }
- return len;
- } else {
- if (!ctx->encrypt) {
- if (gctx->taglen < 0)
- return -1;
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->taglen) != 0)
- return -1;
- gctx->iv_set = 0;
- return 0;
- }
- CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, 16);
- gctx->taglen = 16;
- /* Don't reuse the IV */
- gctx->iv_set = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
-}
-
-# define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
- | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
- | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
- | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
-
-BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
- EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER |
- CUSTOM_FLAGS)
- BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
- EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER |
- CUSTOM_FLAGS)
- BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
- EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER |
- CUSTOM_FLAGS)
-
-static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
-{
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = c->cipher_data;
- if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = out->cipher_data;
- if (xctx->xts.key1) {
- if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1)
- return 0;
- xctx_out->xts.key1 = &xctx_out->ks1;
- }
- if (xctx->xts.key2) {
- if (xctx->xts.key2 != &xctx->ks2)
- return 0;
- xctx_out->xts.key2 = &xctx_out->ks2;
- }
- return 1;
- } else if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT)
- return -1;
- /* key1 and key2 are used as an indicator both key and IV are set */
- xctx->xts.key1 = NULL;
- xctx->xts.key2 = NULL;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- if (!iv && !key)
- return 1;
-
- if (key)
- do {
-# ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
- xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt;
-# else
- xctx->stream = NULL;
-# endif
- /* key_len is two AES keys */
-# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
- if (BSAES_CAPABLE)
- xctx->stream = enc ? bsaes_xts_encrypt : bsaes_xts_decrypt;
- else
-# endif
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
- if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- if (enc) {
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
- xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
- } else {
- vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
- xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
- }
-
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
- ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2);
- xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
-
- xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
- break;
- } else
-# endif
- (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
-
- if (enc) {
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
- xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
- } else {
- AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
- xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
- }
-
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
- ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2);
- xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
-
- xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
- } while (0);
-
- if (iv) {
- xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- if (!xctx->xts.key1 || !xctx->xts.key2)
- return 0;
- if (!out || !in || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
- return 0;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- /* Requirement of SP800-38E */
- if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) &&
- (len > (1UL << 20) * 16)) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
- return 0;
- }
-# endif
- if (xctx->stream)
- (*xctx->stream) (in, out, len,
- xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2, ctx->iv);
- else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, ctx->iv, in, out, len,
- ctx->encrypt))
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-# define aes_xts_cleanup NULL
-
-# define XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \
- | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
- | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
-
-BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 16, xts, XTS,
- EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | XTS_FLAGS)
- BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 16, xts, XTS,
- EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | XTS_FLAGS)
-
-static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
-{
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = c->cipher_data;
- switch (type) {
- case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
- cctx->key_set = 0;
- cctx->iv_set = 0;
- cctx->L = 8;
- cctx->M = 12;
- cctx->tag_set = 0;
- cctx->len_set = 0;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN:
- arg = 15 - arg;
- case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L:
- if (arg < 2 || arg > 8)
- return 0;
- cctx->L = arg;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG:
- if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
- return 0;
- if ((c->encrypt && ptr) || (!c->encrypt && !ptr))
- return 0;
- if (ptr) {
- cctx->tag_set = 1;
- memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
- }
- cctx->M = arg;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_CCM_GET_TAG:
- if (!c->encrypt || !cctx->tag_set)
- return 0;
- if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(&cctx->ccm, ptr, (size_t)arg))
- return 0;
- cctx->tag_set = 0;
- cctx->iv_set = 0;
- cctx->len_set = 0;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = out->cipher_data;
- if (cctx->ccm.key) {
- if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks)
- return 0;
- cctx_out->ccm.key = &cctx_out->ks;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- default:
- return -1;
-
- }
-}
-
-static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- if (!iv && !key)
- return 1;
- if (key)
- do {
-# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
- if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &cctx->ks);
- CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
- &cctx->ks, (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
- cctx->str = NULL;
- cctx->key_set = 1;
- break;
- }
-# endif
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &cctx->ks);
- CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
- &cctx->ks, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
- cctx->str = NULL;
- cctx->key_set = 1;
- } while (0);
- if (iv) {
- memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L);
- cctx->iv_set = 1;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
-{
- EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
- CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
- /* If not set up, return error */
- if (!cctx->iv_set && !cctx->key_set)
- return -1;
- if (!ctx->encrypt && !cctx->tag_set)
- return -1;
- if (!out) {
- if (!in) {
- if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len))
- return -1;
- cctx->len_set = 1;
- return len;
- }
- /* If have AAD need message length */
- if (!cctx->len_set && len)
- return -1;
- CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len);
- return len;
- }
- /* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */
- if (!in)
- return 0;
- /* If not set length yet do it */
- if (!cctx->len_set) {
- if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len))
- return -1;
- cctx->len_set = 1;
- }
- if (ctx->encrypt) {
- if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
- cctx->str) :
- CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
- return -1;
- cctx->tag_set = 1;
- return len;
- } else {
- int rv = -1;
- if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
- cctx->str) :
- !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
- unsigned char tag[16];
- if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
- if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, ctx->buf, cctx->M))
- rv = len;
- }
- }
- if (rv == -1)
- OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
- cctx->iv_set = 0;
- cctx->tag_set = 0;
- cctx->len_set = 0;
- return rv;
- }
-
-}
-
-# define aes_ccm_cleanup NULL
-
-BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
- EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
- BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
- EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
- BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
- EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
-# endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_aes.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/e_aes.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_aes.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_aes.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1286 @@
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <assert.h>
+# include <openssl/aes.h>
+# include "evp_locl.h"
+# ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include "modes_lcl.h"
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ AES_KEY ks;
+ block128_f block;
+ union {
+ cbc128_f cbc;
+ ctr128_f ctr;
+ } stream;
+} EVP_AES_KEY;
+
+typedef struct {
+ AES_KEY ks; /* AES key schedule to use */
+ int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
+ int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */
+ GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
+ unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */
+ int ivlen; /* IV length */
+ int taglen;
+ int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */
+ int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
+ ctr128_f ctr;
+} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ AES_KEY ks1, ks2; /* AES key schedules to use */
+ XTS128_CONTEXT xts;
+ void (*stream) (const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t length,
+ const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+ const unsigned char iv[16]);
+} EVP_AES_XTS_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ AES_KEY ks; /* AES key schedule to use */
+ int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
+ int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */
+ int tag_set; /* Set if tag is valid */
+ int len_set; /* Set if message length set */
+ int L, M; /* L and M parameters from RFC3610 */
+ CCM128_CONTEXT ccm;
+ ccm128_f str;
+} EVP_AES_CCM_CTX;
+
+# define MAXBITCHUNK ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-4))
+
+# ifdef VPAES_ASM
+int vpaes_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+ AES_KEY *key);
+int vpaes_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+ AES_KEY *key);
+
+void vpaes_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ const AES_KEY *key);
+void vpaes_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ const AES_KEY *key);
+
+void vpaes_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ size_t length,
+ const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
+# endif
+# ifdef BSAES_ASM
+void bsaes_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
+ unsigned char ivec[16], int enc);
+void bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
+ const unsigned char ivec[16]);
+void bsaes_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
+ const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
+void bsaes_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t len, const AES_KEY *key1,
+ const AES_KEY *key2, const unsigned char iv[16]);
+# endif
+# ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
+void AES_ctr32_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key,
+ const unsigned char ivec[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+# endif
+# ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
+void AES_xts_encrypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len,
+ const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+ const unsigned char iv[16]);
+void AES_xts_decrypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len,
+ const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+ const unsigned char iv[16]);
+# endif
+
+# if defined(AES_ASM) && !defined(I386_ONLY) && ( \
+ ((defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || \
+ defined(_M_IX86)) && defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2))|| \
+ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
+ defined(__INTEL__) )
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
+
+# ifdef VPAES_ASM
+# define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
+# endif
+# ifdef BSAES_ASM
+# define BSAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
+# endif
+/*
+ * AES-NI section
+ */
+# define AESNI_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(57-32)))
+
+int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+ AES_KEY *key);
+int aesni_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, int bits,
+ AES_KEY *key);
+
+void aesni_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ const AES_KEY *key);
+void aesni_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+ const AES_KEY *key);
+
+void aesni_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ size_t length, const AES_KEY *key, int enc);
+void aesni_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ size_t length,
+ const AES_KEY *key, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);
+
+void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ size_t blocks,
+ const void *key, const unsigned char *ivec);
+
+void aesni_xts_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ size_t length,
+ const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+ const unsigned char iv[16]);
+
+void aesni_xts_decrypt(const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ size_t length,
+ const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+ const unsigned char iv[16]);
+
+void aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ size_t blocks,
+ const void *key,
+ const unsigned char ivec[16],
+ unsigned char cmac[16]);
+
+void aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks(const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ size_t blocks,
+ const void *key,
+ const unsigned char ivec[16],
+ unsigned char cmac[16]);
+
+static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ int ret, mode;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE;
+ if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ && !enc) {
+ ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, ctx->cipher_data);
+ dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
+ dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+ (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+ } else {
+ ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, ctx->cipher_data);
+ dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
+ if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt;
+ else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+ dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+ else
+ dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aesni_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, ctx->cipher_data, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aesni_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
+
+ if (len < bl)
+ return 1;
+
+ aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, ctx->cipher_data, ctx->encrypt);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define aesni_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
+static int aesni_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aesni_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
+static int aesni_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aesni_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
+static int aesni_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aesni_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
+static int aesni_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define aesni_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
+static int aesni_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+static int aesni_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ if (!iv && !key)
+ return 1;
+ if (key) {
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt);
+ gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+ /*
+ * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
+ */
+ if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
+ iv = gctx->iv;
+ if (iv) {
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ }
+ gctx->key_set = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
+ if (gctx->key_set)
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ else
+ memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define aesni_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher
+static int aesni_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ if (!iv && !key)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (key) {
+ /* key_len is two AES keys */
+ if (enc) {
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
+ xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
+ xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt;
+ } else {
+ aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
+ xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
+ xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt;
+ }
+
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
+ ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2);
+ xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
+
+ xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
+ }
+
+ if (iv) {
+ xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define aesni_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
+static int aesni_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+static int aesni_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ if (!iv && !key)
+ return 1;
+ if (key) {
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &cctx->ks);
+ CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
+ &cctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt);
+ cctx->str = enc ? (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks :
+ (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks;
+ cctx->key_set = 1;
+ }
+ if (iv) {
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L);
+ cctx->iv_set = 1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define aesni_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
+static int aesni_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
+ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+ aesni_init_key, \
+ aesni_##mode##_cipher, \
+ NULL, \
+ sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
+ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \
+ keylen/8,ivlen, \
+ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+ aes_init_key, \
+ aes_##mode##_cipher, \
+ NULL, \
+ sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
+ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+ nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+ aesni_##mode##_init_key, \
+ aesni_##mode##_cipher, \
+ aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
+ sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
+ NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+ nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+ aes_##mode##_init_key, \
+ aes_##mode##_cipher, \
+ aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
+ sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
+ NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+# else
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
+ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+ aes_init_key, \
+ aes_##mode##_cipher, \
+ NULL, \
+ sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
+ NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
+static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
+ nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
+ aes_##mode##_init_key, \
+ aes_##mode##_cipher, \
+ aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
+ sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
+ NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
+{ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
+# endif
+
+# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid,keylen,flags) \
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,16,cbc,cbc,CBC,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,0,ecb,ecb,ECB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ofb128,ofb,OFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb128,cfb,CFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb1,cfb1,CFB,flags) \
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb8,cfb8,CFB,flags) \
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ctr,ctr,CTR,flags)
+
+static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ int ret, mode;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE;
+ if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ && !enc)
+# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+ if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
+ dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
+ dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) bsaes_cbc_encrypt;
+ } else
+# endif
+# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+ if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+ ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
+ dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
+ dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+ (cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+ } else
+# endif
+ {
+ ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
+ dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
+ dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+ (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+ } else
+# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+ if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
+ ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
+ dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
+ dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+ } else
+# endif
+# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+ if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+ ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
+ dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
+ dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+ (cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+ } else
+# endif
+ {
+ ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks);
+ dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
+ dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
+ (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
+# ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
+ if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
+ dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
+# endif
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ if (dat->stream.cbc)
+ (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
+ else if (ctx->encrypt)
+ CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, dat->block);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, dat->block);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
+ size_t i;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ if (len < bl)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl)
+ (*dat->block) (in + i, out + i, &dat->ks);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+ ctx->iv, &ctx->num, dat->block);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+ ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+ ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS) {
+ CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+ ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) {
+ CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks,
+ ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
+ len -= MAXBITCHUNK;
+ }
+ if (len)
+ CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks,
+ ctx->iv, &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt, dat->block);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned int num = ctx->num;
+ EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ if (dat->stream.ctr)
+ CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+ ctx->iv, ctx->buf, &num, dat->stream.ctr);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
+ ctx->iv, ctx->buf, &num, dat->block);
+ ctx->num = (size_t)num;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 128, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS)
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 192, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS)
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 256, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS)
+
+static int aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
+{
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = c->cipher_data;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
+ if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
+ OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
+static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+ int n = 8;
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ do {
+ --n;
+ c = counter[n];
+ ++c;
+ counter[n] = c;
+ if (c)
+ return;
+ } while (n);
+}
+
+static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = c->cipher_data;
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+ gctx->key_set = 0;
+ gctx->iv_set = 0;
+ gctx->ivlen = c->cipher->iv_len;
+ gctx->iv = c->iv;
+ gctx->taglen = -1;
+ gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+ gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN:
+ if (arg <= 0)
+ return 0;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(c->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
+ && arg < 12)
+ return 0;
+# endif
+ /* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
+ if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
+ if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
+ OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
+ gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
+ if (!gctx->iv)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ gctx->ivlen = arg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG:
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
+ gctx->taglen = arg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG:
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt || gctx->taglen < 0)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg);
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
+ /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */
+ if (arg == -1) {
+ memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
+ gctx->iv_gen = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least
+ * 8.
+ */
+ if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8)
+ return 0;
+ if (arg)
+ memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
+ if (c->encrypt && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ gctx->iv_gen = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
+ if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
+ return 0;
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
+ arg = gctx->ivlen;
+ memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
+ /*
+ * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
+ * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
+ */
+ ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
+ if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+ /* Save the AAD for later use */
+ if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
+ gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ {
+ unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
+ /* Correct length for explicit IV */
+ len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ /* If decrypting correct for tag too */
+ if (!c->encrypt)
+ len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+ }
+ /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
+ return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = out->cipher_data;
+ if (gctx->gcm.key) {
+ if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks)
+ return 0;
+ gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
+ }
+ if (gctx->iv == c->iv)
+ gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
+ else {
+ gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
+ if (!gctx_out->iv)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+
+ }
+}
+
+static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ if (!iv && !key)
+ return 1;
+ if (key) {
+ do {
+# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+ if (BSAES_CAPABLE) {
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
+ (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+ gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
+ break;
+ } else
+# endif
+# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+ if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
+ (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
+ gctx->ctr = NULL;
+ break;
+ } else
+# endif
+ (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
+
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
+ (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+# ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
+ gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
+# else
+ gctx->ctr = NULL;
+# endif
+ } while (0);
+
+ /*
+ * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
+ */
+ if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
+ iv = gctx->iv;
+ if (iv) {
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ }
+ gctx->key_set = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
+ if (gctx->key_set)
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ else
+ memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ gctx->iv_gen = 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV
+ * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV,
+ * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload
+ * and verify tag.
+ */
+
+static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ int rv = -1;
+ /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */
+ if (out != in
+ || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
+ return -1;
+ /*
+ * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
+ * buffer.
+ */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, ctx->encrypt ?
+ EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
+ EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Use saved AAD */
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->tls_aad_len))
+ goto err;
+ /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */
+ in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ if (ctx->encrypt) {
+ /* Encrypt payload */
+ if (gctx->ctr) {
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
+ in, out, len, gctx->ctr))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, len))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ out += len;
+ /* Finally write tag */
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, out, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
+ rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ } else {
+ /* Decrypt */
+ if (gctx->ctr) {
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
+ in, out, len, gctx->ctr))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, len))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Retrieve tag */
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
+ /* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rv = len;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ gctx->iv_set = 0;
+ gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ /* If not set up, return error */
+ if (!gctx->key_set)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
+ return aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
+
+ if (!gctx->iv_set)
+ return -1;
+ if (in) {
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len))
+ return -1;
+ } else if (ctx->encrypt) {
+ if (gctx->ctr) {
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
+ in, out, len, gctx->ctr))
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, len))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (gctx->ctr) {
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
+ in, out, len, gctx->ctr))
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, len))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return len;
+ } else {
+ if (!ctx->encrypt) {
+ if (gctx->taglen < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->taglen) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ gctx->iv_set = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, 16);
+ gctx->taglen = 16;
+ /* Don't reuse the IV */
+ gctx->iv_set = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+}
+
+# define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
+ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
+ | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
+ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER |
+ CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER |
+ CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER |
+ CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+
+static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = c->cipher_data;
+ if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = out->cipher_data;
+ if (xctx->xts.key1) {
+ if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1)
+ return 0;
+ xctx_out->xts.key1 = &xctx_out->ks1;
+ }
+ if (xctx->xts.key2) {
+ if (xctx->xts.key2 != &xctx->ks2)
+ return 0;
+ xctx_out->xts.key2 = &xctx_out->ks2;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ } else if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT)
+ return -1;
+ /* key1 and key2 are used as an indicator both key and IV are set */
+ xctx->xts.key1 = NULL;
+ xctx->xts.key2 = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ if (!iv && !key)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (key)
+ do {
+# ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
+ xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt;
+# else
+ xctx->stream = NULL;
+# endif
+ /* key_len is two AES keys */
+# ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
+ if (BSAES_CAPABLE)
+ xctx->stream = enc ? bsaes_xts_encrypt : bsaes_xts_decrypt;
+ else
+# endif
+# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+ if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+ if (enc) {
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
+ xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
+ } else {
+ vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
+ xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
+ }
+
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
+ ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2);
+ xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
+
+ xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
+ break;
+ } else
+# endif
+ (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
+
+ if (enc) {
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
+ xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
+ } else {
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1);
+ xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
+ }
+
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2,
+ ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2);
+ xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
+
+ xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
+ } while (0);
+
+ if (iv) {
+ xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ if (!xctx->xts.key1 || !xctx->xts.key2)
+ return 0;
+ if (!out || !in || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ return 0;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ /* Requirement of SP800-38E */
+ if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) &&
+ (len > (1UL << 20) * 16)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
+ if (xctx->stream)
+ (*xctx->stream) (in, out, len,
+ xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2, ctx->iv);
+ else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, ctx->iv, in, out, len,
+ ctx->encrypt))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define aes_xts_cleanup NULL
+
+# define XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \
+ | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
+ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 16, xts, XTS,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | XTS_FLAGS)
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 16, xts, XTS,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | XTS_FLAGS)
+
+static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = c->cipher_data;
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+ cctx->key_set = 0;
+ cctx->iv_set = 0;
+ cctx->L = 8;
+ cctx->M = 12;
+ cctx->tag_set = 0;
+ cctx->len_set = 0;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN:
+ arg = 15 - arg;
+ case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L:
+ if (arg < 2 || arg > 8)
+ return 0;
+ cctx->L = arg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG:
+ if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
+ return 0;
+ if (c->encrypt && ptr)
+ return 0;
+ if (ptr) {
+ cctx->tag_set = 1;
+ memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
+ }
+ cctx->M = arg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_CCM_GET_TAG:
+ if (!c->encrypt || !cctx->tag_set)
+ return 0;
+ if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(&cctx->ccm, ptr, (size_t)arg))
+ return 0;
+ cctx->tag_set = 0;
+ cctx->iv_set = 0;
+ cctx->len_set = 0;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = out->cipher_data;
+ if (cctx->ccm.key) {
+ if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks)
+ return 0;
+ cctx_out->ccm.key = &cctx_out->ks;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+
+ }
+}
+
+static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ if (!iv && !key)
+ return 1;
+ if (key)
+ do {
+# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
+ if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &cctx->ks);
+ CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
+ &cctx->ks, (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
+ cctx->str = NULL;
+ cctx->key_set = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+# endif
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &cctx->ks);
+ CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
+ &cctx->ks, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
+ cctx->str = NULL;
+ cctx->key_set = 1;
+ } while (0);
+ if (iv) {
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L);
+ cctx->iv_set = 1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = ctx->cipher_data;
+ CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
+ /* If not set up, return error */
+ if (!cctx->iv_set && !cctx->key_set)
+ return -1;
+ if (!ctx->encrypt && !cctx->tag_set)
+ return -1;
+ if (!out) {
+ if (!in) {
+ if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len))
+ return -1;
+ cctx->len_set = 1;
+ return len;
+ }
+ /* If have AAD need message length */
+ if (!cctx->len_set && len)
+ return -1;
+ CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len);
+ return len;
+ }
+ /* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */
+ if (!in)
+ return 0;
+ /* If not set length yet do it */
+ if (!cctx->len_set) {
+ if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len))
+ return -1;
+ cctx->len_set = 1;
+ }
+ if (ctx->encrypt) {
+ if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
+ cctx->str) :
+ CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
+ return -1;
+ cctx->tag_set = 1;
+ return len;
+ } else {
+ int rv = -1;
+ if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
+ cctx->str) :
+ !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
+ unsigned char tag[16];
+ if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
+ if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, ctx->buf, cctx->M))
+ rv = len;
+ }
+ }
+ if (rv == -1)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+ cctx->iv_set = 0;
+ cctx->tag_set = 0;
+ cctx->len_set = 0;
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+}
+
+# define aes_ccm_cleanup NULL
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
+# endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/e_des3.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_des3.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,319 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/evp/e_des3.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/objects.h>
-# include "evp_locl.h"
-# include <openssl/des.h>
-# include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
-
-static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-
-static int des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-
-static int des3_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
-
-typedef struct {
- DES_key_schedule ks1; /* key schedule */
- DES_key_schedule ks2; /* key schedule (for ede) */
- DES_key_schedule ks3; /* key schedule (for ede3) */
-} DES_EDE_KEY;
-
-# define data(ctx) ((DES_EDE_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
-
-/*
- * Because of various casts and different args can't use
- * IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER
- */
-
-static int des_ede_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-{
- BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop()
- DES_ecb3_encrypt((const_DES_cblock *)(in + i),
- (DES_cblock *)(out + i),
- &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
- &data(ctx)->ks3, ctx->encrypt);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int des_ede_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-{
- while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
- DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
- &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
- &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
- &ctx->num);
- inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- }
- if (inl)
- DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
- &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
- &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
- &ctx->num);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-{
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- int i;
- fprintf(stderr, "des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx=%p, buflen=%d)\n", ctx,
- ctx->buf_len);
- fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= ");
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ctx->iv[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
- DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
- &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
- &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
- ctx->encrypt);
- inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- }
- if (inl)
- DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
- &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
- &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
- ctx->encrypt);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int des_ede_cfb64_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-{
- while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
- DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
- &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
- &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
- &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt);
- inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- }
- if (inl)
- DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
- &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
- &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
- &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Although we have a CFB-r implementation for 3-DES, it doesn't pack the
- * right way, so wrap it here
- */
-static int des_ede3_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-{
- size_t n;
- unsigned char c[1], d[1];
-
- for (n = 0; n < inl; ++n) {
- c[0] = (in[n / 8] & (1 << (7 - n % 8))) ? 0x80 : 0;
- DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(c, d, 1, 1,
- &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
- &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
- ctx->encrypt);
- out[n / 8] = (out[n / 8] & ~(0x80 >> (unsigned int)(n % 8)))
- | ((d[0] & 0x80) >> (unsigned int)(n % 8));
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int des_ede3_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-{
- while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
- DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
- &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
- &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
- ctx->encrypt);
- inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
- }
- if (inl)
- DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)inl,
- &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
- &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
- ctx->encrypt);
- return 1;
-}
-
-BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(des_ede, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede, 8, 16, 8, 64,
- EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_ede_init_key, NULL,
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des3_ctrl)
-# define des_ede3_cfb64_cipher des_ede_cfb64_cipher
-# define des_ede3_ofb_cipher des_ede_ofb_cipher
-# define des_ede3_cbc_cipher des_ede_cbc_cipher
-# define des_ede3_ecb_cipher des_ede_ecb_cipher
- BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 8, 24, 8, 64,
- EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_ede3_init_key, NULL,
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des3_ctrl)
-
- BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 24, 8, 1,
- EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_ede3_init_key, NULL,
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des3_ctrl)
-
- BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 24, 8, 8,
- EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_ede3_init_key, NULL,
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des3_ctrl)
-
-static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
-# ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY
- if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1)
- ! !DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2))
- return 0;
-# else
- DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1);
- DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2);
-# endif
- memcpy(&data(ctx)->ks3, &data(ctx)->ks1, sizeof(data(ctx)->ks1));
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- int i;
- fprintf(stderr, "des_ede3_init_key(ctx=%p)\n", ctx);
- fprintf(stderr, "\tKEY= ");
- for (i = 0; i < 24; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X", key[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- if (iv) {
- fprintf(stderr, "\t IV= ");
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X", iv[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
- }
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-# ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY
- if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1)
- || DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2)
- || DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[2], &data(ctx)->ks3))
- return 0;
-# else
- DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1);
- DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2);
- DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[2], &data(ctx)->ks3);
-# endif
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int des3_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
-{
-
- DES_cblock *deskey = ptr;
-
- switch (type) {
- case EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY:
- if (RAND_bytes(ptr, c->key_len) <= 0)
- return 0;
- DES_set_odd_parity(deskey);
- if (c->key_len >= 16)
- DES_set_odd_parity(deskey + 1);
- if (c->key_len >= 24)
- DES_set_odd_parity(deskey + 2);
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede(void)
-{
- return &des_ede_ecb;
-}
-
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3(void)
-{
- return &des_ede3_ecb;
-}
-# endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_des3.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/e_des3.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_des3.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/e_des3.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+/* crypto/evp/e_des3.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/objects.h>
+# include "evp_locl.h"
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+static int des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+
+static int des3_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+
+typedef struct {
+ DES_key_schedule ks1; /* key schedule */
+ DES_key_schedule ks2; /* key schedule (for ede) */
+ DES_key_schedule ks3; /* key schedule (for ede3) */
+} DES_EDE_KEY;
+
+# define data(ctx) ((DES_EDE_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
+
+/*
+ * Because of various casts and different args can't use
+ * IMPLEMENT_BLOCK_CIPHER
+ */
+
+static int des_ede_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_ecb_loop()
+ DES_ecb3_encrypt((const_DES_cblock *)(in + i),
+ (DES_cblock *)(out + i),
+ &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+ &data(ctx)->ks3, ctx->encrypt);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ede_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+ while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+ DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+ &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+ &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
+ &ctx->num);
+ inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ }
+ if (inl)
+ DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
+ &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+ &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
+ &ctx->num);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ int i;
+ fprintf(stderr, "des_ede_cbc_cipher(ctx=%p, buflen=%d)\n", ctx,
+ ctx->buf_len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= ");
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ctx->iv[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+ DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+ &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+ &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
+ ctx->encrypt);
+ inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ }
+ if (inl)
+ DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
+ &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+ &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
+ ctx->encrypt);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ede_cfb64_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+ while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+ DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+ &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+ &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
+ &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt);
+ inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ }
+ if (inl)
+ DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(in, out, (long)inl,
+ &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+ &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
+ &ctx->num, ctx->encrypt);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Although we have a CFB-r implementation for 3-DES, it doesn't pack the
+ * right way, so wrap it here
+ */
+static int des_ede3_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+ size_t n;
+ unsigned char c[1], d[1];
+
+ for (n = 0; n < inl; ++n) {
+ c[0] = (in[n / 8] & (1 << (7 - n % 8))) ? 0x80 : 0;
+ DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(c, d, 1, 1,
+ &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+ &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
+ ctx->encrypt);
+ out[n / 8] = (out[n / 8] & ~(0x80 >> (unsigned int)(n % 8)))
+ | ((d[0] & 0x80) >> (unsigned int)(n % 8));
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ede3_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+{
+ while (inl >= EVP_MAXCHUNK) {
+ DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)EVP_MAXCHUNK,
+ &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+ &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
+ ctx->encrypt);
+ inl -= EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ in += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ out += EVP_MAXCHUNK;
+ }
+ if (inl)
+ DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt(in, out, 8, (long)inl,
+ &data(ctx)->ks1, &data(ctx)->ks2,
+ &data(ctx)->ks3, (DES_cblock *)ctx->iv,
+ ctx->encrypt);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(des_ede, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede, 8, 16, 8, 64,
+ EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_ede_init_key, NULL,
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des3_ctrl)
+# define des_ede3_cfb64_cipher des_ede_cfb64_cipher
+# define des_ede3_ofb_cipher des_ede_ofb_cipher
+# define des_ede3_cbc_cipher des_ede_cbc_cipher
+# define des_ede3_ecb_cipher des_ede_ecb_cipher
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 8, 24, 8, 64,
+ EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_ede3_init_key, NULL,
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des3_ctrl)
+
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 24, 8, 1,
+ EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_ede3_init_key, NULL,
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des3_ctrl)
+
+ BLOCK_CIPHER_def_cfb(des_ede3, DES_EDE_KEY, NID_des_ede3, 24, 8, 8,
+ EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY, des_ede3_init_key, NULL,
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, des3_ctrl)
+
+static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
+# ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY
+ if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1)
+ || DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2))
+ return 0;
+# else
+ DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1);
+ DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2);
+# endif
+ memcpy(&data(ctx)->ks3, &data(ctx)->ks1, sizeof(data(ctx)->ks1));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ int i;
+ fprintf(stderr, "des_ede3_init_key(ctx=%p)\n", ctx);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tKEY= ");
+ for (i = 0; i < 24; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X", key[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ if (iv) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t IV= ");
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X", iv[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+# ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY
+ if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1)
+ || DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2)
+ || DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[2], &data(ctx)->ks3))
+ return 0;
+# else
+ DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1);
+ DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2);
+ DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[2], &data(ctx)->ks3);
+# endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int des3_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+
+ DES_cblock *deskey = ptr;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY:
+ if (RAND_bytes(ptr, c->key_len) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ DES_set_odd_parity(deskey);
+ if (c->key_len >= 16)
+ DES_set_odd_parity(deskey + 1);
+ if (c->key_len >= 24)
+ DES_set_odd_parity(deskey + 2);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede(void)
+{
+ return &des_ede_ecb;
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3(void)
+{
+ return &des_ede3_ecb;
+}
+# endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/encode.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/encode.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/encode.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,452 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/evp/encode.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
-# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[(a)&0x7f])
-#else
-/*
- * We assume that PEM encoded files are EBCDIC files (i.e., printable text
- * files). Convert them here while decoding. When encoding, output is EBCDIC
- * (text) format again. (No need for conversion in the conv_bin2ascii macro,
- * as the underlying textstring data_bin2ascii[] is already EBCDIC)
- */
-# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
-# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[os_toascii[a]&0x7f])
-#endif
-
-/*-
- * 64 char lines
- * pad input with 0
- * left over chars are set to =
- * 1 byte => xx==
- * 2 bytes => xxx=
- * 3 bytes => xxxx
- */
-#define BIN_PER_LINE (64/4*3)
-#define CHUNKS_PER_LINE (64/4)
-#define CHAR_PER_LINE (64+1)
-
-static const unsigned char data_bin2ascii[65] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ\
-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
-
-/*-
- * 0xF0 is a EOLN
- * 0xF1 is ignore but next needs to be 0xF0 (for \r\n processing).
- * 0xF2 is EOF
- * 0xE0 is ignore at start of line.
- * 0xFF is error
- */
-
-#define B64_EOLN 0xF0
-#define B64_CR 0xF1
-#define B64_EOF 0xF2
-#define B64_WS 0xE0
-#define B64_ERROR 0xFF
-#define B64_NOT_BASE64(a) (((a)|0x13) == 0xF3)
-
-static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
- 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
- 0xFF, 0xE0, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xF1, 0xFF, 0xFF,
- 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
- 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
- 0xE0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
- 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x3E, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xFF, 0x3F,
- 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B,
- 0x3C, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF,
- 0xFF, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06,
- 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E,
- 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16,
- 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
- 0xFF, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0x20,
- 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28,
- 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30,
- 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-};
-
-void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- ctx->length = 48;
- ctx->num = 0;
- ctx->line_num = 0;
-}
-
-void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
- const unsigned char *in, int inl)
-{
- int i, j;
- unsigned int total = 0;
-
- *outl = 0;
- if (inl <= 0)
- return;
- OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
- if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
- memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
- ctx->num += inl;
- return;
- }
- if (ctx->num != 0) {
- i = ctx->length - ctx->num;
- memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, i);
- in += i;
- inl -= i;
- j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->length);
- ctx->num = 0;
- out += j;
- *(out++) = '\n';
- *out = '\0';
- total = j + 1;
- }
- while (inl >= ctx->length) {
- j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
- in += ctx->length;
- inl -= ctx->length;
- out += j;
- *(out++) = '\n';
- *out = '\0';
- total += j + 1;
- }
- if (inl != 0)
- memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
- ctx->num = inl;
- *outl = total;
-}
-
-void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
-{
- unsigned int ret = 0;
-
- if (ctx->num != 0) {
- ret = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->num);
- out[ret++] = '\n';
- out[ret] = '\0';
- ctx->num = 0;
- }
- *outl = ret;
-}
-
-int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int dlen)
-{
- int i, ret = 0;
- unsigned long l;
-
- for (i = dlen; i > 0; i -= 3) {
- if (i >= 3) {
- l = (((unsigned long)f[0]) << 16L) |
- (((unsigned long)f[1]) << 8L) | f[2];
- *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L);
- *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L);
- *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L);
- *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l);
- } else {
- l = ((unsigned long)f[0]) << 16L;
- if (i == 2)
- l |= ((unsigned long)f[1] << 8L);
-
- *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L);
- *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L);
- *(t++) = (i == 1) ? '=' : conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L);
- *(t++) = '=';
- }
- ret += 4;
- f += 3;
- }
-
- *t = '\0';
- return (ret);
-}
-
-void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- ctx->length = 30;
- ctx->num = 0;
- ctx->line_num = 0;
- ctx->expect_nl = 0;
-}
-
-/*-
- * -1 for error
- * 0 for last line
- * 1 for full line
- */
-int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
- const unsigned char *in, int inl)
-{
- int seof = -1, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, ln, exp_nl;
- unsigned char *d;
-
- n = ctx->num;
- d = ctx->enc_data;
- ln = ctx->line_num;
- exp_nl = ctx->expect_nl;
-
- /* last line of input. */
- if ((inl == 0) || ((n == 0) && (conv_ascii2bin(in[0]) == B64_EOF))) {
- rv = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* We parse the input data */
- for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) {
- /* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream alot */
- if (ln >= 80) {
- rv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* Get char and put it into the buffer */
- tmp = *(in++);
- v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp);
- /* only save the good data :-) */
- if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v)) {
- OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
- d[n++] = tmp;
- ln++;
- } else if (v == B64_ERROR) {
- rv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /*
- * have we seen a '=' which is 'definitly' the last input line. seof
- * will point to the character that holds it. and eof will hold how
- * many characters to chop off.
- */
- if (tmp == '=') {
- if (seof == -1)
- seof = n;
- eof++;
- }
-
- if (v == B64_CR) {
- ln = 0;
- if (exp_nl)
- continue;
- }
-
- /* eoln */
- if (v == B64_EOLN) {
- ln = 0;
- if (exp_nl) {
- exp_nl = 0;
- continue;
- }
- }
- exp_nl = 0;
-
- /*
- * If we are at the end of input and it looks like a line, process
- * it.
- */
- if (((i + 1) == inl) && (((n & 3) == 0) || eof)) {
- v = B64_EOF;
- /*
- * In case things were given us in really small records (so two
- * '=' were given in separate updates), eof may contain the
- * incorrect number of ending bytes to skip, so let's redo the
- * count
- */
- eof = 0;
- if (d[n - 1] == '=')
- eof++;
- if (d[n - 2] == '=')
- eof++;
- /* There will never be more than two '=' */
- }
-
- if ((v == B64_EOF && (n & 3) == 0) || (n >= 64)) {
- /*
- * This is needed to work correctly on 64 byte input lines. We
- * process the line and then need to accept the '\n'
- */
- if ((v != B64_EOF) && (n >= 64))
- exp_nl = 1;
- if (n > 0) {
- v = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
- n = 0;
- if (v < 0) {
- rv = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- if (eof > v) {
- rv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- ret += (v - eof);
- } else {
- eof = 1;
- v = 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * This is the case where we have had a short but valid input
- * line
- */
- if ((v < ctx->length) && eof) {
- rv = 0;
- goto end;
- } else
- ctx->length = v;
-
- if (seof >= 0) {
- rv = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- out += v;
- }
- }
- rv = 1;
- end:
- *outl = ret;
- ctx->num = n;
- ctx->line_num = ln;
- ctx->expect_nl = exp_nl;
- return (rv);
-}
-
-int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n)
-{
- int i, ret = 0, a, b, c, d;
- unsigned long l;
-
- /* trim white space from the start of the line. */
- while ((conv_ascii2bin(*f) == B64_WS) && (n > 0)) {
- f++;
- n--;
- }
-
- /*
- * strip off stuff at the end of the line ascii2bin values B64_WS,
- * B64_EOLN, B64_EOLN and B64_EOF
- */
- while ((n > 3) && (B64_NOT_BASE64(conv_ascii2bin(f[n - 1]))))
- n--;
-
- if (n % 4 != 0)
- return (-1);
-
- for (i = 0; i < n; i += 4) {
- a = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
- b = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
- c = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
- d = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
- if ((a & 0x80) || (b & 0x80) || (c & 0x80) || (d & 0x80))
- return (-1);
- l = ((((unsigned long)a) << 18L) |
- (((unsigned long)b) << 12L) |
- (((unsigned long)c) << 6L) | (((unsigned long)d)));
- *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l >> 16L) & 0xff;
- *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l >> 8L) & 0xff;
- *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l) & 0xff;
- ret += 3;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
-{
- int i;
-
- *outl = 0;
- if (ctx->num != 0) {
- i = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->num);
- if (i < 0)
- return (-1);
- ctx->num = 0;
- *outl = i;
- return (1);
- } else
- return (1);
-}
-
-#ifdef undef
-int EVP_DecodeValid(unsigned char *buf, int len)
-{
- int i, num = 0, bad = 0;
-
- if (len == 0)
- return (-1);
- while (conv_ascii2bin(*buf) == B64_WS) {
- buf++;
- len--;
- if (len == 0)
- return (-1);
- }
-
- for (i = len; i >= 4; i -= 4) {
- if ((conv_ascii2bin(buf[0]) >= 0x40) ||
- (conv_ascii2bin(buf[1]) >= 0x40) ||
- (conv_ascii2bin(buf[2]) >= 0x40) ||
- (conv_ascii2bin(buf[3]) >= 0x40))
- return (-1);
- buf += 4;
- num += 1 + (buf[2] != '=') + (buf[3] != '=');
- }
- if ((i == 1) && (conv_ascii2bin(buf[0]) == B64_EOLN))
- return (num);
- if ((i == 2) && (conv_ascii2bin(buf[0]) == B64_EOLN) &&
- (conv_ascii2bin(buf[0]) == B64_EOLN))
- return (num);
- return (1);
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/encode.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/encode.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/encode.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/encode.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
+/* crypto/evp/encode.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a);
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
+#else
+/*
+ * We assume that PEM encoded files are EBCDIC files (i.e., printable text
+ * files). Convert them here while decoding. When encoding, output is EBCDIC
+ * (text) format again. (No need for conversion in the conv_bin2ascii macro,
+ * as the underlying textstring data_bin2ascii[] is already EBCDIC)
+ */
+# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * 64 char lines
+ * pad input with 0
+ * left over chars are set to =
+ * 1 byte => xx==
+ * 2 bytes => xxx=
+ * 3 bytes => xxxx
+ */
+#define BIN_PER_LINE (64/4*3)
+#define CHUNKS_PER_LINE (64/4)
+#define CHAR_PER_LINE (64+1)
+
+static const unsigned char data_bin2ascii[65] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ\
+abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+/*-
+ * 0xF0 is a EOLN
+ * 0xF1 is ignore but next needs to be 0xF0 (for \r\n processing).
+ * 0xF2 is EOF
+ * 0xE0 is ignore at start of line.
+ * 0xFF is error
+ */
+
+#define B64_EOLN 0xF0
+#define B64_CR 0xF1
+#define B64_EOF 0xF2
+#define B64_WS 0xE0
+#define B64_ERROR 0xFF
+#define B64_NOT_BASE64(a) (((a)|0x13) == 0xF3)
+#define B64_BASE64(a) !B64_NOT_BASE64(a)
+
+static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xE0, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xF1, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xE0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x3E, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xFF, 0x3F,
+ 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B,
+ 0x3C, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06,
+ 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E,
+ 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16,
+ 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0x20,
+ 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28,
+ 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30,
+ 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+};
+
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
+{
+ if (a & 0x80)
+ return B64_ERROR;
+ return data_ascii2bin[a];
+}
+#else
+static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
+{
+ a = os_toascii[a];
+ if (a & 0x80)
+ return B64_ERROR;
+ return data_ascii2bin[a];
+}
+#endif
+
+void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->length = 48;
+ ctx->num = 0;
+ ctx->line_num = 0;
+}
+
+void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+ const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ unsigned int total = 0;
+
+ *outl = 0;
+ if (inl <= 0)
+ return;
+ OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
+ if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
+ memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
+ ctx->num += inl;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (ctx->num != 0) {
+ i = ctx->length - ctx->num;
+ memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, i);
+ in += i;
+ inl -= i;
+ j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->length);
+ ctx->num = 0;
+ out += j;
+ *(out++) = '\n';
+ *out = '\0';
+ total = j + 1;
+ }
+ while (inl >= ctx->length) {
+ j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
+ in += ctx->length;
+ inl -= ctx->length;
+ out += j;
+ *(out++) = '\n';
+ *out = '\0';
+ total += j + 1;
+ }
+ if (inl != 0)
+ memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
+ ctx->num = inl;
+ *outl = total;
+}
+
+void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+ unsigned int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->num != 0) {
+ ret = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->num);
+ out[ret++] = '\n';
+ out[ret] = '\0';
+ ctx->num = 0;
+ }
+ *outl = ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int dlen)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ for (i = dlen; i > 0; i -= 3) {
+ if (i >= 3) {
+ l = (((unsigned long)f[0]) << 16L) |
+ (((unsigned long)f[1]) << 8L) | f[2];
+ *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L);
+ *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L);
+ *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L);
+ *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l);
+ } else {
+ l = ((unsigned long)f[0]) << 16L;
+ if (i == 2)
+ l |= ((unsigned long)f[1] << 8L);
+
+ *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L);
+ *(t++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L);
+ *(t++) = (i == 1) ? '=' : conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L);
+ *(t++) = '=';
+ }
+ ret += 4;
+ f += 3;
+ }
+
+ *t = '\0';
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ /* Only ctx->num is used during decoding. */
+ ctx->num = 0;
+ ctx->length = 0;
+ ctx->line_num = 0;
+ ctx->expect_nl = 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * -1 for error
+ * 0 for last line
+ * 1 for full line
+ *
+ * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate attempts to detect and report end of
+ * content, the context doesn't currently remember it and will accept more data
+ * in the next call. Therefore, the caller is responsible for checking and
+ * rejecting a 0 return value in the middle of content.
+ *
+ * Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate has historically tried to detect end of
+ * content based on line length, this has never worked properly. Therefore,
+ * we now return 0 when one of the following is true:
+ * - Padding or B64_EOF was detected and the last block is complete.
+ * - Input has zero-length.
+ * -1 is returned if:
+ * - Invalid characters are detected.
+ * - There is extra trailing padding, or data after padding.
+ * - B64_EOF is detected after an incomplete base64 block.
+ */
+int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
+ const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+{
+ int seof = 0, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, decoded_len;
+ unsigned char *d;
+
+ n = ctx->num;
+ d = ctx->enc_data;
+
+ if (n > 0 && d[n - 1] == '=') {
+ eof++;
+ if (n > 1 && d[n - 2] == '=')
+ eof++;
+ }
+
+ /* Legacy behaviour: an empty input chunk signals end of input. */
+ if (inl == 0) {
+ rv = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) {
+ tmp = *(in++);
+ v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp);
+ if (v == B64_ERROR) {
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (tmp == '=') {
+ eof++;
+ } else if (eof > 0 && B64_BASE64(v)) {
+ /* More data after padding. */
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (eof > 2) {
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (v == B64_EOF) {
+ seof = 1;
+ goto tail;
+ }
+
+ /* Only save valid base64 characters. */
+ if (B64_BASE64(v)) {
+ if (n >= 64) {
+ /*
+ * We increment n once per loop, and empty the buffer as soon as
+ * we reach 64 characters, so this can only happen if someone's
+ * manually messed with the ctx. Refuse to write any more data.
+ */
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
+ d[n++] = tmp;
+ }
+
+ if (n == 64) {
+ decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
+ n = 0;
+ if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret += decoded_len - eof;
+ out += decoded_len - eof;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Legacy behaviour: if the current line is a full base64-block (i.e., has
+ * 0 mod 4 base64 characters), it is processed immediately. We keep this
+ * behaviour as applications may not be calling EVP_DecodeFinal properly.
+ */
+tail:
+ if (n > 0) {
+ if ((n & 3) == 0) {
+ decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
+ n = 0;
+ if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret += (decoded_len - eof);
+ } else if (seof) {
+ /* EOF in the middle of a base64 block. */
+ rv = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = seof || (n == 0 && eof) ? 0 : 1;
+end:
+ /* Legacy behaviour. This should probably rather be zeroed on error. */
+ *outl = ret;
+ ctx->num = n;
+ return (rv);
+}
+
+int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0, a, b, c, d;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ /* trim white space from the start of the line. */
+ while ((conv_ascii2bin(*f) == B64_WS) && (n > 0)) {
+ f++;
+ n--;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * strip off stuff at the end of the line ascii2bin values B64_WS,
+ * B64_EOLN, B64_EOLN and B64_EOF
+ */
+ while ((n > 3) && (B64_NOT_BASE64(conv_ascii2bin(f[n - 1]))))
+ n--;
+
+ if (n % 4 != 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i += 4) {
+ a = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
+ b = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
+ c = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
+ d = conv_ascii2bin(*(f++));
+ if ((a & 0x80) || (b & 0x80) || (c & 0x80) || (d & 0x80))
+ return (-1);
+ l = ((((unsigned long)a) << 18L) |
+ (((unsigned long)b) << 12L) |
+ (((unsigned long)c) << 6L) | (((unsigned long)d)));
+ *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l >> 16L) & 0xff;
+ *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l >> 8L) & 0xff;
+ *(t++) = (unsigned char)(l) & 0xff;
+ ret += 3;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ *outl = 0;
+ if (ctx->num != 0) {
+ i = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->num);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ ctx->num = 0;
+ *outl = i;
+ return (1);
+ } else
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#ifdef undef
+int EVP_DecodeValid(unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int i, num = 0, bad = 0;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return (-1);
+ while (conv_ascii2bin(*buf) == B64_WS) {
+ buf++;
+ len--;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ for (i = len; i >= 4; i -= 4) {
+ if ((conv_ascii2bin(buf[0]) >= 0x40) ||
+ (conv_ascii2bin(buf[1]) >= 0x40) ||
+ (conv_ascii2bin(buf[2]) >= 0x40) ||
+ (conv_ascii2bin(buf[3]) >= 0x40))
+ return (-1);
+ buf += 4;
+ num += 1 + (buf[2] != '=') + (buf[3] != '=');
+ }
+ if ((i == 1) && (conv_ascii2bin(buf[0]) == B64_EOLN))
+ return (num);
+ if ((i == 2) && (conv_ascii2bin(buf[0]) == B64_EOLN) &&
+ (conv_ascii2bin(buf[0]) == B64_EOLN))
+ return (num);
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_key.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_key.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/evp/evp_key.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/ui.h>
-
-/* should be init to zeros. */
-static char prompt_string[80];
-
-void EVP_set_pw_prompt(const char *prompt)
-{
- if (prompt == NULL)
- prompt_string[0] = '\0';
- else {
- strncpy(prompt_string, prompt, 79);
- prompt_string[79] = '\0';
- }
-}
-
-char *EVP_get_pw_prompt(void)
-{
- if (prompt_string[0] == '\0')
- return (NULL);
- else
- return (prompt_string);
-}
-
-/*
- * For historical reasons, the standard function for reading passwords is in
- * the DES library -- if someone ever wants to disable DES, this function
- * will fail
- */
-int EVP_read_pw_string(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt, int verify)
-{
- return EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, 0, len, prompt, verify);
-}
-
-int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
- int verify)
-{
- int ret;
- char buff[BUFSIZ];
- UI *ui;
-
- if ((prompt == NULL) && (prompt_string[0] != '\0'))
- prompt = prompt_string;
- ui = UI_new();
- UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
- (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len);
- if (verify)
- UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0,
- buff, min, (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len,
- buf);
- ret = UI_process(ui);
- UI_free(ui);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, BUFSIZ);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
- const unsigned char *salt, const unsigned char *data,
- int datal, int count, unsigned char *key,
- unsigned char *iv)
-{
- EVP_MD_CTX c;
- unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- int niv, nkey, addmd = 0;
- unsigned int mds = 0, i;
- int rv = 0;
- nkey = type->key_len;
- niv = type->iv_len;
- OPENSSL_assert(nkey <= EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
- OPENSSL_assert(niv <= EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
-
- if (data == NULL)
- return (nkey);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
- for (;;) {
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL))
- return 0;
- if (addmd++)
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, data, datal))
- goto err;
- if (salt != NULL)
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, salt, PKCS5_SALT_LEN))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, &(md_buf[0]), &mds))
- goto err;
-
- for (i = 1; i < (unsigned int)count; i++) {
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, &(md_buf[0]), &mds))
- goto err;
- }
- i = 0;
- if (nkey) {
- for (;;) {
- if (nkey == 0)
- break;
- if (i == mds)
- break;
- if (key != NULL)
- *(key++) = md_buf[i];
- nkey--;
- i++;
- }
- }
- if (niv && (i != mds)) {
- for (;;) {
- if (niv == 0)
- break;
- if (i == mds)
- break;
- if (iv != NULL)
- *(iv++) = md_buf[i];
- niv--;
- i++;
- }
- }
- if ((nkey == 0) && (niv == 0))
- break;
- }
- rv = type->key_len;
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&(md_buf[0]), EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- return rv;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_key.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_key.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_key.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_key.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/* crypto/evp/evp_key.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+
+/* should be init to zeros. */
+static char prompt_string[80];
+
+void EVP_set_pw_prompt(const char *prompt)
+{
+ if (prompt == NULL)
+ prompt_string[0] = '\0';
+ else {
+ strncpy(prompt_string, prompt, 79);
+ prompt_string[79] = '\0';
+ }
+}
+
+char *EVP_get_pw_prompt(void)
+{
+ if (prompt_string[0] == '\0')
+ return (NULL);
+ else
+ return (prompt_string);
+}
+
+/*
+ * For historical reasons, the standard function for reading passwords is in
+ * the DES library -- if someone ever wants to disable DES, this function
+ * will fail
+ */
+int EVP_read_pw_string(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt, int verify)
+{
+ return EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, 0, len, prompt, verify);
+}
+
+int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
+ int verify)
+{
+ int ret;
+ char buff[BUFSIZ];
+ UI *ui;
+
+ if ((prompt == NULL) && (prompt_string[0] != '\0'))
+ prompt = prompt_string;
+ ui = UI_new();
+ if (ui == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
+ (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len);
+ if (verify)
+ UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0,
+ buff, min, (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len,
+ buf);
+ ret = UI_process(ui);
+ UI_free(ui);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, BUFSIZ);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *salt, const unsigned char *data,
+ int datal, int count, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned char *iv)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX c;
+ unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int niv, nkey, addmd = 0;
+ unsigned int mds = 0, i;
+ int rv = 0;
+ nkey = type->key_len;
+ niv = type->iv_len;
+ OPENSSL_assert(nkey <= EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
+ OPENSSL_assert(niv <= EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return (nkey);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
+ for (;;) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (addmd++)
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, data, datal))
+ goto err;
+ if (salt != NULL)
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, salt, PKCS5_SALT_LEN))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, &(md_buf[0]), &mds))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < (unsigned int)count; i++) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, &(md_buf[0]), &mds))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = 0;
+ if (nkey) {
+ for (;;) {
+ if (nkey == 0)
+ break;
+ if (i == mds)
+ break;
+ if (key != NULL)
+ *(key++) = md_buf[i];
+ nkey--;
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+ if (niv && (i != mds)) {
+ for (;;) {
+ if (niv == 0)
+ break;
+ if (i == mds)
+ break;
+ if (iv != NULL)
+ *(iv++) = md_buf[i];
+ niv--;
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((nkey == 0) && (niv == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ rv = type->key_len;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, sizeof(md_buf));
+ return rv;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/evp/evp_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
-{
- int ret;
-
- if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL)
- ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type);
- else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
- ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
- else
- ret = -1;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
-{
- int ret;
-
- if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL)
- ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type);
- else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
- ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
- else
- ret = -1;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
-{
- int i = 0;
- unsigned int l;
-
- if (type != NULL) {
- l = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
- OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(c->iv));
- i = ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(type, c->oiv, l);
- if (i != (int)l)
- return (-1);
- else if (i > 0)
- memcpy(c->iv, c->oiv, l);
- }
- return (i);
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
-{
- int i = 0;
- unsigned int j;
-
- if (type != NULL) {
- j = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
- OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof(c->iv));
- i = ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(type, c->oiv, j);
- }
- return (i);
-}
-
-/* Convert the various cipher NIDs and dummies to a proper OID NID */
-int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx)
-{
- int nid;
- ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
- nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(ctx);
-
- switch (nid) {
-
- case NID_rc2_cbc:
- case NID_rc2_64_cbc:
- case NID_rc2_40_cbc:
-
- return NID_rc2_cbc;
-
- case NID_rc4:
- case NID_rc4_40:
-
- return NID_rc4;
-
- case NID_aes_128_cfb128:
- case NID_aes_128_cfb8:
- case NID_aes_128_cfb1:
-
- return NID_aes_128_cfb128;
-
- case NID_aes_192_cfb128:
- case NID_aes_192_cfb8:
- case NID_aes_192_cfb1:
-
- return NID_aes_192_cfb128;
-
- case NID_aes_256_cfb128:
- case NID_aes_256_cfb8:
- case NID_aes_256_cfb1:
-
- return NID_aes_256_cfb128;
-
- case NID_des_cfb64:
- case NID_des_cfb8:
- case NID_des_cfb1:
-
- return NID_des_cfb64;
-
- case NID_des_ede3_cfb64:
- case NID_des_ede3_cfb8:
- case NID_des_ede3_cfb1:
-
- return NID_des_cfb64;
-
- default:
- /* Check it has an OID and it is valid */
- otmp = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
- if (!otmp || !otmp->data)
- nid = NID_undef;
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(otmp);
- return nid;
- }
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER *e)
-{
- return e->block_size;
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->cipher->block_size;
-}
-
-int EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
-{
- return ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
-}
-
-const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->cipher;
-}
-
-unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_flags(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
-{
- return cipher->flags;
-}
-
-unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->cipher->flags;
-}
-
-void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->app_data;
-}
-
-void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *data)
-{
- ctx->app_data = data;
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
-{
- return cipher->iv_len;
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->cipher->iv_len;
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
-{
- return cipher->key_len;
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->key_len;
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_nid(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
-{
- return cipher->nid;
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->cipher->nid;
-}
-
-int EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- return md->block_size;
-}
-
-int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- return md->type;
-}
-
-int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- return md->pkey_type;
-}
-
-int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- if (!md) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE, EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL);
- return -1;
- }
- return md->md_size;
-}
-
-unsigned long EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- return md->flags;
-}
-
-const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (!ctx)
- return NULL;
- return ctx->digest;
-}
-
-void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags)
-{
- ctx->flags |= flags;
-}
-
-void EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags)
-{
- ctx->flags &= ~flags;
-}
-
-int EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags)
-{
- return (ctx->flags & flags);
-}
-
-void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags)
-{
- ctx->flags |= flags;
-}
-
-void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags)
-{
- ctx->flags &= ~flags;
-}
-
-int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags)
-{
- return (ctx->flags & flags);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+/* crypto/evp/evp_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL)
+ ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type);
+ else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
+ switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
+
+ case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+ case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
+ case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = -1;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL)
+ ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type);
+ else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
+ switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
+
+ case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
+ case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
+ case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = -1;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ unsigned int l;
+
+ if (type != NULL) {
+ l = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
+ OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(c->iv));
+ i = ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(type, c->oiv, l);
+ if (i != (int)l)
+ return (-1);
+ else if (i > 0)
+ memcpy(c->iv, c->oiv, l);
+ }
+ return (i);
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ unsigned int j;
+
+ if (type != NULL) {
+ j = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
+ OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof(c->iv));
+ i = ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(type, c->oiv, j);
+ }
+ return (i);
+}
+
+/* Convert the various cipher NIDs and dummies to a proper OID NID */
+int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx)
+{
+ int nid;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *otmp;
+ nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(ctx);
+
+ switch (nid) {
+
+ case NID_rc2_cbc:
+ case NID_rc2_64_cbc:
+ case NID_rc2_40_cbc:
+
+ return NID_rc2_cbc;
+
+ case NID_rc4:
+ case NID_rc4_40:
+
+ return NID_rc4;
+
+ case NID_aes_128_cfb128:
+ case NID_aes_128_cfb8:
+ case NID_aes_128_cfb1:
+
+ return NID_aes_128_cfb128;
+
+ case NID_aes_192_cfb128:
+ case NID_aes_192_cfb8:
+ case NID_aes_192_cfb1:
+
+ return NID_aes_192_cfb128;
+
+ case NID_aes_256_cfb128:
+ case NID_aes_256_cfb8:
+ case NID_aes_256_cfb1:
+
+ return NID_aes_256_cfb128;
+
+ case NID_des_cfb64:
+ case NID_des_cfb8:
+ case NID_des_cfb1:
+
+ return NID_des_cfb64;
+
+ case NID_des_ede3_cfb64:
+ case NID_des_ede3_cfb8:
+ case NID_des_ede3_cfb1:
+
+ return NID_des_cfb64;
+
+ default:
+ /* Check it has an OID and it is valid */
+ otmp = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+ if (!otmp || !otmp->data)
+ nid = NID_undef;
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(otmp);
+ return nid;
+ }
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER *e)
+{
+ return e->block_size;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->cipher->block_size;
+}
+
+int EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
+{
+ return ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->cipher;
+}
+
+unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_flags(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+ return cipher->flags;
+}
+
+unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->cipher->flags;
+}
+
+void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->app_data;
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *data)
+{
+ ctx->app_data = data;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+ return cipher->iv_len;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->cipher->iv_len;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+ return cipher->key_len;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->key_len;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_nid(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+ return cipher->nid;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->cipher->nid;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return md->block_size;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return md->type;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return md->pkey_type;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ if (!md) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE, EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return md->md_size;
+}
+
+unsigned long EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return md->flags;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (!ctx)
+ return NULL;
+ return ctx->digest;
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+ ctx->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+ ctx->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+ return (ctx->flags & flags);
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+ ctx->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+ ctx->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+ return (ctx->flags & flags);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,304 +0,0 @@
-/* evp_pbe.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 1999.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include "evp_locl.h"
-
-/* Password based encryption (PBE) functions */
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(EVP_PBE_CTL)
-static STACK_OF(EVP_PBE_CTL) *pbe_algs;
-
-/* Setup a cipher context from a PBE algorithm */
-
-typedef struct {
- int pbe_type;
- int pbe_nid;
- int cipher_nid;
- int md_nid;
- EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen;
-} EVP_PBE_CTL;
-
-static const EVP_PBE_CTL builtin_pbe[] = {
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC,
- NID_des_cbc, NID_md2, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC,
- NID_des_cbc, NID_md5, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC,
- NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HMAC
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_id_pbkdf2, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen},
-#endif
-
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4,
- NID_rc4, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4,
- NID_rc4_40, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC,
- NID_des_ede3_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC,
- NID_des_ede_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC,
- NID_rc2_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC,
- NID_rc2_40_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HMAC
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbes2, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen},
-#endif
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC,
- NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_md2, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC,
- NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_md5, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC,
- NID_des_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
-
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA1, -1, NID_sha1, 0},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithMD5, -1, NID_md5, 0},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA224, -1, NID_sha224, 0},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA256, -1, NID_sha256, 0},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA384, -1, NID_sha384, 0},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA512, -1, NID_sha512, 0},
- {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_id_HMACGostR3411_94, -1, NID_id_GostR3411_94, 0},
-};
-
-#ifdef TEST
-int main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int i, nid_md, nid_cipher;
- EVP_PBE_CTL *tpbe, *tpbe2;
- /*
- * OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- */
-
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(builtin_pbe) / sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL); i++) {
- tpbe = builtin_pbe + i;
- fprintf(stderr, "%d %d %s ", tpbe->pbe_type, tpbe->pbe_nid,
- OBJ_nid2sn(tpbe->pbe_nid));
- if (EVP_PBE_find(tpbe->pbe_type, tpbe->pbe_nid,
- &nid_cipher, &nid_md, 0))
- fprintf(stderr, "Found %s %s\n",
- OBJ_nid2sn(nid_cipher), OBJ_nid2sn(nid_md));
- else
- fprintf(stderr, "Find ERROR!!\n");
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-int EVP_PBE_CipherInit(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj, const char *pass, int passlen,
- ASN1_TYPE *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int en_de)
-{
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- int cipher_nid, md_nid;
- EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen;
-
- if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, OBJ_obj2nid(pbe_obj),
- &cipher_nid, &md_nid, &keygen)) {
- char obj_tmp[80];
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM);
- if (!pbe_obj)
- BUF_strlcpy(obj_tmp, "NULL", sizeof obj_tmp);
- else
- i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, sizeof obj_tmp, pbe_obj);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "TYPE=", obj_tmp);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!pass)
- passlen = 0;
- else if (passlen == -1)
- passlen = strlen(pass);
-
- if (cipher_nid == -1)
- cipher = NULL;
- else {
- cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid);
- if (!cipher) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (md_nid == -1)
- md = NULL;
- else {
- md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid);
- if (!md) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (!keygen(ctx, pass, passlen, param, cipher, md, en_de)) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(EVP_PBE_CTL, EVP_PBE_CTL, pbe2);
-
-static int pbe2_cmp(const EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe1, const EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe2)
-{
- int ret = pbe1->pbe_type - pbe2->pbe_type;
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- else
- return pbe1->pbe_nid - pbe2->pbe_nid;
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(EVP_PBE_CTL, EVP_PBE_CTL, pbe2);
-
-static int pbe_cmp(const EVP_PBE_CTL *const *a, const EVP_PBE_CTL *const *b)
-{
- int ret = (*a)->pbe_type - (*b)->pbe_type;
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- else
- return (*a)->pbe_nid - (*b)->pbe_nid;
-}
-
-/* Add a PBE algorithm */
-
-int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
- int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
-{
- EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe_tmp;
- if (!pbe_algs)
- pbe_algs = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_new(pbe_cmp);
- if (!(pbe_tmp = (EVP_PBE_CTL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL)))) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- pbe_tmp->pbe_type = pbe_type;
- pbe_tmp->pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
- pbe_tmp->cipher_nid = cipher_nid;
- pbe_tmp->md_nid = md_nid;
- pbe_tmp->keygen = keygen;
-
- sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_push(pbe_algs, pbe_tmp);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
- EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
-{
- int cipher_nid, md_nid;
- if (cipher)
- cipher_nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
- else
- cipher_nid = -1;
- if (md)
- md_nid = EVP_MD_type(md);
- else
- md_nid = -1;
-
- return EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, nid,
- cipher_nid, md_nid, keygen);
-}
-
-int EVP_PBE_find(int type, int pbe_nid,
- int *pcnid, int *pmnid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN **pkeygen)
-{
- EVP_PBE_CTL *pbetmp = NULL, pbelu;
- int i;
- if (pbe_nid == NID_undef)
- return 0;
-
- pbelu.pbe_type = type;
- pbelu.pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
-
- if (pbe_algs) {
- i = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_find(pbe_algs, &pbelu);
- if (i != -1)
- pbetmp = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_value(pbe_algs, i);
- }
- if (pbetmp == NULL) {
- pbetmp = OBJ_bsearch_pbe2(&pbelu, builtin_pbe,
- sizeof(builtin_pbe) / sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL));
- }
- if (pbetmp == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (pcnid)
- *pcnid = pbetmp->cipher_nid;
- if (pmnid)
- *pmnid = pbetmp->md_nid;
- if (pkeygen)
- *pkeygen = pbetmp->keygen;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void free_evp_pbe_ctl(EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe)
-{
- OPENSSL_freeFunc(pbe);
-}
-
-void EVP_PBE_cleanup(void)
-{
- sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_pop_free(pbe_algs, free_evp_pbe_ctl);
- pbe_algs = NULL;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+/* evp_pbe.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+
+/* Password based encryption (PBE) functions */
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(EVP_PBE_CTL)
+static STACK_OF(EVP_PBE_CTL) *pbe_algs;
+
+/* Setup a cipher context from a PBE algorithm */
+
+typedef struct {
+ int pbe_type;
+ int pbe_nid;
+ int cipher_nid;
+ int md_nid;
+ EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen;
+} EVP_PBE_CTL;
+
+static const EVP_PBE_CTL builtin_pbe[] = {
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC,
+ NID_des_cbc, NID_md2, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC,
+ NID_des_cbc, NID_md5, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC,
+ NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HMAC
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_id_pbkdf2, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen},
+#endif
+
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4,
+ NID_rc4, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4,
+ NID_rc4_40, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC,
+ NID_des_ede3_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC,
+ NID_des_ede_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC,
+ NID_rc2_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC,
+ NID_rc2_40_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen},
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HMAC
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbes2, -1, -1, PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen},
+#endif
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC,
+ NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_md2, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC,
+ NID_rc2_64_cbc, NID_md5, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC,
+ NID_des_cbc, NID_sha1, PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen},
+
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA1, -1, NID_sha1, 0},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithMD5, -1, NID_md5, 0},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA224, -1, NID_sha224, 0},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA256, -1, NID_sha256, 0},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA384, -1, NID_sha384, 0},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_hmacWithSHA512, -1, NID_sha512, 0},
+ {EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, NID_id_HMACGostR3411_94, -1, NID_id_GostR3411_94, 0},
+};
+
+#ifdef TEST
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int i, nid_md, nid_cipher;
+ EVP_PBE_CTL *tpbe, *tpbe2;
+ /*
+ * OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(builtin_pbe) / sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL); i++) {
+ tpbe = builtin_pbe + i;
+ fprintf(stderr, "%d %d %s ", tpbe->pbe_type, tpbe->pbe_nid,
+ OBJ_nid2sn(tpbe->pbe_nid));
+ if (EVP_PBE_find(tpbe->pbe_type, tpbe->pbe_nid,
+ &nid_cipher, &nid_md, 0))
+ fprintf(stderr, "Found %s %s\n",
+ OBJ_nid2sn(nid_cipher), OBJ_nid2sn(nid_md));
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Find ERROR!!\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int EVP_PBE_CipherInit(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ ASN1_TYPE *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int en_de)
+{
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ int cipher_nid, md_nid;
+ EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen;
+
+ if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, OBJ_obj2nid(pbe_obj),
+ &cipher_nid, &md_nid, &keygen)) {
+ char obj_tmp[80];
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_PBE_ALGORITHM);
+ if (!pbe_obj)
+ BUF_strlcpy(obj_tmp, "NULL", sizeof obj_tmp);
+ else
+ i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, sizeof obj_tmp, pbe_obj);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "TYPE=", obj_tmp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!pass)
+ passlen = 0;
+ else if (passlen == -1)
+ passlen = strlen(pass);
+
+ if (cipher_nid == -1)
+ cipher = NULL;
+ else {
+ cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid);
+ if (!cipher) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (md_nid == -1)
+ md = NULL;
+ else {
+ md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid);
+ if (!md) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!keygen(ctx, pass, passlen, param, cipher, md, en_de)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_CIPHERINIT, EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(EVP_PBE_CTL, EVP_PBE_CTL, pbe2);
+
+static int pbe2_cmp(const EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe1, const EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe2)
+{
+ int ret = pbe1->pbe_type - pbe2->pbe_type;
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ else
+ return pbe1->pbe_nid - pbe2->pbe_nid;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(EVP_PBE_CTL, EVP_PBE_CTL, pbe2);
+
+static int pbe_cmp(const EVP_PBE_CTL *const *a, const EVP_PBE_CTL *const *b)
+{
+ int ret = (*a)->pbe_type - (*b)->pbe_type;
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ else
+ return (*a)->pbe_nid - (*b)->pbe_nid;
+}
+
+/* Add a PBE algorithm */
+
+int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
+ int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
+{
+ EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe_tmp;
+
+ if (pbe_algs == NULL) {
+ pbe_algs = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_new(pbe_cmp);
+ if (pbe_algs == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((pbe_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pbe_tmp))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ pbe_tmp->pbe_type = pbe_type;
+ pbe_tmp->pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
+ pbe_tmp->cipher_nid = cipher_nid;
+ pbe_tmp->md_nid = md_nid;
+ pbe_tmp->keygen = keygen;
+
+ sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_push(pbe_algs, pbe_tmp);
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
+ EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
+{
+ int cipher_nid, md_nid;
+ if (cipher)
+ cipher_nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
+ else
+ cipher_nid = -1;
+ if (md)
+ md_nid = EVP_MD_type(md);
+ else
+ md_nid = -1;
+
+ return EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(EVP_PBE_TYPE_OUTER, nid,
+ cipher_nid, md_nid, keygen);
+}
+
+int EVP_PBE_find(int type, int pbe_nid,
+ int *pcnid, int *pmnid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN **pkeygen)
+{
+ EVP_PBE_CTL *pbetmp = NULL, pbelu;
+ int i;
+ if (pbe_nid == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+
+ pbelu.pbe_type = type;
+ pbelu.pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
+
+ if (pbe_algs) {
+ i = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_find(pbe_algs, &pbelu);
+ if (i != -1)
+ pbetmp = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_value(pbe_algs, i);
+ }
+ if (pbetmp == NULL) {
+ pbetmp = OBJ_bsearch_pbe2(&pbelu, builtin_pbe,
+ sizeof(builtin_pbe) / sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL));
+ }
+ if (pbetmp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (pcnid)
+ *pcnid = pbetmp->cipher_nid;
+ if (pmnid)
+ *pmnid = pbetmp->md_nid;
+ if (pkeygen)
+ *pkeygen = pbetmp->keygen;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void free_evp_pbe_ctl(EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe)
+{
+ OPENSSL_freeFunc(pbe);
+}
+
+void EVP_PBE_cleanup(void)
+{
+ sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_pop_free(pbe_algs, free_evp_pbe_ctl);
+ pbe_algs = NULL;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/p_lib.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/p_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,456 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/evp/p_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-# include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "asn1_locl.h"
-
-static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x);
-
-int EVP_PKEY_bits(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_bits)
- return pkey->ameth->pkey_bits(pkey);
- return 0;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_size)
- return pkey->ameth->pkey_size(pkey);
- return 0;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_save_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mode)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
-
- if (mode >= 0)
- pkey->save_parameters = mode;
- return (ret);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
-
- if (mode >= 0)
- pkey->save_parameters = mode;
- return (ret);
- }
-#endif
- return (0);
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
-{
- if (to->type != from->type) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(from)) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
- if (from->ameth && from->ameth->param_copy)
- return from->ameth->param_copy(to, from);
- err:
- return 0;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_missing)
- return pkey->ameth->param_missing(pkey);
- return 0;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
-{
- if (a->type != b->type)
- return -1;
- if (a->ameth && a->ameth->param_cmp)
- return a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
- return -2;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
-{
- if (a->type != b->type)
- return -1;
-
- if (a->ameth) {
- int ret;
- /* Compare parameters if the algorithm has them */
- if (a->ameth->param_cmp) {
- ret = a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (a->ameth->pub_cmp)
- return a->ameth->pub_cmp(a, b);
- }
-
- return -2;
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *ret;
-
- ret = (EVP_PKEY *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
- if (ret == NULL) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
- }
- ret->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
- ret->save_type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
- ret->references = 1;
- ret->ameth = NULL;
- ret->engine = NULL;
- ret->pkey.ptr = NULL;
- ret->attributes = NULL;
- ret->save_parameters = 1;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Setup a public key ASN1 method and ENGINE from a NID or a string. If pkey
- * is NULL just return 1 or 0 if the algorithm exists.
- */
-
-static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, const char *str, int len)
-{
- const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
- ENGINE *e = NULL;
- if (pkey) {
- if (pkey->pkey.ptr)
- EVP_PKEY_free_it(pkey);
- /*
- * If key type matches and a method exists then this lookup has
- * succeeded once so just indicate success.
- */
- if ((type == pkey->save_type) && pkey->ameth)
- return 1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- /* If we have an ENGINE release it */
- if (pkey->engine) {
- ENGINE_finish(pkey->engine);
- pkey->engine = NULL;
- }
-#endif
- }
- if (str)
- ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&e, str, len);
- else
- ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (!pkey && e)
- ENGINE_finish(e);
-#endif
- if (!ameth) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
- return 0;
- }
- if (pkey) {
- pkey->ameth = ameth;
- pkey->engine = e;
-
- pkey->type = pkey->ameth->pkey_id;
- pkey->save_type = type;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type)
-{
- return pkey_set_type(pkey, type, NULL, -1);
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len)
-{
- return pkey_set_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_NONE, str, len);
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key)
-{
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
- return 0;
- pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
- return (key != NULL);
-}
-
-void *EVP_PKEY_get0(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- return pkey->pkey.ptr;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key)
-{
- int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, key);
- if (ret)
- RSA_up_ref(key);
- return ret;
-}
-
-RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_RSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY);
- return NULL;
- }
- RSA_up_ref(pkey->pkey.rsa);
- return pkey->pkey.rsa;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key)
-{
- int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key);
- if (ret)
- DSA_up_ref(key);
- return ret;
-}
-
-DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_DSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY);
- return NULL;
- }
- DSA_up_ref(pkey->pkey.dsa);
- return pkey->pkey.dsa;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-
-int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key)
-{
- int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, key);
- if (ret)
- EC_KEY_up_ref(key);
- return ret;
-}
-
-EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_EC_KEY, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY);
- return NULL;
- }
- EC_KEY_up_ref(pkey->pkey.ec);
- return pkey->pkey.ec;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-
-int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key)
-{
- int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, key);
- if (ret)
- DH_up_ref(key);
- return ret;
-}
-
-DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_DH, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY);
- return NULL;
- }
- DH_up_ref(pkey->pkey.dh);
- return pkey->pkey.dh;
-}
-#endif
-
-int EVP_PKEY_type(int type)
-{
- int ret;
- const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
- ENGINE *e;
- ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type);
- if (ameth)
- ret = ameth->pkey_id;
- else
- ret = NID_undef;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (e)
- ENGINE_finish(e);
-#endif
- return ret;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- return pkey->type;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- return EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type);
-}
-
-void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *x)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (x == NULL)
- return;
-
- i = CRYPTO_add(&x->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("EVP_PKEY", x);
-#endif
- if (i > 0)
- return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "EVP_PKEY_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort();
- }
-#endif
- EVP_PKEY_free_it(x);
- if (x->attributes)
- sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(x->attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
- OPENSSL_free(x);
-}
-
-static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x)
-{
- if (x->ameth && x->ameth->pkey_free) {
- x->ameth->pkey_free(x);
- x->pkey.ptr = NULL;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (x->engine) {
- ENGINE_finish(x->engine);
- x->engine = NULL;
- }
-#endif
-}
-
-static int unsup_alg(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
- const char *kstr)
-{
- BIO_indent(out, indent, 128);
- BIO_printf(out, "%s algorithm \"%s\" unsupported\n",
- kstr, OBJ_nid2ln(pkey->type));
- return 1;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_print_public(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
-{
- if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pub_print)
- return pkey->ameth->pub_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
-
- return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Public Key");
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_print_private(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
-{
- if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->priv_print)
- return pkey->ameth->priv_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
-
- return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Private Key");
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_print_params(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
-{
- if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_print)
- return pkey->ameth->param_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
- return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Parameters");
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid)
-{
- if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl)
- return -2;
- return pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID,
- 0, pnid);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/p_lib.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/p_lib.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/p_lib.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/p_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+/* crypto/evp/p_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x);
+
+int EVP_PKEY_bits(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_bits)
+ return pkey->ameth->pkey_bits(pkey);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_size)
+ return pkey->ameth->pkey_size(pkey);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_save_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mode)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
+
+ if (mode >= 0)
+ pkey->save_parameters = mode;
+ return (ret);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
+
+ if (mode >= 0)
+ pkey->save_parameters = mode;
+ return (ret);
+ }
+#endif
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
+{
+ if (to->type != from->type) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(from)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (from->ameth && from->ameth->param_copy)
+ return from->ameth->param_copy(to, from);
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_missing)
+ return pkey->ameth->param_missing(pkey);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+ if (a->type != b->type)
+ return -1;
+ if (a->ameth && a->ameth->param_cmp)
+ return a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
+ return -2;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+ if (a->type != b->type)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (a->ameth) {
+ int ret;
+ /* Compare parameters if the algorithm has them */
+ if (a->ameth->param_cmp) {
+ ret = a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (a->ameth->pub_cmp)
+ return a->ameth->pub_cmp(a, b);
+ }
+
+ return -2;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret;
+
+ ret = (EVP_PKEY *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ ret->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
+ ret->save_type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->ameth = NULL;
+ ret->engine = NULL;
+ ret->pkey.ptr = NULL;
+ ret->attributes = NULL;
+ ret->save_parameters = 1;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup a public key ASN1 method and ENGINE from a NID or a string. If pkey
+ * is NULL just return 1 or 0 if the algorithm exists.
+ */
+
+static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, const char *str, int len)
+{
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+ ENGINE *e = NULL;
+ if (pkey) {
+ if (pkey->pkey.ptr)
+ EVP_PKEY_free_it(pkey);
+ /*
+ * If key type matches and a method exists then this lookup has
+ * succeeded once so just indicate success.
+ */
+ if ((type == pkey->save_type) && pkey->ameth)
+ return 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ /* If we have an ENGINE release it */
+ if (pkey->engine) {
+ ENGINE_finish(pkey->engine);
+ pkey->engine = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ if (str)
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&e, str, len);
+ else
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (!pkey && e)
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+#endif
+ if (!ameth) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (pkey) {
+ pkey->ameth = ameth;
+ pkey->engine = e;
+
+ pkey->type = pkey->ameth->pkey_id;
+ pkey->save_type = type;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type)
+{
+ return pkey_set_type(pkey, type, NULL, -1);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len)
+{
+ return pkey_set_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_NONE, str, len);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key)
+{
+ if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
+ return 0;
+ pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
+ return (key != NULL);
+}
+
+void *EVP_PKEY_get0(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return pkey->pkey.ptr;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key)
+{
+ int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, key);
+ if (ret)
+ RSA_up_ref(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_RSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ RSA_up_ref(pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ return pkey->pkey.rsa;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key)
+{
+ int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key);
+ if (ret)
+ DSA_up_ref(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_DSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ DSA_up_ref(pkey->pkey.dsa);
+ return pkey->pkey.dsa;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, key);
+ if (ret)
+ EC_KEY_up_ref(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_EC_KEY, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ EC_KEY_up_ref(pkey->pkey.ec);
+ return pkey->pkey.ec;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key)
+{
+ int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, key);
+ if (ret)
+ DH_up_ref(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_DH, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ DH_up_ref(pkey->pkey.dh);
+ return pkey->pkey.dh;
+}
+#endif
+
+int EVP_PKEY_type(int type)
+{
+ int ret;
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+ ENGINE *e;
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type);
+ if (ameth)
+ ret = ameth->pkey_id;
+ else
+ ret = NID_undef;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (e)
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+#endif
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return pkey->type;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type);
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *x)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&x->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("EVP_PKEY", x);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "EVP_PKEY_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort();
+ }
+#endif
+ EVP_PKEY_free_it(x);
+ if (x->attributes)
+ sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(x->attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
+ OPENSSL_free(x);
+}
+
+static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x)
+{
+ if (x->ameth && x->ameth->pkey_free) {
+ x->ameth->pkey_free(x);
+ x->pkey.ptr = NULL;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (x->engine) {
+ ENGINE_finish(x->engine);
+ x->engine = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static int unsup_alg(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+ const char *kstr)
+{
+ BIO_indent(out, indent, 128);
+ BIO_printf(out, "%s algorithm \"%s\" unsupported\n",
+ kstr, OBJ_nid2ln(pkey->type));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_print_public(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pub_print)
+ return pkey->ameth->pub_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
+
+ return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Public Key");
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_print_private(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->priv_print)
+ return pkey->ameth->priv_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
+
+ return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Private Key");
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_print_params(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_print)
+ return pkey->ameth->param_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
+ return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Parameters");
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid)
+{
+ if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl)
+ return -2;
+ return pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID,
+ 0, pnid);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
-/* pmeth_gn.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2006.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include "evp_locl.h"
-
-int EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret;
- if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->paramgen) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT,
- EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
- return -2;
- }
- ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN;
- if (!ctx->pmeth->paramgen_init)
- return 1;
- ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen_init(ctx);
- if (ret <= 0)
- ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
- return ret;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
-{
- int ret;
- if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->paramgen) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN,
- EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
- return -2;
- }
-
- if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!ppkey)
- return -1;
-
- if (!*ppkey)
- *ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-
- ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen(ctx, *ppkey);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);
- *ppkey = NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret;
- if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->keygen) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN_INIT,
- EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
- return -2;
- }
- ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN;
- if (!ctx->pmeth->keygen_init)
- return 1;
- ret = ctx->pmeth->keygen_init(ctx);
- if (ret <= 0)
- ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
- return ret;
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
-{
- int ret;
-
- if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->keygen) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN,
- EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
- return -2;
- }
- if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!ppkey)
- return -1;
-
- if (!*ppkey)
- *ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-
- ret = ctx->pmeth->keygen(ctx, *ppkey);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);
- *ppkey = NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *cb)
-{
- ctx->pkey_gencb = cb;
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->pkey_gencb;
-}
-
-/*
- * "translation callback" to call EVP_PKEY_CTX callbacks using BN_GENCB style
- * callbacks.
- */
-
-static int trans_cb(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *gcb)
-{
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = gcb->arg;
- ctx->keygen_info[0] = a;
- ctx->keygen_info[1] = b;
- return ctx->pkey_gencb(ctx);
-}
-
-void evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(BN_GENCB *cb, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BN_GENCB_set(cb, trans_cb, ctx)
-}
-
-int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int idx)
-{
- if (idx == -1)
- return ctx->keygen_info_count;
- if (idx < 0 || idx > ctx->keygen_info_count)
- return 0;
- return ctx->keygen_info[idx];
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
- const unsigned char *key, int keylen)
-{
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *mac_ctx = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL;
- mac_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(type, e);
- if (!mac_ctx)
- return NULL;
- if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(mac_ctx) <= 0)
- goto merr;
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY,
- keylen, (void *)key) <= 0)
- goto merr;
- if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(mac_ctx, &mac_key) <= 0)
- goto merr;
- merr:
- if (mac_ctx)
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(mac_ctx);
- return mac_key;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/* pmeth_gn.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2006.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "evp_locl.h"
+
+int EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+ if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->paramgen) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT,
+ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN;
+ if (!ctx->pmeth->paramgen_init)
+ return 1;
+ ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen_init(ctx);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+{
+ int ret;
+ if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->paramgen) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN,
+ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ppkey == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (*ppkey == NULL)
+ *ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+ if (*ppkey == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen(ctx, *ppkey);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);
+ *ppkey = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+ if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->keygen) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN_INIT,
+ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN;
+ if (!ctx->pmeth->keygen_init)
+ return 1;
+ ret = ctx->pmeth->keygen_init(ctx);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ ctx->operation = EVP_PKEY_OP_UNDEFINED;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!ctx || !ctx->pmeth || !ctx->pmeth->keygen) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN, EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ppkey)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!*ppkey)
+ *ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+ ret = ctx->pmeth->keygen(ctx, *ppkey);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);
+ *ppkey = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *cb)
+{
+ ctx->pkey_gencb = cb;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_gen_cb *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_cb(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->pkey_gencb;
+}
+
+/*
+ * "translation callback" to call EVP_PKEY_CTX callbacks using BN_GENCB style
+ * callbacks.
+ */
+
+static int trans_cb(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *gcb)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = gcb->arg;
+ ctx->keygen_info[0] = a;
+ ctx->keygen_info[1] = b;
+ return ctx->pkey_gencb(ctx);
+}
+
+void evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(BN_GENCB *cb, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BN_GENCB_set(cb, trans_cb, ctx)
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int idx)
+{
+ if (idx == -1)
+ return ctx->keygen_info_count;
+ if (idx < 0 || idx > ctx->keygen_info_count)
+ return 0;
+ return ctx->keygen_info[idx];
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+ const unsigned char *key, int keylen)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *mac_ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL;
+ mac_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(type, e);
+ if (!mac_ctx)
+ return NULL;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(mac_ctx) <= 0)
+ goto merr;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY,
+ keylen, (void *)key) <= 0)
+ goto merr;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(mac_ctx, &mac_key) <= 0)
+ goto merr;
+ merr:
+ if (mac_ctx)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(mac_ctx);
+ return mac_key;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2007.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "asn1_locl.h"
-
-#define HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT
-
-/*
- * HMAC "ASN1" method. This is just here to indicate the maximum HMAC output
- * length and to free up an HMAC key.
- */
-
-static int hmac_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- return EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
-}
-
-static void hmac_key_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)pkey->pkey.ptr;
- if (os) {
- if (os->data)
- OPENSSL_cleanse(os->data, os->length);
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
- }
-}
-
-static int hmac_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
-{
- switch (op) {
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
- *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha1;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
- }
-}
-
-#ifdef HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT
-/*
- * A bogus private key format for test purposes. This is simply the HMAC key
- * with "HMAC PRIVATE KEY" in the headers. When enabled the genpkey utility
- * can be used to "generate" HMAC keys.
- */
-
-static int old_hmac_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
-{
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
- os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- if (!os || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pder, derlen))
- return 0;
- EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int old_hmac_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
-{
- int inc;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)pkey->pkey.ptr;
- if (pder) {
- if (!*pder) {
- *pder = OPENSSL_malloc(os->length);
- inc = 0;
- } else
- inc = 1;
-
- memcpy(*pder, os->data, os->length);
-
- if (inc)
- *pder += os->length;
- }
-
- return os->length;
-}
-
-#endif
-
-const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD hmac_asn1_meth = {
- EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
- EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
- 0,
-
- "HMAC",
- "OpenSSL HMAC method",
-
- 0, 0, 0, 0,
-
- 0, 0, 0,
-
- hmac_size,
- 0,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-
- hmac_key_free,
- hmac_pkey_ctrl,
-#ifdef HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT
- old_hmac_decode,
- old_hmac_encode
-#else
- 0, 0
-#endif
-};
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2007.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+#define HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT
+
+/*
+ * HMAC "ASN1" method. This is just here to indicate the maximum HMAC output
+ * length and to free up an HMAC key.
+ */
+
+static int hmac_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
+}
+
+static void hmac_key_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)pkey->pkey.ptr;
+ if (os) {
+ if (os->data)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(os->data, os->length);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+ }
+}
+
+static int hmac_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+ switch (op) {
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+ *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha1;
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return -2;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT
+/*
+ * A bogus private key format for test purposes. This is simply the HMAC key
+ * with "HMAC PRIVATE KEY" in the headers. When enabled the genpkey utility
+ * can be used to "generate" HMAC keys.
+ */
+
+static int old_hmac_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
+ os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (!os || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pder, derlen))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os))
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int old_hmac_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+ int inc;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)pkey->pkey.ptr;
+ if (pder) {
+ if (!*pder) {
+ *pder = OPENSSL_malloc(os->length);
+ inc = 0;
+ } else
+ inc = 1;
+
+ memcpy(*pder, os->data, os->length);
+
+ if (inc)
+ *pder += os->length;
+ }
+
+ return os->length;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD hmac_asn1_meth = {
+ EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
+ EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
+ 0,
+
+ "HMAC",
+ "OpenSSL HMAC method",
+
+ 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ 0, 0, 0,
+
+ hmac_size,
+ 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ hmac_key_free,
+ hmac_pkey_ctrl,
+#ifdef HMAC_TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_FORMAT
+ old_hmac_decode,
+ old_hmac_encode
+#else
+ 0, 0
+#endif
+};
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/jpake/jpake.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/jpake/jpake.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,507 +0,0 @@
-#include "jpake.h"
-
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <memory.h>
-
-/*
- * In the definition, (xa, xb, xc, xd) are Alice's (x1, x2, x3, x4) or
- * Bob's (x3, x4, x1, x2). If you see what I mean.
- */
-
-typedef struct {
- char *name; /* Must be unique */
- char *peer_name;
- BIGNUM *p;
- BIGNUM *g;
- BIGNUM *q;
- BIGNUM *gxc; /* Alice's g^{x3} or Bob's g^{x1} */
- BIGNUM *gxd; /* Alice's g^{x4} or Bob's g^{x2} */
-} JPAKE_CTX_PUBLIC;
-
-struct JPAKE_CTX {
- JPAKE_CTX_PUBLIC p;
- BIGNUM *secret; /* The shared secret */
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- BIGNUM *xa; /* Alice's x1 or Bob's x3 */
- BIGNUM *xb; /* Alice's x2 or Bob's x4 */
- BIGNUM *key; /* The calculated (shared) key */
-};
-
-static void JPAKE_ZKP_init(JPAKE_ZKP *zkp)
-{
- zkp->gr = BN_new();
- zkp->b = BN_new();
-}
-
-static void JPAKE_ZKP_release(JPAKE_ZKP *zkp)
-{
- BN_free(zkp->b);
- BN_free(zkp->gr);
-}
-
-/* Two birds with one stone - make the global name as expected */
-#define JPAKE_STEP_PART_init JPAKE_STEP2_init
-#define JPAKE_STEP_PART_release JPAKE_STEP2_release
-
-void JPAKE_STEP_PART_init(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p)
-{
- p->gx = BN_new();
- JPAKE_ZKP_init(&p->zkpx);
-}
-
-void JPAKE_STEP_PART_release(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p)
-{
- JPAKE_ZKP_release(&p->zkpx);
- BN_free(p->gx);
-}
-
-void JPAKE_STEP1_init(JPAKE_STEP1 *s1)
-{
- JPAKE_STEP_PART_init(&s1->p1);
- JPAKE_STEP_PART_init(&s1->p2);
-}
-
-void JPAKE_STEP1_release(JPAKE_STEP1 *s1)
-{
- JPAKE_STEP_PART_release(&s1->p2);
- JPAKE_STEP_PART_release(&s1->p1);
-}
-
-static void JPAKE_CTX_init(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const char *name,
- const char *peer_name, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *q,
- const BIGNUM *secret)
-{
- ctx->p.name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
- ctx->p.peer_name = OPENSSL_strdup(peer_name);
- ctx->p.p = BN_dup(p);
- ctx->p.g = BN_dup(g);
- ctx->p.q = BN_dup(q);
- ctx->secret = BN_dup(secret);
-
- ctx->p.gxc = BN_new();
- ctx->p.gxd = BN_new();
-
- ctx->xa = BN_new();
- ctx->xb = BN_new();
- ctx->key = BN_new();
- ctx->ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-}
-
-static void JPAKE_CTX_release(JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BN_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
- BN_clear_free(ctx->key);
- BN_clear_free(ctx->xb);
- BN_clear_free(ctx->xa);
-
- BN_free(ctx->p.gxd);
- BN_free(ctx->p.gxc);
-
- BN_clear_free(ctx->secret);
- BN_free(ctx->p.q);
- BN_free(ctx->p.g);
- BN_free(ctx->p.p);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->p.peer_name);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->p.name);
-
- memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof *ctx);
-}
-
-JPAKE_CTX *JPAKE_CTX_new(const char *name, const char *peer_name,
- const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *q,
- const BIGNUM *secret)
-{
- JPAKE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ctx);
-
- JPAKE_CTX_init(ctx, name, peer_name, p, g, q, secret);
-
- return ctx;
-}
-
-void JPAKE_CTX_free(JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- JPAKE_CTX_release(ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
-}
-
-static void hashlength(SHA_CTX *sha, size_t l)
-{
- unsigned char b[2];
-
- OPENSSL_assert(l <= 0xffff);
- b[0] = l >> 8;
- b[1] = l & 0xff;
- SHA1_Update(sha, b, 2);
-}
-
-static void hashstring(SHA_CTX *sha, const char *string)
-{
- size_t l = strlen(string);
-
- hashlength(sha, l);
- SHA1_Update(sha, string, l);
-}
-
-static void hashbn(SHA_CTX *sha, const BIGNUM *bn)
-{
- size_t l = BN_num_bytes(bn);
- unsigned char *bin = OPENSSL_malloc(l);
-
- hashlength(sha, l);
- BN_bn2bin(bn, bin);
- SHA1_Update(sha, bin, l);
- OPENSSL_free(bin);
-}
-
-/* h=hash(g, g^r, g^x, name) */
-static void zkp_hash(BIGNUM *h, const BIGNUM *zkpg, const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p,
- const char *proof_name)
-{
- unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- SHA_CTX sha;
-
- /*
- * XXX: hash should not allow moving of the boundaries - Java code
- * is flawed in this respect. Length encoding seems simplest.
- */
- SHA1_Init(&sha);
- hashbn(&sha, zkpg);
- OPENSSL_assert(!BN_is_zero(p->zkpx.gr));
- hashbn(&sha, p->zkpx.gr);
- hashbn(&sha, p->gx);
- hashstring(&sha, proof_name);
- SHA1_Final(md, &sha);
- BN_bin2bn(md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, h);
-}
-
-/*
- * Prove knowledge of x
- * Note that p->gx has already been calculated
- */
-static void generate_zkp(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *x,
- const BIGNUM *zkpg, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *r = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *h = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *t = BN_new();
-
- /*-
- * r in [0,q)
- * XXX: Java chooses r in [0, 2^160) - i.e. distribution not uniform
- */
- BN_rand_range(r, ctx->p.q);
- /* g^r */
- BN_mod_exp(p->zkpx.gr, zkpg, r, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
-
- /* h=hash... */
- zkp_hash(h, zkpg, p, ctx->p.name);
-
- /* b = r - x*h */
- BN_mod_mul(t, x, h, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx);
- BN_mod_sub(p->zkpx.b, r, t, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx);
-
- /* cleanup */
- BN_free(t);
- BN_free(h);
- BN_free(r);
-}
-
-static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg,
- JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *h = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *t1 = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *t3 = BN_new();
- int ret = 0;
-
- zkp_hash(h, zkpg, p, ctx->p.peer_name);
-
- /* t1 = g^b */
- BN_mod_exp(t1, zkpg, p->zkpx.b, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- /* t2 = (g^x)^h = g^{hx} */
- BN_mod_exp(t2, p->gx, h, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- /* t3 = t1 * t2 = g^{hx} * g^b = g^{hx+b} = g^r (allegedly) */
- BN_mod_mul(t3, t1, t2, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
-
- /* verify t3 == g^r */
- if (BN_cmp(t3, p->zkpx.gr) == 0)
- ret = 1;
- else
- JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP, JPAKE_R_ZKP_VERIFY_FAILED);
-
- /* cleanup */
- BN_free(t3);
- BN_free(t2);
- BN_free(t1);
- BN_free(h);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void generate_step_part(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *x,
- const BIGNUM *g, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BN_mod_exp(p->gx, g, x, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- generate_zkp(p, x, g, ctx);
-}
-
-/* Generate each party's random numbers. xa is in [0, q), xb is in [1, q). */
-static void genrand(JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *qm1;
-
- /* xa in [0, q) */
- BN_rand_range(ctx->xa, ctx->p.q);
-
- /* q-1 */
- qm1 = BN_new();
- BN_copy(qm1, ctx->p.q);
- BN_sub_word(qm1, 1);
-
- /* ... and xb in [0, q-1) */
- BN_rand_range(ctx->xb, qm1);
- /* [1, q) */
- BN_add_word(ctx->xb, 1);
-
- /* cleanup */
- BN_free(qm1);
-}
-
-int JPAKE_STEP1_generate(JPAKE_STEP1 *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- genrand(ctx);
- generate_step_part(&send->p1, ctx->xa, ctx->p.g, ctx);
- generate_step_part(&send->p2, ctx->xb, ctx->p.g, ctx);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* g^x is a legal value */
-static int is_legal(const BIGNUM *gx, const JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *t;
- int res;
-
- if (BN_is_negative(gx) || BN_is_zero(gx) || BN_cmp(gx, ctx->p.p) >= 0)
- return 0;
-
- t = BN_new();
- BN_mod_exp(t, gx, ctx->p.q, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- res = BN_is_one(t);
- BN_free(t);
-
- return res;
-}
-
-int JPAKE_STEP1_process(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const JPAKE_STEP1 *received)
-{
- if (!is_legal(received->p1.gx, ctx)) {
- JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS,
- JPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X3_IS_NOT_LEGAL);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!is_legal(received->p2.gx, ctx)) {
- JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS,
- JPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X4_IS_NOT_LEGAL);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* verify their ZKP(xc) */
- if (!verify_zkp(&received->p1, ctx->p.g, ctx)) {
- JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_VERIFY_X3_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* verify their ZKP(xd) */
- if (!verify_zkp(&received->p2, ctx->p.g, ctx)) {
- JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_VERIFY_X4_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* g^xd != 1 */
- if (BN_is_one(received->p2.gx)) {
- JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X4_IS_ONE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Save the bits we need for later */
- BN_copy(ctx->p.gxc, received->p1.gx);
- BN_copy(ctx->p.gxd, received->p2.gx);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int JPAKE_STEP2_generate(JPAKE_STEP2 *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BIGNUM *t1 = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new();
-
- /*-
- * X = g^{(xa + xc + xd) * xb * s}
- * t1 = g^xa
- */
- BN_mod_exp(t1, ctx->p.g, ctx->xa, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- /* t2 = t1 * g^{xc} = g^{xa} * g^{xc} = g^{xa + xc} */
- BN_mod_mul(t2, t1, ctx->p.gxc, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- /* t1 = t2 * g^{xd} = g^{xa + xc + xd} */
- BN_mod_mul(t1, t2, ctx->p.gxd, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- /* t2 = xb * s */
- BN_mod_mul(t2, ctx->xb, ctx->secret, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx);
-
- /*-
- * ZKP(xb * s)
- * XXX: this is kinda funky, because we're using
- *
- * g' = g^{xa + xc + xd}
- *
- * as the generator, which means X is g'^{xb * s}
- * X = t1^{t2} = t1^{xb * s} = g^{(xa + xc + xd) * xb * s}
- */
- generate_step_part(send, t2, t1, ctx);
-
- /* cleanup */
- BN_free(t1);
- BN_free(t2);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* gx = g^{xc + xa + xb} * xd * s */
-static int compute_key(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const BIGNUM *gx)
-{
- BIGNUM *t1 = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *t3 = BN_new();
-
- /*-
- * K = (gx/g^{xb * xd * s})^{xb}
- * = (g^{(xc + xa + xb) * xd * s - xb * xd *s})^{xb}
- * = (g^{(xa + xc) * xd * s})^{xb}
- * = g^{(xa + xc) * xb * xd * s}
- * [which is the same regardless of who calculates it]
- */
-
- /* t1 = (g^{xd})^{xb} = g^{xb * xd} */
- BN_mod_exp(t1, ctx->p.gxd, ctx->xb, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- /* t2 = -s = q-s */
- BN_sub(t2, ctx->p.q, ctx->secret);
- /* t3 = t1^t2 = g^{-xb * xd * s} */
- BN_mod_exp(t3, t1, t2, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- /* t1 = gx * t3 = X/g^{xb * xd * s} */
- BN_mod_mul(t1, gx, t3, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- /* K = t1^{xb} */
- BN_mod_exp(ctx->key, t1, ctx->xb, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
-
- /* cleanup */
- BN_free(t3);
- BN_free(t2);
- BN_free(t1);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int JPAKE_STEP2_process(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const JPAKE_STEP2 *received)
-{
- BIGNUM *t1 = BN_new();
- BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new();
- int ret = 0;
-
- /*-
- * g' = g^{xc + xa + xb} [from our POV]
- * t1 = xa + xb
- */
- BN_mod_add(t1, ctx->xa, ctx->xb, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx);
- /* t2 = g^{t1} = g^{xa+xb} */
- BN_mod_exp(t2, ctx->p.g, t1, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
- /* t1 = g^{xc} * t2 = g^{xc + xa + xb} */
- BN_mod_mul(t1, ctx->p.gxc, t2, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
-
- if (verify_zkp(received, t1, ctx))
- ret = 1;
- else
- JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP2_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_VERIFY_B_FAILED);
-
- compute_key(ctx, received->gx);
-
- /* cleanup */
- BN_free(t2);
- BN_free(t1);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void quickhashbn(unsigned char *md, const BIGNUM *bn)
-{
- SHA_CTX sha;
-
- SHA1_Init(&sha);
- hashbn(&sha, bn);
- SHA1_Final(md, &sha);
-}
-
-void JPAKE_STEP3A_init(JPAKE_STEP3A *s3a)
-{
-}
-
-int JPAKE_STEP3A_generate(JPAKE_STEP3A *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- quickhashbn(send->hhk, ctx->key);
- SHA1(send->hhk, sizeof send->hhk, send->hhk);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int JPAKE_STEP3A_process(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const JPAKE_STEP3A *received)
-{
- unsigned char hhk[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- quickhashbn(hhk, ctx->key);
- SHA1(hhk, sizeof hhk, hhk);
- if (memcmp(hhk, received->hhk, sizeof hhk)) {
- JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP3A_PROCESS,
- JPAKE_R_HASH_OF_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-void JPAKE_STEP3A_release(JPAKE_STEP3A *s3a)
-{
-}
-
-void JPAKE_STEP3B_init(JPAKE_STEP3B *s3b)
-{
-}
-
-int JPAKE_STEP3B_generate(JPAKE_STEP3B *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- quickhashbn(send->hk, ctx->key);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int JPAKE_STEP3B_process(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const JPAKE_STEP3B *received)
-{
- unsigned char hk[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- quickhashbn(hk, ctx->key);
- if (memcmp(hk, received->hk, sizeof hk)) {
- JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP3B_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-void JPAKE_STEP3B_release(JPAKE_STEP3B *s3b)
-{
-}
-
-const BIGNUM *JPAKE_get_shared_key(JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->key;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/jpake/jpake.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/jpake/jpake.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/jpake/jpake.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/jpake/jpake.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+#include "jpake.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <memory.h>
+
+/*
+ * In the definition, (xa, xb, xc, xd) are Alice's (x1, x2, x3, x4) or
+ * Bob's (x3, x4, x1, x2). If you see what I mean.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ char *name; /* Must be unique */
+ char *peer_name;
+ BIGNUM *p;
+ BIGNUM *g;
+ BIGNUM *q;
+ BIGNUM *gxc; /* Alice's g^{x3} or Bob's g^{x1} */
+ BIGNUM *gxd; /* Alice's g^{x4} or Bob's g^{x2} */
+} JPAKE_CTX_PUBLIC;
+
+struct JPAKE_CTX {
+ JPAKE_CTX_PUBLIC p;
+ BIGNUM *secret; /* The shared secret */
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ BIGNUM *xa; /* Alice's x1 or Bob's x3 */
+ BIGNUM *xb; /* Alice's x2 or Bob's x4 */
+ BIGNUM *key; /* The calculated (shared) key */
+};
+
+static void JPAKE_ZKP_init(JPAKE_ZKP *zkp)
+{
+ zkp->gr = BN_new();
+ zkp->b = BN_new();
+}
+
+static void JPAKE_ZKP_release(JPAKE_ZKP *zkp)
+{
+ BN_free(zkp->b);
+ BN_free(zkp->gr);
+}
+
+/* Two birds with one stone - make the global name as expected */
+#define JPAKE_STEP_PART_init JPAKE_STEP2_init
+#define JPAKE_STEP_PART_release JPAKE_STEP2_release
+
+void JPAKE_STEP_PART_init(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p)
+{
+ p->gx = BN_new();
+ JPAKE_ZKP_init(&p->zkpx);
+}
+
+void JPAKE_STEP_PART_release(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p)
+{
+ JPAKE_ZKP_release(&p->zkpx);
+ BN_free(p->gx);
+}
+
+void JPAKE_STEP1_init(JPAKE_STEP1 *s1)
+{
+ JPAKE_STEP_PART_init(&s1->p1);
+ JPAKE_STEP_PART_init(&s1->p2);
+}
+
+void JPAKE_STEP1_release(JPAKE_STEP1 *s1)
+{
+ JPAKE_STEP_PART_release(&s1->p2);
+ JPAKE_STEP_PART_release(&s1->p1);
+}
+
+static void JPAKE_CTX_init(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const char *name,
+ const char *peer_name, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *q,
+ const BIGNUM *secret)
+{
+ ctx->p.name = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
+ ctx->p.peer_name = OPENSSL_strdup(peer_name);
+ ctx->p.p = BN_dup(p);
+ ctx->p.g = BN_dup(g);
+ ctx->p.q = BN_dup(q);
+ ctx->secret = BN_dup(secret);
+
+ ctx->p.gxc = BN_new();
+ ctx->p.gxd = BN_new();
+
+ ctx->xa = BN_new();
+ ctx->xb = BN_new();
+ ctx->key = BN_new();
+ ctx->ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+}
+
+static void JPAKE_CTX_release(JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(ctx->key);
+ BN_clear_free(ctx->xb);
+ BN_clear_free(ctx->xa);
+
+ BN_free(ctx->p.gxd);
+ BN_free(ctx->p.gxc);
+
+ BN_clear_free(ctx->secret);
+ BN_free(ctx->p.q);
+ BN_free(ctx->p.g);
+ BN_free(ctx->p.p);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->p.peer_name);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->p.name);
+
+ memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof *ctx);
+}
+
+JPAKE_CTX *JPAKE_CTX_new(const char *name, const char *peer_name,
+ const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *q,
+ const BIGNUM *secret)
+{
+ JPAKE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ctx);
+
+ JPAKE_CTX_init(ctx, name, peer_name, p, g, q, secret);
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+void JPAKE_CTX_free(JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ JPAKE_CTX_release(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void hashlength(SHA_CTX *sha, size_t l)
+{
+ unsigned char b[2];
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(l <= 0xffff);
+ b[0] = l >> 8;
+ b[1] = l & 0xff;
+ SHA1_Update(sha, b, 2);
+}
+
+static void hashstring(SHA_CTX *sha, const char *string)
+{
+ size_t l = strlen(string);
+
+ hashlength(sha, l);
+ SHA1_Update(sha, string, l);
+}
+
+static void hashbn(SHA_CTX *sha, const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+ size_t l = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+ unsigned char *bin = OPENSSL_malloc(l);
+
+ hashlength(sha, l);
+ BN_bn2bin(bn, bin);
+ SHA1_Update(sha, bin, l);
+ OPENSSL_free(bin);
+}
+
+/* h=hash(g, g^r, g^x, name) */
+static void zkp_hash(BIGNUM *h, const BIGNUM *zkpg, const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p,
+ const char *proof_name)
+{
+ unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ SHA_CTX sha;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: hash should not allow moving of the boundaries - Java code
+ * is flawed in this respect. Length encoding seems simplest.
+ */
+ SHA1_Init(&sha);
+ hashbn(&sha, zkpg);
+ OPENSSL_assert(!BN_is_zero(p->zkpx.gr));
+ hashbn(&sha, p->zkpx.gr);
+ hashbn(&sha, p->gx);
+ hashstring(&sha, proof_name);
+ SHA1_Final(md, &sha);
+ BN_bin2bn(md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, h);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prove knowledge of x
+ * Note that p->gx has already been calculated
+ */
+static void generate_zkp(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *x,
+ const BIGNUM *zkpg, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *r = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *h = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *t = BN_new();
+
+ /*-
+ * r in [0,q)
+ * XXX: Java chooses r in [0, 2^160) - i.e. distribution not uniform
+ */
+ BN_rand_range(r, ctx->p.q);
+ /* g^r */
+ BN_mod_exp(p->zkpx.gr, zkpg, r, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+
+ /* h=hash... */
+ zkp_hash(h, zkpg, p, ctx->p.name);
+
+ /* b = r - x*h */
+ BN_mod_mul(t, x, h, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx);
+ BN_mod_sub(p->zkpx.b, r, t, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx);
+
+ /* cleanup */
+ BN_free(t);
+ BN_free(h);
+ BN_free(r);
+}
+
+static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg,
+ JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *h = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *t1 = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *t3 = BN_new();
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (h == NULL || t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL || t3 == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ zkp_hash(h, zkpg, p, ctx->p.peer_name);
+
+ /* t1 = g^b */
+ BN_mod_exp(t1, zkpg, p->zkpx.b, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ /* t2 = (g^x)^h = g^{hx} */
+ BN_mod_exp(t2, p->gx, h, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ /* t3 = t1 * t2 = g^{hx} * g^b = g^{hx+b} = g^r (allegedly) */
+ BN_mod_mul(t3, t1, t2, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+
+ /* verify t3 == g^r */
+ if (BN_cmp(t3, p->zkpx.gr) == 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP, JPAKE_R_ZKP_VERIFY_FAILED);
+
+end:
+ /* cleanup */
+ BN_free(t3);
+ BN_free(t2);
+ BN_free(t1);
+ BN_free(h);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void generate_step_part(JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *x,
+ const BIGNUM *g, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BN_mod_exp(p->gx, g, x, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ generate_zkp(p, x, g, ctx);
+}
+
+/* Generate each party's random numbers. xa is in [0, q), xb is in [1, q). */
+static void genrand(JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *qm1;
+
+ /* xa in [0, q) */
+ BN_rand_range(ctx->xa, ctx->p.q);
+
+ /* q-1 */
+ qm1 = BN_new();
+ BN_copy(qm1, ctx->p.q);
+ BN_sub_word(qm1, 1);
+
+ /* ... and xb in [0, q-1) */
+ BN_rand_range(ctx->xb, qm1);
+ /* [1, q) */
+ BN_add_word(ctx->xb, 1);
+
+ /* cleanup */
+ BN_free(qm1);
+}
+
+int JPAKE_STEP1_generate(JPAKE_STEP1 *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ genrand(ctx);
+ generate_step_part(&send->p1, ctx->xa, ctx->p.g, ctx);
+ generate_step_part(&send->p2, ctx->xb, ctx->p.g, ctx);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* g^x is a legal value */
+static int is_legal(const BIGNUM *gx, const JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *t;
+ int res;
+
+ if (BN_is_negative(gx) || BN_is_zero(gx) || BN_cmp(gx, ctx->p.p) >= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ t = BN_new();
+ BN_mod_exp(t, gx, ctx->p.q, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ res = BN_is_one(t);
+ BN_free(t);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+int JPAKE_STEP1_process(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const JPAKE_STEP1 *received)
+{
+ if (!is_legal(received->p1.gx, ctx)) {
+ JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS,
+ JPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X3_IS_NOT_LEGAL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!is_legal(received->p2.gx, ctx)) {
+ JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS,
+ JPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X4_IS_NOT_LEGAL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* verify their ZKP(xc) */
+ if (!verify_zkp(&received->p1, ctx->p.g, ctx)) {
+ JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_VERIFY_X3_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* verify their ZKP(xd) */
+ if (!verify_zkp(&received->p2, ctx->p.g, ctx)) {
+ JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_VERIFY_X4_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* g^xd != 1 */
+ if (BN_is_one(received->p2.gx)) {
+ JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X4_IS_ONE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the bits we need for later */
+ BN_copy(ctx->p.gxc, received->p1.gx);
+ BN_copy(ctx->p.gxd, received->p2.gx);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int JPAKE_STEP2_generate(JPAKE_STEP2 *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *t1 = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new();
+
+ /*-
+ * X = g^{(xa + xc + xd) * xb * s}
+ * t1 = g^xa
+ */
+ BN_mod_exp(t1, ctx->p.g, ctx->xa, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ /* t2 = t1 * g^{xc} = g^{xa} * g^{xc} = g^{xa + xc} */
+ BN_mod_mul(t2, t1, ctx->p.gxc, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ /* t1 = t2 * g^{xd} = g^{xa + xc + xd} */
+ BN_mod_mul(t1, t2, ctx->p.gxd, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ /* t2 = xb * s */
+ BN_mod_mul(t2, ctx->xb, ctx->secret, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx);
+
+ /*-
+ * ZKP(xb * s)
+ * XXX: this is kinda funky, because we're using
+ *
+ * g' = g^{xa + xc + xd}
+ *
+ * as the generator, which means X is g'^{xb * s}
+ * X = t1^{t2} = t1^{xb * s} = g^{(xa + xc + xd) * xb * s}
+ */
+ generate_step_part(send, t2, t1, ctx);
+
+ /* cleanup */
+ BN_free(t1);
+ BN_free(t2);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* gx = g^{xc + xa + xb} * xd * s */
+static int compute_key(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const BIGNUM *gx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *t1 = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *t3 = BN_new();
+
+ /*-
+ * K = (gx/g^{xb * xd * s})^{xb}
+ * = (g^{(xc + xa + xb) * xd * s - xb * xd *s})^{xb}
+ * = (g^{(xa + xc) * xd * s})^{xb}
+ * = g^{(xa + xc) * xb * xd * s}
+ * [which is the same regardless of who calculates it]
+ */
+
+ /* t1 = (g^{xd})^{xb} = g^{xb * xd} */
+ BN_mod_exp(t1, ctx->p.gxd, ctx->xb, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ /* t2 = -s = q-s */
+ BN_sub(t2, ctx->p.q, ctx->secret);
+ /* t3 = t1^t2 = g^{-xb * xd * s} */
+ BN_mod_exp(t3, t1, t2, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ /* t1 = gx * t3 = X/g^{xb * xd * s} */
+ BN_mod_mul(t1, gx, t3, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ /* K = t1^{xb} */
+ BN_mod_exp(ctx->key, t1, ctx->xb, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+
+ /* cleanup */
+ BN_free(t3);
+ BN_free(t2);
+ BN_free(t1);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int JPAKE_STEP2_process(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const JPAKE_STEP2 *received)
+{
+ BIGNUM *t1 = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new();
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /*-
+ * g' = g^{xc + xa + xb} [from our POV]
+ * t1 = xa + xb
+ */
+ BN_mod_add(t1, ctx->xa, ctx->xb, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx);
+ /* t2 = g^{t1} = g^{xa+xb} */
+ BN_mod_exp(t2, ctx->p.g, t1, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+ /* t1 = g^{xc} * t2 = g^{xc + xa + xb} */
+ BN_mod_mul(t1, ctx->p.gxc, t2, ctx->p.p, ctx->ctx);
+
+ if (verify_zkp(received, t1, ctx))
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP2_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_VERIFY_B_FAILED);
+
+ compute_key(ctx, received->gx);
+
+ /* cleanup */
+ BN_free(t2);
+ BN_free(t1);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void quickhashbn(unsigned char *md, const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+ SHA_CTX sha;
+
+ SHA1_Init(&sha);
+ hashbn(&sha, bn);
+ SHA1_Final(md, &sha);
+}
+
+void JPAKE_STEP3A_init(JPAKE_STEP3A *s3a)
+{
+}
+
+int JPAKE_STEP3A_generate(JPAKE_STEP3A *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ quickhashbn(send->hhk, ctx->key);
+ SHA1(send->hhk, sizeof send->hhk, send->hhk);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int JPAKE_STEP3A_process(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const JPAKE_STEP3A *received)
+{
+ unsigned char hhk[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ quickhashbn(hhk, ctx->key);
+ SHA1(hhk, sizeof hhk, hhk);
+ if (memcmp(hhk, received->hhk, sizeof hhk)) {
+ JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP3A_PROCESS,
+ JPAKE_R_HASH_OF_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void JPAKE_STEP3A_release(JPAKE_STEP3A *s3a)
+{
+}
+
+void JPAKE_STEP3B_init(JPAKE_STEP3B *s3b)
+{
+}
+
+int JPAKE_STEP3B_generate(JPAKE_STEP3B *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ quickhashbn(send->hk, ctx->key);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int JPAKE_STEP3B_process(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const JPAKE_STEP3B *received)
+{
+ unsigned char hk[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ quickhashbn(hk, ctx->key);
+ if (memcmp(hk, received->hk, sizeof hk)) {
+ JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_JPAKE_STEP3B_PROCESS, JPAKE_R_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void JPAKE_STEP3B_release(JPAKE_STEP3B *s3b)
+{
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *JPAKE_get_shared_key(JPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->key;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/mem_clr.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/mem_clr.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/mem_clr.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/mem_clr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/*
- * Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff at geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2002.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-
-unsigned char cleanse_ctr = 0;
-
-void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
-{
- unsigned char *p = ptr;
- size_t loop = len, ctr = cleanse_ctr;
- while (loop--) {
- *(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr;
- ctr += (17 + ((size_t)p & 0xF));
- }
- p = memchr(ptr, (unsigned char)ctr, len);
- if (p)
- ctr += (63 + (size_t)p);
- cleanse_ctr = (unsigned char)ctr;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/mem_clr.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/mem_clr.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/mem_clr.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/mem_clr.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/* crypto/mem_clr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/*
+ * Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff at geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2002.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+unsigned char cleanse_ctr = 0;
+
+void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = ptr;
+ size_t loop = len, ctr = cleanse_ctr;
+
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ while (loop--) {
+ *(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr;
+ ctr += (17 + ((size_t)p & 0xF));
+ }
+ p = memchr(ptr, (unsigned char)ctr, len);
+ if (p)
+ ctr += (63 + (size_t)p);
+ cleanse_ctr = (unsigned char)ctr;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,429 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# April 2010
-#
-# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
-# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
-# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+32 bytes shared table]. There is no
-# experimental performance data available yet. The only approximation
-# that can be made at this point is based on code size. Inner loop is
-# 32 instructions long and on single-issue core should execute in <40
-# cycles. Having verified that gcc 3.4 didn't unroll corresponding
-# loop, this assembler loop body was found to be ~3x smaller than
-# compiler-generated one...
-#
-# July 2010
-#
-# Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 8.5% improvement on
-# Cortex A8 core and ~25 cycles per processed byte (which was observed
-# to be ~3 times faster than gcc-generated code:-)
-#
-# February 2011
-#
-# Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 7%
-# improvement on Cortex A8 core and ~23.5 cycles per byte.
-#
-# March 2011
-#
-# Add NEON implementation featuring polynomial multiplication, i.e. no
-# lookup tables involved. On Cortex A8 it was measured to process one
-# byte in 15 cycles or 55% faster than integer-only code.
-
-# ====================================================================
-# Note about "528B" variant. In ARM case it makes lesser sense to
-# implement it for following reasons:
-#
-# - performance improvement won't be anywhere near 50%, because 128-
-# bit shift operation is neatly fused with 128-bit xor here, and
-# "538B" variant would eliminate only 4-5 instructions out of 32
-# in the inner loop (meaning that estimated improvement is ~15%);
-# - ARM-based systems are often embedded ones and extra memory
-# consumption might be unappreciated (for so little improvement);
-#
-# Byte order [in]dependence. =========================================
-#
-# Caller is expected to maintain specific *dword* order in Htable,
-# namely with *least* significant dword of 128-bit value at *lower*
-# address. This differs completely from C code and has everything to
-# do with ldm instruction and order in which dwords are "consumed" by
-# algorithm. *Byte* order within these dwords in turn is whatever
-# *native* byte order on current platform. See gcm128.c for working
-# example...
-
-while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
-open STDOUT,">$output";
-
-$Xi="r0"; # argument block
-$Htbl="r1";
-$inp="r2";
-$len="r3";
-
-$Zll="r4"; # variables
-$Zlh="r5";
-$Zhl="r6";
-$Zhh="r7";
-$Tll="r8";
-$Tlh="r9";
-$Thl="r10";
-$Thh="r11";
-$nlo="r12";
-################# r13 is stack pointer
-$nhi="r14";
-################# r15 is program counter
-
-$rem_4bit=$inp; # used in gcm_gmult_4bit
-$cnt=$len;
-
-sub Zsmash() {
- my $i=12;
- my @args=@_;
- for ($Zll,$Zlh,$Zhl,$Zhh) {
- $code.=<<___;
-#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 && defined(__ARMEL__)
- rev $_,$_
- str $_,[$Xi,#$i]
-#elif defined(__ARMEB__)
- str $_,[$Xi,#$i]
-#else
- mov $Tlh,$_,lsr#8
- strb $_,[$Xi,#$i+3]
- mov $Thl,$_,lsr#16
- strb $Tlh,[$Xi,#$i+2]
- mov $Thh,$_,lsr#24
- strb $Thl,[$Xi,#$i+1]
- strb $Thh,[$Xi,#$i]
-#endif
-___
- $code.="\t".shift(@args)."\n";
- $i-=4;
- }
-}
-
-$code=<<___;
-#include "arm_arch.h"
-
-.text
-.code 32
-
-.type rem_4bit,%object
-.align 5
-rem_4bit:
-.short 0x0000,0x1C20,0x3840,0x2460
-.short 0x7080,0x6CA0,0x48C0,0x54E0
-.short 0xE100,0xFD20,0xD940,0xC560
-.short 0x9180,0x8DA0,0xA9C0,0xB5E0
-.size rem_4bit,.-rem_4bit
-
-.type rem_4bit_get,%function
-rem_4bit_get:
- sub $rem_4bit,pc,#8
- sub $rem_4bit,$rem_4bit,#32 @ &rem_4bit
- b .Lrem_4bit_got
- nop
-.size rem_4bit_get,.-rem_4bit_get
-
-.global gcm_ghash_4bit
-.type gcm_ghash_4bit,%function
-gcm_ghash_4bit:
- sub r12,pc,#8
- add $len,$inp,$len @ $len to point at the end
- stmdb sp!,{r3-r11,lr} @ save $len/end too
- sub r12,r12,#48 @ &rem_4bit
-
- ldmia r12,{r4-r11} @ copy rem_4bit ...
- stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} @ ... to stack
-
- ldrb $nlo,[$inp,#15]
- ldrb $nhi,[$Xi,#15]
-.Louter:
- eor $nlo,$nlo,$nhi
- and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
- and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
- mov $cnt,#14
-
- add $Zhh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
- ldmia $Zhh,{$Zll-$Zhh} @ load Htbl[nlo]
- add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
- ldrb $nlo,[$inp,#14]
-
- and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
- ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi]
- add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi
- eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
- ldrh $Tll,[sp,$nhi] @ rem_4bit[rem]
- eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
- ldrb $nhi,[$Xi,#14]
- eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
- eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
- eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
- eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
- eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
- eor $nlo,$nlo,$nhi
- and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
- and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
- eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16
-
-.Linner:
- add $Thh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
- and $nlo,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
- subs $cnt,$cnt,#1
- add $nlo,$nlo,$nlo
- ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nlo]
- eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
- eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
- eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
- eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
- ldrh $Tll,[sp,$nlo] @ rem_4bit[rem]
- eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
- ldrplb $nlo,[$inp,$cnt]
- eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
- eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
-
- add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
- and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
- eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
- add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi
- ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi]
- eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
- ldrplb $Tll,[$Xi,$cnt]
- eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
- eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
- ldrh $Tlh,[sp,$nhi]
- eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
- eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
- eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
- eorpl $nlo,$nlo,$Tll
- eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
- andpl $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
- andpl $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
- eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tlh,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
- bpl .Linner
-
- ldr $len,[sp,#32] @ re-load $len/end
- add $inp,$inp,#16
- mov $nhi,$Zll
-___
- &Zsmash("cmp\t$inp,$len","ldrneb\t$nlo,[$inp,#15]");
-$code.=<<___;
- bne .Louter
-
- add sp,sp,#36
-#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
- ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,pc}
-#else
- ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,lr}
- tst lr,#1
- moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet
- bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
-#endif
-.size gcm_ghash_4bit,.-gcm_ghash_4bit
-
-.global gcm_gmult_4bit
-.type gcm_gmult_4bit,%function
-gcm_gmult_4bit:
- stmdb sp!,{r4-r11,lr}
- ldrb $nlo,[$Xi,#15]
- b rem_4bit_get
-.Lrem_4bit_got:
- and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
- and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
- mov $cnt,#14
-
- add $Zhh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
- ldmia $Zhh,{$Zll-$Zhh} @ load Htbl[nlo]
- ldrb $nlo,[$Xi,#14]
-
- add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
- and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
- ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi]
- add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi
- eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
- ldrh $Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nhi] @ rem_4bit[rem]
- eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
- eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
- eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
- eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
- eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
- eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
- and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
- eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16
- and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
-
-.Loop:
- add $Thh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
- and $nlo,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
- subs $cnt,$cnt,#1
- add $nlo,$nlo,$nlo
- ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nlo]
- eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
- eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
- eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
- eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
- ldrh $Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nlo] @ rem_4bit[rem]
- eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
- ldrplb $nlo,[$Xi,$cnt]
- eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
- eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
-
- add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
- and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
- eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
- add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi
- ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi]
- eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
- eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
- eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
- ldrh $Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nhi] @ rem_4bit[rem]
- eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
- eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
- eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
- eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
- andpl $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
- andpl $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
- eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
- bpl .Loop
-___
- &Zsmash();
-$code.=<<___;
-#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
- ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,pc}
-#else
- ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,lr}
- tst lr,#1
- moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet
- bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
-#endif
-.size gcm_gmult_4bit,.-gcm_gmult_4bit
-___
-{
-my $cnt=$Htbl; # $Htbl is used once in the very beginning
-
-my ($Hhi, $Hlo, $Zo, $T, $xi, $mod) = map("d$_",(0..7));
-my ($Qhi, $Qlo, $Z, $R, $zero, $Qpost, $IN) = map("q$_",(8..15));
-
-# Z:Zo keeps 128-bit result shifted by 1 to the right, with bottom bit
-# in Zo. Or should I say "top bit", because GHASH is specified in
-# reverse bit order? Otherwise straightforward 128-bt H by one input
-# byte multiplication and modulo-reduction, times 16.
-
-sub Dlo() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2):""; }
-sub Dhi() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2+1):""; }
-sub Q() { shift=~m|d([1-3]?[02468])|?"q".($1/2):""; }
-
-$code.=<<___;
-#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
-.fpu neon
-
-.global gcm_gmult_neon
-.type gcm_gmult_neon,%function
-.align 4
-gcm_gmult_neon:
- sub $Htbl,#16 @ point at H in GCM128_CTX
- vld1.64 `&Dhi("$IN")`,[$Xi,:64]!@ load Xi
- vmov.i32 $mod,#0xe1 @ our irreducible polynomial
- vld1.64 `&Dlo("$IN")`,[$Xi,:64]!
- vshr.u64 $mod,#32
- vldmia $Htbl,{$Hhi-$Hlo} @ load H
- veor $zero,$zero
-#ifdef __ARMEL__
- vrev64.8 $IN,$IN
-#endif
- veor $Qpost,$Qpost
- veor $R,$R
- mov $cnt,#16
- veor $Z,$Z
- mov $len,#16
- veor $Zo,$Zo
- vdup.8 $xi,`&Dlo("$IN")`[0] @ broadcast lowest byte
- b .Linner_neon
-.size gcm_gmult_neon,.-gcm_gmult_neon
-
-.global gcm_ghash_neon
-.type gcm_ghash_neon,%function
-.align 4
-gcm_ghash_neon:
- vld1.64 `&Dhi("$Z")`,[$Xi,:64]! @ load Xi
- vmov.i32 $mod,#0xe1 @ our irreducible polynomial
- vld1.64 `&Dlo("$Z")`,[$Xi,:64]!
- vshr.u64 $mod,#32
- vldmia $Xi,{$Hhi-$Hlo} @ load H
- veor $zero,$zero
- nop
-#ifdef __ARMEL__
- vrev64.8 $Z,$Z
-#endif
-.Louter_neon:
- vld1.64 `&Dhi($IN)`,[$inp]! @ load inp
- veor $Qpost,$Qpost
- vld1.64 `&Dlo($IN)`,[$inp]!
- veor $R,$R
- mov $cnt,#16
-#ifdef __ARMEL__
- vrev64.8 $IN,$IN
-#endif
- veor $Zo,$Zo
- veor $IN,$Z @ inp^=Xi
- veor $Z,$Z
- vdup.8 $xi,`&Dlo("$IN")`[0] @ broadcast lowest byte
-.Linner_neon:
- subs $cnt,$cnt,#1
- vmull.p8 $Qlo,$Hlo,$xi @ H.lo\xB7Xi[i]
- vmull.p8 $Qhi,$Hhi,$xi @ H.hi\xB7Xi[i]
- vext.8 $IN,$zero,#1 @ IN>>=8
-
- veor $Z,$Qpost @ modulo-scheduled part
- vshl.i64 `&Dlo("$R")`,#48
- vdup.8 $xi,`&Dlo("$IN")`[0] @ broadcast lowest byte
- veor $T,`&Dlo("$Qlo")`,`&Dlo("$Z")`
-
- veor `&Dhi("$Z")`,`&Dlo("$R")`
- vuzp.8 $Qlo,$Qhi
- vsli.8 $Zo,$T,#1 @ compose the "carry" byte
- vext.8 $Z,$zero,#1 @ Z>>=8
-
- vmull.p8 $R,$Zo,$mod @ "carry"\xB70xe1
- vshr.u8 $Zo,$T,#7 @ save Z's bottom bit
- vext.8 $Qpost,$Qlo,$zero,#1 @ Qlo>>=8
- veor $Z,$Qhi
- bne .Linner_neon
-
- veor $Z,$Qpost @ modulo-scheduled artefact
- vshl.i64 `&Dlo("$R")`,#48
- veor `&Dhi("$Z")`,`&Dlo("$R")`
-
- @ finalization, normalize Z:Zo
- vand $Zo,$mod @ suffices to mask the bit
- vshr.u64 `&Dhi(&Q("$Zo"))`,`&Dlo("$Z")`,#63
- vshl.i64 $Z,#1
- subs $len,#16
- vorr $Z,`&Q("$Zo")` @ Z=Z:Zo<<1
- bne .Louter_neon
-
-#ifdef __ARMEL__
- vrev64.8 $Z,$Z
-#endif
- sub $Xi,#16
- vst1.64 `&Dhi("$Z")`,[$Xi,:64]! @ write out Xi
- vst1.64 `&Dlo("$Z")`,[$Xi,:64]
-
- bx lr
-.size gcm_ghash_neon,.-gcm_ghash_neon
-#endif
-___
-}
-$code.=<<___;
-.asciz "GHASH for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
-.align 2
-___
-
-$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
-$code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
-print $code;
-close STDOUT; # enforce flush
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,429 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# April 2010
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
+# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+32 bytes shared table]. There is no
+# experimental performance data available yet. The only approximation
+# that can be made at this point is based on code size. Inner loop is
+# 32 instructions long and on single-issue core should execute in <40
+# cycles. Having verified that gcc 3.4 didn't unroll corresponding
+# loop, this assembler loop body was found to be ~3x smaller than
+# compiler-generated one...
+#
+# July 2010
+#
+# Rescheduling for dual-issue pipeline resulted in 8.5% improvement on
+# Cortex A8 core and ~25 cycles per processed byte (which was observed
+# to be ~3 times faster than gcc-generated code:-)
+#
+# February 2011
+#
+# Profiler-assisted and platform-specific optimization resulted in 7%
+# improvement on Cortex A8 core and ~23.5 cycles per byte.
+#
+# March 2011
+#
+# Add NEON implementation featuring polynomial multiplication, i.e. no
+# lookup tables involved. On Cortex A8 it was measured to process one
+# byte in 15 cycles or 55% faster than integer-only code.
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Note about "528B" variant. In ARM case it makes lesser sense to
+# implement it for following reasons:
+#
+# - performance improvement won't be anywhere near 50%, because 128-
+# bit shift operation is neatly fused with 128-bit xor here, and
+# "538B" variant would eliminate only 4-5 instructions out of 32
+# in the inner loop (meaning that estimated improvement is ~15%);
+# - ARM-based systems are often embedded ones and extra memory
+# consumption might be unappreciated (for so little improvement);
+#
+# Byte order [in]dependence. =========================================
+#
+# Caller is expected to maintain specific *dword* order in Htable,
+# namely with *least* significant dword of 128-bit value at *lower*
+# address. This differs completely from C code and has everything to
+# do with ldm instruction and order in which dwords are "consumed" by
+# algorithm. *Byte* order within these dwords in turn is whatever
+# *native* byte order on current platform. See gcm128.c for working
+# example...
+
+while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+$Xi="r0"; # argument block
+$Htbl="r1";
+$inp="r2";
+$len="r3";
+
+$Zll="r4"; # variables
+$Zlh="r5";
+$Zhl="r6";
+$Zhh="r7";
+$Tll="r8";
+$Tlh="r9";
+$Thl="r10";
+$Thh="r11";
+$nlo="r12";
+################# r13 is stack pointer
+$nhi="r14";
+################# r15 is program counter
+
+$rem_4bit=$inp; # used in gcm_gmult_4bit
+$cnt=$len;
+
+sub Zsmash() {
+ my $i=12;
+ my @args=@_;
+ for ($Zll,$Zlh,$Zhl,$Zhh) {
+ $code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7 && defined(__ARMEL__)
+ rev $_,$_
+ str $_,[$Xi,#$i]
+#elif defined(__ARMEB__)
+ str $_,[$Xi,#$i]
+#else
+ mov $Tlh,$_,lsr#8
+ strb $_,[$Xi,#$i+3]
+ mov $Thl,$_,lsr#16
+ strb $Tlh,[$Xi,#$i+2]
+ mov $Thh,$_,lsr#24
+ strb $Thl,[$Xi,#$i+1]
+ strb $Thh,[$Xi,#$i]
+#endif
+___
+ $code.="\t".shift(@args)."\n";
+ $i-=4;
+ }
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+#include "arm_arch.h"
+
+.text
+.code 32
+
+.type rem_4bit,%object
+.align 5
+rem_4bit:
+.short 0x0000,0x1C20,0x3840,0x2460
+.short 0x7080,0x6CA0,0x48C0,0x54E0
+.short 0xE100,0xFD20,0xD940,0xC560
+.short 0x9180,0x8DA0,0xA9C0,0xB5E0
+.size rem_4bit,.-rem_4bit
+
+.type rem_4bit_get,%function
+rem_4bit_get:
+ sub $rem_4bit,pc,#8
+ sub $rem_4bit,$rem_4bit,#32 @ &rem_4bit
+ b .Lrem_4bit_got
+ nop
+.size rem_4bit_get,.-rem_4bit_get
+
+.global gcm_ghash_4bit
+.type gcm_ghash_4bit,%function
+gcm_ghash_4bit:
+ sub r12,pc,#8
+ add $len,$inp,$len @ $len to point at the end
+ stmdb sp!,{r3-r11,lr} @ save $len/end too
+ sub r12,r12,#48 @ &rem_4bit
+
+ ldmia r12,{r4-r11} @ copy rem_4bit ...
+ stmdb sp!,{r4-r11} @ ... to stack
+
+ ldrb $nlo,[$inp,#15]
+ ldrb $nhi,[$Xi,#15]
+.Louter:
+ eor $nlo,$nlo,$nhi
+ and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+ and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+ mov $cnt,#14
+
+ add $Zhh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
+ ldmia $Zhh,{$Zll-$Zhh} @ load Htbl[nlo]
+ add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
+ ldrb $nlo,[$inp,#14]
+
+ and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
+ ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi]
+ add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi
+ eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+ ldrh $Tll,[sp,$nhi] @ rem_4bit[rem]
+ eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+ ldrb $nhi,[$Xi,#14]
+ eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+ eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+ eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+ eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+ eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+ eor $nlo,$nlo,$nhi
+ and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+ and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+ eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16
+
+.Linner:
+ add $Thh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
+ and $nlo,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
+ subs $cnt,$cnt,#1
+ add $nlo,$nlo,$nlo
+ ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nlo]
+ eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+ eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+ eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+ eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+ ldrh $Tll,[sp,$nlo] @ rem_4bit[rem]
+ eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+ ldrplb $nlo,[$inp,$cnt]
+ eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+ eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+
+ add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
+ and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
+ eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
+ add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi
+ ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi]
+ eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+ ldrplb $Tll,[$Xi,$cnt]
+ eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+ eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+ ldrh $Tlh,[sp,$nhi]
+ eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+ eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+ eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+ eorpl $nlo,$nlo,$Tll
+ eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+ andpl $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+ andpl $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+ eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tlh,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
+ bpl .Linner
+
+ ldr $len,[sp,#32] @ re-load $len/end
+ add $inp,$inp,#16
+ mov $nhi,$Zll
+___
+ &Zsmash("cmp\t$inp,$len","ldrneb\t$nlo,[$inp,#15]");
+$code.=<<___;
+ bne .Louter
+
+ add sp,sp,#36
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+ ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,pc}
+#else
+ ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,lr}
+ tst lr,#1
+ moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+ bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size gcm_ghash_4bit,.-gcm_ghash_4bit
+
+.global gcm_gmult_4bit
+.type gcm_gmult_4bit,%function
+gcm_gmult_4bit:
+ stmdb sp!,{r4-r11,lr}
+ ldrb $nlo,[$Xi,#15]
+ b rem_4bit_get
+.Lrem_4bit_got:
+ and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+ and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+ mov $cnt,#14
+
+ add $Zhh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
+ ldmia $Zhh,{$Zll-$Zhh} @ load Htbl[nlo]
+ ldrb $nlo,[$Xi,#14]
+
+ add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
+ and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
+ ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi]
+ add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi
+ eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+ ldrh $Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nhi] @ rem_4bit[rem]
+ eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+ eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+ eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+ eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+ eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+ eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+ and $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+ eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16
+ and $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+
+.Loop:
+ add $Thh,$Htbl,$nlo,lsl#4
+ and $nlo,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
+ subs $cnt,$cnt,#1
+ add $nlo,$nlo,$nlo
+ ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nlo]
+ eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+ eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+ eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+ eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+ ldrh $Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nlo] @ rem_4bit[rem]
+ eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+ ldrplb $nlo,[$Xi,$cnt]
+ eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+ eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+
+ add $Thh,$Htbl,$nhi
+ and $nhi,$Zll,#0xf @ rem
+ eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
+ add $nhi,$nhi,$nhi
+ ldmia $Thh,{$Tll-$Thh} @ load Htbl[nhi]
+ eor $Zll,$Tll,$Zll,lsr#4
+ eor $Zll,$Zll,$Zlh,lsl#28
+ eor $Zlh,$Tlh,$Zlh,lsr#4
+ ldrh $Tll,[$rem_4bit,$nhi] @ rem_4bit[rem]
+ eor $Zlh,$Zlh,$Zhl,lsl#28
+ eor $Zhl,$Thl,$Zhl,lsr#4
+ eor $Zhl,$Zhl,$Zhh,lsl#28
+ eor $Zhh,$Thh,$Zhh,lsr#4
+ andpl $nhi,$nlo,#0xf0
+ andpl $nlo,$nlo,#0x0f
+ eor $Zhh,$Zhh,$Tll,lsl#16 @ ^= rem_4bit[rem]
+ bpl .Loop
+___
+ &Zsmash();
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=5
+ ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,pc}
+#else
+ ldmia sp!,{r4-r11,lr}
+ tst lr,#1
+ moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet
+ bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
+#endif
+.size gcm_gmult_4bit,.-gcm_gmult_4bit
+___
+{
+my $cnt=$Htbl; # $Htbl is used once in the very beginning
+
+my ($Hhi, $Hlo, $Zo, $T, $xi, $mod) = map("d$_",(0..7));
+my ($Qhi, $Qlo, $Z, $R, $zero, $Qpost, $IN) = map("q$_",(8..15));
+
+# Z:Zo keeps 128-bit result shifted by 1 to the right, with bottom bit
+# in Zo. Or should I say "top bit", because GHASH is specified in
+# reverse bit order? Otherwise straightforward 128-bt H by one input
+# byte multiplication and modulo-reduction, times 16.
+
+sub Dlo() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2):""; }
+sub Dhi() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2+1):""; }
+sub Q() { shift=~m|d([1-3]?[02468])|?"q".($1/2):""; }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
+.fpu neon
+
+.global gcm_gmult_neon
+.type gcm_gmult_neon,%function
+.align 4
+gcm_gmult_neon:
+ sub $Htbl,#16 @ point at H in GCM128_CTX
+ vld1.64 `&Dhi("$IN")`,[$Xi,:64]!@ load Xi
+ vmov.i32 $mod,#0xe1 @ our irreducible polynomial
+ vld1.64 `&Dlo("$IN")`,[$Xi,:64]!
+ vshr.u64 $mod,#32
+ vldmia $Htbl,{$Hhi-$Hlo} @ load H
+ veor $zero,$zero
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+ vrev64.8 $IN,$IN
+#endif
+ veor $Qpost,$Qpost
+ veor $R,$R
+ mov $cnt,#16
+ veor $Z,$Z
+ mov $len,#16
+ veor $Zo,$Zo
+ vdup.8 $xi,`&Dlo("$IN")`[0] @ broadcast lowest byte
+ b .Linner_neon
+.size gcm_gmult_neon,.-gcm_gmult_neon
+
+.global gcm_ghash_neon
+.type gcm_ghash_neon,%function
+.align 4
+gcm_ghash_neon:
+ vld1.64 `&Dhi("$Z")`,[$Xi,:64]! @ load Xi
+ vmov.i32 $mod,#0xe1 @ our irreducible polynomial
+ vld1.64 `&Dlo("$Z")`,[$Xi,:64]!
+ vshr.u64 $mod,#32
+ vldmia $Xi,{$Hhi-$Hlo} @ load H
+ veor $zero,$zero
+ nop
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+ vrev64.8 $Z,$Z
+#endif
+.Louter_neon:
+ vld1.64 `&Dhi($IN)`,[$inp]! @ load inp
+ veor $Qpost,$Qpost
+ vld1.64 `&Dlo($IN)`,[$inp]!
+ veor $R,$R
+ mov $cnt,#16
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+ vrev64.8 $IN,$IN
+#endif
+ veor $Zo,$Zo
+ veor $IN,$Z @ inp^=Xi
+ veor $Z,$Z
+ vdup.8 $xi,`&Dlo("$IN")`[0] @ broadcast lowest byte
+.Linner_neon:
+ subs $cnt,$cnt,#1
+ vmull.p8 $Qlo,$Hlo,$xi @ H.lo·Xi[i]
+ vmull.p8 $Qhi,$Hhi,$xi @ H.hi·Xi[i]
+ vext.8 $IN,$zero,#1 @ IN>>=8
+
+ veor $Z,$Qpost @ modulo-scheduled part
+ vshl.i64 `&Dlo("$R")`,#48
+ vdup.8 $xi,`&Dlo("$IN")`[0] @ broadcast lowest byte
+ veor $T,`&Dlo("$Qlo")`,`&Dlo("$Z")`
+
+ veor `&Dhi("$Z")`,`&Dlo("$R")`
+ vuzp.8 $Qlo,$Qhi
+ vsli.8 $Zo,$T,#1 @ compose the "carry" byte
+ vext.8 $Z,$zero,#1 @ Z>>=8
+
+ vmull.p8 $R,$Zo,$mod @ "carry"·0xe1
+ vshr.u8 $Zo,$T,#7 @ save Z's bottom bit
+ vext.8 $Qpost,$Qlo,$zero,#1 @ Qlo>>=8
+ veor $Z,$Qhi
+ bne .Linner_neon
+
+ veor $Z,$Qpost @ modulo-scheduled artefact
+ vshl.i64 `&Dlo("$R")`,#48
+ veor `&Dhi("$Z")`,`&Dlo("$R")`
+
+ @ finalization, normalize Z:Zo
+ vand $Zo,$mod @ suffices to mask the bit
+ vshr.u64 `&Dhi(&Q("$Zo"))`,`&Dlo("$Z")`,#63
+ vshl.i64 $Z,#1
+ subs $len,#16
+ vorr $Z,`&Q("$Zo")` @ Z=Z:Zo<<1
+ bne .Louter_neon
+
+#ifdef __ARMEL__
+ vrev64.8 $Z,$Z
+#endif
+ sub $Xi,#16
+ vst1.64 `&Dhi("$Z")`,[$Xi,:64]! @ write out Xi
+ vst1.64 `&Dlo("$Z")`,[$Xi,:64]
+
+ bx lr
+.size gcm_ghash_neon,.-gcm_ghash_neon
+#endif
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+.asciz "GHASH for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align 2
+___
+
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+$code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
+print $code;
+close STDOUT; # enforce flush
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1342 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# March, May, June 2010
-#
-# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
-# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
-# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+64/128 bytes fixed table]. It has two
-# code paths: vanilla x86 and vanilla MMX. Former will be executed on
-# 486 and Pentium, latter on all others. MMX GHASH features so called
-# "528B" variant of "4-bit" method utilizing additional 256+16 bytes
-# of per-key storage [+512 bytes shared table]. Performance results
-# are for streamed GHASH subroutine and are expressed in cycles per
-# processed byte, less is better:
-#
-# gcc 2.95.3(*) MMX assembler x86 assembler
-#
-# Pentium 105/111(**) - 50
-# PIII 68 /75 12.2 24
-# P4 125/125 17.8 84(***)
-# Opteron 66 /70 10.1 30
-# Core2 54 /67 8.4 18
-#
-# (*) gcc 3.4.x was observed to generate few percent slower code,
-# which is one of reasons why 2.95.3 results were chosen,
-# another reason is lack of 3.4.x results for older CPUs;
-# comparison with MMX results is not completely fair, because C
-# results are for vanilla "256B" implementation, while
-# assembler results are for "528B";-)
-# (**) second number is result for code compiled with -fPIC flag,
-# which is actually more relevant, because assembler code is
-# position-independent;
-# (***) see comment in non-MMX routine for further details;
-#
-# To summarize, it's >2-5 times faster than gcc-generated code. To
-# anchor it to something else SHA1 assembler processes one byte in
-# 11-13 cycles on contemporary x86 cores. As for choice of MMX in
-# particular, see comment at the end of the file...
-
-# May 2010
-#
-# Add PCLMULQDQ version performing at 2.10 cycles per processed byte.
-# The question is how close is it to theoretical limit? The pclmulqdq
-# instruction latency appears to be 14 cycles and there can't be more
-# than 2 of them executing at any given time. This means that single
-# Karatsuba multiplication would take 28 cycles *plus* few cycles for
-# pre- and post-processing. Then multiplication has to be followed by
-# modulo-reduction. Given that aggregated reduction method [see
-# "Carry-less Multiplication and Its Usage for Computing the GCM Mode"
-# white paper by Intel] allows you to perform reduction only once in
-# a while we can assume that asymptotic performance can be estimated
-# as (28+Tmod/Naggr)/16, where Tmod is time to perform reduction
-# and Naggr is the aggregation factor.
-#
-# Before we proceed to this implementation let's have closer look at
-# the best-performing code suggested by Intel in their white paper.
-# By tracing inter-register dependencies Tmod is estimated as ~19
-# cycles and Naggr chosen by Intel is 4, resulting in 2.05 cycles per
-# processed byte. As implied, this is quite optimistic estimate,
-# because it does not account for Karatsuba pre- and post-processing,
-# which for a single multiplication is ~5 cycles. Unfortunately Intel
-# does not provide performance data for GHASH alone. But benchmarking
-# AES_GCM_encrypt ripped out of Fig. 15 of the white paper with aadt
-# alone resulted in 2.46 cycles per byte of out 16KB buffer. Note that
-# the result accounts even for pre-computing of degrees of the hash
-# key H, but its portion is negligible at 16KB buffer size.
-#
-# Moving on to the implementation in question. Tmod is estimated as
-# ~13 cycles and Naggr is 2, giving asymptotic performance of ...
-# 2.16. How is it possible that measured performance is better than
-# optimistic theoretical estimate? There is one thing Intel failed
-# to recognize. By serializing GHASH with CTR in same subroutine
-# former's performance is really limited to above (Tmul + Tmod/Naggr)
-# equation. But if GHASH procedure is detached, the modulo-reduction
-# can be interleaved with Naggr-1 multiplications at instruction level
-# and under ideal conditions even disappear from the equation. So that
-# optimistic theoretical estimate for this implementation is ...
-# 28/16=1.75, and not 2.16. Well, it's probably way too optimistic,
-# at least for such small Naggr. I'd argue that (28+Tproc/Naggr),
-# where Tproc is time required for Karatsuba pre- and post-processing,
-# is more realistic estimate. In this case it gives ... 1.91 cycles.
-# Or in other words, depending on how well we can interleave reduction
-# and one of the two multiplications the performance should be betwen
-# 1.91 and 2.16. As already mentioned, this implementation processes
-# one byte out of 8KB buffer in 2.10 cycles, while x86_64 counterpart
-# - in 2.02. x86_64 performance is better, because larger register
-# bank allows to interleave reduction and multiplication better.
-#
-# Does it make sense to increase Naggr? To start with it's virtually
-# impossible in 32-bit mode, because of limited register bank
-# capacity. Otherwise improvement has to be weighed agiainst slower
-# setup, as well as code size and complexity increase. As even
-# optimistic estimate doesn't promise 30% performance improvement,
-# there are currently no plans to increase Naggr.
-#
-# Special thanks to David Woodhouse <dwmw2 at infradead.org> for
-# providing access to a Westmere-based system on behalf of Intel
-# Open Source Technology Centre.
-
-# January 2010
-#
-# Tweaked to optimize transitions between integer and FP operations
-# on same XMM register, PCLMULQDQ subroutine was measured to process
-# one byte in 2.07 cycles on Sandy Bridge, and in 2.12 - on Westmere.
-# The minor regression on Westmere is outweighed by ~15% improvement
-# on Sandy Bridge. Strangely enough attempt to modify 64-bit code in
-# similar manner resulted in almost 20% degradation on Sandy Bridge,
-# where original 64-bit code processes one byte in 1.95 cycles.
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
-require "x86asm.pl";
-
-&asm_init($ARGV[0],"ghash-x86.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
-
-$sse2=0;
-for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
-
-($Zhh,$Zhl,$Zlh,$Zll) = ("ebp","edx","ecx","ebx");
-$inp = "edi";
-$Htbl = "esi";
-
-$unroll = 0; # Affects x86 loop. Folded loop performs ~7% worse
- # than unrolled, which has to be weighted against
- # 2.5x x86-specific code size reduction.
-
-sub x86_loop {
- my $off = shift;
- my $rem = "eax";
-
- &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$Zll));
- &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$Zll));
- &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$Zll));
- &mov ($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$Zll));
- &xor ($rem,$rem); # avoid partial register stalls on PIII
-
- # shrd practically kills P4, 2.5x deterioration, but P4 has
- # MMX code-path to execute. shrd runs tad faster [than twice
- # the shifts, move's and or's] on pre-MMX Pentium (as well as
- # PIII and Core2), *but* minimizes code size, spares register
- # and thus allows to fold the loop...
- if (!$unroll) {
- my $cnt = $inp;
- &mov ($cnt,15);
- &jmp (&label("x86_loop"));
- &set_label("x86_loop",16);
- for($i=1;$i<=2;$i++) {
- &mov (&LB($rem),&LB($Zll));
- &shrd ($Zll,$Zlh,4);
- &and (&LB($rem),0xf);
- &shrd ($Zlh,$Zhl,4);
- &shrd ($Zhl,$Zhh,4);
- &shr ($Zhh,4);
- &xor ($Zhh,&DWP($off+16,"esp",$rem,4));
-
- &mov (&LB($rem),&BP($off,"esp",$cnt));
- if ($i&1) {
- &and (&LB($rem),0xf0);
- } else {
- &shl (&LB($rem),4);
- }
-
- &xor ($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$rem));
- &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$rem));
- &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$rem));
- &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$rem));
-
- if ($i&1) {
- &dec ($cnt);
- &js (&label("x86_break"));
- } else {
- &jmp (&label("x86_loop"));
- }
- }
- &set_label("x86_break",16);
- } else {
- for($i=1;$i<32;$i++) {
- &comment($i);
- &mov (&LB($rem),&LB($Zll));
- &shrd ($Zll,$Zlh,4);
- &and (&LB($rem),0xf);
- &shrd ($Zlh,$Zhl,4);
- &shrd ($Zhl,$Zhh,4);
- &shr ($Zhh,4);
- &xor ($Zhh,&DWP($off+16,"esp",$rem,4));
-
- if ($i&1) {
- &mov (&LB($rem),&BP($off+15-($i>>1),"esp"));
- &and (&LB($rem),0xf0);
- } else {
- &mov (&LB($rem),&BP($off+15-($i>>1),"esp"));
- &shl (&LB($rem),4);
- }
-
- &xor ($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$rem));
- &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$rem));
- &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$rem));
- &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$rem));
- }
- }
- &bswap ($Zll);
- &bswap ($Zlh);
- &bswap ($Zhl);
- if (!$x86only) {
- &bswap ($Zhh);
- } else {
- &mov ("eax",$Zhh);
- &bswap ("eax");
- &mov ($Zhh,"eax");
- }
-}
-
-if ($unroll) {
- &function_begin_B("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
- &x86_loop(4);
- &ret ();
- &function_end_B("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
-}
-
-sub deposit_rem_4bit {
- my $bias = shift;
-
- &mov (&DWP($bias+0, "esp"),0x0000<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+4, "esp"),0x1C20<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+8, "esp"),0x3840<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+12,"esp"),0x2460<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+16,"esp"),0x7080<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+20,"esp"),0x6CA0<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+24,"esp"),0x48C0<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+28,"esp"),0x54E0<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+32,"esp"),0xE100<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+36,"esp"),0xFD20<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+40,"esp"),0xD940<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+44,"esp"),0xC560<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+48,"esp"),0x9180<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+52,"esp"),0x8DA0<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+56,"esp"),0xA9C0<<16);
- &mov (&DWP($bias+60,"esp"),0xB5E0<<16);
-}
-
-$suffix = $x86only ? "" : "_x86";
-
-&function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit".$suffix);
- &stack_push(16+4+1); # +1 for stack alignment
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable
-
- &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp)); # load Xi[16]
- &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp));
- &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp));
- &mov ($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp));
-
- &deposit_rem_4bit(16);
-
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh); # copy Xi[16] on stack
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl);
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh);
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll);
- &shr ($Zll,20);
- &and ($Zll,0xf0);
-
- if ($unroll) {
- &call ("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
- } else {
- &x86_loop(0);
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
- }
-
- &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
- &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
- &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
- &stack_pop(16+4+1);
-&function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit".$suffix);
-
-&function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit".$suffix);
- &stack_push(16+4+1); # +1 for 64-bit alignment
- &mov ($Zll,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); # load in
- &mov ("ecx",&wparam(3)); # load len
- &add ("ecx",$inp);
- &mov (&wparam(3),"ecx");
-
- &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$Zll)); # load Xi[16]
- &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$Zll));
- &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$Zll));
- &mov ($Zll,&DWP(12,$Zll));
-
- &deposit_rem_4bit(16);
-
- &set_label("x86_outer_loop",16);
- &xor ($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp)); # xor with input
- &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp));
- &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp));
- &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp));
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll); # dump it on stack
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh);
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl);
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh);
-
- &shr ($Zll,20);
- &and ($Zll,0xf0);
-
- if ($unroll) {
- &call ("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
- } else {
- &x86_loop(0);
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(2));
- }
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
- &cmp ($inp,&wparam(3));
- &mov (&wparam(2),$inp) if (!$unroll);
- &jb (&label("x86_outer_loop"));
-
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
- &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
- &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
- &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
- &stack_pop(16+4+1);
-&function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit".$suffix);
-
-if (!$x86only) {{{
-
-&static_label("rem_4bit");
-
-if (!$sse2) {{ # pure-MMX "May" version...
-
-$S=12; # shift factor for rem_4bit
-
-&function_begin_B("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
-# MMX version performs 3.5 times better on P4 (see comment in non-MMX
-# routine for further details), 100% better on Opteron, ~70% better
-# on Core2 and PIII... In other words effort is considered to be well
-# spent... Since initial release the loop was unrolled in order to
-# "liberate" register previously used as loop counter. Instead it's
-# used to optimize critical path in 'Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[Z.lo&0xf]'.
-# The path involves move of Z.lo from MMX to integer register,
-# effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi.
-# Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4
-# rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement
-# on contemporary \xB5-archs.
-{
- my $cnt;
- my $rem_4bit = "eax";
- my @rem = ($Zhh,$Zll);
- my $nhi = $Zhl;
- my $nlo = $Zlh;
-
- my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm0","mm1");
- my $tmp = "mm2";
-
- &xor ($nlo,$nlo); # avoid partial register stalls on PIII
- &mov ($nhi,$Zll);
- &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($nhi));
- &shl (&LB($nlo),4);
- &and ($nhi,0xf0);
- &movq ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
- &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
- &movd ($rem[0],$Zlo);
-
- for ($cnt=28;$cnt>=-2;$cnt--) {
- my $odd = $cnt&1;
- my $nix = $odd ? $nlo : $nhi;
-
- &shl (&LB($nlo),4) if ($odd);
- &psrlq ($Zlo,4);
- &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
- &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
- &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nix));
- &mov (&LB($nlo),&BP($cnt/2,$inp)) if (!$odd && $cnt>=0);
- &psllq ($tmp,60);
- &and ($nhi,0xf0) if ($odd);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem[1],8)) if ($cnt<28);
- &and ($rem[0],0xf);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nix));
- &mov ($nhi,$nlo) if (!$odd && $cnt>=0);
- &movd ($rem[1],$Zlo);
- &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
-
- push (@rem,shift(@rem)); # "rotate" registers
- }
-
- &mov ($inp,&DWP(4,$rem_4bit,$rem[1],8)); # last rem_4bit[rem]
-
- &psrlq ($Zlo,32); # lower part of Zlo is already there
- &movd ($Zhl,$Zhi);
- &psrlq ($Zhi,32);
- &movd ($Zlh,$Zlo);
- &movd ($Zhh,$Zhi);
- &shl ($inp,4); # compensate for rem_4bit[i] being >>4
-
- &bswap ($Zll);
- &bswap ($Zhl);
- &bswap ($Zlh);
- &xor ($Zhh,$inp);
- &bswap ($Zhh);
-
- &ret ();
-}
-&function_end_B("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
-
-&function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable
-
- &call (&label("pic_point"));
- &set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop("eax");
- &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax"));
-
- &movz ($Zll,&BP(15,$inp));
-
- &call ("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
-
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
- &emms ();
- &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
- &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
- &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
-&function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
-
-# Streamed version performs 20% better on P4, 7% on Opteron,
-# 10% on Core2 and PIII...
-&function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
- &mov ($Zhh,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); # load in
- &mov ($Zlh,&wparam(3)); # load len
-
- &call (&label("pic_point"));
- &set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop("eax");
- &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax"));
-
- &add ($Zlh,$inp);
- &mov (&wparam(3),$Zlh); # len to point at the end of input
- &stack_push(4+1); # +1 for stack alignment
-
- &mov ($Zll,&DWP(12,$Zhh)); # load Xi[16]
- &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$Zhh));
- &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$Zhh));
- &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$Zhh));
- &jmp (&label("mmx_outer_loop"));
-
- &set_label("mmx_outer_loop",16);
- &xor ($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp));
- &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp));
- &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp));
- &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp));
- &mov (&wparam(2),$inp);
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll);
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl);
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh);
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh);
-
- &mov ($inp,"esp");
- &shr ($Zll,24);
-
- &call ("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
-
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(2));
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
- &cmp ($inp,&wparam(3));
- &jb (&label("mmx_outer_loop"));
-
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
- &emms ();
- &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
- &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
- &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
-
- &stack_pop(4+1);
-&function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
-
-}} else {{ # "June" MMX version...
- # ... has slower "April" gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx with folded
- # loop. This is done to conserve code size...
-$S=16; # shift factor for rem_4bit
-
-sub mmx_loop() {
-# MMX version performs 2.8 times better on P4 (see comment in non-MMX
-# routine for further details), 40% better on Opteron and Core2, 50%
-# better on PIII... In other words effort is considered to be well
-# spent...
- my $inp = shift;
- my $rem_4bit = shift;
- my $cnt = $Zhh;
- my $nhi = $Zhl;
- my $nlo = $Zlh;
- my $rem = $Zll;
-
- my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm0","mm1");
- my $tmp = "mm2";
-
- &xor ($nlo,$nlo); # avoid partial register stalls on PIII
- &mov ($nhi,$Zll);
- &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($nhi));
- &mov ($cnt,14);
- &shl (&LB($nlo),4);
- &and ($nhi,0xf0);
- &movq ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
- &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
- &movd ($rem,$Zlo);
- &jmp (&label("mmx_loop"));
-
- &set_label("mmx_loop",16);
- &psrlq ($Zlo,4);
- &and ($rem,0xf);
- &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
- &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
- &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nhi));
- &mov (&LB($nlo),&BP(0,$inp,$cnt));
- &psllq ($tmp,60);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
- &dec ($cnt);
- &movd ($rem,$Zlo);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nhi));
- &mov ($nhi,$nlo);
- &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
- &js (&label("mmx_break"));
-
- &shl (&LB($nlo),4);
- &and ($rem,0xf);
- &psrlq ($Zlo,4);
- &and ($nhi,0xf0);
- &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
- &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
- &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
- &psllq ($tmp,60);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
- &movd ($rem,$Zlo);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
- &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
- &jmp (&label("mmx_loop"));
-
- &set_label("mmx_break",16);
- &shl (&LB($nlo),4);
- &and ($rem,0xf);
- &psrlq ($Zlo,4);
- &and ($nhi,0xf0);
- &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
- &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
- &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
- &psllq ($tmp,60);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
- &movd ($rem,$Zlo);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
- &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
-
- &psrlq ($Zlo,4);
- &and ($rem,0xf);
- &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
- &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
- &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nhi));
- &psllq ($tmp,60);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
- &movd ($rem,$Zlo);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nhi));
- &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
-
- &psrlq ($Zlo,32); # lower part of Zlo is already there
- &movd ($Zhl,$Zhi);
- &psrlq ($Zhi,32);
- &movd ($Zlh,$Zlo);
- &movd ($Zhh,$Zhi);
-
- &bswap ($Zll);
- &bswap ($Zhl);
- &bswap ($Zlh);
- &bswap ($Zhh);
-}
-
-&function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable
-
- &call (&label("pic_point"));
- &set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop("eax");
- &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax"));
-
- &movz ($Zll,&BP(15,$inp));
-
- &mmx_loop($inp,"eax");
-
- &emms ();
- &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
- &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
- &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
- &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
-&function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
-
-######################################################################
-# Below subroutine is "528B" variant of "4-bit" GCM GHASH function
-# (see gcm128.c for details). It provides further 20-40% performance
-# improvement over above mentioned "May" version.
-
-&static_label("rem_8bit");
-
-&function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
-{ my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm7","mm6");
- my $rem_8bit = "esi";
- my $Htbl = "ebx";
-
- # parameter block
- &mov ("eax",&wparam(0)); # Xi
- &mov ("ebx",&wparam(1)); # Htable
- &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # inp
- &mov ("edx",&wparam(3)); # len
- &mov ("ebp","esp"); # original %esp
- &call (&label("pic_point"));
- &set_label ("pic_point");
- &blindpop ($rem_8bit);
- &lea ($rem_8bit,&DWP(&label("rem_8bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),$rem_8bit));
-
- &sub ("esp",512+16+16); # allocate stack frame...
- &and ("esp",-64); # ...and align it
- &sub ("esp",16); # place for (u8)(H[]<<4)
-
- &add ("edx","ecx"); # pointer to the end of input
- &mov (&DWP(528+16+0,"esp"),"eax"); # save Xi
- &mov (&DWP(528+16+8,"esp"),"edx"); # save inp+len
- &mov (&DWP(528+16+12,"esp"),"ebp"); # save original %esp
-
- { my @lo = ("mm0","mm1","mm2");
- my @hi = ("mm3","mm4","mm5");
- my @tmp = ("mm6","mm7");
- my ($off1,$off2,$i) = (0,0,);
-
- &add ($Htbl,128); # optimize for size
- &lea ("edi",&DWP(16+128,"esp"));
- &lea ("ebp",&DWP(16+256+128,"esp"));
-
- # decompose Htable (low and high parts are kept separately),
- # generate Htable[]>>4, (u8)(Htable[]<<4), save to stack...
- for ($i=0;$i<18;$i++) {
-
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(16*$i+8-128,$Htbl)) if ($i<16);
- &movq ($lo[0],&QWP(16*$i+8-128,$Htbl)) if ($i<16);
- &psllq ($tmp[1],60) if ($i>1);
- &movq ($hi[0],&QWP(16*$i+0-128,$Htbl)) if ($i<16);
- &por ($lo[2],$tmp[1]) if ($i>1);
- &movq (&QWP($off1-128,"edi"),$lo[1]) if ($i>0 && $i<17);
- &psrlq ($lo[1],4) if ($i>0 && $i<17);
- &movq (&QWP($off1,"edi"),$hi[1]) if ($i>0 && $i<17);
- &movq ($tmp[0],$hi[1]) if ($i>0 && $i<17);
- &movq (&QWP($off2-128,"ebp"),$lo[2]) if ($i>1);
- &psrlq ($hi[1],4) if ($i>0 && $i<17);
- &movq (&QWP($off2,"ebp"),$hi[2]) if ($i>1);
- &shl ("edx",4) if ($i<16);
- &mov (&BP($i,"esp"),&LB("edx")) if ($i<16);
-
- unshift (@lo,pop(@lo)); # "rotate" registers
- unshift (@hi,pop(@hi));
- unshift (@tmp,pop(@tmp));
- $off1 += 8 if ($i>0);
- $off2 += 8 if ($i>1);
- }
- }
-
- &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(0,"eax"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(8,"eax"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"eax")); # load Xi
-
-&set_label("outer",16);
- { my $nlo = "eax";
- my $dat = "edx";
- my @nhi = ("edi","ebp");
- my @rem = ("ebx","ecx");
- my @red = ("mm0","mm1","mm2");
- my $tmp = "mm3";
-
- &xor ($dat,&DWP(12,"ecx")); # merge input data
- &xor ("ebx",&DWP(8,"ecx"));
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,"ecx"));
- &lea ("ecx",&DWP(16,"ecx")); # inp+=16
- #&mov (&DWP(528+12,"esp"),$dat); # save inp^Xi
- &mov (&DWP(528+8,"esp"),"ebx");
- &movq (&QWP(528+0,"esp"),$Zhi);
- &mov (&DWP(528+16+4,"esp"),"ecx"); # save inp
-
- &xor ($nlo,$nlo);
- &rol ($dat,8);
- &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($dat));
- &mov ($nhi[1],$nlo);
- &and (&LB($nlo),0x0f);
- &shr ($nhi[1],4);
- &pxor ($red[0],$red[0]);
- &rol ($dat,8); # next byte
- &pxor ($red[1],$red[1]);
- &pxor ($red[2],$red[2]);
-
- # Just like in "May" verson modulo-schedule for critical path in
- # 'Z.hi ^= rem_8bit[Z.lo&0xff^((u8)H[nhi]<<4)]<<48'. Final 'pxor'
- # is scheduled so late that rem_8bit[] has to be shifted *right*
- # by 16, which is why last argument to pinsrw is 2, which
- # corresponds to <<32=<<48>>16...
- for ($j=11,$i=0;$i<15;$i++) {
-
- if ($i>0) {
- &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8)); # Z^=H[nlo]
- &rol ($dat,8); # next byte
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8));
-
- &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+256+128,"esp",$nhi[0],8));
- &xor (&LB($rem[1]),&BP(0,"esp",$nhi[0])); # rem^(H[nhi]<<4)
- } else {
- &movq ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8));
- &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8));
- }
-
- &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($dat));
- &mov ($dat,&DWP(528+$j,"esp")) if (--$j%4==0);
-
- &movd ($rem[0],$Zlo);
- &movz ($rem[1],&LB($rem[1])) if ($i>0);
- &psrlq ($Zlo,8); # Z>>=8
-
- &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
- &mov ($nhi[0],$nlo);
- &psrlq ($Zhi,8);
-
- &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16+256+0,"esp",$nhi[1],8)); # Z^=H[nhi]>>4
- &and (&LB($nlo),0x0f);
- &psllq ($tmp,56);
-
- &pxor ($Zhi,$red[1]) if ($i>1);
- &shr ($nhi[0],4);
- &pinsrw ($red[0],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[1],2),2) if ($i>0);
-
- unshift (@red,pop(@red)); # "rotate" registers
- unshift (@rem,pop(@rem));
- unshift (@nhi,pop(@nhi));
- }
-
- &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8)); # Z^=H[nlo]
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8));
- &xor (&LB($rem[1]),&BP(0,"esp",$nhi[0])); # rem^(H[nhi]<<4)
-
- &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+256+128,"esp",$nhi[0],8));
- &movz ($rem[1],&LB($rem[1]));
-
- &pxor ($red[2],$red[2]); # clear 2nd word
- &psllq ($red[1],4);
-
- &movd ($rem[0],$Zlo);
- &psrlq ($Zlo,4); # Z>>=4
-
- &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
- &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
- &shl ($rem[0],4); # rem<<4
-
- &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nhi[1],8)); # Z^=H[nhi]
- &psllq ($tmp,60);
- &movz ($rem[0],&LB($rem[0]));
-
- &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
- &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nhi[1],8));
-
- &pinsrw ($red[0],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[1],2),2);
- &pxor ($Zhi,$red[1]);
-
- &movd ($dat,$Zlo);
- &pinsrw ($red[2],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[0],2),3); # last is <<48
-
- &psllq ($red[0],12); # correct by <<16>>4
- &pxor ($Zhi,$red[0]);
- &psrlq ($Zlo,32);
- &pxor ($Zhi,$red[2]);
-
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(528+16+4,"esp")); # restore inp
- &movd ("ebx",$Zlo);
- &movq ($tmp,$Zhi); # 01234567
- &psllw ($Zhi,8); # 1.3.5.7.
- &psrlw ($tmp,8); # .0.2.4.6
- &por ($Zhi,$tmp); # 10325476
- &bswap ($dat);
- &pshufw ($Zhi,$Zhi,0b00011011); # 76543210
- &bswap ("ebx");
-
- &cmp ("ecx",&DWP(528+16+8,"esp")); # are we done?
- &jne (&label("outer"));
- }
-
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(528+16+0,"esp")); # restore Xi
- &mov (&DWP(12,"eax"),"edx");
- &mov (&DWP(8,"eax"),"ebx");
- &movq (&QWP(0,"eax"),$Zhi);
-
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(528+16+12,"esp")); # restore original %esp
- &emms ();
-}
-&function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
-}}
-
-if ($sse2) {{
-######################################################################
-# PCLMULQDQ version.
-
-$Xip="eax";
-$Htbl="edx";
-$const="ecx";
-$inp="esi";
-$len="ebx";
-
-($Xi,$Xhi)=("xmm0","xmm1"); $Hkey="xmm2";
-($T1,$T2,$T3)=("xmm3","xmm4","xmm5");
-($Xn,$Xhn)=("xmm6","xmm7");
-
-&static_label("bswap");
-
-sub clmul64x64_T2 { # minimal "register" pressure
-my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey)=@_;
-
- &movdqa ($Xhi,$Xi); #
- &pshufd ($T1,$Xi,0b01001110);
- &pshufd ($T2,$Hkey,0b01001110);
- &pxor ($T1,$Xi); #
- &pxor ($T2,$Hkey);
-
- &pclmulqdq ($Xi,$Hkey,0x00); #######
- &pclmulqdq ($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11); #######
- &pclmulqdq ($T1,$T2,0x00); #######
- &xorps ($T1,$Xi); #
- &xorps ($T1,$Xhi); #
-
- &movdqa ($T2,$T1); #
- &psrldq ($T1,8);
- &pslldq ($T2,8); #
- &pxor ($Xhi,$T1);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
-}
-
-sub clmul64x64_T3 {
-# Even though this subroutine offers visually better ILP, it
-# was empirically found to be a tad slower than above version.
-# At least in gcm_ghash_clmul context. But it's just as well,
-# because loop modulo-scheduling is possible only thanks to
-# minimized "register" pressure...
-my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey)=@_;
-
- &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); #
- &movdqa ($Xhi,$Xi);
- &pclmulqdq ($Xi,$Hkey,0x00); #######
- &pclmulqdq ($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11); #######
- &pshufd ($T2,$T1,0b01001110); #
- &pshufd ($T3,$Hkey,0b01001110);
- &pxor ($T2,$T1); #
- &pxor ($T3,$Hkey);
- &pclmulqdq ($T2,$T3,0x00); #######
- &pxor ($T2,$Xi); #
- &pxor ($T2,$Xhi); #
-
- &movdqa ($T3,$T2); #
- &psrldq ($T2,8);
- &pslldq ($T3,8); #
- &pxor ($Xhi,$T2);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T3); #
-}
-
-if (1) { # Algorithm 9 with <<1 twist.
- # Reduction is shorter and uses only two
- # temporary registers, which makes it better
- # candidate for interleaving with 64x64
- # multiplication. Pre-modulo-scheduled loop
- # was found to be ~20% faster than Algorithm 5
- # below. Algorithm 9 was therefore chosen for
- # further optimization...
-
-sub reduction_alg9 { # 17/13 times faster than Intel version
-my ($Xhi,$Xi) = @_;
-
- # 1st phase
- &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); #
- &psllq ($Xi,1);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1); #
- &psllq ($Xi,5); #
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1); #
- &psllq ($Xi,57); #
- &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); #
- &pslldq ($Xi,8);
- &psrldq ($T2,8); #
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1);
- &pxor ($Xhi,$T2); #
-
- # 2nd phase
- &movdqa ($T2,$Xi);
- &psrlq ($Xi,5);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
- &psrlq ($Xi,1); #
- &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
- &pxor ($T2,$Xhi);
- &psrlq ($Xi,1); #
- &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
-}
-
-&function_begin_B("gcm_init_clmul");
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($Xip,&wparam(1));
-
- &call (&label("pic"));
-&set_label("pic");
- &blindpop ($const);
- &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
-
- &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Xip));
- &pshufd ($Hkey,$Hkey,0b01001110);# dword swap
-
- # <<1 twist
- &pshufd ($T2,$Hkey,0b11111111); # broadcast uppermost dword
- &movdqa ($T1,$Hkey);
- &psllq ($Hkey,1);
- &pxor ($T3,$T3); #
- &psrlq ($T1,63);
- &pcmpgtd ($T3,$T2); # broadcast carry bit
- &pslldq ($T1,8);
- &por ($Hkey,$T1); # H<<=1
-
- # magic reduction
- &pand ($T3,&QWP(16,$const)); # 0x1c2_polynomial
- &pxor ($Hkey,$T3); # if(carry) H^=0x1c2_polynomial
-
- # calculate H^2
- &movdqa ($Xi,$Hkey);
- &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
- &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi);
-
- &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Htbl),$Hkey); # save H
- &movdqu (&QWP(16,$Htbl),$Xi); # save H^2
-
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("gcm_init_clmul");
-
-&function_begin_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
- &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1));
-
- &call (&label("pic"));
-&set_label("pic");
- &blindpop ($const);
- &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
-
- &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
- &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
- &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
- &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
-
- &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
- &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi);
-
- &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
- &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
-
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
-
-&function_begin("gcm_ghash_clmul");
- &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($len,&wparam(3));
-
- &call (&label("pic"));
-&set_label("pic");
- &blindpop ($const);
- &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
-
- &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
- &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
- &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
- &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
-
- &sub ($len,0x10);
- &jz (&label("odd_tail"));
-
- #######
- # Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P =
- # [(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P =
- # [(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
- #
- &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
- &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1
- &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
- &pshufb ($Xn,$T3);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi
-
- &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); # H*Ii+1
- &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2
-
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp)); # i+=2
- &sub ($len,0x20);
- &jbe (&label("even_tail"));
-
-&set_label("mod_loop");
- &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H^2*(Ii+Xi)
- &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
- &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H
-
- &pxor ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
- &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn);
-
- &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1
- &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
- &pshufb ($Xn,$T3);
-
- &movdqa ($T3,$Xn); #&clmul64x64_TX ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); H*Ii+1
- &movdqa ($Xhn,$Xn);
- &pxor ($Xhi,$T1); # "Ii+Xi", consume early
-
- &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); #&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi); 1st phase
- &psllq ($Xi,1);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1); #
- &psllq ($Xi,5); #
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1); #
- &pclmulqdq ($Xn,$Hkey,0x00); #######
- &psllq ($Xi,57); #
- &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); #
- &pslldq ($Xi,8);
- &psrldq ($T2,8); #
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1);
- &pshufd ($T1,$T3,0b01001110);
- &pxor ($Xhi,$T2); #
- &pxor ($T1,$T3);
- &pshufd ($T3,$Hkey,0b01001110);
- &pxor ($T3,$Hkey); #
-
- &pclmulqdq ($Xhn,$Hkey,0x11); #######
- &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); # 2nd phase
- &psrlq ($Xi,5);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
- &psrlq ($Xi,1); #
- &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
- &pxor ($T2,$Xhi);
- &psrlq ($Xi,1); #
- &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
-
- &pclmulqdq ($T1,$T3,0x00); #######
- &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2
- &xorps ($T1,$Xn); #
- &xorps ($T1,$Xhn); #
-
- &movdqa ($T3,$T1); #
- &psrldq ($T1,8);
- &pslldq ($T3,8); #
- &pxor ($Xhn,$T1);
- &pxor ($Xn,$T3); #
- &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
-
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp));
- &sub ($len,0x20);
- &ja (&label("mod_loop"));
-
-&set_label("even_tail");
- &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H^2*(Ii+Xi)
-
- &pxor ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
- &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn);
-
- &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi);
-
- &test ($len,$len);
- &jnz (&label("done"));
-
- &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H
-&set_label("odd_tail");
- &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
- &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi
-
- &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H*(Ii+Xi)
- &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi);
-
-&set_label("done");
- &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
- &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
-&function_end("gcm_ghash_clmul");
-
-} else { # Algorith 5. Kept for reference purposes.
-
-sub reduction_alg5 { # 19/16 times faster than Intel version
-my ($Xhi,$Xi)=@_;
-
- # <<1
- &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); #
- &movdqa ($T2,$Xhi);
- &pslld ($Xi,1);
- &pslld ($Xhi,1); #
- &psrld ($T1,31);
- &psrld ($T2,31); #
- &movdqa ($T3,$T1);
- &pslldq ($T1,4);
- &psrldq ($T3,12); #
- &pslldq ($T2,4);
- &por ($Xhi,$T3); #
- &por ($Xi,$T1);
- &por ($Xhi,$T2); #
-
- # 1st phase
- &movdqa ($T1,$Xi);
- &movdqa ($T2,$Xi);
- &movdqa ($T3,$Xi); #
- &pslld ($T1,31);
- &pslld ($T2,30);
- &pslld ($Xi,25); #
- &pxor ($T1,$T2);
- &pxor ($T1,$Xi); #
- &movdqa ($T2,$T1); #
- &pslldq ($T1,12);
- &psrldq ($T2,4); #
- &pxor ($T3,$T1);
-
- # 2nd phase
- &pxor ($Xhi,$T3); #
- &movdqa ($Xi,$T3);
- &movdqa ($T1,$T3);
- &psrld ($Xi,1); #
- &psrld ($T1,2);
- &psrld ($T3,7); #
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1);
- &pxor ($Xhi,$T2);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T3); #
- &pxor ($Xi,$Xhi); #
-}
-
-&function_begin_B("gcm_init_clmul");
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($Xip,&wparam(1));
-
- &call (&label("pic"));
-&set_label("pic");
- &blindpop ($const);
- &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
-
- &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Xip));
- &pshufd ($Hkey,$Hkey,0b01001110);# dword swap
-
- # calculate H^2
- &movdqa ($Xi,$Hkey);
- &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
- &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi);
-
- &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Htbl),$Hkey); # save H
- &movdqu (&QWP(16,$Htbl),$Xi); # save H^2
-
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("gcm_init_clmul");
-
-&function_begin_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
- &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1));
-
- &call (&label("pic"));
-&set_label("pic");
- &blindpop ($const);
- &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
-
- &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
- &movdqa ($Xn,&QWP(0,$const));
- &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
- &pshufb ($Xi,$Xn);
-
- &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
- &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi);
-
- &pshufb ($Xi,$Xn);
- &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
-
- &ret ();
-&function_end_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
-
-&function_begin("gcm_ghash_clmul");
- &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0));
- &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1));
- &mov ($inp,&wparam(2));
- &mov ($len,&wparam(3));
-
- &call (&label("pic"));
-&set_label("pic");
- &blindpop ($const);
- &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
-
- &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
- &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
- &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
- &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
-
- &sub ($len,0x10);
- &jz (&label("odd_tail"));
-
- #######
- # Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P =
- # [(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P =
- # [(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
- #
- &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
- &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1
- &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
- &pshufb ($Xn,$T3);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi
-
- &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); # H*Ii+1
- &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2
-
- &sub ($len,0x20);
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp)); # i+=2
- &jbe (&label("even_tail"));
-
-&set_label("mod_loop");
- &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H^2*(Ii+Xi)
- &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H
-
- &pxor ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
- &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn);
-
- &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi);
-
- #######
- &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
- &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
- &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1
- &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
- &pshufb ($Xn,$T3);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi
-
- &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); # H*Ii+1
- &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2
-
- &sub ($len,0x20);
- &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp));
- &ja (&label("mod_loop"));
-
-&set_label("even_tail");
- &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H^2*(Ii+Xi)
-
- &pxor ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
- &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn);
-
- &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi);
-
- &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
- &test ($len,$len);
- &jnz (&label("done"));
-
- &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H
-&set_label("odd_tail");
- &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
- &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
- &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi
-
- &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H*(Ii+Xi)
- &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi);
-
- &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
-&set_label("done");
- &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
- &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
-&function_end("gcm_ghash_clmul");
-
-}
-
-&set_label("bswap",64);
- &data_byte(15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0);
- &data_byte(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0xc2); # 0x1c2_polynomial
-}} # $sse2
-
-&set_label("rem_4bit",64);
- &data_word(0,0x0000<<$S,0,0x1C20<<$S,0,0x3840<<$S,0,0x2460<<$S);
- &data_word(0,0x7080<<$S,0,0x6CA0<<$S,0,0x48C0<<$S,0,0x54E0<<$S);
- &data_word(0,0xE100<<$S,0,0xFD20<<$S,0,0xD940<<$S,0,0xC560<<$S);
- &data_word(0,0x9180<<$S,0,0x8DA0<<$S,0,0xA9C0<<$S,0,0xB5E0<<$S);
-&set_label("rem_8bit",64);
- &data_short(0x0000,0x01C2,0x0384,0x0246,0x0708,0x06CA,0x048C,0x054E);
- &data_short(0x0E10,0x0FD2,0x0D94,0x0C56,0x0918,0x08DA,0x0A9C,0x0B5E);
- &data_short(0x1C20,0x1DE2,0x1FA4,0x1E66,0x1B28,0x1AEA,0x18AC,0x196E);
- &data_short(0x1230,0x13F2,0x11B4,0x1076,0x1538,0x14FA,0x16BC,0x177E);
- &data_short(0x3840,0x3982,0x3BC4,0x3A06,0x3F48,0x3E8A,0x3CCC,0x3D0E);
- &data_short(0x3650,0x3792,0x35D4,0x3416,0x3158,0x309A,0x32DC,0x331E);
- &data_short(0x2460,0x25A2,0x27E4,0x2626,0x2368,0x22AA,0x20EC,0x212E);
- &data_short(0x2A70,0x2BB2,0x29F4,0x2836,0x2D78,0x2CBA,0x2EFC,0x2F3E);
- &data_short(0x7080,0x7142,0x7304,0x72C6,0x7788,0x764A,0x740C,0x75CE);
- &data_short(0x7E90,0x7F52,0x7D14,0x7CD6,0x7998,0x785A,0x7A1C,0x7BDE);
- &data_short(0x6CA0,0x6D62,0x6F24,0x6EE6,0x6BA8,0x6A6A,0x682C,0x69EE);
- &data_short(0x62B0,0x6372,0x6134,0x60F6,0x65B8,0x647A,0x663C,0x67FE);
- &data_short(0x48C0,0x4902,0x4B44,0x4A86,0x4FC8,0x4E0A,0x4C4C,0x4D8E);
- &data_short(0x46D0,0x4712,0x4554,0x4496,0x41D8,0x401A,0x425C,0x439E);
- &data_short(0x54E0,0x5522,0x5764,0x56A6,0x53E8,0x522A,0x506C,0x51AE);
- &data_short(0x5AF0,0x5B32,0x5974,0x58B6,0x5DF8,0x5C3A,0x5E7C,0x5FBE);
- &data_short(0xE100,0xE0C2,0xE284,0xE346,0xE608,0xE7CA,0xE58C,0xE44E);
- &data_short(0xEF10,0xEED2,0xEC94,0xED56,0xE818,0xE9DA,0xEB9C,0xEA5E);
- &data_short(0xFD20,0xFCE2,0xFEA4,0xFF66,0xFA28,0xFBEA,0xF9AC,0xF86E);
- &data_short(0xF330,0xF2F2,0xF0B4,0xF176,0xF438,0xF5FA,0xF7BC,0xF67E);
- &data_short(0xD940,0xD882,0xDAC4,0xDB06,0xDE48,0xDF8A,0xDDCC,0xDC0E);
- &data_short(0xD750,0xD692,0xD4D4,0xD516,0xD058,0xD19A,0xD3DC,0xD21E);
- &data_short(0xC560,0xC4A2,0xC6E4,0xC726,0xC268,0xC3AA,0xC1EC,0xC02E);
- &data_short(0xCB70,0xCAB2,0xC8F4,0xC936,0xCC78,0xCDBA,0xCFFC,0xCE3E);
- &data_short(0x9180,0x9042,0x9204,0x93C6,0x9688,0x974A,0x950C,0x94CE);
- &data_short(0x9F90,0x9E52,0x9C14,0x9DD6,0x9898,0x995A,0x9B1C,0x9ADE);
- &data_short(0x8DA0,0x8C62,0x8E24,0x8FE6,0x8AA8,0x8B6A,0x892C,0x88EE);
- &data_short(0x83B0,0x8272,0x8034,0x81F6,0x84B8,0x857A,0x873C,0x86FE);
- &data_short(0xA9C0,0xA802,0xAA44,0xAB86,0xAEC8,0xAF0A,0xAD4C,0xAC8E);
- &data_short(0xA7D0,0xA612,0xA454,0xA596,0xA0D8,0xA11A,0xA35C,0xA29E);
- &data_short(0xB5E0,0xB422,0xB664,0xB7A6,0xB2E8,0xB32A,0xB16C,0xB0AE);
- &data_short(0xBBF0,0xBA32,0xB874,0xB9B6,0xBCF8,0xBD3A,0xBF7C,0xBEBE);
-}}} # !$x86only
-
-&asciz("GHASH for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
-&asm_finish();
-
-# A question was risen about choice of vanilla MMX. Or rather why wasn't
-# SSE2 chosen instead? In addition to the fact that MMX runs on legacy
-# CPUs such as PIII, "4-bit" MMX version was observed to provide better
-# performance than *corresponding* SSE2 one even on contemporary CPUs.
-# SSE2 results were provided by Peter-Michael Hager. He maintains SSE2
-# implementation featuring full range of lookup-table sizes, but with
-# per-invocation lookup table setup. Latter means that table size is
-# chosen depending on how much data is to be hashed in every given call,
-# more data - larger table. Best reported result for Core2 is ~4 cycles
-# per processed byte out of 64KB block. This number accounts even for
-# 64KB table setup overhead. As discussed in gcm128.c we choose to be
-# more conservative in respect to lookup table sizes, but how do the
-# results compare? Minimalistic "256B" MMX version delivers ~11 cycles
-# on same platform. As also discussed in gcm128.c, next in line "8-bit
-# Shoup's" or "4KB" method should deliver twice the performance of
-# "256B" one, in other words not worse than ~6 cycles per byte. It
-# should be also be noted that in SSE2 case improvement can be "super-
-# linear," i.e. more than twice, mostly because >>8 maps to single
-# instruction on SSE2 register. This is unlike "4-bit" case when >>4
-# maps to same amount of instructions in both MMX and SSE2 cases.
-# Bottom line is that switch to SSE2 is considered to be justifiable
-# only in case we choose to implement "8-bit" method...
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1342 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# March, May, June 2010
+#
+# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying
+# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it
+# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+64/128 bytes fixed table]. It has two
+# code paths: vanilla x86 and vanilla MMX. Former will be executed on
+# 486 and Pentium, latter on all others. MMX GHASH features so called
+# "528B" variant of "4-bit" method utilizing additional 256+16 bytes
+# of per-key storage [+512 bytes shared table]. Performance results
+# are for streamed GHASH subroutine and are expressed in cycles per
+# processed byte, less is better:
+#
+# gcc 2.95.3(*) MMX assembler x86 assembler
+#
+# Pentium 105/111(**) - 50
+# PIII 68 /75 12.2 24
+# P4 125/125 17.8 84(***)
+# Opteron 66 /70 10.1 30
+# Core2 54 /67 8.4 18
+#
+# (*) gcc 3.4.x was observed to generate few percent slower code,
+# which is one of reasons why 2.95.3 results were chosen,
+# another reason is lack of 3.4.x results for older CPUs;
+# comparison with MMX results is not completely fair, because C
+# results are for vanilla "256B" implementation, while
+# assembler results are for "528B";-)
+# (**) second number is result for code compiled with -fPIC flag,
+# which is actually more relevant, because assembler code is
+# position-independent;
+# (***) see comment in non-MMX routine for further details;
+#
+# To summarize, it's >2-5 times faster than gcc-generated code. To
+# anchor it to something else SHA1 assembler processes one byte in
+# 11-13 cycles on contemporary x86 cores. As for choice of MMX in
+# particular, see comment at the end of the file...
+
+# May 2010
+#
+# Add PCLMULQDQ version performing at 2.10 cycles per processed byte.
+# The question is how close is it to theoretical limit? The pclmulqdq
+# instruction latency appears to be 14 cycles and there can't be more
+# than 2 of them executing at any given time. This means that single
+# Karatsuba multiplication would take 28 cycles *plus* few cycles for
+# pre- and post-processing. Then multiplication has to be followed by
+# modulo-reduction. Given that aggregated reduction method [see
+# "Carry-less Multiplication and Its Usage for Computing the GCM Mode"
+# white paper by Intel] allows you to perform reduction only once in
+# a while we can assume that asymptotic performance can be estimated
+# as (28+Tmod/Naggr)/16, where Tmod is time to perform reduction
+# and Naggr is the aggregation factor.
+#
+# Before we proceed to this implementation let's have closer look at
+# the best-performing code suggested by Intel in their white paper.
+# By tracing inter-register dependencies Tmod is estimated as ~19
+# cycles and Naggr chosen by Intel is 4, resulting in 2.05 cycles per
+# processed byte. As implied, this is quite optimistic estimate,
+# because it does not account for Karatsuba pre- and post-processing,
+# which for a single multiplication is ~5 cycles. Unfortunately Intel
+# does not provide performance data for GHASH alone. But benchmarking
+# AES_GCM_encrypt ripped out of Fig. 15 of the white paper with aadt
+# alone resulted in 2.46 cycles per byte of out 16KB buffer. Note that
+# the result accounts even for pre-computing of degrees of the hash
+# key H, but its portion is negligible at 16KB buffer size.
+#
+# Moving on to the implementation in question. Tmod is estimated as
+# ~13 cycles and Naggr is 2, giving asymptotic performance of ...
+# 2.16. How is it possible that measured performance is better than
+# optimistic theoretical estimate? There is one thing Intel failed
+# to recognize. By serializing GHASH with CTR in same subroutine
+# former's performance is really limited to above (Tmul + Tmod/Naggr)
+# equation. But if GHASH procedure is detached, the modulo-reduction
+# can be interleaved with Naggr-1 multiplications at instruction level
+# and under ideal conditions even disappear from the equation. So that
+# optimistic theoretical estimate for this implementation is ...
+# 28/16=1.75, and not 2.16. Well, it's probably way too optimistic,
+# at least for such small Naggr. I'd argue that (28+Tproc/Naggr),
+# where Tproc is time required for Karatsuba pre- and post-processing,
+# is more realistic estimate. In this case it gives ... 1.91 cycles.
+# Or in other words, depending on how well we can interleave reduction
+# and one of the two multiplications the performance should be betwen
+# 1.91 and 2.16. As already mentioned, this implementation processes
+# one byte out of 8KB buffer in 2.10 cycles, while x86_64 counterpart
+# - in 2.02. x86_64 performance is better, because larger register
+# bank allows to interleave reduction and multiplication better.
+#
+# Does it make sense to increase Naggr? To start with it's virtually
+# impossible in 32-bit mode, because of limited register bank
+# capacity. Otherwise improvement has to be weighed agiainst slower
+# setup, as well as code size and complexity increase. As even
+# optimistic estimate doesn't promise 30% performance improvement,
+# there are currently no plans to increase Naggr.
+#
+# Special thanks to David Woodhouse <dwmw2 at infradead.org> for
+# providing access to a Westmere-based system on behalf of Intel
+# Open Source Technology Centre.
+
+# January 2010
+#
+# Tweaked to optimize transitions between integer and FP operations
+# on same XMM register, PCLMULQDQ subroutine was measured to process
+# one byte in 2.07 cycles on Sandy Bridge, and in 2.12 - on Westmere.
+# The minor regression on Westmere is outweighed by ~15% improvement
+# on Sandy Bridge. Strangely enough attempt to modify 64-bit code in
+# similar manner resulted in almost 20% degradation on Sandy Bridge,
+# where original 64-bit code processes one byte in 1.95 cycles.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"ghash-x86.pl",$x86only = $ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$sse2=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+($Zhh,$Zhl,$Zlh,$Zll) = ("ebp","edx","ecx","ebx");
+$inp = "edi";
+$Htbl = "esi";
+
+$unroll = 0; # Affects x86 loop. Folded loop performs ~7% worse
+ # than unrolled, which has to be weighted against
+ # 2.5x x86-specific code size reduction.
+
+sub x86_loop {
+ my $off = shift;
+ my $rem = "eax";
+
+ &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$Zll));
+ &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$Zll));
+ &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$Zll));
+ &mov ($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$Zll));
+ &xor ($rem,$rem); # avoid partial register stalls on PIII
+
+ # shrd practically kills P4, 2.5x deterioration, but P4 has
+ # MMX code-path to execute. shrd runs tad faster [than twice
+ # the shifts, move's and or's] on pre-MMX Pentium (as well as
+ # PIII and Core2), *but* minimizes code size, spares register
+ # and thus allows to fold the loop...
+ if (!$unroll) {
+ my $cnt = $inp;
+ &mov ($cnt,15);
+ &jmp (&label("x86_loop"));
+ &set_label("x86_loop",16);
+ for($i=1;$i<=2;$i++) {
+ &mov (&LB($rem),&LB($Zll));
+ &shrd ($Zll,$Zlh,4);
+ &and (&LB($rem),0xf);
+ &shrd ($Zlh,$Zhl,4);
+ &shrd ($Zhl,$Zhh,4);
+ &shr ($Zhh,4);
+ &xor ($Zhh,&DWP($off+16,"esp",$rem,4));
+
+ &mov (&LB($rem),&BP($off,"esp",$cnt));
+ if ($i&1) {
+ &and (&LB($rem),0xf0);
+ } else {
+ &shl (&LB($rem),4);
+ }
+
+ &xor ($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$rem));
+ &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$rem));
+ &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$rem));
+ &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$rem));
+
+ if ($i&1) {
+ &dec ($cnt);
+ &js (&label("x86_break"));
+ } else {
+ &jmp (&label("x86_loop"));
+ }
+ }
+ &set_label("x86_break",16);
+ } else {
+ for($i=1;$i<32;$i++) {
+ &comment($i);
+ &mov (&LB($rem),&LB($Zll));
+ &shrd ($Zll,$Zlh,4);
+ &and (&LB($rem),0xf);
+ &shrd ($Zlh,$Zhl,4);
+ &shrd ($Zhl,$Zhh,4);
+ &shr ($Zhh,4);
+ &xor ($Zhh,&DWP($off+16,"esp",$rem,4));
+
+ if ($i&1) {
+ &mov (&LB($rem),&BP($off+15-($i>>1),"esp"));
+ &and (&LB($rem),0xf0);
+ } else {
+ &mov (&LB($rem),&BP($off+15-($i>>1),"esp"));
+ &shl (&LB($rem),4);
+ }
+
+ &xor ($Zll,&DWP(8,$Htbl,$rem));
+ &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(12,$Htbl,$rem));
+ &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(0,$Htbl,$rem));
+ &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(4,$Htbl,$rem));
+ }
+ }
+ &bswap ($Zll);
+ &bswap ($Zlh);
+ &bswap ($Zhl);
+ if (!$x86only) {
+ &bswap ($Zhh);
+ } else {
+ &mov ("eax",$Zhh);
+ &bswap ("eax");
+ &mov ($Zhh,"eax");
+ }
+}
+
+if ($unroll) {
+ &function_begin_B("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
+ &x86_loop(4);
+ &ret ();
+ &function_end_B("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
+}
+
+sub deposit_rem_4bit {
+ my $bias = shift;
+
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+0, "esp"),0x0000<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+4, "esp"),0x1C20<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+8, "esp"),0x3840<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+12,"esp"),0x2460<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+16,"esp"),0x7080<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+20,"esp"),0x6CA0<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+24,"esp"),0x48C0<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+28,"esp"),0x54E0<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+32,"esp"),0xE100<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+36,"esp"),0xFD20<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+40,"esp"),0xD940<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+44,"esp"),0xC560<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+48,"esp"),0x9180<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+52,"esp"),0x8DA0<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+56,"esp"),0xA9C0<<16);
+ &mov (&DWP($bias+60,"esp"),0xB5E0<<16);
+}
+
+$suffix = $x86only ? "" : "_x86";
+
+&function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit".$suffix);
+ &stack_push(16+4+1); # +1 for stack alignment
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable
+
+ &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp)); # load Xi[16]
+ &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp));
+ &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp));
+ &mov ($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp));
+
+ &deposit_rem_4bit(16);
+
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh); # copy Xi[16] on stack
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll);
+ &shr ($Zll,20);
+ &and ($Zll,0xf0);
+
+ if ($unroll) {
+ &call ("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
+ } else {
+ &x86_loop(0);
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0));
+ }
+
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
+ &stack_pop(16+4+1);
+&function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit".$suffix);
+
+&function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit".$suffix);
+ &stack_push(16+4+1); # +1 for 64-bit alignment
+ &mov ($Zll,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); # load in
+ &mov ("ecx",&wparam(3)); # load len
+ &add ("ecx",$inp);
+ &mov (&wparam(3),"ecx");
+
+ &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$Zll)); # load Xi[16]
+ &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$Zll));
+ &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$Zll));
+ &mov ($Zll,&DWP(12,$Zll));
+
+ &deposit_rem_4bit(16);
+
+ &set_label("x86_outer_loop",16);
+ &xor ($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp)); # xor with input
+ &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp));
+ &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp));
+ &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp));
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll); # dump it on stack
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh);
+
+ &shr ($Zll,20);
+ &and ($Zll,0xf0);
+
+ if ($unroll) {
+ &call ("_x86_gmult_4bit_inner");
+ } else {
+ &x86_loop(0);
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(2));
+ }
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+ &cmp ($inp,&wparam(3));
+ &mov (&wparam(2),$inp) if (!$unroll);
+ &jb (&label("x86_outer_loop"));
+
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
+ &stack_pop(16+4+1);
+&function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit".$suffix);
+
+if (!$x86only) {{{
+
+&static_label("rem_4bit");
+
+if (!$sse2) {{ # pure-MMX "May" version...
+
+$S=12; # shift factor for rem_4bit
+
+&function_begin_B("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
+# MMX version performs 3.5 times better on P4 (see comment in non-MMX
+# routine for further details), 100% better on Opteron, ~70% better
+# on Core2 and PIII... In other words effort is considered to be well
+# spent... Since initial release the loop was unrolled in order to
+# "liberate" register previously used as loop counter. Instead it's
+# used to optimize critical path in 'Z.hi ^= rem_4bit[Z.lo&0xf]'.
+# The path involves move of Z.lo from MMX to integer register,
+# effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi.
+# Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4
+# rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement
+# on contemporary µ-archs.
+{
+ my $cnt;
+ my $rem_4bit = "eax";
+ my @rem = ($Zhh,$Zll);
+ my $nhi = $Zhl;
+ my $nlo = $Zlh;
+
+ my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm0","mm1");
+ my $tmp = "mm2";
+
+ &xor ($nlo,$nlo); # avoid partial register stalls on PIII
+ &mov ($nhi,$Zll);
+ &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($nhi));
+ &shl (&LB($nlo),4);
+ &and ($nhi,0xf0);
+ &movq ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
+ &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
+ &movd ($rem[0],$Zlo);
+
+ for ($cnt=28;$cnt>=-2;$cnt--) {
+ my $odd = $cnt&1;
+ my $nix = $odd ? $nlo : $nhi;
+
+ &shl (&LB($nlo),4) if ($odd);
+ &psrlq ($Zlo,4);
+ &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
+ &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
+ &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nix));
+ &mov (&LB($nlo),&BP($cnt/2,$inp)) if (!$odd && $cnt>=0);
+ &psllq ($tmp,60);
+ &and ($nhi,0xf0) if ($odd);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem[1],8)) if ($cnt<28);
+ &and ($rem[0],0xf);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nix));
+ &mov ($nhi,$nlo) if (!$odd && $cnt>=0);
+ &movd ($rem[1],$Zlo);
+ &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
+
+ push (@rem,shift(@rem)); # "rotate" registers
+ }
+
+ &mov ($inp,&DWP(4,$rem_4bit,$rem[1],8)); # last rem_4bit[rem]
+
+ &psrlq ($Zlo,32); # lower part of Zlo is already there
+ &movd ($Zhl,$Zhi);
+ &psrlq ($Zhi,32);
+ &movd ($Zlh,$Zlo);
+ &movd ($Zhh,$Zhi);
+ &shl ($inp,4); # compensate for rem_4bit[i] being >>4
+
+ &bswap ($Zll);
+ &bswap ($Zhl);
+ &bswap ($Zlh);
+ &xor ($Zhh,$inp);
+ &bswap ($Zhh);
+
+ &ret ();
+}
+&function_end_B("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
+
+&function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point"));
+ &set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop("eax");
+ &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax"));
+
+ &movz ($Zll,&BP(15,$inp));
+
+ &call ("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
+
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
+ &emms ();
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
+&function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
+
+# Streamed version performs 20% better on P4, 7% on Opteron,
+# 10% on Core2 and PIII...
+&function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
+ &mov ($Zhh,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(2)); # load in
+ &mov ($Zlh,&wparam(3)); # load len
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point"));
+ &set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop("eax");
+ &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax"));
+
+ &add ($Zlh,$inp);
+ &mov (&wparam(3),$Zlh); # len to point at the end of input
+ &stack_push(4+1); # +1 for stack alignment
+
+ &mov ($Zll,&DWP(12,$Zhh)); # load Xi[16]
+ &mov ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$Zhh));
+ &mov ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$Zhh));
+ &mov ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$Zhh));
+ &jmp (&label("mmx_outer_loop"));
+
+ &set_label("mmx_outer_loop",16);
+ &xor ($Zll,&DWP(12,$inp));
+ &xor ($Zhl,&DWP(4,$inp));
+ &xor ($Zlh,&DWP(8,$inp));
+ &xor ($Zhh,&DWP(0,$inp));
+ &mov (&wparam(2),$inp);
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$Zll);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$Zhl);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$Zlh);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$Zhh);
+
+ &mov ($inp,"esp");
+ &shr ($Zll,24);
+
+ &call ("_mmx_gmult_4bit_inner");
+
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(2));
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
+ &cmp ($inp,&wparam(3));
+ &jb (&label("mmx_outer_loop"));
+
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
+ &emms ();
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
+
+ &stack_pop(4+1);
+&function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
+
+}} else {{ # "June" MMX version...
+ # ... has slower "April" gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx with folded
+ # loop. This is done to conserve code size...
+$S=16; # shift factor for rem_4bit
+
+sub mmx_loop() {
+# MMX version performs 2.8 times better on P4 (see comment in non-MMX
+# routine for further details), 40% better on Opteron and Core2, 50%
+# better on PIII... In other words effort is considered to be well
+# spent...
+ my $inp = shift;
+ my $rem_4bit = shift;
+ my $cnt = $Zhh;
+ my $nhi = $Zhl;
+ my $nlo = $Zlh;
+ my $rem = $Zll;
+
+ my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm0","mm1");
+ my $tmp = "mm2";
+
+ &xor ($nlo,$nlo); # avoid partial register stalls on PIII
+ &mov ($nhi,$Zll);
+ &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($nhi));
+ &mov ($cnt,14);
+ &shl (&LB($nlo),4);
+ &and ($nhi,0xf0);
+ &movq ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
+ &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
+ &movd ($rem,$Zlo);
+ &jmp (&label("mmx_loop"));
+
+ &set_label("mmx_loop",16);
+ &psrlq ($Zlo,4);
+ &and ($rem,0xf);
+ &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
+ &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
+ &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nhi));
+ &mov (&LB($nlo),&BP(0,$inp,$cnt));
+ &psllq ($tmp,60);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
+ &dec ($cnt);
+ &movd ($rem,$Zlo);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nhi));
+ &mov ($nhi,$nlo);
+ &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
+ &js (&label("mmx_break"));
+
+ &shl (&LB($nlo),4);
+ &and ($rem,0xf);
+ &psrlq ($Zlo,4);
+ &and ($nhi,0xf0);
+ &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
+ &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
+ &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
+ &psllq ($tmp,60);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
+ &movd ($rem,$Zlo);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
+ &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
+ &jmp (&label("mmx_loop"));
+
+ &set_label("mmx_break",16);
+ &shl (&LB($nlo),4);
+ &and ($rem,0xf);
+ &psrlq ($Zlo,4);
+ &and ($nhi,0xf0);
+ &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
+ &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
+ &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nlo));
+ &psllq ($tmp,60);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
+ &movd ($rem,$Zlo);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nlo));
+ &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
+
+ &psrlq ($Zlo,4);
+ &and ($rem,0xf);
+ &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
+ &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
+ &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(8,$Htbl,$nhi));
+ &psllq ($tmp,60);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$rem_4bit,$rem,8));
+ &movd ($rem,$Zlo);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,$Htbl,$nhi));
+ &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
+
+ &psrlq ($Zlo,32); # lower part of Zlo is already there
+ &movd ($Zhl,$Zhi);
+ &psrlq ($Zhi,32);
+ &movd ($Zlh,$Zlo);
+ &movd ($Zhh,$Zhi);
+
+ &bswap ($Zll);
+ &bswap ($Zhl);
+ &bswap ($Zlh);
+ &bswap ($Zhh);
+}
+
+&function_begin("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(0)); # load Xi
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1)); # load Htable
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point"));
+ &set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop("eax");
+ &lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("rem_4bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),"eax"));
+
+ &movz ($Zll,&BP(15,$inp));
+
+ &mmx_loop($inp,"eax");
+
+ &emms ();
+ &mov (&DWP(12,$inp),$Zll);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,$inp),$Zhl);
+ &mov (&DWP(8,$inp),$Zlh);
+ &mov (&DWP(0,$inp),$Zhh);
+&function_end("gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx");
+
+######################################################################
+# Below subroutine is "528B" variant of "4-bit" GCM GHASH function
+# (see gcm128.c for details). It provides further 20-40% performance
+# improvement over above mentioned "May" version.
+
+&static_label("rem_8bit");
+
+&function_begin("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
+{ my ($Zlo,$Zhi) = ("mm7","mm6");
+ my $rem_8bit = "esi";
+ my $Htbl = "ebx";
+
+ # parameter block
+ &mov ("eax",&wparam(0)); # Xi
+ &mov ("ebx",&wparam(1)); # Htable
+ &mov ("ecx",&wparam(2)); # inp
+ &mov ("edx",&wparam(3)); # len
+ &mov ("ebp","esp"); # original %esp
+ &call (&label("pic_point"));
+ &set_label ("pic_point");
+ &blindpop ($rem_8bit);
+ &lea ($rem_8bit,&DWP(&label("rem_8bit")."-".&label("pic_point"),$rem_8bit));
+
+ &sub ("esp",512+16+16); # allocate stack frame...
+ &and ("esp",-64); # ...and align it
+ &sub ("esp",16); # place for (u8)(H[]<<4)
+
+ &add ("edx","ecx"); # pointer to the end of input
+ &mov (&DWP(528+16+0,"esp"),"eax"); # save Xi
+ &mov (&DWP(528+16+8,"esp"),"edx"); # save inp+len
+ &mov (&DWP(528+16+12,"esp"),"ebp"); # save original %esp
+
+ { my @lo = ("mm0","mm1","mm2");
+ my @hi = ("mm3","mm4","mm5");
+ my @tmp = ("mm6","mm7");
+ my ($off1,$off2,$i) = (0,0,);
+
+ &add ($Htbl,128); # optimize for size
+ &lea ("edi",&DWP(16+128,"esp"));
+ &lea ("ebp",&DWP(16+256+128,"esp"));
+
+ # decompose Htable (low and high parts are kept separately),
+ # generate Htable[]>>4, (u8)(Htable[]<<4), save to stack...
+ for ($i=0;$i<18;$i++) {
+
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(16*$i+8-128,$Htbl)) if ($i<16);
+ &movq ($lo[0],&QWP(16*$i+8-128,$Htbl)) if ($i<16);
+ &psllq ($tmp[1],60) if ($i>1);
+ &movq ($hi[0],&QWP(16*$i+0-128,$Htbl)) if ($i<16);
+ &por ($lo[2],$tmp[1]) if ($i>1);
+ &movq (&QWP($off1-128,"edi"),$lo[1]) if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+ &psrlq ($lo[1],4) if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+ &movq (&QWP($off1,"edi"),$hi[1]) if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+ &movq ($tmp[0],$hi[1]) if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+ &movq (&QWP($off2-128,"ebp"),$lo[2]) if ($i>1);
+ &psrlq ($hi[1],4) if ($i>0 && $i<17);
+ &movq (&QWP($off2,"ebp"),$hi[2]) if ($i>1);
+ &shl ("edx",4) if ($i<16);
+ &mov (&BP($i,"esp"),&LB("edx")) if ($i<16);
+
+ unshift (@lo,pop(@lo)); # "rotate" registers
+ unshift (@hi,pop(@hi));
+ unshift (@tmp,pop(@tmp));
+ $off1 += 8 if ($i>0);
+ $off2 += 8 if ($i>1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(0,"eax"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(8,"eax"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(12,"eax")); # load Xi
+
+&set_label("outer",16);
+ { my $nlo = "eax";
+ my $dat = "edx";
+ my @nhi = ("edi","ebp");
+ my @rem = ("ebx","ecx");
+ my @red = ("mm0","mm1","mm2");
+ my $tmp = "mm3";
+
+ &xor ($dat,&DWP(12,"ecx")); # merge input data
+ &xor ("ebx",&DWP(8,"ecx"));
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(0,"ecx"));
+ &lea ("ecx",&DWP(16,"ecx")); # inp+=16
+ #&mov (&DWP(528+12,"esp"),$dat); # save inp^Xi
+ &mov (&DWP(528+8,"esp"),"ebx");
+ &movq (&QWP(528+0,"esp"),$Zhi);
+ &mov (&DWP(528+16+4,"esp"),"ecx"); # save inp
+
+ &xor ($nlo,$nlo);
+ &rol ($dat,8);
+ &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($dat));
+ &mov ($nhi[1],$nlo);
+ &and (&LB($nlo),0x0f);
+ &shr ($nhi[1],4);
+ &pxor ($red[0],$red[0]);
+ &rol ($dat,8); # next byte
+ &pxor ($red[1],$red[1]);
+ &pxor ($red[2],$red[2]);
+
+ # Just like in "May" verson modulo-schedule for critical path in
+ # 'Z.hi ^= rem_8bit[Z.lo&0xff^((u8)H[nhi]<<4)]<<48'. Final 'pxor'
+ # is scheduled so late that rem_8bit[] has to be shifted *right*
+ # by 16, which is why last argument to pinsrw is 2, which
+ # corresponds to <<32=<<48>>16...
+ for ($j=11,$i=0;$i<15;$i++) {
+
+ if ($i>0) {
+ &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8)); # Z^=H[nlo]
+ &rol ($dat,8); # next byte
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8));
+
+ &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+256+128,"esp",$nhi[0],8));
+ &xor (&LB($rem[1]),&BP(0,"esp",$nhi[0])); # rem^(H[nhi]<<4)
+ } else {
+ &movq ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8));
+ &movq ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8));
+ }
+
+ &mov (&LB($nlo),&LB($dat));
+ &mov ($dat,&DWP(528+$j,"esp")) if (--$j%4==0);
+
+ &movd ($rem[0],$Zlo);
+ &movz ($rem[1],&LB($rem[1])) if ($i>0);
+ &psrlq ($Zlo,8); # Z>>=8
+
+ &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
+ &mov ($nhi[0],$nlo);
+ &psrlq ($Zhi,8);
+
+ &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16+256+0,"esp",$nhi[1],8)); # Z^=H[nhi]>>4
+ &and (&LB($nlo),0x0f);
+ &psllq ($tmp,56);
+
+ &pxor ($Zhi,$red[1]) if ($i>1);
+ &shr ($nhi[0],4);
+ &pinsrw ($red[0],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[1],2),2) if ($i>0);
+
+ unshift (@red,pop(@red)); # "rotate" registers
+ unshift (@rem,pop(@rem));
+ unshift (@nhi,pop(@nhi));
+ }
+
+ &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nlo,8)); # Z^=H[nlo]
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nlo,8));
+ &xor (&LB($rem[1]),&BP(0,"esp",$nhi[0])); # rem^(H[nhi]<<4)
+
+ &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+256+128,"esp",$nhi[0],8));
+ &movz ($rem[1],&LB($rem[1]));
+
+ &pxor ($red[2],$red[2]); # clear 2nd word
+ &psllq ($red[1],4);
+
+ &movd ($rem[0],$Zlo);
+ &psrlq ($Zlo,4); # Z>>=4
+
+ &movq ($tmp,$Zhi);
+ &psrlq ($Zhi,4);
+ &shl ($rem[0],4); # rem<<4
+
+ &pxor ($Zlo,&QWP(16,"esp",$nhi[1],8)); # Z^=H[nhi]
+ &psllq ($tmp,60);
+ &movz ($rem[0],&LB($rem[0]));
+
+ &pxor ($Zlo,$tmp);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,&QWP(16+128,"esp",$nhi[1],8));
+
+ &pinsrw ($red[0],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[1],2),2);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,$red[1]);
+
+ &movd ($dat,$Zlo);
+ &pinsrw ($red[2],&WP(0,$rem_8bit,$rem[0],2),3); # last is <<48
+
+ &psllq ($red[0],12); # correct by <<16>>4
+ &pxor ($Zhi,$red[0]);
+ &psrlq ($Zlo,32);
+ &pxor ($Zhi,$red[2]);
+
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(528+16+4,"esp")); # restore inp
+ &movd ("ebx",$Zlo);
+ &movq ($tmp,$Zhi); # 01234567
+ &psllw ($Zhi,8); # 1.3.5.7.
+ &psrlw ($tmp,8); # .0.2.4.6
+ &por ($Zhi,$tmp); # 10325476
+ &bswap ($dat);
+ &pshufw ($Zhi,$Zhi,0b00011011); # 76543210
+ &bswap ("ebx");
+
+ &cmp ("ecx",&DWP(528+16+8,"esp")); # are we done?
+ &jne (&label("outer"));
+ }
+
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(528+16+0,"esp")); # restore Xi
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"eax"),"edx");
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"eax"),"ebx");
+ &movq (&QWP(0,"eax"),$Zhi);
+
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(528+16+12,"esp")); # restore original %esp
+ &emms ();
+}
+&function_end("gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx");
+}}
+
+if ($sse2) {{
+######################################################################
+# PCLMULQDQ version.
+
+$Xip="eax";
+$Htbl="edx";
+$const="ecx";
+$inp="esi";
+$len="ebx";
+
+($Xi,$Xhi)=("xmm0","xmm1"); $Hkey="xmm2";
+($T1,$T2,$T3)=("xmm3","xmm4","xmm5");
+($Xn,$Xhn)=("xmm6","xmm7");
+
+&static_label("bswap");
+
+sub clmul64x64_T2 { # minimal "register" pressure
+my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey)=@_;
+
+ &movdqa ($Xhi,$Xi); #
+ &pshufd ($T1,$Xi,0b01001110);
+ &pshufd ($T2,$Hkey,0b01001110);
+ &pxor ($T1,$Xi); #
+ &pxor ($T2,$Hkey);
+
+ &pclmulqdq ($Xi,$Hkey,0x00); #######
+ &pclmulqdq ($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11); #######
+ &pclmulqdq ($T1,$T2,0x00); #######
+ &xorps ($T1,$Xi); #
+ &xorps ($T1,$Xhi); #
+
+ &movdqa ($T2,$T1); #
+ &psrldq ($T1,8);
+ &pslldq ($T2,8); #
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$T1);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
+}
+
+sub clmul64x64_T3 {
+# Even though this subroutine offers visually better ILP, it
+# was empirically found to be a tad slower than above version.
+# At least in gcm_ghash_clmul context. But it's just as well,
+# because loop modulo-scheduling is possible only thanks to
+# minimized "register" pressure...
+my ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey)=@_;
+
+ &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); #
+ &movdqa ($Xhi,$Xi);
+ &pclmulqdq ($Xi,$Hkey,0x00); #######
+ &pclmulqdq ($Xhi,$Hkey,0x11); #######
+ &pshufd ($T2,$T1,0b01001110); #
+ &pshufd ($T3,$Hkey,0b01001110);
+ &pxor ($T2,$T1); #
+ &pxor ($T3,$Hkey);
+ &pclmulqdq ($T2,$T3,0x00); #######
+ &pxor ($T2,$Xi); #
+ &pxor ($T2,$Xhi); #
+
+ &movdqa ($T3,$T2); #
+ &psrldq ($T2,8);
+ &pslldq ($T3,8); #
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$T2);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T3); #
+}
+
+if (1) { # Algorithm 9 with <<1 twist.
+ # Reduction is shorter and uses only two
+ # temporary registers, which makes it better
+ # candidate for interleaving with 64x64
+ # multiplication. Pre-modulo-scheduled loop
+ # was found to be ~20% faster than Algorithm 5
+ # below. Algorithm 9 was therefore chosen for
+ # further optimization...
+
+sub reduction_alg9 { # 17/13 times faster than Intel version
+my ($Xhi,$Xi) = @_;
+
+ # 1st phase
+ &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); #
+ &psllq ($Xi,1);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1); #
+ &psllq ($Xi,5); #
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1); #
+ &psllq ($Xi,57); #
+ &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); #
+ &pslldq ($Xi,8);
+ &psrldq ($T2,8); #
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1);
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$T2); #
+
+ # 2nd phase
+ &movdqa ($T2,$Xi);
+ &psrlq ($Xi,5);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
+ &psrlq ($Xi,1); #
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
+ &pxor ($T2,$Xhi);
+ &psrlq ($Xi,1); #
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("gcm_init_clmul");
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($Xip,&wparam(1));
+
+ &call (&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+ &blindpop ($const);
+ &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+ &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+ &pshufd ($Hkey,$Hkey,0b01001110);# dword swap
+
+ # <<1 twist
+ &pshufd ($T2,$Hkey,0b11111111); # broadcast uppermost dword
+ &movdqa ($T1,$Hkey);
+ &psllq ($Hkey,1);
+ &pxor ($T3,$T3); #
+ &psrlq ($T1,63);
+ &pcmpgtd ($T3,$T2); # broadcast carry bit
+ &pslldq ($T1,8);
+ &por ($Hkey,$T1); # H<<=1
+
+ # magic reduction
+ &pand ($T3,&QWP(16,$const)); # 0x1c2_polynomial
+ &pxor ($Hkey,$T3); # if(carry) H^=0x1c2_polynomial
+
+ # calculate H^2
+ &movdqa ($Xi,$Hkey);
+ &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
+ &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+ &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Htbl),$Hkey); # save H
+ &movdqu (&QWP(16,$Htbl),$Xi); # save H^2
+
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("gcm_init_clmul");
+
+&function_begin_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
+ &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1));
+
+ &call (&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+ &blindpop ($const);
+ &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+ &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+ &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+ &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
+ &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
+
+ &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
+ &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+ &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
+ &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
+
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
+
+&function_begin("gcm_ghash_clmul");
+ &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($len,&wparam(3));
+
+ &call (&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+ &blindpop ($const);
+ &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+ &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+ &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+ &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
+ &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
+
+ &sub ($len,0x10);
+ &jz (&label("odd_tail"));
+
+ #######
+ # Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P =
+ # [(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P =
+ # [(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
+ #
+ &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
+ &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1
+ &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
+ &pshufb ($Xn,$T3);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi
+
+ &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); # H*Ii+1
+ &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2
+
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp)); # i+=2
+ &sub ($len,0x20);
+ &jbe (&label("even_tail"));
+
+&set_label("mod_loop");
+ &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+ &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
+ &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H
+
+ &pxor ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn);
+
+ &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1
+ &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
+ &pshufb ($Xn,$T3);
+
+ &movdqa ($T3,$Xn); #&clmul64x64_TX ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); H*Ii+1
+ &movdqa ($Xhn,$Xn);
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$T1); # "Ii+Xi", consume early
+
+ &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); #&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi); 1st phase
+ &psllq ($Xi,1);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1); #
+ &psllq ($Xi,5); #
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1); #
+ &pclmulqdq ($Xn,$Hkey,0x00); #######
+ &psllq ($Xi,57); #
+ &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); #
+ &pslldq ($Xi,8);
+ &psrldq ($T2,8); #
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1);
+ &pshufd ($T1,$T3,0b01001110);
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$T2); #
+ &pxor ($T1,$T3);
+ &pshufd ($T3,$Hkey,0b01001110);
+ &pxor ($T3,$Hkey); #
+
+ &pclmulqdq ($Xhn,$Hkey,0x11); #######
+ &movdqa ($T2,$Xi); # 2nd phase
+ &psrlq ($Xi,5);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
+ &psrlq ($Xi,1); #
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
+ &pxor ($T2,$Xhi);
+ &psrlq ($Xi,1); #
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T2); #
+
+ &pclmulqdq ($T1,$T3,0x00); #######
+ &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2
+ &xorps ($T1,$Xn); #
+ &xorps ($T1,$Xhn); #
+
+ &movdqa ($T3,$T1); #
+ &psrldq ($T1,8);
+ &pslldq ($T3,8); #
+ &pxor ($Xhn,$T1);
+ &pxor ($Xn,$T3); #
+ &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp));
+ &sub ($len,0x20);
+ &ja (&label("mod_loop"));
+
+&set_label("even_tail");
+ &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+
+ &pxor ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn);
+
+ &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+ &test ($len,$len);
+ &jnz (&label("done"));
+
+ &movups ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H
+&set_label("odd_tail");
+ &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
+ &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi
+
+ &clmul64x64_T2 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H*(Ii+Xi)
+ &reduction_alg9 ($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+&set_label("done");
+ &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
+ &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
+&function_end("gcm_ghash_clmul");
+
+} else { # Algorith 5. Kept for reference purposes.
+
+sub reduction_alg5 { # 19/16 times faster than Intel version
+my ($Xhi,$Xi)=@_;
+
+ # <<1
+ &movdqa ($T1,$Xi); #
+ &movdqa ($T2,$Xhi);
+ &pslld ($Xi,1);
+ &pslld ($Xhi,1); #
+ &psrld ($T1,31);
+ &psrld ($T2,31); #
+ &movdqa ($T3,$T1);
+ &pslldq ($T1,4);
+ &psrldq ($T3,12); #
+ &pslldq ($T2,4);
+ &por ($Xhi,$T3); #
+ &por ($Xi,$T1);
+ &por ($Xhi,$T2); #
+
+ # 1st phase
+ &movdqa ($T1,$Xi);
+ &movdqa ($T2,$Xi);
+ &movdqa ($T3,$Xi); #
+ &pslld ($T1,31);
+ &pslld ($T2,30);
+ &pslld ($Xi,25); #
+ &pxor ($T1,$T2);
+ &pxor ($T1,$Xi); #
+ &movdqa ($T2,$T1); #
+ &pslldq ($T1,12);
+ &psrldq ($T2,4); #
+ &pxor ($T3,$T1);
+
+ # 2nd phase
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$T3); #
+ &movdqa ($Xi,$T3);
+ &movdqa ($T1,$T3);
+ &psrld ($Xi,1); #
+ &psrld ($T1,2);
+ &psrld ($T3,7); #
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1);
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$T2);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T3); #
+ &pxor ($Xi,$Xhi); #
+}
+
+&function_begin_B("gcm_init_clmul");
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($Xip,&wparam(1));
+
+ &call (&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+ &blindpop ($const);
+ &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+ &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+ &pshufd ($Hkey,$Hkey,0b01001110);# dword swap
+
+ # calculate H^2
+ &movdqa ($Xi,$Hkey);
+ &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
+ &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+ &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Htbl),$Hkey); # save H
+ &movdqu (&QWP(16,$Htbl),$Xi); # save H^2
+
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("gcm_init_clmul");
+
+&function_begin_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
+ &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1));
+
+ &call (&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+ &blindpop ($const);
+ &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+ &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+ &movdqa ($Xn,&QWP(0,$const));
+ &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
+ &pshufb ($Xi,$Xn);
+
+ &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey);
+ &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+ &pshufb ($Xi,$Xn);
+ &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
+
+ &ret ();
+&function_end_B("gcm_gmult_clmul");
+
+&function_begin("gcm_ghash_clmul");
+ &mov ($Xip,&wparam(0));
+ &mov ($Htbl,&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($inp,&wparam(2));
+ &mov ($len,&wparam(3));
+
+ &call (&label("pic"));
+&set_label("pic");
+ &blindpop ($const);
+ &lea ($const,&DWP(&label("bswap")."-".&label("pic"),$const));
+
+ &movdqu ($Xi,&QWP(0,$Xip));
+ &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+ &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl));
+ &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
+
+ &sub ($len,0x10);
+ &jz (&label("odd_tail"));
+
+ #######
+ # Xi+2 =[H*(Ii+1 + Xi+1)] mod P =
+ # [(H*Ii+1) + (H*Xi+1)] mod P =
+ # [(H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)] mod P
+ #
+ &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
+ &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1
+ &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
+ &pshufb ($Xn,$T3);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi
+
+ &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); # H*Ii+1
+ &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2
+
+ &sub ($len,0x20);
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp)); # i+=2
+ &jbe (&label("even_tail"));
+
+&set_label("mod_loop");
+ &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+ &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H
+
+ &pxor ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn);
+
+ &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+ #######
+ &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+ &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
+ &movdqu ($Xn,&QWP(16,$inp)); # Ii+1
+ &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
+ &pshufb ($Xn,$T3);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi
+
+ &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhn,$Xn,$Hkey); # H*Ii+1
+ &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(16,$Htbl)); # load H^2
+
+ &sub ($len,0x20);
+ &lea ($inp,&DWP(32,$inp));
+ &ja (&label("mod_loop"));
+
+&set_label("even_tail");
+ &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+
+ &pxor ($Xi,$Xn); # (H*Ii+1) + H^2*(Ii+Xi)
+ &pxor ($Xhi,$Xhn);
+
+ &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+ &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+ &test ($len,$len);
+ &jnz (&label("done"));
+
+ &movdqu ($Hkey,&QWP(0,$Htbl)); # load H
+&set_label("odd_tail");
+ &movdqu ($T1,&QWP(0,$inp)); # Ii
+ &pshufb ($T1,$T3);
+ &pxor ($Xi,$T1); # Ii+Xi
+
+ &clmul64x64_T3 ($Xhi,$Xi,$Hkey); # H*(Ii+Xi)
+ &reduction_alg5 ($Xhi,$Xi);
+
+ &movdqa ($T3,&QWP(0,$const));
+&set_label("done");
+ &pshufb ($Xi,$T3);
+ &movdqu (&QWP(0,$Xip),$Xi);
+&function_end("gcm_ghash_clmul");
+
+}
+
+&set_label("bswap",64);
+ &data_byte(15,14,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0);
+ &data_byte(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0xc2); # 0x1c2_polynomial
+}} # $sse2
+
+&set_label("rem_4bit",64);
+ &data_word(0,0x0000<<$S,0,0x1C20<<$S,0,0x3840<<$S,0,0x2460<<$S);
+ &data_word(0,0x7080<<$S,0,0x6CA0<<$S,0,0x48C0<<$S,0,0x54E0<<$S);
+ &data_word(0,0xE100<<$S,0,0xFD20<<$S,0,0xD940<<$S,0,0xC560<<$S);
+ &data_word(0,0x9180<<$S,0,0x8DA0<<$S,0,0xA9C0<<$S,0,0xB5E0<<$S);
+&set_label("rem_8bit",64);
+ &data_short(0x0000,0x01C2,0x0384,0x0246,0x0708,0x06CA,0x048C,0x054E);
+ &data_short(0x0E10,0x0FD2,0x0D94,0x0C56,0x0918,0x08DA,0x0A9C,0x0B5E);
+ &data_short(0x1C20,0x1DE2,0x1FA4,0x1E66,0x1B28,0x1AEA,0x18AC,0x196E);
+ &data_short(0x1230,0x13F2,0x11B4,0x1076,0x1538,0x14FA,0x16BC,0x177E);
+ &data_short(0x3840,0x3982,0x3BC4,0x3A06,0x3F48,0x3E8A,0x3CCC,0x3D0E);
+ &data_short(0x3650,0x3792,0x35D4,0x3416,0x3158,0x309A,0x32DC,0x331E);
+ &data_short(0x2460,0x25A2,0x27E4,0x2626,0x2368,0x22AA,0x20EC,0x212E);
+ &data_short(0x2A70,0x2BB2,0x29F4,0x2836,0x2D78,0x2CBA,0x2EFC,0x2F3E);
+ &data_short(0x7080,0x7142,0x7304,0x72C6,0x7788,0x764A,0x740C,0x75CE);
+ &data_short(0x7E90,0x7F52,0x7D14,0x7CD6,0x7998,0x785A,0x7A1C,0x7BDE);
+ &data_short(0x6CA0,0x6D62,0x6F24,0x6EE6,0x6BA8,0x6A6A,0x682C,0x69EE);
+ &data_short(0x62B0,0x6372,0x6134,0x60F6,0x65B8,0x647A,0x663C,0x67FE);
+ &data_short(0x48C0,0x4902,0x4B44,0x4A86,0x4FC8,0x4E0A,0x4C4C,0x4D8E);
+ &data_short(0x46D0,0x4712,0x4554,0x4496,0x41D8,0x401A,0x425C,0x439E);
+ &data_short(0x54E0,0x5522,0x5764,0x56A6,0x53E8,0x522A,0x506C,0x51AE);
+ &data_short(0x5AF0,0x5B32,0x5974,0x58B6,0x5DF8,0x5C3A,0x5E7C,0x5FBE);
+ &data_short(0xE100,0xE0C2,0xE284,0xE346,0xE608,0xE7CA,0xE58C,0xE44E);
+ &data_short(0xEF10,0xEED2,0xEC94,0xED56,0xE818,0xE9DA,0xEB9C,0xEA5E);
+ &data_short(0xFD20,0xFCE2,0xFEA4,0xFF66,0xFA28,0xFBEA,0xF9AC,0xF86E);
+ &data_short(0xF330,0xF2F2,0xF0B4,0xF176,0xF438,0xF5FA,0xF7BC,0xF67E);
+ &data_short(0xD940,0xD882,0xDAC4,0xDB06,0xDE48,0xDF8A,0xDDCC,0xDC0E);
+ &data_short(0xD750,0xD692,0xD4D4,0xD516,0xD058,0xD19A,0xD3DC,0xD21E);
+ &data_short(0xC560,0xC4A2,0xC6E4,0xC726,0xC268,0xC3AA,0xC1EC,0xC02E);
+ &data_short(0xCB70,0xCAB2,0xC8F4,0xC936,0xCC78,0xCDBA,0xCFFC,0xCE3E);
+ &data_short(0x9180,0x9042,0x9204,0x93C6,0x9688,0x974A,0x950C,0x94CE);
+ &data_short(0x9F90,0x9E52,0x9C14,0x9DD6,0x9898,0x995A,0x9B1C,0x9ADE);
+ &data_short(0x8DA0,0x8C62,0x8E24,0x8FE6,0x8AA8,0x8B6A,0x892C,0x88EE);
+ &data_short(0x83B0,0x8272,0x8034,0x81F6,0x84B8,0x857A,0x873C,0x86FE);
+ &data_short(0xA9C0,0xA802,0xAA44,0xAB86,0xAEC8,0xAF0A,0xAD4C,0xAC8E);
+ &data_short(0xA7D0,0xA612,0xA454,0xA596,0xA0D8,0xA11A,0xA35C,0xA29E);
+ &data_short(0xB5E0,0xB422,0xB664,0xB7A6,0xB2E8,0xB32A,0xB16C,0xB0AE);
+ &data_short(0xBBF0,0xBA32,0xB874,0xB9B6,0xBCF8,0xBD3A,0xBF7C,0xBEBE);
+}}} # !$x86only
+
+&asciz("GHASH for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+&asm_finish();
+
+# A question was risen about choice of vanilla MMX. Or rather why wasn't
+# SSE2 chosen instead? In addition to the fact that MMX runs on legacy
+# CPUs such as PIII, "4-bit" MMX version was observed to provide better
+# performance than *corresponding* SSE2 one even on contemporary CPUs.
+# SSE2 results were provided by Peter-Michael Hager. He maintains SSE2
+# implementation featuring full range of lookup-table sizes, but with
+# per-invocation lookup table setup. Latter means that table size is
+# chosen depending on how much data is to be hashed in every given call,
+# more data - larger table. Best reported result for Core2 is ~4 cycles
+# per processed byte out of 64KB block. This number accounts even for
+# 64KB table setup overhead. As discussed in gcm128.c we choose to be
+# more conservative in respect to lookup table sizes, but how do the
+# results compare? Minimalistic "256B" MMX version delivers ~11 cycles
+# on same platform. As also discussed in gcm128.c, next in line "8-bit
+# Shoup's" or "4KB" method should deliver twice the performance of
+# "256B" one, in other words not worse than ~6 cycles per byte. It
+# should be also be noted that in SSE2 case improvement can be "super-
+# linear," i.e. more than twice, mostly because >>8 maps to single
+# instruction on SSE2 register. This is unlike "4-bit" case when >>4
+# maps to same amount of instructions in both MMX and SSE2 cases.
+# Bottom line is that switch to SSE2 is considered to be justifiable
+# only in case we choose to implement "8-bit" method...
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,290 +0,0 @@
-/* ocsp_lib.c */
-/*
- * Written by Tom Titchener <Tom_Titchener at groove.net> for the OpenSSL
- * project.
- */
-
-/*
- * History: This file was transfered to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
- * Weinhold in mid-spring 2000 to be included in OpenSSL or released as a
- * patch kit.
- */
-
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <cryptlib.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-
-/* Convert a certificate and its issuer to an OCSP_CERTID */
-
-OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_to_id(const EVP_MD *dgst, X509 *subject, X509 *issuer)
-{
- X509_NAME *iname;
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
- if (!dgst)
- dgst = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
- if (subject) {
- iname = X509_get_issuer_name(subject);
- serial = X509_get_serialNumber(subject);
- } else {
- iname = X509_get_subject_name(issuer);
- serial = NULL;
- }
- ikey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(issuer);
- return OCSP_cert_id_new(dgst, iname, ikey, serial);
-}
-
-OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_id_new(const EVP_MD *dgst,
- X509_NAME *issuerName,
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerKey,
- ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber)
-{
- int nid;
- unsigned int i;
- X509_ALGOR *alg;
- OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
- unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
- if (!(cid = OCSP_CERTID_new()))
- goto err;
-
- alg = cid->hashAlgorithm;
- if (alg->algorithm != NULL)
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg->algorithm);
- if ((nid = EVP_MD_type(dgst)) == NID_undef) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!(alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)))
- goto err;
- if ((alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-
- if (!X509_NAME_digest(issuerName, dgst, md, &i))
- goto digerr;
- if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(cid->issuerNameHash, md, i)))
- goto err;
-
- /* Calculate the issuerKey hash, excluding tag and length */
- if (!EVP_Digest(issuerKey->data, issuerKey->length, md, &i, dgst, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(cid->issuerKeyHash, md, i)))
- goto err;
-
- if (serialNumber) {
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(cid->serialNumber);
- if (!(cid->serialNumber = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(serialNumber)))
- goto err;
- }
- return cid;
- digerr:
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW, OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR);
- err:
- if (cid)
- OCSP_CERTID_free(cid);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b)
-{
- int ret;
- ret = OBJ_cmp(a->hashAlgorithm->algorithm, b->hashAlgorithm->algorithm);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a->issuerNameHash, b->issuerNameHash);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a->issuerKeyHash, b->issuerKeyHash);
-}
-
-int OCSP_id_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b)
-{
- int ret;
- ret = OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(a, b);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->serialNumber, b->serialNumber);
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse a URL and split it up into host, port and path components and
- * whether it is SSL.
- */
-
-int OCSP_parse_url(char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath,
- int *pssl)
-{
- char *p, *buf;
-
- char *host, *port;
-
- *phost = NULL;
- *pport = NULL;
- *ppath = NULL;
-
- /* dup the buffer since we are going to mess with it */
- buf = BUF_strdup(url);
- if (!buf)
- goto mem_err;
-
- /* Check for initial colon */
- p = strchr(buf, ':');
-
- if (!p)
- goto parse_err;
-
- *(p++) = '\0';
-
- if (!strcmp(buf, "http")) {
- *pssl = 0;
- port = "80";
- } else if (!strcmp(buf, "https")) {
- *pssl = 1;
- port = "443";
- } else
- goto parse_err;
-
- /* Check for double slash */
- if ((p[0] != '/') || (p[1] != '/'))
- goto parse_err;
-
- p += 2;
-
- host = p;
-
- /* Check for trailing part of path */
-
- p = strchr(p, '/');
-
- if (!p)
- *ppath = BUF_strdup("/");
- else {
- *ppath = BUF_strdup(p);
- /* Set start of path to 0 so hostname is valid */
- *p = '\0';
- }
-
- if (!*ppath)
- goto mem_err;
-
- p = host;
- if (host[0] == '[') {
- /* ipv6 literal */
- host++;
- p = strchr(host, ']');
- if (!p)
- goto parse_err;
- *p = '\0';
- p++;
- }
-
- /* Look for optional ':' for port number */
- if ((p = strchr(p, ':'))) {
- *p = 0;
- port = p + 1;
- } else {
- /* Not found: set default port */
- if (*pssl)
- port = "443";
- else
- port = "80";
- }
-
- *pport = BUF_strdup(port);
- if (!*pport)
- goto mem_err;
-
- *phost = BUF_strdup(host);
-
- if (!*phost)
- goto mem_err;
-
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
- return 1;
-
- mem_err:
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
-
- parse_err:
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL, OCSP_R_ERROR_PARSING_URL);
-
- err:
- if (buf)
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- if (*ppath)
- OPENSSL_free(*ppath);
- if (*pport)
- OPENSSL_free(*pport);
- if (*phost)
- OPENSSL_free(*phost);
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OCSP_CERTID)
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+/* ocsp_lib.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Tom Titchener <Tom_Titchener at groove.net> for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * History: This file was transfered to Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy
+ * Weinhold in mid-spring 2000 to be included in OpenSSL or released as a
+ * patch kit.
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <cryptlib.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+
+/* Convert a certificate and its issuer to an OCSP_CERTID */
+
+OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_to_id(const EVP_MD *dgst, X509 *subject, X509 *issuer)
+{
+ X509_NAME *iname;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ikey;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
+ if (!dgst)
+ dgst = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+ if (subject) {
+ iname = X509_get_issuer_name(subject);
+ serial = X509_get_serialNumber(subject);
+ } else {
+ iname = X509_get_subject_name(issuer);
+ serial = NULL;
+ }
+ ikey = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(issuer);
+ return OCSP_cert_id_new(dgst, iname, ikey, serial);
+}
+
+OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_id_new(const EVP_MD *dgst,
+ X509_NAME *issuerName,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerKey,
+ ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber)
+{
+ int nid;
+ unsigned int i;
+ X509_ALGOR *alg;
+ OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ if (!(cid = OCSP_CERTID_new()))
+ goto err;
+
+ alg = cid->hashAlgorithm;
+ if (alg->algorithm != NULL)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg->algorithm);
+ if ((nid = EVP_MD_type(dgst)) == NID_undef) {
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)))
+ goto err;
+ if ((alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+
+ if (!X509_NAME_digest(issuerName, dgst, md, &i))
+ goto digerr;
+ if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(cid->issuerNameHash, md, i)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Calculate the issuerKey hash, excluding tag and length */
+ if (!EVP_Digest(issuerKey->data, issuerKey->length, md, &i, dgst, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(cid->issuerKeyHash, md, i)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (serialNumber) {
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(cid->serialNumber);
+ if (!(cid->serialNumber = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(serialNumber)))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return cid;
+ digerr:
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CERT_ID_NEW, OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR);
+ err:
+ if (cid)
+ OCSP_CERTID_free(cid);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = OBJ_cmp(a->hashAlgorithm->algorithm, b->hashAlgorithm->algorithm);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a->issuerNameHash, b->issuerNameHash);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a->issuerKeyHash, b->issuerKeyHash);
+}
+
+int OCSP_id_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(a, b);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a->serialNumber, b->serialNumber);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a URL and split it up into host, port and path components and
+ * whether it is SSL.
+ */
+
+int OCSP_parse_url(char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath,
+ int *pssl)
+{
+ char *p, *buf;
+
+ char *host, *port;
+
+ *phost = NULL;
+ *pport = NULL;
+ *ppath = NULL;
+
+ /* dup the buffer since we are going to mess with it */
+ buf = BUF_strdup(url);
+ if (!buf)
+ goto mem_err;
+
+ /* Check for initial colon */
+ p = strchr(buf, ':');
+
+ if (!p)
+ goto parse_err;
+
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+
+ if (!strcmp(buf, "http")) {
+ *pssl = 0;
+ port = "80";
+ } else if (!strcmp(buf, "https")) {
+ *pssl = 1;
+ port = "443";
+ } else
+ goto parse_err;
+
+ /* Check for double slash */
+ if ((p[0] != '/') || (p[1] != '/'))
+ goto parse_err;
+
+ p += 2;
+
+ host = p;
+
+ /* Check for trailing part of path */
+
+ p = strchr(p, '/');
+
+ if (!p)
+ *ppath = BUF_strdup("/");
+ else {
+ *ppath = BUF_strdup(p);
+ /* Set start of path to 0 so hostname is valid */
+ *p = '\0';
+ }
+
+ if (!*ppath)
+ goto mem_err;
+
+ p = host;
+ if (host[0] == '[') {
+ /* ipv6 literal */
+ host++;
+ p = strchr(host, ']');
+ if (!p)
+ goto parse_err;
+ *p = '\0';
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ /* Look for optional ':' for port number */
+ if ((p = strchr(p, ':'))) {
+ *p = 0;
+ port = p + 1;
+ }
+
+ *pport = BUF_strdup(port);
+ if (!*pport)
+ goto mem_err;
+
+ *phost = BUF_strdup(host);
+
+ if (!*phost)
+ goto mem_err;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+ return 1;
+
+ mem_err:
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+
+ parse_err:
+ OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_PARSE_URL, OCSP_R_ERROR_PARSING_URL);
+
+ err:
+ if (buf)
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ if (*ppath)
+ OPENSSL_free(*ppath);
+ if (*pport)
+ OPENSSL_free(*pport);
+ if (*phost)
+ OPENSSL_free(*phost);
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OCSP_CERTID)
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
-/* ocsp_prn.c */
-/*
- * Written by Tom Titchener <Tom_Titchener at groove.net> for the OpenSSL
- * project.
- */
-
-/*
- * History: This file was originally part of ocsp.c and was transfered to
- * Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy Weinhold in mid-spring 2000 to be
- * included in OpenSSL or released as a patch kit.
- */
-
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-
-static int ocsp_certid_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_CERTID *a, int indent)
-{
- BIO_printf(bp, "%*sCertificate ID:\n", indent, "");
- indent += 2;
- BIO_printf(bp, "%*sHash Algorithm: ", indent, "");
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, a->hashAlgorithm->algorithm);
- BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sIssuer Name Hash: ", indent, "");
- i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, a->issuerNameHash, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sIssuer Key Hash: ", indent, "");
- i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, a->issuerKeyHash, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sSerial Number: ", indent, "");
- i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, a->serialNumber);
- BIO_printf(bp, "\n");
- return 1;
-}
-
-typedef struct {
- long t;
- const char *m;
-} OCSP_TBLSTR;
-
-static const char *table2string(long s, const OCSP_TBLSTR *ts, int len)
-{
- const OCSP_TBLSTR *p;
- for (p = ts; p < ts + len; p++)
- if (p->t == s)
- return p->m;
- return "(UNKNOWN)";
-}
-
-const char *OCSP_response_status_str(long s)
-{
- static const OCSP_TBLSTR rstat_tbl[] = {
- {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, "successful"},
- {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, "malformedrequest"},
- {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR, "internalerror"},
- {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_TRYLATER, "trylater"},
- {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED, "sigrequired"},
- {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized"}
- };
- return table2string(s, rstat_tbl, 6);
-}
-
-const char *OCSP_cert_status_str(long s)
-{
- static const OCSP_TBLSTR cstat_tbl[] = {
- {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD, "good"},
- {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED, "revoked"},
- {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN, "unknown"}
- };
- return table2string(s, cstat_tbl, 3);
-}
-
-const char *OCSP_crl_reason_str(long s)
-{
- static const OCSP_TBLSTR reason_tbl[] = {
- {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED, "unspecified"},
- {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE, "keyCompromise"},
- {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE, "cACompromise"},
- {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED, "affiliationChanged"},
- {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED, "superseded"},
- {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION, "cessationOfOperation"},
- {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD, "certificateHold"},
- {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL, "removeFromCRL"}
- };
- return table2string(s, reason_tbl, 8);
-}
-
-int OCSP_REQUEST_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_REQUEST *o, unsigned long flags)
-{
- int i;
- long l;
- OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
- OCSP_ONEREQ *one = NULL;
- OCSP_REQINFO *inf = o->tbsRequest;
- OCSP_SIGNATURE *sig = o->optionalSignature;
-
- if (BIO_write(bp, "OCSP Request Data:\n", 19) <= 0)
- goto err;
- l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(inf->version);
- if (BIO_printf(bp, " Version: %lu (0x%lx)", l + 1, l) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (inf->requestorName != NULL) {
- if (BIO_write(bp, "\n Requestor Name: ", 21) <= 0)
- goto err;
- GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, inf->requestorName);
- }
- if (BIO_write(bp, "\n Requestor List:\n", 21) <= 0)
- goto err;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_num(inf->requestList); i++) {
- one = sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_value(inf->requestList, i);
- cid = one->reqCert;
- ocsp_certid_print(bp, cid, 8);
- if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp,
- "Request Single Extensions",
- one->singleRequestExtensions, flags, 8))
- goto err;
- }
- if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "Request Extensions",
- inf->requestExtensions, flags, 4))
- goto err;
- if (sig) {
- X509_signature_print(bp, sig->signatureAlgorithm, sig->signature);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sig->certs); i++) {
- X509_print(bp, sk_X509_value(sig->certs, i));
- PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, sk_X509_value(sig->certs, i));
- }
- }
- return 1;
- err:
- return 0;
-}
-
-int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags)
-{
- int i, ret = 0;
- long l;
- OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
- OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
- OCSP_RESPID *rid = NULL;
- OCSP_RESPDATA *rd = NULL;
- OCSP_CERTSTATUS *cst = NULL;
- OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *rev = NULL;
- OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = NULL;
- OCSP_RESPBYTES *rb = o->responseBytes;
-
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "OCSP Response Data:\n") <= 0)
- goto err;
- l = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(o->responseStatus);
- if (BIO_printf(bp, " OCSP Response Status: %s (0x%lx)\n",
- OCSP_response_status_str(l), l) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (rb == NULL)
- return 1;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, " Response Type: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, rb->responseType) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(rb->responseType) != NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic) {
- BIO_puts(bp, " (unknown response type)\n");
- return 1;
- }
-
- i = ASN1_STRING_length(rb->response);
- if (!(br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)))
- goto err;
- rd = br->tbsResponseData;
- l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(rd->version);
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Version: %lu (0x%lx)\n", l + 1, l) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, " Responder Id: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- rid = rd->responderId;
- switch (rid->type) {
- case V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME:
- X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, rid->value.byName, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
- break;
- case V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY:
- i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, rid->value.byKey, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- break;
- }
-
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Produced At: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, rd->producedAt))
- goto err;
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Responses:\n") <= 0)
- goto err;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(rd->responses); i++) {
- if (!sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(rd->responses, i))
- continue;
- single = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(rd->responses, i);
- cid = single->certId;
- if (ocsp_certid_print(bp, cid, 4) <= 0)
- goto err;
- cst = single->certStatus;
- if (BIO_printf(bp, " Cert Status: %s",
- OCSP_cert_status_str(cst->type)) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (cst->type == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) {
- rev = cst->value.revoked;
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Revocation Time: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, rev->revocationTime))
- goto err;
- if (rev->revocationReason) {
- l = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(rev->revocationReason);
- if (BIO_printf(bp,
- "\n Revocation Reason: %s (0x%lx)",
- OCSP_crl_reason_str(l), l) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n This Update: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, single->thisUpdate))
- goto err;
- if (single->nextUpdate) {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Next Update: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, single->nextUpdate))
- goto err;
- }
- if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp,
- "Response Single Extensions",
- single->singleExtensions, flags, 8))
- goto err;
- if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "Response Extensions",
- rd->responseExtensions, flags, 4))
- goto err;
- if (X509_signature_print(bp, br->signatureAlgorithm, br->signature) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(br->certs); i++) {
- X509_print(bp, sk_X509_value(br->certs, i));
- PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, sk_X509_value(br->certs, i));
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- err:
- OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
- return ret;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+/* ocsp_prn.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Tom Titchener <Tom_Titchener at groove.net> for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * History: This file was originally part of ocsp.c and was transfered to
+ * Richard Levitte from CertCo by Kathy Weinhold in mid-spring 2000 to be
+ * included in OpenSSL or released as a patch kit.
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+static int ocsp_certid_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_CERTID *a, int indent)
+{
+ BIO_printf(bp, "%*sCertificate ID:\n", indent, "");
+ indent += 2;
+ BIO_printf(bp, "%*sHash Algorithm: ", indent, "");
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, a->hashAlgorithm->algorithm);
+ BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sIssuer Name Hash: ", indent, "");
+ i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, a->issuerNameHash, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sIssuer Key Hash: ", indent, "");
+ i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, a->issuerKeyHash, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ BIO_printf(bp, "\n%*sSerial Number: ", indent, "");
+ i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, a->serialNumber);
+ BIO_printf(bp, "\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+ long t;
+ const char *m;
+} OCSP_TBLSTR;
+
+static const char *table2string(long s, const OCSP_TBLSTR *ts, int len)
+{
+ const OCSP_TBLSTR *p;
+ for (p = ts; p < ts + len; p++)
+ if (p->t == s)
+ return p->m;
+ return "(UNKNOWN)";
+}
+
+const char *OCSP_response_status_str(long s)
+{
+ static const OCSP_TBLSTR rstat_tbl[] = {
+ {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, "successful"},
+ {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST, "malformedrequest"},
+ {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR, "internalerror"},
+ {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_TRYLATER, "trylater"},
+ {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED, "sigrequired"},
+ {OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized"}
+ };
+ return table2string(s, rstat_tbl, 6);
+}
+
+const char *OCSP_cert_status_str(long s)
+{
+ static const OCSP_TBLSTR cstat_tbl[] = {
+ {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD, "good"},
+ {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED, "revoked"},
+ {V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN, "unknown"}
+ };
+ return table2string(s, cstat_tbl, 3);
+}
+
+const char *OCSP_crl_reason_str(long s)
+{
+ static const OCSP_TBLSTR reason_tbl[] = {
+ {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED, "unspecified"},
+ {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE, "keyCompromise"},
+ {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE, "cACompromise"},
+ {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED, "affiliationChanged"},
+ {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED, "superseded"},
+ {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION, "cessationOfOperation"},
+ {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD, "certificateHold"},
+ {OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL, "removeFromCRL"}
+ };
+ return table2string(s, reason_tbl, 8);
+}
+
+int OCSP_REQUEST_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_REQUEST *o, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int i;
+ long l;
+ OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
+ OCSP_ONEREQ *one = NULL;
+ OCSP_REQINFO *inf = o->tbsRequest;
+ OCSP_SIGNATURE *sig = o->optionalSignature;
+
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "OCSP Request Data:\n", 19) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(inf->version);
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, " Version: %lu (0x%lx)", l + 1, l) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (inf->requestorName != NULL) {
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n Requestor Name: ", 21) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, inf->requestorName);
+ }
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n Requestor List:\n", 21) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_num(inf->requestList); i++) {
+ one = sk_OCSP_ONEREQ_value(inf->requestList, i);
+ cid = one->reqCert;
+ ocsp_certid_print(bp, cid, 8);
+ if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp,
+ "Request Single Extensions",
+ one->singleRequestExtensions, flags, 8))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "Request Extensions",
+ inf->requestExtensions, flags, 4))
+ goto err;
+ if (sig) {
+ X509_signature_print(bp, sig->signatureAlgorithm, sig->signature);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sig->certs); i++) {
+ X509_print(bp, sk_X509_value(sig->certs, i));
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, sk_X509_value(sig->certs, i));
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ long l;
+ OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
+ OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
+ OCSP_RESPID *rid = NULL;
+ OCSP_RESPDATA *rd = NULL;
+ OCSP_CERTSTATUS *cst = NULL;
+ OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *rev = NULL;
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = NULL;
+ OCSP_RESPBYTES *rb = o->responseBytes;
+
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "OCSP Response Data:\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ l = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(o->responseStatus);
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, " OCSP Response Status: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+ OCSP_response_status_str(l), l) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (rb == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " Response Type: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, rb->responseType) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(rb->responseType) != NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic) {
+ BIO_puts(bp, " (unknown response type)\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ rd = br->tbsResponseData;
+ l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(rd->version);
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Version: %lu (0x%lx)\n", l + 1, l) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " Responder Id: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ rid = rd->responderId;
+ switch (rid->type) {
+ case V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME:
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, rid->value.byName, 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ break;
+ case V_OCSP_RESPID_KEY:
+ i2a_ASN1_STRING(bp, rid->value.byKey, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Produced At: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, rd->producedAt))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Responses:\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(rd->responses); i++) {
+ if (!sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(rd->responses, i))
+ continue;
+ single = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(rd->responses, i);
+ cid = single->certId;
+ if (ocsp_certid_print(bp, cid, 4) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ cst = single->certStatus;
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, " Cert Status: %s",
+ OCSP_cert_status_str(cst->type)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (cst->type == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) {
+ rev = cst->value.revoked;
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Revocation Time: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, rev->revocationTime))
+ goto err;
+ if (rev->revocationReason) {
+ l = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(rev->revocationReason);
+ if (BIO_printf(bp,
+ "\n Revocation Reason: %s (0x%lx)",
+ OCSP_crl_reason_str(l), l) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n This Update: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, single->thisUpdate))
+ goto err;
+ if (single->nextUpdate) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Next Update: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, single->nextUpdate))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp,
+ "Response Single Extensions",
+ single->singleExtensions, flags, 8))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "Response Extensions",
+ rd->responseExtensions, flags, 4))
+ goto err;
+ if (X509_signature_print(bp, br->signatureAlgorithm, br->signature) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(br->certs); i++) {
+ X509_print(bp, sk_X509_value(br->certs, i));
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, sk_X509_value(br->certs, i));
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
+ return ret;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslconf.h 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-/* opensslconf.h */
-/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND
-
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-# define OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP
-# define OPENSSL_NO_GMP
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
-# define OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-# define OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
-# define OPENSSL_NO_MD2
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
-# define OPENSSL_NO_RC5
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
-# define OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-# define OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STORE
-# define OPENSSL_NO_STORE
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
-# define OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
-#endif
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
-# define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
-#endif
-
-/* The OPENSSL_NO_* macros are also defined as NO_* if the application
- asks for it. This is a transient feature that is provided for those
- who haven't had the time to do the appropriate changes in their
- applications. */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) && !defined(NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
-# define NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_GMP) && !defined(NO_GMP)
-# define NO_GMP
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(NO_JPAKE)
-# define NO_JPAKE
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_KRB5) && !defined(NO_KRB5)
-# define NO_KRB5
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD2) && !defined(NO_MD2)
-# define NO_MD2
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC5) && !defined(NO_RC5)
-# define NO_RC5
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779) && !defined(NO_RFC3779)
-# define NO_RFC3779
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SCTP) && !defined(NO_SCTP)
-# define NO_SCTP
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STORE) && !defined(NO_STORE)
-# define NO_STORE
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) && !defined(NO_UNIT_TEST)
-# define NO_UNIT_TEST
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
-
-/* Generate 80386 code? */
-#undef I386_ONLY
-
-#if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */
-#if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR)
-#define ENGINESDIR "/usr/local/ssl/lib/engines"
-#define OPENSSLDIR "/usr/local/ssl"
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#undef OPENSSL_UNISTD
-#define OPENSSL_UNISTD <unistd.h>
-
-#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
-
-#if defined(HEADER_IDEA_H) && !defined(IDEA_INT)
-#define IDEA_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_MD2_H) && !defined(MD2_INT)
-#define MD2_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC2_H) && !defined(RC2_INT)
-/* I need to put in a mod for the alpha - eay */
-#define RC2_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC4_H)
-#if !defined(RC4_INT)
-/* using int types make the structure larger but make the code faster
- * on most boxes I have tested - up to %20 faster. */
-/*
- * I don't know what does "most" mean, but declaring "int" is a must on:
- * - Intel P6 because partial register stalls are very expensive;
- * - elder Alpha because it lacks byte load/store instructions;
- */
-#define RC4_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-#if !defined(RC4_CHUNK)
-/*
- * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
- * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
- */
-#undef RC4_CHUNK
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(HEADER_NEW_DES_H) || defined(HEADER_DES_H)) && !defined(DES_LONG)
-/* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
- * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
-#ifndef DES_LONG
-#define DES_LONG unsigned long
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H
-#undef BN_LLONG
-
-/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
-
-/* Only one for the following should be defined */
-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
-#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
-/* if this is defined data[i] is used instead of *data, this is a %20
- * speedup on x86 */
-#undef RC4_INDEX
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
-#undef BF_PTR
-#endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
-
-#if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H
-#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS
-/* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a
- * protected undef/define */
-#ifndef DES_PTR
-#undef DES_PTR
-#endif
-
-/* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional
- * units. It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more
- * registers */
-#ifndef DES_RISC1
-#undef DES_RISC1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef DES_RISC2
-#undef DES_RISC2
-#endif
-
-#if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2)
-YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
-#endif
-
-/* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
- * Very mucy CPU dependant */
-#ifndef DES_UNROLL
-#undef DES_UNROLL
-#endif
-
-/* These default values were supplied by
- * Peter Gutman <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>
- * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */
-#if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL)
-/* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the
- CPU and OS. For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find
- even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for
- optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
- there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
-
-#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
-# define DES_PTR
-# define DES_RISC1
-# define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __ultrix ) /* Older MIPS */
-# define DES_PTR
-# define DES_RISC2
-# define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __osf1__ ) /* Alpha */
-# define DES_PTR
-# define DES_RISC2
-#elif defined ( _AIX ) /* RS6000 */
- /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __hpux ) /* HP-PA */
- /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __aux ) /* 68K */
- /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __dgux ) /* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */
-# define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __sgi ) /* Newer MIPS */
-# define DES_PTR
-# define DES_RISC2
-# define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined(i386) || defined(__i386__) /* x86 boxes, should be gcc */
-# define DES_PTR
-# define DES_RISC1
-# define DES_UNROLL
-#endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */
-#endif
-
-#endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */
-#endif /* HEADER_DES_LOCL_H */
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslconf.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+/* opensslconf.h */
+/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+# define OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP
+# define OPENSSL_NO_GMP
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+# define OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+# define OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+# define OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+# define OPENSSL_NO_RC5
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+# define OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STORE
+# define OPENSSL_NO_STORE
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+# define OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+#endif
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+# define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+#endif
+
+/* The OPENSSL_NO_* macros are also defined as NO_* if the application
+ asks for it. This is a transient feature that is provided for those
+ who haven't had the time to do the appropriate changes in their
+ applications. */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) && !defined(NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
+# define NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_GMP) && !defined(NO_GMP)
+# define NO_GMP
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(NO_JPAKE)
+# define NO_JPAKE
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_KRB5) && !defined(NO_KRB5)
+# define NO_KRB5
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD2) && !defined(NO_MD2)
+# define NO_MD2
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC5) && !defined(NO_RC5)
+# define NO_RC5
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779) && !defined(NO_RFC3779)
+# define NO_RFC3779
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SCTP) && !defined(NO_SCTP)
+# define NO_SCTP
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STORE) && !defined(NO_STORE)
+# define NO_STORE
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) && !defined(NO_UNIT_TEST)
+# define NO_UNIT_TEST
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
+
+/* Generate 80386 code? */
+#undef I386_ONLY
+
+#if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */
+#if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR)
+#define ENGINESDIR "/usr/local/ssl/lib/engines"
+#define OPENSSLDIR "/usr/local/ssl"
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#undef OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#define OPENSSL_UNISTD <unistd.h>
+
+#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+
+#if defined(HEADER_IDEA_H) && !defined(IDEA_INT)
+#define IDEA_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_MD2_H) && !defined(MD2_INT)
+#define MD2_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC2_H) && !defined(RC2_INT)
+/* I need to put in a mod for the alpha - eay */
+#define RC2_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC4_H)
+#if !defined(RC4_INT)
+/* using int types make the structure larger but make the code faster
+ * on most boxes I have tested - up to %20 faster. */
+/*
+ * I don't know what does "most" mean, but declaring "int" is a must on:
+ * - Intel P6 because partial register stalls are very expensive;
+ * - elder Alpha because it lacks byte load/store instructions;
+ */
+#define RC4_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+#if !defined(RC4_CHUNK)
+/*
+ * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
+ * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
+ */
+#undef RC4_CHUNK
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(HEADER_NEW_DES_H) || defined(HEADER_DES_H)) && !defined(DES_LONG)
+/* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
+ * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
+#ifndef DES_LONG
+#define DES_LONG unsigned long
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H
+#undef BN_LLONG
+
+/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
+
+/* Only one for the following should be defined */
+#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
+#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
+/* if this is defined data[i] is used instead of *data, this is a %20
+ * speedup on x86 */
+#undef RC4_INDEX
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
+#undef BF_PTR
+#endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
+
+#if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H
+#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS
+/* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a
+ * protected undef/define */
+#ifndef DES_PTR
+#undef DES_PTR
+#endif
+
+/* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional
+ * units. It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more
+ * registers */
+#ifndef DES_RISC1
+#undef DES_RISC1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DES_RISC2
+#undef DES_RISC2
+#endif
+
+#if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2)
+#error YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
+#endif
+
+/* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
+ * Very mucy CPU dependant */
+#ifndef DES_UNROLL
+#undef DES_UNROLL
+#endif
+
+/* These default values were supplied by
+ * Peter Gutman <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>
+ * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */
+#if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL)
+/* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the
+ CPU and OS. For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find
+ even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for
+ optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
+ there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
+
+#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
+# define DES_PTR
+# define DES_RISC1
+# define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __ultrix ) /* Older MIPS */
+# define DES_PTR
+# define DES_RISC2
+# define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __osf1__ ) /* Alpha */
+# define DES_PTR
+# define DES_RISC2
+#elif defined ( _AIX ) /* RS6000 */
+ /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __hpux ) /* HP-PA */
+ /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __aux ) /* 68K */
+ /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __dgux ) /* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */
+# define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __sgi ) /* Newer MIPS */
+# define DES_PTR
+# define DES_RISC2
+# define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined(i386) || defined(__i386__) /* x86 boxes, should be gcc */
+# define DES_PTR
+# define DES_RISC1
+# define DES_UNROLL
+#endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */
+#endif
+
+#endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */
+#endif /* HEADER_DES_LOCL_H */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h.in
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslconf.h.in 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h.in 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
-
-/* Generate 80386 code? */
-#undef I386_ONLY
-
-#if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */
-#if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR)
-#define ENGINESDIR "/usr/local/lib/engines"
-#define OPENSSLDIR "/usr/local/ssl"
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#undef OPENSSL_UNISTD
-#define OPENSSL_UNISTD <unistd.h>
-
-#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
-
-#if defined(HEADER_IDEA_H) && !defined(IDEA_INT)
-#define IDEA_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_MD2_H) && !defined(MD2_INT)
-#define MD2_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC2_H) && !defined(RC2_INT)
-/* I need to put in a mod for the alpha - eay */
-#define RC2_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC4_H)
-#if !defined(RC4_INT)
-/* using int types make the structure larger but make the code faster
- * on most boxes I have tested - up to %20 faster. */
-/*
- * I don't know what does "most" mean, but declaring "int" is a must on:
- * - Intel P6 because partial register stalls are very expensive;
- * - elder Alpha because it lacks byte load/store instructions;
- */
-#define RC4_INT unsigned int
-#endif
-#if !defined(RC4_CHUNK)
-/*
- * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
- * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
- */
-#undef RC4_CHUNK
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(HEADER_NEW_DES_H) || defined(HEADER_DES_H)) && !defined(DES_LONG)
-/* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
- * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
-#ifndef DES_LONG
-#define DES_LONG unsigned long
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H
-#undef BN_LLONG
-
-/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
-
-/* Only one for the following should be defined */
-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
-#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
-/* if this is defined data[i] is used instead of *data, this is a %20
- * speedup on x86 */
-#undef RC4_INDEX
-#endif
-
-#if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
-#undef BF_PTR
-#endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
-
-#if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
-#define CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H
-#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS
-/* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a
- * protected undef/define */
-#ifndef DES_PTR
-#undef DES_PTR
-#endif
-
-/* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional
- * units. It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more
- * registers */
-#ifndef DES_RISC1
-#undef DES_RISC1
-#endif
-
-#ifndef DES_RISC2
-#undef DES_RISC2
-#endif
-
-#if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2)
-YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
-#endif
-
-/* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
- * Very mucy CPU dependant */
-#ifndef DES_UNROLL
-#undef DES_UNROLL
-#endif
-
-/* These default values were supplied by
- * Peter Gutman <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>
- * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */
-#if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL)
-/* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the
- CPU and OS. For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find
- even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for
- optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
- there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
-
-#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
-# define DES_PTR
-# define DES_RISC1
-# define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __ultrix ) /* Older MIPS */
-# define DES_PTR
-# define DES_RISC2
-# define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __osf1__ ) /* Alpha */
-# define DES_PTR
-# define DES_RISC2
-#elif defined ( _AIX ) /* RS6000 */
- /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __hpux ) /* HP-PA */
- /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __aux ) /* 68K */
- /* Unknown */
-#elif defined( __dgux ) /* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */
-# define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( __sgi ) /* Newer MIPS */
-# define DES_PTR
-# define DES_RISC2
-# define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined(i386) || defined(__i386__) /* x86 boxes, should be gcc */
-# define DES_PTR
-# define DES_RISC1
-# define DES_UNROLL
-#endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */
-#endif
-
-#endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */
-#endif /* HEADER_DES_LOCL_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h.in (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslconf.h.in)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h.in (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslconf.h.in 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
+
+/* Generate 80386 code? */
+#undef I386_ONLY
+
+#if !(defined(VMS) || defined(__VMS)) /* VMS uses logical names instead */
+#if defined(HEADER_CRYPTLIB_H) && !defined(OPENSSLDIR)
+#define ENGINESDIR "/usr/local/lib/engines"
+#define OPENSSLDIR "/usr/local/ssl"
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#undef OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#define OPENSSL_UNISTD <unistd.h>
+
+#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+
+#if defined(HEADER_IDEA_H) && !defined(IDEA_INT)
+#define IDEA_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_MD2_H) && !defined(MD2_INT)
+#define MD2_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC2_H) && !defined(RC2_INT)
+/* I need to put in a mod for the alpha - eay */
+#define RC2_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC4_H)
+#if !defined(RC4_INT)
+/* using int types make the structure larger but make the code faster
+ * on most boxes I have tested - up to %20 faster. */
+/*
+ * I don't know what does "most" mean, but declaring "int" is a must on:
+ * - Intel P6 because partial register stalls are very expensive;
+ * - elder Alpha because it lacks byte load/store instructions;
+ */
+#define RC4_INT unsigned int
+#endif
+#if !defined(RC4_CHUNK)
+/*
+ * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
+ * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
+ */
+#undef RC4_CHUNK
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(HEADER_NEW_DES_H) || defined(HEADER_DES_H)) && !defined(DES_LONG)
+/* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
+ * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
+#ifndef DES_LONG
+#define DES_LONG unsigned long
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_BN_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_BN_H
+#undef BN_LLONG
+
+/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
+
+/* Only one for the following should be defined */
+#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
+#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H
+/* if this is defined data[i] is used instead of *data, this is a %20
+ * speedup on x86 */
+#undef RC4_INDEX
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
+#undef BF_PTR
+#endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
+
+#if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
+#define CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H
+#ifndef DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS
+/* the following is tweaked from a config script, that is why it is a
+ * protected undef/define */
+#ifndef DES_PTR
+#undef DES_PTR
+#endif
+
+/* This helps C compiler generate the correct code for multiple functional
+ * units. It reduces register dependancies at the expense of 2 more
+ * registers */
+#ifndef DES_RISC1
+#undef DES_RISC1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DES_RISC2
+#undef DES_RISC2
+#endif
+
+#if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2)
+#error YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
+#endif
+
+/* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
+ * Very mucy CPU dependant */
+#ifndef DES_UNROLL
+#undef DES_UNROLL
+#endif
+
+/* These default values were supplied by
+ * Peter Gutman <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>
+ * They are only used if nothing else has been defined */
+#if !defined(DES_PTR) && !defined(DES_RISC1) && !defined(DES_RISC2) && !defined(DES_UNROLL)
+/* Special defines which change the way the code is built depending on the
+ CPU and OS. For SGI machines you can use _MIPS_SZLONG (32 or 64) to find
+ even newer MIPS CPU's, but at the moment one size fits all for
+ optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
+ there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
+
+#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
+# define DES_PTR
+# define DES_RISC1
+# define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __ultrix ) /* Older MIPS */
+# define DES_PTR
+# define DES_RISC2
+# define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __osf1__ ) /* Alpha */
+# define DES_PTR
+# define DES_RISC2
+#elif defined ( _AIX ) /* RS6000 */
+ /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __hpux ) /* HP-PA */
+ /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __aux ) /* 68K */
+ /* Unknown */
+#elif defined( __dgux ) /* 88K (but P6 in latest boxes) */
+# define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined( __sgi ) /* Newer MIPS */
+# define DES_PTR
+# define DES_RISC2
+# define DES_UNROLL
+#elif defined(i386) || defined(__i386__) /* x86 boxes, should be gcc */
+# define DES_PTR
+# define DES_RISC1
+# define DES_UNROLL
+#endif /* Systems-specific speed defines */
+#endif
+
+#endif /* DES_DEFAULT_OPTIONS */
+#endif /* HEADER_DES_LOCL_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslv.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslv.h 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslv.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
-# define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/*-
- * Numeric release version identifier:
- * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
- * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas
- * 1 to 14, and f for release. The patch level is exactly that.
- * For example:
- * 0.9.3-dev 0x00903000
- * 0.9.3-beta1 0x00903001
- * 0.9.3-beta2-dev 0x00903002
- * 0.9.3-beta2 0x00903002 (same as ...beta2-dev)
- * 0.9.3 0x0090300f
- * 0.9.3a 0x0090301f
- * 0.9.4 0x0090400f
- * 1.2.3z 0x102031af
- *
- * For continuity reasons (because 0.9.5 is already out, and is coded
- * 0x00905100), between 0.9.5 and 0.9.6 the coding of the patch level
- * part is slightly different, by setting the highest bit. This means
- * that 0.9.5a looks like this: 0x0090581f. At 0.9.6, we can start
- * with 0x0090600S...
- *
- * (Prior to 0.9.3-dev a different scheme was used: 0.9.2b is 0x0922.)
- * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
- * major minor fix final patch/beta)
- */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100010ffL
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1o-fips 12 Jun 2015"
-# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1o 12 Jun 2015"
-# endif
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
-
-/*-
- * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...)
- * versioning. That kind of versioning works a bit differently between
- * operating systems. The most usual scheme is to set a major and a minor
- * number, and have the runtime loader check that the major number is equal
- * to what it was at application link time, while the minor number has to
- * be greater or equal to what it was at application link time. With this
- * scheme, the version number is usually part of the file name, like this:
- *
- * libcrypto.so.0.9
- *
- * Some unixen also make a softlink with the major verson number only:
- *
- * libcrypto.so.0
- *
- * On Tru64 and IRIX 6.x it works a little bit differently. There, the
- * shared library version is stored in the file, and is actually a series
- * of versions, separated by colons. The rightmost version present in the
- * library when linking an application is stored in the application to be
- * matched at run time. When the application is run, a check is done to
- * see if the library version stored in the application matches any of the
- * versions in the version string of the library itself.
- * This version string can be constructed in any way, depending on what
- * kind of matching is desired. However, to implement the same scheme as
- * the one used in the other unixen, all compatible versions, from lowest
- * to highest, should be part of the string. Consecutive builds would
- * give the following versions strings:
- *
- * 3.0
- * 3.0:3.1
- * 3.0:3.1:3.2
- * 4.0
- * 4.0:4.1
- *
- * Notice how version 4 is completely incompatible with version, and
- * therefore give the breach you can see.
- *
- * There may be other schemes as well that I haven't yet discovered.
- *
- * So, here's the way it works here: first of all, the library version
- * number doesn't need at all to match the overall OpenSSL version.
- * However, it's nice and more understandable if it actually does.
- * The current library version is stored in the macro SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER,
- * which is just a piece of text in the format "M.m.e" (Major, minor, edit).
- * For the sake of Tru64, IRIX, and any other OS that behaves in similar ways,
- * we need to keep a history of version numbers, which is done in the
- * macro SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY. The numbers are separated by colons and
- * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current.
- */
-# define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY ""
-# define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"
-
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslv.h (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/opensslv.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslv.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/opensslv.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
+# define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * Numeric release version identifier:
+ * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+ * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas
+ * 1 to 14, and f for release. The patch level is exactly that.
+ * For example:
+ * 0.9.3-dev 0x00903000
+ * 0.9.3-beta1 0x00903001
+ * 0.9.3-beta2-dev 0x00903002
+ * 0.9.3-beta2 0x00903002 (same as ...beta2-dev)
+ * 0.9.3 0x0090300f
+ * 0.9.3a 0x0090301f
+ * 0.9.4 0x0090400f
+ * 1.2.3z 0x102031af
+ *
+ * For continuity reasons (because 0.9.5 is already out, and is coded
+ * 0x00905100), between 0.9.5 and 0.9.6 the coding of the patch level
+ * part is slightly different, by setting the highest bit. This means
+ * that 0.9.5a looks like this: 0x0090581f. At 0.9.6, we can start
+ * with 0x0090600S...
+ *
+ * (Prior to 0.9.3-dev a different scheme was used: 0.9.2b is 0x0922.)
+ * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
+ * major minor fix final patch/beta)
+ */
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000111fL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1q-fips 3 Dec 2015"
+# else
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1q 3 Dec 2015"
+# endif
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
+
+/*-
+ * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...)
+ * versioning. That kind of versioning works a bit differently between
+ * operating systems. The most usual scheme is to set a major and a minor
+ * number, and have the runtime loader check that the major number is equal
+ * to what it was at application link time, while the minor number has to
+ * be greater or equal to what it was at application link time. With this
+ * scheme, the version number is usually part of the file name, like this:
+ *
+ * libcrypto.so.0.9
+ *
+ * Some unixen also make a softlink with the major verson number only:
+ *
+ * libcrypto.so.0
+ *
+ * On Tru64 and IRIX 6.x it works a little bit differently. There, the
+ * shared library version is stored in the file, and is actually a series
+ * of versions, separated by colons. The rightmost version present in the
+ * library when linking an application is stored in the application to be
+ * matched at run time. When the application is run, a check is done to
+ * see if the library version stored in the application matches any of the
+ * versions in the version string of the library itself.
+ * This version string can be constructed in any way, depending on what
+ * kind of matching is desired. However, to implement the same scheme as
+ * the one used in the other unixen, all compatible versions, from lowest
+ * to highest, should be part of the string. Consecutive builds would
+ * give the following versions strings:
+ *
+ * 3.0
+ * 3.0:3.1
+ * 3.0:3.1:3.2
+ * 4.0
+ * 4.0:4.1
+ *
+ * Notice how version 4 is completely incompatible with version, and
+ * therefore give the breach you can see.
+ *
+ * There may be other schemes as well that I haven't yet discovered.
+ *
+ * So, here's the way it works here: first of all, the library version
+ * number doesn't need at all to match the overall OpenSSL version.
+ * However, it's nice and more understandable if it actually does.
+ * The current library version is stored in the macro SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER,
+ * which is just a piece of text in the format "M.m.e" (Major, minor, edit).
+ * For the sake of Tru64, IRIX, and any other OS that behaves in similar ways,
+ * we need to keep a history of version numbers, which is done in the
+ * macro SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY. The numbers are separated by colons and
+ * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current.
+ */
+# define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY ""
+# define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"
+
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pem/pem_info.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pem_info.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,388 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/pem/pem_info.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-# include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read(FILE *fp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
- pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
-{
- BIO *b;
- STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *ret;
-
- if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
- BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- ret = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(b, sk, cb, u);
- BIO_free(b);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
- pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
-{
- X509_INFO *xi = NULL;
- char *name = NULL, *header = NULL;
- void *pp;
- unsigned char *data = NULL;
- const unsigned char *p;
- long len, error = 0;
- int ok = 0;
- STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *ret = NULL;
- unsigned int i, raw, ptype;
- d2i_of_void *d2i = 0;
-
- if (sk == NULL) {
- if ((ret = sk_X509_INFO_new_null()) == NULL) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- ret = sk;
-
- if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- for (;;) {
- raw = 0;
- ptype = 0;
- i = PEM_read_bio(bp, &name, &header, &data, &len);
- if (i == 0) {
- error = ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error());
- if (error == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) {
- ERR_clear_error();
- break;
- }
- goto err;
- }
- start:
- if ((strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0) ||
- (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0)) {
- d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509;
- if (xi->x509 != NULL) {
- if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
- goto err;
- if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- goto start;
- }
- pp = &(xi->x509);
- } else if ((strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0)) {
- d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509_AUX;
- if (xi->x509 != NULL) {
- if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
- goto err;
- if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- goto start;
- }
- pp = &(xi->x509);
- } else if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_CRL) == 0) {
- d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509_CRL;
- if (xi->crl != NULL) {
- if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
- goto err;
- if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- goto start;
- }
- pp = &(xi->crl);
- } else
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_RSA) == 0) {
- d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_RSAPrivateKey;
- if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
- if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
- goto err;
- if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- goto start;
- }
-
- xi->enc_data = NULL;
- xi->enc_len = 0;
-
- xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
- ptype = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
- pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
- if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
- raw = 1;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_DSA) == 0) {
- d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_DSAPrivateKey;
- if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
- if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
- goto err;
- if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- goto start;
- }
-
- xi->enc_data = NULL;
- xi->enc_len = 0;
-
- xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
- ptype = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
- pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
- if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
- raw = 1;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY) == 0) {
- d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_ECPrivateKey;
- if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
- if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
- goto err;
- if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- goto start;
- }
-
- xi->enc_data = NULL;
- xi->enc_len = 0;
-
- xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
- ptype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
- pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
- if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
- raw = 1;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- d2i = NULL;
- pp = NULL;
- }
-
- if (d2i != NULL) {
- if (!raw) {
- EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher;
-
- if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &cipher))
- goto err;
- if (!PEM_do_header(&cipher, data, &len, cb, u))
- goto err;
- p = data;
- if (ptype) {
- if (!d2i_PrivateKey(ptype, pp, &p, len)) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (d2i(pp, &p, len) == NULL) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else { /* encrypted RSA data */
- if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &xi->enc_cipher))
- goto err;
- xi->enc_data = (char *)data;
- xi->enc_len = (int)len;
- data = NULL;
- }
- } else {
- /* unknown */
- }
- if (name != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(name);
- if (header != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(header);
- if (data != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(data);
- name = NULL;
- header = NULL;
- data = NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * if the last one hasn't been pushed yet and there is anything in it
- * then add it to the stack ...
- */
- if ((xi->x509 != NULL) || (xi->crl != NULL) ||
- (xi->x_pkey != NULL) || (xi->enc_data != NULL)) {
- if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
- goto err;
- xi = NULL;
- }
- ok = 1;
- err:
- if (xi != NULL)
- X509_INFO_free(xi);
- if (!ok) {
- for (i = 0; ((int)i) < sk_X509_INFO_num(ret); i++) {
- xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(ret, i);
- X509_INFO_free(xi);
- }
- if (ret != sk)
- sk_X509_INFO_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
- }
-
- if (name != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(name);
- if (header != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(header);
- if (data != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(data);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/* A TJH addition */
-int PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio(BIO *bp, X509_INFO *xi, EVP_CIPHER *enc,
- unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
- pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
-{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- int i, ret = 0;
- unsigned char *data = NULL;
- const char *objstr = NULL;
- char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
- unsigned char *iv = NULL;
-
- if (enc != NULL) {
- objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(enc));
- if (objstr == NULL) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * now for the fun part ... if we have a private key then we have to be
- * able to handle a not-yet-decrypted key being written out correctly ...
- * if it is decrypted or it is non-encrypted then we use the base code
- */
- if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
- if ((xi->enc_data != NULL) && (xi->enc_len > 0)) {
- if (enc == NULL) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_CIPHER_IS_NULL);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* copy from weirdo names into more normal things */
- iv = xi->enc_cipher.iv;
- data = (unsigned char *)xi->enc_data;
- i = xi->enc_len;
-
- /*
- * we take the encryption data from the internal stuff rather
- * than what the user has passed us ... as we have to match
- * exactly for some strange reason
- */
- objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(xi->enc_cipher.cipher));
- if (objstr == NULL) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO,
- PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* create the right magic header stuff */
- OPENSSL_assert(strlen(objstr) + 23 + 2 * enc->iv_len + 13 <=
- sizeof buf);
- buf[0] = '\0';
- PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED);
- PEM_dek_info(buf, objstr, enc->iv_len, (char *)iv);
-
- /* use the normal code to write things out */
- i = PEM_write_bio(bp, PEM_STRING_RSA, buf, data, i);
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
- } else {
- /* Add DSA/DH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- /* normal optionally encrypted stuff */
- if (PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bp,
- xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey->pkey.rsa,
- enc, kstr, klen, cb, u) <= 0)
- goto err;
-#endif
- }
- }
-
- /* if we have a certificate then write it out now */
- if ((xi->x509 != NULL) && (PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, xi->x509) <= 0))
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * we are ignoring anything else that is loaded into the X509_INFO
- * structure for the moment ... as I don't need it so I'm not coding it
- * here and Eric can do it when this makes it into the base library --tjh
- */
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE);
- return (ret);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pem_info.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pem/pem_info.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pem_info.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pem_info.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+/* crypto/pem/pem_info.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read(FILE *fp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
+ pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+ BIO *b;
+ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *ret;
+
+ if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ ret = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(b, sk, cb, u);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
+ pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+ X509_INFO *xi = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL, *header = NULL;
+ void *pp;
+ unsigned char *data = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ long len, error = 0;
+ int ok = 0;
+ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *ret = NULL;
+ unsigned int i, raw, ptype;
+ d2i_of_void *d2i = 0;
+
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ if ((ret = sk_X509_INFO_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = sk;
+
+ if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ for (;;) {
+ raw = 0;
+ ptype = 0;
+ i = PEM_read_bio(bp, &name, &header, &data, &len);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ error = ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error());
+ if (error == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ break;
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ start:
+ if ((strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0) ||
+ (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0)) {
+ d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509;
+ if (xi->x509 != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+ goto err;
+ if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ goto start;
+ }
+ pp = &(xi->x509);
+ } else if ((strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0)) {
+ d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509_AUX;
+ if (xi->x509 != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+ goto err;
+ if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ goto start;
+ }
+ pp = &(xi->x509);
+ } else if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_CRL) == 0) {
+ d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_X509_CRL;
+ if (xi->crl != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+ goto err;
+ if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ goto start;
+ }
+ pp = &(xi->crl);
+ } else
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_RSA) == 0) {
+ d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_RSAPrivateKey;
+ if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+ goto err;
+ if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ xi->enc_data = NULL;
+ xi->enc_len = 0;
+
+ xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+ if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ptype = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+ pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
+ if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
+ raw = 1;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_DSA) == 0) {
+ d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_DSAPrivateKey;
+ if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+ goto err;
+ if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ xi->enc_data = NULL;
+ xi->enc_len = 0;
+
+ xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+ if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ptype = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+ pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
+ if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
+ raw = 1;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY) == 0) {
+ d2i = (D2I_OF(void)) d2i_ECPrivateKey;
+ if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+ goto err;
+ if ((xi = X509_INFO_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ xi->enc_data = NULL;
+ xi->enc_len = 0;
+
+ xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
+ if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ptype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+ pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
+ if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
+ raw = 1;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ d2i = NULL;
+ pp = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (d2i != NULL) {
+ if (!raw) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher;
+
+ if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &cipher))
+ goto err;
+ if (!PEM_do_header(&cipher, data, &len, cb, u))
+ goto err;
+ p = data;
+ if (ptype) {
+ if (!d2i_PrivateKey(ptype, pp, &p, len)) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (d2i(pp, &p, len) == NULL) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_READ_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else { /* encrypted RSA data */
+ if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &xi->enc_cipher))
+ goto err;
+ xi->enc_data = (char *)data;
+ xi->enc_len = (int)len;
+ data = NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* unknown */
+ }
+ if (name != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(name);
+ if (header != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(header);
+ if (data != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(data);
+ name = NULL;
+ header = NULL;
+ data = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if the last one hasn't been pushed yet and there is anything in it
+ * then add it to the stack ...
+ */
+ if ((xi->x509 != NULL) || (xi->crl != NULL) ||
+ (xi->x_pkey != NULL) || (xi->enc_data != NULL)) {
+ if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret, xi))
+ goto err;
+ xi = NULL;
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ if (xi != NULL)
+ X509_INFO_free(xi);
+ if (!ok) {
+ for (i = 0; ((int)i) < sk_X509_INFO_num(ret); i++) {
+ xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(ret, i);
+ X509_INFO_free(xi);
+ }
+ if (ret != sk)
+ sk_X509_INFO_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (name != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(name);
+ if (header != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(header);
+ if (data != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(data);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/* A TJH addition */
+int PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio(BIO *bp, X509_INFO *xi, EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+ unsigned char *kstr, int klen,
+ pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *data = NULL;
+ const char *objstr = NULL;
+ char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+ unsigned char *iv = NULL;
+
+ if (enc != NULL) {
+ objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(enc));
+ if (objstr == NULL) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * now for the fun part ... if we have a private key then we have to be
+ * able to handle a not-yet-decrypted key being written out correctly ...
+ * if it is decrypted or it is non-encrypted then we use the base code
+ */
+ if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) {
+ if ((xi->enc_data != NULL) && (xi->enc_len > 0)) {
+ if (enc == NULL) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_CIPHER_IS_NULL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* copy from weirdo names into more normal things */
+ iv = xi->enc_cipher.iv;
+ data = (unsigned char *)xi->enc_data;
+ i = xi->enc_len;
+
+ /*
+ * we take the encryption data from the internal stuff rather
+ * than what the user has passed us ... as we have to match
+ * exactly for some strange reason
+ */
+ objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(xi->enc_cipher.cipher));
+ if (objstr == NULL) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_X509_INFO_WRITE_BIO,
+ PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* create the right magic header stuff */
+ OPENSSL_assert(strlen(objstr) + 23 + 2 * enc->iv_len + 13 <=
+ sizeof buf);
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED);
+ PEM_dek_info(buf, objstr, enc->iv_len, (char *)iv);
+
+ /* use the normal code to write things out */
+ i = PEM_write_bio(bp, PEM_STRING_RSA, buf, data, i);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ /* Add DSA/DH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ /* normal optionally encrypted stuff */
+ if (PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bp,
+ xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ enc, kstr, klen, cb, u) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* if we have a certificate then write it out now */
+ if ((xi->x509 != NULL) && (PEM_write_bio_X509(bp, xi->x509) <= 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * we are ignoring anything else that is loaded into the X509_INFO
+ * structure for the moment ... as I don't need it so I'm not coding it
+ * here and Eric can do it when this makes it into the base library --tjh
+ */
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE);
+ return (ret);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,883 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * Support for PVK format keys and related structures (such a PUBLICKEYBLOB
- * and PRIVATEKEYBLOB).
- */
-
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
-# include <openssl/dsa.h>
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-/*
- * Utility function: read a DWORD (4 byte unsigned integer) in little endian
- * format
- */
-
-static unsigned int read_ledword(const unsigned char **in)
-{
- const unsigned char *p = *in;
- unsigned int ret;
- ret = *p++;
- ret |= (*p++ << 8);
- ret |= (*p++ << 16);
- ret |= (*p++ << 24);
- *in = p;
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Read a BIGNUM in little endian format. The docs say that this should take
- * up bitlen/8 bytes.
- */
-
-static int read_lebn(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int nbyte, BIGNUM **r)
-{
- const unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *tmpbuf, *q;
- unsigned int i;
- p = *in + nbyte - 1;
- tmpbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(nbyte);
- if (!tmpbuf)
- return 0;
- q = tmpbuf;
- for (i = 0; i < nbyte; i++)
- *q++ = *p--;
- *r = BN_bin2bn(tmpbuf, nbyte, NULL);
- OPENSSL_free(tmpbuf);
- if (*r) {
- *in += nbyte;
- return 1;
- } else
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Convert private key blob to EVP_PKEY: RSA and DSA keys supported */
-
-# define MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB 0x6
-# define MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB 0x7
-# define MS_RSA1MAGIC 0x31415352L
-# define MS_RSA2MAGIC 0x32415352L
-# define MS_DSS1MAGIC 0x31535344L
-# define MS_DSS2MAGIC 0x32535344L
-
-# define MS_KEYALG_RSA_KEYX 0xa400
-# define MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN 0x2200
-
-# define MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX 0x1
-# define MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN 0x2
-
-/* The PVK file magic number: seems to spell out "bobsfile", who is Bob? */
-# define MS_PVKMAGIC 0xb0b5f11eL
-/* Salt length for PVK files */
-# define PVK_SALTLEN 0x10
-
-static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
- unsigned int bitlen, int ispub);
-static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
- unsigned int bitlen, int ispub);
-
-static int do_blob_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
- unsigned int *pmagic, unsigned int *pbitlen,
- int *pisdss, int *pispub)
-{
- const unsigned char *p = *in;
- if (length < 16)
- return 0;
- /* bType */
- if (*p == MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB) {
- if (*pispub == 0) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB);
- return 0;
- }
- *pispub = 1;
- } else if (*p == MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB) {
- if (*pispub == 1) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB);
- return 0;
- }
- *pispub = 0;
- } else
- return 0;
- p++;
- /* Version */
- if (*p++ != 0x2) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_VERSION_NUMBER);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Ignore reserved, aiKeyAlg */
- p += 6;
- *pmagic = read_ledword(&p);
- *pbitlen = read_ledword(&p);
- *pisdss = 0;
- switch (*pmagic) {
-
- case MS_DSS1MAGIC:
- *pisdss = 1;
- case MS_RSA1MAGIC:
- if (*pispub == 0) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB);
- return 0;
- }
- break;
-
- case MS_DSS2MAGIC:
- *pisdss = 1;
- case MS_RSA2MAGIC:
- if (*pispub == 1) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB);
- return 0;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER);
- return -1;
- }
- *in = p;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static unsigned int blob_length(unsigned bitlen, int isdss, int ispub)
-{
- unsigned int nbyte, hnbyte;
- nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
- hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4;
- if (isdss) {
-
- /*
- * Expected length: 20 for q + 3 components bitlen each + 24 for seed
- * structure.
- */
- if (ispub)
- return 44 + 3 * nbyte;
- /*
- * Expected length: 20 for q, priv, 2 bitlen components + 24 for seed
- * structure.
- */
- else
- return 64 + 2 * nbyte;
- } else {
- /* Expected length: 4 for 'e' + 'n' */
- if (ispub)
- return 4 + nbyte;
- else
- /*
- * Expected length: 4 for 'e' and 7 other components. 2
- * components are bitlen size, 5 are bitlen/2
- */
- return 4 + 2 * nbyte + 5 * hnbyte;
- }
-
-}
-
-static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
- int ispub)
-{
- const unsigned char *p = *in;
- unsigned int bitlen, magic;
- int isdss;
- if (do_blob_header(&p, length, &magic, &bitlen, &isdss, &ispub) <= 0) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- length -= 16;
- if (length < blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub)) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (isdss)
- return b2i_dss(&p, length, bitlen, ispub);
- else
- return b2i_rsa(&p, length, bitlen, ispub);
-}
-
-static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i_bio(BIO *in, int ispub)
-{
- const unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char hdr_buf[16], *buf = NULL;
- unsigned int bitlen, magic, length;
- int isdss;
- EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
- if (BIO_read(in, hdr_buf, 16) != 16) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT);
- return NULL;
- }
- p = hdr_buf;
- if (do_blob_header(&p, 16, &magic, &bitlen, &isdss, &ispub) <= 0)
- return NULL;
-
- length = blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
- if (!buf) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- p = buf;
- if (BIO_read(in, buf, length) != (int)length) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (isdss)
- ret = b2i_dss(&p, length, bitlen, ispub);
- else
- ret = b2i_rsa(&p, length, bitlen, ispub);
-
- err:
- if (buf)
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
- unsigned int bitlen, int ispub)
-{
- const unsigned char *p = *in;
- EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
- DSA *dsa = NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned int nbyte;
- nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
-
- dsa = DSA_new();
- ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (!dsa || !ret)
- goto memerr;
- if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &dsa->p))
- goto memerr;
- if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &dsa->q))
- goto memerr;
- if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &dsa->g))
- goto memerr;
- if (ispub) {
- if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &dsa->pub_key))
- goto memerr;
- } else {
- if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &dsa->priv_key))
- goto memerr;
- /* Calculate public key */
- if (!(dsa->pub_key = BN_new()))
- goto memerr;
- if (!(ctx = BN_CTX_new()))
- goto memerr;
-
- if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx))
-
- goto memerr;
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(ret, dsa);
- DSA_free(dsa);
- *in = p;
- return ret;
-
- memerr:
- PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_DSS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- if (dsa)
- DSA_free(dsa);
- if (ret)
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
- if (ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
- unsigned int bitlen, int ispub)
-{
- const unsigned char *p = *in;
- EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- unsigned int nbyte, hnbyte;
- nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
- hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4;
- rsa = RSA_new();
- ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
- if (!rsa || !ret)
- goto memerr;
- rsa->e = BN_new();
- if (!rsa->e)
- goto memerr;
- if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e, read_ledword(&p)))
- goto memerr;
- if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &rsa->n))
- goto memerr;
- if (!ispub) {
- if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->p))
- goto memerr;
- if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->q))
- goto memerr;
- if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->dmp1))
- goto memerr;
- if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->dmq1))
- goto memerr;
- if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->iqmp))
- goto memerr;
- if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &rsa->d))
- goto memerr;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(ret, rsa);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- *in = p;
- return ret;
- memerr:
- PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- if (rsa)
- RSA_free(rsa);
- if (ret)
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey(const unsigned char **in, long length)
-{
- return do_b2i(in, length, 0);
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey(const unsigned char **in, long length)
-{
- return do_b2i(in, length, 1);
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *in)
-{
- return do_b2i_bio(in, 0);
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey_bio(BIO *in)
-{
- return do_b2i_bio(in, 1);
-}
-
-static void write_ledword(unsigned char **out, unsigned int dw)
-{
- unsigned char *p = *out;
- *p++ = dw & 0xff;
- *p++ = (dw >> 8) & 0xff;
- *p++ = (dw >> 16) & 0xff;
- *p++ = (dw >> 24) & 0xff;
- *out = p;
-}
-
-static void write_lebn(unsigned char **out, const BIGNUM *bn, int len)
-{
- int nb, i;
- unsigned char *p = *out, *q, c;
- nb = BN_num_bytes(bn);
- BN_bn2bin(bn, p);
- q = p + nb - 1;
- /* In place byte order reversal */
- for (i = 0; i < nb / 2; i++) {
- c = *p;
- *p++ = *q;
- *q-- = c;
- }
- *out += nb;
- /* Pad with zeroes if we have to */
- if (len > 0) {
- len -= nb;
- if (len > 0) {
- memset(*out, 0, len);
- *out += len;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static int check_bitlen_rsa(RSA *rsa, int ispub, unsigned int *magic);
-static int check_bitlen_dsa(DSA *dsa, int ispub, unsigned int *magic);
-
-static void write_rsa(unsigned char **out, RSA *rsa, int ispub);
-static void write_dsa(unsigned char **out, DSA *dsa, int ispub);
-
-static int do_i2b(unsigned char **out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int ispub)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned int bitlen, magic = 0, keyalg;
- int outlen, noinc = 0;
- if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- bitlen = check_bitlen_dsa(pk->pkey.dsa, ispub, &magic);
- keyalg = MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN;
- } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- bitlen = check_bitlen_rsa(pk->pkey.rsa, ispub, &magic);
- keyalg = MS_KEYALG_RSA_KEYX;
- } else
- return -1;
- if (bitlen == 0)
- return -1;
- outlen = 16 + blob_length(bitlen,
- keyalg == MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN ? 1 : 0, ispub);
- if (out == NULL)
- return outlen;
- if (*out)
- p = *out;
- else {
- p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
- if (!p)
- return -1;
- *out = p;
- noinc = 1;
- }
- if (ispub)
- *p++ = MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB;
- else
- *p++ = MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB;
- *p++ = 0x2;
- *p++ = 0;
- *p++ = 0;
- write_ledword(&p, keyalg);
- write_ledword(&p, magic);
- write_ledword(&p, bitlen);
- if (keyalg == MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN)
- write_dsa(&p, pk->pkey.dsa, ispub);
- else
- write_rsa(&p, pk->pkey.rsa, ispub);
- if (!noinc)
- *out += outlen;
- return outlen;
-}
-
-static int do_i2b_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int ispub)
-{
- unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
- int outlen, wrlen;
- outlen = do_i2b(&tmp, pk, ispub);
- if (outlen < 0)
- return -1;
- wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen);
- OPENSSL_free(tmp);
- if (wrlen == outlen)
- return outlen;
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int check_bitlen_dsa(DSA *dsa, int ispub, unsigned int *pmagic)
-{
- int bitlen;
- bitlen = BN_num_bits(dsa->p);
- if ((bitlen & 7) || (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160)
- || (BN_num_bits(dsa->g) > bitlen))
- goto badkey;
- if (ispub) {
- if (BN_num_bits(dsa->pub_key) > bitlen)
- goto badkey;
- *pmagic = MS_DSS1MAGIC;
- } else {
- if (BN_num_bits(dsa->priv_key) > 160)
- goto badkey;
- *pmagic = MS_DSS2MAGIC;
- }
-
- return bitlen;
- badkey:
- PEMerr(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_DSA, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int check_bitlen_rsa(RSA *rsa, int ispub, unsigned int *pmagic)
-{
- int nbyte, hnbyte, bitlen;
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > 32)
- goto badkey;
- bitlen = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
- nbyte = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- hnbyte = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) + 15) >> 4;
- if (ispub) {
- *pmagic = MS_RSA1MAGIC;
- return bitlen;
- } else {
- *pmagic = MS_RSA2MAGIC;
- /*
- * For private key each component must fit within nbyte or hnbyte.
- */
- if (BN_num_bytes(rsa->d) > nbyte)
- goto badkey;
- if ((BN_num_bytes(rsa->iqmp) > hnbyte)
- || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->p) > hnbyte)
- || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->q) > hnbyte)
- || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->dmp1) > hnbyte)
- || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->dmq1) > hnbyte))
- goto badkey;
- }
- return bitlen;
- badkey:
- PEMerr(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_RSA, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void write_rsa(unsigned char **out, RSA *rsa, int ispub)
-{
- int nbyte, hnbyte;
- nbyte = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- hnbyte = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) + 15) >> 4;
- write_lebn(out, rsa->e, 4);
- write_lebn(out, rsa->n, -1);
- if (ispub)
- return;
- write_lebn(out, rsa->p, hnbyte);
- write_lebn(out, rsa->q, hnbyte);
- write_lebn(out, rsa->dmp1, hnbyte);
- write_lebn(out, rsa->dmq1, hnbyte);
- write_lebn(out, rsa->iqmp, hnbyte);
- write_lebn(out, rsa->d, nbyte);
-}
-
-static void write_dsa(unsigned char **out, DSA *dsa, int ispub)
-{
- int nbyte;
- nbyte = BN_num_bytes(dsa->p);
- write_lebn(out, dsa->p, nbyte);
- write_lebn(out, dsa->q, 20);
- write_lebn(out, dsa->g, nbyte);
- if (ispub)
- write_lebn(out, dsa->pub_key, nbyte);
- else
- write_lebn(out, dsa->priv_key, 20);
- /* Set "invalid" for seed structure values */
- memset(*out, 0xff, 24);
- *out += 24;
- return;
-}
-
-int i2b_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk)
-{
- return do_i2b_bio(out, pk, 0);
-}
-
-int i2b_PublicKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk)
-{
- return do_i2b_bio(out, pk, 1);
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
-
-static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
- int skip_magic,
- unsigned int *psaltlen, unsigned int *pkeylen)
-{
- const unsigned char *p = *in;
- unsigned int pvk_magic, is_encrypted;
- if (skip_magic) {
- if (length < 20) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
- return 0;
- }
- length -= 20;
- } else {
- if (length < 24) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
- return 0;
- }
- length -= 24;
- pvk_magic = read_ledword(&p);
- if (pvk_magic != MS_PVKMAGIC) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* Skip reserved */
- p += 4;
- /*
- * keytype =
- */ read_ledword(&p);
- is_encrypted = read_ledword(&p);
- *psaltlen = read_ledword(&p);
- *pkeylen = read_ledword(&p);
-
- if (is_encrypted && !*psaltlen) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER);
- return 0;
- }
-
- *in = p;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int derive_pvk_key(unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *salt, unsigned int saltlen,
- const unsigned char *pass, int passlen)
-{
- EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
- int rv = 1;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, salt, saltlen)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, pass, passlen)
- || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mctx, key, NULL))
- rv = 0;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- return rv;
-}
-
-static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
- unsigned int saltlen, unsigned int keylen,
- pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
- const unsigned char *p = *in;
- unsigned int magic;
- unsigned char *enctmp = NULL, *q;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cctx);
- if (saltlen) {
- char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
- unsigned char keybuf[20];
- int enctmplen, inlen;
- if (cb)
- inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
- else
- inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
- if (inlen <= 0) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
- return NULL;
- }
- enctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8);
- if (!enctmp) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, p, saltlen,
- (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen))
- return NULL;
- p += saltlen;
- /* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */
- memcpy(enctmp, p, 8);
- p += 8;
- if (keylen < 8) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
- return NULL;
- }
- inlen = keylen - 8;
- q = enctmp + 8;
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cctx, q, &enctmplen, p, inlen))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cctx, q + enctmplen, &enctmplen))
- goto err;
- magic = read_ledword((const unsigned char **)&q);
- if (magic != MS_RSA2MAGIC && magic != MS_DSS2MAGIC) {
- q = enctmp + 8;
- memset(keybuf + 5, 0, 11);
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL))
- goto err;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20);
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cctx, q, &enctmplen, p, inlen))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cctx, q + enctmplen, &enctmplen))
- goto err;
- magic = read_ledword((const unsigned char **)&q);
- if (magic != MS_RSA2MAGIC && magic != MS_DSS2MAGIC) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20);
- p = enctmp;
- }
-
- ret = b2i_PrivateKey(&p, keylen);
- err:
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cctx);
- if (enctmp && saltlen)
- OPENSSL_free(enctmp);
- return ret;
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *b2i_PVK_bio(BIO *in, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
-{
- unsigned char pvk_hdr[24], *buf = NULL;
- const unsigned char *p;
- int buflen;
- EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
- unsigned int saltlen, keylen;
- if (BIO_read(in, pvk_hdr, 24) != 24) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT);
- return NULL;
- }
- p = pvk_hdr;
-
- if (!do_PVK_header(&p, 24, 0, &saltlen, &keylen))
- return 0;
- buflen = (int)keylen + saltlen;
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen);
- if (!buf) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- p = buf;
- if (BIO_read(in, buf, buflen) != buflen) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = do_PVK_body(&p, saltlen, keylen, cb, u);
-
- err:
- if (buf) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, buflen);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int i2b_PVK(unsigned char **out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel,
- pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
-{
- int outlen = 24, pklen;
- unsigned char *p, *salt = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cctx);
- if (enclevel)
- outlen += PVK_SALTLEN;
- pklen = do_i2b(NULL, pk, 0);
- if (pklen < 0)
- return -1;
- outlen += pklen;
- if (!out)
- return outlen;
- if (*out)
- p = *out;
- else {
- p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
- if (!p) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- *out = p;
- }
-
- write_ledword(&p, MS_PVKMAGIC);
- write_ledword(&p, 0);
- if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
- write_ledword(&p, MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN);
- else
- write_ledword(&p, MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX);
- write_ledword(&p, enclevel ? 1 : 0);
- write_ledword(&p, enclevel ? PVK_SALTLEN : 0);
- write_ledword(&p, pklen);
- if (enclevel) {
- if (RAND_bytes(p, PVK_SALTLEN) <= 0)
- goto error;
- salt = p;
- p += PVK_SALTLEN;
- }
- do_i2b(&p, pk, 0);
- if (enclevel == 0)
- return outlen;
- else {
- char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
- unsigned char keybuf[20];
- int enctmplen, inlen;
- if (cb)
- inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u);
- else
- inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u);
- if (inlen <= 0) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
- goto error;
- }
- if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, salt, PVK_SALTLEN,
- (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen))
- goto error;
- if (enclevel == 1)
- memset(keybuf + 5, 0, 11);
- p = salt + PVK_SALTLEN + 8;
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL))
- goto error;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20);
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cctx, p, &enctmplen, p, pklen - 8))
- goto error;
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cctx, p + enctmplen, &enctmplen))
- goto error;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cctx);
- return outlen;
-
- error:
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cctx);
- return -1;
-}
-
-int i2b_PVK_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel,
- pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
-{
- unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
- int outlen, wrlen;
- outlen = i2b_PVK(&tmp, pk, enclevel, cb, u);
- if (outlen < 0)
- return -1;
- wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen);
- OPENSSL_free(tmp);
- if (wrlen == outlen) {
- PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE);
- return outlen;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
-# endif
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,881 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Support for PVK format keys and related structures (such a PUBLICKEYBLOB
+ * and PRIVATEKEYBLOB).
+ */
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+/*
+ * Utility function: read a DWORD (4 byte unsigned integer) in little endian
+ * format
+ */
+
+static unsigned int read_ledword(const unsigned char **in)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
+ unsigned int ret;
+ ret = *p++;
+ ret |= (*p++ << 8);
+ ret |= (*p++ << 16);
+ ret |= (*p++ << 24);
+ *in = p;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a BIGNUM in little endian format. The docs say that this should take
+ * up bitlen/8 bytes.
+ */
+
+static int read_lebn(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int nbyte, BIGNUM **r)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *tmpbuf, *q;
+ unsigned int i;
+ p = *in + nbyte - 1;
+ tmpbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(nbyte);
+ if (!tmpbuf)
+ return 0;
+ q = tmpbuf;
+ for (i = 0; i < nbyte; i++)
+ *q++ = *p--;
+ *r = BN_bin2bn(tmpbuf, nbyte, NULL);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmpbuf);
+ if (*r) {
+ *in += nbyte;
+ return 1;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert private key blob to EVP_PKEY: RSA and DSA keys supported */
+
+# define MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB 0x6
+# define MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB 0x7
+# define MS_RSA1MAGIC 0x31415352L
+# define MS_RSA2MAGIC 0x32415352L
+# define MS_DSS1MAGIC 0x31535344L
+# define MS_DSS2MAGIC 0x32535344L
+
+# define MS_KEYALG_RSA_KEYX 0xa400
+# define MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN 0x2200
+
+# define MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX 0x1
+# define MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN 0x2
+
+/* The PVK file magic number: seems to spell out "bobsfile", who is Bob? */
+# define MS_PVKMAGIC 0xb0b5f11eL
+/* Salt length for PVK files */
+# define PVK_SALTLEN 0x10
+
+static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
+ unsigned int bitlen, int ispub);
+static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
+ unsigned int bitlen, int ispub);
+
+static int do_blob_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
+ unsigned int *pmagic, unsigned int *pbitlen,
+ int *pisdss, int *pispub)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
+ if (length < 16)
+ return 0;
+ /* bType */
+ if (*p == MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB) {
+ if (*pispub == 0) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *pispub = 1;
+ } else if (*p == MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB) {
+ if (*pispub == 1) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *pispub = 0;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+ p++;
+ /* Version */
+ if (*p++ != 0x2) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Ignore reserved, aiKeyAlg */
+ p += 6;
+ *pmagic = read_ledword(&p);
+ *pbitlen = read_ledword(&p);
+ *pisdss = 0;
+ switch (*pmagic) {
+
+ case MS_DSS1MAGIC:
+ *pisdss = 1;
+ case MS_RSA1MAGIC:
+ if (*pispub == 0) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case MS_DSS2MAGIC:
+ *pisdss = 1;
+ case MS_RSA2MAGIC:
+ if (*pispub == 1) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_EXPECTING_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_BLOB_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *in = p;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static unsigned int blob_length(unsigned bitlen, int isdss, int ispub)
+{
+ unsigned int nbyte, hnbyte;
+ nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4;
+ if (isdss) {
+
+ /*
+ * Expected length: 20 for q + 3 components bitlen each + 24 for seed
+ * structure.
+ */
+ if (ispub)
+ return 44 + 3 * nbyte;
+ /*
+ * Expected length: 20 for q, priv, 2 bitlen components + 24 for seed
+ * structure.
+ */
+ else
+ return 64 + 2 * nbyte;
+ } else {
+ /* Expected length: 4 for 'e' + 'n' */
+ if (ispub)
+ return 4 + nbyte;
+ else
+ /*
+ * Expected length: 4 for 'e' and 7 other components. 2
+ * components are bitlen size, 5 are bitlen/2
+ */
+ return 4 + 2 * nbyte + 5 * hnbyte;
+ }
+
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
+ int ispub)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
+ unsigned int bitlen, magic;
+ int isdss;
+ if (do_blob_header(&p, length, &magic, &bitlen, &isdss, &ispub) <= 0) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_HEADER_PARSE_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ length -= 16;
+ if (length < blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub)) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (isdss)
+ return b2i_dss(&p, length, bitlen, ispub);
+ else
+ return b2i_rsa(&p, length, bitlen, ispub);
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *do_b2i_bio(BIO *in, int ispub)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char hdr_buf[16], *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned int bitlen, magic, length;
+ int isdss;
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+ if (BIO_read(in, hdr_buf, 16) != 16) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ p = hdr_buf;
+ if (do_blob_header(&p, 16, &magic, &bitlen, &isdss, &ispub) <= 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ length = blob_length(bitlen, isdss, ispub);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+ if (!buf) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = buf;
+ if (BIO_read(in, buf, length) != (int)length) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_B2I_BIO, PEM_R_KEYBLOB_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (isdss)
+ ret = b2i_dss(&p, length, bitlen, ispub);
+ else
+ ret = b2i_rsa(&p, length, bitlen, ispub);
+
+ err:
+ if (buf)
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
+ unsigned int bitlen, int ispub)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+ DSA *dsa = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned int nbyte;
+ nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+
+ dsa = DSA_new();
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (!dsa || !ret)
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &dsa->p))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &dsa->q))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &dsa->g))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (ispub) {
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &dsa->pub_key))
+ goto memerr;
+ } else {
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &dsa->priv_key))
+ goto memerr;
+ /* Calculate public key */
+ if (!(dsa->pub_key = BN_new()))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!(ctx = BN_CTX_new()))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx))
+
+ goto memerr;
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(ret, dsa);
+ DSA_free(dsa);
+ *in = p;
+ return ret;
+
+ memerr:
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_DSS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (dsa)
+ DSA_free(dsa);
+ if (ret)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ if (ctx)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
+ unsigned int bitlen, int ispub)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ unsigned int nbyte, hnbyte;
+ nbyte = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ hnbyte = (bitlen + 15) >> 4;
+ rsa = RSA_new();
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (!rsa || !ret)
+ goto memerr;
+ rsa->e = BN_new();
+ if (!rsa->e)
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e, read_ledword(&p)))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &rsa->n))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!ispub) {
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->p))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->q))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->dmp1))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->dmq1))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, hnbyte, &rsa->iqmp))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!read_lebn(&p, nbyte, &rsa->d))
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(ret, rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ *in = p;
+ return ret;
+ memerr:
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (rsa)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ if (ret)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey(const unsigned char **in, long length)
+{
+ return do_b2i(in, length, 0);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey(const unsigned char **in, long length)
+{
+ return do_b2i(in, length, 1);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *in)
+{
+ return do_b2i_bio(in, 0);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PublicKey_bio(BIO *in)
+{
+ return do_b2i_bio(in, 1);
+}
+
+static void write_ledword(unsigned char **out, unsigned int dw)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = *out;
+ *p++ = dw & 0xff;
+ *p++ = (dw >> 8) & 0xff;
+ *p++ = (dw >> 16) & 0xff;
+ *p++ = (dw >> 24) & 0xff;
+ *out = p;
+}
+
+static void write_lebn(unsigned char **out, const BIGNUM *bn, int len)
+{
+ int nb, i;
+ unsigned char *p = *out, *q, c;
+ nb = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+ BN_bn2bin(bn, p);
+ q = p + nb - 1;
+ /* In place byte order reversal */
+ for (i = 0; i < nb / 2; i++) {
+ c = *p;
+ *p++ = *q;
+ *q-- = c;
+ }
+ *out += nb;
+ /* Pad with zeroes if we have to */
+ if (len > 0) {
+ len -= nb;
+ if (len > 0) {
+ memset(*out, 0, len);
+ *out += len;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int check_bitlen_rsa(RSA *rsa, int ispub, unsigned int *magic);
+static int check_bitlen_dsa(DSA *dsa, int ispub, unsigned int *magic);
+
+static void write_rsa(unsigned char **out, RSA *rsa, int ispub);
+static void write_dsa(unsigned char **out, DSA *dsa, int ispub);
+
+static int do_i2b(unsigned char **out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int ispub)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned int bitlen, magic = 0, keyalg;
+ int outlen, noinc = 0;
+ if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ bitlen = check_bitlen_dsa(pk->pkey.dsa, ispub, &magic);
+ keyalg = MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN;
+ } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ bitlen = check_bitlen_rsa(pk->pkey.rsa, ispub, &magic);
+ keyalg = MS_KEYALG_RSA_KEYX;
+ } else
+ return -1;
+ if (bitlen == 0)
+ return -1;
+ outlen = 16 + blob_length(bitlen,
+ keyalg == MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN ? 1 : 0, ispub);
+ if (out == NULL)
+ return outlen;
+ if (*out)
+ p = *out;
+ else {
+ p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+ if (!p)
+ return -1;
+ *out = p;
+ noinc = 1;
+ }
+ if (ispub)
+ *p++ = MS_PUBLICKEYBLOB;
+ else
+ *p++ = MS_PRIVATEKEYBLOB;
+ *p++ = 0x2;
+ *p++ = 0;
+ *p++ = 0;
+ write_ledword(&p, keyalg);
+ write_ledword(&p, magic);
+ write_ledword(&p, bitlen);
+ if (keyalg == MS_KEYALG_DSS_SIGN)
+ write_dsa(&p, pk->pkey.dsa, ispub);
+ else
+ write_rsa(&p, pk->pkey.rsa, ispub);
+ if (!noinc)
+ *out += outlen;
+ return outlen;
+}
+
+static int do_i2b_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int ispub)
+{
+ unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+ int outlen, wrlen;
+ outlen = do_i2b(&tmp, pk, ispub);
+ if (outlen < 0)
+ return -1;
+ wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ if (wrlen == outlen)
+ return outlen;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int check_bitlen_dsa(DSA *dsa, int ispub, unsigned int *pmagic)
+{
+ int bitlen;
+ bitlen = BN_num_bits(dsa->p);
+ if ((bitlen & 7) || (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160)
+ || (BN_num_bits(dsa->g) > bitlen))
+ goto badkey;
+ if (ispub) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(dsa->pub_key) > bitlen)
+ goto badkey;
+ *pmagic = MS_DSS1MAGIC;
+ } else {
+ if (BN_num_bits(dsa->priv_key) > 160)
+ goto badkey;
+ *pmagic = MS_DSS2MAGIC;
+ }
+
+ return bitlen;
+ badkey:
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_DSA, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_bitlen_rsa(RSA *rsa, int ispub, unsigned int *pmagic)
+{
+ int nbyte, hnbyte, bitlen;
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > 32)
+ goto badkey;
+ bitlen = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+ nbyte = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ hnbyte = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) + 15) >> 4;
+ if (ispub) {
+ *pmagic = MS_RSA1MAGIC;
+ return bitlen;
+ } else {
+ *pmagic = MS_RSA2MAGIC;
+ /*
+ * For private key each component must fit within nbyte or hnbyte.
+ */
+ if (BN_num_bytes(rsa->d) > nbyte)
+ goto badkey;
+ if ((BN_num_bytes(rsa->iqmp) > hnbyte)
+ || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->p) > hnbyte)
+ || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->q) > hnbyte)
+ || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->dmp1) > hnbyte)
+ || (BN_num_bytes(rsa->dmq1) > hnbyte))
+ goto badkey;
+ }
+ return bitlen;
+ badkey:
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_CHECK_BITLEN_RSA, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void write_rsa(unsigned char **out, RSA *rsa, int ispub)
+{
+ int nbyte, hnbyte;
+ nbyte = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ hnbyte = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) + 15) >> 4;
+ write_lebn(out, rsa->e, 4);
+ write_lebn(out, rsa->n, -1);
+ if (ispub)
+ return;
+ write_lebn(out, rsa->p, hnbyte);
+ write_lebn(out, rsa->q, hnbyte);
+ write_lebn(out, rsa->dmp1, hnbyte);
+ write_lebn(out, rsa->dmq1, hnbyte);
+ write_lebn(out, rsa->iqmp, hnbyte);
+ write_lebn(out, rsa->d, nbyte);
+}
+
+static void write_dsa(unsigned char **out, DSA *dsa, int ispub)
+{
+ int nbyte;
+ nbyte = BN_num_bytes(dsa->p);
+ write_lebn(out, dsa->p, nbyte);
+ write_lebn(out, dsa->q, 20);
+ write_lebn(out, dsa->g, nbyte);
+ if (ispub)
+ write_lebn(out, dsa->pub_key, nbyte);
+ else
+ write_lebn(out, dsa->priv_key, 20);
+ /* Set "invalid" for seed structure values */
+ memset(*out, 0xff, 24);
+ *out += 24;
+ return;
+}
+
+int i2b_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+ return do_i2b_bio(out, pk, 0);
+}
+
+int i2b_PublicKey_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+ return do_i2b_bio(out, pk, 1);
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+
+static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
+ int skip_magic,
+ unsigned int *psaltlen, unsigned int *pkeylen)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
+ unsigned int pvk_magic, is_encrypted;
+ if (skip_magic) {
+ if (length < 20) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (length < 24) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pvk_magic = read_ledword(&p);
+ if (pvk_magic != MS_PVKMAGIC) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Skip reserved */
+ p += 4;
+ /*
+ * keytype =
+ */ read_ledword(&p);
+ is_encrypted = read_ledword(&p);
+ *psaltlen = read_ledword(&p);
+ *pkeylen = read_ledword(&p);
+
+ if (is_encrypted && !*psaltlen) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *in = p;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int derive_pvk_key(unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *salt, unsigned int saltlen,
+ const unsigned char *pass, int passlen)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ int rv = 1;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, salt, saltlen)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, pass, passlen)
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mctx, key, NULL))
+ rv = 0;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
+ unsigned int saltlen, unsigned int keylen,
+ pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p = *in;
+ unsigned int magic;
+ unsigned char *enctmp = NULL, *q;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cctx);
+ if (saltlen) {
+ char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+ unsigned char keybuf[20];
+ int enctmplen, inlen;
+ if (cb)
+ inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
+ else
+ inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
+ if (inlen <= 0) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ enctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8);
+ if (!enctmp) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, p, saltlen,
+ (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen))
+ goto err;
+ p += saltlen;
+ /* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */
+ memcpy(enctmp, p, 8);
+ p += 8;
+ if (keylen < 8) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ inlen = keylen - 8;
+ q = enctmp + 8;
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cctx, q, &enctmplen, p, inlen))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cctx, q + enctmplen, &enctmplen))
+ goto err;
+ magic = read_ledword((const unsigned char **)&q);
+ if (magic != MS_RSA2MAGIC && magic != MS_DSS2MAGIC) {
+ q = enctmp + 8;
+ memset(keybuf + 5, 0, 11);
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20);
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cctx, q, &enctmplen, p, inlen))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cctx, q + enctmplen, &enctmplen))
+ goto err;
+ magic = read_ledword((const unsigned char **)&q);
+ if (magic != MS_RSA2MAGIC && magic != MS_DSS2MAGIC) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20);
+ p = enctmp;
+ }
+
+ ret = b2i_PrivateKey(&p, keylen);
+ err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cctx);
+ if (enctmp && saltlen)
+ OPENSSL_free(enctmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *b2i_PVK_bio(BIO *in, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+ unsigned char pvk_hdr[24], *buf = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int buflen;
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+ unsigned int saltlen, keylen;
+ if (BIO_read(in, pvk_hdr, 24) != 24) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ p = pvk_hdr;
+
+ if (!do_PVK_header(&p, 24, 0, &saltlen, &keylen))
+ return 0;
+ buflen = (int)keylen + saltlen;
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen);
+ if (!buf) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p = buf;
+ if (BIO_read(in, buf, buflen) != buflen) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_B2I_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_PVK_DATA_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = do_PVK_body(&p, saltlen, keylen, cb, u);
+
+ err:
+ if (buf) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, buflen);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int i2b_PVK(unsigned char **out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel,
+ pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+ int outlen = 24, pklen;
+ unsigned char *p, *salt = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cctx);
+ if (enclevel)
+ outlen += PVK_SALTLEN;
+ pklen = do_i2b(NULL, pk, 0);
+ if (pklen < 0)
+ return -1;
+ outlen += pklen;
+ if (!out)
+ return outlen;
+ if (*out)
+ p = *out;
+ else {
+ p = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+ if (!p) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *out = p;
+ }
+
+ write_ledword(&p, MS_PVKMAGIC);
+ write_ledword(&p, 0);
+ if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ write_ledword(&p, MS_KEYTYPE_SIGN);
+ else
+ write_ledword(&p, MS_KEYTYPE_KEYX);
+ write_ledword(&p, enclevel ? 1 : 0);
+ write_ledword(&p, enclevel ? PVK_SALTLEN : 0);
+ write_ledword(&p, pklen);
+ if (enclevel) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(p, PVK_SALTLEN) <= 0)
+ goto error;
+ salt = p;
+ p += PVK_SALTLEN;
+ }
+ do_i2b(&p, pk, 0);
+ if (enclevel == 0)
+ return outlen;
+ else {
+ char psbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
+ unsigned char keybuf[20];
+ int enctmplen, inlen;
+ if (cb)
+ inlen = cb(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u);
+ else
+ inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u);
+ if (inlen <= 0) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, salt, PVK_SALTLEN,
+ (unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen))
+ goto error;
+ if (enclevel == 1)
+ memset(keybuf + 5, 0, 11);
+ p = salt + PVK_SALTLEN + 8;
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL))
+ goto error;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(keybuf, 20);
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cctx, p, &enctmplen, p, pklen - 8))
+ goto error;
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cctx, p + enctmplen, &enctmplen))
+ goto error;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cctx);
+ return outlen;
+
+ error:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cctx);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int i2b_PVK_bio(BIO *out, EVP_PKEY *pk, int enclevel,
+ pem_password_cb *cb, void *u)
+{
+ unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
+ int outlen, wrlen;
+ outlen = i2b_PVK(&tmp, pk, enclevel, cb, u);
+ if (outlen < 0)
+ return -1;
+ wrlen = BIO_write(out, tmp, outlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ if (wrlen == outlen) {
+ PEMerr(PEM_F_I2B_PVK_BIO, PEM_R_BIO_WRITE_FAILURE);
+ return outlen;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+# endif
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,245 +0,0 @@
-/* p12_add.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 1999.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-
-/* Pack an object into an OCTET STRING and turn into a safebag */
-
-PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
- int nid1, int nid2)
-{
- PKCS12_BAGS *bag;
- PKCS12_SAFEBAG *safebag;
- if (!(bag = PKCS12_BAGS_new())) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid1);
- if (!ASN1_item_pack(obj, it, &bag->value.octet)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (!(safebag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- safebag->value.bag = bag;
- safebag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid2);
- return safebag;
-}
-
-/* Turn PKCS8 object into a keybag */
-
-PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
-{
- PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag;
- if (!(bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_keyBag);
- bag->value.keybag = p8;
- return bag;
-}
-
-/* Turn PKCS8 object into a shrouded keybag */
-
-PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG(int pbe_nid, const char *pass,
- int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
- int saltlen, int iter,
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
-{
- PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag;
- const EVP_CIPHER *pbe_ciph;
-
- /* Set up the safe bag */
- if (!(bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag);
-
- pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid);
-
- if (pbe_ciph)
- pbe_nid = -1;
-
- if (!(bag->value.shkeybag =
- PKCS8_encrypt(pbe_nid, pbe_ciph, pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
- p8))) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return bag;
-}
-
-/* Turn a stack of SAFEBAGS into a PKCS#7 data Contentinfo */
-PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk)
-{
- PKCS7 *p7;
- if (!(p7 = PKCS7_new())) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
- if (!(p7->d.data = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new())) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (!ASN1_item_pack(sk, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), &p7->d.data)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- return p7;
-}
-
-/* Unpack SAFEBAGS from PKCS#7 data ContentInfo */
-STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7)
-{
- if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p7)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA,
- PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
-}
-
-/* Turn a stack of SAFEBAGS into a PKCS#7 encrypted data ContentInfo */
-
-PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
- unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
- STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags)
-{
- PKCS7 *p7;
- X509_ALGOR *pbe;
- const EVP_CIPHER *pbe_ciph;
- if (!(p7 = PKCS7_new())) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_encrypted)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA,
- PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid);
-
- if (pbe_ciph)
- pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set(pbe_ciph, iter, salt, saltlen);
- else
- pbe = PKCS5_pbe_set(pbe_nid, iter, salt, saltlen);
-
- if (!pbe) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- X509_ALGOR_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
- p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm = pbe;
- M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data);
- if (!(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data =
- PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass,
- passlen, bags, 1))) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return p7;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
- int passlen)
-{
- if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
- return NULL;
- return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
- ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
- pass, passlen,
- p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data, 1);
-}
-
-PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_decrypt_skey(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag,
- const char *pass, int passlen)
-{
- return PKCS8_decrypt(bag->value.shkeybag, pass, passlen);
-}
-
-int PKCS12_pack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12, STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes)
-{
- if (ASN1_item_pack(safes, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES),
- &p12->authsafes->d.data))
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12)
-{
- if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES,
- PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
- ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+/* p12_add.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* Pack an object into an OCTET STRING and turn into a safebag */
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ int nid1, int nid2)
+{
+ PKCS12_BAGS *bag;
+ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *safebag;
+ if (!(bag = PKCS12_BAGS_new())) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid1);
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(obj, it, &bag->value.octet)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(safebag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ safebag->value.bag = bag;
+ safebag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid2);
+ return safebag;
+
+ err:
+ PKCS12_BAGS_free(bag);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Turn PKCS8 object into a keybag */
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag;
+ if (!(bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_keyBag);
+ bag->value.keybag = p8;
+ return bag;
+}
+
+/* Turn PKCS8 object into a shrouded keybag */
+
+PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG(int pbe_nid, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
+ int saltlen, int iter,
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *pbe_ciph;
+
+ /* Set up the safe bag */
+ if (!(bag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag);
+
+ pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid);
+
+ if (pbe_ciph)
+ pbe_nid = -1;
+
+ if (!(bag->value.shkeybag =
+ PKCS8_encrypt(pbe_nid, pbe_ciph, pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
+ p8))) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(bag);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return bag;
+}
+
+/* Turn a stack of SAFEBAGS into a PKCS#7 data Contentinfo */
+PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk)
+{
+ PKCS7 *p7;
+ if (!(p7 = PKCS7_new())) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
+ if (!(p7->d.data = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new())) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(sk, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), &p7->d.data)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return p7;
+
+ err:
+ PKCS7_free(p7);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Unpack SAFEBAGS from PKCS#7 data ContentInfo */
+STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+ if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p7)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA,
+ PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
+}
+
+/* Turn a stack of SAFEBAGS into a PKCS#7 encrypted data ContentInfo */
+
+PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags)
+{
+ PKCS7 *p7;
+ X509_ALGOR *pbe;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *pbe_ciph;
+ if (!(p7 = PKCS7_new())) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_encrypted)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA,
+ PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid);
+
+ if (pbe_ciph)
+ pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set(pbe_ciph, iter, salt, saltlen);
+ else
+ pbe = PKCS5_pbe_set(pbe_nid, iter, salt, saltlen);
+
+ if (!pbe) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_ALGOR_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
+ p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm = pbe;
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data);
+ if (!(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data =
+ PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass,
+ passlen, bags, 1))) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return p7;
+
+ err:
+ PKCS7_free(p7);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
+ int passlen)
+{
+ if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
+ return NULL;
+ return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
+ pass, passlen,
+ p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data, 1);
+}
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_decrypt_skey(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag,
+ const char *pass, int passlen)
+{
+ return PKCS8_decrypt(bag->value.shkeybag, pass, passlen);
+}
+
+int PKCS12_pack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12, STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes)
+{
+ if (ASN1_item_pack(safes, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES),
+ &p12->authsafes->d.data))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12)
+{
+ if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES,
+ PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-/* p12_crpt.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 1999.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-
-/* PKCS#12 PBE algorithms now in static table */
-
-void PKCS12_PBE_add(void)
-{
-}
-
-int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
- ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
- const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
-{
- PBEPARAM *pbe;
- int saltlen, iter, ret;
- unsigned char *salt;
- const unsigned char *pbuf;
- unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
-
- /* Extract useful info from parameter */
- if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
- param->value.sequence == NULL) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- pbuf = param->value.sequence->data;
- if (!(pbe = d2i_PBEPARAM(NULL, &pbuf, param->value.sequence->length))) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!pbe->iter)
- iter = 1;
- else
- iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter);
- salt = pbe->salt->data;
- saltlen = pbe->salt->length;
- if (!PKCS12_key_gen(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_KEY_ID,
- iter, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher), key, md)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
- PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!PKCS12_key_gen(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_IV_ID,
- iter, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher), iv, md)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_IV_GEN_ERROR);
- PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
- return 0;
- }
- PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
- ret = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, en_de);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
- return ret;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/* p12_crpt.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* PKCS#12 PBE algorithms now in static table */
+
+void PKCS12_PBE_add(void)
+{
+}
+
+int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+ const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
+{
+ PBEPARAM *pbe;
+ int saltlen, iter, ret;
+ unsigned char *salt;
+ const unsigned char *pbuf;
+ unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Extract useful info from parameter */
+ if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
+ param->value.sequence == NULL) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pbuf = param->value.sequence->data;
+ if (!(pbe = d2i_PBEPARAM(NULL, &pbuf, param->value.sequence->length))) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!pbe->iter)
+ iter = 1;
+ else
+ iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter);
+ salt = pbe->salt->data;
+ saltlen = pbe->salt->length;
+ if (!PKCS12_key_gen(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_KEY_ID,
+ iter, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher), key, md)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
+ PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!PKCS12_key_gen(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_IV_ID,
+ iter, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher), iv, md)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN, PKCS12_R_IV_GEN_ERROR);
+ PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+ ret = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, en_de);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+ return ret;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
-/* p12_kiss.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 1999.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-
-/* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */
-
-static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
-
-static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
- int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
-
-static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
-
-/*
- * Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert and
- * other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL, or it
- * should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be passed
- * unitialised.
- */
-
-int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
- STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
-{
- STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
-
- if (!p12) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,
- PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (pkey)
- *pkey = NULL;
- if (cert)
- *cert = NULL;
-
- /* Check the mac */
-
- /*
- * If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases to
- * determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that under
- * PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length
- * password are two different things...
- */
-
- if (!pass || !*pass) {
- if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0))
- pass = NULL;
- else if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0))
- pass = "";
- else {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Allocate stack for other certificates */
- ocerts = sk_X509_new_null();
-
- if (!ocerts) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!parse_pk12(p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- while ((x = sk_X509_pop(ocerts))) {
- if (pkey && *pkey && cert && !*cert) {
- if (X509_check_private_key(x, *pkey)) {
- *cert = x;
- x = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- if (ca && x) {
- if (!*ca)
- *ca = sk_X509_new_null();
- if (!*ca)
- goto err;
- if (!sk_X509_push(*ca, x))
- goto err;
- x = NULL;
- }
- if (x)
- X509_free(x);
- }
-
- if (ocerts)
- sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
-
- return 1;
-
- err:
-
- if (pkey && *pkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
- if (cert && *cert)
- X509_free(*cert);
- if (x)
- X509_free(x);
- if (ocerts)
- sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */
-
-static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
-{
- STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;
- STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
- int i, bagnid;
- PKCS7 *p7;
-
- if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)))
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) {
- p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);
- bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
- if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
- bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
- } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
- bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
- } else
- continue;
- if (!bags) {
- sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts)) {
- sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
- return 0;
- }
- sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- }
- sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
- int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
-{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
- if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i),
- pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
-{
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
- X509 *x509;
- ASN1_TYPE *attrib;
- ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkid = NULL;
-
- if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr(bag, NID_friendlyName)))
- fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;
-
- if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID)))
- lkid = attrib->value.octet_string;
-
- switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag)) {
- case NID_keyBag:
- if (!pkey || *pkey)
- return 1;
- if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag)))
- return 0;
- break;
-
- case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
- if (!pkey || *pkey)
- return 1;
- if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
- return 0;
- *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
- if (!(*pkey))
- return 0;
- break;
-
- case NID_certBag:
- if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate)
- return 1;
- if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag)))
- return 0;
- if (lkid && !X509_keyid_set1(x509, lkid->data, lkid->length)) {
- X509_free(x509);
- return 0;
- }
- if (fname) {
- int len, r;
- unsigned char *data;
- len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);
- if (len >= 0) {
- r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);
- OPENSSL_free(data);
- if (!r) {
- X509_free(x509);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (!sk_X509_push(ocerts, x509)) {
- X509_free(x509);
- return 0;
- }
-
- break;
-
- case NID_safeContentsBag:
- return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts);
- break;
-
- default:
- return 1;
- break;
- }
- return 1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+/* p12_kiss.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */
+
+static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+/*
+ * Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert and
+ * other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL, or it
+ * should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be passed
+ * unitialised.
+ */
+
+int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
+
+ if (!p12) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,
+ PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (pkey)
+ *pkey = NULL;
+ if (cert)
+ *cert = NULL;
+
+ /* Check the mac */
+
+ /*
+ * If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases to
+ * determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that under
+ * PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length
+ * password are two different things...
+ */
+
+ if (!pass || !*pass) {
+ if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0))
+ pass = NULL;
+ else if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0))
+ pass = "";
+ else {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate stack for other certificates */
+ ocerts = sk_X509_new_null();
+
+ if (!ocerts) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!parse_pk12(p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ while ((x = sk_X509_pop(ocerts))) {
+ if (pkey && *pkey && cert && !*cert) {
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ if (X509_check_private_key(x, *pkey)) {
+ *cert = x;
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ }
+
+ if (ca && x) {
+ if (!*ca)
+ *ca = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (!*ca)
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(*ca, x))
+ goto err;
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+ if (x)
+ X509_free(x);
+ }
+
+ if (ocerts)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+
+ if (pkey && *pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
+ if (cert && *cert)
+ X509_free(*cert);
+ if (x)
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (ocerts)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */
+
+static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
+{
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
+ int i, bagnid;
+ PKCS7 *p7;
+
+ if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)))
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) {
+ p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);
+ bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
+ bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+ } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+ bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
+ } else
+ continue;
+ if (!bags) {
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts)) {
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ }
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
+ if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i),
+ pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
+{
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
+ X509 *x509;
+ ASN1_TYPE *attrib;
+ ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkid = NULL;
+
+ if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr(bag, NID_friendlyName)))
+ fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;
+
+ if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID)))
+ lkid = attrib->value.octet_string;
+
+ switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag)) {
+ case NID_keyBag:
+ if (!pkey || *pkey)
+ return 1;
+ if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag)))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
+ if (!pkey || *pkey)
+ return 1;
+ if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
+ return 0;
+ *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ if (!(*pkey))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_certBag:
+ if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate)
+ return 1;
+ if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag)))
+ return 0;
+ if (lkid && !X509_keyid_set1(x509, lkid->data, lkid->length)) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (fname) {
+ int len, r;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);
+ if (len >= 0) {
+ r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);
+ OPENSSL_free(data);
+ if (!r) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ocerts, x509)) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case NID_safeContentsBag:
+ return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
-/* p12_mutl.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 1999.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HMAC
-# include <stdio.h>
-# include "cryptlib.h"
-# include <openssl/crypto.h>
-# include <openssl/hmac.h>
-# include <openssl/rand.h>
-# include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-
-/* Generate a MAC */
-int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
- unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen)
-{
- const EVP_MD *md_type;
- HMAC_CTX hmac;
- unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt;
- int saltlen, iter;
- int md_size;
-
- if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
- saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
- if (!p12->mac->iter)
- iter = 1;
- else
- iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(p12->mac->iter);
- if (!(md_type = EVP_get_digestbyobj(p12->mac->dinfo->algor->algorithm))) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
- return 0;
- }
- md_size = EVP_MD_size(md_type);
- if (md_size < 0)
- return 0;
- if (!PKCS12_key_gen(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID, iter,
- md_size, key, md_type)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, key, md_size, md_type, NULL)
- || !HMAC_Update(&hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data,
- p12->authsafes->d.data->length)
- || !HMAC_Final(&hmac, mac, maclen)) {
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
- return 0;
- }
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Verify the mac */
-int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
-{
- unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int maclen;
- if (p12->mac == NULL) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!PKCS12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((maclen != (unsigned int)p12->mac->dinfo->digest->length)
- || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, p12->mac->dinfo->digest->data, maclen))
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Set a mac */
-
-int PKCS12_set_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
- unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
- const EVP_MD *md_type)
-{
- unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int maclen;
-
- if (!md_type)
- md_type = EVP_sha1();
- if (PKCS12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt, saltlen, md_type) == PKCS12_ERROR) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!PKCS12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!(M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p12->mac->dinfo->digest, mac, maclen))) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Set up a mac structure */
-int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
- const EVP_MD *md_type)
-{
- if (!(p12->mac = PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new()))
- return PKCS12_ERROR;
- if (iter > 1) {
- if (!(p12->mac->iter = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new())) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p12->mac->iter, iter)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (!saltlen)
- saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN;
- p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
- if (!(p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen))) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!salt) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0)
- return 0;
- } else
- memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen);
- p12->mac->dinfo->algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md_type));
- if (!(p12->mac->dinfo->algor->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new())) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- p12->mac->dinfo->algor->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/* p12_mutl.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HMAC
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include "cryptlib.h"
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+/* Generate a MAC */
+int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md_type;
+ HMAC_CTX hmac;
+ unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt;
+ int saltlen, iter;
+ int md_size;
+
+ if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
+ saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
+ if (!p12->mac->iter)
+ iter = 1;
+ else
+ iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(p12->mac->iter);
+ if (!(md_type = EVP_get_digestbyobj(p12->mac->dinfo->algor->algorithm))) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ md_size = EVP_MD_size(md_type);
+ if (md_size < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (!PKCS12_key_gen(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID, iter,
+ md_size, key, md_type)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, key, md_size, md_type, NULL)
+ || !HMAC_Update(&hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data,
+ p12->authsafes->d.data->length)
+ || !HMAC_Final(&hmac, mac, maclen)) {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Verify the mac */
+int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
+{
+ unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int maclen;
+ if (p12->mac == NULL) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!PKCS12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((maclen != (unsigned int)p12->mac->dinfo->digest->length)
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, p12->mac->dinfo->digest->data, maclen))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set a mac */
+
+int PKCS12_set_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
+ const EVP_MD *md_type)
+{
+ unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int maclen;
+
+ if (!md_type)
+ md_type = EVP_sha1();
+ if (PKCS12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt, saltlen, md_type) == PKCS12_ERROR) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!PKCS12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p12->mac->dinfo->digest, mac, maclen))) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set up a mac structure */
+int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
+ const EVP_MD *md_type)
+{
+ if (!(p12->mac = PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new()))
+ return PKCS12_ERROR;
+ if (iter > 1) {
+ if (!(p12->mac->iter = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new())) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p12->mac->iter, iter)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!saltlen)
+ saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN;
+ if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
+ if (!salt) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen);
+ p12->mac->dinfo->algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_MD_type(md_type));
+ if (!(p12->mac->dinfo->algor->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new())) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p12->mac->dinfo->algor->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1294 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-static int add_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **sk, int nid, int atrtype,
- void *value);
-static ASN1_TYPE *get_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, int nid);
-
-static int PKCS7_type_is_other(PKCS7 *p7)
-{
- int isOther = 1;
-
- int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
-
- switch (nid) {
- case NID_pkcs7_data:
- case NID_pkcs7_signed:
- case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
- case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
- case NID_pkcs7_digest:
- case NID_pkcs7_encrypted:
- isOther = 0;
- break;
- default:
- isOther = 1;
- }
-
- return isOther;
-
-}
-
-static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_get_octet_string(PKCS7 *p7)
-{
- if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7))
- return p7->d.data;
- if (PKCS7_type_is_other(p7) && p7->d.other
- && (p7->d.other->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING))
- return p7->d.other->value.octet_string;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int PKCS7_bio_add_digest(BIO **pbio, X509_ALGOR *alg)
-{
- BIO *btmp;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md())) == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm);
- if (md == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BIO_set_md(btmp, md);
- if (*pbio == NULL)
- *pbio = btmp;
- else if (!BIO_push(*pbio, btmp)) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- btmp = NULL;
-
- return 1;
-
- err:
- if (btmp)
- BIO_free(btmp);
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-static int pkcs7_encode_rinfo(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri,
- unsigned char *key, int keylen)
-{
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char *ek = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
- size_t eklen;
-
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ri->cert);
-
- if (!pkey)
- return 0;
-
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- if (!pctx)
- return 0;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, key, keylen) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen);
-
- if (ek == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen, key, keylen) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- ASN1_STRING_set0(ri->enc_key, ek, eklen);
- ek = NULL;
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- if (pkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (pctx)
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- if (ek)
- OPENSSL_free(ek);
- return ret;
-
-}
-
-static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
- PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
- unsigned char *ek = NULL;
- size_t eklen;
-
- int ret = -1;
-
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- if (!pctx)
- return -1;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen,
- ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen);
-
- if (ek == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen,
- ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0) {
- ret = 0;
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- if (*pek) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(*pek, *peklen);
- OPENSSL_free(*pek);
- }
-
- *pek = ek;
- *peklen = eklen;
-
- err:
- if (pctx)
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- if (!ret && ek)
- OPENSSL_free(ek);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
-{
- int i;
- BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR *xa = NULL;
- const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL;
- STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR *xalg = NULL;
- PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
-
- if (p7 == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
- return NULL;
- }
- /*
- * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
- * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
- *
- * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
- * error.
- *
- * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
- * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
- */
- if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
- p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
-
- switch (i) {
- case NID_pkcs7_signed:
- md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
- os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
- break;
- case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
- rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
- md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
- xalg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
- evp_cipher = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->cipher;
- if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED);
- goto err;
- }
- break;
- case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
- rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
- xalg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
- evp_cipher = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->cipher;
- if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED);
- goto err;
- }
- break;
- case NID_pkcs7_digest:
- xa = p7->d.digest->md;
- os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.digest->contents);
- break;
- case NID_pkcs7_data:
- break;
- default:
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++)
- if (!PKCS7_bio_add_digest(&out, sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i)))
- goto err;
-
- if (xa && !PKCS7_bio_add_digest(&out, xa))
- goto err;
-
- if (evp_cipher != NULL) {
- unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int keylen, ivlen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
-
- if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- BIO_get_cipher_ctx(btmp, &ctx);
- keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher);
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(evp_cipher);
- xalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(evp_cipher));
- if (ivlen > 0)
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, key) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, 1) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (ivlen > 0) {
- if (xalg->parameter == NULL) {
- xalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
- if (xalg->parameter == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, xalg->parameter) < 0)
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Lets do the pub key stuff :-) */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
- ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
- if (pkcs7_encode_rinfo(ri, key, keylen) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
-
- if (out == NULL)
- out = btmp;
- else
- BIO_push(out, btmp);
- btmp = NULL;
- }
-
- if (bio == NULL) {
- if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7))
- bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
- else if (os && os->length > 0)
- bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(os->data, os->length);
- if (bio == NULL) {
- bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- if (bio == NULL)
- goto err;
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
- }
- }
- if (out)
- BIO_push(out, bio);
- else
- out = bio;
- bio = NULL;
- if (0) {
- err:
- if (out != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(out);
- if (btmp != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(btmp);
- out = NULL;
- }
- return (out);
-}
-
-static int pkcs7_cmp_ri(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, X509 *pcert)
-{
- int ret;
- ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ri->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
- pcert->cert_info->issuer);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(pcert->cert_info->serialNumber,
- ri->issuer_and_serial->serial);
-}
-
-/* int */
-BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
-{
- int i, j;
- BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL, *etmp = NULL, *bio = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR *xa;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *evp_md;
- const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR *enc_alg = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL;
- STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL;
- PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
- unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
- int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
-
- if (p7 == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
- p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
-
- switch (i) {
- case NID_pkcs7_signed:
- /*
- * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType
- * field and optional content.
- * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content
- * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data").
- */
- data_body = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
- if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
- PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
- break;
- case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
- rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
- md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
- /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
- data_body = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
- enc_alg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
- evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
- if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
- PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- break;
- case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
- rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
- enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
- /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
- data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
- evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
- if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
- PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- break;
- default:
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */
- if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* We will be checking the signature */
- if (md_sk != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) {
- xa = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i);
- if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md())) == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- j = OBJ_obj2nid(xa->algorithm);
- evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(j);
- if (evp_md == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
- PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BIO_set_md(btmp, evp_md);
- if (out == NULL)
- out = btmp;
- else
- BIO_push(out, btmp);
- btmp = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- if (evp_cipher != NULL) {
-#if 0
- unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char *p;
- int keylen, ivlen;
- int max;
- X509_OBJECT ret;
-#endif
-
- if ((etmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key with the
- * private key
- */
-
- /*
- * Find the recipientInfo which matches the passed certificate (if
- * any)
- */
-
- if (pcert) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
- ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
- if (!pkcs7_cmp_ri(ri, pcert))
- break;
- ri = NULL;
- }
- if (ri == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
- PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */
- if (pcert == NULL) {
- /*
- * Always attempt to decrypt all rinfo even after sucess as a
- * defence against MMA timing attacks.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
- ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
-
- if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
- goto err;
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- } else {
- /* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */
- if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
- goto err;
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
-
- evp_ctx = NULL;
- BIO_get_cipher_ctx(etmp, &evp_ctx);
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx, enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
- goto err;
- /* Generate random key as MMA defence */
- tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
- tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
- if (!tkey)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (ek == NULL) {
- ek = tkey;
- eklen = tkeylen;
- tkey = NULL;
- }
-
- if (eklen != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
- /*
- * Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key and effective key
- * length. The key length is determined by the size of the
- * decrypted RSA key.
- */
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, eklen)) {
- /* Use random key as MMA defence */
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ek, eklen);
- OPENSSL_free(ek);
- ek = tkey;
- eklen = tkeylen;
- tkey = NULL;
- }
- }
- /* Clear errors so we don't leak information useful in MMA */
- ERR_clear_error();
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, NULL, NULL, ek, NULL, 0) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (ek) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ek, eklen);
- OPENSSL_free(ek);
- ek = NULL;
- }
- if (tkey) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
- OPENSSL_free(tkey);
- tkey = NULL;
- }
-
- if (out == NULL)
- out = etmp;
- else
- BIO_push(out, etmp);
- etmp = NULL;
- }
-#if 1
- if (in_bio != NULL) {
- bio = in_bio;
- } else {
-# if 0
- bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- /*
- * We need to set this so that when we have read all the data, the
- * encrypt BIO, if present, will read EOF and encode the last few
- * bytes
- */
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
-
- if (data_body->length > 0)
- BIO_write(bio, (char *)data_body->data, data_body->length);
-# else
- if (data_body->length > 0)
- bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
- else {
- bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
- }
- if (bio == NULL)
- goto err;
-# endif
- }
- BIO_push(out, bio);
- bio = NULL;
-#endif
- if (0) {
- err:
- if (ek) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ek, eklen);
- OPENSSL_free(ek);
- }
- if (tkey) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
- OPENSSL_free(tkey);
- }
- if (out != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(out);
- if (btmp != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(btmp);
- if (etmp != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(etmp);
- if (bio != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(bio);
- out = NULL;
- }
- return (out);
-}
-
-static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid)
-{
- for (;;) {
- bio = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MD);
- if (bio == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST,
- PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return NULL;
- }
- BIO_get_md_ctx(bio, pmd);
- if (*pmd == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(*pmd) == nid)
- return bio;
- bio = BIO_next(bio);
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int do_pkcs7_signed_attrib(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
-{
- unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int md_len;
-
- /* Add signing time if not already present */
- if (!PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_signingTime)) {
- if (!PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time(si, NULL)) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Add digest */
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md_data, &md_len)) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest(si, md_data, md_len)) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Now sign the attributes */
- if (!PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(si))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- int i, j;
- BIO *btmp;
- PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
- EVP_MD_CTX *mdc, ctx_tmp;
- STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk;
- STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk = NULL;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
-
- if (p7 == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
- i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
- p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
-
- switch (i) {
- case NID_pkcs7_data:
- os = p7->d.data;
- break;
- case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
- /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */
- si_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->signer_info;
- os = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
- if (!os) {
- os = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- if (!os) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os;
- }
- break;
- case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
- /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */
- os = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
- if (!os) {
- os = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- if (!os) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os;
- }
- break;
- case NID_pkcs7_signed:
- si_sk = p7->d.sign->signer_info;
- os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
- /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
- if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
- M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
- os = NULL;
- p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
- }
- break;
-
- case NID_pkcs7_digest:
- os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.digest->contents);
- /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
- if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) {
- M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
- os = NULL;
- p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (si_sk != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(si_sk); i++) {
- si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(si_sk, i);
- if (si->pkey == NULL)
- continue;
-
- j = OBJ_obj2nid(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
-
- btmp = bio;
-
- btmp = PKCS7_find_digest(&mdc, btmp, j);
-
- if (btmp == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * We now have the EVP_MD_CTX, lets do the signing.
- */
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, mdc))
- goto err;
-
- sk = si->auth_attr;
-
- /*
- * If there are attributes, we add the digest attribute and only
- * sign the attributes
- */
- if (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk) > 0) {
- if (!do_pkcs7_signed_attrib(si, &ctx_tmp))
- goto err;
- } else {
- unsigned char *abuf = NULL;
- unsigned int abuflen;
- abuflen = EVP_PKEY_size(si->pkey);
- abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(abuflen);
- if (!abuf)
- goto err;
-
- if (!EVP_SignFinal(&ctx_tmp, abuf, &abuflen, si->pkey)) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ASN1_STRING_set0(si->enc_digest, abuf, abuflen);
- }
- }
- } else if (i == NID_pkcs7_digest) {
- unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int md_len;
- if (!PKCS7_find_digest(&mdc, bio,
- OBJ_obj2nid(p7->d.digest->md->algorithm)))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdc, md_data, &md_len))
- goto err;
- M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len);
- }
-
- if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
- /*
- * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
- * digested data support is broken.
- */
- if (os == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
- char *cont;
- long contlen;
- btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
- if (btmp == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
- goto err;
- }
- contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
- /*
- * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
- * instead of making an extra copy.
- */
- BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
- ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
-{
- EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
- unsigned char *abuf = NULL;
- int alen;
- size_t siglen;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-
- md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
- if (md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
- if (EVP_DigestSignInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, si->pkey) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 0, si) <= 0) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)si->auth_attr, &abuf,
- ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN));
- if (!abuf)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx, abuf, alen) <= 0)
- goto err;
- OPENSSL_free(abuf);
- abuf = NULL;
- if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0)
- goto err;
- abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
- if (!abuf)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, abuf, &siglen) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 1, si) <= 0) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
-
- ASN1_STRING_set0(si->enc_digest, abuf, siglen);
-
- return 1;
-
- err:
- if (abuf)
- OPENSSL_free(abuf);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bio,
- PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
-{
- PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *ias;
- int ret = 0, i;
- STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
- X509 *x509;
-
- if (p7 == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
- cert = p7->d.sign->cert;
- } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
- cert = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
- } else {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */
- ias = si->issuer_and_serial;
-
- x509 = X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(cert, ias->issuer, ias->serial);
-
- /* were we able to find the cert in passed to us */
- if (x509 == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY,
- PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CERTIFICATE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Lets verify */
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, cert_store, x509, cert)) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN);
- i = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
- if (i <= 0) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-
- return PKCS7_signatureVerify(bio, p7, si, x509);
- err:
- return ret;
-}
-
-int PKCS7_signatureVerify(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
- X509 *x509)
-{
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
- EVP_MD_CTX mdc_tmp, *mdc;
- int ret = 0, i;
- int md_type;
- STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk;
- BIO *btmp;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mdc_tmp);
-
- if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7) && !PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- md_type = OBJ_obj2nid(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
-
- btmp = bio;
- for (;;) {
- if ((btmp == NULL) ||
- ((btmp = BIO_find_type(btmp, BIO_TYPE_MD)) == NULL)) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY,
- PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- goto err;
- }
- BIO_get_md_ctx(btmp, &mdc);
- if (mdc == NULL) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(mdc) == md_type)
- break;
- /*
- * Workaround for some broken clients that put the signature OID
- * instead of the digest OID in digest_alg->algorithm
- */
- if (EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mdc)) == md_type)
- break;
- btmp = BIO_next(btmp);
- }
-
- /*
- * mdc is the digest ctx that we want, unless there are attributes, in
- * which case the digest is the signed attributes
- */
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&mdc_tmp, mdc))
- goto err;
-
- sk = si->auth_attr;
- if ((sk != NULL) && (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk) != 0)) {
- unsigned char md_dat[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *abuf = NULL;
- unsigned int md_len;
- int alen;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *message_digest;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mdc_tmp, md_dat, &md_len))
- goto err;
- message_digest = PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(sk);
- if (!message_digest) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY,
- PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((message_digest->length != (int)md_len) ||
- (memcmp(message_digest->data, md_dat, md_len))) {
-#if 0
- {
- int ii;
- for (ii = 0; ii < message_digest->length; ii++)
- printf("%02X", message_digest->data[ii]);
- printf(" sent\n");
- for (ii = 0; ii < md_len; ii++)
- printf("%02X", md_dat[ii]);
- printf(" calc\n");
- }
-#endif
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE);
- ret = -1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mdc_tmp, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_type), NULL))
- goto err;
-
- alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)sk, &abuf,
- ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY));
- if (alen <= 0) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- ret = -1;
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mdc_tmp, abuf, alen))
- goto err;
-
- OPENSSL_free(abuf);
- }
-
- os = si->enc_digest;
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
- if (!pkey) {
- ret = -1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- i = EVP_VerifyFinal(&mdc_tmp, os->data, os->length, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (i <= 0) {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
- ret = -1;
- goto err;
- } else
- ret = 1;
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mdc_tmp);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial(PKCS7 *p7, int idx)
-{
- STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk;
- PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri;
- int i;
-
- i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
- if (i != NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped)
- return NULL;
- if (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped == NULL)
- return NULL;
- rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
- if (rsk == NULL)
- return NULL;
- ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, 0);
- if (sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk) <= idx)
- return (NULL);
- ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, idx);
- return (ri->issuer_and_serial);
-}
-
-ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid)
-{
- return (get_attribute(si->auth_attr, nid));
-}
-
-ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid)
-{
- return (get_attribute(si->unauth_attr, nid));
-}
-
-static ASN1_TYPE *get_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, int nid)
-{
- int i;
- X509_ATTRIBUTE *xa;
- ASN1_OBJECT *o;
-
- o = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
- if (!o || !sk)
- return (NULL);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) {
- xa = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(sk, i);
- if (OBJ_cmp(xa->object, o) == 0) {
- if (!xa->single && sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(xa->value.set))
- return (sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(xa->value.set, 0));
- else
- return (NULL);
- }
- }
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
-{
- ASN1_TYPE *astype;
- if (!(astype = get_attribute(sk, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest)))
- return NULL;
- return astype->value.octet_string;
-}
-
-int PKCS7_set_signed_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si,
- STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (p7si->auth_attr != NULL)
- sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(p7si->auth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
- p7si->auth_attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk);
- if (p7si->auth_attr == NULL)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) {
- if ((sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(p7si->auth_attr, i,
- X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value
- (sk, i))))
- == NULL)
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-int PKCS7_set_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si,
- STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (p7si->unauth_attr != NULL)
- sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(p7si->unauth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
- p7si->unauth_attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk);
- if (p7si->unauth_attr == NULL)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) {
- if ((sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(p7si->unauth_attr, i,
- X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value
- (sk, i))))
- == NULL)
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-int PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int atrtype,
- void *value)
-{
- return (add_attribute(&(p7si->auth_attr), nid, atrtype, value));
-}
-
-int PKCS7_add_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int atrtype,
- void *value)
-{
- return (add_attribute(&(p7si->unauth_attr), nid, atrtype, value));
-}
-
-static int add_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **sk, int nid, int atrtype,
- void *value)
-{
- X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr = NULL;
-
- if (*sk == NULL) {
- *sk = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null();
- if (*sk == NULL)
- return 0;
- new_attrib:
- if (!(attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(nid, atrtype, value)))
- return 0;
- if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_push(*sk, attr)) {
- X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(*sk); i++) {
- attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(*sk, i);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(attr->object) == nid) {
- X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
- attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(nid, atrtype, value);
- if (attr == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(*sk, i, attr)) {
- X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
- return 0;
- }
- goto end;
- }
- }
- goto new_attrib;
- }
- end:
- return (1);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1295 @@
+/* crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+static int add_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **sk, int nid, int atrtype,
+ void *value);
+static ASN1_TYPE *get_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, int nid);
+
+static int PKCS7_type_is_other(PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+ int isOther = 1;
+
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_pkcs7_data:
+ case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+ case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+ case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+ case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+ case NID_pkcs7_encrypted:
+ isOther = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ isOther = 1;
+ }
+
+ return isOther;
+
+}
+
+static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_get_octet_string(PKCS7 *p7)
+{
+ if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7))
+ return p7->d.data;
+ if (PKCS7_type_is_other(p7) && p7->d.other
+ && (p7->d.other->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING))
+ return p7->d.other->value.octet_string;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int PKCS7_bio_add_digest(BIO **pbio, X509_ALGOR *alg)
+{
+ BIO *btmp;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md())) == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BIO_set_md(btmp, md);
+ if (*pbio == NULL)
+ *pbio = btmp;
+ else if (!BIO_push(*pbio, btmp)) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_BIO_ADD_DIGEST, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ btmp = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (btmp)
+ BIO_free(btmp);
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int pkcs7_encode_rinfo(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri,
+ unsigned char *key, int keylen)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *ek = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t eklen;
+
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ri->cert);
+
+ if (!pkey)
+ return 0;
+
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ if (!pctx)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, key, keylen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen);
+
+ if (ek == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_ENCODE_RINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen, key, keylen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ASN1_STRING_set0(ri->enc_key, ek, eklen);
+ ek = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (pctx)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ if (ek)
+ OPENSSL_free(ek);
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
+ PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ unsigned char *ek = NULL;
+ size_t eklen;
+
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ if (!pctx)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen,
+ ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen);
+
+ if (ek == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen,
+ ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ if (*pek) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(*pek, *peklen);
+ OPENSSL_free(*pek);
+ }
+
+ *pek = ek;
+ *peklen = eklen;
+
+ err:
+ if (pctx)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ if (!ret && ek)
+ OPENSSL_free(ek);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+{
+ int i;
+ BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR *xa = NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR *xalg = NULL;
+ PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+
+ if (p7 == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
+ * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
+ *
+ * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
+ * error.
+ *
+ * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
+ * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
+ */
+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+ md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+ os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
+ break;
+ case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+ rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
+ xalg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+ evp_cipher = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->cipher;
+ if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ break;
+ case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+ rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ xalg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+ evp_cipher = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->cipher;
+ if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ break;
+ case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+ xa = p7->d.digest->md;
+ os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.digest->contents);
+ break;
+ case NID_pkcs7_data:
+ break;
+ default:
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++)
+ if (!PKCS7_bio_add_digest(&out, sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (xa && !PKCS7_bio_add_digest(&out, xa))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (evp_cipher != NULL) {
+ unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int keylen, ivlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+ if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_get_cipher_ctx(btmp, &ctx);
+ keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher);
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(evp_cipher);
+ xalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(evp_cipher));
+ if (ivlen > 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, key) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, 1) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (ivlen > 0) {
+ if (xalg->parameter == NULL) {
+ xalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+ if (xalg->parameter == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, xalg->parameter) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Lets do the pub key stuff :-) */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
+ ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
+ if (pkcs7_encode_rinfo(ri, key, keylen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
+
+ if (out == NULL)
+ out = btmp;
+ else
+ BIO_push(out, btmp);
+ btmp = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7))
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
+ else if (os && os->length > 0)
+ bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(os->data, os->length);
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ if (out)
+ BIO_push(out, bio);
+ else
+ out = bio;
+ bio = NULL;
+ if (0) {
+ err:
+ if (out != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(out);
+ if (btmp != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(btmp);
+ out = NULL;
+ }
+ return (out);
+}
+
+static int pkcs7_cmp_ri(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, X509 *pcert)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = X509_NAME_cmp(ri->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
+ pcert->cert_info->issuer);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(pcert->cert_info->serialNumber,
+ ri->issuer_and_serial->serial);
+}
+
+/* int */
+BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL, *etmp = NULL, *bio = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR *xa;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR *enc_alg = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL;
+ PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
+ unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
+ int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
+
+ if (p7 == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+ /*
+ * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType
+ * field and optional content.
+ * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content
+ * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data").
+ */
+ data_body = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
+ if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+ PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ md_sk = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+ break;
+ case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+ rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
+ /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
+ data_body = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+ enc_alg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+ evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+ if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+ PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ break;
+ case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+ rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+ /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
+ data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+ evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+ if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+ PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */
+ if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We will be checking the signature */
+ if (md_sk != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) {
+ xa = sk_X509_ALGOR_value(md_sk, i);
+ if ((btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md())) == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ j = OBJ_obj2nid(xa->algorithm);
+ evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(j);
+ if (evp_md == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+ PKCS7_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BIO_set_md(btmp, evp_md);
+ if (out == NULL)
+ out = btmp;
+ else
+ BIO_push(out, btmp);
+ btmp = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (evp_cipher != NULL) {
+#if 0
+ unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int keylen, ivlen;
+ int max;
+ X509_OBJECT ret;
+#endif
+
+ if ((etmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * It was encrypted, we need to decrypt the secret key with the
+ * private key
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Find the recipientInfo which matches the passed certificate (if
+ * any)
+ */
+
+ if (pcert) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
+ ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
+ if (!pkcs7_cmp_ri(ri, pcert))
+ break;
+ ri = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ri == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+ PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */
+ if (pcert == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Always attempt to decrypt all rinfo even after sucess as a
+ * defence against MMA timing attacks.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
+ ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
+
+ if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */
+ if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+
+ evp_ctx = NULL;
+ BIO_get_cipher_ctx(etmp, &evp_ctx);
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx, enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Generate random key as MMA defence */
+ tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
+ tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+ if (!tkey)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (ek == NULL) {
+ ek = tkey;
+ eklen = tkeylen;
+ tkey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (eklen != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
+ /*
+ * Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key and effective key
+ * length. The key length is determined by the size of the
+ * decrypted RSA key.
+ */
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, eklen)) {
+ /* Use random key as MMA defence */
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ek, eklen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ek);
+ ek = tkey;
+ eklen = tkeylen;
+ tkey = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Clear errors so we don't leak information useful in MMA */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx, NULL, NULL, ek, NULL, 0) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (ek) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ek, eklen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ek);
+ ek = NULL;
+ }
+ if (tkey) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+ tkey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (out == NULL)
+ out = etmp;
+ else
+ BIO_push(out, etmp);
+ etmp = NULL;
+ }
+#if 1
+ if (in_bio != NULL) {
+ bio = in_bio;
+ } else {
+# if 0
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ /*
+ * We need to set this so that when we have read all the data, the
+ * encrypt BIO, if present, will read EOF and encode the last few
+ * bytes
+ */
+ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
+
+ if (data_body->length > 0)
+ BIO_write(bio, (char *)data_body->data, data_body->length);
+# else
+ if (data_body->length > 0)
+ bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
+ else {
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
+ }
+ if (bio == NULL)
+ goto err;
+# endif
+ }
+ BIO_push(out, bio);
+ bio = NULL;
+#endif
+ if (0) {
+ err:
+ if (ek) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ek, eklen);
+ OPENSSL_free(ek);
+ }
+ if (tkey) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+ }
+ if (out != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(out);
+ if (btmp != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(btmp);
+ if (etmp != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(etmp);
+ if (bio != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(bio);
+ out = NULL;
+ }
+ return (out);
+}
+
+static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ bio = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MD);
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST,
+ PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ BIO_get_md_ctx(bio, pmd);
+ if (*pmd == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(*pmd) == nid)
+ return bio;
+ bio = BIO_next(bio);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int do_pkcs7_signed_attrib(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
+{
+ unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int md_len;
+
+ /* Add signing time if not already present */
+ if (!PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_signingTime)) {
+ if (!PKCS7_add0_attrib_signing_time(si, NULL)) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Add digest */
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, md_data, &md_len)) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!PKCS7_add1_attrib_digest(si, md_data, md_len)) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_DO_PKCS7_SIGNED_ATTRIB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Now sign the attributes */
+ if (!PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(si))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i, j;
+ BIO *btmp;
+ PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdc, ctx_tmp;
+ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+
+ if (p7 == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case NID_pkcs7_data:
+ os = p7->d.data;
+ break;
+ case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+ /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */
+ si_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->signer_info;
+ os = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+ if (!os) {
+ os = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (!os) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os;
+ }
+ break;
+ case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+ /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */
+ os = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+ if (!os) {
+ os = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (!os) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data = os;
+ }
+ break;
+ case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+ si_sk = p7->d.sign->signer_info;
+ os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
+ /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
+ if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+ os = NULL;
+ p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case NID_pkcs7_digest:
+ os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.digest->contents);
+ /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
+ if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) {
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+ os = NULL;
+ p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (si_sk != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(si_sk); i++) {
+ si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(si_sk, i);
+ if (si->pkey == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ j = OBJ_obj2nid(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
+
+ btmp = bio;
+
+ btmp = PKCS7_find_digest(&mdc, btmp, j);
+
+ if (btmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * We now have the EVP_MD_CTX, lets do the signing.
+ */
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, mdc))
+ goto err;
+
+ sk = si->auth_attr;
+
+ /*
+ * If there are attributes, we add the digest attribute and only
+ * sign the attributes
+ */
+ if (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk) > 0) {
+ if (!do_pkcs7_signed_attrib(si, &ctx_tmp))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char *abuf = NULL;
+ unsigned int abuflen;
+ abuflen = EVP_PKEY_size(si->pkey);
+ abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(abuflen);
+ if (!abuf)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&ctx_tmp, abuf, &abuflen, si->pkey)) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ASN1_STRING_set0(si->enc_digest, abuf, abuflen);
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (i == NID_pkcs7_digest) {
+ unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int md_len;
+ if (!PKCS7_find_digest(&mdc, bio,
+ OBJ_obj2nid(p7->d.digest->md->algorithm)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdc, md_data, &md_len))
+ goto err;
+ M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len);
+ }
+
+ if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
+ /*
+ * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
+ * digested data support is broken.
+ */
+ if (os == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
+ char *cont;
+ long contlen;
+ btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
+ if (btmp == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
+ /*
+ * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
+ * instead of making an extra copy.
+ */
+ BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
+ ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+ unsigned char *abuf = NULL;
+ int alen;
+ size_t siglen;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+
+ md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, si->pkey) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 0, si) <= 0) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)si->auth_attr, &abuf,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN));
+ if (!abuf)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx, abuf, alen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+ abuf = NULL;
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
+ if (!abuf)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, abuf, &siglen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN, 1, si) <= 0) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_SIGN, PKCS7_R_CTRL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+
+ ASN1_STRING_set0(si->enc_digest, abuf, siglen);
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (abuf)
+ OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bio,
+ PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
+{
+ PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *ias;
+ int ret = 0, i;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
+ X509 *x509;
+
+ if (p7 == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
+ cert = p7->d.sign->cert;
+ } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
+ cert = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
+ } else {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX */
+ ias = si->issuer_and_serial;
+
+ x509 = X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(cert, ias->issuer, ias->serial);
+
+ /* were we able to find the cert in passed to us */
+ if (x509 == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY,
+ PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Lets verify */
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, cert_store, x509, cert)) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN);
+ i = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+
+ return PKCS7_signatureVerify(bio, p7, si, x509);
+ err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_signatureVerify(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+ X509 *x509)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
+ EVP_MD_CTX mdc_tmp, *mdc;
+ int ret = 0, i;
+ int md_type;
+ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk;
+ BIO *btmp;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mdc_tmp);
+
+ if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7) && !PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ md_type = OBJ_obj2nid(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
+
+ btmp = bio;
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((btmp == NULL) ||
+ ((btmp = BIO_find_type(btmp, BIO_TYPE_MD)) == NULL)) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY,
+ PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_get_md_ctx(btmp, &mdc);
+ if (mdc == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(mdc) == md_type)
+ break;
+ /*
+ * Workaround for some broken clients that put the signature OID
+ * instead of the digest OID in digest_alg->algorithm
+ */
+ if (EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mdc)) == md_type)
+ break;
+ btmp = BIO_next(btmp);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * mdc is the digest ctx that we want, unless there are attributes, in
+ * which case the digest is the signed attributes
+ */
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&mdc_tmp, mdc))
+ goto err;
+
+ sk = si->auth_attr;
+ if ((sk != NULL) && (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk) != 0)) {
+ unsigned char md_dat[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *abuf = NULL;
+ unsigned int md_len;
+ int alen;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *message_digest;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mdc_tmp, md_dat, &md_len))
+ goto err;
+ message_digest = PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(sk);
+ if (!message_digest) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY,
+ PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((message_digest->length != (int)md_len) ||
+ (memcmp(message_digest->data, md_dat, md_len))) {
+#if 0
+ {
+ int ii;
+ for (ii = 0; ii < message_digest->length; ii++)
+ printf("%02X", message_digest->data[ii]);
+ printf(" sent\n");
+ for (ii = 0; ii < md_len; ii++)
+ printf("%02X", md_dat[ii]);
+ printf(" calc\n");
+ }
+#endif
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mdc_tmp, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_type), NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)sk, &abuf,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY));
+ if (alen <= 0) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mdc_tmp, abuf, alen))
+ goto err;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+ }
+
+ os = si->enc_digest;
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
+ if (!pkey) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ i = EVP_VerifyFinal(&mdc_tmp, os->data, os->length, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mdc_tmp);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial(PKCS7 *p7, int idx)
+{
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk;
+ PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri;
+ int i;
+
+ i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ if (i != NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped)
+ return NULL;
+ if (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ if (rsk == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk) <= idx)
+ return (NULL);
+ ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, idx);
+ return (ri->issuer_and_serial);
+}
+
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid)
+{
+ return (get_attribute(si->auth_attr, nid));
+}
+
+ASN1_TYPE *PKCS7_get_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, int nid)
+{
+ return (get_attribute(si->unauth_attr, nid));
+}
+
+static ASN1_TYPE *get_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, int nid)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *xa;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *o;
+
+ o = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
+ if (!o || !sk)
+ return (NULL);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) {
+ xa = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(sk, i);
+ if (OBJ_cmp(xa->object, o) == 0) {
+ if (!xa->single && sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(xa->value.set))
+ return (sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(xa->value.set, 0));
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
+{
+ ASN1_TYPE *astype;
+ if (!(astype = get_attribute(sk, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest)))
+ return NULL;
+ return astype->value.octet_string;
+}
+
+int PKCS7_set_signed_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si,
+ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (p7si->auth_attr != NULL)
+ sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(p7si->auth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
+ p7si->auth_attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk);
+ if (p7si->auth_attr == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) {
+ if ((sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(p7si->auth_attr, i,
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value
+ (sk, i))))
+ == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_set_attributes(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si,
+ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (p7si->unauth_attr != NULL)
+ sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(p7si->unauth_attr, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
+ p7si->unauth_attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk);
+ if (p7si->unauth_attr == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk); i++) {
+ if ((sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(p7si->unauth_attr, i,
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value
+ (sk, i))))
+ == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int atrtype,
+ void *value)
+{
+ return (add_attribute(&(p7si->auth_attr), nid, atrtype, value));
+}
+
+int PKCS7_add_attribute(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si, int nid, int atrtype,
+ void *value)
+{
+ return (add_attribute(&(p7si->unauth_attr), nid, atrtype, value));
+}
+
+static int add_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **sk, int nid, int atrtype,
+ void *value)
+{
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr = NULL;
+
+ if (*sk == NULL) {
+ *sk = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null();
+ if (*sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ new_attrib:
+ if (!(attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(nid, atrtype, value)))
+ return 0;
+ if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_push(*sk, attr)) {
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(*sk); i++) {
+ attr = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(*sk, i);
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(attr->object) == nid) {
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+ attr = X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(nid, atrtype, value);
+ if (attr == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_set(*sk, i, attr)) {
+ X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(attr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ goto new_attrib;
+ }
+ end:
+ return (1);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,677 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# July 2004
-#
-# 2.22x RC4 tune-up:-) It should be noted though that my hand [as in
-# "hand-coded assembler"] doesn't stand for the whole improvement
-# coefficient. It turned out that eliminating RC4_CHAR from config
-# line results in ~40% improvement (yes, even for C implementation).
-# Presumably it has everything to do with AMD cache architecture and
-# RAW or whatever penalties. Once again! The module *requires* config
-# line *without* RC4_CHAR! As for coding "secret," I bet on partial
-# register arithmetics. For example instead of 'inc %r8; and $255,%r8'
-# I simply 'inc %r8b'. Even though optimization manual discourages
-# to operate on partial registers, it turned out to be the best bet.
-# At least for AMD... How IA32E would perform remains to be seen...
-
-# November 2004
-#
-# As was shown by Marc Bevand reordering of couple of load operations
-# results in even higher performance gain of 3.3x:-) At least on
-# Opteron... For reference, 1x in this case is RC4_CHAR C-code
-# compiled with gcc 3.3.2, which performs at ~54MBps per 1GHz clock.
-# Latter means that if you want to *estimate* what to expect from
-# *your* Opteron, then multiply 54 by 3.3 and clock frequency in GHz.
-
-# November 2004
-#
-# Intel P4 EM64T core was found to run the AMD64 code really slow...
-# The only way to achieve comparable performance on P4 was to keep
-# RC4_CHAR. Kind of ironic, huh? As it's apparently impossible to
-# compose blended code, which would perform even within 30% marginal
-# on either AMD and Intel platforms, I implement both cases. See
-# rc4_skey.c for further details...
-
-# April 2005
-#
-# P4 EM64T core appears to be "allergic" to 64-bit inc/dec. Replacing
-# those with add/sub results in 50% performance improvement of folded
-# loop...
-
-# May 2005
-#
-# As was shown by Zou Nanhai loop unrolling can improve Intel EM64T
-# performance by >30% [unlike P4 32-bit case that is]. But this is
-# provided that loads are reordered even more aggressively! Both code
-# pathes, AMD64 and EM64T, reorder loads in essentially same manner
-# as my IA-64 implementation. On Opteron this resulted in modest 5%
-# improvement [I had to test it], while final Intel P4 performance
-# achieves respectful 432MBps on 2.8GHz processor now. For reference.
-# If executed on Xeon, current RC4_CHAR code-path is 2.7x faster than
-# RC4_INT code-path. While if executed on Opteron, it's only 25%
-# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU \xB5-arch detection
-# is not implemented, then this final RC4_CHAR code-path should be
-# preferred, as it provides better *all-round* performance].
-
-# March 2007
-#
-# Intel Core2 was observed to perform poorly on both code paths:-( It
-# apparently suffers from some kind of partial register stall, which
-# occurs in 64-bit mode only [as virtually identical 32-bit loop was
-# observed to outperform 64-bit one by almost 50%]. Adding two movzb to
-# cloop1 boosts its performance by 80%! This loop appears to be optimal
-# fit for Core2 and therefore the code was modified to skip cloop8 on
-# this CPU.
-
-# May 2010
-#
-# Intel Westmere was observed to perform suboptimally. Adding yet
-# another movzb to cloop1 improved performance by almost 50%! Core2
-# performance is improved too, but nominally...
-
-# May 2011
-#
-# The only code path that was not modified is P4-specific one. Non-P4
-# Intel code path optimization is heavily based on submission by Maxim
-# Perminov, Maxim Locktyukhin and Jim Guilford of Intel. I've used
-# some of the ideas even in attempt to optmize the original RC4_INT
-# code path... Current performance in cycles per processed byte (less
-# is better) and improvement coefficients relative to previous
-# version of this module are:
-#
-# Opteron 5.3/+0%(*)
-# P4 6.5
-# Core2 6.2/+15%(**)
-# Westmere 4.2/+60%
-# Sandy Bridge 4.2/+120%
-# Atom 9.3/+80%
-#
-# (*) But corresponding loop has less instructions, which should have
-# positive effect on upcoming Bulldozer, which has one less ALU.
-# For reference, Intel code runs at 6.8 cpb rate on Opteron.
-# (**) Note that Core2 result is ~15% lower than corresponding result
-# for 32-bit code, meaning that it's possible to improve it,
-# but more than likely at the cost of the others (see rc4-586.pl
-# to get the idea)...
-
-$flavour = shift;
-$output = shift;
-if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
-
-$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
-( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
-die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
-
-open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
-*STDOUT=*OUT;
-
-$dat="%rdi"; # arg1
-$len="%rsi"; # arg2
-$inp="%rdx"; # arg3
-$out="%rcx"; # arg4
-
-{
-$code=<<___;
-.text
-.extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
-
-.globl RC4
-.type RC4,\@function,4
-.align 16
-RC4: or $len,$len
- jne .Lentry
- ret
-.Lentry:
- push %rbx
- push %r12
- push %r13
-.Lprologue:
- mov $len,%r11
- mov $inp,%r12
- mov $out,%r13
-___
-my $len="%r11"; # reassign input arguments
-my $inp="%r12";
-my $out="%r13";
-
-my @XX=("%r10","%rsi");
-my @TX=("%rax","%rbx");
-my $YY="%rcx";
-my $TY="%rdx";
-
-$code.=<<___;
- xor $XX[0],$XX[0]
- xor $YY,$YY
-
- lea 8($dat),$dat
- mov -8($dat),$XX[0]#b
- mov -4($dat),$YY#b
- cmpl \$-1,256($dat)
- je .LRC4_CHAR
- mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r8d
- xor $TX[1],$TX[1]
- inc $XX[0]#b
- sub $XX[0],$TX[1]
- sub $inp,$out
- movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
- test \$-16,$len
- jz .Lloop1
- bt \$30,%r8d # Intel CPU?
- jc .Lintel
- and \$7,$TX[1]
- lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
- jz .Loop8
- sub $TX[1],$len
-.Loop8_warmup:
- add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
- movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
- movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
- movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
- add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b
- inc $XX[0]#b
- movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
- movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
- xorb ($inp),$TY#b
- movb $TY#b,($out,$inp)
- lea 1($inp),$inp
- dec $TX[1]
- jnz .Loop8_warmup
-
- lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
- jmp .Loop8
-.align 16
-.Loop8:
-___
-for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
-$code.=<<___ if ($i==7);
- add \$8,$XX[1]#b
-___
-$code.=<<___;
- add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
- movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
- movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
- movl `4*($i==7?-1:$i)`($dat,$XX[1],4),$TX[1]#d
- ror \$8,%r8 # ror is redundant when $i=0
- movl $TY#d,4*$i($dat,$XX[0],4)
- add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b
- movb ($dat,$TY,4),%r8b
-___
-push(@TX,shift(@TX)); #push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers
-}
-$code.=<<___;
- add \$8,$XX[0]#b
- ror \$8,%r8
- sub \$8,$len
-
- xor ($inp),%r8
- mov %r8,($out,$inp)
- lea 8($inp),$inp
-
- test \$-8,$len
- jnz .Loop8
- cmp \$0,$len
- jne .Lloop1
- jmp .Lexit
-
-.align 16
-.Lintel:
- test \$-32,$len
- jz .Lloop1
- and \$15,$TX[1]
- jz .Loop16_is_hot
- sub $TX[1],$len
-.Loop16_warmup:
- add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
- movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
- movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
- movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
- add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b
- inc $XX[0]#b
- movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
- movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
- xorb ($inp),$TY#b
- movb $TY#b,($out,$inp)
- lea 1($inp),$inp
- dec $TX[1]
- jnz .Loop16_warmup
-
- mov $YY,$TX[1]
- xor $YY,$YY
- mov $TX[1]#b,$YY#b
-
-.Loop16_is_hot:
- lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]
-___
-sub RC4_loop {
- my $i=shift;
- my $j=$i<0?0:$i;
- my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1);
-
- $code.=" add \$16,$XX[0]#b\n" if ($i==15);
- $code.=" movdqu ($inp),%xmm2\n" if ($i==15);
- $code.=" add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b\n" if ($i<=0);
- $code.=" movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d\n";
- $code.=" pxor %xmm0,%xmm2\n" if ($i==0);
- $code.=" psllq \$8,%xmm1\n" if ($i==0);
- $code.=" pxor $xmm,$xmm\n" if ($i<=1);
- $code.=" movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)\n";
- $code.=" add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b\n";
- $code.=" movl `4*($j+1)`($XX[1]),$TX[1]#d\n" if ($i<15);
- $code.=" movz $TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d\n";
- $code.=" movl $TY#d,4*$j($XX[1])\n";
- $code.=" pxor %xmm1,%xmm2\n" if ($i==0);
- $code.=" lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]\n" if ($i==15);
- $code.=" add $TX[1]#b,$YY#b\n" if ($i<15);
- $code.=" pinsrw \$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n";
- $code.=" movdqu %xmm2,($out,$inp)\n" if ($i==0);
- $code.=" lea 16($inp),$inp\n" if ($i==0);
- $code.=" movl ($XX[1]),$TX[1]#d\n" if ($i==15);
-}
- RC4_loop(-1);
-$code.=<<___;
- jmp .Loop16_enter
-.align 16
-.Loop16:
-___
-
-for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) {
- $code.=".Loop16_enter:\n" if ($i==1);
- RC4_loop($i);
- push(@TX,shift(@TX)); # "rotate" registers
-}
-$code.=<<___;
- mov $YY,$TX[1]
- xor $YY,$YY # keyword to partial register
- sub \$16,$len
- mov $TX[1]#b,$YY#b
- test \$-16,$len
- jnz .Loop16
-
- psllq \$8,%xmm1
- pxor %xmm0,%xmm2
- pxor %xmm1,%xmm2
- movdqu %xmm2,($out,$inp)
- lea 16($inp),$inp
-
- cmp \$0,$len
- jne .Lloop1
- jmp .Lexit
-
-.align 16
-.Lloop1:
- add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
- movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
- movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
- movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
- add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b
- inc $XX[0]#b
- movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
- movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
- xorb ($inp),$TY#b
- movb $TY#b,($out,$inp)
- lea 1($inp),$inp
- dec $len
- jnz .Lloop1
- jmp .Lexit
-
-.align 16
-.LRC4_CHAR:
- add \$1,$XX[0]#b
- movzb ($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d
- test \$-8,$len
- jz .Lcloop1
- jmp .Lcloop8
-.align 16
-.Lcloop8:
- mov ($inp),%r8d
- mov 4($inp),%r9d
-___
-# unroll 2x4-wise, because 64-bit rotates kill Intel P4...
-for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
- add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
- lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
- movzb ($dat,$YY),$TY#d
- movzb $XX[1]#b,$XX[1]#d
- movzb ($dat,$XX[1]),$TX[1]#d
- movb $TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY)
- cmp $XX[1],$YY
- movb $TY#b,($dat,$XX[0])
- jne .Lcmov$i # Intel cmov is sloooow...
- mov $TX[0],$TX[1]
-.Lcmov$i:
- add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b
- xor ($dat,$TY),%r8b
- ror \$8,%r8d
-___
-push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers
-}
-for ($i=4;$i<8;$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
- add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
- lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
- movzb ($dat,$YY),$TY#d
- movzb $XX[1]#b,$XX[1]#d
- movzb ($dat,$XX[1]),$TX[1]#d
- movb $TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY)
- cmp $XX[1],$YY
- movb $TY#b,($dat,$XX[0])
- jne .Lcmov$i # Intel cmov is sloooow...
- mov $TX[0],$TX[1]
-.Lcmov$i:
- add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b
- xor ($dat,$TY),%r9b
- ror \$8,%r9d
-___
-push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers
-}
-$code.=<<___;
- lea -8($len),$len
- mov %r8d,($out)
- lea 8($inp),$inp
- mov %r9d,4($out)
- lea 8($out),$out
-
- test \$-8,$len
- jnz .Lcloop8
- cmp \$0,$len
- jne .Lcloop1
- jmp .Lexit
-___
-$code.=<<___;
-.align 16
-.Lcloop1:
- add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
- movzb $YY#b,$YY#d
- movzb ($dat,$YY),$TY#d
- movb $TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY)
- movb $TY#b,($dat,$XX[0])
- add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b
- add \$1,$XX[0]#b
- movzb $TY#b,$TY#d
- movzb $XX[0]#b,$XX[0]#d
- movzb ($dat,$TY),$TY#d
- movzb ($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d
- xorb ($inp),$TY#b
- lea 1($inp),$inp
- movb $TY#b,($out)
- lea 1($out),$out
- sub \$1,$len
- jnz .Lcloop1
- jmp .Lexit
-
-.align 16
-.Lexit:
- sub \$1,$XX[0]#b
- movl $XX[0]#d,-8($dat)
- movl $YY#d,-4($dat)
-
- mov (%rsp),%r13
- mov 8(%rsp),%r12
- mov 16(%rsp),%rbx
- add \$24,%rsp
-.Lepilogue:
- ret
-.size RC4,.-RC4
-___
-}
-
-$idx="%r8";
-$ido="%r9";
-
-$code.=<<___;
-.globl private_RC4_set_key
-.type private_RC4_set_key,\@function,3
-.align 16
-private_RC4_set_key:
- lea 8($dat),$dat
- lea ($inp,$len),$inp
- neg $len
- mov $len,%rcx
- xor %eax,%eax
- xor $ido,$ido
- xor %r10,%r10
- xor %r11,%r11
-
- mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),$idx#d
- bt \$20,$idx#d # RC4_CHAR?
- jc .Lc1stloop
- jmp .Lw1stloop
-
-.align 16
-.Lw1stloop:
- mov %eax,($dat,%rax,4)
- add \$1,%al
- jnc .Lw1stloop
-
- xor $ido,$ido
- xor $idx,$idx
-.align 16
-.Lw2ndloop:
- mov ($dat,$ido,4),%r10d
- add ($inp,$len,1),$idx#b
- add %r10b,$idx#b
- add \$1,$len
- mov ($dat,$idx,4),%r11d
- cmovz %rcx,$len
- mov %r10d,($dat,$idx,4)
- mov %r11d,($dat,$ido,4)
- add \$1,$ido#b
- jnc .Lw2ndloop
- jmp .Lexit_key
-
-.align 16
-.Lc1stloop:
- mov %al,($dat,%rax)
- add \$1,%al
- jnc .Lc1stloop
-
- xor $ido,$ido
- xor $idx,$idx
-.align 16
-.Lc2ndloop:
- mov ($dat,$ido),%r10b
- add ($inp,$len),$idx#b
- add %r10b,$idx#b
- add \$1,$len
- mov ($dat,$idx),%r11b
- jnz .Lcnowrap
- mov %rcx,$len
-.Lcnowrap:
- mov %r10b,($dat,$idx)
- mov %r11b,($dat,$ido)
- add \$1,$ido#b
- jnc .Lc2ndloop
- movl \$-1,256($dat)
-
-.align 16
-.Lexit_key:
- xor %eax,%eax
- mov %eax,-8($dat)
- mov %eax,-4($dat)
- ret
-.size private_RC4_set_key,.-private_RC4_set_key
-
-.globl RC4_options
-.type RC4_options,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align 16
-RC4_options:
- lea .Lopts(%rip),%rax
- mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%edx
- bt \$20,%edx
- jc .L8xchar
- bt \$30,%edx
- jnc .Ldone
- add \$25,%rax
- ret
-.L8xchar:
- add \$12,%rax
-.Ldone:
- ret
-.align 64
-.Lopts:
-.asciz "rc4(8x,int)"
-.asciz "rc4(8x,char)"
-.asciz "rc4(16x,int)"
-.asciz "RC4 for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
-.align 64
-.size RC4_options,.-RC4_options
-___
-
-# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
-# CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
-if ($win64) {
-$rec="%rcx";
-$frame="%rdx";
-$context="%r8";
-$disp="%r9";
-
-$code.=<<___;
-.extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
-.type stream_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align 16
-stream_se_handler:
- push %rsi
- push %rdi
- push %rbx
- push %rbp
- push %r12
- push %r13
- push %r14
- push %r15
- pushfq
- sub \$64,%rsp
-
- mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax
- mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip
-
- lea .Lprologue(%rip),%r10
- cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<prologue label
- jb .Lin_prologue
-
- mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp
-
- lea .Lepilogue(%rip),%r10
- cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label
- jae .Lin_prologue
-
- lea 24(%rax),%rax
-
- mov -8(%rax),%rbx
- mov -16(%rax),%r12
- mov -24(%rax),%r13
- mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx
- mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12
- mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
-
-.Lin_prologue:
- mov 8(%rax),%rdi
- mov 16(%rax),%rsi
- mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp
- mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi
- mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi
-
- jmp .Lcommon_seh_exit
-.size stream_se_handler,.-stream_se_handler
-
-.type key_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align 16
-key_se_handler:
- push %rsi
- push %rdi
- push %rbx
- push %rbp
- push %r12
- push %r13
- push %r14
- push %r15
- pushfq
- sub \$64,%rsp
-
- mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp
- mov 8(%rax),%rdi
- mov 16(%rax),%rsi
- mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi
- mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi
-
-.Lcommon_seh_exit:
-
- mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord
- mov $context,%rsi # context
- mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT)
- .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq
-
- mov $disp,%rsi
- xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
- mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase
- mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc
- mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
- mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord
- lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData
- lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame
- mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5
- mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6
- mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7
- mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL)
- call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
-
- mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch
- add \$64,%rsp
- popfq
- pop %r15
- pop %r14
- pop %r13
- pop %r12
- pop %rbp
- pop %rbx
- pop %rdi
- pop %rsi
- ret
-.size key_se_handler,.-key_se_handler
-
-.section .pdata
-.align 4
- .rva .LSEH_begin_RC4
- .rva .LSEH_end_RC4
- .rva .LSEH_info_RC4
-
- .rva .LSEH_begin_private_RC4_set_key
- .rva .LSEH_end_private_RC4_set_key
- .rva .LSEH_info_private_RC4_set_key
-
-.section .xdata
-.align 8
-.LSEH_info_RC4:
- .byte 9,0,0,0
- .rva stream_se_handler
-.LSEH_info_private_RC4_set_key:
- .byte 9,0,0,0
- .rva key_se_handler
-___
-}
-
-sub reg_part {
-my ($reg,$conv)=@_;
- if ($reg =~ /%r[0-9]+/) { $reg .= $conv; }
- elsif ($conv eq "b") { $reg =~ s/%[er]([^x]+)x?/%$1l/; }
- elsif ($conv eq "w") { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%$1/; }
- elsif ($conv eq "d") { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%e$1/; }
- return $reg;
-}
-
-$code =~ s/(%[a-z0-9]+)#([bwd])/reg_part($1,$2)/gem;
-$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
-
-print $code;
-
-close STDOUT;
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,677 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# July 2004
+#
+# 2.22x RC4 tune-up:-) It should be noted though that my hand [as in
+# "hand-coded assembler"] doesn't stand for the whole improvement
+# coefficient. It turned out that eliminating RC4_CHAR from config
+# line results in ~40% improvement (yes, even for C implementation).
+# Presumably it has everything to do with AMD cache architecture and
+# RAW or whatever penalties. Once again! The module *requires* config
+# line *without* RC4_CHAR! As for coding "secret," I bet on partial
+# register arithmetics. For example instead of 'inc %r8; and $255,%r8'
+# I simply 'inc %r8b'. Even though optimization manual discourages
+# to operate on partial registers, it turned out to be the best bet.
+# At least for AMD... How IA32E would perform remains to be seen...
+
+# November 2004
+#
+# As was shown by Marc Bevand reordering of couple of load operations
+# results in even higher performance gain of 3.3x:-) At least on
+# Opteron... For reference, 1x in this case is RC4_CHAR C-code
+# compiled with gcc 3.3.2, which performs at ~54MBps per 1GHz clock.
+# Latter means that if you want to *estimate* what to expect from
+# *your* Opteron, then multiply 54 by 3.3 and clock frequency in GHz.
+
+# November 2004
+#
+# Intel P4 EM64T core was found to run the AMD64 code really slow...
+# The only way to achieve comparable performance on P4 was to keep
+# RC4_CHAR. Kind of ironic, huh? As it's apparently impossible to
+# compose blended code, which would perform even within 30% marginal
+# on either AMD and Intel platforms, I implement both cases. See
+# rc4_skey.c for further details...
+
+# April 2005
+#
+# P4 EM64T core appears to be "allergic" to 64-bit inc/dec. Replacing
+# those with add/sub results in 50% performance improvement of folded
+# loop...
+
+# May 2005
+#
+# As was shown by Zou Nanhai loop unrolling can improve Intel EM64T
+# performance by >30% [unlike P4 32-bit case that is]. But this is
+# provided that loads are reordered even more aggressively! Both code
+# pathes, AMD64 and EM64T, reorder loads in essentially same manner
+# as my IA-64 implementation. On Opteron this resulted in modest 5%
+# improvement [I had to test it], while final Intel P4 performance
+# achieves respectful 432MBps on 2.8GHz processor now. For reference.
+# If executed on Xeon, current RC4_CHAR code-path is 2.7x faster than
+# RC4_INT code-path. While if executed on Opteron, it's only 25%
+# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU µ-arch detection
+# is not implemented, then this final RC4_CHAR code-path should be
+# preferred, as it provides better *all-round* performance].
+
+# March 2007
+#
+# Intel Core2 was observed to perform poorly on both code paths:-( It
+# apparently suffers from some kind of partial register stall, which
+# occurs in 64-bit mode only [as virtually identical 32-bit loop was
+# observed to outperform 64-bit one by almost 50%]. Adding two movzb to
+# cloop1 boosts its performance by 80%! This loop appears to be optimal
+# fit for Core2 and therefore the code was modified to skip cloop8 on
+# this CPU.
+
+# May 2010
+#
+# Intel Westmere was observed to perform suboptimally. Adding yet
+# another movzb to cloop1 improved performance by almost 50%! Core2
+# performance is improved too, but nominally...
+
+# May 2011
+#
+# The only code path that was not modified is P4-specific one. Non-P4
+# Intel code path optimization is heavily based on submission by Maxim
+# Perminov, Maxim Locktyukhin and Jim Guilford of Intel. I've used
+# some of the ideas even in attempt to optmize the original RC4_INT
+# code path... Current performance in cycles per processed byte (less
+# is better) and improvement coefficients relative to previous
+# version of this module are:
+#
+# Opteron 5.3/+0%(*)
+# P4 6.5
+# Core2 6.2/+15%(**)
+# Westmere 4.2/+60%
+# Sandy Bridge 4.2/+120%
+# Atom 9.3/+80%
+#
+# (*) But corresponding loop has less instructions, which should have
+# positive effect on upcoming Bulldozer, which has one less ALU.
+# For reference, Intel code runs at 6.8 cpb rate on Opteron.
+# (**) Note that Core2 result is ~15% lower than corresponding result
+# for 32-bit code, meaning that it's possible to improve it,
+# but more than likely at the cost of the others (see rc4-586.pl
+# to get the idea)...
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output = shift;
+if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
+
+$win64=0; $win64=1 if ($flavour =~ /[nm]asm|mingw64/ || $output =~ /\.asm$/);
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+( $xlate="${dir}x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
+( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
+die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
+
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
+
+$dat="%rdi"; # arg1
+$len="%rsi"; # arg2
+$inp="%rdx"; # arg3
+$out="%rcx"; # arg4
+
+{
+$code=<<___;
+.text
+.extern OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
+
+.globl RC4
+.type RC4,\@function,4
+.align 16
+RC4: or $len,$len
+ jne .Lentry
+ ret
+.Lentry:
+ push %rbx
+ push %r12
+ push %r13
+.Lprologue:
+ mov $len,%r11
+ mov $inp,%r12
+ mov $out,%r13
+___
+my $len="%r11"; # reassign input arguments
+my $inp="%r12";
+my $out="%r13";
+
+my @XX=("%r10","%rsi");
+my @TX=("%rax","%rbx");
+my $YY="%rcx";
+my $TY="%rdx";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+ xor $XX[0],$XX[0]
+ xor $YY,$YY
+
+ lea 8($dat),$dat
+ mov -8($dat),$XX[0]#b
+ mov -4($dat),$YY#b
+ cmpl \$-1,256($dat)
+ je .LRC4_CHAR
+ mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%r8d
+ xor $TX[1],$TX[1]
+ inc $XX[0]#b
+ sub $XX[0],$TX[1]
+ sub $inp,$out
+ movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+ test \$-16,$len
+ jz .Lloop1
+ bt \$30,%r8d # Intel CPU?
+ jc .Lintel
+ and \$7,$TX[1]
+ lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
+ jz .Loop8
+ sub $TX[1],$len
+.Loop8_warmup:
+ add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+ movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+ movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+ movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
+ add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+ inc $XX[0]#b
+ movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
+ movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+ xorb ($inp),$TY#b
+ movb $TY#b,($out,$inp)
+ lea 1($inp),$inp
+ dec $TX[1]
+ jnz .Loop8_warmup
+
+ lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
+ jmp .Loop8
+.align 16
+.Loop8:
+___
+for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==7);
+ add \$8,$XX[1]#b
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+ add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+ movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+ movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+ movl `4*($i==7?-1:$i)`($dat,$XX[1],4),$TX[1]#d
+ ror \$8,%r8 # ror is redundant when $i=0
+ movl $TY#d,4*$i($dat,$XX[0],4)
+ add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b
+ movb ($dat,$TY,4),%r8b
+___
+push(@TX,shift(@TX)); #push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ add \$8,$XX[0]#b
+ ror \$8,%r8
+ sub \$8,$len
+
+ xor ($inp),%r8
+ mov %r8,($out,$inp)
+ lea 8($inp),$inp
+
+ test \$-8,$len
+ jnz .Loop8
+ cmp \$0,$len
+ jne .Lloop1
+ jmp .Lexit
+
+.align 16
+.Lintel:
+ test \$-32,$len
+ jz .Lloop1
+ and \$15,$TX[1]
+ jz .Loop16_is_hot
+ sub $TX[1],$len
+.Loop16_warmup:
+ add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+ movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+ movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+ movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
+ add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+ inc $XX[0]#b
+ movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
+ movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+ xorb ($inp),$TY#b
+ movb $TY#b,($out,$inp)
+ lea 1($inp),$inp
+ dec $TX[1]
+ jnz .Loop16_warmup
+
+ mov $YY,$TX[1]
+ xor $YY,$YY
+ mov $TX[1]#b,$YY#b
+
+.Loop16_is_hot:
+ lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]
+___
+sub RC4_loop {
+ my $i=shift;
+ my $j=$i<0?0:$i;
+ my $xmm="%xmm".($j&1);
+
+ $code.=" add \$16,$XX[0]#b\n" if ($i==15);
+ $code.=" movdqu ($inp),%xmm2\n" if ($i==15);
+ $code.=" add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b\n" if ($i<=0);
+ $code.=" movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d\n";
+ $code.=" pxor %xmm0,%xmm2\n" if ($i==0);
+ $code.=" psllq \$8,%xmm1\n" if ($i==0);
+ $code.=" pxor $xmm,$xmm\n" if ($i<=1);
+ $code.=" movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)\n";
+ $code.=" add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b\n";
+ $code.=" movl `4*($j+1)`($XX[1]),$TX[1]#d\n" if ($i<15);
+ $code.=" movz $TX[0]#b,$TX[0]#d\n";
+ $code.=" movl $TY#d,4*$j($XX[1])\n";
+ $code.=" pxor %xmm1,%xmm2\n" if ($i==0);
+ $code.=" lea ($dat,$XX[0],4),$XX[1]\n" if ($i==15);
+ $code.=" add $TX[1]#b,$YY#b\n" if ($i<15);
+ $code.=" pinsrw \$`($j>>1)&7`,($dat,$TX[0],4),$xmm\n";
+ $code.=" movdqu %xmm2,($out,$inp)\n" if ($i==0);
+ $code.=" lea 16($inp),$inp\n" if ($i==0);
+ $code.=" movl ($XX[1]),$TX[1]#d\n" if ($i==15);
+}
+ RC4_loop(-1);
+$code.=<<___;
+ jmp .Loop16_enter
+.align 16
+.Loop16:
+___
+
+for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) {
+ $code.=".Loop16_enter:\n" if ($i==1);
+ RC4_loop($i);
+ push(@TX,shift(@TX)); # "rotate" registers
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ mov $YY,$TX[1]
+ xor $YY,$YY # keyword to partial register
+ sub \$16,$len
+ mov $TX[1]#b,$YY#b
+ test \$-16,$len
+ jnz .Loop16
+
+ psllq \$8,%xmm1
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm2
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm2
+ movdqu %xmm2,($out,$inp)
+ lea 16($inp),$inp
+
+ cmp \$0,$len
+ jne .Lloop1
+ jmp .Lexit
+
+.align 16
+.Lloop1:
+ add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+ movl ($dat,$YY,4),$TY#d
+ movl $TX[0]#d,($dat,$YY,4)
+ movl $TY#d,($dat,$XX[0],4)
+ add $TY#b,$TX[0]#b
+ inc $XX[0]#b
+ movl ($dat,$TX[0],4),$TY#d
+ movl ($dat,$XX[0],4),$TX[0]#d
+ xorb ($inp),$TY#b
+ movb $TY#b,($out,$inp)
+ lea 1($inp),$inp
+ dec $len
+ jnz .Lloop1
+ jmp .Lexit
+
+.align 16
+.LRC4_CHAR:
+ add \$1,$XX[0]#b
+ movzb ($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d
+ test \$-8,$len
+ jz .Lcloop1
+ jmp .Lcloop8
+.align 16
+.Lcloop8:
+ mov ($inp),%r8d
+ mov 4($inp),%r9d
+___
+# unroll 2x4-wise, because 64-bit rotates kill Intel P4...
+for ($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+ lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
+ movzb ($dat,$YY),$TY#d
+ movzb $XX[1]#b,$XX[1]#d
+ movzb ($dat,$XX[1]),$TX[1]#d
+ movb $TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY)
+ cmp $XX[1],$YY
+ movb $TY#b,($dat,$XX[0])
+ jne .Lcmov$i # Intel cmov is sloooow...
+ mov $TX[0],$TX[1]
+.Lcmov$i:
+ add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b
+ xor ($dat,$TY),%r8b
+ ror \$8,%r8d
+___
+push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers
+}
+for ($i=4;$i<8;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+ lea 1($XX[0]),$XX[1]
+ movzb ($dat,$YY),$TY#d
+ movzb $XX[1]#b,$XX[1]#d
+ movzb ($dat,$XX[1]),$TX[1]#d
+ movb $TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY)
+ cmp $XX[1],$YY
+ movb $TY#b,($dat,$XX[0])
+ jne .Lcmov$i # Intel cmov is sloooow...
+ mov $TX[0],$TX[1]
+.Lcmov$i:
+ add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b
+ xor ($dat,$TY),%r9b
+ ror \$8,%r9d
+___
+push(@TX,shift(@TX)); push(@XX,shift(@XX)); # "rotate" registers
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ lea -8($len),$len
+ mov %r8d,($out)
+ lea 8($inp),$inp
+ mov %r9d,4($out)
+ lea 8($out),$out
+
+ test \$-8,$len
+ jnz .Lcloop8
+ cmp \$0,$len
+ jne .Lcloop1
+ jmp .Lexit
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+.align 16
+.Lcloop1:
+ add $TX[0]#b,$YY#b
+ movzb $YY#b,$YY#d
+ movzb ($dat,$YY),$TY#d
+ movb $TX[0]#b,($dat,$YY)
+ movb $TY#b,($dat,$XX[0])
+ add $TX[0]#b,$TY#b
+ add \$1,$XX[0]#b
+ movzb $TY#b,$TY#d
+ movzb $XX[0]#b,$XX[0]#d
+ movzb ($dat,$TY),$TY#d
+ movzb ($dat,$XX[0]),$TX[0]#d
+ xorb ($inp),$TY#b
+ lea 1($inp),$inp
+ movb $TY#b,($out)
+ lea 1($out),$out
+ sub \$1,$len
+ jnz .Lcloop1
+ jmp .Lexit
+
+.align 16
+.Lexit:
+ sub \$1,$XX[0]#b
+ movl $XX[0]#d,-8($dat)
+ movl $YY#d,-4($dat)
+
+ mov (%rsp),%r13
+ mov 8(%rsp),%r12
+ mov 16(%rsp),%rbx
+ add \$24,%rsp
+.Lepilogue:
+ ret
+.size RC4,.-RC4
+___
+}
+
+$idx="%r8";
+$ido="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl private_RC4_set_key
+.type private_RC4_set_key,\@function,3
+.align 16
+private_RC4_set_key:
+ lea 8($dat),$dat
+ lea ($inp,$len),$inp
+ neg $len
+ mov $len,%rcx
+ xor %eax,%eax
+ xor $ido,$ido
+ xor %r10,%r10
+ xor %r11,%r11
+
+ mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),$idx#d
+ bt \$20,$idx#d # RC4_CHAR?
+ jc .Lc1stloop
+ jmp .Lw1stloop
+
+.align 16
+.Lw1stloop:
+ mov %eax,($dat,%rax,4)
+ add \$1,%al
+ jnc .Lw1stloop
+
+ xor $ido,$ido
+ xor $idx,$idx
+.align 16
+.Lw2ndloop:
+ mov ($dat,$ido,4),%r10d
+ add ($inp,$len,1),$idx#b
+ add %r10b,$idx#b
+ add \$1,$len
+ mov ($dat,$idx,4),%r11d
+ cmovz %rcx,$len
+ mov %r10d,($dat,$idx,4)
+ mov %r11d,($dat,$ido,4)
+ add \$1,$ido#b
+ jnc .Lw2ndloop
+ jmp .Lexit_key
+
+.align 16
+.Lc1stloop:
+ mov %al,($dat,%rax)
+ add \$1,%al
+ jnc .Lc1stloop
+
+ xor $ido,$ido
+ xor $idx,$idx
+.align 16
+.Lc2ndloop:
+ mov ($dat,$ido),%r10b
+ add ($inp,$len),$idx#b
+ add %r10b,$idx#b
+ add \$1,$len
+ mov ($dat,$idx),%r11b
+ jnz .Lcnowrap
+ mov %rcx,$len
+.Lcnowrap:
+ mov %r10b,($dat,$idx)
+ mov %r11b,($dat,$ido)
+ add \$1,$ido#b
+ jnc .Lc2ndloop
+ movl \$-1,256($dat)
+
+.align 16
+.Lexit_key:
+ xor %eax,%eax
+ mov %eax,-8($dat)
+ mov %eax,-4($dat)
+ ret
+.size private_RC4_set_key,.-private_RC4_set_key
+
+.globl RC4_options
+.type RC4_options,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align 16
+RC4_options:
+ lea .Lopts(%rip),%rax
+ mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P(%rip),%edx
+ bt \$20,%edx
+ jc .L8xchar
+ bt \$30,%edx
+ jnc .Ldone
+ add \$25,%rax
+ ret
+.L8xchar:
+ add \$12,%rax
+.Ldone:
+ ret
+.align 64
+.Lopts:
+.asciz "rc4(8x,int)"
+.asciz "rc4(8x,char)"
+.asciz "rc4(16x,int)"
+.asciz "RC4 for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+.align 64
+.size RC4_options,.-RC4_options
+___
+
+# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
+# CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
+if ($win64) {
+$rec="%rcx";
+$frame="%rdx";
+$context="%r8";
+$disp="%r9";
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
+.type stream_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align 16
+stream_se_handler:
+ push %rsi
+ push %rdi
+ push %rbx
+ push %rbp
+ push %r12
+ push %r13
+ push %r14
+ push %r15
+ pushfq
+ sub \$64,%rsp
+
+ mov 120($context),%rax # pull context->Rax
+ mov 248($context),%rbx # pull context->Rip
+
+ lea .Lprologue(%rip),%r10
+ cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<prologue label
+ jb .Lin_prologue
+
+ mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp
+
+ lea .Lepilogue(%rip),%r10
+ cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip>=epilogue label
+ jae .Lin_prologue
+
+ lea 24(%rax),%rax
+
+ mov -8(%rax),%rbx
+ mov -16(%rax),%r12
+ mov -24(%rax),%r13
+ mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx
+ mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12
+ mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
+
+.Lin_prologue:
+ mov 8(%rax),%rdi
+ mov 16(%rax),%rsi
+ mov %rax,152($context) # restore context->Rsp
+ mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi
+ mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi
+
+ jmp .Lcommon_seh_exit
+.size stream_se_handler,.-stream_se_handler
+
+.type key_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align 16
+key_se_handler:
+ push %rsi
+ push %rdi
+ push %rbx
+ push %rbp
+ push %r12
+ push %r13
+ push %r14
+ push %r15
+ pushfq
+ sub \$64,%rsp
+
+ mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp
+ mov 8(%rax),%rdi
+ mov 16(%rax),%rsi
+ mov %rsi,168($context) # restore context->Rsi
+ mov %rdi,176($context) # restore context->Rdi
+
+.Lcommon_seh_exit:
+
+ mov 40($disp),%rdi # disp->ContextRecord
+ mov $context,%rsi # context
+ mov \$154,%ecx # sizeof(CONTEXT)
+ .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq
+
+ mov $disp,%rsi
+ xor %rcx,%rcx # arg1, UNW_FLAG_NHANDLER
+ mov 8(%rsi),%rdx # arg2, disp->ImageBase
+ mov 0(%rsi),%r8 # arg3, disp->ControlPc
+ mov 16(%rsi),%r9 # arg4, disp->FunctionEntry
+ mov 40(%rsi),%r10 # disp->ContextRecord
+ lea 56(%rsi),%r11 # &disp->HandlerData
+ lea 24(%rsi),%r12 # &disp->EstablisherFrame
+ mov %r10,32(%rsp) # arg5
+ mov %r11,40(%rsp) # arg6
+ mov %r12,48(%rsp) # arg7
+ mov %rcx,56(%rsp) # arg8, (NULL)
+ call *__imp_RtlVirtualUnwind(%rip)
+
+ mov \$1,%eax # ExceptionContinueSearch
+ add \$64,%rsp
+ popfq
+ pop %r15
+ pop %r14
+ pop %r13
+ pop %r12
+ pop %rbp
+ pop %rbx
+ pop %rdi
+ pop %rsi
+ ret
+.size key_se_handler,.-key_se_handler
+
+.section .pdata
+.align 4
+ .rva .LSEH_begin_RC4
+ .rva .LSEH_end_RC4
+ .rva .LSEH_info_RC4
+
+ .rva .LSEH_begin_private_RC4_set_key
+ .rva .LSEH_end_private_RC4_set_key
+ .rva .LSEH_info_private_RC4_set_key
+
+.section .xdata
+.align 8
+.LSEH_info_RC4:
+ .byte 9,0,0,0
+ .rva stream_se_handler
+.LSEH_info_private_RC4_set_key:
+ .byte 9,0,0,0
+ .rva key_se_handler
+___
+}
+
+sub reg_part {
+my ($reg,$conv)=@_;
+ if ($reg =~ /%r[0-9]+/) { $reg .= $conv; }
+ elsif ($conv eq "b") { $reg =~ s/%[er]([^x]+)x?/%$1l/; }
+ elsif ($conv eq "w") { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%$1/; }
+ elsif ($conv eq "d") { $reg =~ s/%[er](.+)/%e$1/; }
+ return $reg;
+}
+
+$code =~ s/(%[a-z0-9]+)#([bwd])/reg_part($1,$2)/gem;
+$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
+
+print $code;
+
+close STDOUT;
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,649 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2006.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
-# include <openssl/cms.h>
-#endif
-#include "asn1_locl.h"
-
-static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- unsigned char *penc = NULL;
- int penclen;
- penclen = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &penc);
- if (penclen <= 0)
- return 0;
- if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA),
- V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, penc, penclen))
- return 1;
-
- OPENSSL_free(penc);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
-{
- const unsigned char *p;
- int pklen;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, pubkey))
- return 0;
- if (!(rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen))) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
-{
- if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0
- || BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
-{
- RSA *rsa;
- if (!(rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen))) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int old_rsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
-{
- return i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, pder);
-}
-
-static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- unsigned char *rk = NULL;
- int rklen;
- rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk);
-
- if (rklen <= 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0,
- V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, rk, rklen)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
-{
- const unsigned char *p;
- int pklen;
- if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8))
- return 0;
- return old_rsa_priv_decode(pkey, &p, pklen);
-}
-
-static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa);
-}
-
-static int rsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n);
-}
-
-static void int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa);
-}
-
-static void update_buflen(const BIGNUM *b, size_t *pbuflen)
-{
- size_t i;
- if (!b)
- return;
- if (*pbuflen < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(b)))
- *pbuflen = i;
-}
-
-static int do_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off, int priv)
-{
- char *str;
- const char *s;
- unsigned char *m = NULL;
- int ret = 0, mod_len = 0;
- size_t buf_len = 0;
-
- update_buflen(x->n, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->e, &buf_len);
-
- if (priv) {
- update_buflen(x->d, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->p, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->q, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->dmp1, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->dmq1, &buf_len);
- update_buflen(x->iqmp, &buf_len);
- }
-
- m = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len + 10);
- if (m == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_DO_RSA_PRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (x->n != NULL)
- mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n);
-
- if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
- goto err;
-
- if (priv && x->d) {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len)
- <= 0)
- goto err;
- str = "modulus:";
- s = "publicExponent:";
- } else {
- if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len)
- <= 0)
- goto err;
- str = "Modulus:";
- s = "Exponent:";
- }
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (priv) {
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, m, off))
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, m, off))
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (m != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(m);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
- ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
-{
- return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0);
-}
-
-static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
- ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
-{
- return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1);
-}
-
-static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
- X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
-{
- const unsigned char *p;
- int plen;
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
-
- *pmaskHash = NULL;
-
- if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- return NULL;
- p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
- plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
- pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
-
- if (!pss)
- return NULL;
-
- if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
- ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
- && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
- p = param->value.sequence->data;
- plen = param->value.sequence->length;
- *pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
- }
- }
-
- return pss;
-}
-
-static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
- X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent)
-{
- int rv = 0;
- if (!pss) {
- if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
- goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
- if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
- goto err;
- } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
- goto err;
-
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
- if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (maskHash) {
- if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0)
- goto err;
- } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0)
- goto err;
- } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0)
- goto err;
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
-
- if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
- goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (pss->saltLength) {
- if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
- goto err;
- } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0)
- goto err;
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
-
- if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
- goto err;
- if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (pss->trailerField) {
- if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
- goto err;
- } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0)
- goto err;
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
-
- rv = 1;
-
- err:
- return rv;
-
-}
-
-static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
- const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
-{
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) {
- int rv;
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
- X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
- pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
- rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent);
- if (pss)
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
- if (maskHash)
- X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
- if (!rv)
- return 0;
- } else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
- return 0;
- if (sig)
- return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
-{
- X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
- switch (op) {
-
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
- if (arg1 == 0)
- PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
- break;
-
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
- if (arg1 == 0)
- PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
- if (arg1 == 0)
- CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
- break;
-
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
- if (arg1 == 0)
- CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
- break;
-#endif
-
- case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
- *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha1;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
-
- }
-
- if (alg)
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
-
- return 1;
-
-}
-
-/*
- * Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called when a signature
- * is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS.
- */
-
-static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
- X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
- EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- int rv = -1;
- int saltlen;
- const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
- X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
- /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- return -1;
- }
- /* Decode PSS parameters */
- pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
-
- if (pss == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */
- if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!maskHash) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER);
- goto err;
- }
- mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm);
- if (mgf1md == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- mgf1md = EVP_sha1();
-
- if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
- md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm);
- if (md == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- md = EVP_sha1();
-
- if (pss->saltLength) {
- saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
-
- /*
- * Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main RSA
- * routines will trap other invalid values anyway.
- */
- if (saltlen < 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- saltlen = 20;
-
- /*
- * low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and
- * PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
- */
- if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* We have all parameters now set up context */
-
- if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
- goto err;
- /* Carry on */
- rv = 2;
-
- err:
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
- if (maskHash)
- X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
- return rv;
-}
-
-static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
- X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)
-{
- int pad_mode;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = ctx->pctx;
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
- return 0;
- if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
- return 2;
- if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
- const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR *mgf1alg = NULL;
- ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL, *os2 = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
- int saltlen, rv = 0;
- sigmd = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen))
- goto err;
- if (saltlen == -1)
- saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
- else if (saltlen == -2) {
- saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
- if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0)
- saltlen--;
- }
- pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
- if (!pss)
- goto err;
- if (saltlen != 20) {
- pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
- if (!pss->saltLength)
- goto err;
- if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen))
- goto err;
- }
- if (EVP_MD_type(sigmd) != NID_sha1) {
- pss->hashAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
- if (!pss->hashAlgorithm)
- goto err;
- X509_ALGOR_set_md(pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd);
- }
- if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) != NID_sha1) {
- ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
- /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */
- mgf1alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
- X509_ALGOR_set_md(mgf1alg, mgf1md);
- if (!ASN1_item_pack(mgf1alg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp))
- goto err;
- pss->maskGenAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
- if (!pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
- goto err;
- X509_ALGOR_set0(pss->maskGenAlgorithm,
- OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp);
- }
- /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */
- if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os1))
- goto err;
- if (alg2) {
- os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1);
- if (!os2)
- goto err;
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
- V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
- }
- X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
- V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
- os1 = os2 = NULL;
- rv = 3;
- err:
- if (mgf1alg)
- X509_ALGOR_free(mgf1alg);
- if (pss)
- RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
- if (os1)
- ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
- return rv;
-
- }
- return 2;
-}
-
-const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] = {
- {
- EVP_PKEY_RSA,
- EVP_PKEY_RSA,
- ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL,
-
- "RSA",
- "OpenSSL RSA method",
-
- rsa_pub_decode,
- rsa_pub_encode,
- rsa_pub_cmp,
- rsa_pub_print,
-
- rsa_priv_decode,
- rsa_priv_encode,
- rsa_priv_print,
-
- int_rsa_size,
- rsa_bits,
-
- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-
- rsa_sig_print,
- int_rsa_free,
- rsa_pkey_ctrl,
- old_rsa_priv_decode,
- old_rsa_priv_encode,
- rsa_item_verify,
- rsa_item_sign},
-
- {
- EVP_PKEY_RSA2,
- EVP_PKEY_RSA,
- ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS}
-};
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,649 @@
+/* crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2006.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+# include <openssl/cms.h>
+#endif
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ unsigned char *penc = NULL;
+ int penclen;
+ penclen = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &penc);
+ if (penclen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA),
+ V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, penc, penclen))
+ return 1;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(penc);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int pklen;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, pubkey))
+ return 0;
+ if (!(rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen))) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+ if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0
+ || BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
+{
+ RSA *rsa;
+ if (!(rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen))) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int old_rsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
+{
+ return i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, pder);
+}
+
+static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ unsigned char *rk = NULL;
+ int rklen;
+ rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk);
+
+ if (rklen <= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0,
+ V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, rk, rklen)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int pklen;
+ if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8))
+ return 0;
+ return old_rsa_priv_decode(pkey, &p, pklen);
+}
+
+static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa);
+}
+
+static int rsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n);
+}
+
+static void int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa);
+}
+
+static void update_buflen(const BIGNUM *b, size_t *pbuflen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ if (!b)
+ return;
+ if (*pbuflen < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(b)))
+ *pbuflen = i;
+}
+
+static int do_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off, int priv)
+{
+ char *str;
+ const char *s;
+ unsigned char *m = NULL;
+ int ret = 0, mod_len = 0;
+ size_t buf_len = 0;
+
+ update_buflen(x->n, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->e, &buf_len);
+
+ if (priv) {
+ update_buflen(x->d, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->p, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->q, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->dmp1, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->dmq1, &buf_len);
+ update_buflen(x->iqmp, &buf_len);
+ }
+
+ m = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len + 10);
+ if (m == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_DO_RSA_PRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (x->n != NULL)
+ mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n);
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (priv && x->d) {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len)
+ <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ str = "modulus:";
+ s = "publicExponent:";
+ } else {
+ if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len)
+ <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ str = "Modulus:";
+ s = "Exponent:";
+ }
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (priv) {
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, m, off))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (m != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(m);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+ ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+ return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0);
+}
+
+static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+ ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
+{
+ return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1);
+}
+
+static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
+ X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int plen;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+
+ *pmaskHash = NULL;
+
+ if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ return NULL;
+ p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
+ pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
+
+ if (!pss)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
+ ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
+ && param && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+ p = param->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = param->value.sequence->length;
+ *pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return pss;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
+ X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+ if (!pss) {
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (maskHash) {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (pss->saltLength) {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
+ goto err;
+ if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (pss->trailerField) {
+ if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+ rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+ return rv;
+
+}
+
+static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+ const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) {
+ int rv;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+ X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+ pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
+ rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent);
+ if (pss)
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+ if (maskHash)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+ if (!rv)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (sig)
+ return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+ X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
+ switch (op) {
+
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+ if (arg1 == 0)
+ PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
+ if (arg1 == 0)
+ PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg);
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+ if (arg1 == 0)
+ CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
+ if (arg1 == 0)
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+ *(int *)arg2 = NID_sha1;
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return -2;
+
+ }
+
+ if (alg)
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called when a signature
+ * is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS.
+ */
+
+static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+ X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ int rv = -1;
+ int saltlen;
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+ X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
+ /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Decode PSS parameters */
+ pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
+
+ if (pss == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */
+ if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!maskHash) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm);
+ if (mgf1md == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ mgf1md = EVP_sha1();
+
+ if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
+ md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PSS_DIGEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+
+ if (pss->saltLength) {
+ saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
+
+ /*
+ * Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main RSA
+ * routines will trap other invalid values anyway.
+ */
+ if (saltlen < 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ saltlen = 20;
+
+ /*
+ * low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and
+ * PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
+ */
+ if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We have all parameters now set up context */
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Carry on */
+ rv = 2;
+
+ err:
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+ if (maskHash)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+ X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)
+{
+ int pad_mode;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = ctx->pctx;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return 2;
+ if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR *mgf1alg = NULL;
+ ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL, *os2 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
+ int saltlen, rv = 0;
+ sigmd = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen))
+ goto err;
+ if (saltlen == -1)
+ saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
+ else if (saltlen == -2) {
+ saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
+ if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0)
+ saltlen--;
+ }
+ pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
+ if (!pss)
+ goto err;
+ if (saltlen != 20) {
+ pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+ if (!pss->saltLength)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_MD_type(sigmd) != NID_sha1) {
+ pss->hashAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (!pss->hashAlgorithm)
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set_md(pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd);
+ }
+ if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) != NID_sha1) {
+ ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
+ /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */
+ mgf1alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ X509_ALGOR_set_md(mgf1alg, mgf1md);
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(mgf1alg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp))
+ goto err;
+ pss->maskGenAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (!pss->maskGenAlgorithm)
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(pss->maskGenAlgorithm,
+ OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp);
+ }
+ /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */
+ if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os1))
+ goto err;
+ if (alg2) {
+ os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1);
+ if (!os2)
+ goto err;
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
+ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
+ }
+ X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
+ V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
+ os1 = os2 = NULL;
+ rv = 3;
+ err:
+ if (mgf1alg)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(mgf1alg);
+ if (pss)
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+ if (os1)
+ ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
+ return rv;
+
+ }
+ return 2;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[] = {
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL,
+
+ "RSA",
+ "OpenSSL RSA method",
+
+ rsa_pub_decode,
+ rsa_pub_encode,
+ rsa_pub_cmp,
+ rsa_pub_print,
+
+ rsa_priv_decode,
+ rsa_priv_encode,
+ rsa_priv_print,
+
+ int_rsa_size,
+ rsa_bits,
+
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ rsa_sig_print,
+ int_rsa_free,
+ rsa_pkey_ctrl,
+ old_rsa_priv_decode,
+ old_rsa_priv_encode,
+ rsa_item_verify,
+ rsa_item_sign},
+
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA2,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS}
+};
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-/*
- * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which
- * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. -
- * Geoff
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# include <openssl/fips.h>
-#endif
-
-static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
- BN_GENCB *cb);
-
-/*
- * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
- * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here
- * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application
- * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't
- * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD.
- */
-int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
-{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
- if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
- return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
-#endif
- return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
-}
-
-static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
- BN_GENCB *cb)
-{
- BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
- BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p;
- BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
- int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (r3 == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
- bitsq = bits - bitsp;
-
- /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
- if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL))
- goto err;
-
- BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value);
-
- /* generate p and q */
- for (;;) {
- if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_one(r1))
- break;
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
- goto err;
- for (;;) {
- /*
- * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
- * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for this and
- * bail if it happens 3 times.
- */
- unsigned int degenerate = 0;
- do {
- if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
- goto err;
- } while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
- if (degenerate == 3) {
- ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_one(r1))
- break;
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
- goto err;
- }
- if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
- goto err;
- if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
- tmp = rsa->p;
- rsa->p = rsa->q;
- rsa->q = tmp;
- }
-
- /* calculate n */
- if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* calculate d */
- if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
- goto err; /* p-1 */
- if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
- goto err; /* q-1 */
- if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
- goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- pr0 = &local_r0;
- BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else
- pr0 = r0;
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx))
- goto err; /* d */
-
- /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else
- d = rsa->d;
-
- /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
- if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
- if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
- p = &local_p;
- BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else
- p = rsa->p;
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- ok = 1;
- err:
- if (ok == -1) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
- ok = 0;
- }
- if (ctx != NULL) {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
-
- return ok;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/* crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which
+ * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. -
+ * Geoff
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+extern int FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
+ BN_GENCB *cb);
+#endif
+
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
+ BN_GENCB *cb);
+
+/*
+ * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
+ * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here
+ * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application
+ * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't
+ * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD.
+ */
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+#endif
+ return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+}
+
+static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
+ BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
+ BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p;
+ BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
+ int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (r3 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
+ bitsq = bits - bitsp;
+
+ /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
+ if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value);
+
+ /* generate p and q */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_one(r1))
+ break;
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
+ goto err;
+ for (;;) {
+ /*
+ * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
+ * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for this and
+ * bail if it happens 3 times.
+ */
+ unsigned int degenerate = 0;
+ do {
+ if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
+ goto err;
+ } while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
+ if (degenerate == 3) {
+ ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_one(r1))
+ break;
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
+ tmp = rsa->p;
+ rsa->p = rsa->q;
+ rsa->q = tmp;
+ }
+
+ /* calculate n */
+ if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* calculate d */
+ if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err; /* p-1 */
+ if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
+ goto err; /* q-1 */
+ if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
+ goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ pr0 = &local_r0;
+ BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ pr0 = r0;
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx))
+ goto err; /* d */
+
+ /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ d = &local_d;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+
+ /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
+ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
+ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ p = &local_p;
+ BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ p = rsa->p;
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ok = 1;
+ err:
+ if (ok == -1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ok;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,313 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include "rsa_locl.h"
-
-/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
-#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-
-int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
-{
- X509_SIG sig;
- ASN1_TYPE parameter;
- int i, j, ret = 1;
- unsigned char *p, *tmps = NULL;
- const unsigned char *s = NULL;
- X509_ALGOR algor;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
- return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
- }
- /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
- if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
- if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
- return (0);
- }
- i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
- s = m;
- } else {
- sig.algor = &algor;
- sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
- if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
- return (0);
- }
- if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,
- RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
- return (0);
- }
- parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
- parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
- sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
-
- sig.digest = &digest;
- sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; /* TMP UGLY CAST */
- sig.digest->length = m_len;
-
- i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
- }
- j = RSA_size(rsa);
- if (i > (j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
- return (0);
- }
- if (type != NID_md5_sha1) {
- tmps = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j + 1);
- if (tmps == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- p = tmps;
- i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
- s = tmps;
- }
- i = RSA_private_encrypt(i, s, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
- ret = 0;
- else
- *siglen = i;
-
- if (type != NID_md5_sha1) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmps, (unsigned int)j + 1);
- OPENSSL_free(tmps);
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Check DigestInfo structure does not contain extraneous data by reencoding
- * using DER and checking encoding against original.
- */
-static int rsa_check_digestinfo(X509_SIG *sig, const unsigned char *dinfo,
- int dinfolen)
-{
- unsigned char *der = NULL;
- int derlen;
- int ret = 0;
- derlen = i2d_X509_SIG(sig, &der);
- if (derlen <= 0)
- return 0;
- if (derlen == dinfolen && !memcmp(dinfo, der, derlen))
- ret = 1;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
- OPENSSL_free(der);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
- unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
-{
- int i, ret = 0, sigtype;
- unsigned char *s;
- X509_SIG *sig = NULL;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
- && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- return (0);
- }
-
- if ((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && rm) {
- i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,
- sigbuf, rm, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
- return 0;
- *prm_len = i;
- return 1;
- }
-
- s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
- if (s == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
- i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, s, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
- /*
- * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. check for correct
- * tag and length octets.
- */
- if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10) {
- if (rm) {
- memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
- *prm_len = 16;
- ret = 1;
- } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- else
- ret = 1;
- }
-
- /* Special case: SSL signature */
- if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
- if ((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- else
- ret = 1;
- } else {
- const unsigned char *p = s;
- sig = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &p, (long)i);
-
- if (sig == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
- if (p != s + i || !rsa_check_digestinfo(sig, s, i)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to create
- * forgeries
- */
- if (sig->algor->parameter
- && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- sigtype = OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
-
-#ifdef RSA_DEBUG
- /* put a backward compatibility flag in EAY */
- fprintf(stderr, "in(%s) expect(%s)\n", OBJ_nid2ln(sigtype),
- OBJ_nid2ln(dtype));
-#endif
- if (sigtype != dtype) {
- if (((dtype == NID_md5) &&
- (sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) ||
- ((dtype == NID_md2) &&
- (sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))) {
- /* ok, we will let it through */
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
- fprintf(stderr,
- "signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045\n");
-#endif
- } else {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (rm) {
- const EVP_MD *md;
- md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dtype);
- if (md && (EVP_MD_size(md) != sig->digest->length))
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- else {
- memcpy(rm, sig->digest->data, sig->digest->length);
- *prm_len = sig->digest->length;
- ret = 1;
- }
- } else if (((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len) ||
- (memcmp(m, sig->digest->data, m_len) != 0)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- } else
- ret = 1;
- }
- err:
- if (sig != NULL)
- X509_SIG_free(sig);
- if (s != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(s, (unsigned int)siglen);
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
-{
-
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
- return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
- }
-
- return int_rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+/* crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
+
+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
+
+int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ X509_SIG sig;
+ ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+ int i, j, ret = 1;
+ unsigned char *p, *tmps = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *s = NULL;
+ X509_ALGOR algor;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
+ }
+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+ s = m;
+ } else {
+ sig.algor = &algor;
+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,
+ RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter;
+
+ sig.digest = &digest;
+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; /* TMP UGLY CAST */
+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
+
+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+ }
+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if (i > (j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) {
+ tmps = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j + 1);
+ if (tmps == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ p = tmps;
+ i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+ s = tmps;
+ }
+ i = RSA_private_encrypt(i, s, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ else
+ *siglen = i;
+
+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmps, (unsigned int)j + 1);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmps);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check DigestInfo structure does not contain extraneous data by reencoding
+ * using DER and checking encoding against original.
+ */
+static int rsa_check_digestinfo(X509_SIG *sig, const unsigned char *dinfo,
+ int dinfolen)
+{
+ unsigned char *der = NULL;
+ int derlen;
+ int ret = 0;
+ derlen = i2d_X509_SIG(sig, &der);
+ if (derlen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (derlen == dinfolen && !memcmp(dinfo, der, derlen))
+ ret = 1;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+ unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0, sigtype;
+ unsigned char *s;
+ X509_SIG *sig = NULL;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+ && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if ((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && rm) {
+ i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,
+ sigbuf, rm, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ *prm_len = i;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, s, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. check for correct
+ * tag and length octets.
+ */
+ if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10) {
+ if (rm) {
+ memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
+ *prm_len = 16;
+ ret = 1;
+ } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ } else {
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ } else if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ /* Special case: SSL signature */
+ if ((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ const unsigned char *p = s;
+ sig = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &p, (long)i);
+
+ if (sig == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
+ if (p != s + i || !rsa_check_digestinfo(sig, s, i)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to create
+ * forgeries
+ */
+ if (sig->algor->parameter
+ && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ sigtype = OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
+
+#ifdef RSA_DEBUG
+ /* put a backward compatibility flag in EAY */
+ fprintf(stderr, "in(%s) expect(%s)\n", OBJ_nid2ln(sigtype),
+ OBJ_nid2ln(dtype));
+#endif
+ if (sigtype != dtype) {
+ if (((dtype == NID_md5) &&
+ (sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) ||
+ ((dtype == NID_md2) &&
+ (sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))) {
+ /* ok, we will let it through */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045\n");
+#endif
+ } else {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (rm) {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dtype);
+ if (md && (EVP_MD_size(md) != sig->digest->length))
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ else {
+ memcpy(rm, sig->digest->data, sig->digest->length);
+ *prm_len = sig->digest->length;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ } else if (((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len) ||
+ (memcmp(m, sig->digest->data, m_len) != 0)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ err:
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ X509_SIG_free(sig);
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s, (unsigned int)siglen);
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+ }
+
+ return int_rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,331 +0,0 @@
-/* test vectors from p1ovect1.txt */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-{
- printf("No RSA support\n");
- return (0);
-}
-#else
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-# define SetKey \
- key->n = BN_bin2bn(n, sizeof(n)-1, key->n); \
- key->e = BN_bin2bn(e, sizeof(e)-1, key->e); \
- key->d = BN_bin2bn(d, sizeof(d)-1, key->d); \
- key->p = BN_bin2bn(p, sizeof(p)-1, key->p); \
- key->q = BN_bin2bn(q, sizeof(q)-1, key->q); \
- key->dmp1 = BN_bin2bn(dmp1, sizeof(dmp1)-1, key->dmp1); \
- key->dmq1 = BN_bin2bn(dmq1, sizeof(dmq1)-1, key->dmq1); \
- key->iqmp = BN_bin2bn(iqmp, sizeof(iqmp)-1, key->iqmp); \
- memcpy(c, ctext_ex, sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1); \
- return (sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1);
-
-static int key1(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
-{
- static unsigned char n[] =
- "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F"
- "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5"
- "\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93"
- "\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1"
- "\xF5";
-
- static unsigned char e[] = "\x11";
-
- static unsigned char d[] =
- "\x0A\x03\x37\x48\x62\x64\x87\x69\x5F\x5F\x30\xBC\x38\xB9\x8B\x44"
- "\xC2\xCD\x2D\xFF\x43\x40\x98\xCD\x20\xD8\xA1\x38\xD0\x90\xBF\x64"
- "\x79\x7C\x3F\xA7\xA2\xCD\xCB\x3C\xD1\xE0\xBD\xBA\x26\x54\xB4\xF9"
- "\xDF\x8E\x8A\xE5\x9D\x73\x3D\x9F\x33\xB3\x01\x62\x4A\xFD\x1D\x51";
-
- static unsigned char p[] =
- "\x00\xD8\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
- "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x12"
- "\x0D";
-
- static unsigned char q[] =
- "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
- "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
- "\x89";
-
- static unsigned char dmp1[] =
- "\x59\x0B\x95\x72\xA2\xC2\xA9\xC4\x06\x05\x9D\xC2\xAB\x2F\x1D\xAF"
- "\xEB\x7E\x8B\x4F\x10\xA7\x54\x9E\x8E\xED\xF5\xB4\xFC\xE0\x9E\x05";
-
- static unsigned char dmq1[] =
- "\x00\x8E\x3C\x05\x21\xFE\x15\xE0\xEA\x06\xA3\x6F\xF0\xF1\x0C\x99"
- "\x52\xC3\x5B\x7A\x75\x14\xFD\x32\x38\xB8\x0A\xAD\x52\x98\x62\x8D"
- "\x51";
-
- static unsigned char iqmp[] =
- "\x36\x3F\xF7\x18\x9D\xA8\xE9\x0B\x1D\x34\x1F\x71\xD0\x9B\x76\xA8"
- "\xA9\x43\xE1\x1D\x10\xB2\x4D\x24\x9F\x2D\xEA\xFE\xF8\x0C\x18\x26";
-
- static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
- "\x1b\x8f\x05\xf9\xca\x1a\x79\x52\x6e\x53\xf3\xcc\x51\x4f\xdb\x89"
- "\x2b\xfb\x91\x93\x23\x1e\x78\xb9\x92\xe6\x8d\x50\xa4\x80\xcb\x52"
- "\x33\x89\x5c\x74\x95\x8d\x5d\x02\xab\x8c\x0f\xd0\x40\xeb\x58\x44"
- "\xb0\x05\xc3\x9e\xd8\x27\x4a\x9d\xbf\xa8\x06\x71\x40\x94\x39\xd2";
-
- SetKey;
-}
-
-static int key2(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
-{
- static unsigned char n[] =
- "\x00\xA3\x07\x9A\x90\xDF\x0D\xFD\x72\xAC\x09\x0C\xCC\x2A\x78\xB8"
- "\x74\x13\x13\x3E\x40\x75\x9C\x98\xFA\xF8\x20\x4F\x35\x8A\x0B\x26"
- "\x3C\x67\x70\xE7\x83\xA9\x3B\x69\x71\xB7\x37\x79\xD2\x71\x7B\xE8"
- "\x34\x77\xCF";
-
- static unsigned char e[] = "\x3";
-
- static unsigned char d[] =
- "\x6C\xAF\xBC\x60\x94\xB3\xFE\x4C\x72\xB0\xB3\x32\xC6\xFB\x25\xA2"
- "\xB7\x62\x29\x80\x4E\x68\x65\xFC\xA4\x5A\x74\xDF\x0F\x8F\xB8\x41"
- "\x3B\x52\xC0\xD0\xE5\x3D\x9B\x59\x0F\xF1\x9B\xE7\x9F\x49\xDD\x21"
- "\xE5\xEB";
-
- static unsigned char p[] =
- "\x00\xCF\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92"
- "\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5\xCF\xCE\x91";
-
- static unsigned char q[] =
- "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
- "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5F";
-
- static unsigned char dmp1[] =
- "\x00\x8A\x15\x78\xAC\x5D\x13\xAF\x10\x2B\x22\xB9\x99\xCD\x74\x61"
- "\xF1\x5E\x6D\x22\xCC\x03\x23\xDF\xDF\x0B";
-
- static unsigned char dmq1[] =
- "\x00\x86\x55\x21\x4A\xC5\x4D\x8D\x4E\xCD\x61\x77\xF1\xC7\x36\x90"
- "\xCE\x2A\x48\x2C\x8B\x05\x99\xCB\xE0\x3F";
-
- static unsigned char iqmp[] =
- "\x00\x83\xEF\xEF\xB8\xA9\xA4\x0D\x1D\xB6\xED\x98\xAD\x84\xED\x13"
- "\x35\xDC\xC1\x08\xF3\x22\xD0\x57\xCF\x8D";
-
- static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
- "\x14\xbd\xdd\x28\xc9\x83\x35\x19\x23\x80\xe8\xe5\x49\xb1\x58\x2a"
- "\x8b\x40\xb4\x48\x6d\x03\xa6\xa5\x31\x1f\x1f\xd5\xf0\xa1\x80\xe4"
- "\x17\x53\x03\x29\xa9\x34\x90\x74\xb1\x52\x13\x54\x29\x08\x24\x52"
- "\x62\x51";
-
- SetKey;
-}
-
-static int key3(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
-{
- static unsigned char n[] =
- "\x00\xBB\xF8\x2F\x09\x06\x82\xCE\x9C\x23\x38\xAC\x2B\x9D\xA8\x71"
- "\xF7\x36\x8D\x07\xEE\xD4\x10\x43\xA4\x40\xD6\xB6\xF0\x74\x54\xF5"
- "\x1F\xB8\xDF\xBA\xAF\x03\x5C\x02\xAB\x61\xEA\x48\xCE\xEB\x6F\xCD"
- "\x48\x76\xED\x52\x0D\x60\xE1\xEC\x46\x19\x71\x9D\x8A\x5B\x8B\x80"
- "\x7F\xAF\xB8\xE0\xA3\xDF\xC7\x37\x72\x3E\xE6\xB4\xB7\xD9\x3A\x25"
- "\x84\xEE\x6A\x64\x9D\x06\x09\x53\x74\x88\x34\xB2\x45\x45\x98\x39"
- "\x4E\xE0\xAA\xB1\x2D\x7B\x61\xA5\x1F\x52\x7A\x9A\x41\xF6\xC1\x68"
- "\x7F\xE2\x53\x72\x98\xCA\x2A\x8F\x59\x46\xF8\xE5\xFD\x09\x1D\xBD"
- "\xCB";
-
- static unsigned char e[] = "\x11";
-
- static unsigned char d[] =
- "\x00\xA5\xDA\xFC\x53\x41\xFA\xF2\x89\xC4\xB9\x88\xDB\x30\xC1\xCD"
- "\xF8\x3F\x31\x25\x1E\x06\x68\xB4\x27\x84\x81\x38\x01\x57\x96\x41"
- "\xB2\x94\x10\xB3\xC7\x99\x8D\x6B\xC4\x65\x74\x5E\x5C\x39\x26\x69"
- "\xD6\x87\x0D\xA2\xC0\x82\xA9\x39\xE3\x7F\xDC\xB8\x2E\xC9\x3E\xDA"
- "\xC9\x7F\xF3\xAD\x59\x50\xAC\xCF\xBC\x11\x1C\x76\xF1\xA9\x52\x94"
- "\x44\xE5\x6A\xAF\x68\xC5\x6C\x09\x2C\xD3\x8D\xC3\xBE\xF5\xD2\x0A"
- "\x93\x99\x26\xED\x4F\x74\xA1\x3E\xDD\xFB\xE1\xA1\xCE\xCC\x48\x94"
- "\xAF\x94\x28\xC2\xB7\xB8\x88\x3F\xE4\x46\x3A\x4B\xC8\x5B\x1C\xB3"
- "\xC1";
-
- static unsigned char p[] =
- "\x00\xEE\xCF\xAE\x81\xB1\xB9\xB3\xC9\x08\x81\x0B\x10\xA1\xB5\x60"
- "\x01\x99\xEB\x9F\x44\xAE\xF4\xFD\xA4\x93\xB8\x1A\x9E\x3D\x84\xF6"
- "\x32\x12\x4E\xF0\x23\x6E\x5D\x1E\x3B\x7E\x28\xFA\xE7\xAA\x04\x0A"
- "\x2D\x5B\x25\x21\x76\x45\x9D\x1F\x39\x75\x41\xBA\x2A\x58\xFB\x65"
- "\x99";
-
- static unsigned char q[] =
- "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
- "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
- "\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
- "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x15"
- "\x03";
-
- static unsigned char dmp1[] =
- "\x54\x49\x4C\xA6\x3E\xBA\x03\x37\xE4\xE2\x40\x23\xFC\xD6\x9A\x5A"
- "\xEB\x07\xDD\xDC\x01\x83\xA4\xD0\xAC\x9B\x54\xB0\x51\xF2\xB1\x3E"
- "\xD9\x49\x09\x75\xEA\xB7\x74\x14\xFF\x59\xC1\xF7\x69\x2E\x9A\x2E"
- "\x20\x2B\x38\xFC\x91\x0A\x47\x41\x74\xAD\xC9\x3C\x1F\x67\xC9\x81";
-
- static unsigned char dmq1[] =
- "\x47\x1E\x02\x90\xFF\x0A\xF0\x75\x03\x51\xB7\xF8\x78\x86\x4C\xA9"
- "\x61\xAD\xBD\x3A\x8A\x7E\x99\x1C\x5C\x05\x56\xA9\x4C\x31\x46\xA7"
- "\xF9\x80\x3F\x8F\x6F\x8A\xE3\x42\xE9\x31\xFD\x8A\xE4\x7A\x22\x0D"
- "\x1B\x99\xA4\x95\x84\x98\x07\xFE\x39\xF9\x24\x5A\x98\x36\xDA\x3D";
-
- static unsigned char iqmp[] =
- "\x00\xB0\x6C\x4F\xDA\xBB\x63\x01\x19\x8D\x26\x5B\xDB\xAE\x94\x23"
- "\xB3\x80\xF2\x71\xF7\x34\x53\x88\x50\x93\x07\x7F\xCD\x39\xE2\x11"
- "\x9F\xC9\x86\x32\x15\x4F\x58\x83\xB1\x67\xA9\x67\xBF\x40\x2B\x4E"
- "\x9E\x2E\x0F\x96\x56\xE6\x98\xEA\x36\x66\xED\xFB\x25\x79\x80\x39"
- "\xF7";
-
- static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
- "\xb8\x24\x6b\x56\xa6\xed\x58\x81\xae\xb5\x85\xd9\xa2\x5b\x2a\xd7"
- "\x90\xc4\x17\xe0\x80\x68\x1b\xf1\xac\x2b\xc3\xde\xb6\x9d\x8b\xce"
- "\xf0\xc4\x36\x6f\xec\x40\x0a\xf0\x52\xa7\x2e\x9b\x0e\xff\xb5\xb3"
- "\xf2\xf1\x92\xdb\xea\xca\x03\xc1\x27\x40\x05\x71\x13\xbf\x1f\x06"
- "\x69\xac\x22\xe9\xf3\xa7\x85\x2e\x3c\x15\xd9\x13\xca\xb0\xb8\x86"
- "\x3a\x95\xc9\x92\x94\xce\x86\x74\x21\x49\x54\x61\x03\x46\xf4\xd4"
- "\x74\xb2\x6f\x7c\x48\xb4\x2e\xe6\x8e\x1f\x57\x2a\x1f\xc4\x02\x6a"
- "\xc4\x56\xb4\xf5\x9f\x7b\x62\x1e\xa1\xb9\xd8\x8f\x64\x20\x2f\xb1";
-
- SetKey;
-}
-
-static int pad_unknown(void)
-{
- unsigned long l;
- while ((l = ERR_get_error()) != 0)
- if (ERR_GET_REASON(l) == RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE)
- return (1);
- return (0);
-}
-
-static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
-
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-{
- int err = 0;
- int v;
- RSA *key;
- unsigned char ptext[256];
- unsigned char ctext[256];
- static unsigned char ptext_ex[] = "\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a";
- unsigned char ctext_ex[256];
- int plen;
- int clen = 0;
- int num;
- int n;
-
- CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
- CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
- CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
-
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or OAEP may fail */
-
- plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1;
-
- for (v = 0; v < 6; v++) {
- key = RSA_new();
- switch (v % 3) {
- case 0:
- clen = key1(key, ctext_ex);
- break;
- case 1:
- clen = key2(key, ctext_ex);
- break;
- case 2:
- clen = key3(key, ctext_ex);
- break;
- }
- if (v / 3 >= 1)
- key->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME;
-
- num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (num != clen) {
- printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption failed!\n");
- err = 1;
- goto oaep;
- }
-
- num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
- printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption failed!\n");
- err = 1;
- } else
- printf("PKCS #1 v1.5 encryption/decryption ok\n");
-
- oaep:
- ERR_clear_error();
- num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
- if (num == -1 && pad_unknown()) {
- printf("No OAEP support\n");
- goto next;
- }
- if (num != clen) {
- printf("OAEP encryption failed!\n");
- err = 1;
- goto next;
- }
-
- num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
- if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
- printf("OAEP decryption (encrypted data) failed!\n");
- err = 1;
- } else if (memcmp(ctext, ctext_ex, num) == 0)
- printf("OAEP test vector %d passed!\n", v);
-
- /*
- * Different ciphertexts (rsa_oaep.c without -DPKCS_TESTVECT). Try
- * decrypting ctext_ex
- */
-
- num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext_ex, ptext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
-
- if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
- printf("OAEP decryption (test vector data) failed!\n");
- err = 1;
- } else
- printf("OAEP encryption/decryption ok\n");
-
- /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts */
- for (n = 0; n < clen; ++n) {
- int b;
- unsigned char saved = ctext[n];
- for (b = 0; b < 256; ++b) {
- if (b == saved)
- continue;
- ctext[n] = b;
- num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
- if (num > 0) {
- printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
- err = 1;
- }
- }
- }
- next:
- RSA_free(key);
- }
-
- CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
- ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
-
- CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
- if (err)
- printf("ERROR: %d\n", err);
-# endif
- return err;
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+/* test vectors from p1ovect1.txt */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ printf("No RSA support\n");
+ return (0);
+}
+#else
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+# define SetKey \
+ key->n = BN_bin2bn(n, sizeof(n)-1, key->n); \
+ key->e = BN_bin2bn(e, sizeof(e)-1, key->e); \
+ key->d = BN_bin2bn(d, sizeof(d)-1, key->d); \
+ key->p = BN_bin2bn(p, sizeof(p)-1, key->p); \
+ key->q = BN_bin2bn(q, sizeof(q)-1, key->q); \
+ key->dmp1 = BN_bin2bn(dmp1, sizeof(dmp1)-1, key->dmp1); \
+ key->dmq1 = BN_bin2bn(dmq1, sizeof(dmq1)-1, key->dmq1); \
+ key->iqmp = BN_bin2bn(iqmp, sizeof(iqmp)-1, key->iqmp); \
+ memcpy(c, ctext_ex, sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1); \
+ return (sizeof(ctext_ex) - 1);
+
+static int key1(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
+{
+ static unsigned char n[] =
+ "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F"
+ "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5"
+ "\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93"
+ "\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1"
+ "\xF5";
+
+ static unsigned char e[] = "\x11";
+
+ static unsigned char d[] =
+ "\x0A\x03\x37\x48\x62\x64\x87\x69\x5F\x5F\x30\xBC\x38\xB9\x8B\x44"
+ "\xC2\xCD\x2D\xFF\x43\x40\x98\xCD\x20\xD8\xA1\x38\xD0\x90\xBF\x64"
+ "\x79\x7C\x3F\xA7\xA2\xCD\xCB\x3C\xD1\xE0\xBD\xBA\x26\x54\xB4\xF9"
+ "\xDF\x8E\x8A\xE5\x9D\x73\x3D\x9F\x33\xB3\x01\x62\x4A\xFD\x1D\x51";
+
+ static unsigned char p[] =
+ "\x00\xD8\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
+ "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x12"
+ "\x0D";
+
+ static unsigned char q[] =
+ "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
+ "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
+ "\x89";
+
+ static unsigned char dmp1[] =
+ "\x59\x0B\x95\x72\xA2\xC2\xA9\xC4\x06\x05\x9D\xC2\xAB\x2F\x1D\xAF"
+ "\xEB\x7E\x8B\x4F\x10\xA7\x54\x9E\x8E\xED\xF5\xB4\xFC\xE0\x9E\x05";
+
+ static unsigned char dmq1[] =
+ "\x00\x8E\x3C\x05\x21\xFE\x15\xE0\xEA\x06\xA3\x6F\xF0\xF1\x0C\x99"
+ "\x52\xC3\x5B\x7A\x75\x14\xFD\x32\x38\xB8\x0A\xAD\x52\x98\x62\x8D"
+ "\x51";
+
+ static unsigned char iqmp[] =
+ "\x36\x3F\xF7\x18\x9D\xA8\xE9\x0B\x1D\x34\x1F\x71\xD0\x9B\x76\xA8"
+ "\xA9\x43\xE1\x1D\x10\xB2\x4D\x24\x9F\x2D\xEA\xFE\xF8\x0C\x18\x26";
+
+ static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
+ "\x1b\x8f\x05\xf9\xca\x1a\x79\x52\x6e\x53\xf3\xcc\x51\x4f\xdb\x89"
+ "\x2b\xfb\x91\x93\x23\x1e\x78\xb9\x92\xe6\x8d\x50\xa4\x80\xcb\x52"
+ "\x33\x89\x5c\x74\x95\x8d\x5d\x02\xab\x8c\x0f\xd0\x40\xeb\x58\x44"
+ "\xb0\x05\xc3\x9e\xd8\x27\x4a\x9d\xbf\xa8\x06\x71\x40\x94\x39\xd2";
+
+ SetKey;
+}
+
+static int key2(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
+{
+ static unsigned char n[] =
+ "\x00\xA3\x07\x9A\x90\xDF\x0D\xFD\x72\xAC\x09\x0C\xCC\x2A\x78\xB8"
+ "\x74\x13\x13\x3E\x40\x75\x9C\x98\xFA\xF8\x20\x4F\x35\x8A\x0B\x26"
+ "\x3C\x67\x70\xE7\x83\xA9\x3B\x69\x71\xB7\x37\x79\xD2\x71\x7B\xE8"
+ "\x34\x77\xCF";
+
+ static unsigned char e[] = "\x3";
+
+ static unsigned char d[] =
+ "\x6C\xAF\xBC\x60\x94\xB3\xFE\x4C\x72\xB0\xB3\x32\xC6\xFB\x25\xA2"
+ "\xB7\x62\x29\x80\x4E\x68\x65\xFC\xA4\x5A\x74\xDF\x0F\x8F\xB8\x41"
+ "\x3B\x52\xC0\xD0\xE5\x3D\x9B\x59\x0F\xF1\x9B\xE7\x9F\x49\xDD\x21"
+ "\xE5\xEB";
+
+ static unsigned char p[] =
+ "\x00\xCF\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92"
+ "\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5\xCF\xCE\x91";
+
+ static unsigned char q[] =
+ "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
+ "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5F";
+
+ static unsigned char dmp1[] =
+ "\x00\x8A\x15\x78\xAC\x5D\x13\xAF\x10\x2B\x22\xB9\x99\xCD\x74\x61"
+ "\xF1\x5E\x6D\x22\xCC\x03\x23\xDF\xDF\x0B";
+
+ static unsigned char dmq1[] =
+ "\x00\x86\x55\x21\x4A\xC5\x4D\x8D\x4E\xCD\x61\x77\xF1\xC7\x36\x90"
+ "\xCE\x2A\x48\x2C\x8B\x05\x99\xCB\xE0\x3F";
+
+ static unsigned char iqmp[] =
+ "\x00\x83\xEF\xEF\xB8\xA9\xA4\x0D\x1D\xB6\xED\x98\xAD\x84\xED\x13"
+ "\x35\xDC\xC1\x08\xF3\x22\xD0\x57\xCF\x8D";
+
+ static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
+ "\x14\xbd\xdd\x28\xc9\x83\x35\x19\x23\x80\xe8\xe5\x49\xb1\x58\x2a"
+ "\x8b\x40\xb4\x48\x6d\x03\xa6\xa5\x31\x1f\x1f\xd5\xf0\xa1\x80\xe4"
+ "\x17\x53\x03\x29\xa9\x34\x90\x74\xb1\x52\x13\x54\x29\x08\x24\x52"
+ "\x62\x51";
+
+ SetKey;
+}
+
+static int key3(RSA *key, unsigned char *c)
+{
+ static unsigned char n[] =
+ "\x00\xBB\xF8\x2F\x09\x06\x82\xCE\x9C\x23\x38\xAC\x2B\x9D\xA8\x71"
+ "\xF7\x36\x8D\x07\xEE\xD4\x10\x43\xA4\x40\xD6\xB6\xF0\x74\x54\xF5"
+ "\x1F\xB8\xDF\xBA\xAF\x03\x5C\x02\xAB\x61\xEA\x48\xCE\xEB\x6F\xCD"
+ "\x48\x76\xED\x52\x0D\x60\xE1\xEC\x46\x19\x71\x9D\x8A\x5B\x8B\x80"
+ "\x7F\xAF\xB8\xE0\xA3\xDF\xC7\x37\x72\x3E\xE6\xB4\xB7\xD9\x3A\x25"
+ "\x84\xEE\x6A\x64\x9D\x06\x09\x53\x74\x88\x34\xB2\x45\x45\x98\x39"
+ "\x4E\xE0\xAA\xB1\x2D\x7B\x61\xA5\x1F\x52\x7A\x9A\x41\xF6\xC1\x68"
+ "\x7F\xE2\x53\x72\x98\xCA\x2A\x8F\x59\x46\xF8\xE5\xFD\x09\x1D\xBD"
+ "\xCB";
+
+ static unsigned char e[] = "\x11";
+
+ static unsigned char d[] =
+ "\x00\xA5\xDA\xFC\x53\x41\xFA\xF2\x89\xC4\xB9\x88\xDB\x30\xC1\xCD"
+ "\xF8\x3F\x31\x25\x1E\x06\x68\xB4\x27\x84\x81\x38\x01\x57\x96\x41"
+ "\xB2\x94\x10\xB3\xC7\x99\x8D\x6B\xC4\x65\x74\x5E\x5C\x39\x26\x69"
+ "\xD6\x87\x0D\xA2\xC0\x82\xA9\x39\xE3\x7F\xDC\xB8\x2E\xC9\x3E\xDA"
+ "\xC9\x7F\xF3\xAD\x59\x50\xAC\xCF\xBC\x11\x1C\x76\xF1\xA9\x52\x94"
+ "\x44\xE5\x6A\xAF\x68\xC5\x6C\x09\x2C\xD3\x8D\xC3\xBE\xF5\xD2\x0A"
+ "\x93\x99\x26\xED\x4F\x74\xA1\x3E\xDD\xFB\xE1\xA1\xCE\xCC\x48\x94"
+ "\xAF\x94\x28\xC2\xB7\xB8\x88\x3F\xE4\x46\x3A\x4B\xC8\x5B\x1C\xB3"
+ "\xC1";
+
+ static unsigned char p[] =
+ "\x00\xEE\xCF\xAE\x81\xB1\xB9\xB3\xC9\x08\x81\x0B\x10\xA1\xB5\x60"
+ "\x01\x99\xEB\x9F\x44\xAE\xF4\xFD\xA4\x93\xB8\x1A\x9E\x3D\x84\xF6"
+ "\x32\x12\x4E\xF0\x23\x6E\x5D\x1E\x3B\x7E\x28\xFA\xE7\xAA\x04\x0A"
+ "\x2D\x5B\x25\x21\x76\x45\x9D\x1F\x39\x75\x41\xBA\x2A\x58\xFB\x65"
+ "\x99";
+
+ static unsigned char q[] =
+ "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
+ "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
+ "\x86\x98\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
+ "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x15"
+ "\x03";
+
+ static unsigned char dmp1[] =
+ "\x54\x49\x4C\xA6\x3E\xBA\x03\x37\xE4\xE2\x40\x23\xFC\xD6\x9A\x5A"
+ "\xEB\x07\xDD\xDC\x01\x83\xA4\xD0\xAC\x9B\x54\xB0\x51\xF2\xB1\x3E"
+ "\xD9\x49\x09\x75\xEA\xB7\x74\x14\xFF\x59\xC1\xF7\x69\x2E\x9A\x2E"
+ "\x20\x2B\x38\xFC\x91\x0A\x47\x41\x74\xAD\xC9\x3C\x1F\x67\xC9\x81";
+
+ static unsigned char dmq1[] =
+ "\x47\x1E\x02\x90\xFF\x0A\xF0\x75\x03\x51\xB7\xF8\x78\x86\x4C\xA9"
+ "\x61\xAD\xBD\x3A\x8A\x7E\x99\x1C\x5C\x05\x56\xA9\x4C\x31\x46\xA7"
+ "\xF9\x80\x3F\x8F\x6F\x8A\xE3\x42\xE9\x31\xFD\x8A\xE4\x7A\x22\x0D"
+ "\x1B\x99\xA4\x95\x84\x98\x07\xFE\x39\xF9\x24\x5A\x98\x36\xDA\x3D";
+
+ static unsigned char iqmp[] =
+ "\x00\xB0\x6C\x4F\xDA\xBB\x63\x01\x19\x8D\x26\x5B\xDB\xAE\x94\x23"
+ "\xB3\x80\xF2\x71\xF7\x34\x53\x88\x50\x93\x07\x7F\xCD\x39\xE2\x11"
+ "\x9F\xC9\x86\x32\x15\x4F\x58\x83\xB1\x67\xA9\x67\xBF\x40\x2B\x4E"
+ "\x9E\x2E\x0F\x96\x56\xE6\x98\xEA\x36\x66\xED\xFB\x25\x79\x80\x39"
+ "\xF7";
+
+ static unsigned char ctext_ex[] =
+ "\xb8\x24\x6b\x56\xa6\xed\x58\x81\xae\xb5\x85\xd9\xa2\x5b\x2a\xd7"
+ "\x90\xc4\x17\xe0\x80\x68\x1b\xf1\xac\x2b\xc3\xde\xb6\x9d\x8b\xce"
+ "\xf0\xc4\x36\x6f\xec\x40\x0a\xf0\x52\xa7\x2e\x9b\x0e\xff\xb5\xb3"
+ "\xf2\xf1\x92\xdb\xea\xca\x03\xc1\x27\x40\x05\x71\x13\xbf\x1f\x06"
+ "\x69\xac\x22\xe9\xf3\xa7\x85\x2e\x3c\x15\xd9\x13\xca\xb0\xb8\x86"
+ "\x3a\x95\xc9\x92\x94\xce\x86\x74\x21\x49\x54\x61\x03\x46\xf4\xd4"
+ "\x74\xb2\x6f\x7c\x48\xb4\x2e\xe6\x8e\x1f\x57\x2a\x1f\xc4\x02\x6a"
+ "\xc4\x56\xb4\xf5\x9f\x7b\x62\x1e\xa1\xb9\xd8\x8f\x64\x20\x2f\xb1";
+
+ SetKey;
+}
+
+static int pad_unknown(void)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ while ((l = ERR_get_error()) != 0)
+ if (ERR_GET_REASON(l) == RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE)
+ return (1);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+ "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ int v;
+ RSA *key;
+ unsigned char ptext[256];
+ unsigned char ctext[256];
+ static unsigned char ptext_ex[] = "\x54\x85\x9b\x34\x2c\x49\xea\x2a";
+ unsigned char ctext_ex[256];
+ int plen;
+ int clen = 0;
+ int num;
+ int n;
+
+ CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+ CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or OAEP may fail */
+
+ plen = sizeof(ptext_ex) - 1;
+
+ for (v = 0; v < 6; v++) {
+ key = RSA_new();
+ switch (v % 3) {
+ case 0:
+ clen = key1(key, ctext_ex);
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ clen = key2(key, ctext_ex);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ clen = key3(key, ctext_ex);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (v / 3 >= 1)
+ key->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME;
+
+ num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (num != clen) {
+ printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption failed!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ goto oaep;
+ }
+
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
+ printf("PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption failed!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ } else
+ printf("PKCS #1 v1.5 encryption/decryption ok\n");
+
+ oaep:
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ if (num == -1 && pad_unknown()) {
+ printf("No OAEP support\n");
+ goto next;
+ }
+ if (num != clen) {
+ printf("OAEP encryption failed!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ goto next;
+ }
+
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
+ printf("OAEP decryption (encrypted data) failed!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ } else if (memcmp(ctext, ctext_ex, num) == 0)
+ printf("OAEP test vector %d passed!\n", v);
+
+ /*
+ * Different ciphertexts (rsa_oaep.c without -DPKCS_TESTVECT). Try
+ * decrypting ctext_ex
+ */
+
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext_ex, ptext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+
+ if (num != plen || memcmp(ptext, ptext_ex, num) != 0) {
+ printf("OAEP decryption (test vector data) failed!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ } else
+ printf("OAEP encryption/decryption ok\n");
+
+ /* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts. */
+ for (n = 0; n < clen; ++n) {
+ ctext[n] ^= 1;
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext, ptext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ if (num > 0) {
+ printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ctext[n] ^= 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Test truncated ciphertexts, as well as negative length. */
+ for (n = -1; n < clen; ++n) {
+ num = RSA_private_decrypt(n, ctext, ptext, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ if (num > 0) {
+ printf("Truncated data decrypted!\n");
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ next:
+ RSA_free(key);
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+
+ CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
+ if (err)
+ printf("ERROR: %d\n", err);
+# endif
+ return err;
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1229 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-
-# ====================================================================
-# [Re]written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-
-# "[Re]written" was achieved in two major overhauls. In 2004 BODY_*
-# functions were re-implemented to address P4 performance issue [see
-# commentary below], and in 2006 the rest was rewritten in order to
-# gain freedom to liberate licensing terms.
-
-# January, September 2004.
-#
-# It was noted that Intel IA-32 C compiler generates code which
-# performs ~30% *faster* on P4 CPU than original *hand-coded*
-# SHA1 assembler implementation. To address this problem (and
-# prove that humans are still better than machines:-), the
-# original code was overhauled, which resulted in following
-# performance changes:
-#
-# compared with original compared with Intel cc
-# assembler impl. generated code
-# Pentium -16% +48%
-# PIII/AMD +8% +16%
-# P4 +85%(!) +45%
-#
-# As you can see Pentium came out as looser:-( Yet I reckoned that
-# improvement on P4 outweights the loss and incorporate this
-# re-tuned code to 0.9.7 and later.
-# ----------------------------------------------------------------
-# <appro at fy.chalmers.se>
-
-# August 2009.
-#
-# George Spelvin has tipped that F_40_59(b,c,d) can be rewritten as
-# '(c&d) + (b&(c^d))', which allows to accumulate partial results
-# and lighten "pressure" on scratch registers. This resulted in
-# >12% performance improvement on contemporary AMD cores (with no
-# degradation on other CPUs:-). Also, the code was revised to maximize
-# "distance" between instructions producing input to 'lea' instruction
-# and the 'lea' instruction itself, which is essential for Intel Atom
-# core and resulted in ~15% improvement.
-
-# October 2010.
-#
-# Add SSSE3, Supplemental[!] SSE3, implementation. The idea behind it
-# is to offload message schedule denoted by Wt in NIST specification,
-# or Xupdate in OpenSSL source, to SIMD unit. The idea is not novel,
-# and in SSE2 context was first explored by Dean Gaudet in 2004, see
-# http://arctic.org/~dean/crypto/sha1.html. Since then several things
-# have changed that made it interesting again:
-#
-# a) XMM units became faster and wider;
-# b) instruction set became more versatile;
-# c) an important observation was made by Max Locktykhin, which made
-# it possible to reduce amount of instructions required to perform
-# the operation in question, for further details see
-# http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/improving-the-performance-of-the-secure-hash-algorithm-1/.
-
-# April 2011.
-#
-# Add AVX code path, probably most controversial... The thing is that
-# switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in
-# comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like
-# 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as
-# pair of \xB5-ops, and it's the additional \xB5-ops, two per round, that
-# make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded
-# as single \xB5-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
-# equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1
-# cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used
-# to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer
-# [according to its optimization manual]. Which is why AVX code path
-# is guarded by *both* AVX and synthetic bit denoting Intel CPUs.
-# One can argue that it's unfair to AMD, but without 'sh[rl]d' it
-# makes no sense to keep the AVX code path. If somebody feels that
-# strongly, it's probably more appropriate to discuss possibility of
-# using vector rotate XOP on AMD...
-
-######################################################################
-# Current performance is summarized in following table. Numbers are
-# CPU clock cycles spent to process single byte (less is better).
-#
-# x86 SSSE3 AVX
-# Pentium 15.7 -
-# PIII 11.5 -
-# P4 10.6 -
-# AMD K8 7.1 -
-# Core2 7.3 6.1/+20% -
-# Atom 12.5 9.5(*)/+32% -
-# Westmere 7.3 5.6/+30% -
-# Sandy Bridge 8.8 6.2/+40% 5.1(**)/+70%
-#
-# (*) Loop is 1056 instructions long and expected result is ~8.25.
-# It remains mystery [to me] why ILP is limited to 1.7.
-#
-# (**) As per above comment, the result is for AVX *plus* sh[rl]d.
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
-require "x86asm.pl";
-
-&asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha1-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
-
-$xmm=$ymm=0;
-for (@ARGV) { $xmm=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
-
-$ymm=1 if ($xmm &&
- `$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
- =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
- $1>=2.19); # first version supporting AVX
-
-$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" &&
- `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
- $1>=2.03); # first version supporting AVX
-
-&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($xmm);
-
-
-$A="eax";
-$B="ebx";
-$C="ecx";
-$D="edx";
-$E="edi";
-$T="esi";
-$tmp1="ebp";
-
- at V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
-
-$alt=0; # 1 denotes alternative IALU implementation, which performs
- # 8% *worse* on P4, same on Westmere and Atom, 2% better on
- # Sandy Bridge...
-
-sub BODY_00_15
- {
- local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
-
- &comment("00_15 $n");
-
- &mov($f,$c); # f to hold F_00_19(b,c,d)
- if ($n==0) { &mov($tmp1,$a); }
- else { &mov($a,$tmp1); }
- &rotl($tmp1,5); # tmp1=ROTATE(a,5)
- &xor($f,$d);
- &add($tmp1,$e); # tmp1+=e;
- &mov($e,&swtmp($n%16)); # e becomes volatile and is loaded
- # with xi, also note that e becomes
- # f in next round...
- &and($f,$b);
- &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
- &xor($f,$d); # f holds F_00_19(b,c,d)
- &lea($tmp1,&DWP(0x5a827999,$tmp1,$e)); # tmp1+=K_00_19+xi
-
- if ($n==15) { &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16));# pre-fetch f for next round
- &add($f,$tmp1); } # f+=tmp1
- else { &add($tmp1,$f); } # f becomes a in next round
- &mov($tmp1,$a) if ($alt && $n==15);
- }
-
-sub BODY_16_19
- {
- local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
-
- &comment("16_19 $n");
-
-if ($alt) {
- &xor($c,$d);
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
- &and($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_00_19(b,c,d), b&=c^d
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
- &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1=F_00_19(b,c,d)
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
- &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
- &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
- &xor($c,$d); # restore $c
- &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round
- &rotr($b,$n==16?2:7); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
- &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f
- &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
- &lea($f,&DWP(0x5a827999,$f,$e));# f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)+e
- &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round
- &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
-} else {
- &mov($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_00_19(b,c,d)
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
- &xor($tmp1,$d);
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
- &and($tmp1,$b);
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
- &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
- &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1=F_00_19(b,c,d)
- &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
- &mov($tmp1,$a);
- &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
- &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f
- &rotl($tmp1,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
- &lea($f,&DWP(0x5a827999,$f,$e));# f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)+e
- &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round
- &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
-}
- }
-
-sub BODY_20_39
- {
- local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
- local $K=($n<40)?0x6ed9eba1:0xca62c1d6;
-
- &comment("20_39 $n");
-
-if ($alt) {
- &xor($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_20_39(b,c,d), b^=c
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
- &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1 holds F_20_39(b,c,d)
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
- &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_20_39(b,c,d)
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
- &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
- &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round
- &rotr($b,7); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
- &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f) if($n<77);# xi=f
- &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
- &xor($b,$c) if($n==39);# warm up for BODY_40_59
- &and($tmp1,$b) if($n==39);
- &lea($f,&DWP($K,$f,$e)); # f+=e+K_XX_YY
- &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)) if($n<79);# pre-fetch f for next round
- &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
- &rotr($a,5) if ($n==79);
-} else {
- &mov($tmp1,$b); # tmp1 to hold F_20_39(b,c,d)
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
- &xor($tmp1,$c);
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
- &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1 holds F_20_39(b,c,d)
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
- &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
- &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_20_39(b,c,d)
- &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
- &mov($tmp1,$a);
- &rotl($tmp1,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
- &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f) if($n<77);# xi=f
- &lea($f,&DWP($K,$f,$e)); # f+=e+K_XX_YY
- &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)) if($n<79);# pre-fetch f for next round
- &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
-}
- }
-
-sub BODY_40_59
- {
- local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
-
- &comment("40_59 $n");
-
-if ($alt) {
- &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=b&(c^d)
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
- &mov($tmp1,$d);
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
- &xor($c,$d); # restore $c
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
- &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
- &and($tmp1,$c);
- &rotr($b,7); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
- &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=c&d
- &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round
- &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f
- &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
- &xor($b,$c) if ($n<59);
- &and($tmp1,$b) if ($n<59);# tmp1 to hold F_40_59(b,c,d)
- &lea($f,&DWP(0x8f1bbcdc,$f,$e));# f+=K_40_59+e+(b&(c^d))
- &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round
- &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
-} else {
- &mov($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_40_59(b,c,d)
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
- &xor($tmp1,$d);
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
- &and($tmp1,$b);
- &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
- &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
- &add($tmp1,$e); # b&(c^d)+=e
- &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
- &mov($e,$a); # e becomes volatile
- &rotl($e,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
- &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f
- &lea($f,&DWP(0x8f1bbcdc,$f,$tmp1));# f+=K_40_59+e+(b&(c^d))
- &mov($tmp1,$c);
- &add($f,$e); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
- &and($tmp1,$d);
- &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round
- &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=c&d
-}
- }
-
-&function_begin("sha1_block_data_order");
-if ($xmm) {
- &static_label("ssse3_shortcut");
- &static_label("avx_shortcut") if ($ymm);
- &static_label("K_XX_XX");
-
- &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
- &set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop($tmp1);
- &picmeup($T,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tmp1,&label("pic_point"));
- &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1));
-
- &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$T));
- &mov ($D,&DWP(4,$T));
- &test ($D,1<<9); # check SSSE3 bit
- &jz (&label("x86"));
- &test ($A,1<<24); # check FXSR bit
- &jz (&label("x86"));
- if ($ymm) {
- &and ($D,1<<28); # mask AVX bit
- &and ($A,1<<30); # mask "Intel CPU" bit
- &or ($A,$D);
- &cmp ($A,1<<28|1<<30);
- &je (&label("avx_shortcut"));
- }
- &jmp (&label("ssse3_shortcut"));
- &set_label("x86",16);
-}
- &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); # SHA_CTX *c
- &mov($T,&wparam(1)); # const void *input
- &mov($A,&wparam(2)); # size_t num
- &stack_push(16+3); # allocate X[16]
- &shl($A,6);
- &add($A,$T);
- &mov(&wparam(2),$A); # pointer beyond the end of input
- &mov($E,&DWP(16,$tmp1));# pre-load E
- &jmp(&label("loop"));
-
-&set_label("loop",16);
-
- # copy input chunk to X, but reversing byte order!
- for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=4)
- {
- &mov($A,&DWP(4*($i+0),$T));
- &mov($B,&DWP(4*($i+1),$T));
- &mov($C,&DWP(4*($i+2),$T));
- &mov($D,&DWP(4*($i+3),$T));
- &bswap($A);
- &bswap($B);
- &bswap($C);
- &bswap($D);
- &mov(&swtmp($i+0),$A);
- &mov(&swtmp($i+1),$B);
- &mov(&swtmp($i+2),$C);
- &mov(&swtmp($i+3),$D);
- }
- &mov(&wparam(1),$T); # redundant in 1st spin
-
- &mov($A,&DWP(0,$tmp1)); # load SHA_CTX
- &mov($B,&DWP(4,$tmp1));
- &mov($C,&DWP(8,$tmp1));
- &mov($D,&DWP(12,$tmp1));
- # E is pre-loaded
-
- for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
- for(;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_16_19($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
- for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
- for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
- for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
-
- (($V[5] eq $D) and ($V[0] eq $E)) or die; # double-check
-
- &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); # re-load SHA_CTX*
- &mov($D,&wparam(1)); # D is last "T" and is discarded
-
- &add($E,&DWP(0,$tmp1)); # E is last "A"...
- &add($T,&DWP(4,$tmp1));
- &add($A,&DWP(8,$tmp1));
- &add($B,&DWP(12,$tmp1));
- &add($C,&DWP(16,$tmp1));
-
- &mov(&DWP(0,$tmp1),$E); # update SHA_CTX
- &add($D,64); # advance input pointer
- &mov(&DWP(4,$tmp1),$T);
- &cmp($D,&wparam(2)); # have we reached the end yet?
- &mov(&DWP(8,$tmp1),$A);
- &mov($E,$C); # C is last "E" which needs to be "pre-loaded"
- &mov(&DWP(12,$tmp1),$B);
- &mov($T,$D); # input pointer
- &mov(&DWP(16,$tmp1),$C);
- &jb(&label("loop"));
-
- &stack_pop(16+3);
-&function_end("sha1_block_data_order");
-
-if ($xmm) {
-######################################################################
-# The SSSE3 implementation.
-#
-# %xmm[0-7] are used as ring @X[] buffer containing quadruples of last
-# 32 elements of the message schedule or Xupdate outputs. First 4
-# quadruples are simply byte-swapped input, next 4 are calculated
-# according to method originally suggested by Dean Gaudet (modulo
-# being implemented in SSSE3). Once 8 quadruples or 32 elements are
-# collected, it switches to routine proposed by Max Locktyukhin.
-#
-# Calculations inevitably require temporary reqisters, and there are
-# no %xmm registers left to spare. For this reason part of the ring
-# buffer, X[2..4] to be specific, is offloaded to 3 quadriples ring
-# buffer on the stack. Keep in mind that X[2] is alias X[-6], X[3] -
-# X[-5], and X[4] - X[-4]...
-#
-# Another notable optimization is aggressive stack frame compression
-# aiming to minimize amount of 9-byte instructions...
-#
-# Yet another notable optimization is "jumping" $B variable. It means
-# that there is no register permanently allocated for $B value. This
-# allowed to eliminate one instruction from body_20_39...
-#
-my $Xi=4; # 4xSIMD Xupdate round, start pre-seeded
-my @X=map("xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); # pre-seeded for $Xi=4
-my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
-my $j=0; # hash round
-my @T=($T,$tmp1);
-my $inp;
-
-my $_rol=sub { &rol(@_) };
-my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) };
-
-&function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3");
- &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
- &set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop($tmp1);
- &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1));
-&set_label("ssse3_shortcut");
-
- &movdqa (@X[3],&QWP(0,$tmp1)); # K_00_19
- &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(16,$tmp1)); # K_20_39
- &movdqa (@X[5],&QWP(32,$tmp1)); # K_40_59
- &movdqa (@X[6],&QWP(48,$tmp1)); # K_60_79
- &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64,$tmp1)); # pbswap mask
-
- &mov ($E,&wparam(0)); # load argument block
- &mov ($inp=@T[1],&wparam(1));
- &mov ($D,&wparam(2));
- &mov (@T[0],"esp");
-
- # stack frame layout
- #
- # +0 X[0]+K X[1]+K X[2]+K X[3]+K # XMM->IALU xfer area
- # X[4]+K X[5]+K X[6]+K X[7]+K
- # X[8]+K X[9]+K X[10]+K X[11]+K
- # X[12]+K X[13]+K X[14]+K X[15]+K
- #
- # +64 X[0] X[1] X[2] X[3] # XMM->XMM backtrace area
- # X[4] X[5] X[6] X[7]
- # X[8] X[9] X[10] X[11] # even borrowed for K_00_19
- #
- # +112 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 # constants
- # K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59
- # K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79
- # K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19
- # pbswap mask
- #
- # +192 ctx # argument block
- # +196 inp
- # +200 end
- # +204 esp
- &sub ("esp",208);
- &and ("esp",-64);
-
- &movdqa (&QWP(112+0,"esp"), at X[4]); # copy constants
- &movdqa (&QWP(112+16,"esp"), at X[5]);
- &movdqa (&QWP(112+32,"esp"), at X[6]);
- &shl ($D,6); # len*64
- &movdqa (&QWP(112+48,"esp"), at X[3]);
- &add ($D,$inp); # end of input
- &movdqa (&QWP(112+64,"esp"), at X[2]);
- &add ($inp,64);
- &mov (&DWP(192+0,"esp"),$E); # save argument block
- &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
- &mov (&DWP(192+8,"esp"),$D);
- &mov (&DWP(192+12,"esp"), at T[0]); # save original %esp
-
- &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$E)); # load context
- &mov ($B,&DWP(4,$E));
- &mov ($C,&DWP(8,$E));
- &mov ($D,&DWP(12,$E));
- &mov ($E,&DWP(16,$E));
- &mov (@T[0],$B); # magic seed
-
- &movdqu (@X[-4&7],&QWP(-64,$inp)); # load input to %xmm[0-3]
- &movdqu (@X[-3&7],&QWP(-48,$inp));
- &movdqu (@X[-2&7],&QWP(-32,$inp));
- &movdqu (@X[-1&7],&QWP(-16,$inp));
- &pshufb (@X[-4&7], at X[2]); # byte swap
- &pshufb (@X[-3&7], at X[2]);
- &pshufb (@X[-2&7], at X[2]);
- &movdqa (&QWP(112-16,"esp"), at X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot
- &pshufb (@X[-1&7], at X[2]);
- &paddd (@X[-4&7], at X[3]); # add K_00_19
- &paddd (@X[-3&7], at X[3]);
- &paddd (@X[-2&7], at X[3]);
- &movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"), at X[-4&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
- &psubd (@X[-4&7], at X[3]); # restore X[]
- &movdqa (&QWP(0+16,"esp"), at X[-3&7]);
- &psubd (@X[-3&7], at X[3]);
- &movdqa (&QWP(0+32,"esp"), at X[-2&7]);
- &psubd (@X[-2&7], at X[3]);
- &movdqa (@X[0], at X[-3&7]);
- &jmp (&label("loop"));
-
-######################################################################
-# SSE instruction sequence is first broken to groups of indepentent
-# instructions, independent in respect to their inputs and shifter
-# (not all architectures have more than one). Then IALU instructions
-# are "knitted in" between the SSE groups. Distance is maintained for
-# SSE latency of 2 in hope that it fits better upcoming AMD Bulldozer
-# [which allegedly also implements SSSE3]...
-#
-# Temporary registers usage. X[2] is volatile at the entry and at the
-# end is restored from backtrace ring buffer. X[3] is expected to
-# contain current K_XX_XX constant and is used to caclulate X[-1]+K
-# from previous round, it becomes volatile the moment the value is
-# saved to stack for transfer to IALU. X[4] becomes volatile whenever
-# X[-4] is accumulated and offloaded to backtrace ring buffer, at the
-# end it is loaded with next K_XX_XX [which becomes X[3] in next
-# round]...
-#
-sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
-{ use integer;
- my $body = shift;
- my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions
- my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
-
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &palignr(@X[0], at X[-4&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]"
- &movdqa (@X[2], at X[-1&7]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &paddd (@X[3], at X[-1&7]);
- &movdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"), at X[-4&7]);# save X[] to backtrace buffer
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &psrldq (@X[2],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &pxor (@X[0], at X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &pxor (@X[2], at X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &pxor (@X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &movdqa (@X[4], at X[0]);
- &movdqa (@X[2], at X[0]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &pslldq (@X[4],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
- &paddd (@X[0], at X[0]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &psrld (@X[2],31);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &movdqa (@X[3], at X[4]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &psrld (@X[4],30);
- &por (@X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=1
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if ($Xi>5); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &pslld (@X[3],2);
- &pxor (@X[0], at X[4]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*(($Xi)/5),"esp")); # K_XX_XX
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &pxor (@X[0], at X[3]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]"<<96)<<<2
- &movdqa (@X[1], at X[-2&7]) if ($Xi<7);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any]
-
- $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[]
-}
-
-sub Xupdate_ssse3_32_79()
-{ use integer;
- my $body = shift;
- my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 48 instructions
- my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
-
- &movdqa (@X[2], at X[-1&7]) if ($Xi==8);
- eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
- &pxor (@X[0], at X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
- &palignr(@X[2], at X[-2&7],8); # compose "X[-6]"
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
-
- &pxor (@X[0], at X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
- &movdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"), at X[-4&7]); # save X[] to backtrace buffer
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- if ($Xi%5) {
- &movdqa (@X[4], at X[3]); # "perpetuate" K_XX_XX...
- } else { # ... or load next one
- &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*($Xi/5),"esp"));
- }
- &paddd (@X[3], at X[-1&7]);
- eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &pxor (@X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
- eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
-
- &movdqa (@X[2], at X[0]);
- &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &pslld (@X[0],2);
- eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &psrld (@X[2],30);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &por (@X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=2
- eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if($Xi<19); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
- &movdqa (@X[3], at X[0]) if ($Xi<19);
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions
-
- $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[]
-}
-
-sub Xuplast_ssse3_80()
-{ use integer;
- my $body = shift;
- my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
- my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
-
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &paddd (@X[3], at X[-1&7]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer IALU
-
- foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions
-
- &mov ($inp=@T[1],&DWP(192+4,"esp"));
- &cmp ($inp,&DWP(192+8,"esp"));
- &je (&label("done"));
-
- &movdqa (@X[3],&QWP(112+48,"esp")); # K_00_19
- &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(112+64,"esp")); # pbswap mask
- &movdqu (@X[-4&7],&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input
- &movdqu (@X[-3&7],&QWP(16,$inp));
- &movdqu (@X[-2&7],&QWP(32,$inp));
- &movdqu (@X[-1&7],&QWP(48,$inp));
- &add ($inp,64);
- &pshufb (@X[-4&7], at X[2]); # byte swap
- &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
- &movdqa (&QWP(112-16,"esp"), at X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot
-
- $Xi=0;
-}
-
-sub Xloop_ssse3()
-{ use integer;
- my $body = shift;
- my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
- my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
-
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &pshufb (@X[($Xi-3)&7], at X[2]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &paddd (@X[($Xi-4)&7], at X[3]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*$Xi,"esp"), at X[($Xi-4)&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &psubd (@X[($Xi-4)&7], at X[3]);
-
- foreach (@insns) { eval; }
- $Xi++;
-}
-
-sub Xtail_ssse3()
-{ use integer;
- my $body = shift;
- my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
- my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
-
- foreach (@insns) { eval; }
-}
-
-sub body_00_19 () {
- (
- '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
- '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer
- '&xor ($c,$d);',
- '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b in next round
- '&$_rol ($a,5);',
- '&and (@T[0],$c);', # ($b&($c^$d))
- '&xor ($c,$d);', # restore $c
- '&xor (@T[0],$d);',
- '&add ($e,$a);',
- '&$_ror ($b,$j?7:2);', # $b>>>2
- '&add ($e, at T[0]);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
- );
-}
-
-sub body_20_39 () {
- (
- '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
- '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j++&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer
- '&xor (@T[0],$d);', # ($b^$d)
- '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b in next round
- '&$_rol ($a,5);',
- '&xor (@T[0],$c);', # ($b^$d^$c)
- '&add ($e,$a);',
- '&$_ror ($b,7);', # $b>>>2
- '&add ($e, at T[0]);' .'unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
- );
-}
-
-sub body_40_59 () {
- (
- '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
- '&mov (@T[1],$c);',
- '&xor ($c,$d);',
- '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j++&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer
- '&and (@T[1],$d);',
- '&and (@T[0],$c);', # ($b&($c^$d))
- '&$_ror ($b,7);', # $b>>>2
- '&add ($e, at T[1]);',
- '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b in next round
- '&$_rol ($a,5);',
- '&add ($e, at T[0]);',
- '&xor ($c,$d);', # restore $c
- '&add ($e,$a);' .'unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
- );
-}
-
-&set_label("loop",16);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
- &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39); # can jump to "done"
-
- $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
-
- &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
- &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
- &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
-
- &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context
- &add ($A,&DWP(0, at T[1]));
- &add (@T[0],&DWP(4, at T[1])); # $b
- &add ($C,&DWP(8, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(0, at T[1]),$A);
- &add ($D,&DWP(12, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(4, at T[1]), at T[0]);
- &add ($E,&DWP(16, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(8, at T[1]),$C);
- &mov ($B, at T[0]);
- &mov (&DWP(12, at T[1]),$D);
- &mov (&DWP(16, at T[1]),$E);
- &movdqa (@X[0], at X[-3&7]);
-
- &jmp (&label("loop"));
-
-&set_label("done",16); $j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
-
- &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
- &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
- &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
-
- &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context
- &add ($A,&DWP(0, at T[1]));
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(192+12,"esp")); # restore %esp
- &add (@T[0],&DWP(4, at T[1])); # $b
- &add ($C,&DWP(8, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(0, at T[1]),$A);
- &add ($D,&DWP(12, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(4, at T[1]), at T[0]);
- &add ($E,&DWP(16, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(8, at T[1]),$C);
- &mov (&DWP(12, at T[1]),$D);
- &mov (&DWP(16, at T[1]),$E);
-
-&function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3");
-
-if ($ymm) {
-my $Xi=4; # 4xSIMD Xupdate round, start pre-seeded
-my @X=map("xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); # pre-seeded for $Xi=4
-my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
-my $j=0; # hash round
-my @T=($T,$tmp1);
-my $inp;
-
-my $_rol=sub { &shld(@_[0], at _) };
-my $_ror=sub { &shrd(@_[0], at _) };
-
-&function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_avx");
- &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
- &set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop($tmp1);
- &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1));
-&set_label("avx_shortcut");
- &vzeroall();
-
- &vmovdqa(@X[3],&QWP(0,$tmp1)); # K_00_19
- &vmovdqa(@X[4],&QWP(16,$tmp1)); # K_20_39
- &vmovdqa(@X[5],&QWP(32,$tmp1)); # K_40_59
- &vmovdqa(@X[6],&QWP(48,$tmp1)); # K_60_79
- &vmovdqa(@X[2],&QWP(64,$tmp1)); # pbswap mask
-
- &mov ($E,&wparam(0)); # load argument block
- &mov ($inp=@T[1],&wparam(1));
- &mov ($D,&wparam(2));
- &mov (@T[0],"esp");
-
- # stack frame layout
- #
- # +0 X[0]+K X[1]+K X[2]+K X[3]+K # XMM->IALU xfer area
- # X[4]+K X[5]+K X[6]+K X[7]+K
- # X[8]+K X[9]+K X[10]+K X[11]+K
- # X[12]+K X[13]+K X[14]+K X[15]+K
- #
- # +64 X[0] X[1] X[2] X[3] # XMM->XMM backtrace area
- # X[4] X[5] X[6] X[7]
- # X[8] X[9] X[10] X[11] # even borrowed for K_00_19
- #
- # +112 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 # constants
- # K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59
- # K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79
- # K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19
- # pbswap mask
- #
- # +192 ctx # argument block
- # +196 inp
- # +200 end
- # +204 esp
- &sub ("esp",208);
- &and ("esp",-64);
-
- &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+0,"esp"), at X[4]); # copy constants
- &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+16,"esp"), at X[5]);
- &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+32,"esp"), at X[6]);
- &shl ($D,6); # len*64
- &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+48,"esp"), at X[3]);
- &add ($D,$inp); # end of input
- &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+64,"esp"), at X[2]);
- &add ($inp,64);
- &mov (&DWP(192+0,"esp"),$E); # save argument block
- &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
- &mov (&DWP(192+8,"esp"),$D);
- &mov (&DWP(192+12,"esp"), at T[0]); # save original %esp
-
- &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$E)); # load context
- &mov ($B,&DWP(4,$E));
- &mov ($C,&DWP(8,$E));
- &mov ($D,&DWP(12,$E));
- &mov ($E,&DWP(16,$E));
- &mov (@T[0],$B); # magic seed
-
- &vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],&QWP(-64,$inp)); # load input to %xmm[0-3]
- &vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],&QWP(-48,$inp));
- &vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],&QWP(-32,$inp));
- &vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],&QWP(-16,$inp));
- &vpshufb(@X[-4&7], at X[-4&7], at X[2]); # byte swap
- &vpshufb(@X[-3&7], at X[-3&7], at X[2]);
- &vpshufb(@X[-2&7], at X[-2&7], at X[2]);
- &vmovdqa(&QWP(112-16,"esp"), at X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot
- &vpshufb(@X[-1&7], at X[-1&7], at X[2]);
- &vpaddd (@X[0], at X[-4&7], at X[3]); # add K_00_19
- &vpaddd (@X[1], at X[-3&7], at X[3]);
- &vpaddd (@X[2], at X[-2&7], at X[3]);
- &vmovdqa(&QWP(0,"esp"), at X[0]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
- &vmovdqa(&QWP(0+16,"esp"), at X[1]);
- &vmovdqa(&QWP(0+32,"esp"), at X[2]);
- &jmp (&label("loop"));
-
-sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
-{ use integer;
- my $body = shift;
- my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions
- my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
-
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vpalignr(@X[0], at X[-3&7], at X[-4&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]"
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpaddd (@X[3], at X[3], at X[-1&7]);
- &vmovdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"), at X[-4&7]);# save X[] to backtrace buffer
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vpsrldq(@X[2], at X[-1&7],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpxor (@X[2], at X[2], at X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpsrld (@X[2], at X[0],31);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpslldq(@X[4], at X[0],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
- &vpaddd (@X[0], at X[0], at X[0]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpsrld (@X[3], at X[4],30);
- &vpor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=1
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpslld (@X[4], at X[4],2);
- &vmovdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if ($Xi>5); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[3]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[4]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]"<<96)<<<2
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vmovdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*(($Xi)/5),"esp")); # K_XX_XX
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any]
-
- $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[]
-}
-
-sub Xupdate_avx_32_79()
-{ use integer;
- my $body = shift;
- my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 48 instructions
- my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
-
- &vpalignr(@X[2], at X[-1&7], at X[-2&7],8); # compose "X[-6]"
- &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
- eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
-
- &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
- &vmovdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"), at X[-4&7]); # save X[] to backtrace buffer
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- if ($Xi%5) {
- &vmovdqa (@X[4], at X[3]); # "perpetuate" K_XX_XX...
- } else { # ... or load next one
- &vmovdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*($Xi/5),"esp"));
- }
- &vpaddd (@X[3], at X[3], at X[-1&7]);
- eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
- eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
-
- &vpsrld (@X[2], at X[0],30);
- &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpslld (@X[0], at X[0],2);
- eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vpor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=2
- eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vmovdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if($Xi<19); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions
-
- $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[]
-}
-
-sub Xuplast_avx_80()
-{ use integer;
- my $body = shift;
- my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
- my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
-
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vpaddd (@X[3], at X[3], at X[-1&7]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer IALU
-
- foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions
-
- &mov ($inp=@T[1],&DWP(192+4,"esp"));
- &cmp ($inp,&DWP(192+8,"esp"));
- &je (&label("done"));
-
- &vmovdqa(@X[3],&QWP(112+48,"esp")); # K_00_19
- &vmovdqa(@X[2],&QWP(112+64,"esp")); # pbswap mask
- &vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input
- &vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],&QWP(16,$inp));
- &vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],&QWP(32,$inp));
- &vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],&QWP(48,$inp));
- &add ($inp,64);
- &vpshufb(@X[-4&7], at X[-4&7], at X[2]); # byte swap
- &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
- &vmovdqa(&QWP(112-16,"esp"), at X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot
-
- $Xi=0;
-}
-
-sub Xloop_avx()
-{ use integer;
- my $body = shift;
- my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
- my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
-
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vpshufb (@X[($Xi-3)&7], at X[($Xi-3)&7], at X[2]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vpaddd (@X[$Xi&7], at X[($Xi-4)&7], at X[3]);
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
- &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*$Xi,"esp"), at X[$Xi&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
- eval(shift(@insns));
- eval(shift(@insns));
-
- foreach (@insns) { eval; }
- $Xi++;
-}
-
-sub Xtail_avx()
-{ use integer;
- my $body = shift;
- my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
- my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
-
- foreach (@insns) { eval; }
-}
-
-&set_label("loop",16);
- &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
- &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
- &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
- &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
- &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
- &Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39); # can jump to "done"
-
- $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
-
- &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
- &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
- &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
-
- &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context
- &add ($A,&DWP(0, at T[1]));
- &add (@T[0],&DWP(4, at T[1])); # $b
- &add ($C,&DWP(8, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(0, at T[1]),$A);
- &add ($D,&DWP(12, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(4, at T[1]), at T[0]);
- &add ($E,&DWP(16, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(8, at T[1]),$C);
- &mov ($B, at T[0]);
- &mov (&DWP(12, at T[1]),$D);
- &mov (&DWP(16, at T[1]),$E);
-
- &jmp (&label("loop"));
-
-&set_label("done",16); $j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
-
- &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
- &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
- &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
-
- &vzeroall();
-
- &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context
- &add ($A,&DWP(0, at T[1]));
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(192+12,"esp")); # restore %esp
- &add (@T[0],&DWP(4, at T[1])); # $b
- &add ($C,&DWP(8, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(0, at T[1]),$A);
- &add ($D,&DWP(12, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(4, at T[1]), at T[0]);
- &add ($E,&DWP(16, at T[1]));
- &mov (&DWP(8, at T[1]),$C);
- &mov (&DWP(12, at T[1]),$D);
- &mov (&DWP(16, at T[1]),$E);
-&function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_avx");
-}
-&set_label("K_XX_XX",64);
-&data_word(0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999); # K_00_19
-&data_word(0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1); # K_20_39
-&data_word(0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc); # K_40_59
-&data_word(0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6); # K_60_79
-&data_word(0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f); # pbswap mask
-}
-&asciz("SHA1 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
-
-&asm_finish();
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1229 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+
+# ====================================================================
+# [Re]written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# "[Re]written" was achieved in two major overhauls. In 2004 BODY_*
+# functions were re-implemented to address P4 performance issue [see
+# commentary below], and in 2006 the rest was rewritten in order to
+# gain freedom to liberate licensing terms.
+
+# January, September 2004.
+#
+# It was noted that Intel IA-32 C compiler generates code which
+# performs ~30% *faster* on P4 CPU than original *hand-coded*
+# SHA1 assembler implementation. To address this problem (and
+# prove that humans are still better than machines:-), the
+# original code was overhauled, which resulted in following
+# performance changes:
+#
+# compared with original compared with Intel cc
+# assembler impl. generated code
+# Pentium -16% +48%
+# PIII/AMD +8% +16%
+# P4 +85%(!) +45%
+#
+# As you can see Pentium came out as looser:-( Yet I reckoned that
+# improvement on P4 outweights the loss and incorporate this
+# re-tuned code to 0.9.7 and later.
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------
+# <appro at fy.chalmers.se>
+
+# August 2009.
+#
+# George Spelvin has tipped that F_40_59(b,c,d) can be rewritten as
+# '(c&d) + (b&(c^d))', which allows to accumulate partial results
+# and lighten "pressure" on scratch registers. This resulted in
+# >12% performance improvement on contemporary AMD cores (with no
+# degradation on other CPUs:-). Also, the code was revised to maximize
+# "distance" between instructions producing input to 'lea' instruction
+# and the 'lea' instruction itself, which is essential for Intel Atom
+# core and resulted in ~15% improvement.
+
+# October 2010.
+#
+# Add SSSE3, Supplemental[!] SSE3, implementation. The idea behind it
+# is to offload message schedule denoted by Wt in NIST specification,
+# or Xupdate in OpenSSL source, to SIMD unit. The idea is not novel,
+# and in SSE2 context was first explored by Dean Gaudet in 2004, see
+# http://arctic.org/~dean/crypto/sha1.html. Since then several things
+# have changed that made it interesting again:
+#
+# a) XMM units became faster and wider;
+# b) instruction set became more versatile;
+# c) an important observation was made by Max Locktykhin, which made
+# it possible to reduce amount of instructions required to perform
+# the operation in question, for further details see
+# http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/improving-the-performance-of-the-secure-hash-algorithm-1/.
+
+# April 2011.
+#
+# Add AVX code path, probably most controversial... The thing is that
+# switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in
+# comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like
+# 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as
+# pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that
+# make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded
+# as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
+# equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1
+# cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used
+# to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer
+# [according to its optimization manual]. Which is why AVX code path
+# is guarded by *both* AVX and synthetic bit denoting Intel CPUs.
+# One can argue that it's unfair to AMD, but without 'sh[rl]d' it
+# makes no sense to keep the AVX code path. If somebody feels that
+# strongly, it's probably more appropriate to discuss possibility of
+# using vector rotate XOP on AMD...
+
+######################################################################
+# Current performance is summarized in following table. Numbers are
+# CPU clock cycles spent to process single byte (less is better).
+#
+# x86 SSSE3 AVX
+# Pentium 15.7 -
+# PIII 11.5 -
+# P4 10.6 -
+# AMD K8 7.1 -
+# Core2 7.3 6.1/+20% -
+# Atom 12.5 9.5(*)/+32% -
+# Westmere 7.3 5.6/+30% -
+# Sandy Bridge 8.8 6.2/+40% 5.1(**)/+70%
+#
+# (*) Loop is 1056 instructions long and expected result is ~8.25.
+# It remains mystery [to me] why ILP is limited to 1.7.
+#
+# (**) As per above comment, the result is for AVX *plus* sh[rl]d.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha1-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$xmm=$ymm=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $xmm=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm &&
+ `$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
+ =~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+ $1>=2.19); # first version supporting AVX
+
+$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32n" &&
+ `nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
+ $1>=2.03); # first version supporting AVX
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($xmm);
+
+
+$A="eax";
+$B="ebx";
+$C="ecx";
+$D="edx";
+$E="edi";
+$T="esi";
+$tmp1="ebp";
+
+ at V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$T);
+
+$alt=0; # 1 denotes alternative IALU implementation, which performs
+ # 8% *worse* on P4, same on Westmere and Atom, 2% better on
+ # Sandy Bridge...
+
+sub BODY_00_15
+ {
+ local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+
+ &comment("00_15 $n");
+
+ &mov($f,$c); # f to hold F_00_19(b,c,d)
+ if ($n==0) { &mov($tmp1,$a); }
+ else { &mov($a,$tmp1); }
+ &rotl($tmp1,5); # tmp1=ROTATE(a,5)
+ &xor($f,$d);
+ &add($tmp1,$e); # tmp1+=e;
+ &mov($e,&swtmp($n%16)); # e becomes volatile and is loaded
+ # with xi, also note that e becomes
+ # f in next round...
+ &and($f,$b);
+ &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
+ &xor($f,$d); # f holds F_00_19(b,c,d)
+ &lea($tmp1,&DWP(0x5a827999,$tmp1,$e)); # tmp1+=K_00_19+xi
+
+ if ($n==15) { &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16));# pre-fetch f for next round
+ &add($f,$tmp1); } # f+=tmp1
+ else { &add($tmp1,$f); } # f becomes a in next round
+ &mov($tmp1,$a) if ($alt && $n==15);
+ }
+
+sub BODY_16_19
+ {
+ local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+
+ &comment("16_19 $n");
+
+if ($alt) {
+ &xor($c,$d);
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+ &and($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_00_19(b,c,d), b&=c^d
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+ &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+ &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
+ &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+ &xor($c,$d); # restore $c
+ &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round
+ &rotr($b,$n==16?2:7); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
+ &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f
+ &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
+ &lea($f,&DWP(0x5a827999,$f,$e));# f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)+e
+ &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round
+ &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+} else {
+ &mov($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_00_19(b,c,d)
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+ &xor($tmp1,$d);
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+ &and($tmp1,$b);
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+ &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
+ &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+ &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_00_19(b,c,d)
+ &mov($tmp1,$a);
+ &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
+ &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f
+ &rotl($tmp1,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
+ &lea($f,&DWP(0x5a827999,$f,$e));# f+=F_00_19(b,c,d)+e
+ &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round
+ &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+}
+ }
+
+sub BODY_20_39
+ {
+ local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+ local $K=($n<40)?0x6ed9eba1:0xca62c1d6;
+
+ &comment("20_39 $n");
+
+if ($alt) {
+ &xor($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_20_39(b,c,d), b^=c
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+ &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1 holds F_20_39(b,c,d)
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+ &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_20_39(b,c,d)
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+ &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
+ &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round
+ &rotr($b,7); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
+ &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f) if($n<77);# xi=f
+ &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
+ &xor($b,$c) if($n==39);# warm up for BODY_40_59
+ &and($tmp1,$b) if($n==39);
+ &lea($f,&DWP($K,$f,$e)); # f+=e+K_XX_YY
+ &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)) if($n<79);# pre-fetch f for next round
+ &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+ &rotr($a,5) if ($n==79);
+} else {
+ &mov($tmp1,$b); # tmp1 to hold F_20_39(b,c,d)
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+ &xor($tmp1,$c);
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+ &xor($tmp1,$d); # tmp1 holds F_20_39(b,c,d)
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+ &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
+ &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=F_20_39(b,c,d)
+ &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
+ &mov($tmp1,$a);
+ &rotl($tmp1,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
+ &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f) if($n<77);# xi=f
+ &lea($f,&DWP($K,$f,$e)); # f+=e+K_XX_YY
+ &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)) if($n<79);# pre-fetch f for next round
+ &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+}
+ }
+
+sub BODY_40_59
+ {
+ local($n,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f)=@_;
+
+ &comment("40_59 $n");
+
+if ($alt) {
+ &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=b&(c^d)
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+ &mov($tmp1,$d);
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+ &xor($c,$d); # restore $c
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+ &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
+ &and($tmp1,$c);
+ &rotr($b,7); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
+ &add($e,$tmp1); # e+=c&d
+ &mov($tmp1,$a); # b in next round
+ &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f
+ &rotl($a,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
+ &xor($b,$c) if ($n<59);
+ &and($tmp1,$b) if ($n<59);# tmp1 to hold F_40_59(b,c,d)
+ &lea($f,&DWP(0x8f1bbcdc,$f,$e));# f+=K_40_59+e+(b&(c^d))
+ &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round
+ &add($f,$a); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+} else {
+ &mov($tmp1,$c); # tmp1 to hold F_40_59(b,c,d)
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+2)%16)); # f to hold Xupdate(xi,xa,xb,xc,xd)
+ &xor($tmp1,$d);
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+8)%16));
+ &and($tmp1,$b);
+ &xor($f,&swtmp(($n+13)%16)); # f holds xa^xb^xc^xd
+ &rotl($f,1); # f=ROTATE(f,1)
+ &add($tmp1,$e); # b&(c^d)+=e
+ &rotr($b,2); # b=ROTATE(b,30)
+ &mov($e,$a); # e becomes volatile
+ &rotl($e,5); # ROTATE(a,5)
+ &mov(&swtmp($n%16),$f); # xi=f
+ &lea($f,&DWP(0x8f1bbcdc,$f,$tmp1));# f+=K_40_59+e+(b&(c^d))
+ &mov($tmp1,$c);
+ &add($f,$e); # f+=ROTATE(a,5)
+ &and($tmp1,$d);
+ &mov($e,&swtmp(($n+1)%16)); # pre-fetch f for next round
+ &add($f,$tmp1); # f+=c&d
+}
+ }
+
+&function_begin("sha1_block_data_order");
+if ($xmm) {
+ &static_label("ssse3_shortcut");
+ &static_label("avx_shortcut") if ($ymm);
+ &static_label("K_XX_XX");
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
+ &set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop($tmp1);
+ &picmeup($T,"OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$tmp1,&label("pic_point"));
+ &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1));
+
+ &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$T));
+ &mov ($D,&DWP(4,$T));
+ &test ($D,1<<9); # check SSSE3 bit
+ &jz (&label("x86"));
+ &test ($A,1<<24); # check FXSR bit
+ &jz (&label("x86"));
+ if ($ymm) {
+ &and ($D,1<<28); # mask AVX bit
+ &and ($A,1<<30); # mask "Intel CPU" bit
+ &or ($A,$D);
+ &cmp ($A,1<<28|1<<30);
+ &je (&label("avx_shortcut"));
+ }
+ &jmp (&label("ssse3_shortcut"));
+ &set_label("x86",16);
+}
+ &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); # SHA_CTX *c
+ &mov($T,&wparam(1)); # const void *input
+ &mov($A,&wparam(2)); # size_t num
+ &stack_push(16+3); # allocate X[16]
+ &shl($A,6);
+ &add($A,$T);
+ &mov(&wparam(2),$A); # pointer beyond the end of input
+ &mov($E,&DWP(16,$tmp1));# pre-load E
+ &jmp(&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+
+ # copy input chunk to X, but reversing byte order!
+ for ($i=0; $i<16; $i+=4)
+ {
+ &mov($A,&DWP(4*($i+0),$T));
+ &mov($B,&DWP(4*($i+1),$T));
+ &mov($C,&DWP(4*($i+2),$T));
+ &mov($D,&DWP(4*($i+3),$T));
+ &bswap($A);
+ &bswap($B);
+ &bswap($C);
+ &bswap($D);
+ &mov(&swtmp($i+0),$A);
+ &mov(&swtmp($i+1),$B);
+ &mov(&swtmp($i+2),$C);
+ &mov(&swtmp($i+3),$D);
+ }
+ &mov(&wparam(1),$T); # redundant in 1st spin
+
+ &mov($A,&DWP(0,$tmp1)); # load SHA_CTX
+ &mov($B,&DWP(4,$tmp1));
+ &mov($C,&DWP(8,$tmp1));
+ &mov($D,&DWP(12,$tmp1));
+ # E is pre-loaded
+
+ for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &BODY_00_15($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+ for(;$i<20;$i++) { &BODY_16_19($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+ for(;$i<40;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+ for(;$i<60;$i++) { &BODY_40_59($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+ for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+ (($V[5] eq $D) and ($V[0] eq $E)) or die; # double-check
+
+ &mov($tmp1,&wparam(0)); # re-load SHA_CTX*
+ &mov($D,&wparam(1)); # D is last "T" and is discarded
+
+ &add($E,&DWP(0,$tmp1)); # E is last "A"...
+ &add($T,&DWP(4,$tmp1));
+ &add($A,&DWP(8,$tmp1));
+ &add($B,&DWP(12,$tmp1));
+ &add($C,&DWP(16,$tmp1));
+
+ &mov(&DWP(0,$tmp1),$E); # update SHA_CTX
+ &add($D,64); # advance input pointer
+ &mov(&DWP(4,$tmp1),$T);
+ &cmp($D,&wparam(2)); # have we reached the end yet?
+ &mov(&DWP(8,$tmp1),$A);
+ &mov($E,$C); # C is last "E" which needs to be "pre-loaded"
+ &mov(&DWP(12,$tmp1),$B);
+ &mov($T,$D); # input pointer
+ &mov(&DWP(16,$tmp1),$C);
+ &jb(&label("loop"));
+
+ &stack_pop(16+3);
+&function_end("sha1_block_data_order");
+
+if ($xmm) {
+######################################################################
+# The SSSE3 implementation.
+#
+# %xmm[0-7] are used as ring @X[] buffer containing quadruples of last
+# 32 elements of the message schedule or Xupdate outputs. First 4
+# quadruples are simply byte-swapped input, next 4 are calculated
+# according to method originally suggested by Dean Gaudet (modulo
+# being implemented in SSSE3). Once 8 quadruples or 32 elements are
+# collected, it switches to routine proposed by Max Locktyukhin.
+#
+# Calculations inevitably require temporary reqisters, and there are
+# no %xmm registers left to spare. For this reason part of the ring
+# buffer, X[2..4] to be specific, is offloaded to 3 quadriples ring
+# buffer on the stack. Keep in mind that X[2] is alias X[-6], X[3] -
+# X[-5], and X[4] - X[-4]...
+#
+# Another notable optimization is aggressive stack frame compression
+# aiming to minimize amount of 9-byte instructions...
+#
+# Yet another notable optimization is "jumping" $B variable. It means
+# that there is no register permanently allocated for $B value. This
+# allowed to eliminate one instruction from body_20_39...
+#
+my $Xi=4; # 4xSIMD Xupdate round, start pre-seeded
+my @X=map("xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); # pre-seeded for $Xi=4
+my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+my $j=0; # hash round
+my @T=($T,$tmp1);
+my $inp;
+
+my $_rol=sub { &rol(@_) };
+my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) };
+
+&function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3");
+ &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
+ &set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop($tmp1);
+ &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1));
+&set_label("ssse3_shortcut");
+
+ &movdqa (@X[3],&QWP(0,$tmp1)); # K_00_19
+ &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(16,$tmp1)); # K_20_39
+ &movdqa (@X[5],&QWP(32,$tmp1)); # K_40_59
+ &movdqa (@X[6],&QWP(48,$tmp1)); # K_60_79
+ &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64,$tmp1)); # pbswap mask
+
+ &mov ($E,&wparam(0)); # load argument block
+ &mov ($inp=@T[1],&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($D,&wparam(2));
+ &mov (@T[0],"esp");
+
+ # stack frame layout
+ #
+ # +0 X[0]+K X[1]+K X[2]+K X[3]+K # XMM->IALU xfer area
+ # X[4]+K X[5]+K X[6]+K X[7]+K
+ # X[8]+K X[9]+K X[10]+K X[11]+K
+ # X[12]+K X[13]+K X[14]+K X[15]+K
+ #
+ # +64 X[0] X[1] X[2] X[3] # XMM->XMM backtrace area
+ # X[4] X[5] X[6] X[7]
+ # X[8] X[9] X[10] X[11] # even borrowed for K_00_19
+ #
+ # +112 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 # constants
+ # K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59
+ # K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79
+ # K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19
+ # pbswap mask
+ #
+ # +192 ctx # argument block
+ # +196 inp
+ # +200 end
+ # +204 esp
+ &sub ("esp",208);
+ &and ("esp",-64);
+
+ &movdqa (&QWP(112+0,"esp"), at X[4]); # copy constants
+ &movdqa (&QWP(112+16,"esp"), at X[5]);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(112+32,"esp"), at X[6]);
+ &shl ($D,6); # len*64
+ &movdqa (&QWP(112+48,"esp"), at X[3]);
+ &add ($D,$inp); # end of input
+ &movdqa (&QWP(112+64,"esp"), at X[2]);
+ &add ($inp,64);
+ &mov (&DWP(192+0,"esp"),$E); # save argument block
+ &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
+ &mov (&DWP(192+8,"esp"),$D);
+ &mov (&DWP(192+12,"esp"), at T[0]); # save original %esp
+
+ &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$E)); # load context
+ &mov ($B,&DWP(4,$E));
+ &mov ($C,&DWP(8,$E));
+ &mov ($D,&DWP(12,$E));
+ &mov ($E,&DWP(16,$E));
+ &mov (@T[0],$B); # magic seed
+
+ &movdqu (@X[-4&7],&QWP(-64,$inp)); # load input to %xmm[0-3]
+ &movdqu (@X[-3&7],&QWP(-48,$inp));
+ &movdqu (@X[-2&7],&QWP(-32,$inp));
+ &movdqu (@X[-1&7],&QWP(-16,$inp));
+ &pshufb (@X[-4&7], at X[2]); # byte swap
+ &pshufb (@X[-3&7], at X[2]);
+ &pshufb (@X[-2&7], at X[2]);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(112-16,"esp"), at X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot
+ &pshufb (@X[-1&7], at X[2]);
+ &paddd (@X[-4&7], at X[3]); # add K_00_19
+ &paddd (@X[-3&7], at X[3]);
+ &paddd (@X[-2&7], at X[3]);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"), at X[-4&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
+ &psubd (@X[-4&7], at X[3]); # restore X[]
+ &movdqa (&QWP(0+16,"esp"), at X[-3&7]);
+ &psubd (@X[-3&7], at X[3]);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(0+32,"esp"), at X[-2&7]);
+ &psubd (@X[-2&7], at X[3]);
+ &movdqa (@X[0], at X[-3&7]);
+ &jmp (&label("loop"));
+
+######################################################################
+# SSE instruction sequence is first broken to groups of indepentent
+# instructions, independent in respect to their inputs and shifter
+# (not all architectures have more than one). Then IALU instructions
+# are "knitted in" between the SSE groups. Distance is maintained for
+# SSE latency of 2 in hope that it fits better upcoming AMD Bulldozer
+# [which allegedly also implements SSSE3]...
+#
+# Temporary registers usage. X[2] is volatile at the entry and at the
+# end is restored from backtrace ring buffer. X[3] is expected to
+# contain current K_XX_XX constant and is used to caclulate X[-1]+K
+# from previous round, it becomes volatile the moment the value is
+# saved to stack for transfer to IALU. X[4] becomes volatile whenever
+# X[-4] is accumulated and offloaded to backtrace ring buffer, at the
+# end it is loaded with next K_XX_XX [which becomes X[3] in next
+# round]...
+#
+sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
+{ use integer;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions
+ my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &palignr(@X[0], at X[-4&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]"
+ &movdqa (@X[2], at X[-1&7]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &paddd (@X[3], at X[-1&7]);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"), at X[-4&7]);# save X[] to backtrace buffer
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &psrldq (@X[2],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &pxor (@X[0], at X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &pxor (@X[2], at X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &pxor (@X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &movdqa (@X[4], at X[0]);
+ &movdqa (@X[2], at X[0]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &pslldq (@X[4],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+ &paddd (@X[0], at X[0]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &psrld (@X[2],31);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &movdqa (@X[3], at X[4]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &psrld (@X[4],30);
+ &por (@X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=1
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if ($Xi>5); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &pslld (@X[3],2);
+ &pxor (@X[0], at X[4]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*(($Xi)/5),"esp")); # K_XX_XX
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &pxor (@X[0], at X[3]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]"<<96)<<<2
+ &movdqa (@X[1], at X[-2&7]) if ($Xi<7);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any]
+
+ $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_ssse3_32_79()
+{ use integer;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 48 instructions
+ my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+ &movdqa (@X[2], at X[-1&7]) if ($Xi==8);
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
+ &pxor (@X[0], at X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
+ &palignr(@X[2], at X[-2&7],8); # compose "X[-6]"
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
+
+ &pxor (@X[0], at X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
+ &movdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"), at X[-4&7]); # save X[] to backtrace buffer
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ if ($Xi%5) {
+ &movdqa (@X[4], at X[3]); # "perpetuate" K_XX_XX...
+ } else { # ... or load next one
+ &movdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*($Xi/5),"esp"));
+ }
+ &paddd (@X[3], at X[-1&7]);
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &pxor (@X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
+
+ &movdqa (@X[2], at X[0]);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &pslld (@X[0],2);
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &psrld (@X[2],30);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &por (@X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=2
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if($Xi<19); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
+ &movdqa (@X[3], at X[0]) if ($Xi<19);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions
+
+ $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xuplast_ssse3_80()
+{ use integer;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
+ my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &paddd (@X[3], at X[-1&7]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer IALU
+
+ foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions
+
+ &mov ($inp=@T[1],&DWP(192+4,"esp"));
+ &cmp ($inp,&DWP(192+8,"esp"));
+ &je (&label("done"));
+
+ &movdqa (@X[3],&QWP(112+48,"esp")); # K_00_19
+ &movdqa (@X[2],&QWP(112+64,"esp")); # pbswap mask
+ &movdqu (@X[-4&7],&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input
+ &movdqu (@X[-3&7],&QWP(16,$inp));
+ &movdqu (@X[-2&7],&QWP(32,$inp));
+ &movdqu (@X[-1&7],&QWP(48,$inp));
+ &add ($inp,64);
+ &pshufb (@X[-4&7], at X[2]); # byte swap
+ &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
+ &movdqa (&QWP(112-16,"esp"), at X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot
+
+ $Xi=0;
+}
+
+sub Xloop_ssse3()
+{ use integer;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
+ my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &pshufb (@X[($Xi-3)&7], at X[2]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &paddd (@X[($Xi-4)&7], at X[3]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &movdqa (&QWP(0+16*$Xi,"esp"), at X[($Xi-4)&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &psubd (@X[($Xi-4)&7], at X[3]);
+
+ foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+ $Xi++;
+}
+
+sub Xtail_ssse3()
+{ use integer;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
+ my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+ foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+}
+
+sub body_00_19 () {
+ (
+ '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+ '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer
+ '&xor ($c,$d);',
+ '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b in next round
+ '&$_rol ($a,5);',
+ '&and (@T[0],$c);', # ($b&($c^$d))
+ '&xor ($c,$d);', # restore $c
+ '&xor (@T[0],$d);',
+ '&add ($e,$a);',
+ '&$_ror ($b,$j?7:2);', # $b>>>2
+ '&add ($e, at T[0]);' .'$j++; unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+ );
+}
+
+sub body_20_39 () {
+ (
+ '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+ '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j++&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer
+ '&xor (@T[0],$d);', # ($b^$d)
+ '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b in next round
+ '&$_rol ($a,5);',
+ '&xor (@T[0],$c);', # ($b^$d^$c)
+ '&add ($e,$a);',
+ '&$_ror ($b,7);', # $b>>>2
+ '&add ($e, at T[0]);' .'unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+ );
+}
+
+sub body_40_59 () {
+ (
+ '($a,$b,$c,$d,$e)=@V;'.
+ '&mov (@T[1],$c);',
+ '&xor ($c,$d);',
+ '&add ($e,&DWP(4*($j++&15),"esp"));', # X[]+K xfer
+ '&and (@T[1],$d);',
+ '&and (@T[0],$c);', # ($b&($c^$d))
+ '&$_ror ($b,7);', # $b>>>2
+ '&add ($e, at T[1]);',
+ '&mov (@T[1],$a);', # $b in next round
+ '&$_rol ($a,5);',
+ '&add ($e, at T[0]);',
+ '&xor ($c,$d);', # restore $c
+ '&add ($e,$a);' .'unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@T,pop(@T));'
+ );
+}
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_00_19);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+ &Xupdate_ssse3_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xuplast_ssse3_80(\&body_20_39); # can jump to "done"
+
+ $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
+
+ &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xloop_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+
+ &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context
+ &add ($A,&DWP(0, at T[1]));
+ &add (@T[0],&DWP(4, at T[1])); # $b
+ &add ($C,&DWP(8, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(0, at T[1]),$A);
+ &add ($D,&DWP(12, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(4, at T[1]), at T[0]);
+ &add ($E,&DWP(16, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(8, at T[1]),$C);
+ &mov ($B, at T[0]);
+ &mov (&DWP(12, at T[1]),$D);
+ &mov (&DWP(16, at T[1]),$E);
+ &movdqa (@X[0], at X[-3&7]);
+
+ &jmp (&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("done",16); $j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
+
+ &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xtail_ssse3(\&body_20_39);
+
+ &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context
+ &add ($A,&DWP(0, at T[1]));
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(192+12,"esp")); # restore %esp
+ &add (@T[0],&DWP(4, at T[1])); # $b
+ &add ($C,&DWP(8, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(0, at T[1]),$A);
+ &add ($D,&DWP(12, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(4, at T[1]), at T[0]);
+ &add ($E,&DWP(16, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(8, at T[1]),$C);
+ &mov (&DWP(12, at T[1]),$D);
+ &mov (&DWP(16, at T[1]),$E);
+
+&function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_ssse3");
+
+if ($ymm) {
+my $Xi=4; # 4xSIMD Xupdate round, start pre-seeded
+my @X=map("xmm$_",(4..7,0..3)); # pre-seeded for $Xi=4
+my @V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E);
+my $j=0; # hash round
+my @T=($T,$tmp1);
+my $inp;
+
+my $_rol=sub { &shld(@_[0], at _) };
+my $_ror=sub { &shrd(@_[0], at _) };
+
+&function_begin("_sha1_block_data_order_avx");
+ &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
+ &set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop($tmp1);
+ &lea ($tmp1,&DWP(&label("K_XX_XX")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tmp1));
+&set_label("avx_shortcut");
+ &vzeroall();
+
+ &vmovdqa(@X[3],&QWP(0,$tmp1)); # K_00_19
+ &vmovdqa(@X[4],&QWP(16,$tmp1)); # K_20_39
+ &vmovdqa(@X[5],&QWP(32,$tmp1)); # K_40_59
+ &vmovdqa(@X[6],&QWP(48,$tmp1)); # K_60_79
+ &vmovdqa(@X[2],&QWP(64,$tmp1)); # pbswap mask
+
+ &mov ($E,&wparam(0)); # load argument block
+ &mov ($inp=@T[1],&wparam(1));
+ &mov ($D,&wparam(2));
+ &mov (@T[0],"esp");
+
+ # stack frame layout
+ #
+ # +0 X[0]+K X[1]+K X[2]+K X[3]+K # XMM->IALU xfer area
+ # X[4]+K X[5]+K X[6]+K X[7]+K
+ # X[8]+K X[9]+K X[10]+K X[11]+K
+ # X[12]+K X[13]+K X[14]+K X[15]+K
+ #
+ # +64 X[0] X[1] X[2] X[3] # XMM->XMM backtrace area
+ # X[4] X[5] X[6] X[7]
+ # X[8] X[9] X[10] X[11] # even borrowed for K_00_19
+ #
+ # +112 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 K_20_39 # constants
+ # K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59 K_40_59
+ # K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79 K_60_79
+ # K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19 K_00_19
+ # pbswap mask
+ #
+ # +192 ctx # argument block
+ # +196 inp
+ # +200 end
+ # +204 esp
+ &sub ("esp",208);
+ &and ("esp",-64);
+
+ &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+0,"esp"), at X[4]); # copy constants
+ &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+16,"esp"), at X[5]);
+ &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+32,"esp"), at X[6]);
+ &shl ($D,6); # len*64
+ &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+48,"esp"), at X[3]);
+ &add ($D,$inp); # end of input
+ &vmovdqa(&QWP(112+64,"esp"), at X[2]);
+ &add ($inp,64);
+ &mov (&DWP(192+0,"esp"),$E); # save argument block
+ &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
+ &mov (&DWP(192+8,"esp"),$D);
+ &mov (&DWP(192+12,"esp"), at T[0]); # save original %esp
+
+ &mov ($A,&DWP(0,$E)); # load context
+ &mov ($B,&DWP(4,$E));
+ &mov ($C,&DWP(8,$E));
+ &mov ($D,&DWP(12,$E));
+ &mov ($E,&DWP(16,$E));
+ &mov (@T[0],$B); # magic seed
+
+ &vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],&QWP(-64,$inp)); # load input to %xmm[0-3]
+ &vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],&QWP(-48,$inp));
+ &vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],&QWP(-32,$inp));
+ &vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],&QWP(-16,$inp));
+ &vpshufb(@X[-4&7], at X[-4&7], at X[2]); # byte swap
+ &vpshufb(@X[-3&7], at X[-3&7], at X[2]);
+ &vpshufb(@X[-2&7], at X[-2&7], at X[2]);
+ &vmovdqa(&QWP(112-16,"esp"), at X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot
+ &vpshufb(@X[-1&7], at X[-1&7], at X[2]);
+ &vpaddd (@X[0], at X[-4&7], at X[3]); # add K_00_19
+ &vpaddd (@X[1], at X[-3&7], at X[3]);
+ &vpaddd (@X[2], at X[-2&7], at X[3]);
+ &vmovdqa(&QWP(0,"esp"), at X[0]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
+ &vmovdqa(&QWP(0+16,"esp"), at X[1]);
+ &vmovdqa(&QWP(0+32,"esp"), at X[2]);
+ &jmp (&label("loop"));
+
+sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
+{ use integer;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions
+ my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vpalignr(@X[0], at X[-3&7], at X[-4&7],8); # compose "X[-14]" in "X[0]"
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpaddd (@X[3], at X[3], at X[-1&7]);
+ &vmovdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"), at X[-4&7]);# save X[] to backtrace buffer
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vpsrldq(@X[2], at X[-1&7],4); # "X[-3]", 3 dwords
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-16]"
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpxor (@X[2], at X[2], at X[-2&7]); # "X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-3]"^"X[-8]"
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpsrld (@X[2], at X[0],31);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpslldq(@X[4], at X[0],12); # "X[0]"<<96, extract one dword
+ &vpaddd (@X[0], at X[0], at X[0]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpsrld (@X[3], at X[4],30);
+ &vpor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=1
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpslld (@X[4], at X[4],2);
+ &vmovdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if ($Xi>5); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[3]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[4]); # "X[0]"^=("X[0]"<<96)<<<2
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vmovdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*(($Xi)/5),"esp")); # K_XX_XX
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions [if any]
+
+ $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xupdate_avx_32_79()
+{ use integer;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 to 48 instructions
+ my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+ &vpalignr(@X[2], at X[-1&7], at X[-2&7],8); # compose "X[-6]"
+ &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[-4&7]); # "X[0]"="X[-32]"^"X[-16]"
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
+
+ &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[-7&7]); # "X[0]"^="X[-28]"
+ &vmovdqa (&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-4)%3),"esp"), at X[-4&7]); # save X[] to backtrace buffer
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ if ($Xi%5) {
+ &vmovdqa (@X[4], at X[3]); # "perpetuate" K_XX_XX...
+ } else { # ... or load next one
+ &vmovdqa (@X[4],&QWP(112-16+16*($Xi/5),"esp"));
+ }
+ &vpaddd (@X[3], at X[3], at X[-1&7]);
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpxor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"^="X[-6]"
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
+
+ &vpsrld (@X[2], at X[0],30);
+ &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpslld (@X[0], at X[0],2);
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vpor (@X[0], at X[0], at X[2]); # "X[0]"<<<=2
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # body_20_39
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vmovdqa (@X[2],&QWP(64+16*(($Xi-6)%3),"esp")) if($Xi<19); # restore X[] from backtrace buffer
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # rol
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns)); # ror
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions
+
+ $Xi++; push(@X,shift(@X)); # "rotate" X[]
+}
+
+sub Xuplast_avx_80()
+{ use integer;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
+ my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vpaddd (@X[3], at X[3], at X[-1&7]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*(($Xi-1)&3),"esp"), at X[3]); # X[]+K xfer IALU
+
+ foreach (@insns) { eval; } # remaining instructions
+
+ &mov ($inp=@T[1],&DWP(192+4,"esp"));
+ &cmp ($inp,&DWP(192+8,"esp"));
+ &je (&label("done"));
+
+ &vmovdqa(@X[3],&QWP(112+48,"esp")); # K_00_19
+ &vmovdqa(@X[2],&QWP(112+64,"esp")); # pbswap mask
+ &vmovdqu(@X[-4&7],&QWP(0,$inp)); # load input
+ &vmovdqu(@X[-3&7],&QWP(16,$inp));
+ &vmovdqu(@X[-2&7],&QWP(32,$inp));
+ &vmovdqu(@X[-1&7],&QWP(48,$inp));
+ &add ($inp,64);
+ &vpshufb(@X[-4&7], at X[-4&7], at X[2]); # byte swap
+ &mov (&DWP(192+4,"esp"),$inp);
+ &vmovdqa(&QWP(112-16,"esp"), at X[3]); # borrow last backtrace slot
+
+ $Xi=0;
+}
+
+sub Xloop_avx()
+{ use integer;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
+ my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vpshufb (@X[($Xi-3)&7], at X[($Xi-3)&7], at X[2]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vpaddd (@X[$Xi&7], at X[($Xi-4)&7], at X[3]);
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ &vmovdqa (&QWP(0+16*$Xi,"esp"), at X[$Xi&7]); # X[]+K xfer to IALU
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+ eval(shift(@insns));
+
+ foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+ $Xi++;
+}
+
+sub Xtail_avx()
+{ use integer;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 32 instructions
+ my ($a,$b,$c,$d,$e);
+
+ foreach (@insns) { eval; }
+}
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+ &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+ &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+ &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+ &Xupdate_avx_16_31(\&body_00_19);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_00_19);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_40_59);
+ &Xupdate_avx_32_79(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xuplast_avx_80(\&body_20_39); # can jump to "done"
+
+ $saved_j=$j; @saved_V=@V;
+
+ &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xloop_avx(\&body_20_39);
+
+ &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context
+ &add ($A,&DWP(0, at T[1]));
+ &add (@T[0],&DWP(4, at T[1])); # $b
+ &add ($C,&DWP(8, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(0, at T[1]),$A);
+ &add ($D,&DWP(12, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(4, at T[1]), at T[0]);
+ &add ($E,&DWP(16, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(8, at T[1]),$C);
+ &mov ($B, at T[0]);
+ &mov (&DWP(12, at T[1]),$D);
+ &mov (&DWP(16, at T[1]),$E);
+
+ &jmp (&label("loop"));
+
+&set_label("done",16); $j=$saved_j; @V=@saved_V;
+
+ &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+ &Xtail_avx(\&body_20_39);
+
+ &vzeroall();
+
+ &mov (@T[1],&DWP(192,"esp")); # update context
+ &add ($A,&DWP(0, at T[1]));
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(192+12,"esp")); # restore %esp
+ &add (@T[0],&DWP(4, at T[1])); # $b
+ &add ($C,&DWP(8, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(0, at T[1]),$A);
+ &add ($D,&DWP(12, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(4, at T[1]), at T[0]);
+ &add ($E,&DWP(16, at T[1]));
+ &mov (&DWP(8, at T[1]),$C);
+ &mov (&DWP(12, at T[1]),$D);
+ &mov (&DWP(16, at T[1]),$E);
+&function_end("_sha1_block_data_order_avx");
+}
+&set_label("K_XX_XX",64);
+&data_word(0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999,0x5a827999); # K_00_19
+&data_word(0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1,0x6ed9eba1); # K_20_39
+&data_word(0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc,0x8f1bbcdc); # K_40_59
+&data_word(0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6,0xca62c1d6); # K_60_79
+&data_word(0x00010203,0x04050607,0x08090a0b,0x0c0d0e0f); # pbswap mask
+}
+&asciz("SHA1 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# SHA256 block transform for x86. September 2007.
-#
-# Performance in clock cycles per processed byte (less is better):
-#
-# Pentium PIII P4 AMD K8 Core2
-# gcc 46 36 41 27 26
-# icc 57 33 38 25 23
-# x86 asm 40 30 33 20 18
-# x86_64 asm(*) - - 21 16 16
-#
-# (*) x86_64 assembler performance is presented for reference
-# purposes.
-#
-# Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from
-# 10% to 40% [see above]. Not very impressive on some \xB5-archs, but
-# it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes.
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
-require "x86asm.pl";
-
-&asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha512-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
-
-$A="eax";
-$E="edx";
-$T="ebx";
-$Aoff=&DWP(0,"esp");
-$Boff=&DWP(4,"esp");
-$Coff=&DWP(8,"esp");
-$Doff=&DWP(12,"esp");
-$Eoff=&DWP(16,"esp");
-$Foff=&DWP(20,"esp");
-$Goff=&DWP(24,"esp");
-$Hoff=&DWP(28,"esp");
-$Xoff=&DWP(32,"esp");
-$K256="ebp";
-
-sub BODY_00_15() {
- my $in_16_63=shift;
-
- &mov ("ecx",$E);
- &add ($T,"edi") if ($in_16_63); # T += sigma1(X[-2])
- &ror ("ecx",25-11);
- &mov ("esi",$Foff);
- &xor ("ecx",$E);
- &ror ("ecx",11-6);
- &mov (&DWP(4*(8+15),"esp"),$T) if ($in_16_63); # save X[0]
- &xor ("ecx",$E);
- &ror ("ecx",6); # Sigma1(e)
- &mov ("edi",$Goff);
- &add ($T,"ecx"); # T += Sigma1(e)
-
- &xor ("esi","edi");
- &mov ($Eoff,$E); # modulo-scheduled
- &mov ("ecx",$A);
- &and ("esi",$E);
- &mov ($E,$Doff); # e becomes d, which is e in next iteration
- &xor ("esi","edi"); # Ch(e,f,g)
- &mov ("edi",$A);
- &add ($T,"esi"); # T += Ch(e,f,g)
-
- &ror ("ecx",22-13);
- &add ($T,$Hoff); # T += h
- &xor ("ecx",$A);
- &ror ("ecx",13-2);
- &mov ("esi",$Boff);
- &xor ("ecx",$A);
- &ror ("ecx",2); # Sigma0(a)
- &add ($E,$T); # d += T
- &mov ("edi",$Coff);
-
- &add ($T,"ecx"); # T += Sigma0(a)
- &mov ($Aoff,$A); # modulo-scheduled
-
- &mov ("ecx",$A);
- &sub ("esp",4);
- &or ($A,"esi"); # a becomes h, which is a in next iteration
- &and ("ecx","esi");
- &and ($A,"edi");
- &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,$K256));
- &or ($A,"ecx"); # h=Maj(a,b,c)
-
- &add ($K256,4);
- &add ($A,$T); # h += T
- &mov ($T,&DWP(4*(8+15+16-1),"esp")) if ($in_16_63); # preload T
- &add ($E,"esi"); # d += K256[i]
- &add ($A,"esi"); # h += K256[i]
-}
-
-&function_begin("sha256_block_data_order");
- &mov ("esi",wparam(0)); # ctx
- &mov ("edi",wparam(1)); # inp
- &mov ("eax",wparam(2)); # num
- &mov ("ebx","esp"); # saved sp
-
- &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
-&set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop($K256);
- &lea ($K256,&DWP(&label("K256")."-".&label("pic_point"),$K256));
-
- &sub ("esp",16);
- &and ("esp",-64);
-
- &shl ("eax",6);
- &add ("eax","edi");
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"esi"); # ctx
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"edi"); # inp
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax"); # inp+num*128
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx"); # saved sp
-
-&set_label("loop",16);
- # copy input block to stack reversing byte and dword order
- for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
- &mov ("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"edi"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"edi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"edi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"edi"));
- &bswap ("eax");
- &bswap ("ebx");
- &bswap ("ecx");
- &bswap ("edx");
- &push ("eax");
- &push ("ebx");
- &push ("ecx");
- &push ("edx");
- }
- &add ("edi",64);
- &sub ("esp",4*8); # place for A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H
- &mov (&DWP(4*(8+16)+4,"esp"),"edi");
-
- # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack
- &mov ($A,&DWP(0,"esi"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
- &mov ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi"));
- # &mov ($Aoff,$A);
- &mov ($Boff,"ebx");
- &mov ($Coff,"ecx");
- &mov ($Doff,"edi");
- &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
- &mov ("edi",&DWP(28,"esi"));
- # &mov ($Eoff,$E);
- &mov ($Foff,"ebx");
- &mov ($Goff,"ecx");
- &mov ($Hoff,"edi");
-
-&set_label("00_15",16);
- &mov ($T,&DWP(4*(8+15),"esp"));
-
- &BODY_00_15();
-
- &cmp ("esi",0xc19bf174);
- &jne (&label("00_15"));
-
- &mov ($T,&DWP(4*(8+15+16-1),"esp")); # preloaded in BODY_00_15(1)
-&set_label("16_63",16);
- &mov ("esi",$T);
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*(8+15+16-14),"esp"));
- &ror ("esi",18-7);
- &mov ("edi","ecx");
- &xor ("esi",$T);
- &ror ("esi",7);
- &shr ($T,3);
-
- &ror ("edi",19-17);
- &xor ($T,"esi"); # T = sigma0(X[-15])
- &xor ("edi","ecx");
- &ror ("edi",17);
- &shr ("ecx",10);
- &add ($T,&DWP(4*(8+15+16),"esp")); # T += X[-16]
- &xor ("edi","ecx"); # sigma1(X[-2])
-
- &add ($T,&DWP(4*(8+15+16-9),"esp")); # T += X[-7]
- # &add ($T,"edi"); # T += sigma1(X[-2])
- # &mov (&DWP(4*(8+15),"esp"),$T); # save X[0]
-
- &BODY_00_15(1);
-
- &cmp ("esi",0xc67178f2);
- &jne (&label("16_63"));
-
- &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*(8+16+64)+0,"esp"));#ctx
- # &mov ($A,$Aoff);
- &mov ("ebx",$Boff);
- &mov ("ecx",$Coff);
- &mov ("edi",$Doff);
- &add ($A,&DWP(0,"esi"));
- &add ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
- &add ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
- &add ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi"));
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$A);
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),"ebx");
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"ecx");
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"edi");
- # &mov ($E,$Eoff);
- &mov ("eax",$Foff);
- &mov ("ebx",$Goff);
- &mov ("ecx",$Hoff);
- &mov ("edi",&DWP(4*(8+16+64)+4,"esp"));#inp
- &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
- &add ("eax",&DWP(20,"esi"));
- &add ("ebx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
- &add ("ecx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
- &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E);
- &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ebx");
- &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"ecx");
-
- &add ("esp",4*(8+16+64)); # destroy frame
- &sub ($K256,4*64); # rewind K
-
- &cmp ("edi",&DWP(8,"esp")); # are we done yet?
- &jb (&label("loop"));
-
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(12,"esp")); # restore sp
-&function_end_A();
-
-&set_label("K256",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
- &data_word(0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5);
- &data_word(0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5);
- &data_word(0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3);
- &data_word(0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174);
- &data_word(0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc);
- &data_word(0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da);
- &data_word(0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7);
- &data_word(0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967);
- &data_word(0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13);
- &data_word(0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85);
- &data_word(0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3);
- &data_word(0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070);
- &data_word(0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5);
- &data_word(0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3);
- &data_word(0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208);
- &data_word(0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2);
-&function_end_B("sha256_block_data_order");
-&asciz("SHA256 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
-
-&asm_finish();
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# SHA256 block transform for x86. September 2007.
+#
+# Performance in clock cycles per processed byte (less is better):
+#
+# Pentium PIII P4 AMD K8 Core2
+# gcc 46 36 41 27 26
+# icc 57 33 38 25 23
+# x86 asm 40 30 33 20 18
+# x86_64 asm(*) - - 21 16 16
+#
+# (*) x86_64 assembler performance is presented for reference
+# purposes.
+#
+# Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from
+# 10% to 40% [see above]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but
+# it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha512-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$A="eax";
+$E="edx";
+$T="ebx";
+$Aoff=&DWP(0,"esp");
+$Boff=&DWP(4,"esp");
+$Coff=&DWP(8,"esp");
+$Doff=&DWP(12,"esp");
+$Eoff=&DWP(16,"esp");
+$Foff=&DWP(20,"esp");
+$Goff=&DWP(24,"esp");
+$Hoff=&DWP(28,"esp");
+$Xoff=&DWP(32,"esp");
+$K256="ebp";
+
+sub BODY_00_15() {
+ my $in_16_63=shift;
+
+ &mov ("ecx",$E);
+ &add ($T,"edi") if ($in_16_63); # T += sigma1(X[-2])
+ &ror ("ecx",25-11);
+ &mov ("esi",$Foff);
+ &xor ("ecx",$E);
+ &ror ("ecx",11-6);
+ &mov (&DWP(4*(8+15),"esp"),$T) if ($in_16_63); # save X[0]
+ &xor ("ecx",$E);
+ &ror ("ecx",6); # Sigma1(e)
+ &mov ("edi",$Goff);
+ &add ($T,"ecx"); # T += Sigma1(e)
+
+ &xor ("esi","edi");
+ &mov ($Eoff,$E); # modulo-scheduled
+ &mov ("ecx",$A);
+ &and ("esi",$E);
+ &mov ($E,$Doff); # e becomes d, which is e in next iteration
+ &xor ("esi","edi"); # Ch(e,f,g)
+ &mov ("edi",$A);
+ &add ($T,"esi"); # T += Ch(e,f,g)
+
+ &ror ("ecx",22-13);
+ &add ($T,$Hoff); # T += h
+ &xor ("ecx",$A);
+ &ror ("ecx",13-2);
+ &mov ("esi",$Boff);
+ &xor ("ecx",$A);
+ &ror ("ecx",2); # Sigma0(a)
+ &add ($E,$T); # d += T
+ &mov ("edi",$Coff);
+
+ &add ($T,"ecx"); # T += Sigma0(a)
+ &mov ($Aoff,$A); # modulo-scheduled
+
+ &mov ("ecx",$A);
+ &sub ("esp",4);
+ &or ($A,"esi"); # a becomes h, which is a in next iteration
+ &and ("ecx","esi");
+ &and ($A,"edi");
+ &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,$K256));
+ &or ($A,"ecx"); # h=Maj(a,b,c)
+
+ &add ($K256,4);
+ &add ($A,$T); # h += T
+ &mov ($T,&DWP(4*(8+15+16-1),"esp")) if ($in_16_63); # preload T
+ &add ($E,"esi"); # d += K256[i]
+ &add ($A,"esi"); # h += K256[i]
+}
+
+&function_begin("sha256_block_data_order");
+ &mov ("esi",wparam(0)); # ctx
+ &mov ("edi",wparam(1)); # inp
+ &mov ("eax",wparam(2)); # num
+ &mov ("ebx","esp"); # saved sp
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
+&set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop($K256);
+ &lea ($K256,&DWP(&label("K256")."-".&label("pic_point"),$K256));
+
+ &sub ("esp",16);
+ &and ("esp",-64);
+
+ &shl ("eax",6);
+ &add ("eax","edi");
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"esi"); # ctx
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"edi"); # inp
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax"); # inp+num*128
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx"); # saved sp
+
+&set_label("loop",16);
+ # copy input block to stack reversing byte and dword order
+ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"edi"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"edi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"edi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"edi"));
+ &bswap ("eax");
+ &bswap ("ebx");
+ &bswap ("ecx");
+ &bswap ("edx");
+ &push ("eax");
+ &push ("ebx");
+ &push ("ecx");
+ &push ("edx");
+ }
+ &add ("edi",64);
+ &sub ("esp",4*8); # place for A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H
+ &mov (&DWP(4*(8+16)+4,"esp"),"edi");
+
+ # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack
+ &mov ($A,&DWP(0,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+ &mov ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+ # &mov ($Aoff,$A);
+ &mov ($Boff,"ebx");
+ &mov ($Coff,"ecx");
+ &mov ($Doff,"edi");
+ &mov ($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+ &mov ("edi",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+ # &mov ($Eoff,$E);
+ &mov ($Foff,"ebx");
+ &mov ($Goff,"ecx");
+ &mov ($Hoff,"edi");
+
+&set_label("00_15",16);
+ &mov ($T,&DWP(4*(8+15),"esp"));
+
+ &BODY_00_15();
+
+ &cmp ("esi",0xc19bf174);
+ &jne (&label("00_15"));
+
+ &mov ($T,&DWP(4*(8+15+16-1),"esp")); # preloaded in BODY_00_15(1)
+&set_label("16_63",16);
+ &mov ("esi",$T);
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(4*(8+15+16-14),"esp"));
+ &ror ("esi",18-7);
+ &mov ("edi","ecx");
+ &xor ("esi",$T);
+ &ror ("esi",7);
+ &shr ($T,3);
+
+ &ror ("edi",19-17);
+ &xor ($T,"esi"); # T = sigma0(X[-15])
+ &xor ("edi","ecx");
+ &ror ("edi",17);
+ &shr ("ecx",10);
+ &add ($T,&DWP(4*(8+15+16),"esp")); # T += X[-16]
+ &xor ("edi","ecx"); # sigma1(X[-2])
+
+ &add ($T,&DWP(4*(8+15+16-9),"esp")); # T += X[-7]
+ # &add ($T,"edi"); # T += sigma1(X[-2])
+ # &mov (&DWP(4*(8+15),"esp"),$T); # save X[0]
+
+ &BODY_00_15(1);
+
+ &cmp ("esi",0xc67178f2);
+ &jne (&label("16_63"));
+
+ &mov ("esi",&DWP(4*(8+16+64)+0,"esp"));#ctx
+ # &mov ($A,$Aoff);
+ &mov ("ebx",$Boff);
+ &mov ("ecx",$Coff);
+ &mov ("edi",$Doff);
+ &add ($A,&DWP(0,"esi"));
+ &add ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esi"));
+ &add ("ecx",&DWP(8,"esi"));
+ &add ("edi",&DWP(12,"esi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esi"),$A);
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esi"),"ebx");
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esi"),"ecx");
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esi"),"edi");
+ # &mov ($E,$Eoff);
+ &mov ("eax",$Foff);
+ &mov ("ebx",$Goff);
+ &mov ("ecx",$Hoff);
+ &mov ("edi",&DWP(4*(8+16+64)+4,"esp"));#inp
+ &add ($E,&DWP(16,"esi"));
+ &add ("eax",&DWP(20,"esi"));
+ &add ("ebx",&DWP(24,"esi"));
+ &add ("ecx",&DWP(28,"esi"));
+ &mov (&DWP(16,"esi"),$E);
+ &mov (&DWP(20,"esi"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP(24,"esi"),"ebx");
+ &mov (&DWP(28,"esi"),"ecx");
+
+ &add ("esp",4*(8+16+64)); # destroy frame
+ &sub ($K256,4*64); # rewind K
+
+ &cmp ("edi",&DWP(8,"esp")); # are we done yet?
+ &jb (&label("loop"));
+
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(12,"esp")); # restore sp
+&function_end_A();
+
+&set_label("K256",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
+ &data_word(0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5);
+ &data_word(0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5);
+ &data_word(0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3);
+ &data_word(0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174);
+ &data_word(0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc);
+ &data_word(0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da);
+ &data_word(0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7);
+ &data_word(0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967);
+ &data_word(0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13);
+ &data_word(0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85);
+ &data_word(0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3);
+ &data_word(0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070);
+ &data_word(0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5);
+ &data_word(0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3);
+ &data_word(0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208);
+ &data_word(0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2);
+&function_end_B("sha256_block_data_order");
+&asciz("SHA256 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,644 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# SHA512 block transform for x86. September 2007.
-#
-# Performance in clock cycles per processed byte (less is better):
-#
-# Pentium PIII P4 AMD K8 Core2
-# gcc 100 75 116 54 66
-# icc 97 77 95 55 57
-# x86 asm 61 56 82 36 40
-# SSE2 asm - - 38 24 20
-# x86_64 asm(*) - - 30 10.0 10.5
-#
-# (*) x86_64 assembler performance is presented for reference
-# purposes.
-#
-# IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium
-# performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%,
-# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer \xB5-archs improvement varies from 15%
-# to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2
-# code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated
-# code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even
-# though it does not use 128-bit operations. The latter means that
-# SSE2-aware kernel is no longer required to execute the code. Another
-# difference is that new code optimizes amount of writes, but at the
-# cost of increased data cache "footprint" by 1/2KB.
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
-require "x86asm.pl";
-
-&asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha512-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
-
-$sse2=0;
-for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
-
-&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2);
-
-$Tlo=&DWP(0,"esp"); $Thi=&DWP(4,"esp");
-$Alo=&DWP(8,"esp"); $Ahi=&DWP(8+4,"esp");
-$Blo=&DWP(16,"esp"); $Bhi=&DWP(16+4,"esp");
-$Clo=&DWP(24,"esp"); $Chi=&DWP(24+4,"esp");
-$Dlo=&DWP(32,"esp"); $Dhi=&DWP(32+4,"esp");
-$Elo=&DWP(40,"esp"); $Ehi=&DWP(40+4,"esp");
-$Flo=&DWP(48,"esp"); $Fhi=&DWP(48+4,"esp");
-$Glo=&DWP(56,"esp"); $Ghi=&DWP(56+4,"esp");
-$Hlo=&DWP(64,"esp"); $Hhi=&DWP(64+4,"esp");
-$K512="ebp";
-
-$Asse2=&QWP(0,"esp");
-$Bsse2=&QWP(8,"esp");
-$Csse2=&QWP(16,"esp");
-$Dsse2=&QWP(24,"esp");
-$Esse2=&QWP(32,"esp");
-$Fsse2=&QWP(40,"esp");
-$Gsse2=&QWP(48,"esp");
-$Hsse2=&QWP(56,"esp");
-
-$A="mm0"; # B-D and
-$E="mm4"; # F-H are commonly loaded to respectively mm1-mm3 and
- # mm5-mm7, but it's done on on-demand basis...
-
-sub BODY_00_15_sse2 {
- my $prefetch=shift;
-
- &movq ("mm5",$Fsse2); # load f
- &movq ("mm6",$Gsse2); # load g
- &movq ("mm7",$Hsse2); # load h
-
- &movq ("mm1",$E); # %mm1 is sliding right
- &movq ("mm2",$E); # %mm2 is sliding left
- &psrlq ("mm1",14);
- &movq ($Esse2,$E); # modulo-scheduled save e
- &psllq ("mm2",23);
- &movq ("mm3","mm1"); # %mm3 is T1
- &psrlq ("mm1",4);
- &pxor ("mm3","mm2");
- &psllq ("mm2",23);
- &pxor ("mm3","mm1");
- &psrlq ("mm1",23);
- &pxor ("mm3","mm2");
- &psllq ("mm2",4);
- &pxor ("mm3","mm1");
- &paddq ("mm7",QWP(0,$K512)); # h+=K512[i]
- &pxor ("mm3","mm2"); # T1=Sigma1_512(e)
-
- &pxor ("mm5","mm6"); # f^=g
- &movq ("mm1",$Bsse2); # load b
- &pand ("mm5",$E); # f&=e
- &movq ("mm2",$Csse2); # load c
- &pxor ("mm5","mm6"); # f^=g
- &movq ($E,$Dsse2); # e = load d
- &paddq ("mm3","mm5"); # T1+=Ch(e,f,g)
- &movq (&QWP(0,"esp"),$A); # modulo-scheduled save a
- &paddq ("mm3","mm7"); # T1+=h
-
- &movq ("mm5",$A); # %mm5 is sliding right
- &movq ("mm6",$A); # %mm6 is sliding left
- &paddq ("mm3",&QWP(8*9,"esp")); # T1+=X[0]
- &psrlq ("mm5",28);
- &paddq ($E,"mm3"); # e += T1
- &psllq ("mm6",25);
- &movq ("mm7","mm5"); # %mm7 is T2
- &psrlq ("mm5",6);
- &pxor ("mm7","mm6");
- &psllq ("mm6",5);
- &pxor ("mm7","mm5");
- &psrlq ("mm5",5);
- &pxor ("mm7","mm6");
- &psllq ("mm6",6);
- &pxor ("mm7","mm5");
- &sub ("esp",8);
- &pxor ("mm7","mm6"); # T2=Sigma0_512(a)
-
- &movq ("mm5",$A); # %mm5=a
- &por ($A,"mm2"); # a=a|c
- &movq ("mm6",&QWP(8*(9+16-14),"esp")) if ($prefetch);
- &pand ("mm5","mm2"); # %mm5=a&c
- &pand ($A,"mm1"); # a=(a|c)&b
- &movq ("mm2",&QWP(8*(9+16-1),"esp")) if ($prefetch);
- &por ("mm5",$A); # %mm5=(a&c)|((a|c)&b)
- &paddq ("mm7","mm5"); # T2+=Maj(a,b,c)
- &movq ($A,"mm3"); # a=T1
-
- &mov (&LB("edx"),&BP(0,$K512));
- &paddq ($A,"mm7"); # a+=T2
- &add ($K512,8);
-}
-
-sub BODY_00_15_x86 {
- #define Sigma1(x) (ROTR((x),14) ^ ROTR((x),18) ^ ROTR((x),41))
- # LO lo>>14^hi<<18 ^ lo>>18^hi<<14 ^ hi>>9^lo<<23
- # HI hi>>14^lo<<18 ^ hi>>18^lo<<14 ^ lo>>9^hi<<23
- &mov ("ecx",$Elo);
- &mov ("edx",$Ehi);
- &mov ("esi","ecx");
-
- &shr ("ecx",9); # lo>>9
- &mov ("edi","edx");
- &shr ("edx",9); # hi>>9
- &mov ("ebx","ecx");
- &shl ("esi",14); # lo<<14
- &mov ("eax","edx");
- &shl ("edi",14); # hi<<14
- &xor ("ebx","esi");
-
- &shr ("ecx",14-9); # lo>>14
- &xor ("eax","edi");
- &shr ("edx",14-9); # hi>>14
- &xor ("eax","ecx");
- &shl ("esi",18-14); # lo<<18
- &xor ("ebx","edx");
- &shl ("edi",18-14); # hi<<18
- &xor ("ebx","esi");
-
- &shr ("ecx",18-14); # lo>>18
- &xor ("eax","edi");
- &shr ("edx",18-14); # hi>>18
- &xor ("eax","ecx");
- &shl ("esi",23-18); # lo<<23
- &xor ("ebx","edx");
- &shl ("edi",23-18); # hi<<23
- &xor ("eax","esi");
- &xor ("ebx","edi"); # T1 = Sigma1(e)
-
- &mov ("ecx",$Flo);
- &mov ("edx",$Fhi);
- &mov ("esi",$Glo);
- &mov ("edi",$Ghi);
- &add ("eax",$Hlo);
- &adc ("ebx",$Hhi); # T1 += h
- &xor ("ecx","esi");
- &xor ("edx","edi");
- &and ("ecx",$Elo);
- &and ("edx",$Ehi);
- &add ("eax",&DWP(8*(9+15)+0,"esp"));
- &adc ("ebx",&DWP(8*(9+15)+4,"esp")); # T1 += X[0]
- &xor ("ecx","esi");
- &xor ("edx","edi"); # Ch(e,f,g) = (f^g)&e)^g
-
- &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,$K512));
- &mov ("edi",&DWP(4,$K512)); # K[i]
- &add ("eax","ecx");
- &adc ("ebx","edx"); # T1 += Ch(e,f,g)
- &mov ("ecx",$Dlo);
- &mov ("edx",$Dhi);
- &add ("eax","esi");
- &adc ("ebx","edi"); # T1 += K[i]
- &mov ($Tlo,"eax");
- &mov ($Thi,"ebx"); # put T1 away
- &add ("eax","ecx");
- &adc ("ebx","edx"); # d += T1
-
- #define Sigma0(x) (ROTR((x),28) ^ ROTR((x),34) ^ ROTR((x),39))
- # LO lo>>28^hi<<4 ^ hi>>2^lo<<30 ^ hi>>7^lo<<25
- # HI hi>>28^lo<<4 ^ lo>>2^hi<<30 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25
- &mov ("ecx",$Alo);
- &mov ("edx",$Ahi);
- &mov ($Dlo,"eax");
- &mov ($Dhi,"ebx");
- &mov ("esi","ecx");
-
- &shr ("ecx",2); # lo>>2
- &mov ("edi","edx");
- &shr ("edx",2); # hi>>2
- &mov ("ebx","ecx");
- &shl ("esi",4); # lo<<4
- &mov ("eax","edx");
- &shl ("edi",4); # hi<<4
- &xor ("ebx","esi");
-
- &shr ("ecx",7-2); # lo>>7
- &xor ("eax","edi");
- &shr ("edx",7-2); # hi>>7
- &xor ("ebx","ecx");
- &shl ("esi",25-4); # lo<<25
- &xor ("eax","edx");
- &shl ("edi",25-4); # hi<<25
- &xor ("eax","esi");
-
- &shr ("ecx",28-7); # lo>>28
- &xor ("ebx","edi");
- &shr ("edx",28-7); # hi>>28
- &xor ("eax","ecx");
- &shl ("esi",30-25); # lo<<30
- &xor ("ebx","edx");
- &shl ("edi",30-25); # hi<<30
- &xor ("eax","esi");
- &xor ("ebx","edi"); # Sigma0(a)
-
- &mov ("ecx",$Alo);
- &mov ("edx",$Ahi);
- &mov ("esi",$Blo);
- &mov ("edi",$Bhi);
- &add ("eax",$Tlo);
- &adc ("ebx",$Thi); # T1 = Sigma0(a)+T1
- &or ("ecx","esi");
- &or ("edx","edi");
- &and ("ecx",$Clo);
- &and ("edx",$Chi);
- &and ("esi",$Alo);
- &and ("edi",$Ahi);
- &or ("ecx","esi");
- &or ("edx","edi"); # Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b)
-
- &add ("eax","ecx");
- &adc ("ebx","edx"); # T1 += Maj(a,b,c)
- &mov ($Tlo,"eax");
- &mov ($Thi,"ebx");
-
- &mov (&LB("edx"),&BP(0,$K512)); # pre-fetch LSB of *K
- &sub ("esp",8);
- &lea ($K512,&DWP(8,$K512)); # K++
-}
-
-
-&function_begin("sha512_block_data_order");
- &mov ("esi",wparam(0)); # ctx
- &mov ("edi",wparam(1)); # inp
- &mov ("eax",wparam(2)); # num
- &mov ("ebx","esp"); # saved sp
-
- &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
-&set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop($K512);
- &lea ($K512,&DWP(&label("K512")."-".&label("pic_point"),$K512));
-
- &sub ("esp",16);
- &and ("esp",-64);
-
- &shl ("eax",7);
- &add ("eax","edi");
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"esi"); # ctx
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"edi"); # inp
- &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax"); # inp+num*128
- &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx"); # saved sp
-
-if ($sse2) {
- &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$K512,&label("K512"));
- &bt (&DWP(0,"edx"),26);
- &jnc (&label("loop_x86"));
-
- # load ctx->h[0-7]
- &movq ($A,&QWP(0,"esi"));
- &movq ("mm1",&QWP(8,"esi"));
- &movq ("mm2",&QWP(16,"esi"));
- &movq ("mm3",&QWP(24,"esi"));
- &movq ($E,&QWP(32,"esi"));
- &movq ("mm5",&QWP(40,"esi"));
- &movq ("mm6",&QWP(48,"esi"));
- &movq ("mm7",&QWP(56,"esi"));
- &sub ("esp",8*10);
-
-&set_label("loop_sse2",16);
- # &movq ($Asse2,$A);
- &movq ($Bsse2,"mm1");
- &movq ($Csse2,"mm2");
- &movq ($Dsse2,"mm3");
- # &movq ($Esse2,$E);
- &movq ($Fsse2,"mm5");
- &movq ($Gsse2,"mm6");
- &movq ($Hsse2,"mm7");
-
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,"edi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
- &add ("edi",8);
- &bswap ("ecx");
- &bswap ("edx");
- &mov (&DWP(8*9+4,"esp"),"ecx");
- &mov (&DWP(8*9+0,"esp"),"edx");
-
-&set_label("00_14_sse2",16);
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
- &add ("edi",8);
- &bswap ("eax");
- &bswap ("ebx");
- &mov (&DWP(8*8+4,"esp"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP(8*8+0,"esp"),"ebx");
-
- &BODY_00_15_sse2();
-
- &cmp (&LB("edx"),0x35);
- &jne (&label("00_14_sse2"));
-
- &BODY_00_15_sse2(1);
-
-&set_label("16_79_sse2",16);
- #&movq ("mm2",&QWP(8*(9+16-1),"esp")); #prefetched in BODY_00_15
- #&movq ("mm6",&QWP(8*(9+16-14),"esp"));
- &movq ("mm1","mm2");
-
- &psrlq ("mm2",1);
- &movq ("mm7","mm6");
- &psrlq ("mm6",6);
- &movq ("mm3","mm2");
-
- &psrlq ("mm2",7-1);
- &movq ("mm5","mm6");
- &psrlq ("mm6",19-6);
- &pxor ("mm3","mm2");
-
- &psrlq ("mm2",8-7);
- &pxor ("mm5","mm6");
- &psrlq ("mm6",61-19);
- &pxor ("mm3","mm2");
-
- &movq ("mm2",&QWP(8*(9+16),"esp"));
-
- &psllq ("mm1",56);
- &pxor ("mm5","mm6");
- &psllq ("mm7",3);
- &pxor ("mm3","mm1");
-
- &paddq ("mm2",&QWP(8*(9+16-9),"esp"));
-
- &psllq ("mm1",63-56);
- &pxor ("mm5","mm7");
- &psllq ("mm7",45-3);
- &pxor ("mm3","mm1");
- &pxor ("mm5","mm7");
-
- &paddq ("mm3","mm5");
- &paddq ("mm3","mm2");
- &movq (&QWP(8*9,"esp"),"mm3");
-
- &BODY_00_15_sse2(1);
-
- &cmp (&LB("edx"),0x17);
- &jne (&label("16_79_sse2"));
-
- # &movq ($A,$Asse2);
- &movq ("mm1",$Bsse2);
- &movq ("mm2",$Csse2);
- &movq ("mm3",$Dsse2);
- # &movq ($E,$Esse2);
- &movq ("mm5",$Fsse2);
- &movq ("mm6",$Gsse2);
- &movq ("mm7",$Hsse2);
-
- &paddq ($A,&QWP(0,"esi"));
- &paddq ("mm1",&QWP(8,"esi"));
- &paddq ("mm2",&QWP(16,"esi"));
- &paddq ("mm3",&QWP(24,"esi"));
- &paddq ($E,&QWP(32,"esi"));
- &paddq ("mm5",&QWP(40,"esi"));
- &paddq ("mm6",&QWP(48,"esi"));
- &paddq ("mm7",&QWP(56,"esi"));
-
- &movq (&QWP(0,"esi"),$A);
- &movq (&QWP(8,"esi"),"mm1");
- &movq (&QWP(16,"esi"),"mm2");
- &movq (&QWP(24,"esi"),"mm3");
- &movq (&QWP(32,"esi"),$E);
- &movq (&QWP(40,"esi"),"mm5");
- &movq (&QWP(48,"esi"),"mm6");
- &movq (&QWP(56,"esi"),"mm7");
-
- &add ("esp",8*80); # destroy frame
- &sub ($K512,8*80); # rewind K
-
- &cmp ("edi",&DWP(8*10+8,"esp")); # are we done yet?
- &jb (&label("loop_sse2"));
-
- &emms ();
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(8*10+12,"esp")); # restore sp
-&function_end_A();
-}
-&set_label("loop_x86",16);
- # copy input block to stack reversing byte and qword order
- for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
- &mov ("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"edi"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"edi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"edi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"edi"));
- &bswap ("eax");
- &bswap ("ebx");
- &bswap ("ecx");
- &bswap ("edx");
- &push ("eax");
- &push ("ebx");
- &push ("ecx");
- &push ("edx");
- }
- &add ("edi",128);
- &sub ("esp",9*8); # place for T,A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H
- &mov (&DWP(8*(9+16)+4,"esp"),"edi");
-
- # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack
- &lea ("edi",&DWP(8,"esp"));
- &mov ("ecx",16);
- &data_word(0xA5F3F689); # rep movsd
-
-&set_label("00_15_x86",16);
- &BODY_00_15_x86();
-
- &cmp (&LB("edx"),0x94);
- &jne (&label("00_15_x86"));
-
-&set_label("16_79_x86",16);
- #define sigma0(x) (ROTR((x),1) ^ ROTR((x),8) ^ ((x)>>7))
- # LO lo>>1^hi<<31 ^ lo>>8^hi<<24 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25
- # HI hi>>1^lo<<31 ^ hi>>8^lo<<24 ^ hi>>7
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-1)+0,"esp"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-1)+4,"esp"));
- &mov ("esi","ecx");
-
- &shr ("ecx",1); # lo>>1
- &mov ("edi","edx");
- &shr ("edx",1); # hi>>1
- &mov ("eax","ecx");
- &shl ("esi",24); # lo<<24
- &mov ("ebx","edx");
- &shl ("edi",24); # hi<<24
- &xor ("ebx","esi");
-
- &shr ("ecx",7-1); # lo>>7
- &xor ("eax","edi");
- &shr ("edx",7-1); # hi>>7
- &xor ("eax","ecx");
- &shl ("esi",31-24); # lo<<31
- &xor ("ebx","edx");
- &shl ("edi",25-24); # hi<<25
- &xor ("ebx","esi");
-
- &shr ("ecx",8-7); # lo>>8
- &xor ("eax","edi");
- &shr ("edx",8-7); # hi>>8
- &xor ("eax","ecx");
- &shl ("edi",31-25); # hi<<31
- &xor ("ebx","edx");
- &xor ("eax","edi"); # T1 = sigma0(X[-15])
-
- &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"ebx"); # put T1 away
-
- #define sigma1(x) (ROTR((x),19) ^ ROTR((x),61) ^ ((x)>>6))
- # LO lo>>19^hi<<13 ^ hi>>29^lo<<3 ^ lo>>6^hi<<26
- # HI hi>>19^lo<<13 ^ lo>>29^hi<<3 ^ hi>>6
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-14)+0,"esp"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-14)+4,"esp"));
- &mov ("esi","ecx");
-
- &shr ("ecx",6); # lo>>6
- &mov ("edi","edx");
- &shr ("edx",6); # hi>>6
- &mov ("eax","ecx");
- &shl ("esi",3); # lo<<3
- &mov ("ebx","edx");
- &shl ("edi",3); # hi<<3
- &xor ("eax","esi");
-
- &shr ("ecx",19-6); # lo>>19
- &xor ("ebx","edi");
- &shr ("edx",19-6); # hi>>19
- &xor ("eax","ecx");
- &shl ("esi",13-3); # lo<<13
- &xor ("ebx","edx");
- &shl ("edi",13-3); # hi<<13
- &xor ("ebx","esi");
-
- &shr ("ecx",29-19); # lo>>29
- &xor ("eax","edi");
- &shr ("edx",29-19); # hi>>29
- &xor ("ebx","ecx");
- &shl ("edi",26-13); # hi<<26
- &xor ("eax","edx");
- &xor ("eax","edi"); # sigma1(X[-2])
-
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16)+0,"esp"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16)+4,"esp"));
- &add ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
- &adc ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esp")); # T1 = sigma1(X[-2])+T1
- &mov ("esi",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-9)+0,"esp"));
- &mov ("edi",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-9)+4,"esp"));
- &add ("eax","ecx");
- &adc ("ebx","edx"); # T1 += X[-16]
- &add ("eax","esi");
- &adc ("ebx","edi"); # T1 += X[-7]
- &mov (&DWP(8*(9+15)+0,"esp"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP(8*(9+15)+4,"esp"),"ebx"); # save X[0]
-
- &BODY_00_15_x86();
-
- &cmp (&LB("edx"),0x17);
- &jne (&label("16_79_x86"));
-
- &mov ("esi",&DWP(8*(9+16+80)+0,"esp"));# ctx
- &mov ("edi",&DWP(8*(9+16+80)+4,"esp"));# inp
- for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
- &mov ("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"esi"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"esi"));
- &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"esi"));
- &mov ("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"esi"));
- &add ("eax",&DWP(8+($i*16)+0,"esp"));
- &adc ("ebx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+4,"esp"));
- &mov (&DWP($i*16+0,"esi"),"eax");
- &mov (&DWP($i*16+4,"esi"),"ebx");
- &add ("ecx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+8,"esp"));
- &adc ("edx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+12,"esp"));
- &mov (&DWP($i*16+8,"esi"),"ecx");
- &mov (&DWP($i*16+12,"esi"),"edx");
- }
- &add ("esp",8*(9+16+80)); # destroy frame
- &sub ($K512,8*80); # rewind K
-
- &cmp ("edi",&DWP(8,"esp")); # are we done yet?
- &jb (&label("loop_x86"));
-
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(12,"esp")); # restore sp
-&function_end_A();
-
-&set_label("K512",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
- &data_word(0xd728ae22,0x428a2f98); # u64
- &data_word(0x23ef65cd,0x71374491); # u64
- &data_word(0xec4d3b2f,0xb5c0fbcf); # u64
- &data_word(0x8189dbbc,0xe9b5dba5); # u64
- &data_word(0xf348b538,0x3956c25b); # u64
- &data_word(0xb605d019,0x59f111f1); # u64
- &data_word(0xaf194f9b,0x923f82a4); # u64
- &data_word(0xda6d8118,0xab1c5ed5); # u64
- &data_word(0xa3030242,0xd807aa98); # u64
- &data_word(0x45706fbe,0x12835b01); # u64
- &data_word(0x4ee4b28c,0x243185be); # u64
- &data_word(0xd5ffb4e2,0x550c7dc3); # u64
- &data_word(0xf27b896f,0x72be5d74); # u64
- &data_word(0x3b1696b1,0x80deb1fe); # u64
- &data_word(0x25c71235,0x9bdc06a7); # u64
- &data_word(0xcf692694,0xc19bf174); # u64
- &data_word(0x9ef14ad2,0xe49b69c1); # u64
- &data_word(0x384f25e3,0xefbe4786); # u64
- &data_word(0x8b8cd5b5,0x0fc19dc6); # u64
- &data_word(0x77ac9c65,0x240ca1cc); # u64
- &data_word(0x592b0275,0x2de92c6f); # u64
- &data_word(0x6ea6e483,0x4a7484aa); # u64
- &data_word(0xbd41fbd4,0x5cb0a9dc); # u64
- &data_word(0x831153b5,0x76f988da); # u64
- &data_word(0xee66dfab,0x983e5152); # u64
- &data_word(0x2db43210,0xa831c66d); # u64
- &data_word(0x98fb213f,0xb00327c8); # u64
- &data_word(0xbeef0ee4,0xbf597fc7); # u64
- &data_word(0x3da88fc2,0xc6e00bf3); # u64
- &data_word(0x930aa725,0xd5a79147); # u64
- &data_word(0xe003826f,0x06ca6351); # u64
- &data_word(0x0a0e6e70,0x14292967); # u64
- &data_word(0x46d22ffc,0x27b70a85); # u64
- &data_word(0x5c26c926,0x2e1b2138); # u64
- &data_word(0x5ac42aed,0x4d2c6dfc); # u64
- &data_word(0x9d95b3df,0x53380d13); # u64
- &data_word(0x8baf63de,0x650a7354); # u64
- &data_word(0x3c77b2a8,0x766a0abb); # u64
- &data_word(0x47edaee6,0x81c2c92e); # u64
- &data_word(0x1482353b,0x92722c85); # u64
- &data_word(0x4cf10364,0xa2bfe8a1); # u64
- &data_word(0xbc423001,0xa81a664b); # u64
- &data_word(0xd0f89791,0xc24b8b70); # u64
- &data_word(0x0654be30,0xc76c51a3); # u64
- &data_word(0xd6ef5218,0xd192e819); # u64
- &data_word(0x5565a910,0xd6990624); # u64
- &data_word(0x5771202a,0xf40e3585); # u64
- &data_word(0x32bbd1b8,0x106aa070); # u64
- &data_word(0xb8d2d0c8,0x19a4c116); # u64
- &data_word(0x5141ab53,0x1e376c08); # u64
- &data_word(0xdf8eeb99,0x2748774c); # u64
- &data_word(0xe19b48a8,0x34b0bcb5); # u64
- &data_word(0xc5c95a63,0x391c0cb3); # u64
- &data_word(0xe3418acb,0x4ed8aa4a); # u64
- &data_word(0x7763e373,0x5b9cca4f); # u64
- &data_word(0xd6b2b8a3,0x682e6ff3); # u64
- &data_word(0x5defb2fc,0x748f82ee); # u64
- &data_word(0x43172f60,0x78a5636f); # u64
- &data_word(0xa1f0ab72,0x84c87814); # u64
- &data_word(0x1a6439ec,0x8cc70208); # u64
- &data_word(0x23631e28,0x90befffa); # u64
- &data_word(0xde82bde9,0xa4506ceb); # u64
- &data_word(0xb2c67915,0xbef9a3f7); # u64
- &data_word(0xe372532b,0xc67178f2); # u64
- &data_word(0xea26619c,0xca273ece); # u64
- &data_word(0x21c0c207,0xd186b8c7); # u64
- &data_word(0xcde0eb1e,0xeada7dd6); # u64
- &data_word(0xee6ed178,0xf57d4f7f); # u64
- &data_word(0x72176fba,0x06f067aa); # u64
- &data_word(0xa2c898a6,0x0a637dc5); # u64
- &data_word(0xbef90dae,0x113f9804); # u64
- &data_word(0x131c471b,0x1b710b35); # u64
- &data_word(0x23047d84,0x28db77f5); # u64
- &data_word(0x40c72493,0x32caab7b); # u64
- &data_word(0x15c9bebc,0x3c9ebe0a); # u64
- &data_word(0x9c100d4c,0x431d67c4); # u64
- &data_word(0xcb3e42b6,0x4cc5d4be); # u64
- &data_word(0xfc657e2a,0x597f299c); # u64
- &data_word(0x3ad6faec,0x5fcb6fab); # u64
- &data_word(0x4a475817,0x6c44198c); # u64
-&function_end_B("sha512_block_data_order");
-&asciz("SHA512 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
-
-&asm_finish();
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# SHA512 block transform for x86. September 2007.
+#
+# Performance in clock cycles per processed byte (less is better):
+#
+# Pentium PIII P4 AMD K8 Core2
+# gcc 100 75 116 54 66
+# icc 97 77 95 55 57
+# x86 asm 61 56 82 36 40
+# SSE2 asm - - 38 24 20
+# x86_64 asm(*) - - 30 10.0 10.5
+#
+# (*) x86_64 assembler performance is presented for reference
+# purposes.
+#
+# IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium
+# performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%,
+# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer µ-archs improvement varies from 15%
+# to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2
+# code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated
+# code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even
+# though it does not use 128-bit operations. The latter means that
+# SSE2-aware kernel is no longer required to execute the code. Another
+# difference is that new code optimizes amount of writes, but at the
+# cost of increased data cache "footprint" by 1/2KB.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"sha512-586.pl",$ARGV[$#ARGV] eq "386");
+
+$sse2=0;
+for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
+
+&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P") if ($sse2);
+
+$Tlo=&DWP(0,"esp"); $Thi=&DWP(4,"esp");
+$Alo=&DWP(8,"esp"); $Ahi=&DWP(8+4,"esp");
+$Blo=&DWP(16,"esp"); $Bhi=&DWP(16+4,"esp");
+$Clo=&DWP(24,"esp"); $Chi=&DWP(24+4,"esp");
+$Dlo=&DWP(32,"esp"); $Dhi=&DWP(32+4,"esp");
+$Elo=&DWP(40,"esp"); $Ehi=&DWP(40+4,"esp");
+$Flo=&DWP(48,"esp"); $Fhi=&DWP(48+4,"esp");
+$Glo=&DWP(56,"esp"); $Ghi=&DWP(56+4,"esp");
+$Hlo=&DWP(64,"esp"); $Hhi=&DWP(64+4,"esp");
+$K512="ebp";
+
+$Asse2=&QWP(0,"esp");
+$Bsse2=&QWP(8,"esp");
+$Csse2=&QWP(16,"esp");
+$Dsse2=&QWP(24,"esp");
+$Esse2=&QWP(32,"esp");
+$Fsse2=&QWP(40,"esp");
+$Gsse2=&QWP(48,"esp");
+$Hsse2=&QWP(56,"esp");
+
+$A="mm0"; # B-D and
+$E="mm4"; # F-H are commonly loaded to respectively mm1-mm3 and
+ # mm5-mm7, but it's done on on-demand basis...
+
+sub BODY_00_15_sse2 {
+ my $prefetch=shift;
+
+ &movq ("mm5",$Fsse2); # load f
+ &movq ("mm6",$Gsse2); # load g
+ &movq ("mm7",$Hsse2); # load h
+
+ &movq ("mm1",$E); # %mm1 is sliding right
+ &movq ("mm2",$E); # %mm2 is sliding left
+ &psrlq ("mm1",14);
+ &movq ($Esse2,$E); # modulo-scheduled save e
+ &psllq ("mm2",23);
+ &movq ("mm3","mm1"); # %mm3 is T1
+ &psrlq ("mm1",4);
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm2");
+ &psllq ("mm2",23);
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm1");
+ &psrlq ("mm1",23);
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm2");
+ &psllq ("mm2",4);
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm1");
+ &paddq ("mm7",QWP(0,$K512)); # h+=K512[i]
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm2"); # T1=Sigma1_512(e)
+
+ &pxor ("mm5","mm6"); # f^=g
+ &movq ("mm1",$Bsse2); # load b
+ &pand ("mm5",$E); # f&=e
+ &movq ("mm2",$Csse2); # load c
+ &pxor ("mm5","mm6"); # f^=g
+ &movq ($E,$Dsse2); # e = load d
+ &paddq ("mm3","mm5"); # T1+=Ch(e,f,g)
+ &movq (&QWP(0,"esp"),$A); # modulo-scheduled save a
+ &paddq ("mm3","mm7"); # T1+=h
+
+ &movq ("mm5",$A); # %mm5 is sliding right
+ &movq ("mm6",$A); # %mm6 is sliding left
+ &paddq ("mm3",&QWP(8*9,"esp")); # T1+=X[0]
+ &psrlq ("mm5",28);
+ &paddq ($E,"mm3"); # e += T1
+ &psllq ("mm6",25);
+ &movq ("mm7","mm5"); # %mm7 is T2
+ &psrlq ("mm5",6);
+ &pxor ("mm7","mm6");
+ &psllq ("mm6",5);
+ &pxor ("mm7","mm5");
+ &psrlq ("mm5",5);
+ &pxor ("mm7","mm6");
+ &psllq ("mm6",6);
+ &pxor ("mm7","mm5");
+ &sub ("esp",8);
+ &pxor ("mm7","mm6"); # T2=Sigma0_512(a)
+
+ &movq ("mm5",$A); # %mm5=a
+ &por ($A,"mm2"); # a=a|c
+ &movq ("mm6",&QWP(8*(9+16-14),"esp")) if ($prefetch);
+ &pand ("mm5","mm2"); # %mm5=a&c
+ &pand ($A,"mm1"); # a=(a|c)&b
+ &movq ("mm2",&QWP(8*(9+16-1),"esp")) if ($prefetch);
+ &por ("mm5",$A); # %mm5=(a&c)|((a|c)&b)
+ &paddq ("mm7","mm5"); # T2+=Maj(a,b,c)
+ &movq ($A,"mm3"); # a=T1
+
+ &mov (&LB("edx"),&BP(0,$K512));
+ &paddq ($A,"mm7"); # a+=T2
+ &add ($K512,8);
+}
+
+sub BODY_00_15_x86 {
+ #define Sigma1(x) (ROTR((x),14) ^ ROTR((x),18) ^ ROTR((x),41))
+ # LO lo>>14^hi<<18 ^ lo>>18^hi<<14 ^ hi>>9^lo<<23
+ # HI hi>>14^lo<<18 ^ hi>>18^lo<<14 ^ lo>>9^hi<<23
+ &mov ("ecx",$Elo);
+ &mov ("edx",$Ehi);
+ &mov ("esi","ecx");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",9); # lo>>9
+ &mov ("edi","edx");
+ &shr ("edx",9); # hi>>9
+ &mov ("ebx","ecx");
+ &shl ("esi",14); # lo<<14
+ &mov ("eax","edx");
+ &shl ("edi",14); # hi<<14
+ &xor ("ebx","esi");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",14-9); # lo>>14
+ &xor ("eax","edi");
+ &shr ("edx",14-9); # hi>>14
+ &xor ("eax","ecx");
+ &shl ("esi",18-14); # lo<<18
+ &xor ("ebx","edx");
+ &shl ("edi",18-14); # hi<<18
+ &xor ("ebx","esi");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",18-14); # lo>>18
+ &xor ("eax","edi");
+ &shr ("edx",18-14); # hi>>18
+ &xor ("eax","ecx");
+ &shl ("esi",23-18); # lo<<23
+ &xor ("ebx","edx");
+ &shl ("edi",23-18); # hi<<23
+ &xor ("eax","esi");
+ &xor ("ebx","edi"); # T1 = Sigma1(e)
+
+ &mov ("ecx",$Flo);
+ &mov ("edx",$Fhi);
+ &mov ("esi",$Glo);
+ &mov ("edi",$Ghi);
+ &add ("eax",$Hlo);
+ &adc ("ebx",$Hhi); # T1 += h
+ &xor ("ecx","esi");
+ &xor ("edx","edi");
+ &and ("ecx",$Elo);
+ &and ("edx",$Ehi);
+ &add ("eax",&DWP(8*(9+15)+0,"esp"));
+ &adc ("ebx",&DWP(8*(9+15)+4,"esp")); # T1 += X[0]
+ &xor ("ecx","esi");
+ &xor ("edx","edi"); # Ch(e,f,g) = (f^g)&e)^g
+
+ &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,$K512));
+ &mov ("edi",&DWP(4,$K512)); # K[i]
+ &add ("eax","ecx");
+ &adc ("ebx","edx"); # T1 += Ch(e,f,g)
+ &mov ("ecx",$Dlo);
+ &mov ("edx",$Dhi);
+ &add ("eax","esi");
+ &adc ("ebx","edi"); # T1 += K[i]
+ &mov ($Tlo,"eax");
+ &mov ($Thi,"ebx"); # put T1 away
+ &add ("eax","ecx");
+ &adc ("ebx","edx"); # d += T1
+
+ #define Sigma0(x) (ROTR((x),28) ^ ROTR((x),34) ^ ROTR((x),39))
+ # LO lo>>28^hi<<4 ^ hi>>2^lo<<30 ^ hi>>7^lo<<25
+ # HI hi>>28^lo<<4 ^ lo>>2^hi<<30 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25
+ &mov ("ecx",$Alo);
+ &mov ("edx",$Ahi);
+ &mov ($Dlo,"eax");
+ &mov ($Dhi,"ebx");
+ &mov ("esi","ecx");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",2); # lo>>2
+ &mov ("edi","edx");
+ &shr ("edx",2); # hi>>2
+ &mov ("ebx","ecx");
+ &shl ("esi",4); # lo<<4
+ &mov ("eax","edx");
+ &shl ("edi",4); # hi<<4
+ &xor ("ebx","esi");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",7-2); # lo>>7
+ &xor ("eax","edi");
+ &shr ("edx",7-2); # hi>>7
+ &xor ("ebx","ecx");
+ &shl ("esi",25-4); # lo<<25
+ &xor ("eax","edx");
+ &shl ("edi",25-4); # hi<<25
+ &xor ("eax","esi");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",28-7); # lo>>28
+ &xor ("ebx","edi");
+ &shr ("edx",28-7); # hi>>28
+ &xor ("eax","ecx");
+ &shl ("esi",30-25); # lo<<30
+ &xor ("ebx","edx");
+ &shl ("edi",30-25); # hi<<30
+ &xor ("eax","esi");
+ &xor ("ebx","edi"); # Sigma0(a)
+
+ &mov ("ecx",$Alo);
+ &mov ("edx",$Ahi);
+ &mov ("esi",$Blo);
+ &mov ("edi",$Bhi);
+ &add ("eax",$Tlo);
+ &adc ("ebx",$Thi); # T1 = Sigma0(a)+T1
+ &or ("ecx","esi");
+ &or ("edx","edi");
+ &and ("ecx",$Clo);
+ &and ("edx",$Chi);
+ &and ("esi",$Alo);
+ &and ("edi",$Ahi);
+ &or ("ecx","esi");
+ &or ("edx","edi"); # Maj(a,b,c) = ((a|b)&c)|(a&b)
+
+ &add ("eax","ecx");
+ &adc ("ebx","edx"); # T1 += Maj(a,b,c)
+ &mov ($Tlo,"eax");
+ &mov ($Thi,"ebx");
+
+ &mov (&LB("edx"),&BP(0,$K512)); # pre-fetch LSB of *K
+ &sub ("esp",8);
+ &lea ($K512,&DWP(8,$K512)); # K++
+}
+
+
+&function_begin("sha512_block_data_order");
+ &mov ("esi",wparam(0)); # ctx
+ &mov ("edi",wparam(1)); # inp
+ &mov ("eax",wparam(2)); # num
+ &mov ("ebx","esp"); # saved sp
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point")); # make it PIC!
+&set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop($K512);
+ &lea ($K512,&DWP(&label("K512")."-".&label("pic_point"),$K512));
+
+ &sub ("esp",16);
+ &and ("esp",-64);
+
+ &shl ("eax",7);
+ &add ("eax","edi");
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"esi"); # ctx
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"edi"); # inp
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),"eax"); # inp+num*128
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),"ebx"); # saved sp
+
+if ($sse2) {
+ &picmeup("edx","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P",$K512,&label("K512"));
+ &bt (&DWP(0,"edx"),26);
+ &jnc (&label("loop_x86"));
+
+ # load ctx->h[0-7]
+ &movq ($A,&QWP(0,"esi"));
+ &movq ("mm1",&QWP(8,"esi"));
+ &movq ("mm2",&QWP(16,"esi"));
+ &movq ("mm3",&QWP(24,"esi"));
+ &movq ($E,&QWP(32,"esi"));
+ &movq ("mm5",&QWP(40,"esi"));
+ &movq ("mm6",&QWP(48,"esi"));
+ &movq ("mm7",&QWP(56,"esi"));
+ &sub ("esp",8*10);
+
+&set_label("loop_sse2",16);
+ # &movq ($Asse2,$A);
+ &movq ($Bsse2,"mm1");
+ &movq ($Csse2,"mm2");
+ &movq ($Dsse2,"mm3");
+ # &movq ($Esse2,$E);
+ &movq ($Fsse2,"mm5");
+ &movq ($Gsse2,"mm6");
+ &movq ($Hsse2,"mm7");
+
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+ &add ("edi",8);
+ &bswap ("ecx");
+ &bswap ("edx");
+ &mov (&DWP(8*9+4,"esp"),"ecx");
+ &mov (&DWP(8*9+0,"esp"),"edx");
+
+&set_label("00_14_sse2",16);
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"edi"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"edi"));
+ &add ("edi",8);
+ &bswap ("eax");
+ &bswap ("ebx");
+ &mov (&DWP(8*8+4,"esp"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP(8*8+0,"esp"),"ebx");
+
+ &BODY_00_15_sse2();
+
+ &cmp (&LB("edx"),0x35);
+ &jne (&label("00_14_sse2"));
+
+ &BODY_00_15_sse2(1);
+
+&set_label("16_79_sse2",16);
+ #&movq ("mm2",&QWP(8*(9+16-1),"esp")); #prefetched in BODY_00_15
+ #&movq ("mm6",&QWP(8*(9+16-14),"esp"));
+ &movq ("mm1","mm2");
+
+ &psrlq ("mm2",1);
+ &movq ("mm7","mm6");
+ &psrlq ("mm6",6);
+ &movq ("mm3","mm2");
+
+ &psrlq ("mm2",7-1);
+ &movq ("mm5","mm6");
+ &psrlq ("mm6",19-6);
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm2");
+
+ &psrlq ("mm2",8-7);
+ &pxor ("mm5","mm6");
+ &psrlq ("mm6",61-19);
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm2");
+
+ &movq ("mm2",&QWP(8*(9+16),"esp"));
+
+ &psllq ("mm1",56);
+ &pxor ("mm5","mm6");
+ &psllq ("mm7",3);
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm1");
+
+ &paddq ("mm2",&QWP(8*(9+16-9),"esp"));
+
+ &psllq ("mm1",63-56);
+ &pxor ("mm5","mm7");
+ &psllq ("mm7",45-3);
+ &pxor ("mm3","mm1");
+ &pxor ("mm5","mm7");
+
+ &paddq ("mm3","mm5");
+ &paddq ("mm3","mm2");
+ &movq (&QWP(8*9,"esp"),"mm3");
+
+ &BODY_00_15_sse2(1);
+
+ &cmp (&LB("edx"),0x17);
+ &jne (&label("16_79_sse2"));
+
+ # &movq ($A,$Asse2);
+ &movq ("mm1",$Bsse2);
+ &movq ("mm2",$Csse2);
+ &movq ("mm3",$Dsse2);
+ # &movq ($E,$Esse2);
+ &movq ("mm5",$Fsse2);
+ &movq ("mm6",$Gsse2);
+ &movq ("mm7",$Hsse2);
+
+ &paddq ($A,&QWP(0,"esi"));
+ &paddq ("mm1",&QWP(8,"esi"));
+ &paddq ("mm2",&QWP(16,"esi"));
+ &paddq ("mm3",&QWP(24,"esi"));
+ &paddq ($E,&QWP(32,"esi"));
+ &paddq ("mm5",&QWP(40,"esi"));
+ &paddq ("mm6",&QWP(48,"esi"));
+ &paddq ("mm7",&QWP(56,"esi"));
+
+ &movq (&QWP(0,"esi"),$A);
+ &movq (&QWP(8,"esi"),"mm1");
+ &movq (&QWP(16,"esi"),"mm2");
+ &movq (&QWP(24,"esi"),"mm3");
+ &movq (&QWP(32,"esi"),$E);
+ &movq (&QWP(40,"esi"),"mm5");
+ &movq (&QWP(48,"esi"),"mm6");
+ &movq (&QWP(56,"esi"),"mm7");
+
+ &add ("esp",8*80); # destroy frame
+ &sub ($K512,8*80); # rewind K
+
+ &cmp ("edi",&DWP(8*10+8,"esp")); # are we done yet?
+ &jb (&label("loop_sse2"));
+
+ &emms ();
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(8*10+12,"esp")); # restore sp
+&function_end_A();
+}
+&set_label("loop_x86",16);
+ # copy input block to stack reversing byte and qword order
+ for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"edi"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"edi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"edi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"edi"));
+ &bswap ("eax");
+ &bswap ("ebx");
+ &bswap ("ecx");
+ &bswap ("edx");
+ &push ("eax");
+ &push ("ebx");
+ &push ("ecx");
+ &push ("edx");
+ }
+ &add ("edi",128);
+ &sub ("esp",9*8); # place for T,A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H
+ &mov (&DWP(8*(9+16)+4,"esp"),"edi");
+
+ # copy ctx->h[0-7] to A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H on stack
+ &lea ("edi",&DWP(8,"esp"));
+ &mov ("ecx",16);
+ &data_word(0xA5F3F689); # rep movsd
+
+&set_label("00_15_x86",16);
+ &BODY_00_15_x86();
+
+ &cmp (&LB("edx"),0x94);
+ &jne (&label("00_15_x86"));
+
+&set_label("16_79_x86",16);
+ #define sigma0(x) (ROTR((x),1) ^ ROTR((x),8) ^ ((x)>>7))
+ # LO lo>>1^hi<<31 ^ lo>>8^hi<<24 ^ lo>>7^hi<<25
+ # HI hi>>1^lo<<31 ^ hi>>8^lo<<24 ^ hi>>7
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-1)+0,"esp"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-1)+4,"esp"));
+ &mov ("esi","ecx");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",1); # lo>>1
+ &mov ("edi","edx");
+ &shr ("edx",1); # hi>>1
+ &mov ("eax","ecx");
+ &shl ("esi",24); # lo<<24
+ &mov ("ebx","edx");
+ &shl ("edi",24); # hi<<24
+ &xor ("ebx","esi");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",7-1); # lo>>7
+ &xor ("eax","edi");
+ &shr ("edx",7-1); # hi>>7
+ &xor ("eax","ecx");
+ &shl ("esi",31-24); # lo<<31
+ &xor ("ebx","edx");
+ &shl ("edi",25-24); # hi<<25
+ &xor ("ebx","esi");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",8-7); # lo>>8
+ &xor ("eax","edi");
+ &shr ("edx",8-7); # hi>>8
+ &xor ("eax","ecx");
+ &shl ("edi",31-25); # hi<<31
+ &xor ("ebx","edx");
+ &xor ("eax","edi"); # T1 = sigma0(X[-15])
+
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),"ebx"); # put T1 away
+
+ #define sigma1(x) (ROTR((x),19) ^ ROTR((x),61) ^ ((x)>>6))
+ # LO lo>>19^hi<<13 ^ hi>>29^lo<<3 ^ lo>>6^hi<<26
+ # HI hi>>19^lo<<13 ^ lo>>29^hi<<3 ^ hi>>6
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-14)+0,"esp"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-14)+4,"esp"));
+ &mov ("esi","ecx");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",6); # lo>>6
+ &mov ("edi","edx");
+ &shr ("edx",6); # hi>>6
+ &mov ("eax","ecx");
+ &shl ("esi",3); # lo<<3
+ &mov ("ebx","edx");
+ &shl ("edi",3); # hi<<3
+ &xor ("eax","esi");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",19-6); # lo>>19
+ &xor ("ebx","edi");
+ &shr ("edx",19-6); # hi>>19
+ &xor ("eax","ecx");
+ &shl ("esi",13-3); # lo<<13
+ &xor ("ebx","edx");
+ &shl ("edi",13-3); # hi<<13
+ &xor ("ebx","esi");
+
+ &shr ("ecx",29-19); # lo>>29
+ &xor ("eax","edi");
+ &shr ("edx",29-19); # hi>>29
+ &xor ("ebx","ecx");
+ &shl ("edi",26-13); # hi<<26
+ &xor ("eax","edx");
+ &xor ("eax","edi"); # sigma1(X[-2])
+
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16)+0,"esp"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP(8*(9+15+16)+4,"esp"));
+ &add ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+ &adc ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esp")); # T1 = sigma1(X[-2])+T1
+ &mov ("esi",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-9)+0,"esp"));
+ &mov ("edi",&DWP(8*(9+15+16-9)+4,"esp"));
+ &add ("eax","ecx");
+ &adc ("ebx","edx"); # T1 += X[-16]
+ &add ("eax","esi");
+ &adc ("ebx","edi"); # T1 += X[-7]
+ &mov (&DWP(8*(9+15)+0,"esp"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP(8*(9+15)+4,"esp"),"ebx"); # save X[0]
+
+ &BODY_00_15_x86();
+
+ &cmp (&LB("edx"),0x17);
+ &jne (&label("16_79_x86"));
+
+ &mov ("esi",&DWP(8*(9+16+80)+0,"esp"));# ctx
+ &mov ("edi",&DWP(8*(9+16+80)+4,"esp"));# inp
+ for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP($i*16+0,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP($i*16+4,"esi"));
+ &mov ("ecx",&DWP($i*16+8,"esi"));
+ &mov ("edx",&DWP($i*16+12,"esi"));
+ &add ("eax",&DWP(8+($i*16)+0,"esp"));
+ &adc ("ebx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+4,"esp"));
+ &mov (&DWP($i*16+0,"esi"),"eax");
+ &mov (&DWP($i*16+4,"esi"),"ebx");
+ &add ("ecx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+8,"esp"));
+ &adc ("edx",&DWP(8+($i*16)+12,"esp"));
+ &mov (&DWP($i*16+8,"esi"),"ecx");
+ &mov (&DWP($i*16+12,"esi"),"edx");
+ }
+ &add ("esp",8*(9+16+80)); # destroy frame
+ &sub ($K512,8*80); # rewind K
+
+ &cmp ("edi",&DWP(8,"esp")); # are we done yet?
+ &jb (&label("loop_x86"));
+
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(12,"esp")); # restore sp
+&function_end_A();
+
+&set_label("K512",64); # Yes! I keep it in the code segment!
+ &data_word(0xd728ae22,0x428a2f98); # u64
+ &data_word(0x23ef65cd,0x71374491); # u64
+ &data_word(0xec4d3b2f,0xb5c0fbcf); # u64
+ &data_word(0x8189dbbc,0xe9b5dba5); # u64
+ &data_word(0xf348b538,0x3956c25b); # u64
+ &data_word(0xb605d019,0x59f111f1); # u64
+ &data_word(0xaf194f9b,0x923f82a4); # u64
+ &data_word(0xda6d8118,0xab1c5ed5); # u64
+ &data_word(0xa3030242,0xd807aa98); # u64
+ &data_word(0x45706fbe,0x12835b01); # u64
+ &data_word(0x4ee4b28c,0x243185be); # u64
+ &data_word(0xd5ffb4e2,0x550c7dc3); # u64
+ &data_word(0xf27b896f,0x72be5d74); # u64
+ &data_word(0x3b1696b1,0x80deb1fe); # u64
+ &data_word(0x25c71235,0x9bdc06a7); # u64
+ &data_word(0xcf692694,0xc19bf174); # u64
+ &data_word(0x9ef14ad2,0xe49b69c1); # u64
+ &data_word(0x384f25e3,0xefbe4786); # u64
+ &data_word(0x8b8cd5b5,0x0fc19dc6); # u64
+ &data_word(0x77ac9c65,0x240ca1cc); # u64
+ &data_word(0x592b0275,0x2de92c6f); # u64
+ &data_word(0x6ea6e483,0x4a7484aa); # u64
+ &data_word(0xbd41fbd4,0x5cb0a9dc); # u64
+ &data_word(0x831153b5,0x76f988da); # u64
+ &data_word(0xee66dfab,0x983e5152); # u64
+ &data_word(0x2db43210,0xa831c66d); # u64
+ &data_word(0x98fb213f,0xb00327c8); # u64
+ &data_word(0xbeef0ee4,0xbf597fc7); # u64
+ &data_word(0x3da88fc2,0xc6e00bf3); # u64
+ &data_word(0x930aa725,0xd5a79147); # u64
+ &data_word(0xe003826f,0x06ca6351); # u64
+ &data_word(0x0a0e6e70,0x14292967); # u64
+ &data_word(0x46d22ffc,0x27b70a85); # u64
+ &data_word(0x5c26c926,0x2e1b2138); # u64
+ &data_word(0x5ac42aed,0x4d2c6dfc); # u64
+ &data_word(0x9d95b3df,0x53380d13); # u64
+ &data_word(0x8baf63de,0x650a7354); # u64
+ &data_word(0x3c77b2a8,0x766a0abb); # u64
+ &data_word(0x47edaee6,0x81c2c92e); # u64
+ &data_word(0x1482353b,0x92722c85); # u64
+ &data_word(0x4cf10364,0xa2bfe8a1); # u64
+ &data_word(0xbc423001,0xa81a664b); # u64
+ &data_word(0xd0f89791,0xc24b8b70); # u64
+ &data_word(0x0654be30,0xc76c51a3); # u64
+ &data_word(0xd6ef5218,0xd192e819); # u64
+ &data_word(0x5565a910,0xd6990624); # u64
+ &data_word(0x5771202a,0xf40e3585); # u64
+ &data_word(0x32bbd1b8,0x106aa070); # u64
+ &data_word(0xb8d2d0c8,0x19a4c116); # u64
+ &data_word(0x5141ab53,0x1e376c08); # u64
+ &data_word(0xdf8eeb99,0x2748774c); # u64
+ &data_word(0xe19b48a8,0x34b0bcb5); # u64
+ &data_word(0xc5c95a63,0x391c0cb3); # u64
+ &data_word(0xe3418acb,0x4ed8aa4a); # u64
+ &data_word(0x7763e373,0x5b9cca4f); # u64
+ &data_word(0xd6b2b8a3,0x682e6ff3); # u64
+ &data_word(0x5defb2fc,0x748f82ee); # u64
+ &data_word(0x43172f60,0x78a5636f); # u64
+ &data_word(0xa1f0ab72,0x84c87814); # u64
+ &data_word(0x1a6439ec,0x8cc70208); # u64
+ &data_word(0x23631e28,0x90befffa); # u64
+ &data_word(0xde82bde9,0xa4506ceb); # u64
+ &data_word(0xb2c67915,0xbef9a3f7); # u64
+ &data_word(0xe372532b,0xc67178f2); # u64
+ &data_word(0xea26619c,0xca273ece); # u64
+ &data_word(0x21c0c207,0xd186b8c7); # u64
+ &data_word(0xcde0eb1e,0xeada7dd6); # u64
+ &data_word(0xee6ed178,0xf57d4f7f); # u64
+ &data_word(0x72176fba,0x06f067aa); # u64
+ &data_word(0xa2c898a6,0x0a637dc5); # u64
+ &data_word(0xbef90dae,0x113f9804); # u64
+ &data_word(0x131c471b,0x1b710b35); # u64
+ &data_word(0x23047d84,0x28db77f5); # u64
+ &data_word(0x40c72493,0x32caab7b); # u64
+ &data_word(0x15c9bebc,0x3c9ebe0a); # u64
+ &data_word(0x9c100d4c,0x431d67c4); # u64
+ &data_word(0xcb3e42b6,0x4cc5d4be); # u64
+ &data_word(0xfc657e2a,0x597f299c); # u64
+ &data_word(0x3ad6faec,0x5fcb6fab); # u64
+ &data_word(0x4a475817,0x6c44198c); # u64
+&function_end_B("sha512_block_data_order");
+&asciz("SHA512 block transform for x86, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
+
+&asm_finish();
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,793 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
-# ====================================================================
-
-# SHA256/512 block procedure for PA-RISC.
-
-# June 2009.
-#
-# SHA256 performance is >75% better than gcc 3.2 generated code on
-# PA-7100LC. Compared to code generated by vendor compiler this
-# implementation is almost 70% faster in 64-bit build, but delivers
-# virtually same performance in 32-bit build on PA-8600.
-#
-# SHA512 performance is >2.9x better than gcc 3.2 generated code on
-# PA-7100LC, PA-RISC 1.1 processor. Then implementation detects if the
-# code is executed on PA-RISC 2.0 processor and switches to 64-bit
-# code path delivering adequate peformance even in "blended" 32-bit
-# build. Though 64-bit code is not any faster than code generated by
-# vendor compiler on PA-8600...
-#
-# Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account.
-
-$flavour = shift;
-$output = shift;
-open STDOUT,">$output";
-
-if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
- $LEVEL ="2.0W";
- $SIZE_T =8;
- $FRAME_MARKER =80;
- $SAVED_RP =16;
- $PUSH ="std";
- $PUSHMA ="std,ma";
- $POP ="ldd";
- $POPMB ="ldd,mb";
-} else {
- $LEVEL ="1.0";
- $SIZE_T =4;
- $FRAME_MARKER =48;
- $SAVED_RP =20;
- $PUSH ="stw";
- $PUSHMA ="stwm";
- $POP ="ldw";
- $POPMB ="ldwm";
-}
-
-if ($output =~ /512/) {
- $func="sha512_block_data_order";
- $SZ=8;
- @Sigma0=(28,34,39);
- @Sigma1=(14,18,41);
- @sigma0=(1, 8, 7);
- @sigma1=(19,61, 6);
- $rounds=80;
- $LAST10BITS=0x017;
- $LD="ldd";
- $LDM="ldd,ma";
- $ST="std";
-} else {
- $func="sha256_block_data_order";
- $SZ=4;
- @Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
- @Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
- @sigma0=( 7,18, 3);
- @sigma1=(17,19,10);
- $rounds=64;
- $LAST10BITS=0x0f2;
- $LD="ldw";
- $LDM="ldwm";
- $ST="stw";
-}
-
-$FRAME=16*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;# 16 saved regs + frame marker
- # [+ argument transfer]
-$XOFF=16*$SZ+32; # local variables
-$FRAME+=$XOFF;
-$XOFF+=$FRAME_MARKER; # distance between %sp and local variables
-
-$ctx="%r26"; # zapped by $a0
-$inp="%r25"; # zapped by $a1
-$num="%r24"; # zapped by $t0
-
-$a0 ="%r26";
-$a1 ="%r25";
-$t0 ="%r24";
-$t1 ="%r29";
-$Tbl="%r31";
-
- at V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=("%r17","%r18","%r19","%r20","%r21","%r22","%r23","%r28");
-
- at X=("%r1", "%r2", "%r3", "%r4", "%r5", "%r6", "%r7", "%r8",
- "%r9", "%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16",$inp);
-
-sub ROUND_00_15 {
-my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
-$code.=<<___;
- _ror $e,$Sigma1[0],$a0
- and $f,$e,$t0
- _ror $e,$Sigma1[1],$a1
- addl $t1,$h,$h
- andcm $g,$e,$t1
- xor $a1,$a0,$a0
- _ror $a1,`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]`,$a1
- or $t0,$t1,$t1 ; Ch(e,f,g)
- addl @X[$i%16],$h,$h
- xor $a0,$a1,$a1 ; Sigma1(e)
- addl $t1,$h,$h
- _ror $a,$Sigma0[0],$a0
- addl $a1,$h,$h
-
- _ror $a,$Sigma0[1],$a1
- and $a,$b,$t0
- and $a,$c,$t1
- xor $a1,$a0,$a0
- _ror $a1,`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]`,$a1
- xor $t1,$t0,$t0
- and $b,$c,$t1
- xor $a0,$a1,$a1 ; Sigma0(a)
- addl $h,$d,$d
- xor $t1,$t0,$t0 ; Maj(a,b,c)
- `"$LDM $SZ($Tbl),$t1" if ($i<15)`
- addl $a1,$h,$h
- addl $t0,$h,$h
-
-___
-}
-
-sub ROUND_16_xx {
-my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
-$i-=16;
-$code.=<<___;
- _ror @X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[0],$a0
- _ror @X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[1],$a1
- addl @X[($i+9)%16], at X[$i], at X[$i]
- _ror @X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[0],$t0
- _ror @X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[1],$t1
- xor $a1,$a0,$a0
- _shr @X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[2],$a1
- xor $t1,$t0,$t0
- _shr @X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[2],$t1
- xor $a1,$a0,$a0 ; sigma0(X[(i+1)&0x0f])
- xor $t1,$t0,$t0 ; sigma1(X[(i+14)&0x0f])
- $LDM $SZ($Tbl),$t1
- addl $a0, at X[$i], at X[$i]
- addl $t0, at X[$i], at X[$i]
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($i==15);
- extru $t1,31,10,$a1
- comiclr,<> $LAST10BITS,$a1,%r0
- ldo 1($Tbl),$Tbl ; signal end of $Tbl
-___
-&ROUND_00_15($i+16,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h);
-}
-
-$code=<<___;
- .LEVEL $LEVEL
- .SPACE \$TEXT\$
- .SUBSPA \$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY
-
- .ALIGN 64
-L\$table
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8);
- .WORD 0x428a2f98,0xd728ae22,0x71374491,0x23ef65cd
- .WORD 0xb5c0fbcf,0xec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba5,0x8189dbbc
- .WORD 0x3956c25b,0xf348b538,0x59f111f1,0xb605d019
- .WORD 0x923f82a4,0xaf194f9b,0xab1c5ed5,0xda6d8118
- .WORD 0xd807aa98,0xa3030242,0x12835b01,0x45706fbe
- .WORD 0x243185be,0x4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3,0xd5ffb4e2
- .WORD 0x72be5d74,0xf27b896f,0x80deb1fe,0x3b1696b1
- .WORD 0x9bdc06a7,0x25c71235,0xc19bf174,0xcf692694
- .WORD 0xe49b69c1,0x9ef14ad2,0xefbe4786,0x384f25e3
- .WORD 0x0fc19dc6,0x8b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc,0x77ac9c65
- .WORD 0x2de92c6f,0x592b0275,0x4a7484aa,0x6ea6e483
- .WORD 0x5cb0a9dc,0xbd41fbd4,0x76f988da,0x831153b5
- .WORD 0x983e5152,0xee66dfab,0xa831c66d,0x2db43210
- .WORD 0xb00327c8,0x98fb213f,0xbf597fc7,0xbeef0ee4
- .WORD 0xc6e00bf3,0x3da88fc2,0xd5a79147,0x930aa725
- .WORD 0x06ca6351,0xe003826f,0x14292967,0x0a0e6e70
- .WORD 0x27b70a85,0x46d22ffc,0x2e1b2138,0x5c26c926
- .WORD 0x4d2c6dfc,0x5ac42aed,0x53380d13,0x9d95b3df
- .WORD 0x650a7354,0x8baf63de,0x766a0abb,0x3c77b2a8
- .WORD 0x81c2c92e,0x47edaee6,0x92722c85,0x1482353b
- .WORD 0xa2bfe8a1,0x4cf10364,0xa81a664b,0xbc423001
- .WORD 0xc24b8b70,0xd0f89791,0xc76c51a3,0x0654be30
- .WORD 0xd192e819,0xd6ef5218,0xd6990624,0x5565a910
- .WORD 0xf40e3585,0x5771202a,0x106aa070,0x32bbd1b8
- .WORD 0x19a4c116,0xb8d2d0c8,0x1e376c08,0x5141ab53
- .WORD 0x2748774c,0xdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5,0xe19b48a8
- .WORD 0x391c0cb3,0xc5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4a,0xe3418acb
- .WORD 0x5b9cca4f,0x7763e373,0x682e6ff3,0xd6b2b8a3
- .WORD 0x748f82ee,0x5defb2fc,0x78a5636f,0x43172f60
- .WORD 0x84c87814,0xa1f0ab72,0x8cc70208,0x1a6439ec
- .WORD 0x90befffa,0x23631e28,0xa4506ceb,0xde82bde9
- .WORD 0xbef9a3f7,0xb2c67915,0xc67178f2,0xe372532b
- .WORD 0xca273ece,0xea26619c,0xd186b8c7,0x21c0c207
- .WORD 0xeada7dd6,0xcde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7f,0xee6ed178
- .WORD 0x06f067aa,0x72176fba,0x0a637dc5,0xa2c898a6
- .WORD 0x113f9804,0xbef90dae,0x1b710b35,0x131c471b
- .WORD 0x28db77f5,0x23047d84,0x32caab7b,0x40c72493
- .WORD 0x3c9ebe0a,0x15c9bebc,0x431d67c4,0x9c100d4c
- .WORD 0x4cc5d4be,0xcb3e42b6,0x597f299c,0xfc657e2a
- .WORD 0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec,0x6c44198c,0x4a475817
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4);
- .WORD 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
- .WORD 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
- .WORD 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
- .WORD 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
- .WORD 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
- .WORD 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
- .WORD 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
- .WORD 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
- .WORD 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
- .WORD 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
- .WORD 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
- .WORD 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
- .WORD 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
- .WORD 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
- .WORD 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
- .WORD 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
-___
-$code.=<<___;
-
- .EXPORT $func,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR
- .ALIGN 64
-$func
- .PROC
- .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-16*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=18
- .ENTRY
- $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue
- $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp)
- $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r12,`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r13,`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r14,`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r15,`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r16,`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r17,`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH %r18,`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
-
- _shl $num,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)`,$num
- addl $inp,$num,$num ; $num to point at the end of $inp
-
- $PUSH $num,`-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ; save arguments
- $PUSH $inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
- $PUSH $ctx,`-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
-
- blr %r0,$Tbl
- ldi 3,$t1
-L\$pic
- andcm $Tbl,$t1,$Tbl ; wipe privilege level
- ldo L\$table-L\$pic($Tbl),$Tbl
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8 && $SIZE_T==4);
- ldi 31,$t1
- mtctl $t1,%cr11
- extrd,u,*= $t1,%sar,1,$t1 ; executes on PA-RISC 1.0
- b L\$parisc1
- nop
-___
-$code.=<<___;
- $LD `0*$SZ`($ctx),$A ; load context
- $LD `1*$SZ`($ctx),$B
- $LD `2*$SZ`($ctx),$C
- $LD `3*$SZ`($ctx),$D
- $LD `4*$SZ`($ctx),$E
- $LD `5*$SZ`($ctx),$F
- $LD `6*$SZ`($ctx),$G
- $LD `7*$SZ`($ctx),$H
-
- extru $inp,31,`log($SZ)/log(2)`,$t0
- sh3addl $t0,%r0,$t0
- subi `8*$SZ`,$t0,$t0
- mtctl $t0,%cr11 ; load %sar with align factor
-
-L\$oop
- ldi `$SZ-1`,$t0
- $LDM $SZ($Tbl),$t1
- andcm $inp,$t0,$t0 ; align $inp
-___
- for ($i=0;$i<15;$i++) { # load input block
- $code.="\t$LD `$SZ*$i`($t0), at X[$i]\n"; }
-$code.=<<___;
- cmpb,*= $inp,$t0,L\$aligned
- $LD `$SZ*15`($t0), at X[15]
- $LD `$SZ*16`($t0), at X[16]
-___
- for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { # align data
- $code.="\t_align @X[$i], at X[$i+1], at X[$i]\n"; }
-$code.=<<___;
-L\$aligned
- nop ; otherwise /usr/ccs/bin/as is confused by below .WORD
-___
-
-for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND_00_15($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
-$code.=<<___;
-L\$rounds
- nop ; otherwise /usr/ccs/bin/as is confused by below .WORD
-___
-for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_xx($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
-$code.=<<___;
- bb,>= $Tbl,31,L\$rounds ; end of $Tbl signalled?
- nop
-
- $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$ctx ; restore arguments
- $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$inp
- $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$num
- ldo `-$rounds*$SZ-1`($Tbl),$Tbl ; rewind $Tbl
-
- $LD `0*$SZ`($ctx), at X[0] ; load context
- $LD `1*$SZ`($ctx), at X[1]
- $LD `2*$SZ`($ctx), at X[2]
- $LD `3*$SZ`($ctx), at X[3]
- $LD `4*$SZ`($ctx), at X[4]
- $LD `5*$SZ`($ctx), at X[5]
- addl @X[0],$A,$A
- $LD `6*$SZ`($ctx), at X[6]
- addl @X[1],$B,$B
- $LD `7*$SZ`($ctx), at X[7]
- ldo `16*$SZ`($inp),$inp ; advance $inp
-
- $ST $A,`0*$SZ`($ctx) ; save context
- addl @X[2],$C,$C
- $ST $B,`1*$SZ`($ctx)
- addl @X[3],$D,$D
- $ST $C,`2*$SZ`($ctx)
- addl @X[4],$E,$E
- $ST $D,`3*$SZ`($ctx)
- addl @X[5],$F,$F
- $ST $E,`4*$SZ`($ctx)
- addl @X[6],$G,$G
- $ST $F,`5*$SZ`($ctx)
- addl @X[7],$H,$H
- $ST $G,`6*$SZ`($ctx)
- $ST $H,`7*$SZ`($ctx)
-
- cmpb,*<>,n $inp,$num,L\$oop
- $PUSH $inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ; save $inp
-___
-if ($SZ==8 && $SIZE_T==4) # SHA512 for 32-bit PA-RISC 1.0
-{{
-$code.=<<___;
- b L\$done
- nop
-
- .ALIGN 64
-L\$parisc1
-___
-
- at V=( $Ahi, $Alo, $Bhi, $Blo, $Chi, $Clo, $Dhi, $Dlo,
- $Ehi, $Elo, $Fhi, $Flo, $Ghi, $Glo, $Hhi, $Hlo) =
- ( "%r1", "%r2", "%r3", "%r4", "%r5", "%r6", "%r7", "%r8",
- "%r9","%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16");
-$a0 ="%r17";
-$a1 ="%r18";
-$a2 ="%r19";
-$a3 ="%r20";
-$t0 ="%r21";
-$t1 ="%r22";
-$t2 ="%r28";
-$t3 ="%r29";
-$Tbl="%r31";
-
- at X=("%r23","%r24","%r25","%r26"); # zaps $num,$inp,$ctx
-
-sub ROUND_00_15_pa1 {
-my ($i,$ahi,$alo,$bhi,$blo,$chi,$clo,$dhi,$dlo,
- $ehi,$elo,$fhi,$flo,$ghi,$glo,$hhi,$hlo,$flag)=@_;
-my ($Xhi,$Xlo,$Xnhi,$Xnlo) = @X;
-
-$code.=<<___ if (!$flag);
- ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)`(%sp),$Xnhi
- ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)+4`(%sp),$Xnlo ; load X[i+1]
-___
-$code.=<<___;
- shd $ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[0],$t0
- add $Xlo,$hlo,$hlo
- shd $elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[0],$t1
- addc $Xhi,$hhi,$hhi ; h += X[i]
- shd $ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[1],$t2
- ldwm 8($Tbl),$Xhi
- shd $elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[1],$t3
- ldw -4($Tbl),$Xlo ; load K[i]
- xor $t2,$t0,$t0
- xor $t3,$t1,$t1
- and $flo,$elo,$a0
- and $fhi,$ehi,$a1
- shd $ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[2],$t2
- andcm $glo,$elo,$a2
- shd $elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[2],$t3
- andcm $ghi,$ehi,$a3
- xor $t2,$t0,$t0
- xor $t3,$t1,$t1 ; Sigma1(e)
- add $Xlo,$hlo,$hlo
- xor $a2,$a0,$a0
- addc $Xhi,$hhi,$hhi ; h += K[i]
- xor $a3,$a1,$a1 ; Ch(e,f,g)
-
- add $t0,$hlo,$hlo
- shd $ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[0],$t0
- addc $t1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Sigma1(e)
- shd $alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[0],$t1
- add $a0,$hlo,$hlo
- shd $ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[1],$t2
- addc $a1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Ch(e,f,g)
- shd $alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[1],$t3
-
- xor $t2,$t0,$t0
- xor $t3,$t1,$t1
- shd $ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[2],$t2
- and $alo,$blo,$a0
- shd $alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[2],$t3
- and $ahi,$bhi,$a1
- xor $t2,$t0,$t0
- xor $t3,$t1,$t1 ; Sigma0(a)
-
- and $alo,$clo,$a2
- and $ahi,$chi,$a3
- xor $a2,$a0,$a0
- add $hlo,$dlo,$dlo
- xor $a3,$a1,$a1
- addc $hhi,$dhi,$dhi ; d += h
- and $blo,$clo,$a2
- add $t0,$hlo,$hlo
- and $bhi,$chi,$a3
- addc $t1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Sigma0(a)
- xor $a2,$a0,$a0
- add $a0,$hlo,$hlo
- xor $a3,$a1,$a1 ; Maj(a,b,c)
- addc $a1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Maj(a,b,c)
-
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($i==15 && $flag);
- extru $Xlo,31,10,$Xlo
- comiclr,= $LAST10BITS,$Xlo,%r0
- b L\$rounds_pa1
- nop
-___
-push(@X,shift(@X)); push(@X,shift(@X));
-}
-
-sub ROUND_16_xx_pa1 {
-my ($Xhi,$Xlo,$Xnhi,$Xnlo) = @X;
-my ($i)=shift;
-$i-=16;
-$code.=<<___;
- ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)`(%sp),$Xnhi
- ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)+4`(%sp),$Xnlo ; load X[i+1]
- ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+9)%16)`(%sp),$a1
- ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+9)%16)+4`(%sp),$a0 ; load X[i+9]
- ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+14)%16)`(%sp),$a3
- ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+14)%16)+4`(%sp),$a2 ; load X[i+14]
- shd $Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[0],$t0
- shd $Xnlo,$Xnhi,$sigma0[0],$t1
- add $a0,$Xlo,$Xlo
- shd $Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[1],$t2
- addc $a1,$Xhi,$Xhi
- shd $Xnlo,$Xnhi,$sigma0[1],$t3
- xor $t2,$t0,$t0
- shd $Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[2],$t2
- xor $t3,$t1,$t1
- extru $Xnhi,`31-$sigma0[2]`,`32-$sigma0[2]`,$t3
- xor $t2,$t0,$t0
- shd $a3,$a2,$sigma1[0],$a0
- xor $t3,$t1,$t1 ; sigma0(X[i+1)&0x0f])
- shd $a2,$a3,$sigma1[0],$a1
- add $t0,$Xlo,$Xlo
- shd $a3,$a2,$sigma1[1],$t2
- addc $t1,$Xhi,$Xhi
- shd $a2,$a3,$sigma1[1],$t3
- xor $t2,$a0,$a0
- shd $a3,$a2,$sigma1[2],$t2
- xor $t3,$a1,$a1
- extru $a3,`31-$sigma1[2]`,`32-$sigma1[2]`,$t3
- xor $t2,$a0,$a0
- xor $t3,$a1,$a1 ; sigma0(X[i+14)&0x0f])
- add $a0,$Xlo,$Xlo
- addc $a1,$Xhi,$Xhi
-
- stw $Xhi,`-$XOFF+8*($i%16)`(%sp)
- stw $Xlo,`-$XOFF+8*($i%16)+4`(%sp)
-___
-&ROUND_00_15_pa1($i, at _,1);
-}
-$code.=<<___;
- ldw `0*4`($ctx),$Ahi ; load context
- ldw `1*4`($ctx),$Alo
- ldw `2*4`($ctx),$Bhi
- ldw `3*4`($ctx),$Blo
- ldw `4*4`($ctx),$Chi
- ldw `5*4`($ctx),$Clo
- ldw `6*4`($ctx),$Dhi
- ldw `7*4`($ctx),$Dlo
- ldw `8*4`($ctx),$Ehi
- ldw `9*4`($ctx),$Elo
- ldw `10*4`($ctx),$Fhi
- ldw `11*4`($ctx),$Flo
- ldw `12*4`($ctx),$Ghi
- ldw `13*4`($ctx),$Glo
- ldw `14*4`($ctx),$Hhi
- ldw `15*4`($ctx),$Hlo
-
- extru $inp,31,2,$t0
- sh3addl $t0,%r0,$t0
- subi 32,$t0,$t0
- mtctl $t0,%cr11 ; load %sar with align factor
-
-L\$oop_pa1
- extru $inp,31,2,$a3
- comib,= 0,$a3,L\$aligned_pa1
- sub $inp,$a3,$inp
-
- ldw `0*4`($inp),$X[0]
- ldw `1*4`($inp),$X[1]
- ldw `2*4`($inp),$t2
- ldw `3*4`($inp),$t3
- ldw `4*4`($inp),$a0
- ldw `5*4`($inp),$a1
- ldw `6*4`($inp),$a2
- ldw `7*4`($inp),$a3
- vshd $X[0],$X[1],$X[0]
- vshd $X[1],$t2,$X[1]
- stw $X[0],`-$XOFF+0*4`(%sp)
- ldw `8*4`($inp),$t0
- vshd $t2,$t3,$t2
- stw $X[1],`-$XOFF+1*4`(%sp)
- ldw `9*4`($inp),$t1
- vshd $t3,$a0,$t3
-___
-{
-my @t=($t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t0,$t1);
-for ($i=2;$i<=(128/4-8);$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
- stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
- ldw `(8+$i)*4`($inp),$t[0]
- vshd $t[1],$t[2],$t[1]
-___
-push(@t,shift(@t));
-}
-for (;$i<(128/4-1);$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
- stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
- vshd $t[1],$t[2],$t[1]
-___
-push(@t,shift(@t));
-}
-$code.=<<___;
- b L\$collected_pa1
- stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
-
-___
-}
-$code.=<<___;
-L\$aligned_pa1
- ldw `0*4`($inp),$X[0]
- ldw `1*4`($inp),$X[1]
- ldw `2*4`($inp),$t2
- ldw `3*4`($inp),$t3
- ldw `4*4`($inp),$a0
- ldw `5*4`($inp),$a1
- ldw `6*4`($inp),$a2
- ldw `7*4`($inp),$a3
- stw $X[0],`-$XOFF+0*4`(%sp)
- ldw `8*4`($inp),$t0
- stw $X[1],`-$XOFF+1*4`(%sp)
- ldw `9*4`($inp),$t1
-___
-{
-my @t=($t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t0,$t1);
-for ($i=2;$i<(128/4-8);$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
- stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
- ldw `(8+$i)*4`($inp),$t[0]
-___
-push(@t,shift(@t));
-}
-for (;$i<128/4;$i++) {
-$code.=<<___;
- stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
-___
-push(@t,shift(@t));
-}
-$code.="L\$collected_pa1\n";
-}
-
-for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND_00_15_pa1($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
-$code.="L\$rounds_pa1\n";
-for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_xx_pa1($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
-
-$code.=<<___;
- $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$ctx ; restore arguments
- $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$inp
- $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$num
- ldo `-$rounds*$SZ`($Tbl),$Tbl ; rewind $Tbl
-
- ldw `0*4`($ctx),$t1 ; update context
- ldw `1*4`($ctx),$t0
- ldw `2*4`($ctx),$t3
- ldw `3*4`($ctx),$t2
- ldw `4*4`($ctx),$a1
- ldw `5*4`($ctx),$a0
- ldw `6*4`($ctx),$a3
- add $t0,$Alo,$Alo
- ldw `7*4`($ctx),$a2
- addc $t1,$Ahi,$Ahi
- ldw `8*4`($ctx),$t1
- add $t2,$Blo,$Blo
- ldw `9*4`($ctx),$t0
- addc $t3,$Bhi,$Bhi
- ldw `10*4`($ctx),$t3
- add $a0,$Clo,$Clo
- ldw `11*4`($ctx),$t2
- addc $a1,$Chi,$Chi
- ldw `12*4`($ctx),$a1
- add $a2,$Dlo,$Dlo
- ldw `13*4`($ctx),$a0
- addc $a3,$Dhi,$Dhi
- ldw `14*4`($ctx),$a3
- add $t0,$Elo,$Elo
- ldw `15*4`($ctx),$a2
- addc $t1,$Ehi,$Ehi
- stw $Ahi,`0*4`($ctx)
- add $t2,$Flo,$Flo
- stw $Alo,`1*4`($ctx)
- addc $t3,$Fhi,$Fhi
- stw $Bhi,`2*4`($ctx)
- add $a0,$Glo,$Glo
- stw $Blo,`3*4`($ctx)
- addc $a1,$Ghi,$Ghi
- stw $Chi,`4*4`($ctx)
- add $a2,$Hlo,$Hlo
- stw $Clo,`5*4`($ctx)
- addc $a3,$Hhi,$Hhi
- stw $Dhi,`6*4`($ctx)
- ldo `16*$SZ`($inp),$inp ; advance $inp
- stw $Dlo,`7*4`($ctx)
- stw $Ehi,`8*4`($ctx)
- stw $Elo,`9*4`($ctx)
- stw $Fhi,`10*4`($ctx)
- stw $Flo,`11*4`($ctx)
- stw $Ghi,`12*4`($ctx)
- stw $Glo,`13*4`($ctx)
- stw $Hhi,`14*4`($ctx)
- comb,= $inp,$num,L\$done
- stw $Hlo,`15*4`($ctx)
- b L\$oop_pa1
- $PUSH $inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ; save $inp
-L\$done
-___
-}}
-$code.=<<___;
- $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ; standard epilogue
- $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4
- $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5
- $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6
- $POP `-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7
- $POP `-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8
- $POP `-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9
- $POP `-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10
- $POP `-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11
- $POP `-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r12
- $POP `-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r13
- $POP `-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r14
- $POP `-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r15
- $POP `-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r16
- $POP `-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r17
- $POP `-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r18
- bv (%r2)
- .EXIT
- $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3
- .PROCEND
- .STRINGZ "SHA`64*$SZ` block transform for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
-___
-
-# Explicitly encode PA-RISC 2.0 instructions used in this module, so
-# that it can be compiled with .LEVEL 1.0. It should be noted that I
-# wouldn't have to do this, if GNU assembler understood .ALLOW 2.0
-# directive...
-
-my $ldd = sub {
- my ($mod,$args) = @_;
- my $orig = "ldd$mod\t$args";
-
- if ($args =~ /(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 3 suffices
- { my $opcode=(0x14<<26)|($2<<21)|($3<<16)|(($1&0x1FF8)<<1)|(($1>>13)&1);
- $opcode|=(1<<3) if ($mod =~ /^,m/);
- $opcode|=(1<<2) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/);
- sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
- }
- else { "\t".$orig; }
-};
-
-my $std = sub {
- my ($mod,$args) = @_;
- my $orig = "std$mod\t$args";
-
- if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\)/) # format 3 suffices
- { my $opcode=(0x1c<<26)|($3<<21)|($1<<16)|(($2&0x1FF8)<<1)|(($2>>13)&1);
- sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
- }
- else { "\t".$orig; }
-};
-
-my $extrd = sub {
- my ($mod,$args) = @_;
- my $orig = "extrd$mod\t$args";
-
- # I only have ",u" completer, it's implicitly encoded...
- if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 15
- { my $opcode=(0x36<<26)|($1<<21)|($4<<16);
- my $len=32-$3;
- $opcode |= (($2&0x20)<<6)|(($2&0x1f)<<5); # encode pos
- $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f); # encode len
- sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
- }
- elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%sar,([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 12
- { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($1<<21)|($3<<16)|(2<<11)|(1<<9);
- my $len=32-$2;
- $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<3)|($len&0x1f); # encode len
- $opcode |= (1<<13) if ($mod =~ /,\**=/);
- sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
- }
- else { "\t".$orig; }
-};
-
-my $shrpd = sub {
- my ($mod,$args) = @_;
- my $orig = "shrpd$mod\t$args";
-
- if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 14
- { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<10)|$4;
- my $cpos=63-$3;
- $opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5); # encode sa
- sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
- }
- elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),%sar,%r([0-9]+)/) # format 11
- { sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",
- (0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<9)|$3,$orig;
- }
- else { "\t".$orig; }
-};
-
-sub assemble {
- my ($mnemonic,$mod,$args)=@_;
- my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic");
-
- ref($opcode) eq 'CODE' ? &$opcode($mod,$args) : "\t$mnemonic$mod\t$args";
-}
-
-foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
- s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
-
- s/shd\s+(%r[0-9]+),(%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/
- $3>31 ? sprintf("shd\t%$2,%$1,%d",$3-32) # rotation for >=32
- : sprintf("shd\t%$1,%$2,%d",$3)/e or
- # translate made up instructons: _ror, _shr, _align, _shl
- s/_ror(\s+)(%r[0-9]+),/
- ($SZ==4 ? "shd" : "shrpd")."$1$2,$2,"/e or
-
- s/_shr(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/
- $SZ==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,%d,",$1,31-$2,32-$2)
- : sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,%d,",$1,63-$2,64-$2)/e or
-
- s/_align(\s+%r[0-9]+,%r[0-9]+),/
- ($SZ==4 ? "vshd$1," : "shrpd$1,%sar,")/e or
-
- s/_shl(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/
- $SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("zdep%s,%d,%d,",$1,31-$2,32-$2)
- : sprintf("depd,z%s,%d,%d,",$1,63-$2,64-$2)/e;
-
- s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($SIZE_T==4);
-
- s/cmpb,\*/comb,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
-
- s/\bbv\b/bve/ if ($SIZE_T==8);
-
- print $_,"\n";
-}
-
-close STDOUT;
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,793 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
+# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
+# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
+# ====================================================================
+
+# SHA256/512 block procedure for PA-RISC.
+
+# June 2009.
+#
+# SHA256 performance is >75% better than gcc 3.2 generated code on
+# PA-7100LC. Compared to code generated by vendor compiler this
+# implementation is almost 70% faster in 64-bit build, but delivers
+# virtually same performance in 32-bit build on PA-8600.
+#
+# SHA512 performance is >2.9x better than gcc 3.2 generated code on
+# PA-7100LC, PA-RISC 1.1 processor. Then implementation detects if the
+# code is executed on PA-RISC 2.0 processor and switches to 64-bit
+# code path delivering adequate performance even in "blended" 32-bit
+# build. Though 64-bit code is not any faster than code generated by
+# vendor compiler on PA-8600...
+#
+# Special thanks to polarhome.com for providing HP-UX account.
+
+$flavour = shift;
+$output = shift;
+open STDOUT,">$output";
+
+if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
+ $LEVEL ="2.0W";
+ $SIZE_T =8;
+ $FRAME_MARKER =80;
+ $SAVED_RP =16;
+ $PUSH ="std";
+ $PUSHMA ="std,ma";
+ $POP ="ldd";
+ $POPMB ="ldd,mb";
+} else {
+ $LEVEL ="1.0";
+ $SIZE_T =4;
+ $FRAME_MARKER =48;
+ $SAVED_RP =20;
+ $PUSH ="stw";
+ $PUSHMA ="stwm";
+ $POP ="ldw";
+ $POPMB ="ldwm";
+}
+
+if ($output =~ /512/) {
+ $func="sha512_block_data_order";
+ $SZ=8;
+ @Sigma0=(28,34,39);
+ @Sigma1=(14,18,41);
+ @sigma0=(1, 8, 7);
+ @sigma1=(19,61, 6);
+ $rounds=80;
+ $LAST10BITS=0x017;
+ $LD="ldd";
+ $LDM="ldd,ma";
+ $ST="std";
+} else {
+ $func="sha256_block_data_order";
+ $SZ=4;
+ @Sigma0=( 2,13,22);
+ @Sigma1=( 6,11,25);
+ @sigma0=( 7,18, 3);
+ @sigma1=(17,19,10);
+ $rounds=64;
+ $LAST10BITS=0x0f2;
+ $LD="ldw";
+ $LDM="ldwm";
+ $ST="stw";
+}
+
+$FRAME=16*$SIZE_T+$FRAME_MARKER;# 16 saved regs + frame marker
+ # [+ argument transfer]
+$XOFF=16*$SZ+32; # local variables
+$FRAME+=$XOFF;
+$XOFF+=$FRAME_MARKER; # distance between %sp and local variables
+
+$ctx="%r26"; # zapped by $a0
+$inp="%r25"; # zapped by $a1
+$num="%r24"; # zapped by $t0
+
+$a0 ="%r26";
+$a1 ="%r25";
+$t0 ="%r24";
+$t1 ="%r29";
+$Tbl="%r31";
+
+ at V=($A,$B,$C,$D,$E,$F,$G,$H)=("%r17","%r18","%r19","%r20","%r21","%r22","%r23","%r28");
+
+ at X=("%r1", "%r2", "%r3", "%r4", "%r5", "%r6", "%r7", "%r8",
+ "%r9", "%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16",$inp);
+
+sub ROUND_00_15 {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+$code.=<<___;
+ _ror $e,$Sigma1[0],$a0
+ and $f,$e,$t0
+ _ror $e,$Sigma1[1],$a1
+ addl $t1,$h,$h
+ andcm $g,$e,$t1
+ xor $a1,$a0,$a0
+ _ror $a1,`$Sigma1[2]-$Sigma1[1]`,$a1
+ or $t0,$t1,$t1 ; Ch(e,f,g)
+ addl @X[$i%16],$h,$h
+ xor $a0,$a1,$a1 ; Sigma1(e)
+ addl $t1,$h,$h
+ _ror $a,$Sigma0[0],$a0
+ addl $a1,$h,$h
+
+ _ror $a,$Sigma0[1],$a1
+ and $a,$b,$t0
+ and $a,$c,$t1
+ xor $a1,$a0,$a0
+ _ror $a1,`$Sigma0[2]-$Sigma0[1]`,$a1
+ xor $t1,$t0,$t0
+ and $b,$c,$t1
+ xor $a0,$a1,$a1 ; Sigma0(a)
+ addl $h,$d,$d
+ xor $t1,$t0,$t0 ; Maj(a,b,c)
+ `"$LDM $SZ($Tbl),$t1" if ($i<15)`
+ addl $a1,$h,$h
+ addl $t0,$h,$h
+
+___
+}
+
+sub ROUND_16_xx {
+my ($i,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h)=@_;
+$i-=16;
+$code.=<<___;
+ _ror @X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[0],$a0
+ _ror @X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[1],$a1
+ addl @X[($i+9)%16], at X[$i], at X[$i]
+ _ror @X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[0],$t0
+ _ror @X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[1],$t1
+ xor $a1,$a0,$a0
+ _shr @X[($i+1)%16],$sigma0[2],$a1
+ xor $t1,$t0,$t0
+ _shr @X[($i+14)%16],$sigma1[2],$t1
+ xor $a1,$a0,$a0 ; sigma0(X[(i+1)&0x0f])
+ xor $t1,$t0,$t0 ; sigma1(X[(i+14)&0x0f])
+ $LDM $SZ($Tbl),$t1
+ addl $a0, at X[$i], at X[$i]
+ addl $t0, at X[$i], at X[$i]
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==15);
+ extru $t1,31,10,$a1
+ comiclr,<> $LAST10BITS,$a1,%r0
+ ldo 1($Tbl),$Tbl ; signal end of $Tbl
+___
+&ROUND_00_15($i+16,$a,$b,$c,$d,$e,$f,$g,$h);
+}
+
+$code=<<___;
+ .LEVEL $LEVEL
+ .SPACE \$TEXT\$
+ .SUBSPA \$CODE\$,QUAD=0,ALIGN=8,ACCESS=0x2C,CODE_ONLY
+
+ .ALIGN 64
+L\$table
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8);
+ .WORD 0x428a2f98,0xd728ae22,0x71374491,0x23ef65cd
+ .WORD 0xb5c0fbcf,0xec4d3b2f,0xe9b5dba5,0x8189dbbc
+ .WORD 0x3956c25b,0xf348b538,0x59f111f1,0xb605d019
+ .WORD 0x923f82a4,0xaf194f9b,0xab1c5ed5,0xda6d8118
+ .WORD 0xd807aa98,0xa3030242,0x12835b01,0x45706fbe
+ .WORD 0x243185be,0x4ee4b28c,0x550c7dc3,0xd5ffb4e2
+ .WORD 0x72be5d74,0xf27b896f,0x80deb1fe,0x3b1696b1
+ .WORD 0x9bdc06a7,0x25c71235,0xc19bf174,0xcf692694
+ .WORD 0xe49b69c1,0x9ef14ad2,0xefbe4786,0x384f25e3
+ .WORD 0x0fc19dc6,0x8b8cd5b5,0x240ca1cc,0x77ac9c65
+ .WORD 0x2de92c6f,0x592b0275,0x4a7484aa,0x6ea6e483
+ .WORD 0x5cb0a9dc,0xbd41fbd4,0x76f988da,0x831153b5
+ .WORD 0x983e5152,0xee66dfab,0xa831c66d,0x2db43210
+ .WORD 0xb00327c8,0x98fb213f,0xbf597fc7,0xbeef0ee4
+ .WORD 0xc6e00bf3,0x3da88fc2,0xd5a79147,0x930aa725
+ .WORD 0x06ca6351,0xe003826f,0x14292967,0x0a0e6e70
+ .WORD 0x27b70a85,0x46d22ffc,0x2e1b2138,0x5c26c926
+ .WORD 0x4d2c6dfc,0x5ac42aed,0x53380d13,0x9d95b3df
+ .WORD 0x650a7354,0x8baf63de,0x766a0abb,0x3c77b2a8
+ .WORD 0x81c2c92e,0x47edaee6,0x92722c85,0x1482353b
+ .WORD 0xa2bfe8a1,0x4cf10364,0xa81a664b,0xbc423001
+ .WORD 0xc24b8b70,0xd0f89791,0xc76c51a3,0x0654be30
+ .WORD 0xd192e819,0xd6ef5218,0xd6990624,0x5565a910
+ .WORD 0xf40e3585,0x5771202a,0x106aa070,0x32bbd1b8
+ .WORD 0x19a4c116,0xb8d2d0c8,0x1e376c08,0x5141ab53
+ .WORD 0x2748774c,0xdf8eeb99,0x34b0bcb5,0xe19b48a8
+ .WORD 0x391c0cb3,0xc5c95a63,0x4ed8aa4a,0xe3418acb
+ .WORD 0x5b9cca4f,0x7763e373,0x682e6ff3,0xd6b2b8a3
+ .WORD 0x748f82ee,0x5defb2fc,0x78a5636f,0x43172f60
+ .WORD 0x84c87814,0xa1f0ab72,0x8cc70208,0x1a6439ec
+ .WORD 0x90befffa,0x23631e28,0xa4506ceb,0xde82bde9
+ .WORD 0xbef9a3f7,0xb2c67915,0xc67178f2,0xe372532b
+ .WORD 0xca273ece,0xea26619c,0xd186b8c7,0x21c0c207
+ .WORD 0xeada7dd6,0xcde0eb1e,0xf57d4f7f,0xee6ed178
+ .WORD 0x06f067aa,0x72176fba,0x0a637dc5,0xa2c898a6
+ .WORD 0x113f9804,0xbef90dae,0x1b710b35,0x131c471b
+ .WORD 0x28db77f5,0x23047d84,0x32caab7b,0x40c72493
+ .WORD 0x3c9ebe0a,0x15c9bebc,0x431d67c4,0x9c100d4c
+ .WORD 0x4cc5d4be,0xcb3e42b6,0x597f299c,0xfc657e2a
+ .WORD 0x5fcb6fab,0x3ad6faec,0x6c44198c,0x4a475817
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==4);
+ .WORD 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5
+ .WORD 0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5
+ .WORD 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3
+ .WORD 0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174
+ .WORD 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc
+ .WORD 0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da
+ .WORD 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7
+ .WORD 0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967
+ .WORD 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13
+ .WORD 0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85
+ .WORD 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3
+ .WORD 0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070
+ .WORD 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5
+ .WORD 0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3
+ .WORD 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208
+ .WORD 0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+
+ .EXPORT $func,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR
+ .ALIGN 64
+$func
+ .PROC
+ .CALLINFO FRAME=`$FRAME-16*$SIZE_T`,NO_CALLS,SAVE_RP,ENTRY_GR=18
+ .ENTRY
+ $PUSH %r2,-$SAVED_RP(%sp) ; standard prologue
+ $PUSHMA %r3,$FRAME(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r4,`-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r5,`-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r6,`-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r7,`-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r8,`-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r9,`-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r10,`-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r11,`-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r12,`-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r13,`-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r14,`-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r15,`-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r16,`-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r17,`-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH %r18,`-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+
+ _shl $num,`log(16*$SZ)/log(2)`,$num
+ addl $inp,$num,$num ; $num to point at the end of $inp
+
+ $PUSH $num,`-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ; save arguments
+ $PUSH $inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+ $PUSH $ctx,`-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp)
+
+ blr %r0,$Tbl
+ ldi 3,$t1
+L\$pic
+ andcm $Tbl,$t1,$Tbl ; wipe privilege level
+ ldo L\$table-L\$pic($Tbl),$Tbl
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($SZ==8 && $SIZE_T==4);
+ ldi 31,$t1
+ mtctl $t1,%cr11
+ extrd,u,*= $t1,%sar,1,$t1 ; executes on PA-RISC 1.0
+ b L\$parisc1
+ nop
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+ $LD `0*$SZ`($ctx),$A ; load context
+ $LD `1*$SZ`($ctx),$B
+ $LD `2*$SZ`($ctx),$C
+ $LD `3*$SZ`($ctx),$D
+ $LD `4*$SZ`($ctx),$E
+ $LD `5*$SZ`($ctx),$F
+ $LD `6*$SZ`($ctx),$G
+ $LD `7*$SZ`($ctx),$H
+
+ extru $inp,31,`log($SZ)/log(2)`,$t0
+ sh3addl $t0,%r0,$t0
+ subi `8*$SZ`,$t0,$t0
+ mtctl $t0,%cr11 ; load %sar with align factor
+
+L\$oop
+ ldi `$SZ-1`,$t0
+ $LDM $SZ($Tbl),$t1
+ andcm $inp,$t0,$t0 ; align $inp
+___
+ for ($i=0;$i<15;$i++) { # load input block
+ $code.="\t$LD `$SZ*$i`($t0), at X[$i]\n"; }
+$code.=<<___;
+ cmpb,*= $inp,$t0,L\$aligned
+ $LD `$SZ*15`($t0), at X[15]
+ $LD `$SZ*16`($t0), at X[16]
+___
+ for ($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { # align data
+ $code.="\t_align @X[$i], at X[$i+1], at X[$i]\n"; }
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$aligned
+ nop ; otherwise /usr/ccs/bin/as is confused by below .WORD
+___
+
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND_00_15($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$rounds
+ nop ; otherwise /usr/ccs/bin/as is confused by below .WORD
+___
+for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_xx($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.=<<___;
+ bb,>= $Tbl,31,L\$rounds ; end of $Tbl signalled?
+ nop
+
+ $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$ctx ; restore arguments
+ $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$inp
+ $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$num
+ ldo `-$rounds*$SZ-1`($Tbl),$Tbl ; rewind $Tbl
+
+ $LD `0*$SZ`($ctx), at X[0] ; load context
+ $LD `1*$SZ`($ctx), at X[1]
+ $LD `2*$SZ`($ctx), at X[2]
+ $LD `3*$SZ`($ctx), at X[3]
+ $LD `4*$SZ`($ctx), at X[4]
+ $LD `5*$SZ`($ctx), at X[5]
+ addl @X[0],$A,$A
+ $LD `6*$SZ`($ctx), at X[6]
+ addl @X[1],$B,$B
+ $LD `7*$SZ`($ctx), at X[7]
+ ldo `16*$SZ`($inp),$inp ; advance $inp
+
+ $ST $A,`0*$SZ`($ctx) ; save context
+ addl @X[2],$C,$C
+ $ST $B,`1*$SZ`($ctx)
+ addl @X[3],$D,$D
+ $ST $C,`2*$SZ`($ctx)
+ addl @X[4],$E,$E
+ $ST $D,`3*$SZ`($ctx)
+ addl @X[5],$F,$F
+ $ST $E,`4*$SZ`($ctx)
+ addl @X[6],$G,$G
+ $ST $F,`5*$SZ`($ctx)
+ addl @X[7],$H,$H
+ $ST $G,`6*$SZ`($ctx)
+ $ST $H,`7*$SZ`($ctx)
+
+ cmpb,*<>,n $inp,$num,L\$oop
+ $PUSH $inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ; save $inp
+___
+if ($SZ==8 && $SIZE_T==4) # SHA512 for 32-bit PA-RISC 1.0
+{{
+$code.=<<___;
+ b L\$done
+ nop
+
+ .ALIGN 64
+L\$parisc1
+___
+
+ at V=( $Ahi, $Alo, $Bhi, $Blo, $Chi, $Clo, $Dhi, $Dlo,
+ $Ehi, $Elo, $Fhi, $Flo, $Ghi, $Glo, $Hhi, $Hlo) =
+ ( "%r1", "%r2", "%r3", "%r4", "%r5", "%r6", "%r7", "%r8",
+ "%r9","%r10","%r11","%r12","%r13","%r14","%r15","%r16");
+$a0 ="%r17";
+$a1 ="%r18";
+$a2 ="%r19";
+$a3 ="%r20";
+$t0 ="%r21";
+$t1 ="%r22";
+$t2 ="%r28";
+$t3 ="%r29";
+$Tbl="%r31";
+
+ at X=("%r23","%r24","%r25","%r26"); # zaps $num,$inp,$ctx
+
+sub ROUND_00_15_pa1 {
+my ($i,$ahi,$alo,$bhi,$blo,$chi,$clo,$dhi,$dlo,
+ $ehi,$elo,$fhi,$flo,$ghi,$glo,$hhi,$hlo,$flag)=@_;
+my ($Xhi,$Xlo,$Xnhi,$Xnlo) = @X;
+
+$code.=<<___ if (!$flag);
+ ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)`(%sp),$Xnhi
+ ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)+4`(%sp),$Xnlo ; load X[i+1]
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+ shd $ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[0],$t0
+ add $Xlo,$hlo,$hlo
+ shd $elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[0],$t1
+ addc $Xhi,$hhi,$hhi ; h += X[i]
+ shd $ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[1],$t2
+ ldwm 8($Tbl),$Xhi
+ shd $elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[1],$t3
+ ldw -4($Tbl),$Xlo ; load K[i]
+ xor $t2,$t0,$t0
+ xor $t3,$t1,$t1
+ and $flo,$elo,$a0
+ and $fhi,$ehi,$a1
+ shd $ehi,$elo,$Sigma1[2],$t2
+ andcm $glo,$elo,$a2
+ shd $elo,$ehi,$Sigma1[2],$t3
+ andcm $ghi,$ehi,$a3
+ xor $t2,$t0,$t0
+ xor $t3,$t1,$t1 ; Sigma1(e)
+ add $Xlo,$hlo,$hlo
+ xor $a2,$a0,$a0
+ addc $Xhi,$hhi,$hhi ; h += K[i]
+ xor $a3,$a1,$a1 ; Ch(e,f,g)
+
+ add $t0,$hlo,$hlo
+ shd $ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[0],$t0
+ addc $t1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Sigma1(e)
+ shd $alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[0],$t1
+ add $a0,$hlo,$hlo
+ shd $ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[1],$t2
+ addc $a1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Ch(e,f,g)
+ shd $alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[1],$t3
+
+ xor $t2,$t0,$t0
+ xor $t3,$t1,$t1
+ shd $ahi,$alo,$Sigma0[2],$t2
+ and $alo,$blo,$a0
+ shd $alo,$ahi,$Sigma0[2],$t3
+ and $ahi,$bhi,$a1
+ xor $t2,$t0,$t0
+ xor $t3,$t1,$t1 ; Sigma0(a)
+
+ and $alo,$clo,$a2
+ and $ahi,$chi,$a3
+ xor $a2,$a0,$a0
+ add $hlo,$dlo,$dlo
+ xor $a3,$a1,$a1
+ addc $hhi,$dhi,$dhi ; d += h
+ and $blo,$clo,$a2
+ add $t0,$hlo,$hlo
+ and $bhi,$chi,$a3
+ addc $t1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Sigma0(a)
+ xor $a2,$a0,$a0
+ add $a0,$hlo,$hlo
+ xor $a3,$a1,$a1 ; Maj(a,b,c)
+ addc $a1,$hhi,$hhi ; h += Maj(a,b,c)
+
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i==15 && $flag);
+ extru $Xlo,31,10,$Xlo
+ comiclr,= $LAST10BITS,$Xlo,%r0
+ b L\$rounds_pa1
+ nop
+___
+push(@X,shift(@X)); push(@X,shift(@X));
+}
+
+sub ROUND_16_xx_pa1 {
+my ($Xhi,$Xlo,$Xnhi,$Xnlo) = @X;
+my ($i)=shift;
+$i-=16;
+$code.=<<___;
+ ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)`(%sp),$Xnhi
+ ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+1)%16)+4`(%sp),$Xnlo ; load X[i+1]
+ ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+9)%16)`(%sp),$a1
+ ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+9)%16)+4`(%sp),$a0 ; load X[i+9]
+ ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+14)%16)`(%sp),$a3
+ ldw `-$XOFF+8*(($i+14)%16)+4`(%sp),$a2 ; load X[i+14]
+ shd $Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[0],$t0
+ shd $Xnlo,$Xnhi,$sigma0[0],$t1
+ add $a0,$Xlo,$Xlo
+ shd $Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[1],$t2
+ addc $a1,$Xhi,$Xhi
+ shd $Xnlo,$Xnhi,$sigma0[1],$t3
+ xor $t2,$t0,$t0
+ shd $Xnhi,$Xnlo,$sigma0[2],$t2
+ xor $t3,$t1,$t1
+ extru $Xnhi,`31-$sigma0[2]`,`32-$sigma0[2]`,$t3
+ xor $t2,$t0,$t0
+ shd $a3,$a2,$sigma1[0],$a0
+ xor $t3,$t1,$t1 ; sigma0(X[i+1)&0x0f])
+ shd $a2,$a3,$sigma1[0],$a1
+ add $t0,$Xlo,$Xlo
+ shd $a3,$a2,$sigma1[1],$t2
+ addc $t1,$Xhi,$Xhi
+ shd $a2,$a3,$sigma1[1],$t3
+ xor $t2,$a0,$a0
+ shd $a3,$a2,$sigma1[2],$t2
+ xor $t3,$a1,$a1
+ extru $a3,`31-$sigma1[2]`,`32-$sigma1[2]`,$t3
+ xor $t2,$a0,$a0
+ xor $t3,$a1,$a1 ; sigma0(X[i+14)&0x0f])
+ add $a0,$Xlo,$Xlo
+ addc $a1,$Xhi,$Xhi
+
+ stw $Xhi,`-$XOFF+8*($i%16)`(%sp)
+ stw $Xlo,`-$XOFF+8*($i%16)+4`(%sp)
+___
+&ROUND_00_15_pa1($i, at _,1);
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ ldw `0*4`($ctx),$Ahi ; load context
+ ldw `1*4`($ctx),$Alo
+ ldw `2*4`($ctx),$Bhi
+ ldw `3*4`($ctx),$Blo
+ ldw `4*4`($ctx),$Chi
+ ldw `5*4`($ctx),$Clo
+ ldw `6*4`($ctx),$Dhi
+ ldw `7*4`($ctx),$Dlo
+ ldw `8*4`($ctx),$Ehi
+ ldw `9*4`($ctx),$Elo
+ ldw `10*4`($ctx),$Fhi
+ ldw `11*4`($ctx),$Flo
+ ldw `12*4`($ctx),$Ghi
+ ldw `13*4`($ctx),$Glo
+ ldw `14*4`($ctx),$Hhi
+ ldw `15*4`($ctx),$Hlo
+
+ extru $inp,31,2,$t0
+ sh3addl $t0,%r0,$t0
+ subi 32,$t0,$t0
+ mtctl $t0,%cr11 ; load %sar with align factor
+
+L\$oop_pa1
+ extru $inp,31,2,$a3
+ comib,= 0,$a3,L\$aligned_pa1
+ sub $inp,$a3,$inp
+
+ ldw `0*4`($inp),$X[0]
+ ldw `1*4`($inp),$X[1]
+ ldw `2*4`($inp),$t2
+ ldw `3*4`($inp),$t3
+ ldw `4*4`($inp),$a0
+ ldw `5*4`($inp),$a1
+ ldw `6*4`($inp),$a2
+ ldw `7*4`($inp),$a3
+ vshd $X[0],$X[1],$X[0]
+ vshd $X[1],$t2,$X[1]
+ stw $X[0],`-$XOFF+0*4`(%sp)
+ ldw `8*4`($inp),$t0
+ vshd $t2,$t3,$t2
+ stw $X[1],`-$XOFF+1*4`(%sp)
+ ldw `9*4`($inp),$t1
+ vshd $t3,$a0,$t3
+___
+{
+my @t=($t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t0,$t1);
+for ($i=2;$i<=(128/4-8);$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
+ ldw `(8+$i)*4`($inp),$t[0]
+ vshd $t[1],$t[2],$t[1]
+___
+push(@t,shift(@t));
+}
+for (;$i<(128/4-1);$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
+ vshd $t[1],$t[2],$t[1]
+___
+push(@t,shift(@t));
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ b L\$collected_pa1
+ stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
+
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+L\$aligned_pa1
+ ldw `0*4`($inp),$X[0]
+ ldw `1*4`($inp),$X[1]
+ ldw `2*4`($inp),$t2
+ ldw `3*4`($inp),$t3
+ ldw `4*4`($inp),$a0
+ ldw `5*4`($inp),$a1
+ ldw `6*4`($inp),$a2
+ ldw `7*4`($inp),$a3
+ stw $X[0],`-$XOFF+0*4`(%sp)
+ ldw `8*4`($inp),$t0
+ stw $X[1],`-$XOFF+1*4`(%sp)
+ ldw `9*4`($inp),$t1
+___
+{
+my @t=($t2,$t3,$a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$t0,$t1);
+for ($i=2;$i<(128/4-8);$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
+ ldw `(8+$i)*4`($inp),$t[0]
+___
+push(@t,shift(@t));
+}
+for (;$i<128/4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ stw $t[0],`-$XOFF+$i*4`(%sp)
+___
+push(@t,shift(@t));
+}
+$code.="L\$collected_pa1\n";
+}
+
+for($i=0;$i<16;$i++) { &ROUND_00_15_pa1($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+$code.="L\$rounds_pa1\n";
+for(;$i<32;$i++) { &ROUND_16_xx_pa1($i, at V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
+
+$code.=<<___;
+ $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$ctx ; restore arguments
+ $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$inp
+ $POP `-$FRAME_MARKER-4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),$num
+ ldo `-$rounds*$SZ`($Tbl),$Tbl ; rewind $Tbl
+
+ ldw `0*4`($ctx),$t1 ; update context
+ ldw `1*4`($ctx),$t0
+ ldw `2*4`($ctx),$t3
+ ldw `3*4`($ctx),$t2
+ ldw `4*4`($ctx),$a1
+ ldw `5*4`($ctx),$a0
+ ldw `6*4`($ctx),$a3
+ add $t0,$Alo,$Alo
+ ldw `7*4`($ctx),$a2
+ addc $t1,$Ahi,$Ahi
+ ldw `8*4`($ctx),$t1
+ add $t2,$Blo,$Blo
+ ldw `9*4`($ctx),$t0
+ addc $t3,$Bhi,$Bhi
+ ldw `10*4`($ctx),$t3
+ add $a0,$Clo,$Clo
+ ldw `11*4`($ctx),$t2
+ addc $a1,$Chi,$Chi
+ ldw `12*4`($ctx),$a1
+ add $a2,$Dlo,$Dlo
+ ldw `13*4`($ctx),$a0
+ addc $a3,$Dhi,$Dhi
+ ldw `14*4`($ctx),$a3
+ add $t0,$Elo,$Elo
+ ldw `15*4`($ctx),$a2
+ addc $t1,$Ehi,$Ehi
+ stw $Ahi,`0*4`($ctx)
+ add $t2,$Flo,$Flo
+ stw $Alo,`1*4`($ctx)
+ addc $t3,$Fhi,$Fhi
+ stw $Bhi,`2*4`($ctx)
+ add $a0,$Glo,$Glo
+ stw $Blo,`3*4`($ctx)
+ addc $a1,$Ghi,$Ghi
+ stw $Chi,`4*4`($ctx)
+ add $a2,$Hlo,$Hlo
+ stw $Clo,`5*4`($ctx)
+ addc $a3,$Hhi,$Hhi
+ stw $Dhi,`6*4`($ctx)
+ ldo `16*$SZ`($inp),$inp ; advance $inp
+ stw $Dlo,`7*4`($ctx)
+ stw $Ehi,`8*4`($ctx)
+ stw $Elo,`9*4`($ctx)
+ stw $Fhi,`10*4`($ctx)
+ stw $Flo,`11*4`($ctx)
+ stw $Ghi,`12*4`($ctx)
+ stw $Glo,`13*4`($ctx)
+ stw $Hhi,`14*4`($ctx)
+ comb,= $inp,$num,L\$done
+ stw $Hlo,`15*4`($ctx)
+ b L\$oop_pa1
+ $PUSH $inp,`-$FRAME_MARKER-3*$SIZE_T`(%sp) ; save $inp
+L\$done
+___
+}}
+$code.=<<___;
+ $POP `-$FRAME-$SAVED_RP`(%sp),%r2 ; standard epilogue
+ $POP `-$FRAME+1*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r4
+ $POP `-$FRAME+2*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r5
+ $POP `-$FRAME+3*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r6
+ $POP `-$FRAME+4*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r7
+ $POP `-$FRAME+5*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r8
+ $POP `-$FRAME+6*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r9
+ $POP `-$FRAME+7*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r10
+ $POP `-$FRAME+8*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r11
+ $POP `-$FRAME+9*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r12
+ $POP `-$FRAME+10*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r13
+ $POP `-$FRAME+11*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r14
+ $POP `-$FRAME+12*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r15
+ $POP `-$FRAME+13*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r16
+ $POP `-$FRAME+14*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r17
+ $POP `-$FRAME+15*$SIZE_T`(%sp),%r18
+ bv (%r2)
+ .EXIT
+ $POPMB -$FRAME(%sp),%r3
+ .PROCEND
+ .STRINGZ "SHA`64*$SZ` block transform for PA-RISC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
+___
+
+# Explicitly encode PA-RISC 2.0 instructions used in this module, so
+# that it can be compiled with .LEVEL 1.0. It should be noted that I
+# wouldn't have to do this, if GNU assembler understood .ALLOW 2.0
+# directive...
+
+my $ldd = sub {
+ my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+ my $orig = "ldd$mod\t$args";
+
+ if ($args =~ /(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 3 suffices
+ { my $opcode=(0x14<<26)|($2<<21)|($3<<16)|(($1&0x1FF8)<<1)|(($1>>13)&1);
+ $opcode|=(1<<3) if ($mod =~ /^,m/);
+ $opcode|=(1<<2) if ($mod =~ /^,mb/);
+ sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+ }
+ else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $std = sub {
+ my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+ my $orig = "std$mod\t$args";
+
+ if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),(\-?[0-9]+)\(%r([0-9]+)\)/) # format 3 suffices
+ { my $opcode=(0x1c<<26)|($3<<21)|($1<<16)|(($2&0x1FF8)<<1)|(($2>>13)&1);
+ sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+ }
+ else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $extrd = sub {
+ my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+ my $orig = "extrd$mod\t$args";
+
+ # I only have ",u" completer, it's implicitly encoded...
+ if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 15
+ { my $opcode=(0x36<<26)|($1<<21)|($4<<16);
+ my $len=32-$3;
+ $opcode |= (($2&0x20)<<6)|(($2&0x1f)<<5); # encode pos
+ $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<7)|($len&0x1f); # encode len
+ sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+ }
+ elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%sar,([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 12
+ { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($1<<21)|($3<<16)|(2<<11)|(1<<9);
+ my $len=32-$2;
+ $opcode |= (($len&0x20)<<3)|($len&0x1f); # encode len
+ $opcode |= (1<<13) if ($mod =~ /,\**=/);
+ sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+ }
+ else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+my $shrpd = sub {
+ my ($mod,$args) = @_;
+ my $orig = "shrpd$mod\t$args";
+
+ if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 14
+ { my $opcode=(0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<10)|$4;
+ my $cpos=63-$3;
+ $opcode |= (($cpos&0x20)<<6)|(($cpos&0x1f)<<5); # encode sa
+ sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",$opcode,$orig;
+ }
+ elsif ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+),%sar,%r([0-9]+)/) # format 11
+ { sprintf "\t.WORD\t0x%08x\t; %s",
+ (0x34<<26)|($2<<21)|($1<<16)|(1<<9)|$3,$orig;
+ }
+ else { "\t".$orig; }
+};
+
+sub assemble {
+ my ($mnemonic,$mod,$args)=@_;
+ my $opcode = eval("\$$mnemonic");
+
+ ref($opcode) eq 'CODE' ? &$opcode($mod,$args) : "\t$mnemonic$mod\t$args";
+}
+
+foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
+ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
+
+ s/shd\s+(%r[0-9]+),(%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/
+ $3>31 ? sprintf("shd\t%$2,%$1,%d",$3-32) # rotation for >=32
+ : sprintf("shd\t%$1,%$2,%d",$3)/e or
+ # translate made up instructons: _ror, _shr, _align, _shl
+ s/_ror(\s+)(%r[0-9]+),/
+ ($SZ==4 ? "shd" : "shrpd")."$1$2,$2,"/e or
+
+ s/_shr(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/
+ $SZ==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,%d,",$1,31-$2,32-$2)
+ : sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,%d,",$1,63-$2,64-$2)/e or
+
+ s/_align(\s+%r[0-9]+,%r[0-9]+),/
+ ($SZ==4 ? "vshd$1," : "shrpd$1,%sar,")/e or
+
+ s/_shl(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/
+ $SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("zdep%s,%d,%d,",$1,31-$2,32-$2)
+ : sprintf("depd,z%s,%d,%d,",$1,63-$2,64-$2)/e;
+
+ s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($SIZE_T==4);
+
+ s/cmpb,\*/comb,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+
+ s/\bbv\b/bve/ if ($SIZE_T==8);
+
+ print $_,"\n";
+}
+
+close STDOUT;
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sparccpuid.S
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/sparccpuid.S 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sparccpuid.S 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
-#if defined(__SUNPRO_C) && defined(__sparcv9)
-# define ABI64 /* They've said -xarch=v9 at command line */
-#elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__arch64__)
-# define ABI64 /* They've said -m64 at command line */
-#endif
-
-#ifdef ABI64
- .register %g2,#scratch
- .register %g3,#scratch
-# define FRAME -192
-# define BIAS 2047
-#else
-# define FRAME -96
-# define BIAS 0
-#endif
-
-.text
-.align 32
-.global OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
-.type OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,#function
-! Keep in mind that this does not excuse us from wiping the stack!
-! This routine wipes registers, but not the backing store [which
-! resides on the stack, toward lower addresses]. To facilitate for
-! stack wiping I return pointer to the top of stack of the *caller*.
-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
- save %sp,FRAME,%sp
- nop
-#ifdef __sun
-#include <sys/trap.h>
- ta ST_CLEAN_WINDOWS
-#else
- call .walk.reg.wins
-#endif
- nop
- call .PIC.zero.up
- mov .zero-(.-4),%o0
- ld [%o0],%f0
- ld [%o0],%f1
-
- subcc %g0,1,%o0
- ! Following is V9 "rd %ccr,%o0" instruction. However! V8
- ! specification says that it ("rd %asr2,%o0" in V8 terms) does
- ! not cause illegal_instruction trap. It therefore can be used
- ! to determine if the CPU the code is executing on is V8- or
- ! V9-compliant, as V9 returns a distinct value of 0x99,
- ! "negative" and "borrow" bits set in both %icc and %xcc.
- .word 0x91408000 !rd %ccr,%o0
- cmp %o0,0x99
- bne .v8
- nop
- ! Even though we do not use %fp register bank,
- ! we wipe it as memcpy might have used it...
- .word 0xbfa00040 !fmovd %f0,%f62
- .word 0xbba00040 !...
- .word 0xb7a00040
- .word 0xb3a00040
- .word 0xafa00040
- .word 0xaba00040
- .word 0xa7a00040
- .word 0xa3a00040
- .word 0x9fa00040
- .word 0x9ba00040
- .word 0x97a00040
- .word 0x93a00040
- .word 0x8fa00040
- .word 0x8ba00040
- .word 0x87a00040
- .word 0x83a00040 !fmovd %f0,%f32
-.v8: fmovs %f1,%f31
- clr %o0
- fmovs %f0,%f30
- clr %o1
- fmovs %f1,%f29
- clr %o2
- fmovs %f0,%f28
- clr %o3
- fmovs %f1,%f27
- clr %o4
- fmovs %f0,%f26
- clr %o5
- fmovs %f1,%f25
- clr %o7
- fmovs %f0,%f24
- clr %l0
- fmovs %f1,%f23
- clr %l1
- fmovs %f0,%f22
- clr %l2
- fmovs %f1,%f21
- clr %l3
- fmovs %f0,%f20
- clr %l4
- fmovs %f1,%f19
- clr %l5
- fmovs %f0,%f18
- clr %l6
- fmovs %f1,%f17
- clr %l7
- fmovs %f0,%f16
- clr %i0
- fmovs %f1,%f15
- clr %i1
- fmovs %f0,%f14
- clr %i2
- fmovs %f1,%f13
- clr %i3
- fmovs %f0,%f12
- clr %i4
- fmovs %f1,%f11
- clr %i5
- fmovs %f0,%f10
- clr %g1
- fmovs %f1,%f9
- clr %g2
- fmovs %f0,%f8
- clr %g3
- fmovs %f1,%f7
- clr %g4
- fmovs %f0,%f6
- clr %g5
- fmovs %f1,%f5
- fmovs %f0,%f4
- fmovs %f1,%f3
- fmovs %f0,%f2
-
- add %fp,BIAS,%i0 ! return pointer to caller\xB4s top of stack
-
- ret
- restore
-
-.zero: .long 0x0,0x0
-.PIC.zero.up:
- retl
- add %o0,%o7,%o0
-#ifdef DEBUG
-.global walk_reg_wins
-.type walk_reg_wins,#function
-walk_reg_wins:
-#endif
-.walk.reg.wins:
- save %sp,FRAME,%sp
- cmp %i7,%o7
- be 2f
- clr %o0
- cmp %o7,0 ! compiler never cleans %o7...
- be 1f ! could have been a leaf function...
- clr %o1
- call .walk.reg.wins
- nop
-1: clr %o2
- clr %o3
- clr %o4
- clr %o5
- clr %o7
- clr %l0
- clr %l1
- clr %l2
- clr %l3
- clr %l4
- clr %l5
- clr %l6
- clr %l7
- add %o0,1,%i0 ! used for debugging
-2: ret
- restore
-.size OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
-
-.global OPENSSL_atomic_add
-.type OPENSSL_atomic_add,#function
-.align 32
-OPENSSL_atomic_add:
-#ifndef ABI64
- subcc %g0,1,%o2
- .word 0x95408000 !rd %ccr,%o2, see comment above
- cmp %o2,0x99
- be .v9
- nop
- save %sp,FRAME,%sp
- ba .enter
- nop
-#ifdef __sun
-! Note that you do not have to link with libthread to call thr_yield,
-! as libc provides a stub, which is overloaded the moment you link
-! with *either* libpthread or libthread...
-#define YIELD_CPU thr_yield
-#else
-! applies at least to Linux and FreeBSD... Feedback expected...
-#define YIELD_CPU sched_yield
-#endif
-.spin: call YIELD_CPU
- nop
-.enter: ld [%i0],%i2
- cmp %i2,-4096
- be .spin
- mov -1,%i2
- swap [%i0],%i2
- cmp %i2,-1
- be .spin
- add %i2,%i1,%i2
- stbar
- st %i2,[%i0]
- sra %i2,%g0,%i0
- ret
- restore
-.v9:
-#endif
- ld [%o0],%o2
-1: add %o1,%o2,%o3
- .word 0xd7e2100a !cas [%o0],%o2,%o3, compare [%o0] with %o2 and swap %o3
- cmp %o2,%o3
- bne 1b
- mov %o3,%o2 ! cas is always fetching to dest. register
- add %o1,%o2,%o0 ! OpenSSL expects the new value
- retl
- sra %o0,%g0,%o0 ! we return signed int, remember?
-.size OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add
-
-.global _sparcv9_rdtick
-.align 32
-_sparcv9_rdtick:
- subcc %g0,1,%o0
- .word 0x91408000 !rd %ccr,%o0
- cmp %o0,0x99
- bne .notick
- xor %o0,%o0,%o0
- .word 0x91410000 !rd %tick,%o0
- retl
- .word 0x93323020 !srlx %o0,32,%o1
-.notick:
- retl
- xor %o1,%o1,%o1
-.type _sparcv9_rdtick,#function
-.size _sparcv9_rdtick,.-_sparcv9_rdtick
-
-.global _sparcv9_vis1_probe
-.align 8
-_sparcv9_vis1_probe:
- add %sp,BIAS+2,%o1
- .word 0xc19a5a40 !ldda [%o1]ASI_FP16_P,%f0
- retl
- .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
-.type _sparcv9_vis1_probe,#function
-.size _sparcv9_vis1_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis1_probe
-
-! Probe and instrument VIS1 instruction. Output is number of cycles it
-! takes to execute rdtick and pair of VIS1 instructions. US-Tx VIS unit
-! is slow (documented to be 6 cycles on T2) and the core is in-order
-! single-issue, it should be possible to distinguish Tx reliably...
-! Observed return values are:
-!
-! UltraSPARC IIe 7
-! UltraSPARC III 7
-! UltraSPARC T1 24
-!
-! Numbers for T2 and SPARC64 V-VII are more than welcomed.
-!
-! It would be possible to detect specifically US-T1 by instrumenting
-! fmul8ulx16, which is emulated on T1 and as such accounts for quite
-! a lot of %tick-s, couple of thousand on Linux...
-.global _sparcv9_vis1_instrument
-.align 8
-_sparcv9_vis1_instrument:
- .word 0x91410000 !rd %tick,%o0
- .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
- .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2
- .word 0x93410000 !rd %tick,%o1
- .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
- .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2
- .word 0x95410000 !rd %tick,%o2
- .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
- .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2
- .word 0x97410000 !rd %tick,%o3
- .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
- .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2
- .word 0x99410000 !rd %tick,%o4
-
- ! calculate intervals
- sub %o1,%o0,%o0
- sub %o2,%o1,%o1
- sub %o3,%o2,%o2
- sub %o4,%o3,%o3
-
- ! find minumum value
- cmp %o0,%o1
- .word 0x38680002 !bgu,a %xcc,.+8
- mov %o1,%o0
- cmp %o0,%o2
- .word 0x38680002 !bgu,a %xcc,.+8
- mov %o2,%o0
- cmp %o0,%o3
- .word 0x38680002 !bgu,a %xcc,.+8
- mov %o3,%o0
-
- retl
- nop
-.type _sparcv9_vis1_instrument,#function
-.size _sparcv9_vis1_instrument,.-_sparcv9_vis1_instrument
-
-.global _sparcv9_vis2_probe
-.align 8
-_sparcv9_vis2_probe:
- retl
- .word 0x81b00980 !bshuffle %f0,%f0,%f0
-.type _sparcv9_vis2_probe,#function
-.size _sparcv9_vis2_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis2_probe
-
-.global _sparcv9_fmadd_probe
-.align 8
-_sparcv9_fmadd_probe:
- .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
- .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2
- retl
- .word 0x81b80440 !fmaddd %f0,%f0,%f2,%f0
-.type _sparcv9_fmadd_probe,#function
-.size _sparcv9_fmadd_probe,.-_sparcv9_fmadd_probe
-
-.global OPENSSL_cleanse
-.align 32
-OPENSSL_cleanse:
- cmp %o1,14
- nop
-#ifdef ABI64
- bgu %xcc,.Lot
-#else
- bgu .Lot
-#endif
- cmp %o1,0
- bne .Little
- nop
- retl
- nop
-
-.Little:
- stb %g0,[%o0]
- subcc %o1,1,%o1
- bnz .Little
- add %o0,1,%o0
- retl
- nop
-.align 32
-.Lot:
-#ifndef ABI64
- subcc %g0,1,%g1
- ! see above for explanation
- .word 0x83408000 !rd %ccr,%g1
- cmp %g1,0x99
- bne .v8lot
- nop
-#endif
-
-.v9lot: andcc %o0,7,%g0
- bz .v9aligned
- nop
- stb %g0,[%o0]
- sub %o1,1,%o1
- ba .v9lot
- add %o0,1,%o0
-.align 16,0x01000000
-.v9aligned:
- .word 0xc0720000 !stx %g0,[%o0]
- sub %o1,8,%o1
- andcc %o1,-8,%g0
-#ifdef ABI64
- .word 0x126ffffd !bnz %xcc,.v9aligned
-#else
- .word 0x124ffffd !bnz %icc,.v9aligned
-#endif
- add %o0,8,%o0
-
- cmp %o1,0
- bne .Little
- nop
- retl
- nop
-#ifndef ABI64
-.v8lot: andcc %o0,3,%g0
- bz .v8aligned
- nop
- stb %g0,[%o0]
- sub %o1,1,%o1
- ba .v8lot
- add %o0,1,%o0
- nop
-.v8aligned:
- st %g0,[%o0]
- sub %o1,4,%o1
- andcc %o1,-4,%g0
- bnz .v8aligned
- add %o0,4,%o0
-
- cmp %o1,0
- bne .Little
- nop
- retl
- nop
-#endif
-.type OPENSSL_cleanse,#function
-.size OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse
-
-.section ".init",#alloc,#execinstr
- call OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
- nop
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sparccpuid.S (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/sparccpuid.S)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sparccpuid.S (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/sparccpuid.S 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+#if defined(__SUNPRO_C) && defined(__sparcv9)
+# define ABI64 /* They've said -xarch=v9 at command line */
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__arch64__)
+# define ABI64 /* They've said -m64 at command line */
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ABI64
+ .register %g2,#scratch
+ .register %g3,#scratch
+# define FRAME -192
+# define BIAS 2047
+#else
+# define FRAME -96
+# define BIAS 0
+#endif
+
+.text
+.align 32
+.global OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+.type OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,#function
+! Keep in mind that this does not excuse us from wiping the stack!
+! This routine wipes registers, but not the backing store [which
+! resides on the stack, toward lower addresses]. To facilitate for
+! stack wiping I return pointer to the top of stack of the *caller*.
+OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
+ save %sp,FRAME,%sp
+ nop
+#ifdef __sun
+#include <sys/trap.h>
+ ta ST_CLEAN_WINDOWS
+#else
+ call .walk.reg.wins
+#endif
+ nop
+ call .PIC.zero.up
+ mov .zero-(.-4),%o0
+ ld [%o0],%f0
+ ld [%o0],%f1
+
+ subcc %g0,1,%o0
+ ! Following is V9 "rd %ccr,%o0" instruction. However! V8
+ ! specification says that it ("rd %asr2,%o0" in V8 terms) does
+ ! not cause illegal_instruction trap. It therefore can be used
+ ! to determine if the CPU the code is executing on is V8- or
+ ! V9-compliant, as V9 returns a distinct value of 0x99,
+ ! "negative" and "borrow" bits set in both %icc and %xcc.
+ .word 0x91408000 !rd %ccr,%o0
+ cmp %o0,0x99
+ bne .v8
+ nop
+ ! Even though we do not use %fp register bank,
+ ! we wipe it as memcpy might have used it...
+ .word 0xbfa00040 !fmovd %f0,%f62
+ .word 0xbba00040 !...
+ .word 0xb7a00040
+ .word 0xb3a00040
+ .word 0xafa00040
+ .word 0xaba00040
+ .word 0xa7a00040
+ .word 0xa3a00040
+ .word 0x9fa00040
+ .word 0x9ba00040
+ .word 0x97a00040
+ .word 0x93a00040
+ .word 0x8fa00040
+ .word 0x8ba00040
+ .word 0x87a00040
+ .word 0x83a00040 !fmovd %f0,%f32
+.v8: fmovs %f1,%f31
+ clr %o0
+ fmovs %f0,%f30
+ clr %o1
+ fmovs %f1,%f29
+ clr %o2
+ fmovs %f0,%f28
+ clr %o3
+ fmovs %f1,%f27
+ clr %o4
+ fmovs %f0,%f26
+ clr %o5
+ fmovs %f1,%f25
+ clr %o7
+ fmovs %f0,%f24
+ clr %l0
+ fmovs %f1,%f23
+ clr %l1
+ fmovs %f0,%f22
+ clr %l2
+ fmovs %f1,%f21
+ clr %l3
+ fmovs %f0,%f20
+ clr %l4
+ fmovs %f1,%f19
+ clr %l5
+ fmovs %f0,%f18
+ clr %l6
+ fmovs %f1,%f17
+ clr %l7
+ fmovs %f0,%f16
+ clr %i0
+ fmovs %f1,%f15
+ clr %i1
+ fmovs %f0,%f14
+ clr %i2
+ fmovs %f1,%f13
+ clr %i3
+ fmovs %f0,%f12
+ clr %i4
+ fmovs %f1,%f11
+ clr %i5
+ fmovs %f0,%f10
+ clr %g1
+ fmovs %f1,%f9
+ clr %g2
+ fmovs %f0,%f8
+ clr %g3
+ fmovs %f1,%f7
+ clr %g4
+ fmovs %f0,%f6
+ clr %g5
+ fmovs %f1,%f5
+ fmovs %f0,%f4
+ fmovs %f1,%f3
+ fmovs %f0,%f2
+
+ add %fp,BIAS,%i0 ! return pointer to caller´s top of stack
+
+ ret
+ restore
+
+.zero: .long 0x0,0x0
+.PIC.zero.up:
+ retl
+ add %o0,%o7,%o0
+#ifdef DEBUG
+.global walk_reg_wins
+.type walk_reg_wins,#function
+walk_reg_wins:
+#endif
+.walk.reg.wins:
+ save %sp,FRAME,%sp
+ cmp %i7,%o7
+ be 2f
+ clr %o0
+ cmp %o7,0 ! compiler never cleans %o7...
+ be 1f ! could have been a leaf function...
+ clr %o1
+ call .walk.reg.wins
+ nop
+1: clr %o2
+ clr %o3
+ clr %o4
+ clr %o5
+ clr %o7
+ clr %l0
+ clr %l1
+ clr %l2
+ clr %l3
+ clr %l4
+ clr %l5
+ clr %l6
+ clr %l7
+ add %o0,1,%i0 ! used for debugging
+2: ret
+ restore
+.size OPENSSL_wipe_cpu,.-OPENSSL_wipe_cpu
+
+.global OPENSSL_atomic_add
+.type OPENSSL_atomic_add,#function
+.align 32
+OPENSSL_atomic_add:
+#ifndef ABI64
+ subcc %g0,1,%o2
+ .word 0x95408000 !rd %ccr,%o2, see comment above
+ cmp %o2,0x99
+ be .v9
+ nop
+ save %sp,FRAME,%sp
+ ba .enter
+ nop
+#ifdef __sun
+! Note that you do not have to link with libthread to call thr_yield,
+! as libc provides a stub, which is overloaded the moment you link
+! with *either* libpthread or libthread...
+#define YIELD_CPU thr_yield
+#else
+! applies at least to Linux and FreeBSD... Feedback expected...
+#define YIELD_CPU sched_yield
+#endif
+.spin: call YIELD_CPU
+ nop
+.enter: ld [%i0],%i2
+ cmp %i2,-4096
+ be .spin
+ mov -1,%i2
+ swap [%i0],%i2
+ cmp %i2,-1
+ be .spin
+ add %i2,%i1,%i2
+ stbar
+ st %i2,[%i0]
+ sra %i2,%g0,%i0
+ ret
+ restore
+.v9:
+#endif
+ ld [%o0],%o2
+1: add %o1,%o2,%o3
+ .word 0xd7e2100a !cas [%o0],%o2,%o3, compare [%o0] with %o2 and swap %o3
+ cmp %o2,%o3
+ bne 1b
+ mov %o3,%o2 ! cas is always fetching to dest. register
+ add %o1,%o2,%o0 ! OpenSSL expects the new value
+ retl
+ sra %o0,%g0,%o0 ! we return signed int, remember?
+.size OPENSSL_atomic_add,.-OPENSSL_atomic_add
+
+.global _sparcv9_rdtick
+.align 32
+_sparcv9_rdtick:
+ subcc %g0,1,%o0
+ .word 0x91408000 !rd %ccr,%o0
+ cmp %o0,0x99
+ bne .notick
+ xor %o0,%o0,%o0
+ .word 0x91410000 !rd %tick,%o0
+ retl
+ .word 0x93323020 !srlx %o0,32,%o1
+.notick:
+ retl
+ xor %o1,%o1,%o1
+.type _sparcv9_rdtick,#function
+.size _sparcv9_rdtick,.-_sparcv9_rdtick
+
+.global _sparcv9_vis1_probe
+.align 8
+_sparcv9_vis1_probe:
+ add %sp,BIAS+2,%o1
+ .word 0xc19a5a40 !ldda [%o1]ASI_FP16_P,%f0
+ retl
+ .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
+.type _sparcv9_vis1_probe,#function
+.size _sparcv9_vis1_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis1_probe
+
+! Probe and instrument VIS1 instruction. Output is number of cycles it
+! takes to execute rdtick and pair of VIS1 instructions. US-Tx VIS unit
+! is slow (documented to be 6 cycles on T2) and the core is in-order
+! single-issue, it should be possible to distinguish Tx reliably...
+! Observed return values are:
+!
+! UltraSPARC IIe 7
+! UltraSPARC III 7
+! UltraSPARC T1 24
+!
+! Numbers for T2 and SPARC64 V-VII are more than welcomed.
+!
+! It would be possible to detect specifically US-T1 by instrumenting
+! fmul8ulx16, which is emulated on T1 and as such accounts for quite
+! a lot of %tick-s, couple of thousand on Linux...
+.global _sparcv9_vis1_instrument
+.align 8
+_sparcv9_vis1_instrument:
+ .word 0x91410000 !rd %tick,%o0
+ .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
+ .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2
+ .word 0x93410000 !rd %tick,%o1
+ .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
+ .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2
+ .word 0x95410000 !rd %tick,%o2
+ .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
+ .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2
+ .word 0x97410000 !rd %tick,%o3
+ .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
+ .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2
+ .word 0x99410000 !rd %tick,%o4
+
+ ! calculate intervals
+ sub %o1,%o0,%o0
+ sub %o2,%o1,%o1
+ sub %o3,%o2,%o2
+ sub %o4,%o3,%o3
+
+ ! find minumum value
+ cmp %o0,%o1
+ .word 0x38680002 !bgu,a %xcc,.+8
+ mov %o1,%o0
+ cmp %o0,%o2
+ .word 0x38680002 !bgu,a %xcc,.+8
+ mov %o2,%o0
+ cmp %o0,%o3
+ .word 0x38680002 !bgu,a %xcc,.+8
+ mov %o3,%o0
+
+ retl
+ nop
+.type _sparcv9_vis1_instrument,#function
+.size _sparcv9_vis1_instrument,.-_sparcv9_vis1_instrument
+
+.global _sparcv9_vis2_probe
+.align 8
+_sparcv9_vis2_probe:
+ retl
+ .word 0x81b00980 !bshuffle %f0,%f0,%f0
+.type _sparcv9_vis2_probe,#function
+.size _sparcv9_vis2_probe,.-_sparcv9_vis2_probe
+
+.global _sparcv9_fmadd_probe
+.align 8
+_sparcv9_fmadd_probe:
+ .word 0x81b00d80 !fxor %f0,%f0,%f0
+ .word 0x85b08d82 !fxor %f2,%f2,%f2
+ retl
+ .word 0x81b80440 !fmaddd %f0,%f0,%f2,%f0
+.type _sparcv9_fmadd_probe,#function
+.size _sparcv9_fmadd_probe,.-_sparcv9_fmadd_probe
+
+.global OPENSSL_cleanse
+.align 32
+OPENSSL_cleanse:
+ cmp %o1,14
+ nop
+#ifdef ABI64
+ bgu %xcc,.Lot
+#else
+ bgu .Lot
+#endif
+ cmp %o1,0
+ bne .Little
+ nop
+ retl
+ nop
+
+.Little:
+ stb %g0,[%o0]
+ subcc %o1,1,%o1
+ bnz .Little
+ add %o0,1,%o0
+ retl
+ nop
+.align 32
+.Lot:
+#ifndef ABI64
+ subcc %g0,1,%g1
+ ! see above for explanation
+ .word 0x83408000 !rd %ccr,%g1
+ cmp %g1,0x99
+ bne .v8lot
+ nop
+#endif
+
+.v9lot: andcc %o0,7,%g0
+ bz .v9aligned
+ nop
+ stb %g0,[%o0]
+ sub %o1,1,%o1
+ ba .v9lot
+ add %o0,1,%o0
+.align 16,0x01000000
+.v9aligned:
+ .word 0xc0720000 !stx %g0,[%o0]
+ sub %o1,8,%o1
+ andcc %o1,-8,%g0
+#ifdef ABI64
+ .word 0x126ffffd !bnz %xcc,.v9aligned
+#else
+ .word 0x124ffffd !bnz %icc,.v9aligned
+#endif
+ add %o0,8,%o0
+
+ cmp %o1,0
+ bne .Little
+ nop
+ retl
+ nop
+#ifndef ABI64
+.v8lot: andcc %o0,3,%g0
+ bz .v8aligned
+ nop
+ stb %g0,[%o0]
+ sub %o1,1,%o1
+ ba .v8lot
+ add %o0,1,%o0
+ nop
+.v8aligned:
+ st %g0,[%o0]
+ sub %o1,4,%o1
+ andcc %o1,-4,%g0
+ bnz .v8aligned
+ add %o0,4,%o0
+
+ cmp %o1,0
+ bne .Little
+ nop
+ retl
+ nop
+#endif
+.type OPENSSL_cleanse,#function
+.size OPENSSL_cleanse,.-OPENSSL_cleanse
+
+.section ".init",#alloc,#execinstr
+ call OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
+ nop
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,642 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c */
-/*
- * Written by Christophe Renou (christophe.renou at edelweb.fr) with the
- * precious help of Peter Sylvester (peter.sylvester at edelweb.fr) for the
- * EdelKey project and contributed to the OpenSSL project 2004.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-# include "cryptlib.h"
-# include "srp_lcl.h"
-# include <openssl/srp.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/buffer.h>
-# include <openssl/rand.h>
-# include <openssl/txt_db.h>
-
-# define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20
-# define MAX_LEN 2500
-
-static char b64table[] =
- "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./";
-
-/*
- * the following two conversion routines have been inspired by code from
- * Stanford
- */
-
-/*
- * Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation.
- */
-static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, const char *src)
-{
- char *loc;
- int i, j;
- int size;
-
- while (*src && (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n'))
- ++src;
- size = strlen(src);
- i = 0;
- while (i < size) {
- loc = strchr(b64table, src[i]);
- if (loc == (char *)0)
- break;
- else
- a[i] = loc - b64table;
- ++i;
- }
- /* if nothing valid to process we have a zero length response */
- if (i == 0)
- return 0;
- size = i;
- i = size - 1;
- j = size;
- while (1) {
- a[j] = a[i];
- if (--i < 0)
- break;
- a[j] |= (a[i] & 3) << 6;
- --j;
- a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x3c) >> 2);
- if (--i < 0)
- break;
- a[j] |= (a[i] & 0xf) << 4;
- --j;
- a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x30) >> 4);
- if (--i < 0)
- break;
- a[j] |= (a[i] << 2);
-
- a[--j] = 0;
- if (--i < 0)
- break;
- }
- while (a[j] == 0 && j <= size)
- ++j;
- i = 0;
- while (j <= size)
- a[i++] = a[j++];
- return i;
-}
-
-/*
- * Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string.
- */
-static char *t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size)
-{
- int c, pos = size % 3;
- unsigned char b0 = 0, b1 = 0, b2 = 0, notleading = 0;
- char *olddst = dst;
-
- switch (pos) {
- case 1:
- b2 = src[0];
- break;
- case 2:
- b1 = src[0];
- b2 = src[1];
- break;
- }
-
- while (1) {
- c = (b0 & 0xfc) >> 2;
- if (notleading || c != 0) {
- *dst++ = b64table[c];
- notleading = 1;
- }
- c = ((b0 & 3) << 4) | ((b1 & 0xf0) >> 4);
- if (notleading || c != 0) {
- *dst++ = b64table[c];
- notleading = 1;
- }
- c = ((b1 & 0xf) << 2) | ((b2 & 0xc0) >> 6);
- if (notleading || c != 0) {
- *dst++ = b64table[c];
- notleading = 1;
- }
- c = b2 & 0x3f;
- if (notleading || c != 0) {
- *dst++ = b64table[c];
- notleading = 1;
- }
- if (pos >= size)
- break;
- else {
- b0 = src[pos++];
- b1 = src[pos++];
- b2 = src[pos++];
- }
- }
-
- *dst++ = '\0';
- return olddst;
-}
-
-static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
-{
- if (user_pwd == NULL)
- return;
- BN_free(user_pwd->s);
- BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
- OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
- OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
- OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
-}
-
-static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new()
-{
- SRP_user_pwd *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_user_pwd));
- if (ret == NULL)
- return NULL;
- ret->N = NULL;
- ret->g = NULL;
- ret->s = NULL;
- ret->v = NULL;
- ret->id = NULL;
- ret->info = NULL;
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
- const BIGNUM *N)
-{
- vinfo->N = N;
- vinfo->g = g;
-}
-
-static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id,
- const char *info)
-{
- if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = BUF_strdup(id)))
- return 0;
- return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = BUF_strdup(info)));
-}
-
-static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
- const char *v)
-{
- unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
- int len;
-
- if (strlen(s) > MAX_LEN || strlen(v) > MAX_LEN)
- return 0;
- len = t_fromb64(tmp, v);
- if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
- return 0;
- len = t_fromb64(tmp, s);
- return ((vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)) != NULL);
-}
-
-static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v)
-{
- vinfo->v = v;
- vinfo->s = s;
- return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL);
-}
-
-SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
-{
- SRP_VBASE *vb = (SRP_VBASE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_VBASE));
-
- if (vb == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (!(vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) ||
- !(vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null())) {
- OPENSSL_free(vb);
- return NULL;
- }
- vb->default_g = NULL;
- vb->default_N = NULL;
- vb->seed_key = NULL;
- if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = BUF_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) {
- sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd);
- sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
- OPENSSL_free(vb);
- return NULL;
- }
- return vb;
-}
-
-int SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
-{
- sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free);
- sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
- OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key);
- OPENSSL_free(vb);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
-{
- unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
- int len;
-
- SRP_gN_cache *newgN =
- (SRP_gN_cache *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN_cache));
- if (newgN == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- if ((newgN->b64_bn = BUF_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- len = t_fromb64(tmp, ch);
- if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
- return newgN;
-
- OPENSSL_free(newgN->b64_bn);
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(newgN);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static void SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_cache *gN_cache)
-{
- if (gN_cache == NULL)
- return;
- OPENSSL_free(gN_cache->b64_bn);
- BN_free(gN_cache->bn);
- OPENSSL_free(gN_cache);
-}
-
-static SRP_gN *SRP_get_gN_by_id(const char *id, STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *gN_tab)
-{
- int i;
-
- SRP_gN *gN;
- if (gN_tab != NULL)
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_num(gN_tab); i++) {
- gN = sk_SRP_gN_value(gN_tab, i);
- if (gN && (id == NULL || strcmp(gN->id, id) == 0))
- return gN;
- }
-
- return SRP_get_default_gN(id);
-}
-
-static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch)
-{
- int i;
- if (gN_cache == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- /* search if we have already one... */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++) {
- SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i);
- if (strcmp(cache->b64_bn, ch) == 0)
- return cache->bn;
- }
- { /* it is the first time that we find it */
- SRP_gN_cache *newgN = SRP_gN_new_init(ch);
- if (newgN) {
- if (sk_SRP_gN_cache_insert(gN_cache, newgN, 0) > 0)
- return newgN->bn;
- SRP_gN_free(newgN);
- }
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * this function parses verifier file. Format is:
- * string(index):base64(N):base64(g):0
- * string(username):base64(v):base64(salt):int(index)
- */
-
-int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
-{
- int error_code;
- STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null();
- char *last_index = NULL;
- int i;
- char **pp;
-
- SRP_gN *gN = NULL;
- SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL;
-
- TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
- BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
-
- error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE;
-
- if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE;
-
- if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
-
- if (vb->seed_key) {
- last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) {
- pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i);
- if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) {
- /*
- * we add this couple in the internal Stack
- */
-
- if ((gN = (SRP_gN *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN))) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!(gN->id = BUF_strdup(pp[DB_srpid]))
- || !(gN->N =
- SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
- || !(gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
- || sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- gN = NULL;
-
- if (vb->seed_key != NULL) {
- last_index = pp[DB_srpid];
- }
- } else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) {
- /* it is a user .... */
- SRP_gN *lgN;
- if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) {
- error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
- if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N);
- if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids
- (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo]))
- goto err;
-
- error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
- if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv
- (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier]))
- goto err;
-
- if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
- goto err;
- user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsability */
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (last_index != NULL) {
- /* this means that we want to simulate a default user */
-
- if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) {
- error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
- goto err;
- }
- vb->default_g = gN->g;
- vb->default_N = gN->N;
- gN = NULL;
- }
- error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR;
-
- err:
- /*
- * there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application
- * terminates most likely
- */
-
- if (gN != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(gN->id);
- OPENSSL_free(gN);
- }
-
- SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
-
- if (tmpdb)
- TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
- if (in)
- BIO_free_all(in);
-
- sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
-
- return error_code;
-
-}
-
-SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
-{
- int i;
- SRP_user_pwd *user;
- unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
-
- if (vb == NULL)
- return NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) {
- user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
- if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0)
- return user;
- }
- if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) ||
- (vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL))
- return NULL;
-
-/* if the user is unknown we set parameters as well if we have a seed_key */
-
- if ((user = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user, vb->default_g, vb->default_N);
-
- if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
- goto err;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, username, strlen(username));
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, digs, NULL);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
- if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN
- (user, BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL),
- BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL)))
- return user;
-
- err:SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are in base64)
- */
-char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
- char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
-{
- int len;
- char *result = NULL;
- char *vf;
- BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
- unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
- unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
- char *defgNid = NULL;
-
- if ((user == NULL) ||
- (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
- goto err;
-
- if (N) {
- if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, N)))
- goto err;
- N_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
- if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, g)))
- goto err;
- g_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
- defgNid = "*";
- } else {
- SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL);
- if (gN == NULL)
- goto err;
- N_bn = gN->N;
- g_bn = gN->g;
- defgNid = gN->id;
- }
-
- if (*salt == NULL) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
- goto err;
-
- s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
- } else {
- if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp2, *salt)))
- goto err;
- s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
- }
-
- if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn))
- goto err;
-
- BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
- if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(v) * 2)) == NULL))
- goto err;
- t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
-
- *verifier = vf;
- if (*salt == NULL) {
- char *tmp_salt;
-
- if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(vf);
- goto err;
- }
- t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
- *salt = tmp_salt;
- }
-
- result = defgNid;
-
- err:
- if (N) {
- BN_free(N_bn);
- BN_free(g_bn);
- }
- return result;
-}
-
-/*
- * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs)
- */
-int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
- BIGNUM **verifier, BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
-{
- int result = 0;
- BIGNUM *x = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
-
- if ((user == NULL) ||
- (pass == NULL) ||
- (salt == NULL) ||
- (verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
- goto err;
-
- srp_bn_print(N);
- srp_bn_print(g);
-
- if (*salt == NULL) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
- goto err;
-
- *salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
- }
-
- x = SRP_Calc_x(*salt, user, pass);
-
- *verifier = BN_new();
- if (*verifier == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_mod_exp(*verifier, g, x, N, bn_ctx)) {
- BN_clear_free(*verifier);
- goto err;
- }
-
- srp_bn_print(*verifier);
-
- result = 1;
-
- err:
-
- BN_clear_free(x);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- return result;
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,658 @@
+/* crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Christophe Renou (christophe.renou at edelweb.fr) with the
+ * precious help of Peter Sylvester (peter.sylvester at edelweb.fr) for the
+ * EdelKey project and contributed to the OpenSSL project 2004.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include "cryptlib.h"
+# include "srp_lcl.h"
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/txt_db.h>
+
+# define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20
+# define MAX_LEN 2500
+
+static char b64table[] =
+ "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./";
+
+/*
+ * the following two conversion routines have been inspired by code from
+ * Stanford
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation.
+ */
+static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, const char *src)
+{
+ char *loc;
+ int i, j;
+ int size;
+
+ while (*src && (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n'))
+ ++src;
+ size = strlen(src);
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < size) {
+ loc = strchr(b64table, src[i]);
+ if (loc == (char *)0)
+ break;
+ else
+ a[i] = loc - b64table;
+ ++i;
+ }
+ /* if nothing valid to process we have a zero length response */
+ if (i == 0)
+ return 0;
+ size = i;
+ i = size - 1;
+ j = size;
+ while (1) {
+ a[j] = a[i];
+ if (--i < 0)
+ break;
+ a[j] |= (a[i] & 3) << 6;
+ --j;
+ a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x3c) >> 2);
+ if (--i < 0)
+ break;
+ a[j] |= (a[i] & 0xf) << 4;
+ --j;
+ a[j] = (unsigned char)((a[i] & 0x30) >> 4);
+ if (--i < 0)
+ break;
+ a[j] |= (a[i] << 2);
+
+ a[--j] = 0;
+ if (--i < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ while (a[j] == 0 && j <= size)
+ ++j;
+ i = 0;
+ while (j <= size)
+ a[i++] = a[j++];
+ return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string.
+ */
+static char *t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size)
+{
+ int c, pos = size % 3;
+ unsigned char b0 = 0, b1 = 0, b2 = 0, notleading = 0;
+ char *olddst = dst;
+
+ switch (pos) {
+ case 1:
+ b2 = src[0];
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ b1 = src[0];
+ b2 = src[1];
+ break;
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ c = (b0 & 0xfc) >> 2;
+ if (notleading || c != 0) {
+ *dst++ = b64table[c];
+ notleading = 1;
+ }
+ c = ((b0 & 3) << 4) | ((b1 & 0xf0) >> 4);
+ if (notleading || c != 0) {
+ *dst++ = b64table[c];
+ notleading = 1;
+ }
+ c = ((b1 & 0xf) << 2) | ((b2 & 0xc0) >> 6);
+ if (notleading || c != 0) {
+ *dst++ = b64table[c];
+ notleading = 1;
+ }
+ c = b2 & 0x3f;
+ if (notleading || c != 0) {
+ *dst++ = b64table[c];
+ notleading = 1;
+ }
+ if (pos >= size)
+ break;
+ else {
+ b0 = src[pos++];
+ b1 = src[pos++];
+ b2 = src[pos++];
+ }
+ }
+
+ *dst++ = '\0';
+ return olddst;
+}
+
+static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
+{
+ if (user_pwd == NULL)
+ return;
+ BN_free(user_pwd->s);
+ BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
+ OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
+ OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
+ OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
+}
+
+static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new()
+{
+ SRP_user_pwd *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_user_pwd));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ ret->N = NULL;
+ ret->g = NULL;
+ ret->s = NULL;
+ ret->v = NULL;
+ ret->id = NULL;
+ ret->info = NULL;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
+ const BIGNUM *N)
+{
+ vinfo->N = N;
+ vinfo->g = g;
+}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id,
+ const char *info)
+{
+ if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = BUF_strdup(id)))
+ return 0;
+ return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = BUF_strdup(info)));
+}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
+ const char *v)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+ int len;
+
+ if (strlen(s) > MAX_LEN || strlen(v) > MAX_LEN)
+ return 0;
+ len = t_fromb64(tmp, v);
+ if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
+ return 0;
+ len = t_fromb64(tmp, s);
+ return ((vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)) != NULL);
+}
+
+static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v)
+{
+ vinfo->v = v;
+ vinfo->s = s;
+ return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL);
+}
+
+SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
+{
+ SRP_VBASE *vb = (SRP_VBASE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_VBASE));
+
+ if (vb == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!(vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) ||
+ !(vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null())) {
+ OPENSSL_free(vb);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ vb->default_g = NULL;
+ vb->default_N = NULL;
+ vb->seed_key = NULL;
+ if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = BUF_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) {
+ sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd);
+ sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
+ OPENSSL_free(vb);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return vb;
+}
+
+int SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
+{
+ sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free);
+ sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
+ OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key);
+ OPENSSL_free(vb);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+ int len;
+
+ SRP_gN_cache *newgN =
+ (SRP_gN_cache *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN_cache));
+ if (newgN == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((newgN->b64_bn = BUF_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ len = t_fromb64(tmp, ch);
+ if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
+ return newgN;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(newgN->b64_bn);
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(newgN);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_cache *gN_cache)
+{
+ if (gN_cache == NULL)
+ return;
+ OPENSSL_free(gN_cache->b64_bn);
+ BN_free(gN_cache->bn);
+ OPENSSL_free(gN_cache);
+}
+
+static SRP_gN *SRP_get_gN_by_id(const char *id, STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *gN_tab)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ SRP_gN *gN;
+ if (gN_tab != NULL)
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_num(gN_tab); i++) {
+ gN = sk_SRP_gN_value(gN_tab, i);
+ if (gN && (id == NULL || strcmp(gN->id, id) == 0))
+ return gN;
+ }
+
+ return SRP_get_default_gN(id);
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (gN_cache == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* search if we have already one... */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++) {
+ SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i);
+ if (strcmp(cache->b64_bn, ch) == 0)
+ return cache->bn;
+ }
+ { /* it is the first time that we find it */
+ SRP_gN_cache *newgN = SRP_gN_new_init(ch);
+ if (newgN) {
+ if (sk_SRP_gN_cache_insert(gN_cache, newgN, 0) > 0)
+ return newgN->bn;
+ SRP_gN_free(newgN);
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this function parses verifier file. Format is:
+ * string(index):base64(N):base64(g):0
+ * string(username):base64(v):base64(salt):int(index)
+ */
+
+int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
+{
+ int error_code;
+ STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null();
+ char *last_index = NULL;
+ int i;
+ char **pp;
+
+ SRP_gN *gN = NULL;
+ SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL;
+
+ TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
+ BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+
+ if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE;
+
+ if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
+
+ if (vb->seed_key) {
+ last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) {
+ pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i);
+ if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) {
+ /*
+ * we add this couple in the internal Stack
+ */
+
+ if ((gN = (SRP_gN *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!(gN->id = BUF_strdup(pp[DB_srpid]))
+ || !(gN->N =
+ SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
+ || !(gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
+ || sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ gN = NULL;
+
+ if (vb->seed_key != NULL) {
+ last_index = pp[DB_srpid];
+ }
+ } else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) {
+ /* it is a user .... */
+ SRP_gN *lgN;
+ if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) {
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
+ if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N);
+ if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids
+ (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo]))
+ goto err;
+
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
+ if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv
+ (user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier]))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
+ goto err;
+ user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsability */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (last_index != NULL) {
+ /* this means that we want to simulate a default user */
+
+ if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) {
+ error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ vb->default_g = gN->g;
+ vb->default_N = gN->N;
+ gN = NULL;
+ }
+ error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR;
+
+ err:
+ /*
+ * there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application
+ * terminates most likely
+ */
+
+ if (gN != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(gN->id);
+ OPENSSL_free(gN);
+ }
+
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
+
+ if (tmpdb)
+ TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
+ if (in)
+ BIO_free_all(in);
+
+ sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
+
+ return error_code;
+
+}
+
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+{
+ int i;
+ SRP_user_pwd *user;
+ unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
+
+ if (vb == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) {
+ user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
+ if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0)
+ return user;
+ }
+ if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) ||
+ (vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+
+/* if the user is unknown we set parameters as well if we have a seed_key */
+
+ if ((user = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user, vb->default_g, vb->default_N);
+
+ if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt);
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, username, strlen(username));
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, digs, NULL);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
+ if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN
+ (user, BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL),
+ BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL)))
+ return user;
+
+ err:SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are in base64)
+ */
+char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
+ char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
+{
+ int len;
+ char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
+ unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
+ unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+ char *defgNid = NULL;
+ int vfsize = 0;
+
+ if ((user == NULL) ||
+ (pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (N) {
+ if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, N)))
+ goto err;
+ N_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, g)))
+ goto err;
+ g_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
+ defgNid = "*";
+ } else {
+ SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL);
+ if (gN == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ N_bn = gN->N;
+ g_bn = gN->g;
+ defgNid = gN->id;
+ }
+
+ if (*salt == NULL) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+ } else {
+ if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp2, *salt)))
+ goto err;
+ s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn))
+ goto err;
+
+ BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
+ vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
+ if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
+ goto err;
+ t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
+
+ if (*salt == NULL) {
+ char *tmp_salt;
+
+ if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
+ *salt = tmp_salt;
+ }
+
+ *verifier = vf;
+ vf = NULL;
+ result = defgNid;
+
+ err:
+ if (N) {
+ BN_free(N_bn);
+ BN_free(g_bn);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(vf, vfsize);
+ OPENSSL_free(vf);
+ BN_clear_free(s);
+ BN_clear_free(v);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL
+ * then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point
+ * to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not
+ * provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a
+ * random salt.
+ * The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier
+ * BIGNUMS.
+ */
+int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
+ BIGNUM **verifier, BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+ int result = 0;
+ BIGNUM *x = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
+ BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL;
+
+ if ((user == NULL) ||
+ (pass == NULL) ||
+ (salt == NULL) ||
+ (verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ srp_bn_print(N);
+ srp_bn_print(g);
+
+ if (*salt == NULL) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
+ } else {
+ salttmp = *salt;
+ }
+
+ x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
+
+ *verifier = BN_new();
+ if (*verifier == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(*verifier, g, x, N, bn_ctx)) {
+ BN_clear_free(*verifier);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ srp_bn_print(*verifier);
+
+ result = 1;
+ *salt = salttmp;
+
+ err:
+ if (*salt != salttmp)
+ BN_clear_free(salttmp);
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ return result;
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/mttest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/threads/mttest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/mttest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1208 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/threads/mttest.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#ifdef LINUX
-# include <typedefs.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-# include <windows.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef SOLARIS
-# include <synch.h>
-# include <thread.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef IRIX
-# include <ulocks.h>
-# include <sys/prctl.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef PTHREADS
-# include <pthread.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
-# if !defined __int64
-# define __int64 long long
-# endif
-# include <nwmpk.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include "../../e_os.h"
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-# define APPS_WIN16
-# include "../buffer/bss_file.c"
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
-# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "/openssl/apps/server.pem"
-# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "/openssl/apps/client.pem"
-#else
-# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "../../apps/server.pem"
-# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "../../apps/client.pem"
-#endif
-
-#define MAX_THREAD_NUMBER 100
-
-int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *xs);
-void thread_setup(void);
-void thread_cleanup(void);
-void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx);
-
-void irix_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line);
-void solaris_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line);
-void win32_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line);
-void pthreads_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line);
-void netware_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line);
-void beos_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line);
-
-unsigned long irix_thread_id(void);
-unsigned long solaris_thread_id(void);
-unsigned long pthreads_thread_id(void);
-unsigned long netware_thread_id(void);
-unsigned long beos_thread_id(void);
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-static MPKMutex *lock_cs;
-static MPKSema ThreadSem;
-static long *lock_count;
-#endif
-
-BIO *bio_err = NULL;
-BIO *bio_stdout = NULL;
-
-static char *cipher = NULL;
-int verbose = 0;
-#ifdef FIONBIO
-static int s_nbio = 0;
-#endif
-
-int thread_number = 10;
-int number_of_loops = 10;
-int reconnect = 0;
-int cache_stats = 0;
-
-static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
-
-int doit(char *ctx[4]);
-static void print_stats(FILE *fp, SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- fprintf(fp, "%4ld items in the session cache\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx));
- fprintf(fp, "%4d client connects (SSL_connect())\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx));
- fprintf(fp, "%4d client connects that finished\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx));
- fprintf(fp, "%4d server connects (SSL_accept())\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx));
- fprintf(fp, "%4d server connects that finished\n",
- SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx));
- fprintf(fp, "%4d session cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx));
- fprintf(fp, "%4d session cache misses\n", SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx));
- fprintf(fp, "%4d session cache timeouts\n", SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx));
-}
-
-static void sv_usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssltest [args ...]\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -server_auth - check server certificate\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -client_auth - do client authentication\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -v - more output\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -threads arg - number of threads\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -loops arg - number of 'connections', per thread\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -reconnect - reuse session-id's\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -stats - server session-id cache stats\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -cert arg - server certificate/key\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -ccert arg - client certificate/key\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -ssl3 - just SSLv3n\n");
-}
-
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-{
- char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
- int badop = 0;
- int ret = 1;
- int client_auth = 0;
- int server_auth = 0;
- SSL_CTX *s_ctx = NULL;
- SSL_CTX *c_ctx = NULL;
- char *scert = TEST_SERVER_CERT;
- char *ccert = TEST_CLIENT_CERT;
- SSL_METHOD *ssl_method = SSLv23_method();
-
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
-
- if (bio_err == NULL)
- bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- if (bio_stdout == NULL)
- bio_stdout = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- argc--;
- argv++;
-
- while (argc >= 1) {
- if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_auth") == 0)
- server_auth = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_auth") == 0)
- client_auth = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reconnect") == 0)
- reconnect = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-stats") == 0)
- cache_stats = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0)
- ssl_method = SSLv3_method();
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0)
- ssl_method = SSLv2_method();
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- CApath = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- CAfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- scert = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ccert") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- ccert = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-threads") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- thread_number = atoi(*(++argv));
- if (thread_number == 0)
- thread_number = 1;
- if (thread_number > MAX_THREAD_NUMBER)
- thread_number = MAX_THREAD_NUMBER;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-loops") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- number_of_loops = atoi(*(++argv));
- if (number_of_loops == 0)
- number_of_loops = 1;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
- badop = 1;
- break;
- }
- argc--;
- argv++;
- }
- if (badop) {
- bad:
- sv_usage();
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (cipher == NULL && OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
- cipher = getenv("SSL_CIPHER");
-
- SSL_load_error_strings();
- OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
-
- c_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(ssl_method);
- s_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(ssl_method);
- if ((c_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx == NULL)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(s_ctx,
- SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR |
- SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
- SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(c_ctx,
- SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR |
- SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s_ctx, scert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- } else
- if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(s_ctx, scert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (client_auth) {
- SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(c_ctx, ccert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
- SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(c_ctx, ccert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
- }
-
- if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
- (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx)) ||
- (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
- (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(c_ctx))) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL_load_verify_locations\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (client_auth) {
- fprintf(stderr, "client authentication\n");
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx,
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
- verify_callback);
- }
- if (server_auth) {
- fprintf(stderr, "server authentication\n");
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(c_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback);
- }
-
- thread_setup();
- do_threads(s_ctx, c_ctx);
- thread_cleanup();
- end:
-
- if (c_ctx != NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Client SSL_CTX stats then free it\n");
- print_stats(stderr, c_ctx);
- SSL_CTX_free(c_ctx);
- }
- if (s_ctx != NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Server SSL_CTX stats then free it\n");
- print_stats(stderr, s_ctx);
- if (cache_stats) {
- fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
- lh_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx), stderr);
- fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
- /*- lh_node_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx),stderr);
- fprintf(stderr,"-----\n"); */
- lh_node_usage_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx), stderr);
- fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
- }
- SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx);
- fprintf(stderr, "done free\n");
- }
- exit(ret);
- return (0);
-}
-
-#define W_READ 1
-#define W_WRITE 2
-#define C_DONE 1
-#define S_DONE 2
-
-int ndoit(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2])
-{
- int i;
- int ret;
- char *ctx[4];
-
- ctx[0] = (char *)ssl_ctx[0];
- ctx[1] = (char *)ssl_ctx[1];
-
- if (reconnect) {
- ctx[2] = (char *)SSL_new(ssl_ctx[0]);
- ctx[3] = (char *)SSL_new(ssl_ctx[1]);
- } else {
- ctx[2] = NULL;
- ctx[3] = NULL;
- }
-
- fprintf(stdout, "started thread %lu\n", CRYPTO_thread_id());
- for (i = 0; i < number_of_loops; i++) {
-/*- fprintf(stderr,"%4d %2d ctx->ref (%3d,%3d)\n",
- CRYPTO_thread_id(),i,
- ssl_ctx[0]->references,
- ssl_ctx[1]->references); */
-/* pthread_delay_np(&tm); */
-
- ret = doit(ctx);
- if (ret != 0) {
- fprintf(stdout, "error[%d] %lu - %d\n",
- i, CRYPTO_thread_id(), ret);
- return (ret);
- }
- }
- fprintf(stdout, "DONE %lu\n", CRYPTO_thread_id());
- if (reconnect) {
- SSL_free((SSL *)ctx[2]);
- SSL_free((SSL *)ctx[3]);
- }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
- MPKSemaphoreSignal(ThreadSem);
-#endif
- return (0);
-}
-
-int doit(char *ctx[4])
-{
- SSL_CTX *s_ctx, *c_ctx;
- static char cbuf[200], sbuf[200];
- SSL *c_ssl = NULL;
- SSL *s_ssl = NULL;
- BIO *c_to_s = NULL;
- BIO *s_to_c = NULL;
- BIO *c_bio = NULL;
- BIO *s_bio = NULL;
- int c_r, c_w, s_r, s_w;
- int c_want, s_want;
- int i;
- int done = 0;
- int c_write, s_write;
- int do_server = 0, do_client = 0;
-
- s_ctx = (SSL_CTX *)ctx[0];
- c_ctx = (SSL_CTX *)ctx[1];
-
- if (ctx[2] != NULL)
- s_ssl = (SSL *)ctx[2];
- else
- s_ssl = SSL_new(s_ctx);
-
- if (ctx[3] != NULL)
- c_ssl = (SSL *)ctx[3];
- else
- c_ssl = SSL_new(c_ctx);
-
- if ((s_ssl == NULL) || (c_ssl == NULL))
- goto err;
-
- c_to_s = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- s_to_c = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL))
- goto err;
-
- c_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
- s_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
- if ((c_bio == NULL) || (s_bio == NULL))
- goto err;
-
- SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
- SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, s_to_c, c_to_s);
- BIO_set_ssl(c_bio, c_ssl, (ctx[2] == NULL) ? BIO_CLOSE : BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
- SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, c_to_s, s_to_c);
- BIO_set_ssl(s_bio, s_ssl, (ctx[3] == NULL) ? BIO_CLOSE : BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- c_r = 0;
- s_r = 1;
- c_w = 1;
- s_w = 0;
- c_want = W_WRITE;
- s_want = 0;
- c_write = 1, s_write = 0;
-
- /* We can always do writes */
- for (;;) {
- do_server = 0;
- do_client = 0;
-
- i = (int)BIO_pending(s_bio);
- if ((i && s_r) || s_w)
- do_server = 1;
-
- i = (int)BIO_pending(c_bio);
- if ((i && c_r) || c_w)
- do_client = 1;
-
- if (do_server && verbose) {
- if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
- printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
- SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
- else if (s_write)
- printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
- else
- printf("server:SSL_read()\n");
- }
-
- if (do_client && verbose) {
- if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
- printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
- SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
- else if (c_write)
- printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
- else
- printf("client:SSL_read()\n");
- }
-
- if (!do_client && !do_server) {
- fprintf(stdout, "ERROR IN STARTUP\n");
- break;
- }
- if (do_client && !(done & C_DONE)) {
- if (c_write) {
- i = BIO_write(c_bio, "hello from client\n", 18);
- if (i < 0) {
- c_r = 0;
- c_w = 0;
- if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) {
- if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
- c_r = 1;
- if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
- c_w = 1;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- return (1);
- }
- } else if (i == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
- return (1);
- } else {
- /* ok */
- c_write = 0;
- }
- } else {
- i = BIO_read(c_bio, cbuf, 100);
- if (i < 0) {
- c_r = 0;
- c_w = 0;
- if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) {
- if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
- c_r = 1;
- if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
- c_w = 1;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- return (1);
- }
- } else if (i == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
- return (1);
- } else {
- done |= C_DONE;
-#ifdef undef
- fprintf(stdout, "CLIENT:from server:");
- fwrite(cbuf, 1, i, stdout);
- fflush(stdout);
-#endif
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (do_server && !(done & S_DONE)) {
- if (!s_write) {
- i = BIO_read(s_bio, sbuf, 100);
- if (i < 0) {
- s_r = 0;
- s_w = 0;
- if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) {
- if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
- s_r = 1;
- if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
- s_w = 1;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- return (1);
- }
- } else if (i == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
- return (1);
- } else {
- s_write = 1;
- s_w = 1;
-#ifdef undef
- fprintf(stdout, "SERVER:from client:");
- fwrite(sbuf, 1, i, stdout);
- fflush(stdout);
-#endif
- }
- } else {
- i = BIO_write(s_bio, "hello from server\n", 18);
- if (i < 0) {
- s_r = 0;
- s_w = 0;
- if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) {
- if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
- s_r = 1;
- if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
- s_w = 1;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- return (1);
- }
- } else if (i == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
- return (1);
- } else {
- s_write = 0;
- s_r = 1;
- done |= S_DONE;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if ((done & S_DONE) && (done & C_DONE))
- break;
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
- ThreadSwitchWithDelay();
-#endif
- }
-
- SSL_set_shutdown(c_ssl, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
- SSL_set_shutdown(s_ssl, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
-
-#ifdef undef
- fprintf(stdout, "DONE\n");
-#endif
- err:
- /*
- * We have to set the BIO's to NULL otherwise they will be free()ed
- * twice. Once when th s_ssl is SSL_free()ed and again when c_ssl is
- * SSL_free()ed. This is a hack required because s_ssl and c_ssl are
- * sharing the same BIO structure and SSL_set_bio() and SSL_free()
- * automatically BIO_free non NULL entries. You should not normally do
- * this or be required to do this
- */
-
- if (s_ssl != NULL) {
- s_ssl->rbio = NULL;
- s_ssl->wbio = NULL;
- }
- if (c_ssl != NULL) {
- c_ssl->rbio = NULL;
- c_ssl->wbio = NULL;
- }
-
- /* The SSL's are optionally freed in the following calls */
- if (c_to_s != NULL)
- BIO_free(c_to_s);
- if (s_to_c != NULL)
- BIO_free(s_to_c);
-
- if (c_bio != NULL)
- BIO_free(c_bio);
- if (s_bio != NULL)
- BIO_free(s_bio);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- char *s, buf[256];
-
- if (verbose) {
- s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
- buf, 256);
- if (s != NULL) {
- if (ok)
- fprintf(stderr, "depth=%d %s\n", ctx->error_depth, buf);
- else
- fprintf(stderr, "depth=%d error=%d %s\n",
- ctx->error_depth, ctx->error, buf);
- }
- }
- return (ok);
-}
-
-#define THREAD_STACK_SIZE (16*1024)
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-
-static HANDLE *lock_cs;
-
-void thread_setup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(HANDLE));
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- lock_cs[i] = CreateMutex(NULL, FALSE, NULL);
- }
-
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback((void (*)(int, int, char *, int))
- win32_locking_callback);
- /* id callback defined */
-}
-
-void thread_cleanup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++)
- CloseHandle(lock_cs[i]);
- OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
-}
-
-void win32_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
-{
- if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
- WaitForSingleObject(lock_cs[type], INFINITE);
- } else {
- ReleaseMutex(lock_cs[type]);
- }
-}
-
-void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
-{
- double ret;
- SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
- DWORD thread_id[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
- HANDLE thread_handle[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
- int i;
- SYSTEMTIME start, end;
-
- ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
- ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
-
- GetSystemTime(&start);
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- thread_handle[i] = CreateThread(NULL,
- THREAD_STACK_SIZE,
- (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE) ndoit,
- (void *)ssl_ctx, 0L, &(thread_id[i]));
- }
-
- printf("reaping\n");
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i += 50) {
- int j;
-
- j = (thread_number < (i + 50)) ? (thread_number - i) : 50;
-
- if (WaitForMultipleObjects(j,
- (CONST HANDLE *) & (thread_handle[i]),
- TRUE, INFINITE)
- == WAIT_FAILED) {
- fprintf(stderr, "WaitForMultipleObjects failed:%d\n",
- GetLastError());
- exit(1);
- }
- }
- GetSystemTime(&end);
-
- if (start.wDayOfWeek > end.wDayOfWeek)
- end.wDayOfWeek += 7;
- ret = (end.wDayOfWeek - start.wDayOfWeek) * 24;
-
- ret = (ret + end.wHour - start.wHour) * 60;
- ret = (ret + end.wMinute - start.wMinute) * 60;
- ret = (ret + end.wSecond - start.wSecond);
- ret += (end.wMilliseconds - start.wMilliseconds) / 1000.0;
-
- printf("win32 threads done - %.3f seconds\n", ret);
-}
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
-
-#ifdef SOLARIS
-
-static mutex_t *lock_cs;
-/*
- * static rwlock_t *lock_cs;
- */
-static long *lock_count;
-
-void thread_setup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(mutex_t));
- lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- lock_count[i] = 0;
- /* rwlock_init(&(lock_cs[i]),USYNC_THREAD,NULL); */
- mutex_init(&(lock_cs[i]), USYNC_THREAD, NULL);
- }
-
- CRYPTO_set_id_callback((unsigned long (*)())solaris_thread_id);
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback((void (*)())solaris_locking_callback);
-}
-
-void thread_cleanup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
-
- fprintf(stderr, "cleanup\n");
-
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- /* rwlock_destroy(&(lock_cs[i])); */
- mutex_destroy(&(lock_cs[i]));
- fprintf(stderr, "%8ld:%s\n", lock_count[i], CRYPTO_get_lock_name(i));
- }
- OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
- OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
-
- fprintf(stderr, "done cleanup\n");
-
-}
-
-void solaris_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
-{
-# ifdef undef
- fprintf(stderr, "thread=%4d mode=%s lock=%s %s:%d\n",
- CRYPTO_thread_id(),
- (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) ? "l" : "u",
- (type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
-# endif
-
- /*-
- if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
- fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
- CRYPTO_thread_id(),
- mode,file,line);
- */
- if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
- /*-
- if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
- rw_rdlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
- else
- rw_wrlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
-
- mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));
- lock_count[type]++;
- } else {
-/* rw_unlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
- mutex_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
- }
-}
-
-void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
-{
- SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
- thread_t thread_ctx[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
- int i;
-
- ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
- ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
-
- thr_setconcurrency(thread_number);
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- thr_create(NULL, THREAD_STACK_SIZE,
- (void *(*)())ndoit, (void *)ssl_ctx, 0L, &(thread_ctx[i]));
- }
-
- printf("reaping\n");
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- thr_join(thread_ctx[i], NULL, NULL);
- }
-
- printf("solaris threads done (%d,%d)\n",
- s_ctx->references, c_ctx->references);
-}
-
-unsigned long solaris_thread_id(void)
-{
- unsigned long ret;
-
- ret = (unsigned long)thr_self();
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif /* SOLARIS */
-
-#ifdef IRIX
-
-static usptr_t *arena;
-static usema_t **lock_cs;
-
-void thread_setup(void)
-{
- int i;
- char filename[20];
-
- strcpy(filename, "/tmp/mttest.XXXXXX");
- mktemp(filename);
-
- usconfig(CONF_STHREADIOOFF);
- usconfig(CONF_STHREADMALLOCOFF);
- usconfig(CONF_INITUSERS, 100);
- usconfig(CONF_LOCKTYPE, US_DEBUGPLUS);
- arena = usinit(filename);
- unlink(filename);
-
- lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(usema_t *));
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- lock_cs[i] = usnewsema(arena, 1);
- }
-
- CRYPTO_set_id_callback((unsigned long (*)())irix_thread_id);
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback((void (*)())irix_locking_callback);
-}
-
-void thread_cleanup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- char buf[10];
-
- sprintf(buf, "%2d:", i);
- usdumpsema(lock_cs[i], stdout, buf);
- usfreesema(lock_cs[i], arena);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
-}
-
-void irix_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
-{
- if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
- printf("lock %d\n", type);
- uspsema(lock_cs[type]);
- } else {
- printf("unlock %d\n", type);
- usvsema(lock_cs[type]);
- }
-}
-
-void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
-{
- SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
- int thread_ctx[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
- int i;
-
- ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
- ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
-
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- thread_ctx[i] = sproc((void (*)())ndoit,
- PR_SADDR | PR_SFDS, (void *)ssl_ctx);
- }
-
- printf("reaping\n");
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- wait(NULL);
- }
-
- printf("irix threads done (%d,%d)\n",
- s_ctx->references, c_ctx->references);
-}
-
-unsigned long irix_thread_id(void)
-{
- unsigned long ret;
-
- ret = (unsigned long)getpid();
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif /* IRIX */
-
-#ifdef PTHREADS
-
-static pthread_mutex_t *lock_cs;
-static long *lock_count;
-
-void thread_setup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(pthread_mutex_t));
- lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- lock_count[i] = 0;
- pthread_mutex_init(&(lock_cs[i]), NULL);
- }
-
- CRYPTO_set_id_callback((unsigned long (*)())pthreads_thread_id);
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback((void (*)())pthreads_locking_callback);
-}
-
-void thread_cleanup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
- fprintf(stderr, "cleanup\n");
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- pthread_mutex_destroy(&(lock_cs[i]));
- fprintf(stderr, "%8ld:%s\n", lock_count[i], CRYPTO_get_lock_name(i));
- }
- OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
- OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
-
- fprintf(stderr, "done cleanup\n");
-}
-
-void pthreads_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
-{
-# ifdef undef
- fprintf(stderr, "thread=%4d mode=%s lock=%s %s:%d\n",
- CRYPTO_thread_id(),
- (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) ? "l" : "u",
- (type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
-# endif
-/*-
- if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
- fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
- CRYPTO_thread_id(),
- mode,file,line);
-*/
- if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
- pthread_mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));
- lock_count[type]++;
- } else {
- pthread_mutex_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
- }
-}
-
-void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
-{
- SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
- pthread_t thread_ctx[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
- int i;
-
- ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
- ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
-
- /*
- * thr_setconcurrency(thread_number);
- */
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- pthread_create(&(thread_ctx[i]), NULL,
- (void *(*)())ndoit, (void *)ssl_ctx);
- }
-
- printf("reaping\n");
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- pthread_join(thread_ctx[i], NULL);
- }
-
- printf("pthreads threads done (%d,%d)\n",
- s_ctx->references, c_ctx->references);
-}
-
-unsigned long pthreads_thread_id(void)
-{
- unsigned long ret;
-
- ret = (unsigned long)pthread_self();
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#endif /* PTHREADS */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
-
-void thread_setup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(MPKMutex));
- lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- lock_count[i] = 0;
- lock_cs[i] = MPKMutexAlloc("OpenSSL mutex");
- }
-
- ThreadSem = MPKSemaphoreAlloc("OpenSSL mttest semaphore", 0);
-
- CRYPTO_set_id_callback((unsigned long (*)())netware_thread_id);
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback((void (*)())netware_locking_callback);
-}
-
-void thread_cleanup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
-
- fprintf(stdout, "thread_cleanup\n");
-
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- MPKMutexFree(lock_cs[i]);
- fprintf(stdout, "%8ld:%s\n", lock_count[i], CRYPTO_get_lock_name(i));
- }
- OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
- OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
-
- MPKSemaphoreFree(ThreadSem);
-
- fprintf(stdout, "done cleanup\n");
-}
-
-void netware_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
-{
- if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
- MPKMutexLock(lock_cs[type]);
- lock_count[type]++;
- } else
- MPKMutexUnlock(lock_cs[type]);
-}
-
-void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
-{
- SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
- int i;
- ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
- ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
-
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- BeginThread((void (*)(void *))ndoit, NULL, THREAD_STACK_SIZE,
- (void *)ssl_ctx);
- ThreadSwitchWithDelay();
- }
-
- printf("reaping\n");
-
- /* loop until all threads have signaled the semaphore */
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- MPKSemaphoreWait(ThreadSem);
- }
- printf("netware threads done (%d,%d)\n",
- s_ctx->references, c_ctx->references);
-}
-
-unsigned long netware_thread_id(void)
-{
- unsigned long ret;
-
- ret = (unsigned long)GetThreadID();
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif /* NETWARE */
-
-#ifdef BEOS_THREADS
-
-# include <Locker.h>
-
-static BLocker **lock_cs;
-static long *lock_count;
-
-void thread_setup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- lock_cs =
- (BLocker **) OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(BLocker *));
- lock_count = (long *)OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- lock_count[i] = 0;
- lock_cs[i] = new BLocker(CRYPTO_get_lock_name(i));
- }
-
- CRYPTO_set_id_callback((unsigned long (*)())beos_thread_id);
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(beos_locking_callback);
-}
-
-void thread_cleanup(void)
-{
- int i;
-
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
- fprintf(stderr, "cleanup\n");
- for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
- delete lock_cs[i];
- fprintf(stderr, "%8ld:%s\n", lock_count[i], CRYPTO_get_lock_name(i));
- }
- OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
- OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
-
- fprintf(stderr, "done cleanup\n");
-}
-
-void beos_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
-{
-# if 0
- fprintf(stderr, "thread=%4d mode=%s lock=%s %s:%d\n",
- CRYPTO_thread_id(),
- (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) ? "l" : "u",
- (type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
-# endif
- if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
- lock_cs[type]->Lock();
- lock_count[type]++;
- } else {
- lock_cs[type]->Unlock();
- }
-}
-
-void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
-{
- SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
- thread_id thread_ctx[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
- int i;
-
- ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
- ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
-
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- thread_ctx[i] = spawn_thread((thread_func) ndoit,
- NULL, B_NORMAL_PRIORITY,
- (void *)ssl_ctx);
- resume_thread(thread_ctx[i]);
- }
-
- printf("waiting...\n");
- for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
- status_t result;
- wait_for_thread(thread_ctx[i], &result);
- }
-
- printf("beos threads done (%d,%d)\n",
- s_ctx->references, c_ctx->references);
-}
-
-unsigned long beos_thread_id(void)
-{
- unsigned long ret;
-
- ret = (unsigned long)find_thread(NULL);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#endif /* BEOS_THREADS */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/mttest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/threads/mttest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/mttest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/mttest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1211 @@
+/* crypto/threads/mttest.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef LINUX
+# include <typedefs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+# include <windows.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef SOLARIS
+# include <synch.h>
+# include <thread.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef IRIX
+# include <ulocks.h>
+# include <sys/prctl.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef PTHREADS
+# include <pthread.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
+# if !defined __int64
+# define __int64 long long
+# endif
+# include <nwmpk.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
+# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "/openssl/apps/server.pem"
+# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "/openssl/apps/client.pem"
+#else
+# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "../../apps/server.pem"
+# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "../../apps/client.pem"
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_THREAD_NUMBER 100
+
+int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *xs);
+void thread_setup(void);
+void thread_cleanup(void);
+void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx);
+
+void irix_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line);
+void solaris_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line);
+void win32_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line);
+void pthreads_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line);
+void netware_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line);
+void beos_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line);
+
+void irix_thread_id(CRYPTO_THREADID *tid);
+void solaris_thread_id(CRYPTO_THREADID *tid);
+void pthreads_thread_id(CRYPTO_THREADID *tid);
+void netware_thread_id(CRYPTO_THREADID *tid);
+void beos_thread_id(CRYPTO_THREADID *tid);
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+static MPKMutex *lock_cs;
+static MPKSema ThreadSem;
+static long *lock_count;
+#endif
+
+BIO *bio_err = NULL;
+BIO *bio_stdout = NULL;
+
+static char *cipher = NULL;
+int verbose = 0;
+#ifdef FIONBIO
+static int s_nbio = 0;
+#endif
+
+int thread_number = 10;
+int number_of_loops = 10;
+int reconnect = 0;
+int cache_stats = 0;
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+ "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+int doit(char *ctx[4]);
+static void print_stats(BIO *bio, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld items in the session cache\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4d client connects (SSL_connect())\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4d client connects that finished\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4d server connects (SSL_accept())\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4d server connects that finished\n",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4d session cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4d session cache misses\n", SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx));
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%4d session cache timeouts\n", SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx));
+}
+
+static void sv_usage(void)
+{
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "usage: ssltest [args ...]\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -server_auth - check server certificate\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -client_auth - do client authentication\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -v - more output\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -threads arg - number of threads\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -loops arg - number of 'connections', per thread\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -reconnect - reuse session-id's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -stats - server session-id cache stats\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -cert arg - server certificate/key\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ccert arg - client certificate/key\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, " -ssl3 - just SSLv3n\n");
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
+ int badop = 0;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int client_auth = 0;
+ int server_auth = 0;
+ SSL_CTX *s_ctx = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *c_ctx = NULL;
+ char *scert = TEST_SERVER_CERT;
+ char *ccert = TEST_CLIENT_CERT;
+ const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method = SSLv23_method();
+
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+
+ if (bio_err == NULL)
+ bio_err = BIO_new_fd(2, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ if (bio_stdout == NULL)
+ bio_stdout = BIO_new_fd(1, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+
+ while (argc >= 1) {
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_auth") == 0)
+ server_auth = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_auth") == 0)
+ client_auth = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reconnect") == 0)
+ reconnect = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-stats") == 0)
+ cache_stats = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0)
+ ssl_method = SSLv3_method();
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0)
+ ssl_method = SSLv2_method();
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ CApath = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ CAfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ scert = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ccert") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ ccert = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-threads") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ thread_number = atoi(*(++argv));
+ if (thread_number == 0)
+ thread_number = 1;
+ if (thread_number > MAX_THREAD_NUMBER)
+ thread_number = MAX_THREAD_NUMBER;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-loops") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ number_of_loops = atoi(*(++argv));
+ if (number_of_loops == 0)
+ number_of_loops = 1;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
+ badop = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+ if (badop) {
+ bad:
+ sv_usage();
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher == NULL && OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
+ cipher = getenv("SSL_CIPHER");
+
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+
+ c_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(ssl_method);
+ s_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(ssl_method);
+ if ((c_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx == NULL)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(s_ctx,
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR |
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(c_ctx,
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR |
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s_ctx, scert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file (%s)\n", scert);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(s_ctx, scert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file (%s)\n", scert);
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (client_auth) {
+ SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(c_ctx, ccert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(c_ctx, ccert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ }
+
+ if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(c_ctx))) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL_load_verify_locations\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (client_auth) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "client authentication\n");
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx,
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
+ verify_callback);
+ }
+ if (server_auth) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "server authentication\n");
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(c_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback);
+ }
+
+ thread_setup();
+ do_threads(s_ctx, c_ctx);
+ thread_cleanup();
+ end:
+
+ if (c_ctx != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Client SSL_CTX stats then free it\n");
+ print_stats(bio_err, c_ctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(c_ctx);
+ }
+ if (s_ctx != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Server SSL_CTX stats then free it\n");
+ print_stats(bio_err, s_ctx);
+ if (cache_stats) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-----\n");
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_stats_bio(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx), bio_err);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-----\n");
+ /*- lh_SSL_SESSION_node_stats_bio(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx),bio_err);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"-----\n"); */
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_node_usage_stats_bio(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx), bio_err);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-----\n");
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "done free\n");
+ }
+ exit(ret);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+#define W_READ 1
+#define W_WRITE 2
+#define C_DONE 1
+#define S_DONE 2
+
+int ndoit(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2])
+{
+ int i;
+ int ret;
+ char *ctx[4];
+ CRYPTO_THREADID thread_id;
+
+ ctx[0] = (char *)ssl_ctx[0];
+ ctx[1] = (char *)ssl_ctx[1];
+
+ if (reconnect) {
+ ctx[2] = (char *)SSL_new(ssl_ctx[0]);
+ ctx[3] = (char *)SSL_new(ssl_ctx[1]);
+ } else {
+ ctx[2] = NULL;
+ ctx[3] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&thread_id);
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "started thread %lu\n",
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&thread_id));
+ for (i = 0; i < number_of_loops; i++) {
+/*- BIO_printf(bio_err,"%4d %2d ctx->ref (%3d,%3d)\n",
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&thread_id),i,
+ ssl_ctx[0]->references,
+ ssl_ctx[1]->references); */
+/* pthread_delay_np(&tm); */
+
+ ret = doit(ctx);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "error[%d] %lu - %d\n",
+ i, CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&thread_id), ret);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "DONE %lu\n", CRYPTO_THREADID_hash(&thread_id));
+ if (reconnect) {
+ SSL_free((SSL *)ctx[2]);
+ SSL_free((SSL *)ctx[3]);
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
+ MPKSemaphoreSignal(ThreadSem);
+#endif
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int doit(char *ctx[4])
+{
+ SSL_CTX *s_ctx, *c_ctx;
+ static char cbuf[200], sbuf[200];
+ SSL *c_ssl = NULL;
+ SSL *s_ssl = NULL;
+ BIO *c_to_s = NULL;
+ BIO *s_to_c = NULL;
+ BIO *c_bio = NULL;
+ BIO *s_bio = NULL;
+ int c_r, c_w, s_r, s_w;
+ int c_want, s_want;
+ int i;
+ int done = 0;
+ int c_write, s_write;
+ int do_server = 0, do_client = 0;
+
+ s_ctx = (SSL_CTX *)ctx[0];
+ c_ctx = (SSL_CTX *)ctx[1];
+
+ if (ctx[2] != NULL)
+ s_ssl = (SSL *)ctx[2];
+ else
+ s_ssl = SSL_new(s_ctx);
+
+ if (ctx[3] != NULL)
+ c_ssl = (SSL *)ctx[3];
+ else
+ c_ssl = SSL_new(c_ctx);
+
+ if ((s_ssl == NULL) || (c_ssl == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ c_to_s = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ s_to_c = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ c_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ s_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ if ((c_bio == NULL) || (s_bio == NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
+ SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, s_to_c, c_to_s);
+ BIO_set_ssl(c_bio, c_ssl, (ctx[2] == NULL) ? BIO_CLOSE : BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
+ SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, c_to_s, s_to_c);
+ BIO_set_ssl(s_bio, s_ssl, (ctx[3] == NULL) ? BIO_CLOSE : BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ c_r = 0;
+ s_r = 1;
+ c_w = 1;
+ s_w = 0;
+ c_want = W_WRITE;
+ s_want = 0;
+ c_write = 1, s_write = 0;
+
+ /* We can always do writes */
+ for (;;) {
+ do_server = 0;
+ do_client = 0;
+
+ i = (int)BIO_pending(s_bio);
+ if ((i && s_r) || s_w)
+ do_server = 1;
+
+ i = (int)BIO_pending(c_bio);
+ if ((i && c_r) || c_w)
+ do_client = 1;
+
+ if (do_server && verbose) {
+ if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
+ SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
+ else if (s_write)
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "server:SSL_write()\n");
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "server:SSL_read()\n");
+ }
+
+ if (do_client && verbose) {
+ if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
+ SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
+ else if (c_write)
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "client:SSL_write()\n");
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "client:SSL_read()\n");
+ }
+
+ if (!do_client && !do_server) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "ERROR IN STARTUP\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (do_client && !(done & C_DONE)) {
+ if (c_write) {
+ i = BIO_write(c_bio, "hello from client\n", 18);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ c_r = 0;
+ c_w = 0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) {
+ if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
+ c_r = 1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
+ c_w = 1;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return (1);
+ }
+ } else if (i == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ /* ok */
+ c_write = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ i = BIO_read(c_bio, cbuf, 100);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ c_r = 0;
+ c_w = 0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) {
+ if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
+ c_r = 1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
+ c_w = 1;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return (1);
+ }
+ } else if (i == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ done |= C_DONE;
+#ifdef undef
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "CLIENT:from server:");
+ BIO_write(bio_stdout, cbuf, i);
+ BIO_flush(bio_stdout);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (do_server && !(done & S_DONE)) {
+ if (!s_write) {
+ i = BIO_read(s_bio, sbuf, 100);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s_r = 0;
+ s_w = 0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) {
+ if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
+ s_r = 1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
+ s_w = 1;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return (1);
+ }
+ } else if (i == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ s_write = 1;
+ s_w = 1;
+#ifdef undef
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "SERVER:from client:");
+ BIO_write(bio_stdout, sbuf, i);
+ BIO_flush(bio_stdout);
+#endif
+ }
+ } else {
+ i = BIO_write(s_bio, "hello from server\n", 18);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s_r = 0;
+ s_w = 0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) {
+ if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
+ s_r = 1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
+ s_w = 1;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return (1);
+ }
+ } else if (i == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ s_write = 0;
+ s_r = 1;
+ done |= S_DONE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((done & S_DONE) && (done & C_DONE))
+ break;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+ ThreadSwitchWithDelay();
+#endif
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_shutdown(c_ssl, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+ SSL_set_shutdown(s_ssl, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+
+#ifdef undef
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "DONE\n");
+#endif
+ err:
+ /*
+ * We have to set the BIO's to NULL otherwise they will be free()ed
+ * twice. Once when th s_ssl is SSL_free()ed and again when c_ssl is
+ * SSL_free()ed. This is a hack required because s_ssl and c_ssl are
+ * sharing the same BIO structure and SSL_set_bio() and SSL_free()
+ * automatically BIO_free non NULL entries. You should not normally do
+ * this or be required to do this
+ */
+
+ if (s_ssl != NULL) {
+ s_ssl->rbio = NULL;
+ s_ssl->wbio = NULL;
+ }
+ if (c_ssl != NULL) {
+ c_ssl->rbio = NULL;
+ c_ssl->wbio = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* The SSL's are optionally freed in the following calls */
+ if (c_to_s != NULL)
+ BIO_free(c_to_s);
+ if (s_to_c != NULL)
+ BIO_free(s_to_c);
+
+ if (c_bio != NULL)
+ BIO_free(c_bio);
+ if (s_bio != NULL)
+ BIO_free(s_bio);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ char *s, buf[256];
+
+ if (verbose) {
+ s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
+ buf, 256);
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ if (ok)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "depth=%d %s\n", ctx->error_depth, buf);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "depth=%d error=%d %s\n",
+ ctx->error_depth, ctx->error, buf);
+ }
+ }
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+#define THREAD_STACK_SIZE (16*1024)
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+
+static HANDLE *lock_cs;
+
+void thread_setup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(HANDLE));
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ lock_cs[i] = CreateMutex(NULL, FALSE, NULL);
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback((void (*)(int, int, char *, int))
+ win32_locking_callback);
+ /* id callback defined */
+}
+
+void thread_cleanup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++)
+ CloseHandle(lock_cs[i]);
+ OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
+}
+
+void win32_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
+{
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
+ WaitForSingleObject(lock_cs[type], INFINITE);
+ } else {
+ ReleaseMutex(lock_cs[type]);
+ }
+}
+
+void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
+{
+ double ret;
+ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
+ DWORD thread_id[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
+ HANDLE thread_handle[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
+ int i;
+ SYSTEMTIME start, end;
+
+ ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
+ ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
+
+ GetSystemTime(&start);
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ thread_handle[i] = CreateThread(NULL,
+ THREAD_STACK_SIZE,
+ (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE) ndoit,
+ (void *)ssl_ctx, 0L, &(thread_id[i]));
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "reaping\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i += 50) {
+ int j;
+
+ j = (thread_number < (i + 50)) ? (thread_number - i) : 50;
+
+ if (WaitForMultipleObjects(j,
+ (CONST HANDLE *) & (thread_handle[i]),
+ TRUE, INFINITE)
+ == WAIT_FAILED) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "WaitForMultipleObjects failed:%d\n",
+ GetLastError());
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ GetSystemTime(&end);
+
+ if (start.wDayOfWeek > end.wDayOfWeek)
+ end.wDayOfWeek += 7;
+ ret = (end.wDayOfWeek - start.wDayOfWeek) * 24;
+
+ ret = (ret + end.wHour - start.wHour) * 60;
+ ret = (ret + end.wMinute - start.wMinute) * 60;
+ ret = (ret + end.wSecond - start.wSecond);
+ ret += (end.wMilliseconds - start.wMilliseconds) / 1000.0;
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "win32 threads done - %.3f seconds\n", ret);
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
+
+#ifdef SOLARIS
+
+static mutex_t *lock_cs;
+/*
+ * static rwlock_t *lock_cs;
+ */
+static long *lock_count;
+
+void thread_setup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(mutex_t));
+ lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ lock_count[i] = 0;
+ /* rwlock_init(&(lock_cs[i]),USYNC_THREAD,NULL); */
+ mutex_init(&(lock_cs[i]), USYNC_THREAD, NULL);
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_set_id_callback(solaris_thread_id);
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(solaris_locking_callback);
+}
+
+void thread_cleanup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "cleanup\n");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ /* rwlock_destroy(&(lock_cs[i])); */
+ mutex_destroy(&(lock_cs[i]));
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%8ld:%s\n", lock_count[i], CRYPTO_get_lock_name(i));
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
+ OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "done cleanup\n");
+
+}
+
+void solaris_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
+{
+# ifdef undef
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "thread=%4d mode=%s lock=%s %s:%d\n",
+ CRYPTO_thread_id(),
+ (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) ? "l" : "u",
+ (type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
+# endif
+
+ /*-
+ if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
+ CRYPTO_thread_id(),
+ mode,file,line);
+ */
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
+ /*-
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
+ rw_rdlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
+ else
+ rw_wrlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
+
+ mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));
+ lock_count[type]++;
+ } else {
+/* rw_unlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
+ mutex_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
+ }
+}
+
+void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
+ thread_t thread_ctx[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
+ int i;
+
+ ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
+ ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
+
+ thr_setconcurrency(thread_number);
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ thr_create(NULL, THREAD_STACK_SIZE,
+ (void *(*)())ndoit, (void *)ssl_ctx, 0L, &(thread_ctx[i]));
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "reaping\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ thr_join(thread_ctx[i], NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+#if 0 /* We can't currently find out the reference amount */
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "solaris threads done (%d,%d)\n",
+ s_ctx->references, c_ctx->references);
+#else
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "solaris threads done\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+void solaris_thread_id(CRYPTO_THREADID *tid)
+{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric((unsigned long)thr_self());
+}
+#endif /* SOLARIS */
+
+#ifdef IRIX
+
+static usptr_t *arena;
+static usema_t **lock_cs;
+
+void thread_setup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ char filename[20];
+
+ strcpy(filename, "/tmp/mttest.XXXXXX");
+ mktemp(filename);
+
+ usconfig(CONF_STHREADIOOFF);
+ usconfig(CONF_STHREADMALLOCOFF);
+ usconfig(CONF_INITUSERS, 100);
+ usconfig(CONF_LOCKTYPE, US_DEBUGPLUS);
+ arena = usinit(filename);
+ unlink(filename);
+
+ lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(usema_t *));
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ lock_cs[i] = usnewsema(arena, 1);
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_set_id_callback(irix_thread_id);
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(irix_locking_callback);
+}
+
+void thread_cleanup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ char buf[10];
+
+ sprintf(buf, "%2d:", i);
+ usdumpsema(lock_cs[i], stdout, buf);
+ usfreesema(lock_cs[i], arena);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
+}
+
+void irix_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
+{
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "lock %d\n", type);
+ uspsema(lock_cs[type]);
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "unlock %d\n", type);
+ usvsema(lock_cs[type]);
+ }
+}
+
+void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
+ int thread_ctx[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
+ int i;
+
+ ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
+ ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ thread_ctx[i] = sproc((void (*)())ndoit,
+ PR_SADDR | PR_SFDS, (void *)ssl_ctx);
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "reaping\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ wait(NULL);
+ }
+
+#if 0 /* We can't currently find out the reference amount */
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "irix threads done (%d,%d)\n",
+ s_ctx->references, c_ctx->references);
+#else
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "irix threads done\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+unsigned long irix_thread_id(void)
+{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric((unsigned long)getpid());
+}
+#endif /* IRIX */
+
+#ifdef PTHREADS
+
+static pthread_mutex_t *lock_cs;
+static long *lock_count;
+
+void thread_setup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(pthread_mutex_t));
+ lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ lock_count[i] = 0;
+ pthread_mutex_init(&(lock_cs[i]), NULL);
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(pthreads_thread_id);
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(pthreads_locking_callback);
+}
+
+void thread_cleanup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "cleanup\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ pthread_mutex_destroy(&(lock_cs[i]));
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%8ld:%s\n", lock_count[i], CRYPTO_get_lock_name(i));
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
+ OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "done cleanup\n");
+}
+
+void pthreads_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
+{
+# ifdef undef
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "thread=%4d mode=%s lock=%s %s:%d\n",
+ CRYPTO_thread_id(),
+ (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) ? "l" : "u",
+ (type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
+# endif
+/*-
+ if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
+ CRYPTO_thread_id(),
+ mode,file,line);
+*/
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));
+ lock_count[type]++;
+ } else {
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
+ }
+}
+
+void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
+ pthread_t thread_ctx[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
+ int i;
+
+ ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
+ ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
+
+ /*
+ * thr_setconcurrency(thread_number);
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ pthread_create(&(thread_ctx[i]), NULL,
+ (void *(*)())ndoit, (void *)ssl_ctx);
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "reaping\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ pthread_join(thread_ctx[i], NULL);
+ }
+
+#if 0 /* We can't currently find out the reference amount */
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "pthreads threads done (%d,%d)\n",
+ s_ctx->references, c_ctx->references);
+#else
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "pthreads threads done\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+void pthreads_thread_id(CRYPTO_THREADID *tid)
+{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(tid, (unsigned long)pthread_self());
+}
+
+#endif /* PTHREADS */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
+
+void thread_setup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(MPKMutex));
+ lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ lock_count[i] = 0;
+ lock_cs[i] = MPKMutexAlloc("OpenSSL mutex");
+ }
+
+ ThreadSem = MPKSemaphoreAlloc("OpenSSL mttest semaphore", 0);
+
+ CRYPTO_set_id_callback(netware_thread_id);
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(netware_locking_callback);
+}
+
+void thread_cleanup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "thread_cleanup\n");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ MPKMutexFree(lock_cs[i]);
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%8ld:%s\n", lock_count[i], CRYPTO_get_lock_name(i));
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
+ OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
+
+ MPKSemaphoreFree(ThreadSem);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "done cleanup\n");
+}
+
+void netware_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
+{
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
+ MPKMutexLock(lock_cs[type]);
+ lock_count[type]++;
+ } else
+ MPKMutexUnlock(lock_cs[type]);
+}
+
+void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
+ int i;
+ ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
+ ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ BeginThread((void (*)(void *))ndoit, NULL, THREAD_STACK_SIZE,
+ (void *)ssl_ctx);
+ ThreadSwitchWithDelay();
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "reaping\n");
+
+ /* loop until all threads have signaled the semaphore */
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ MPKSemaphoreWait(ThreadSem);
+ }
+#if 0 /* We can't currently find out the reference amount */
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "netware threads done (%d,%d)\n",
+ s_ctx->references, c_ctx->references);
+#else
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "netware threads done\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+unsigned long netware_thread_id(void)
+{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric((unsigned long)GetThreadID());
+}
+#endif /* NETWARE */
+
+#ifdef BEOS_THREADS
+
+# include <Locker.h>
+
+static BLocker **lock_cs;
+static long *lock_count;
+
+void thread_setup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ lock_cs =
+ (BLocker **) OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(BLocker *));
+ lock_count = (long *)OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ lock_count[i] = 0;
+ lock_cs[i] = new BLocker(CRYPTO_get_lock_name(i));
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_set_id_callback((unsigned long (*)())beos_thread_id);
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(beos_locking_callback);
+}
+
+void thread_cleanup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(NULL);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "cleanup\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_num_locks(); i++) {
+ delete lock_cs[i];
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%8ld:%s\n", lock_count[i], CRYPTO_get_lock_name(i));
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
+ OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "done cleanup\n");
+}
+
+void beos_locking_callback(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
+{
+# if 0
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "thread=%4d mode=%s lock=%s %s:%d\n",
+ CRYPTO_thread_id(),
+ (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) ? "l" : "u",
+ (type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
+# endif
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
+ lock_cs[type]->Lock();
+ lock_count[type]++;
+ } else {
+ lock_cs[type]->Unlock();
+ }
+}
+
+void do_threads(SSL_CTX *s_ctx, SSL_CTX *c_ctx)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2];
+ thread_id thread_ctx[MAX_THREAD_NUMBER];
+ int i;
+
+ ssl_ctx[0] = s_ctx;
+ ssl_ctx[1] = c_ctx;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ thread_ctx[i] = spawn_thread((thread_func) ndoit,
+ NULL, B_NORMAL_PRIORITY,
+ (void *)ssl_ctx);
+ resume_thread(thread_ctx[i]);
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "waiting...\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < thread_number; i++) {
+ status_t result;
+ wait_for_thread(thread_ctx[i], &result);
+ }
+
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "beos threads done (%d,%d)\n",
+ s_ctx->references, c_ctx->references);
+}
+
+unsigned long beos_thread_id(void)
+{
+ unsigned long ret;
+
+ ret = (unsigned long)find_thread(NULL);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif /* BEOS_THREADS */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/pthread2.sh
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/threads/pthread2.sh 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/pthread2.sh 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-# build using pthreads where it's already built into the system
-#
-/bin/rm -f mttest
-gcc -DPTHREADS -I../../include -g mttest.c -o mttest -L../.. -lssl -lcrypto -lpthread
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/pthread2.sh (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/threads/pthread2.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/pthread2.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/threads/pthread2.sh 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# build using pthreads where it's already built into the system
+#
+/bin/rm -f mttest
+gcc -DPTHREADS -I../../include -g mttest.c -o mttest -L../.. -lssl -lcrypto -lpthread -ldl
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,736 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/ts/ts_resp_verify.c */
-/*
- * Written by Zoltan Glozik (zglozik at stones.com) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2002.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/ts.h>
-#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
-
-/* Private function declarations. */
-
-static int TS_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted,
- X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
-static int TS_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
-static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ESS_get_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
-static int TS_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert);
-static int TS_issuer_serial_cmp(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is, X509_CINF *cinfo);
-static int int_TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
- PKCS7 *token, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
-static int TS_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response);
-static char *TS_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text);
-static int TS_check_policy(ASN1_OBJECT *req_oid, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
-static int TS_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info,
- X509_ALGOR **md_alg,
- unsigned char **imprint, unsigned *imprint_len);
-static int TS_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a,
- unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a,
- TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
-static int TS_check_nonces(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
-static int TS_check_signer_name(GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name, X509 *signer);
-static int TS_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names,
- GENERAL_NAME *name);
-
-/*
- * Local mapping between response codes and descriptions.
- * Don't forget to change TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE when modifying
- * the elements of this array.
- */
-static const char *TS_status_text[] = { "granted",
- "grantedWithMods",
- "rejection",
- "waiting",
- "revocationWarning",
- "revocationNotification"
-};
-
-#define TS_STATUS_TEXT_SIZE (sizeof(TS_status_text)/sizeof(*TS_status_text))
-
-/*
- * This must be greater or equal to the sum of the strings in TS_status_text
- * plus the number of its elements.
- */
-#define TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE 256
-
-static struct {
- int code;
- const char *text;
-} TS_failure_info[] = {
- {
- TS_INFO_BAD_ALG, "badAlg"
- },
- {
- TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST, "badRequest"
- },
- {
- TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT, "badDataFormat"
- },
- {
- TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE, "timeNotAvailable"
- },
- {
- TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY, "unacceptedPolicy"
- },
- {
- TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION, "unacceptedExtension"
- },
- {
- TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE, "addInfoNotAvailable"
- },
- {
- TS_INFO_SYSTEM_FAILURE, "systemFailure"
- }
-};
-
-#define TS_FAILURE_INFO_SIZE (sizeof(TS_failure_info) / \
- sizeof(*TS_failure_info))
-
-/* Functions for verifying a signed TS_TST_INFO structure. */
-
-/*-
- * This function carries out the following tasks:
- * - Checks if there is one and only one signer.
- * - Search for the signing certificate in 'certs' and in the response.
- * - Check the extended key usage and key usage fields of the signer
- * certificate (done by the path validation).
- * - Build and validate the certificate path.
- * - Check if the certificate path meets the requirements of the
- * SigningCertificate ESS signed attribute.
- * - Verify the signature value.
- * - Returns the signer certificate in 'signer', if 'signer' is not NULL.
- */
-int TS_RESP_verify_signature(PKCS7 *token, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- X509_STORE *store, X509 **signer_out)
-{
- STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos = NULL;
- PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
- STACK_OF(X509) *signers = NULL;
- X509 *signer;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
- char buf[4096];
- int i, j = 0, ret = 0;
- BIO *p7bio = NULL;
-
- /* Some sanity checks first. */
- if (!token) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Check for the correct content type */
- if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(token)) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Check if there is one and only one signer. */
- sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(token);
- if (!sinfos || sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos) != 1) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_THERE_MUST_BE_ONE_SIGNER);
- goto err;
- }
- si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, 0);
-
- /* Check for no content: no data to verify signature. */
- if (PKCS7_get_detached(token)) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_NO_CONTENT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Get hold of the signer certificate, search only internal certificates
- * if it was requested.
- */
- signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(token, certs, 0);
- if (!signers || sk_X509_num(signers) != 1)
- goto err;
- signer = sk_X509_value(signers, 0);
-
- /* Now verify the certificate. */
- if (!TS_verify_cert(store, certs, signer, &chain))
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Check if the signer certificate is consistent with the ESS extension.
- */
- if (!TS_check_signing_certs(si, chain))
- goto err;
-
- /* Creating the message digest. */
- p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(token, NULL);
-
- /* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate digests etc. */
- while ((i = BIO_read(p7bio, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) ;
-
- /* Verifying the signature. */
- j = PKCS7_signatureVerify(p7bio, token, si, signer);
- if (j <= 0) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Return the signer certificate if needed. */
- if (signer_out) {
- *signer_out = signer;
- CRYPTO_add(&signer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- BIO_free_all(p7bio);
- sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
- sk_X509_free(signers);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * The certificate chain is returned in chain. Caller is responsible for
- * freeing the vector.
- */
-static int TS_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted,
- X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
-{
- X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx;
- int i;
- int ret = 1;
-
- /* chain is an out argument. */
- *chain = NULL;
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&cert_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN);
- i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx);
- if (i <= 0) {
- int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&cert_ctx);
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT, TS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
- ret = 0;
- } else {
- /* Get a copy of the certificate chain. */
- *chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&cert_ctx);
- }
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_ctx);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int TS_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
-{
- ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ss = ESS_get_signing_cert(si);
- STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids = NULL;
- X509 *cert;
- int i = 0;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (!ss)
- goto err;
- cert_ids = ss->cert_ids;
- /* The signer certificate must be the first in cert_ids. */
- cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
- if (TS_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) != 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * Check the other certificates of the chain if there are more than one
- * certificate ids in cert_ids.
- */
- if (sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids) > 1) {
- /* All the certificates of the chain must be in cert_ids. */
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain); ++i) {
- cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- if (TS_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) < 0)
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (!ret)
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_SIGNING_CERTS,
- TS_R_ESS_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE_ERROR);
- ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(ss);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ESS_get_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
-{
- ASN1_TYPE *attr;
- const unsigned char *p;
- attr = PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate);
- if (!attr)
- return NULL;
- p = attr->value.sequence->data;
- return d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(NULL, &p, attr->value.sequence->length);
-}
-
-/* Returns < 0 if certificate is not found, certificate index otherwise. */
-static int TS_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (!cert_ids || !cert)
- return -1;
-
- /* Recompute SHA1 hash of certificate if necessary (side effect). */
- X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, 0);
-
- /* Look for cert in the cert_ids vector. */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids); ++i) {
- ESS_CERT_ID *cid = sk_ESS_CERT_ID_value(cert_ids, i);
-
- /* Check the SHA-1 hash first. */
- if (cid->hash->length == sizeof(cert->sha1_hash)
- && !memcmp(cid->hash->data, cert->sha1_hash,
- sizeof(cert->sha1_hash))) {
- /* Check the issuer/serial as well if specified. */
- ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is = cid->issuer_serial;
- if (!is || !TS_issuer_serial_cmp(is, cert->cert_info))
- return i;
- }
- }
-
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int TS_issuer_serial_cmp(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is, X509_CINF *cinfo)
-{
- GENERAL_NAME *issuer;
-
- if (!is || !cinfo || sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(is->issuer) != 1)
- return -1;
-
- /* Check the issuer first. It must be a directory name. */
- issuer = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(is->issuer, 0);
- if (issuer->type != GEN_DIRNAME
- || X509_NAME_cmp(issuer->d.dirn, cinfo->issuer))
- return -1;
-
- /* Check the serial number, too. */
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(is->serial, cinfo->serialNumber))
- return -1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*-
- * Verifies whether 'response' contains a valid response with regards
- * to the settings of the context:
- * - Gives an error message if the TS_TST_INFO is not present.
- * - Calls _TS_RESP_verify_token to verify the token content.
- */
-int TS_RESP_verify_response(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, TS_RESP *response)
-{
- PKCS7 *token = TS_RESP_get_token(response);
- TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = TS_RESP_get_tst_info(response);
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* Check if we have a successful TS_TST_INFO object in place. */
- if (!TS_check_status_info(response))
- goto err;
-
- /* Check the contents of the time stamp token. */
- if (!int_TS_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info))
- goto err;
-
- ret = 1;
- err:
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to extract a TS_TST_INFO structure from the PKCS7 token and
- * calls the internal int_TS_RESP_verify_token function for verifying it.
- */
-int TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *token)
-{
- TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(token);
- int ret = 0;
- if (tst_info) {
- ret = int_TS_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info);
- TS_TST_INFO_free(tst_info);
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*-
- * Verifies whether the 'token' contains a valid time stamp token
- * with regards to the settings of the context. Only those checks are
- * carried out that are specified in the context:
- * - Verifies the signature of the TS_TST_INFO.
- * - Checks the version number of the response.
- * - Check if the requested and returned policies math.
- * - Check if the message imprints are the same.
- * - Check if the nonces are the same.
- * - Check if the TSA name matches the signer.
- * - Check if the TSA name is the expected TSA.
- */
-static int int_TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
- PKCS7 *token, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
-{
- X509 *signer = NULL;
- GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name = TS_TST_INFO_get_tsa(tst_info);
- X509_ALGOR *md_alg = NULL;
- unsigned char *imprint = NULL;
- unsigned imprint_len = 0;
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* Verify the signature. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_SIGNATURE)
- && !TS_RESP_verify_signature(token, ctx->certs, ctx->store, &signer))
- goto err;
-
- /* Check version number of response. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_VERSION)
- && TS_TST_INFO_get_version(tst_info) != 1) {
- TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Check policies. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_POLICY)
- && !TS_check_policy(ctx->policy, tst_info))
- goto err;
-
- /* Check message imprints. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_IMPRINT)
- && !TS_check_imprints(ctx->md_alg, ctx->imprint, ctx->imprint_len,
- tst_info))
- goto err;
-
- /* Compute and check message imprints. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_DATA)
- && (!TS_compute_imprint(ctx->data, tst_info,
- &md_alg, &imprint, &imprint_len)
- || !TS_check_imprints(md_alg, imprint, imprint_len, tst_info)))
- goto err;
-
- /* Check nonces. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_NONCE)
- && !TS_check_nonces(ctx->nonce, tst_info))
- goto err;
-
- /* Check whether TSA name and signer certificate match. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER)
- && tsa_name && !TS_check_signer_name(tsa_name, signer)) {
- TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Check whether the TSA is the expected one. */
- if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)
- && !TS_check_signer_name(ctx->tsa_name, signer)) {
- TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- err:
- X509_free(signer);
- X509_ALGOR_free(md_alg);
- OPENSSL_free(imprint);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int TS_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response)
-{
- TS_STATUS_INFO *info = TS_RESP_get_status_info(response);
- long status = ASN1_INTEGER_get(info->status);
- const char *status_text = NULL;
- char *embedded_status_text = NULL;
- char failure_text[TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE] = "";
-
- /* Check if everything went fine. */
- if (status == 0 || status == 1)
- return 1;
-
- /* There was an error, get the description in status_text. */
- if (0 <= status && status < (long)TS_STATUS_TEXT_SIZE)
- status_text = TS_status_text[status];
- else
- status_text = "unknown code";
-
- /* Set the embedded_status_text to the returned description. */
- if (sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(info->text) > 0
- && !(embedded_status_text = TS_get_status_text(info->text)))
- return 0;
-
- /* Filling in failure_text with the failure information. */
- if (info->failure_info) {
- int i;
- int first = 1;
- for (i = 0; i < (int)TS_FAILURE_INFO_SIZE; ++i) {
- if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info,
- TS_failure_info[i].code)) {
- if (!first)
- strcpy(failure_text, ",");
- else
- first = 0;
- strcat(failure_text, TS_failure_info[i].text);
- }
- }
- }
- if (failure_text[0] == '\0')
- strcpy(failure_text, "unspecified");
-
- /* Making up the error string. */
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_STATUS_INFO, TS_R_NO_TIME_STAMP_TOKEN);
- ERR_add_error_data(6,
- "status code: ", status_text,
- ", status text: ", embedded_status_text ?
- embedded_status_text : "unspecified",
- ", failure codes: ", failure_text);
- OPENSSL_free(embedded_status_text);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static char *TS_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text)
-{
- int i;
- unsigned int length = 0;
- char *result = NULL;
- char *p;
-
- /* Determine length first. */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
- ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
- length += ASN1_STRING_length(current);
- length += 1; /* separator character */
- }
- /* Allocate memory (closing '\0' included). */
- if (!(result = OPENSSL_malloc(length))) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- /* Concatenate the descriptions. */
- for (i = 0, p = result; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
- ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
- length = ASN1_STRING_length(current);
- if (i > 0)
- *p++ = '/';
- strncpy(p, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_data(current), length);
- p += length;
- }
- /* We do have space for this, too. */
- *p = '\0';
-
- return result;
-}
-
-static int TS_check_policy(ASN1_OBJECT *req_oid, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
-{
- ASN1_OBJECT *resp_oid = TS_TST_INFO_get_policy_id(tst_info);
-
- if (OBJ_cmp(req_oid, resp_oid) != 0) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_POLICY, TS_R_POLICY_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int TS_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info,
- X509_ALGOR **md_alg,
- unsigned char **imprint, unsigned *imprint_len)
-{
- TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint = TS_TST_INFO_get_msg_imprint(tst_info);
- X509_ALGOR *md_alg_resp = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_algo(msg_imprint);
- const EVP_MD *md;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- unsigned char buffer[4096];
- int length;
-
- *md_alg = NULL;
- *imprint = NULL;
-
- /* Return the MD algorithm of the response. */
- if (!(*md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(md_alg_resp)))
- goto err;
-
- /* Getting the MD object. */
- if (!(md = EVP_get_digestbyobj((*md_alg)->algorithm))) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_MD_ALGORITHM);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Compute message digest. */
- length = EVP_MD_size(md);
- if (length < 0)
- goto err;
- *imprint_len = length;
- if (!(*imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(*imprint_len))) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_DigestInit(&md_ctx, md))
- goto err;
- while ((length = BIO_read(data, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0) {
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, buffer, length))
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, *imprint, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- return 1;
- err:
- X509_ALGOR_free(*md_alg);
- OPENSSL_free(*imprint);
- *imprint_len = 0;
- *imprint = NULL;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int TS_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a,
- unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a,
- TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
-{
- TS_MSG_IMPRINT *b = TS_TST_INFO_get_msg_imprint(tst_info);
- X509_ALGOR *algor_b = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_algo(b);
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* algor_a is optional. */
- if (algor_a) {
- /* Compare algorithm OIDs. */
- if (OBJ_cmp(algor_a->algorithm, algor_b->algorithm))
- goto err;
-
- /* The parameter must be NULL in both. */
- if ((algor_a->parameter
- && ASN1_TYPE_get(algor_a->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
- || (algor_b->parameter
- && ASN1_TYPE_get(algor_b->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Compare octet strings. */
- ret = len_a == (unsigned)ASN1_STRING_length(b->hashed_msg) &&
- memcmp(imprint_a, ASN1_STRING_data(b->hashed_msg), len_a) == 0;
- err:
- if (!ret)
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_IMPRINTS, TS_R_MESSAGE_IMPRINT_MISMATCH);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int TS_check_nonces(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
-{
- const ASN1_INTEGER *b = TS_TST_INFO_get_nonce(tst_info);
-
- /* Error if nonce is missing. */
- if (!b) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_NOT_RETURNED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* No error if a nonce is returned without being requested. */
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a, b) != 0) {
- TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if the specified TSA name matches either the subject or one of the
- * subject alternative names of the TSA certificate.
- */
-static int TS_check_signer_name(GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name, X509 *signer)
-{
- STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names = NULL;
- int idx = -1;
- int found = 0;
-
- /* Check the subject name first. */
- if (tsa_name->type == GEN_DIRNAME
- && X509_name_cmp(tsa_name->d.dirn, signer->cert_info->subject) == 0)
- return 1;
-
- /* Check all the alternative names. */
- gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, &idx);
- while (gen_names != NULL
- && !(found = TS_find_name(gen_names, tsa_name) >= 0)) {
- /*
- * Get the next subject alternative name, although there should be no
- * more than one.
- */
- GENERAL_NAMES_free(gen_names);
- gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name,
- NULL, &idx);
- }
- if (gen_names)
- GENERAL_NAMES_free(gen_names);
-
- return found;
-}
-
-/* Returns 1 if name is in gen_names, 0 otherwise. */
-static int TS_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names, GENERAL_NAME *name)
-{
- int i, found;
- for (i = 0, found = 0; !found && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gen_names); ++i) {
- GENERAL_NAME *current = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gen_names, i);
- found = GENERAL_NAME_cmp(current, name) == 0;
- }
- return found ? i - 1 : -1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,736 @@
+/* crypto/ts/ts_resp_verify.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Zoltan Glozik (zglozik at stones.com) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2002.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ts.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+/* Private function declarations. */
+
+static int TS_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted,
+ X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
+static int TS_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ESS_get_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
+static int TS_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert);
+static int TS_issuer_serial_cmp(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is, X509_CINF *cinfo);
+static int int_TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
+ PKCS7 *token, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
+static int TS_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response);
+static char *TS_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text);
+static int TS_check_policy(ASN1_OBJECT *req_oid, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
+static int TS_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info,
+ X509_ALGOR **md_alg,
+ unsigned char **imprint, unsigned *imprint_len);
+static int TS_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a,
+ unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a,
+ TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
+static int TS_check_nonces(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info);
+static int TS_check_signer_name(GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name, X509 *signer);
+static int TS_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names,
+ GENERAL_NAME *name);
+
+/*
+ * Local mapping between response codes and descriptions.
+ * Don't forget to change TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE when modifying
+ * the elements of this array.
+ */
+static const char *TS_status_text[] = { "granted",
+ "grantedWithMods",
+ "rejection",
+ "waiting",
+ "revocationWarning",
+ "revocationNotification"
+};
+
+#define TS_STATUS_TEXT_SIZE (sizeof(TS_status_text)/sizeof(*TS_status_text))
+
+/*
+ * This must be greater or equal to the sum of the strings in TS_status_text
+ * plus the number of its elements.
+ */
+#define TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE 256
+
+static struct {
+ int code;
+ const char *text;
+} TS_failure_info[] = {
+ {
+ TS_INFO_BAD_ALG, "badAlg"
+ },
+ {
+ TS_INFO_BAD_REQUEST, "badRequest"
+ },
+ {
+ TS_INFO_BAD_DATA_FORMAT, "badDataFormat"
+ },
+ {
+ TS_INFO_TIME_NOT_AVAILABLE, "timeNotAvailable"
+ },
+ {
+ TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_POLICY, "unacceptedPolicy"
+ },
+ {
+ TS_INFO_UNACCEPTED_EXTENSION, "unacceptedExtension"
+ },
+ {
+ TS_INFO_ADD_INFO_NOT_AVAILABLE, "addInfoNotAvailable"
+ },
+ {
+ TS_INFO_SYSTEM_FAILURE, "systemFailure"
+ }
+};
+
+#define TS_FAILURE_INFO_SIZE (sizeof(TS_failure_info) / \
+ sizeof(*TS_failure_info))
+
+/* Functions for verifying a signed TS_TST_INFO structure. */
+
+/*-
+ * This function carries out the following tasks:
+ * - Checks if there is one and only one signer.
+ * - Search for the signing certificate in 'certs' and in the response.
+ * - Check the extended key usage and key usage fields of the signer
+ * certificate (done by the path validation).
+ * - Build and validate the certificate path.
+ * - Check if the certificate path meets the requirements of the
+ * SigningCertificate ESS signed attribute.
+ * - Verify the signature value.
+ * - Returns the signer certificate in 'signer', if 'signer' is not NULL.
+ */
+int TS_RESP_verify_signature(PKCS7 *token, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ X509_STORE *store, X509 **signer_out)
+{
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos = NULL;
+ PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *signers = NULL;
+ X509 *signer;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+ char buf[4096];
+ int i, j = 0, ret = 0;
+ BIO *p7bio = NULL;
+
+ /* Some sanity checks first. */
+ if (!token) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for the correct content type */
+ if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(token)) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if there is one and only one signer. */
+ sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(token);
+ if (!sinfos || sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos) != 1) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_THERE_MUST_BE_ONE_SIGNER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, 0);
+
+ /* Check for no content: no data to verify signature. */
+ if (PKCS7_get_detached(token)) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get hold of the signer certificate, search only internal certificates
+ * if it was requested.
+ */
+ signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(token, certs, 0);
+ if (!signers || sk_X509_num(signers) != 1)
+ goto err;
+ signer = sk_X509_value(signers, 0);
+
+ /* Now verify the certificate. */
+ if (!TS_verify_cert(store, certs, signer, &chain))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the signer certificate is consistent with the ESS extension.
+ */
+ if (!TS_check_signing_certs(si, chain))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Creating the message digest. */
+ p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(token, NULL);
+
+ /* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate digests etc. */
+ while ((i = BIO_read(p7bio, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) ;
+
+ /* Verifying the signature. */
+ j = PKCS7_signatureVerify(p7bio, token, si, signer);
+ if (j <= 0) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Return the signer certificate if needed. */
+ if (signer_out) {
+ *signer_out = signer;
+ CRYPTO_add(&signer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BIO_free_all(p7bio);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+ sk_X509_free(signers);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The certificate chain is returned in chain. Caller is responsible for
+ * freeing the vector.
+ */
+static int TS_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted,
+ X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx;
+ int i;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ /* chain is an out argument. */
+ *chain = NULL;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&cert_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN);
+ i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&cert_ctx);
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT, TS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Get a copy of the certificate chain. */
+ *chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&cert_ctx);
+ }
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int TS_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ss = ESS_get_signing_cert(si);
+ STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids = NULL;
+ X509 *cert;
+ int i = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!ss)
+ goto err;
+ cert_ids = ss->cert_ids;
+ /* The signer certificate must be the first in cert_ids. */
+ cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+ if (TS_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Check the other certificates of the chain if there are more than one
+ * certificate ids in cert_ids.
+ */
+ if (sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids) > 1) {
+ /* All the certificates of the chain must be in cert_ids. */
+ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain); ++i) {
+ cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (TS_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (!ret)
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_SIGNING_CERTS,
+ TS_R_ESS_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE_ERROR);
+ ESS_SIGNING_CERT_free(ss);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ESS_SIGNING_CERT *ESS_get_signing_cert(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
+{
+ ASN1_TYPE *attr;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ attr = PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si, NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate);
+ if (!attr)
+ return NULL;
+ p = attr->value.sequence->data;
+ return d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT(NULL, &p, attr->value.sequence->length);
+}
+
+/* Returns < 0 if certificate is not found, certificate index otherwise. */
+static int TS_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!cert_ids || !cert)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Recompute SHA1 hash of certificate if necessary (side effect). */
+ X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, 0);
+
+ /* Look for cert in the cert_ids vector. */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids); ++i) {
+ ESS_CERT_ID *cid = sk_ESS_CERT_ID_value(cert_ids, i);
+
+ /* Check the SHA-1 hash first. */
+ if (cid->hash->length == sizeof(cert->sha1_hash)
+ && !memcmp(cid->hash->data, cert->sha1_hash,
+ sizeof(cert->sha1_hash))) {
+ /* Check the issuer/serial as well if specified. */
+ ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is = cid->issuer_serial;
+ if (!is || !TS_issuer_serial_cmp(is, cert->cert_info))
+ return i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int TS_issuer_serial_cmp(ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is, X509_CINF *cinfo)
+{
+ GENERAL_NAME *issuer;
+
+ if (!is || !cinfo || sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(is->issuer) != 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Check the issuer first. It must be a directory name. */
+ issuer = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(is->issuer, 0);
+ if (issuer->type != GEN_DIRNAME
+ || X509_NAME_cmp(issuer->d.dirn, cinfo->issuer))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Check the serial number, too. */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(is->serial, cinfo->serialNumber))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Verifies whether 'response' contains a valid response with regards
+ * to the settings of the context:
+ * - Gives an error message if the TS_TST_INFO is not present.
+ * - Calls _TS_RESP_verify_token to verify the token content.
+ */
+int TS_RESP_verify_response(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, TS_RESP *response)
+{
+ PKCS7 *token = TS_RESP_get_token(response);
+ TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = TS_RESP_get_tst_info(response);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Check if we have a successful TS_TST_INFO object in place. */
+ if (!TS_check_status_info(response))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Check the contents of the time stamp token. */
+ if (!int_TS_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to extract a TS_TST_INFO structure from the PKCS7 token and
+ * calls the internal int_TS_RESP_verify_token function for verifying it.
+ */
+int TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *token)
+{
+ TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = PKCS7_to_TS_TST_INFO(token);
+ int ret = 0;
+ if (tst_info) {
+ ret = int_TS_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info);
+ TS_TST_INFO_free(tst_info);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Verifies whether the 'token' contains a valid time stamp token
+ * with regards to the settings of the context. Only those checks are
+ * carried out that are specified in the context:
+ * - Verifies the signature of the TS_TST_INFO.
+ * - Checks the version number of the response.
+ * - Check if the requested and returned policies math.
+ * - Check if the message imprints are the same.
+ * - Check if the nonces are the same.
+ * - Check if the TSA name matches the signer.
+ * - Check if the TSA name is the expected TSA.
+ */
+static int int_TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
+ PKCS7 *token, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
+{
+ X509 *signer = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name = TS_TST_INFO_get_tsa(tst_info);
+ X509_ALGOR *md_alg = NULL;
+ unsigned char *imprint = NULL;
+ unsigned imprint_len = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Verify the signature. */
+ if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_SIGNATURE)
+ && !TS_RESP_verify_signature(token, ctx->certs, ctx->store, &signer))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Check version number of response. */
+ if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_VERSION)
+ && TS_TST_INFO_get_version(tst_info) != 1) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check policies. */
+ if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_POLICY)
+ && !TS_check_policy(ctx->policy, tst_info))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Check message imprints. */
+ if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_IMPRINT)
+ && !TS_check_imprints(ctx->md_alg, ctx->imprint, ctx->imprint_len,
+ tst_info))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Compute and check message imprints. */
+ if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_DATA)
+ && (!TS_compute_imprint(ctx->data, tst_info,
+ &md_alg, &imprint, &imprint_len)
+ || !TS_check_imprints(md_alg, imprint, imprint_len, tst_info)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Check nonces. */
+ if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_NONCE)
+ && !TS_check_nonces(ctx->nonce, tst_info))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Check whether TSA name and signer certificate match. */
+ if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER)
+ && tsa_name && !TS_check_signer_name(tsa_name, signer)) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check whether the TSA is the expected one. */
+ if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)
+ && !TS_check_signer_name(ctx->tsa_name, signer)) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ X509_free(signer);
+ X509_ALGOR_free(md_alg);
+ OPENSSL_free(imprint);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int TS_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response)
+{
+ TS_STATUS_INFO *info = TS_RESP_get_status_info(response);
+ long status = ASN1_INTEGER_get(info->status);
+ const char *status_text = NULL;
+ char *embedded_status_text = NULL;
+ char failure_text[TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE] = "";
+
+ /* Check if everything went fine. */
+ if (status == 0 || status == 1)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* There was an error, get the description in status_text. */
+ if (0 <= status && status < (long)TS_STATUS_TEXT_SIZE)
+ status_text = TS_status_text[status];
+ else
+ status_text = "unknown code";
+
+ /* Set the embedded_status_text to the returned description. */
+ if (sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(info->text) > 0
+ && !(embedded_status_text = TS_get_status_text(info->text)))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Filling in failure_text with the failure information. */
+ if (info->failure_info) {
+ int i;
+ int first = 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)TS_FAILURE_INFO_SIZE; ++i) {
+ if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info,
+ TS_failure_info[i].code)) {
+ if (!first)
+ strcat(failure_text, ",");
+ else
+ first = 0;
+ strcat(failure_text, TS_failure_info[i].text);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (failure_text[0] == '\0')
+ strcpy(failure_text, "unspecified");
+
+ /* Making up the error string. */
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_STATUS_INFO, TS_R_NO_TIME_STAMP_TOKEN);
+ ERR_add_error_data(6,
+ "status code: ", status_text,
+ ", status text: ", embedded_status_text ?
+ embedded_status_text : "unspecified",
+ ", failure codes: ", failure_text);
+ OPENSSL_free(embedded_status_text);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char *TS_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned int length = 0;
+ char *result = NULL;
+ char *p;
+
+ /* Determine length first. */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
+ ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
+ length += ASN1_STRING_length(current);
+ length += 1; /* separator character */
+ }
+ /* Allocate memory (closing '\0' included). */
+ if (!(result = OPENSSL_malloc(length))) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Concatenate the descriptions. */
+ for (i = 0, p = result; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
+ ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
+ length = ASN1_STRING_length(current);
+ if (i > 0)
+ *p++ = '/';
+ strncpy(p, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_data(current), length);
+ p += length;
+ }
+ /* We do have space for this, too. */
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static int TS_check_policy(ASN1_OBJECT *req_oid, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
+{
+ ASN1_OBJECT *resp_oid = TS_TST_INFO_get_policy_id(tst_info);
+
+ if (OBJ_cmp(req_oid, resp_oid) != 0) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_POLICY, TS_R_POLICY_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int TS_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info,
+ X509_ALGOR **md_alg,
+ unsigned char **imprint, unsigned *imprint_len)
+{
+ TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint = TS_TST_INFO_get_msg_imprint(tst_info);
+ X509_ALGOR *md_alg_resp = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_algo(msg_imprint);
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ unsigned char buffer[4096];
+ int length;
+
+ *md_alg = NULL;
+ *imprint = NULL;
+
+ /* Return the MD algorithm of the response. */
+ if (!(*md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(md_alg_resp)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Getting the MD object. */
+ if (!(md = EVP_get_digestbyobj((*md_alg)->algorithm))) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_MD_ALGORITHM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute message digest. */
+ length = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if (length < 0)
+ goto err;
+ *imprint_len = length;
+ if (!(*imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(*imprint_len))) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit(&md_ctx, md))
+ goto err;
+ while ((length = BIO_read(data, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, buffer, length))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, *imprint, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ X509_ALGOR_free(*md_alg);
+ OPENSSL_free(*imprint);
+ *imprint_len = 0;
+ *imprint = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int TS_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a,
+ unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a,
+ TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
+{
+ TS_MSG_IMPRINT *b = TS_TST_INFO_get_msg_imprint(tst_info);
+ X509_ALGOR *algor_b = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_algo(b);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* algor_a is optional. */
+ if (algor_a) {
+ /* Compare algorithm OIDs. */
+ if (OBJ_cmp(algor_a->algorithm, algor_b->algorithm))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* The parameter must be NULL in both. */
+ if ((algor_a->parameter
+ && ASN1_TYPE_get(algor_a->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
+ || (algor_b->parameter
+ && ASN1_TYPE_get(algor_b->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Compare octet strings. */
+ ret = len_a == (unsigned)ASN1_STRING_length(b->hashed_msg) &&
+ memcmp(imprint_a, ASN1_STRING_data(b->hashed_msg), len_a) == 0;
+ err:
+ if (!ret)
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_IMPRINTS, TS_R_MESSAGE_IMPRINT_MISMATCH);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int TS_check_nonces(const ASN1_INTEGER *a, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info)
+{
+ const ASN1_INTEGER *b = TS_TST_INFO_get_nonce(tst_info);
+
+ /* Error if nonce is missing. */
+ if (!b) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_NOT_RETURNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* No error if a nonce is returned without being requested. */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a, b) != 0) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the specified TSA name matches either the subject or one of the
+ * subject alternative names of the TSA certificate.
+ */
+static int TS_check_signer_name(GENERAL_NAME *tsa_name, X509 *signer)
+{
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names = NULL;
+ int idx = -1;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ /* Check the subject name first. */
+ if (tsa_name->type == GEN_DIRNAME
+ && X509_name_cmp(tsa_name->d.dirn, signer->cert_info->subject) == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Check all the alternative names. */
+ gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, &idx);
+ while (gen_names != NULL
+ && !(found = TS_find_name(gen_names, tsa_name) >= 0)) {
+ /*
+ * Get the next subject alternative name, although there should be no
+ * more than one.
+ */
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(gen_names);
+ gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name,
+ NULL, &idx);
+ }
+ if (gen_names)
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(gen_names);
+
+ return found;
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if name is in gen_names, 0 otherwise. */
+static int TS_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names, GENERAL_NAME *name)
+{
+ int i, found;
+ for (i = 0, found = 0; !found && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gen_names); ++i) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *current = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gen_names, i);
+ found = GENERAL_NAME_cmp(current, name) == 0;
+ }
+ return found ? i - 1 : -1;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,493 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
-#
-# ====================================================================
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
-# project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary
-# forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license.
-# ====================================================================
-#
-# whirlpool_block_mmx implementation.
-#
-*SCALE=\(2); # 2 or 8, that is the question:-) Value of 8 results
-# in 16KB large table, which is tough on L1 cache, but eliminates
-# unaligned references to it. Value of 2 results in 4KB table, but
-# 7/8 of references to it are unaligned. AMD cores seem to be
-# allergic to the latter, while Intel ones - to former [see the
-# table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table
-# minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side-
-# channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance
-# gap among different \xB5-archs is smaller.
-#
-# Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by
-# whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e.
-# smaller is better and asymptotic throughput can be estimated by
-# multiplying 64 by CPU clock frequency and dividing by relevant
-# value from the given table:
-#
-# $SCALE=2/8 icc8 gcc3
-# Intel P4 3200/4600 4600(*) 6400
-# Intel PIII 2900/3000 4900 5400
-# AMD K[78] 2500/1800 9900 8200(**)
-#
-# (*) I've sketched even non-MMX assembler, but for the record
-# I've failed to beat the Intel compiler on P4, without using
-# MMX that is...
-# (**) ... on AMD on the other hand non-MMX assembler was observed
-# to perform significantly better, but I figured this MMX
-# implementation is even faster anyway, so why bother? As for
-# pre-MMX AMD core[s], the improvement coefficient is more
-# than likely to vary anyway and I don't know how. But the
-# least I know is that gcc-generated code compiled with
-# -DL_ENDIAN and -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT [see C module for
-# details] and optimized for Pentium was observed to perform
-# *better* on Pentium 100 than unrolled non-MMX assembler
-# loop... So we just say that I don't know if maintaining
-# non-MMX implementation would actually pay off, but till
-# opposite is proved "unlikely" is assumed.
-
-$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
-push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
-require "x86asm.pl";
-
-&asm_init($ARGV[0],"wp-mmx.pl");
-
-sub L() { &data_byte(@_); }
-sub LL()
-{ if ($SCALE==2) { &data_byte(@_); &data_byte(@_); }
- elsif ($SCALE==8) { for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
- &data_byte(@_);
- unshift(@_,pop(@_));
- }
- }
- else { die "unvalid SCALE value"; }
-}
-
-sub scale()
-{ if ($SCALE==2) { &lea(@_[0],&DWP(0, at _[1], at _[1])); }
- elsif ($SCALE==8) { &lea(@_[0],&DWP(0,"", at _[1],8)); }
- else { die "unvalid SCALE value"; }
-}
-
-sub row()
-{ if ($SCALE==2) { ((8-shift)&7); }
- elsif ($SCALE==8) { (8*shift); }
- else { die "unvalid SCALE value"; }
-}
-
-$tbl="ebp";
- at mm=("mm0","mm1","mm2","mm3","mm4","mm5","mm6","mm7");
-
-&function_begin_B("whirlpool_block_mmx");
- &push ("ebp");
- &push ("ebx");
- &push ("esi");
- &push ("edi");
-
- &mov ("esi",&wparam(0)); # hash value
- &mov ("edi",&wparam(1)); # input data stream
- &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); # number of chunks in input
-
- &mov ("eax","esp"); # copy stack pointer
- &sub ("esp",128+20); # allocate frame
- &and ("esp",-64); # align for cache-line
-
- &lea ("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp"));
- &mov (&DWP(0,"ebx"),"esi"); # save parameter block
- &mov (&DWP(4,"ebx"),"edi");
- &mov (&DWP(8,"ebx"),"ebp");
- &mov (&DWP(16,"ebx"),"eax"); # saved stack pointer
-
- &call (&label("pic_point"));
-&set_label("pic_point");
- &blindpop($tbl);
- &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("table")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
-
- &xor ("ecx","ecx");
- &xor ("edx","edx");
-
- for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"esi")); } # L=H
-&set_label("outerloop");
- for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esp"), at mm[$i]); } # K=L
- for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"edi")); } # L^=inp
- for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP(64+$i*8,"esp"), at mm[$i]); } # S=L
-
- &xor ("esi","esi");
- &mov (&DWP(12,"ebx"),"esi"); # zero round counter
-
-&set_label("round",16);
- &movq (@mm[0],&QWP(2048*$SCALE,$tbl,"esi",8)); # rc[r]
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esp"));
-for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
- my $func = ($i==0)? \&movq : \&pxor;
- &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("eax"));
- &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("eax"));
- &scale ("esi","ecx");
- &scale ("edi","edx");
- &shr ("eax",16);
- &pxor (@mm[0],&QWP(&row(0),$tbl,"esi",8));
- &$func (@mm[1],&QWP(&row(1),$tbl,"edi",8));
- &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("eax"));
- &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("eax"));
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(($i+1)*8,"esp"));
- &scale ("esi","ecx");
- &scale ("edi","edx");
- &$func (@mm[2],&QWP(&row(2),$tbl,"esi",8));
- &$func (@mm[3],&QWP(&row(3),$tbl,"edi",8));
- &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("ebx"));
- &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("ebx"));
- &scale ("esi","ecx");
- &scale ("edi","edx");
- &shr ("ebx",16);
- &$func (@mm[4],&QWP(&row(4),$tbl,"esi",8));
- &$func (@mm[5],&QWP(&row(5),$tbl,"edi",8));
- &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("ebx"));
- &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("ebx"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(($i+1)*8+4,"esp"));
- &scale ("esi","ecx");
- &scale ("edi","edx");
- &$func (@mm[6],&QWP(&row(6),$tbl,"esi",8));
- &$func (@mm[7],&QWP(&row(7),$tbl,"edi",8));
- push(@mm,shift(@mm));
-}
-
- for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esp"), at mm[$i]); } # K=L
-
-for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
- &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("eax"));
- &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("eax"));
- &scale ("esi","ecx");
- &scale ("edi","edx");
- &shr ("eax",16);
- &pxor (@mm[0],&QWP(&row(0),$tbl,"esi",8));
- &pxor (@mm[1],&QWP(&row(1),$tbl,"edi",8));
- &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("eax"));
- &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("eax"));
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(64+($i+1)*8,"esp")) if ($i<7);
- &scale ("esi","ecx");
- &scale ("edi","edx");
- &pxor (@mm[2],&QWP(&row(2),$tbl,"esi",8));
- &pxor (@mm[3],&QWP(&row(3),$tbl,"edi",8));
- &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("ebx"));
- &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("ebx"));
- &scale ("esi","ecx");
- &scale ("edi","edx");
- &shr ("ebx",16);
- &pxor (@mm[4],&QWP(&row(4),$tbl,"esi",8));
- &pxor (@mm[5],&QWP(&row(5),$tbl,"edi",8));
- &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("ebx"));
- &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("ebx"));
- &mov ("ebx",&DWP(64+($i+1)*8+4,"esp")) if ($i<7);
- &scale ("esi","ecx");
- &scale ("edi","edx");
- &pxor (@mm[6],&QWP(&row(6),$tbl,"esi",8));
- &pxor (@mm[7],&QWP(&row(7),$tbl,"edi",8));
- push(@mm,shift(@mm));
-}
- &lea ("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp"));
- &mov ("esi",&DWP(12,"ebx")); # pull round counter
- &add ("esi",1);
- &cmp ("esi",10);
- &je (&label("roundsdone"));
-
- &mov (&DWP(12,"ebx"),"esi"); # update round counter
- for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP(64+$i*8,"esp"), at mm[$i]); } # S=L
- &jmp (&label("round"));
-
-&set_label("roundsdone",16);
- &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,"ebx")); # reload argument block
- &mov ("edi",&DWP(4,"ebx"));
- &mov ("eax",&DWP(8,"ebx"));
-
- for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"edi")); } # L^=inp
- for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"esi")); } # L^=H
- for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esi"), at mm[$i]); } # H=L
-
- &lea ("edi",&DWP(64,"edi")); # inp+=64
- &sub ("eax",1); # num--
- &jz (&label("alldone"));
- &mov (&DWP(4,"ebx"),"edi"); # update argument block
- &mov (&DWP(8,"ebx"),"eax");
- &jmp (&label("outerloop"));
-
-&set_label("alldone");
- &emms ();
- &mov ("esp",&DWP(16,"ebx")); # restore saved stack pointer
- &pop ("edi");
- &pop ("esi");
- &pop ("ebx");
- &pop ("ebp");
- &ret ();
-
-&align(64);
-&set_label("table");
- &LL(0x18,0x18,0x60,0x18,0xc0,0x78,0x30,0xd8);
- &LL(0x23,0x23,0x8c,0x23,0x05,0xaf,0x46,0x26);
- &LL(0xc6,0xc6,0x3f,0xc6,0x7e,0xf9,0x91,0xb8);
- &LL(0xe8,0xe8,0x87,0xe8,0x13,0x6f,0xcd,0xfb);
- &LL(0x87,0x87,0x26,0x87,0x4c,0xa1,0x13,0xcb);
- &LL(0xb8,0xb8,0xda,0xb8,0xa9,0x62,0x6d,0x11);
- &LL(0x01,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x08,0x05,0x02,0x09);
- &LL(0x4f,0x4f,0x21,0x4f,0x42,0x6e,0x9e,0x0d);
- &LL(0x36,0x36,0xd8,0x36,0xad,0xee,0x6c,0x9b);
- &LL(0xa6,0xa6,0xa2,0xa6,0x59,0x04,0x51,0xff);
- &LL(0xd2,0xd2,0x6f,0xd2,0xde,0xbd,0xb9,0x0c);
- &LL(0xf5,0xf5,0xf3,0xf5,0xfb,0x06,0xf7,0x0e);
- &LL(0x79,0x79,0xf9,0x79,0xef,0x80,0xf2,0x96);
- &LL(0x6f,0x6f,0xa1,0x6f,0x5f,0xce,0xde,0x30);
- &LL(0x91,0x91,0x7e,0x91,0xfc,0xef,0x3f,0x6d);
- &LL(0x52,0x52,0x55,0x52,0xaa,0x07,0xa4,0xf8);
- &LL(0x60,0x60,0x9d,0x60,0x27,0xfd,0xc0,0x47);
- &LL(0xbc,0xbc,0xca,0xbc,0x89,0x76,0x65,0x35);
- &LL(0x9b,0x9b,0x56,0x9b,0xac,0xcd,0x2b,0x37);
- &LL(0x8e,0x8e,0x02,0x8e,0x04,0x8c,0x01,0x8a);
- &LL(0xa3,0xa3,0xb6,0xa3,0x71,0x15,0x5b,0xd2);
- &LL(0x0c,0x0c,0x30,0x0c,0x60,0x3c,0x18,0x6c);
- &LL(0x7b,0x7b,0xf1,0x7b,0xff,0x8a,0xf6,0x84);
- &LL(0x35,0x35,0xd4,0x35,0xb5,0xe1,0x6a,0x80);
- &LL(0x1d,0x1d,0x74,0x1d,0xe8,0x69,0x3a,0xf5);
- &LL(0xe0,0xe0,0xa7,0xe0,0x53,0x47,0xdd,0xb3);
- &LL(0xd7,0xd7,0x7b,0xd7,0xf6,0xac,0xb3,0x21);
- &LL(0xc2,0xc2,0x2f,0xc2,0x5e,0xed,0x99,0x9c);
- &LL(0x2e,0x2e,0xb8,0x2e,0x6d,0x96,0x5c,0x43);
- &LL(0x4b,0x4b,0x31,0x4b,0x62,0x7a,0x96,0x29);
- &LL(0xfe,0xfe,0xdf,0xfe,0xa3,0x21,0xe1,0x5d);
- &LL(0x57,0x57,0x41,0x57,0x82,0x16,0xae,0xd5);
- &LL(0x15,0x15,0x54,0x15,0xa8,0x41,0x2a,0xbd);
- &LL(0x77,0x77,0xc1,0x77,0x9f,0xb6,0xee,0xe8);
- &LL(0x37,0x37,0xdc,0x37,0xa5,0xeb,0x6e,0x92);
- &LL(0xe5,0xe5,0xb3,0xe5,0x7b,0x56,0xd7,0x9e);
- &LL(0x9f,0x9f,0x46,0x9f,0x8c,0xd9,0x23,0x13);
- &LL(0xf0,0xf0,0xe7,0xf0,0xd3,0x17,0xfd,0x23);
- &LL(0x4a,0x4a,0x35,0x4a,0x6a,0x7f,0x94,0x20);
- &LL(0xda,0xda,0x4f,0xda,0x9e,0x95,0xa9,0x44);
- &LL(0x58,0x58,0x7d,0x58,0xfa,0x25,0xb0,0xa2);
- &LL(0xc9,0xc9,0x03,0xc9,0x06,0xca,0x8f,0xcf);
- &LL(0x29,0x29,0xa4,0x29,0x55,0x8d,0x52,0x7c);
- &LL(0x0a,0x0a,0x28,0x0a,0x50,0x22,0x14,0x5a);
- &LL(0xb1,0xb1,0xfe,0xb1,0xe1,0x4f,0x7f,0x50);
- &LL(0xa0,0xa0,0xba,0xa0,0x69,0x1a,0x5d,0xc9);
- &LL(0x6b,0x6b,0xb1,0x6b,0x7f,0xda,0xd6,0x14);
- &LL(0x85,0x85,0x2e,0x85,0x5c,0xab,0x17,0xd9);
- &LL(0xbd,0xbd,0xce,0xbd,0x81,0x73,0x67,0x3c);
- &LL(0x5d,0x5d,0x69,0x5d,0xd2,0x34,0xba,0x8f);
- &LL(0x10,0x10,0x40,0x10,0x80,0x50,0x20,0x90);
- &LL(0xf4,0xf4,0xf7,0xf4,0xf3,0x03,0xf5,0x07);
- &LL(0xcb,0xcb,0x0b,0xcb,0x16,0xc0,0x8b,0xdd);
- &LL(0x3e,0x3e,0xf8,0x3e,0xed,0xc6,0x7c,0xd3);
- &LL(0x05,0x05,0x14,0x05,0x28,0x11,0x0a,0x2d);
- &LL(0x67,0x67,0x81,0x67,0x1f,0xe6,0xce,0x78);
- &LL(0xe4,0xe4,0xb7,0xe4,0x73,0x53,0xd5,0x97);
- &LL(0x27,0x27,0x9c,0x27,0x25,0xbb,0x4e,0x02);
- &LL(0x41,0x41,0x19,0x41,0x32,0x58,0x82,0x73);
- &LL(0x8b,0x8b,0x16,0x8b,0x2c,0x9d,0x0b,0xa7);
- &LL(0xa7,0xa7,0xa6,0xa7,0x51,0x01,0x53,0xf6);
- &LL(0x7d,0x7d,0xe9,0x7d,0xcf,0x94,0xfa,0xb2);
- &LL(0x95,0x95,0x6e,0x95,0xdc,0xfb,0x37,0x49);
- &LL(0xd8,0xd8,0x47,0xd8,0x8e,0x9f,0xad,0x56);
- &LL(0xfb,0xfb,0xcb,0xfb,0x8b,0x30,0xeb,0x70);
- &LL(0xee,0xee,0x9f,0xee,0x23,0x71,0xc1,0xcd);
- &LL(0x7c,0x7c,0xed,0x7c,0xc7,0x91,0xf8,0xbb);
- &LL(0x66,0x66,0x85,0x66,0x17,0xe3,0xcc,0x71);
- &LL(0xdd,0xdd,0x53,0xdd,0xa6,0x8e,0xa7,0x7b);
- &LL(0x17,0x17,0x5c,0x17,0xb8,0x4b,0x2e,0xaf);
- &LL(0x47,0x47,0x01,0x47,0x02,0x46,0x8e,0x45);
- &LL(0x9e,0x9e,0x42,0x9e,0x84,0xdc,0x21,0x1a);
- &LL(0xca,0xca,0x0f,0xca,0x1e,0xc5,0x89,0xd4);
- &LL(0x2d,0x2d,0xb4,0x2d,0x75,0x99,0x5a,0x58);
- &LL(0xbf,0xbf,0xc6,0xbf,0x91,0x79,0x63,0x2e);
- &LL(0x07,0x07,0x1c,0x07,0x38,0x1b,0x0e,0x3f);
- &LL(0xad,0xad,0x8e,0xad,0x01,0x23,0x47,0xac);
- &LL(0x5a,0x5a,0x75,0x5a,0xea,0x2f,0xb4,0xb0);
- &LL(0x83,0x83,0x36,0x83,0x6c,0xb5,0x1b,0xef);
- &LL(0x33,0x33,0xcc,0x33,0x85,0xff,0x66,0xb6);
- &LL(0x63,0x63,0x91,0x63,0x3f,0xf2,0xc6,0x5c);
- &LL(0x02,0x02,0x08,0x02,0x10,0x0a,0x04,0x12);
- &LL(0xaa,0xaa,0x92,0xaa,0x39,0x38,0x49,0x93);
- &LL(0x71,0x71,0xd9,0x71,0xaf,0xa8,0xe2,0xde);
- &LL(0xc8,0xc8,0x07,0xc8,0x0e,0xcf,0x8d,0xc6);
- &LL(0x19,0x19,0x64,0x19,0xc8,0x7d,0x32,0xd1);
- &LL(0x49,0x49,0x39,0x49,0x72,0x70,0x92,0x3b);
- &LL(0xd9,0xd9,0x43,0xd9,0x86,0x9a,0xaf,0x5f);
- &LL(0xf2,0xf2,0xef,0xf2,0xc3,0x1d,0xf9,0x31);
- &LL(0xe3,0xe3,0xab,0xe3,0x4b,0x48,0xdb,0xa8);
- &LL(0x5b,0x5b,0x71,0x5b,0xe2,0x2a,0xb6,0xb9);
- &LL(0x88,0x88,0x1a,0x88,0x34,0x92,0x0d,0xbc);
- &LL(0x9a,0x9a,0x52,0x9a,0xa4,0xc8,0x29,0x3e);
- &LL(0x26,0x26,0x98,0x26,0x2d,0xbe,0x4c,0x0b);
- &LL(0x32,0x32,0xc8,0x32,0x8d,0xfa,0x64,0xbf);
- &LL(0xb0,0xb0,0xfa,0xb0,0xe9,0x4a,0x7d,0x59);
- &LL(0xe9,0xe9,0x83,0xe9,0x1b,0x6a,0xcf,0xf2);
- &LL(0x0f,0x0f,0x3c,0x0f,0x78,0x33,0x1e,0x77);
- &LL(0xd5,0xd5,0x73,0xd5,0xe6,0xa6,0xb7,0x33);
- &LL(0x80,0x80,0x3a,0x80,0x74,0xba,0x1d,0xf4);
- &LL(0xbe,0xbe,0xc2,0xbe,0x99,0x7c,0x61,0x27);
- &LL(0xcd,0xcd,0x13,0xcd,0x26,0xde,0x87,0xeb);
- &LL(0x34,0x34,0xd0,0x34,0xbd,0xe4,0x68,0x89);
- &LL(0x48,0x48,0x3d,0x48,0x7a,0x75,0x90,0x32);
- &LL(0xff,0xff,0xdb,0xff,0xab,0x24,0xe3,0x54);
- &LL(0x7a,0x7a,0xf5,0x7a,0xf7,0x8f,0xf4,0x8d);
- &LL(0x90,0x90,0x7a,0x90,0xf4,0xea,0x3d,0x64);
- &LL(0x5f,0x5f,0x61,0x5f,0xc2,0x3e,0xbe,0x9d);
- &LL(0x20,0x20,0x80,0x20,0x1d,0xa0,0x40,0x3d);
- &LL(0x68,0x68,0xbd,0x68,0x67,0xd5,0xd0,0x0f);
- &LL(0x1a,0x1a,0x68,0x1a,0xd0,0x72,0x34,0xca);
- &LL(0xae,0xae,0x82,0xae,0x19,0x2c,0x41,0xb7);
- &LL(0xb4,0xb4,0xea,0xb4,0xc9,0x5e,0x75,0x7d);
- &LL(0x54,0x54,0x4d,0x54,0x9a,0x19,0xa8,0xce);
- &LL(0x93,0x93,0x76,0x93,0xec,0xe5,0x3b,0x7f);
- &LL(0x22,0x22,0x88,0x22,0x0d,0xaa,0x44,0x2f);
- &LL(0x64,0x64,0x8d,0x64,0x07,0xe9,0xc8,0x63);
- &LL(0xf1,0xf1,0xe3,0xf1,0xdb,0x12,0xff,0x2a);
- &LL(0x73,0x73,0xd1,0x73,0xbf,0xa2,0xe6,0xcc);
- &LL(0x12,0x12,0x48,0x12,0x90,0x5a,0x24,0x82);
- &LL(0x40,0x40,0x1d,0x40,0x3a,0x5d,0x80,0x7a);
- &LL(0x08,0x08,0x20,0x08,0x40,0x28,0x10,0x48);
- &LL(0xc3,0xc3,0x2b,0xc3,0x56,0xe8,0x9b,0x95);
- &LL(0xec,0xec,0x97,0xec,0x33,0x7b,0xc5,0xdf);
- &LL(0xdb,0xdb,0x4b,0xdb,0x96,0x90,0xab,0x4d);
- &LL(0xa1,0xa1,0xbe,0xa1,0x61,0x1f,0x5f,0xc0);
- &LL(0x8d,0x8d,0x0e,0x8d,0x1c,0x83,0x07,0x91);
- &LL(0x3d,0x3d,0xf4,0x3d,0xf5,0xc9,0x7a,0xc8);
- &LL(0x97,0x97,0x66,0x97,0xcc,0xf1,0x33,0x5b);
- &LL(0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00);
- &LL(0xcf,0xcf,0x1b,0xcf,0x36,0xd4,0x83,0xf9);
- &LL(0x2b,0x2b,0xac,0x2b,0x45,0x87,0x56,0x6e);
- &LL(0x76,0x76,0xc5,0x76,0x97,0xb3,0xec,0xe1);
- &LL(0x82,0x82,0x32,0x82,0x64,0xb0,0x19,0xe6);
- &LL(0xd6,0xd6,0x7f,0xd6,0xfe,0xa9,0xb1,0x28);
- &LL(0x1b,0x1b,0x6c,0x1b,0xd8,0x77,0x36,0xc3);
- &LL(0xb5,0xb5,0xee,0xb5,0xc1,0x5b,0x77,0x74);
- &LL(0xaf,0xaf,0x86,0xaf,0x11,0x29,0x43,0xbe);
- &LL(0x6a,0x6a,0xb5,0x6a,0x77,0xdf,0xd4,0x1d);
- &LL(0x50,0x50,0x5d,0x50,0xba,0x0d,0xa0,0xea);
- &LL(0x45,0x45,0x09,0x45,0x12,0x4c,0x8a,0x57);
- &LL(0xf3,0xf3,0xeb,0xf3,0xcb,0x18,0xfb,0x38);
- &LL(0x30,0x30,0xc0,0x30,0x9d,0xf0,0x60,0xad);
- &LL(0xef,0xef,0x9b,0xef,0x2b,0x74,0xc3,0xc4);
- &LL(0x3f,0x3f,0xfc,0x3f,0xe5,0xc3,0x7e,0xda);
- &LL(0x55,0x55,0x49,0x55,0x92,0x1c,0xaa,0xc7);
- &LL(0xa2,0xa2,0xb2,0xa2,0x79,0x10,0x59,0xdb);
- &LL(0xea,0xea,0x8f,0xea,0x03,0x65,0xc9,0xe9);
- &LL(0x65,0x65,0x89,0x65,0x0f,0xec,0xca,0x6a);
- &LL(0xba,0xba,0xd2,0xba,0xb9,0x68,0x69,0x03);
- &LL(0x2f,0x2f,0xbc,0x2f,0x65,0x93,0x5e,0x4a);
- &LL(0xc0,0xc0,0x27,0xc0,0x4e,0xe7,0x9d,0x8e);
- &LL(0xde,0xde,0x5f,0xde,0xbe,0x81,0xa1,0x60);
- &LL(0x1c,0x1c,0x70,0x1c,0xe0,0x6c,0x38,0xfc);
- &LL(0xfd,0xfd,0xd3,0xfd,0xbb,0x2e,0xe7,0x46);
- &LL(0x4d,0x4d,0x29,0x4d,0x52,0x64,0x9a,0x1f);
- &LL(0x92,0x92,0x72,0x92,0xe4,0xe0,0x39,0x76);
- &LL(0x75,0x75,0xc9,0x75,0x8f,0xbc,0xea,0xfa);
- &LL(0x06,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x30,0x1e,0x0c,0x36);
- &LL(0x8a,0x8a,0x12,0x8a,0x24,0x98,0x09,0xae);
- &LL(0xb2,0xb2,0xf2,0xb2,0xf9,0x40,0x79,0x4b);
- &LL(0xe6,0xe6,0xbf,0xe6,0x63,0x59,0xd1,0x85);
- &LL(0x0e,0x0e,0x38,0x0e,0x70,0x36,0x1c,0x7e);
- &LL(0x1f,0x1f,0x7c,0x1f,0xf8,0x63,0x3e,0xe7);
- &LL(0x62,0x62,0x95,0x62,0x37,0xf7,0xc4,0x55);
- &LL(0xd4,0xd4,0x77,0xd4,0xee,0xa3,0xb5,0x3a);
- &LL(0xa8,0xa8,0x9a,0xa8,0x29,0x32,0x4d,0x81);
- &LL(0x96,0x96,0x62,0x96,0xc4,0xf4,0x31,0x52);
- &LL(0xf9,0xf9,0xc3,0xf9,0x9b,0x3a,0xef,0x62);
- &LL(0xc5,0xc5,0x33,0xc5,0x66,0xf6,0x97,0xa3);
- &LL(0x25,0x25,0x94,0x25,0x35,0xb1,0x4a,0x10);
- &LL(0x59,0x59,0x79,0x59,0xf2,0x20,0xb2,0xab);
- &LL(0x84,0x84,0x2a,0x84,0x54,0xae,0x15,0xd0);
- &LL(0x72,0x72,0xd5,0x72,0xb7,0xa7,0xe4,0xc5);
- &LL(0x39,0x39,0xe4,0x39,0xd5,0xdd,0x72,0xec);
- &LL(0x4c,0x4c,0x2d,0x4c,0x5a,0x61,0x98,0x16);
- &LL(0x5e,0x5e,0x65,0x5e,0xca,0x3b,0xbc,0x94);
- &LL(0x78,0x78,0xfd,0x78,0xe7,0x85,0xf0,0x9f);
- &LL(0x38,0x38,0xe0,0x38,0xdd,0xd8,0x70,0xe5);
- &LL(0x8c,0x8c,0x0a,0x8c,0x14,0x86,0x05,0x98);
- &LL(0xd1,0xd1,0x63,0xd1,0xc6,0xb2,0xbf,0x17);
- &LL(0xa5,0xa5,0xae,0xa5,0x41,0x0b,0x57,0xe4);
- &LL(0xe2,0xe2,0xaf,0xe2,0x43,0x4d,0xd9,0xa1);
- &LL(0x61,0x61,0x99,0x61,0x2f,0xf8,0xc2,0x4e);
- &LL(0xb3,0xb3,0xf6,0xb3,0xf1,0x45,0x7b,0x42);
- &LL(0x21,0x21,0x84,0x21,0x15,0xa5,0x42,0x34);
- &LL(0x9c,0x9c,0x4a,0x9c,0x94,0xd6,0x25,0x08);
- &LL(0x1e,0x1e,0x78,0x1e,0xf0,0x66,0x3c,0xee);
- &LL(0x43,0x43,0x11,0x43,0x22,0x52,0x86,0x61);
- &LL(0xc7,0xc7,0x3b,0xc7,0x76,0xfc,0x93,0xb1);
- &LL(0xfc,0xfc,0xd7,0xfc,0xb3,0x2b,0xe5,0x4f);
- &LL(0x04,0x04,0x10,0x04,0x20,0x14,0x08,0x24);
- &LL(0x51,0x51,0x59,0x51,0xb2,0x08,0xa2,0xe3);
- &LL(0x99,0x99,0x5e,0x99,0xbc,0xc7,0x2f,0x25);
- &LL(0x6d,0x6d,0xa9,0x6d,0x4f,0xc4,0xda,0x22);
- &LL(0x0d,0x0d,0x34,0x0d,0x68,0x39,0x1a,0x65);
- &LL(0xfa,0xfa,0xcf,0xfa,0x83,0x35,0xe9,0x79);
- &LL(0xdf,0xdf,0x5b,0xdf,0xb6,0x84,0xa3,0x69);
- &LL(0x7e,0x7e,0xe5,0x7e,0xd7,0x9b,0xfc,0xa9);
- &LL(0x24,0x24,0x90,0x24,0x3d,0xb4,0x48,0x19);
- &LL(0x3b,0x3b,0xec,0x3b,0xc5,0xd7,0x76,0xfe);
- &LL(0xab,0xab,0x96,0xab,0x31,0x3d,0x4b,0x9a);
- &LL(0xce,0xce,0x1f,0xce,0x3e,0xd1,0x81,0xf0);
- &LL(0x11,0x11,0x44,0x11,0x88,0x55,0x22,0x99);
- &LL(0x8f,0x8f,0x06,0x8f,0x0c,0x89,0x03,0x83);
- &LL(0x4e,0x4e,0x25,0x4e,0x4a,0x6b,0x9c,0x04);
- &LL(0xb7,0xb7,0xe6,0xb7,0xd1,0x51,0x73,0x66);
- &LL(0xeb,0xeb,0x8b,0xeb,0x0b,0x60,0xcb,0xe0);
- &LL(0x3c,0x3c,0xf0,0x3c,0xfd,0xcc,0x78,0xc1);
- &LL(0x81,0x81,0x3e,0x81,0x7c,0xbf,0x1f,0xfd);
- &LL(0x94,0x94,0x6a,0x94,0xd4,0xfe,0x35,0x40);
- &LL(0xf7,0xf7,0xfb,0xf7,0xeb,0x0c,0xf3,0x1c);
- &LL(0xb9,0xb9,0xde,0xb9,0xa1,0x67,0x6f,0x18);
- &LL(0x13,0x13,0x4c,0x13,0x98,0x5f,0x26,0x8b);
- &LL(0x2c,0x2c,0xb0,0x2c,0x7d,0x9c,0x58,0x51);
- &LL(0xd3,0xd3,0x6b,0xd3,0xd6,0xb8,0xbb,0x05);
- &LL(0xe7,0xe7,0xbb,0xe7,0x6b,0x5c,0xd3,0x8c);
- &LL(0x6e,0x6e,0xa5,0x6e,0x57,0xcb,0xdc,0x39);
- &LL(0xc4,0xc4,0x37,0xc4,0x6e,0xf3,0x95,0xaa);
- &LL(0x03,0x03,0x0c,0x03,0x18,0x0f,0x06,0x1b);
- &LL(0x56,0x56,0x45,0x56,0x8a,0x13,0xac,0xdc);
- &LL(0x44,0x44,0x0d,0x44,0x1a,0x49,0x88,0x5e);
- &LL(0x7f,0x7f,0xe1,0x7f,0xdf,0x9e,0xfe,0xa0);
- &LL(0xa9,0xa9,0x9e,0xa9,0x21,0x37,0x4f,0x88);
- &LL(0x2a,0x2a,0xa8,0x2a,0x4d,0x82,0x54,0x67);
- &LL(0xbb,0xbb,0xd6,0xbb,0xb1,0x6d,0x6b,0x0a);
- &LL(0xc1,0xc1,0x23,0xc1,0x46,0xe2,0x9f,0x87);
- &LL(0x53,0x53,0x51,0x53,0xa2,0x02,0xa6,0xf1);
- &LL(0xdc,0xdc,0x57,0xdc,0xae,0x8b,0xa5,0x72);
- &LL(0x0b,0x0b,0x2c,0x0b,0x58,0x27,0x16,0x53);
- &LL(0x9d,0x9d,0x4e,0x9d,0x9c,0xd3,0x27,0x01);
- &LL(0x6c,0x6c,0xad,0x6c,0x47,0xc1,0xd8,0x2b);
- &LL(0x31,0x31,0xc4,0x31,0x95,0xf5,0x62,0xa4);
- &LL(0x74,0x74,0xcd,0x74,0x87,0xb9,0xe8,0xf3);
- &LL(0xf6,0xf6,0xff,0xf6,0xe3,0x09,0xf1,0x15);
- &LL(0x46,0x46,0x05,0x46,0x0a,0x43,0x8c,0x4c);
- &LL(0xac,0xac,0x8a,0xac,0x09,0x26,0x45,0xa5);
- &LL(0x89,0x89,0x1e,0x89,0x3c,0x97,0x0f,0xb5);
- &LL(0x14,0x14,0x50,0x14,0xa0,0x44,0x28,0xb4);
- &LL(0xe1,0xe1,0xa3,0xe1,0x5b,0x42,0xdf,0xba);
- &LL(0x16,0x16,0x58,0x16,0xb0,0x4e,0x2c,0xa6);
- &LL(0x3a,0x3a,0xe8,0x3a,0xcd,0xd2,0x74,0xf7);
- &LL(0x69,0x69,0xb9,0x69,0x6f,0xd0,0xd2,0x06);
- &LL(0x09,0x09,0x24,0x09,0x48,0x2d,0x12,0x41);
- &LL(0x70,0x70,0xdd,0x70,0xa7,0xad,0xe0,0xd7);
- &LL(0xb6,0xb6,0xe2,0xb6,0xd9,0x54,0x71,0x6f);
- &LL(0xd0,0xd0,0x67,0xd0,0xce,0xb7,0xbd,0x1e);
- &LL(0xed,0xed,0x93,0xed,0x3b,0x7e,0xc7,0xd6);
- &LL(0xcc,0xcc,0x17,0xcc,0x2e,0xdb,0x85,0xe2);
- &LL(0x42,0x42,0x15,0x42,0x2a,0x57,0x84,0x68);
- &LL(0x98,0x98,0x5a,0x98,0xb4,0xc2,0x2d,0x2c);
- &LL(0xa4,0xa4,0xaa,0xa4,0x49,0x0e,0x55,0xed);
- &LL(0x28,0x28,0xa0,0x28,0x5d,0x88,0x50,0x75);
- &LL(0x5c,0x5c,0x6d,0x5c,0xda,0x31,0xb8,0x86);
- &LL(0xf8,0xf8,0xc7,0xf8,0x93,0x3f,0xed,0x6b);
- &LL(0x86,0x86,0x22,0x86,0x44,0xa4,0x11,0xc2);
-
- &L(0x18,0x23,0xc6,0xe8,0x87,0xb8,0x01,0x4f); # rc[ROUNDS]
- &L(0x36,0xa6,0xd2,0xf5,0x79,0x6f,0x91,0x52);
- &L(0x60,0xbc,0x9b,0x8e,0xa3,0x0c,0x7b,0x35);
- &L(0x1d,0xe0,0xd7,0xc2,0x2e,0x4b,0xfe,0x57);
- &L(0x15,0x77,0x37,0xe5,0x9f,0xf0,0x4a,0xda);
- &L(0x58,0xc9,0x29,0x0a,0xb1,0xa0,0x6b,0x85);
- &L(0xbd,0x5d,0x10,0xf4,0xcb,0x3e,0x05,0x67);
- &L(0xe4,0x27,0x41,0x8b,0xa7,0x7d,0x95,0xd8);
- &L(0xfb,0xee,0x7c,0x66,0xdd,0x17,0x47,0x9e);
- &L(0xca,0x2d,0xbf,0x07,0xad,0x5a,0x83,0x33);
-
-&function_end_B("whirlpool_block_mmx");
-&asm_finish();
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,493 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#
+# ====================================================================
+# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+# project. Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary
+# forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license.
+# ====================================================================
+#
+# whirlpool_block_mmx implementation.
+#
+*SCALE=\(2); # 2 or 8, that is the question:-) Value of 8 results
+# in 16KB large table, which is tough on L1 cache, but eliminates
+# unaligned references to it. Value of 2 results in 4KB table, but
+# 7/8 of references to it are unaligned. AMD cores seem to be
+# allergic to the latter, while Intel ones - to former [see the
+# table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table
+# minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side-
+# channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance
+# gap among different µ-archs is smaller.
+#
+# Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by
+# whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e.
+# smaller is better and asymptotic throughput can be estimated by
+# multiplying 64 by CPU clock frequency and dividing by relevant
+# value from the given table:
+#
+# $SCALE=2/8 icc8 gcc3
+# Intel P4 3200/4600 4600(*) 6400
+# Intel PIII 2900/3000 4900 5400
+# AMD K[78] 2500/1800 9900 8200(**)
+#
+# (*) I've sketched even non-MMX assembler, but for the record
+# I've failed to beat the Intel compiler on P4, without using
+# MMX that is...
+# (**) ... on AMD on the other hand non-MMX assembler was observed
+# to perform significantly better, but I figured this MMX
+# implementation is even faster anyway, so why bother? As for
+# pre-MMX AMD core[s], the improvement coefficient is more
+# than likely to vary anyway and I don't know how. But the
+# least I know is that gcc-generated code compiled with
+# -DL_ENDIAN and -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT [see C module for
+# details] and optimized for Pentium was observed to perform
+# *better* on Pentium 100 than unrolled non-MMX assembler
+# loop... So we just say that I don't know if maintaining
+# non-MMX implementation would actually pay off, but till
+# opposite is proved "unlikely" is assumed.
+
+$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
+push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
+require "x86asm.pl";
+
+&asm_init($ARGV[0],"wp-mmx.pl");
+
+sub L() { &data_byte(@_); }
+sub LL()
+{ if ($SCALE==2) { &data_byte(@_); &data_byte(@_); }
+ elsif ($SCALE==8) { for ($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+ &data_byte(@_);
+ unshift(@_,pop(@_));
+ }
+ }
+ else { die "unvalid SCALE value"; }
+}
+
+sub scale()
+{ if ($SCALE==2) { &lea(@_[0],&DWP(0, at _[1], at _[1])); }
+ elsif ($SCALE==8) { &lea(@_[0],&DWP(0,"", at _[1],8)); }
+ else { die "unvalid SCALE value"; }
+}
+
+sub row()
+{ if ($SCALE==2) { ((8-shift)&7); }
+ elsif ($SCALE==8) { (8*shift); }
+ else { die "unvalid SCALE value"; }
+}
+
+$tbl="ebp";
+ at mm=("mm0","mm1","mm2","mm3","mm4","mm5","mm6","mm7");
+
+&function_begin_B("whirlpool_block_mmx");
+ &push ("ebp");
+ &push ("ebx");
+ &push ("esi");
+ &push ("edi");
+
+ &mov ("esi",&wparam(0)); # hash value
+ &mov ("edi",&wparam(1)); # input data stream
+ &mov ("ebp",&wparam(2)); # number of chunks in input
+
+ &mov ("eax","esp"); # copy stack pointer
+ &sub ("esp",128+20); # allocate frame
+ &and ("esp",-64); # align for cache-line
+
+ &lea ("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp"));
+ &mov (&DWP(0,"ebx"),"esi"); # save parameter block
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"ebx"),"edi");
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"ebx"),"ebp");
+ &mov (&DWP(16,"ebx"),"eax"); # saved stack pointer
+
+ &call (&label("pic_point"));
+&set_label("pic_point");
+ &blindpop($tbl);
+ &lea ($tbl,&DWP(&label("table")."-".&label("pic_point"),$tbl));
+
+ &xor ("ecx","ecx");
+ &xor ("edx","edx");
+
+ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"esi")); } # L=H
+&set_label("outerloop");
+ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esp"), at mm[$i]); } # K=L
+ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"edi")); } # L^=inp
+ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP(64+$i*8,"esp"), at mm[$i]); } # S=L
+
+ &xor ("esi","esi");
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"ebx"),"esi"); # zero round counter
+
+&set_label("round",16);
+ &movq (@mm[0],&QWP(2048*$SCALE,$tbl,"esi",8)); # rc[r]
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(0,"esp"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(4,"esp"));
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+ my $func = ($i==0)? \&movq : \&pxor;
+ &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("eax"));
+ &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("eax"));
+ &scale ("esi","ecx");
+ &scale ("edi","edx");
+ &shr ("eax",16);
+ &pxor (@mm[0],&QWP(&row(0),$tbl,"esi",8));
+ &$func (@mm[1],&QWP(&row(1),$tbl,"edi",8));
+ &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("eax"));
+ &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("eax"));
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(($i+1)*8,"esp"));
+ &scale ("esi","ecx");
+ &scale ("edi","edx");
+ &$func (@mm[2],&QWP(&row(2),$tbl,"esi",8));
+ &$func (@mm[3],&QWP(&row(3),$tbl,"edi",8));
+ &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("ebx"));
+ &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("ebx"));
+ &scale ("esi","ecx");
+ &scale ("edi","edx");
+ &shr ("ebx",16);
+ &$func (@mm[4],&QWP(&row(4),$tbl,"esi",8));
+ &$func (@mm[5],&QWP(&row(5),$tbl,"edi",8));
+ &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("ebx"));
+ &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("ebx"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(($i+1)*8+4,"esp"));
+ &scale ("esi","ecx");
+ &scale ("edi","edx");
+ &$func (@mm[6],&QWP(&row(6),$tbl,"esi",8));
+ &$func (@mm[7],&QWP(&row(7),$tbl,"edi",8));
+ push(@mm,shift(@mm));
+}
+
+ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esp"), at mm[$i]); } # K=L
+
+for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) {
+ &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("eax"));
+ &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("eax"));
+ &scale ("esi","ecx");
+ &scale ("edi","edx");
+ &shr ("eax",16);
+ &pxor (@mm[0],&QWP(&row(0),$tbl,"esi",8));
+ &pxor (@mm[1],&QWP(&row(1),$tbl,"edi",8));
+ &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("eax"));
+ &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("eax"));
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(64+($i+1)*8,"esp")) if ($i<7);
+ &scale ("esi","ecx");
+ &scale ("edi","edx");
+ &pxor (@mm[2],&QWP(&row(2),$tbl,"esi",8));
+ &pxor (@mm[3],&QWP(&row(3),$tbl,"edi",8));
+ &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("ebx"));
+ &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("ebx"));
+ &scale ("esi","ecx");
+ &scale ("edi","edx");
+ &shr ("ebx",16);
+ &pxor (@mm[4],&QWP(&row(4),$tbl,"esi",8));
+ &pxor (@mm[5],&QWP(&row(5),$tbl,"edi",8));
+ &movb (&LB("ecx"),&LB("ebx"));
+ &movb (&LB("edx"),&HB("ebx"));
+ &mov ("ebx",&DWP(64+($i+1)*8+4,"esp")) if ($i<7);
+ &scale ("esi","ecx");
+ &scale ("edi","edx");
+ &pxor (@mm[6],&QWP(&row(6),$tbl,"esi",8));
+ &pxor (@mm[7],&QWP(&row(7),$tbl,"edi",8));
+ push(@mm,shift(@mm));
+}
+ &lea ("ebx",&DWP(128,"esp"));
+ &mov ("esi",&DWP(12,"ebx")); # pull round counter
+ &add ("esi",1);
+ &cmp ("esi",10);
+ &je (&label("roundsdone"));
+
+ &mov (&DWP(12,"ebx"),"esi"); # update round counter
+ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP(64+$i*8,"esp"), at mm[$i]); } # S=L
+ &jmp (&label("round"));
+
+&set_label("roundsdone",16);
+ &mov ("esi",&DWP(0,"ebx")); # reload argument block
+ &mov ("edi",&DWP(4,"ebx"));
+ &mov ("eax",&DWP(8,"ebx"));
+
+ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"edi")); } # L^=inp
+ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &pxor(@mm[$i],&QWP($i*8,"esi")); } # L^=H
+ for($i=0;$i<8;$i++) { &movq(&QWP($i*8,"esi"), at mm[$i]); } # H=L
+
+ &lea ("edi",&DWP(64,"edi")); # inp+=64
+ &sub ("eax",1); # num--
+ &jz (&label("alldone"));
+ &mov (&DWP(4,"ebx"),"edi"); # update argument block
+ &mov (&DWP(8,"ebx"),"eax");
+ &jmp (&label("outerloop"));
+
+&set_label("alldone");
+ &emms ();
+ &mov ("esp",&DWP(16,"ebx")); # restore saved stack pointer
+ &pop ("edi");
+ &pop ("esi");
+ &pop ("ebx");
+ &pop ("ebp");
+ &ret ();
+
+&align(64);
+&set_label("table");
+ &LL(0x18,0x18,0x60,0x18,0xc0,0x78,0x30,0xd8);
+ &LL(0x23,0x23,0x8c,0x23,0x05,0xaf,0x46,0x26);
+ &LL(0xc6,0xc6,0x3f,0xc6,0x7e,0xf9,0x91,0xb8);
+ &LL(0xe8,0xe8,0x87,0xe8,0x13,0x6f,0xcd,0xfb);
+ &LL(0x87,0x87,0x26,0x87,0x4c,0xa1,0x13,0xcb);
+ &LL(0xb8,0xb8,0xda,0xb8,0xa9,0x62,0x6d,0x11);
+ &LL(0x01,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x08,0x05,0x02,0x09);
+ &LL(0x4f,0x4f,0x21,0x4f,0x42,0x6e,0x9e,0x0d);
+ &LL(0x36,0x36,0xd8,0x36,0xad,0xee,0x6c,0x9b);
+ &LL(0xa6,0xa6,0xa2,0xa6,0x59,0x04,0x51,0xff);
+ &LL(0xd2,0xd2,0x6f,0xd2,0xde,0xbd,0xb9,0x0c);
+ &LL(0xf5,0xf5,0xf3,0xf5,0xfb,0x06,0xf7,0x0e);
+ &LL(0x79,0x79,0xf9,0x79,0xef,0x80,0xf2,0x96);
+ &LL(0x6f,0x6f,0xa1,0x6f,0x5f,0xce,0xde,0x30);
+ &LL(0x91,0x91,0x7e,0x91,0xfc,0xef,0x3f,0x6d);
+ &LL(0x52,0x52,0x55,0x52,0xaa,0x07,0xa4,0xf8);
+ &LL(0x60,0x60,0x9d,0x60,0x27,0xfd,0xc0,0x47);
+ &LL(0xbc,0xbc,0xca,0xbc,0x89,0x76,0x65,0x35);
+ &LL(0x9b,0x9b,0x56,0x9b,0xac,0xcd,0x2b,0x37);
+ &LL(0x8e,0x8e,0x02,0x8e,0x04,0x8c,0x01,0x8a);
+ &LL(0xa3,0xa3,0xb6,0xa3,0x71,0x15,0x5b,0xd2);
+ &LL(0x0c,0x0c,0x30,0x0c,0x60,0x3c,0x18,0x6c);
+ &LL(0x7b,0x7b,0xf1,0x7b,0xff,0x8a,0xf6,0x84);
+ &LL(0x35,0x35,0xd4,0x35,0xb5,0xe1,0x6a,0x80);
+ &LL(0x1d,0x1d,0x74,0x1d,0xe8,0x69,0x3a,0xf5);
+ &LL(0xe0,0xe0,0xa7,0xe0,0x53,0x47,0xdd,0xb3);
+ &LL(0xd7,0xd7,0x7b,0xd7,0xf6,0xac,0xb3,0x21);
+ &LL(0xc2,0xc2,0x2f,0xc2,0x5e,0xed,0x99,0x9c);
+ &LL(0x2e,0x2e,0xb8,0x2e,0x6d,0x96,0x5c,0x43);
+ &LL(0x4b,0x4b,0x31,0x4b,0x62,0x7a,0x96,0x29);
+ &LL(0xfe,0xfe,0xdf,0xfe,0xa3,0x21,0xe1,0x5d);
+ &LL(0x57,0x57,0x41,0x57,0x82,0x16,0xae,0xd5);
+ &LL(0x15,0x15,0x54,0x15,0xa8,0x41,0x2a,0xbd);
+ &LL(0x77,0x77,0xc1,0x77,0x9f,0xb6,0xee,0xe8);
+ &LL(0x37,0x37,0xdc,0x37,0xa5,0xeb,0x6e,0x92);
+ &LL(0xe5,0xe5,0xb3,0xe5,0x7b,0x56,0xd7,0x9e);
+ &LL(0x9f,0x9f,0x46,0x9f,0x8c,0xd9,0x23,0x13);
+ &LL(0xf0,0xf0,0xe7,0xf0,0xd3,0x17,0xfd,0x23);
+ &LL(0x4a,0x4a,0x35,0x4a,0x6a,0x7f,0x94,0x20);
+ &LL(0xda,0xda,0x4f,0xda,0x9e,0x95,0xa9,0x44);
+ &LL(0x58,0x58,0x7d,0x58,0xfa,0x25,0xb0,0xa2);
+ &LL(0xc9,0xc9,0x03,0xc9,0x06,0xca,0x8f,0xcf);
+ &LL(0x29,0x29,0xa4,0x29,0x55,0x8d,0x52,0x7c);
+ &LL(0x0a,0x0a,0x28,0x0a,0x50,0x22,0x14,0x5a);
+ &LL(0xb1,0xb1,0xfe,0xb1,0xe1,0x4f,0x7f,0x50);
+ &LL(0xa0,0xa0,0xba,0xa0,0x69,0x1a,0x5d,0xc9);
+ &LL(0x6b,0x6b,0xb1,0x6b,0x7f,0xda,0xd6,0x14);
+ &LL(0x85,0x85,0x2e,0x85,0x5c,0xab,0x17,0xd9);
+ &LL(0xbd,0xbd,0xce,0xbd,0x81,0x73,0x67,0x3c);
+ &LL(0x5d,0x5d,0x69,0x5d,0xd2,0x34,0xba,0x8f);
+ &LL(0x10,0x10,0x40,0x10,0x80,0x50,0x20,0x90);
+ &LL(0xf4,0xf4,0xf7,0xf4,0xf3,0x03,0xf5,0x07);
+ &LL(0xcb,0xcb,0x0b,0xcb,0x16,0xc0,0x8b,0xdd);
+ &LL(0x3e,0x3e,0xf8,0x3e,0xed,0xc6,0x7c,0xd3);
+ &LL(0x05,0x05,0x14,0x05,0x28,0x11,0x0a,0x2d);
+ &LL(0x67,0x67,0x81,0x67,0x1f,0xe6,0xce,0x78);
+ &LL(0xe4,0xe4,0xb7,0xe4,0x73,0x53,0xd5,0x97);
+ &LL(0x27,0x27,0x9c,0x27,0x25,0xbb,0x4e,0x02);
+ &LL(0x41,0x41,0x19,0x41,0x32,0x58,0x82,0x73);
+ &LL(0x8b,0x8b,0x16,0x8b,0x2c,0x9d,0x0b,0xa7);
+ &LL(0xa7,0xa7,0xa6,0xa7,0x51,0x01,0x53,0xf6);
+ &LL(0x7d,0x7d,0xe9,0x7d,0xcf,0x94,0xfa,0xb2);
+ &LL(0x95,0x95,0x6e,0x95,0xdc,0xfb,0x37,0x49);
+ &LL(0xd8,0xd8,0x47,0xd8,0x8e,0x9f,0xad,0x56);
+ &LL(0xfb,0xfb,0xcb,0xfb,0x8b,0x30,0xeb,0x70);
+ &LL(0xee,0xee,0x9f,0xee,0x23,0x71,0xc1,0xcd);
+ &LL(0x7c,0x7c,0xed,0x7c,0xc7,0x91,0xf8,0xbb);
+ &LL(0x66,0x66,0x85,0x66,0x17,0xe3,0xcc,0x71);
+ &LL(0xdd,0xdd,0x53,0xdd,0xa6,0x8e,0xa7,0x7b);
+ &LL(0x17,0x17,0x5c,0x17,0xb8,0x4b,0x2e,0xaf);
+ &LL(0x47,0x47,0x01,0x47,0x02,0x46,0x8e,0x45);
+ &LL(0x9e,0x9e,0x42,0x9e,0x84,0xdc,0x21,0x1a);
+ &LL(0xca,0xca,0x0f,0xca,0x1e,0xc5,0x89,0xd4);
+ &LL(0x2d,0x2d,0xb4,0x2d,0x75,0x99,0x5a,0x58);
+ &LL(0xbf,0xbf,0xc6,0xbf,0x91,0x79,0x63,0x2e);
+ &LL(0x07,0x07,0x1c,0x07,0x38,0x1b,0x0e,0x3f);
+ &LL(0xad,0xad,0x8e,0xad,0x01,0x23,0x47,0xac);
+ &LL(0x5a,0x5a,0x75,0x5a,0xea,0x2f,0xb4,0xb0);
+ &LL(0x83,0x83,0x36,0x83,0x6c,0xb5,0x1b,0xef);
+ &LL(0x33,0x33,0xcc,0x33,0x85,0xff,0x66,0xb6);
+ &LL(0x63,0x63,0x91,0x63,0x3f,0xf2,0xc6,0x5c);
+ &LL(0x02,0x02,0x08,0x02,0x10,0x0a,0x04,0x12);
+ &LL(0xaa,0xaa,0x92,0xaa,0x39,0x38,0x49,0x93);
+ &LL(0x71,0x71,0xd9,0x71,0xaf,0xa8,0xe2,0xde);
+ &LL(0xc8,0xc8,0x07,0xc8,0x0e,0xcf,0x8d,0xc6);
+ &LL(0x19,0x19,0x64,0x19,0xc8,0x7d,0x32,0xd1);
+ &LL(0x49,0x49,0x39,0x49,0x72,0x70,0x92,0x3b);
+ &LL(0xd9,0xd9,0x43,0xd9,0x86,0x9a,0xaf,0x5f);
+ &LL(0xf2,0xf2,0xef,0xf2,0xc3,0x1d,0xf9,0x31);
+ &LL(0xe3,0xe3,0xab,0xe3,0x4b,0x48,0xdb,0xa8);
+ &LL(0x5b,0x5b,0x71,0x5b,0xe2,0x2a,0xb6,0xb9);
+ &LL(0x88,0x88,0x1a,0x88,0x34,0x92,0x0d,0xbc);
+ &LL(0x9a,0x9a,0x52,0x9a,0xa4,0xc8,0x29,0x3e);
+ &LL(0x26,0x26,0x98,0x26,0x2d,0xbe,0x4c,0x0b);
+ &LL(0x32,0x32,0xc8,0x32,0x8d,0xfa,0x64,0xbf);
+ &LL(0xb0,0xb0,0xfa,0xb0,0xe9,0x4a,0x7d,0x59);
+ &LL(0xe9,0xe9,0x83,0xe9,0x1b,0x6a,0xcf,0xf2);
+ &LL(0x0f,0x0f,0x3c,0x0f,0x78,0x33,0x1e,0x77);
+ &LL(0xd5,0xd5,0x73,0xd5,0xe6,0xa6,0xb7,0x33);
+ &LL(0x80,0x80,0x3a,0x80,0x74,0xba,0x1d,0xf4);
+ &LL(0xbe,0xbe,0xc2,0xbe,0x99,0x7c,0x61,0x27);
+ &LL(0xcd,0xcd,0x13,0xcd,0x26,0xde,0x87,0xeb);
+ &LL(0x34,0x34,0xd0,0x34,0xbd,0xe4,0x68,0x89);
+ &LL(0x48,0x48,0x3d,0x48,0x7a,0x75,0x90,0x32);
+ &LL(0xff,0xff,0xdb,0xff,0xab,0x24,0xe3,0x54);
+ &LL(0x7a,0x7a,0xf5,0x7a,0xf7,0x8f,0xf4,0x8d);
+ &LL(0x90,0x90,0x7a,0x90,0xf4,0xea,0x3d,0x64);
+ &LL(0x5f,0x5f,0x61,0x5f,0xc2,0x3e,0xbe,0x9d);
+ &LL(0x20,0x20,0x80,0x20,0x1d,0xa0,0x40,0x3d);
+ &LL(0x68,0x68,0xbd,0x68,0x67,0xd5,0xd0,0x0f);
+ &LL(0x1a,0x1a,0x68,0x1a,0xd0,0x72,0x34,0xca);
+ &LL(0xae,0xae,0x82,0xae,0x19,0x2c,0x41,0xb7);
+ &LL(0xb4,0xb4,0xea,0xb4,0xc9,0x5e,0x75,0x7d);
+ &LL(0x54,0x54,0x4d,0x54,0x9a,0x19,0xa8,0xce);
+ &LL(0x93,0x93,0x76,0x93,0xec,0xe5,0x3b,0x7f);
+ &LL(0x22,0x22,0x88,0x22,0x0d,0xaa,0x44,0x2f);
+ &LL(0x64,0x64,0x8d,0x64,0x07,0xe9,0xc8,0x63);
+ &LL(0xf1,0xf1,0xe3,0xf1,0xdb,0x12,0xff,0x2a);
+ &LL(0x73,0x73,0xd1,0x73,0xbf,0xa2,0xe6,0xcc);
+ &LL(0x12,0x12,0x48,0x12,0x90,0x5a,0x24,0x82);
+ &LL(0x40,0x40,0x1d,0x40,0x3a,0x5d,0x80,0x7a);
+ &LL(0x08,0x08,0x20,0x08,0x40,0x28,0x10,0x48);
+ &LL(0xc3,0xc3,0x2b,0xc3,0x56,0xe8,0x9b,0x95);
+ &LL(0xec,0xec,0x97,0xec,0x33,0x7b,0xc5,0xdf);
+ &LL(0xdb,0xdb,0x4b,0xdb,0x96,0x90,0xab,0x4d);
+ &LL(0xa1,0xa1,0xbe,0xa1,0x61,0x1f,0x5f,0xc0);
+ &LL(0x8d,0x8d,0x0e,0x8d,0x1c,0x83,0x07,0x91);
+ &LL(0x3d,0x3d,0xf4,0x3d,0xf5,0xc9,0x7a,0xc8);
+ &LL(0x97,0x97,0x66,0x97,0xcc,0xf1,0x33,0x5b);
+ &LL(0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00);
+ &LL(0xcf,0xcf,0x1b,0xcf,0x36,0xd4,0x83,0xf9);
+ &LL(0x2b,0x2b,0xac,0x2b,0x45,0x87,0x56,0x6e);
+ &LL(0x76,0x76,0xc5,0x76,0x97,0xb3,0xec,0xe1);
+ &LL(0x82,0x82,0x32,0x82,0x64,0xb0,0x19,0xe6);
+ &LL(0xd6,0xd6,0x7f,0xd6,0xfe,0xa9,0xb1,0x28);
+ &LL(0x1b,0x1b,0x6c,0x1b,0xd8,0x77,0x36,0xc3);
+ &LL(0xb5,0xb5,0xee,0xb5,0xc1,0x5b,0x77,0x74);
+ &LL(0xaf,0xaf,0x86,0xaf,0x11,0x29,0x43,0xbe);
+ &LL(0x6a,0x6a,0xb5,0x6a,0x77,0xdf,0xd4,0x1d);
+ &LL(0x50,0x50,0x5d,0x50,0xba,0x0d,0xa0,0xea);
+ &LL(0x45,0x45,0x09,0x45,0x12,0x4c,0x8a,0x57);
+ &LL(0xf3,0xf3,0xeb,0xf3,0xcb,0x18,0xfb,0x38);
+ &LL(0x30,0x30,0xc0,0x30,0x9d,0xf0,0x60,0xad);
+ &LL(0xef,0xef,0x9b,0xef,0x2b,0x74,0xc3,0xc4);
+ &LL(0x3f,0x3f,0xfc,0x3f,0xe5,0xc3,0x7e,0xda);
+ &LL(0x55,0x55,0x49,0x55,0x92,0x1c,0xaa,0xc7);
+ &LL(0xa2,0xa2,0xb2,0xa2,0x79,0x10,0x59,0xdb);
+ &LL(0xea,0xea,0x8f,0xea,0x03,0x65,0xc9,0xe9);
+ &LL(0x65,0x65,0x89,0x65,0x0f,0xec,0xca,0x6a);
+ &LL(0xba,0xba,0xd2,0xba,0xb9,0x68,0x69,0x03);
+ &LL(0x2f,0x2f,0xbc,0x2f,0x65,0x93,0x5e,0x4a);
+ &LL(0xc0,0xc0,0x27,0xc0,0x4e,0xe7,0x9d,0x8e);
+ &LL(0xde,0xde,0x5f,0xde,0xbe,0x81,0xa1,0x60);
+ &LL(0x1c,0x1c,0x70,0x1c,0xe0,0x6c,0x38,0xfc);
+ &LL(0xfd,0xfd,0xd3,0xfd,0xbb,0x2e,0xe7,0x46);
+ &LL(0x4d,0x4d,0x29,0x4d,0x52,0x64,0x9a,0x1f);
+ &LL(0x92,0x92,0x72,0x92,0xe4,0xe0,0x39,0x76);
+ &LL(0x75,0x75,0xc9,0x75,0x8f,0xbc,0xea,0xfa);
+ &LL(0x06,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x30,0x1e,0x0c,0x36);
+ &LL(0x8a,0x8a,0x12,0x8a,0x24,0x98,0x09,0xae);
+ &LL(0xb2,0xb2,0xf2,0xb2,0xf9,0x40,0x79,0x4b);
+ &LL(0xe6,0xe6,0xbf,0xe6,0x63,0x59,0xd1,0x85);
+ &LL(0x0e,0x0e,0x38,0x0e,0x70,0x36,0x1c,0x7e);
+ &LL(0x1f,0x1f,0x7c,0x1f,0xf8,0x63,0x3e,0xe7);
+ &LL(0x62,0x62,0x95,0x62,0x37,0xf7,0xc4,0x55);
+ &LL(0xd4,0xd4,0x77,0xd4,0xee,0xa3,0xb5,0x3a);
+ &LL(0xa8,0xa8,0x9a,0xa8,0x29,0x32,0x4d,0x81);
+ &LL(0x96,0x96,0x62,0x96,0xc4,0xf4,0x31,0x52);
+ &LL(0xf9,0xf9,0xc3,0xf9,0x9b,0x3a,0xef,0x62);
+ &LL(0xc5,0xc5,0x33,0xc5,0x66,0xf6,0x97,0xa3);
+ &LL(0x25,0x25,0x94,0x25,0x35,0xb1,0x4a,0x10);
+ &LL(0x59,0x59,0x79,0x59,0xf2,0x20,0xb2,0xab);
+ &LL(0x84,0x84,0x2a,0x84,0x54,0xae,0x15,0xd0);
+ &LL(0x72,0x72,0xd5,0x72,0xb7,0xa7,0xe4,0xc5);
+ &LL(0x39,0x39,0xe4,0x39,0xd5,0xdd,0x72,0xec);
+ &LL(0x4c,0x4c,0x2d,0x4c,0x5a,0x61,0x98,0x16);
+ &LL(0x5e,0x5e,0x65,0x5e,0xca,0x3b,0xbc,0x94);
+ &LL(0x78,0x78,0xfd,0x78,0xe7,0x85,0xf0,0x9f);
+ &LL(0x38,0x38,0xe0,0x38,0xdd,0xd8,0x70,0xe5);
+ &LL(0x8c,0x8c,0x0a,0x8c,0x14,0x86,0x05,0x98);
+ &LL(0xd1,0xd1,0x63,0xd1,0xc6,0xb2,0xbf,0x17);
+ &LL(0xa5,0xa5,0xae,0xa5,0x41,0x0b,0x57,0xe4);
+ &LL(0xe2,0xe2,0xaf,0xe2,0x43,0x4d,0xd9,0xa1);
+ &LL(0x61,0x61,0x99,0x61,0x2f,0xf8,0xc2,0x4e);
+ &LL(0xb3,0xb3,0xf6,0xb3,0xf1,0x45,0x7b,0x42);
+ &LL(0x21,0x21,0x84,0x21,0x15,0xa5,0x42,0x34);
+ &LL(0x9c,0x9c,0x4a,0x9c,0x94,0xd6,0x25,0x08);
+ &LL(0x1e,0x1e,0x78,0x1e,0xf0,0x66,0x3c,0xee);
+ &LL(0x43,0x43,0x11,0x43,0x22,0x52,0x86,0x61);
+ &LL(0xc7,0xc7,0x3b,0xc7,0x76,0xfc,0x93,0xb1);
+ &LL(0xfc,0xfc,0xd7,0xfc,0xb3,0x2b,0xe5,0x4f);
+ &LL(0x04,0x04,0x10,0x04,0x20,0x14,0x08,0x24);
+ &LL(0x51,0x51,0x59,0x51,0xb2,0x08,0xa2,0xe3);
+ &LL(0x99,0x99,0x5e,0x99,0xbc,0xc7,0x2f,0x25);
+ &LL(0x6d,0x6d,0xa9,0x6d,0x4f,0xc4,0xda,0x22);
+ &LL(0x0d,0x0d,0x34,0x0d,0x68,0x39,0x1a,0x65);
+ &LL(0xfa,0xfa,0xcf,0xfa,0x83,0x35,0xe9,0x79);
+ &LL(0xdf,0xdf,0x5b,0xdf,0xb6,0x84,0xa3,0x69);
+ &LL(0x7e,0x7e,0xe5,0x7e,0xd7,0x9b,0xfc,0xa9);
+ &LL(0x24,0x24,0x90,0x24,0x3d,0xb4,0x48,0x19);
+ &LL(0x3b,0x3b,0xec,0x3b,0xc5,0xd7,0x76,0xfe);
+ &LL(0xab,0xab,0x96,0xab,0x31,0x3d,0x4b,0x9a);
+ &LL(0xce,0xce,0x1f,0xce,0x3e,0xd1,0x81,0xf0);
+ &LL(0x11,0x11,0x44,0x11,0x88,0x55,0x22,0x99);
+ &LL(0x8f,0x8f,0x06,0x8f,0x0c,0x89,0x03,0x83);
+ &LL(0x4e,0x4e,0x25,0x4e,0x4a,0x6b,0x9c,0x04);
+ &LL(0xb7,0xb7,0xe6,0xb7,0xd1,0x51,0x73,0x66);
+ &LL(0xeb,0xeb,0x8b,0xeb,0x0b,0x60,0xcb,0xe0);
+ &LL(0x3c,0x3c,0xf0,0x3c,0xfd,0xcc,0x78,0xc1);
+ &LL(0x81,0x81,0x3e,0x81,0x7c,0xbf,0x1f,0xfd);
+ &LL(0x94,0x94,0x6a,0x94,0xd4,0xfe,0x35,0x40);
+ &LL(0xf7,0xf7,0xfb,0xf7,0xeb,0x0c,0xf3,0x1c);
+ &LL(0xb9,0xb9,0xde,0xb9,0xa1,0x67,0x6f,0x18);
+ &LL(0x13,0x13,0x4c,0x13,0x98,0x5f,0x26,0x8b);
+ &LL(0x2c,0x2c,0xb0,0x2c,0x7d,0x9c,0x58,0x51);
+ &LL(0xd3,0xd3,0x6b,0xd3,0xd6,0xb8,0xbb,0x05);
+ &LL(0xe7,0xe7,0xbb,0xe7,0x6b,0x5c,0xd3,0x8c);
+ &LL(0x6e,0x6e,0xa5,0x6e,0x57,0xcb,0xdc,0x39);
+ &LL(0xc4,0xc4,0x37,0xc4,0x6e,0xf3,0x95,0xaa);
+ &LL(0x03,0x03,0x0c,0x03,0x18,0x0f,0x06,0x1b);
+ &LL(0x56,0x56,0x45,0x56,0x8a,0x13,0xac,0xdc);
+ &LL(0x44,0x44,0x0d,0x44,0x1a,0x49,0x88,0x5e);
+ &LL(0x7f,0x7f,0xe1,0x7f,0xdf,0x9e,0xfe,0xa0);
+ &LL(0xa9,0xa9,0x9e,0xa9,0x21,0x37,0x4f,0x88);
+ &LL(0x2a,0x2a,0xa8,0x2a,0x4d,0x82,0x54,0x67);
+ &LL(0xbb,0xbb,0xd6,0xbb,0xb1,0x6d,0x6b,0x0a);
+ &LL(0xc1,0xc1,0x23,0xc1,0x46,0xe2,0x9f,0x87);
+ &LL(0x53,0x53,0x51,0x53,0xa2,0x02,0xa6,0xf1);
+ &LL(0xdc,0xdc,0x57,0xdc,0xae,0x8b,0xa5,0x72);
+ &LL(0x0b,0x0b,0x2c,0x0b,0x58,0x27,0x16,0x53);
+ &LL(0x9d,0x9d,0x4e,0x9d,0x9c,0xd3,0x27,0x01);
+ &LL(0x6c,0x6c,0xad,0x6c,0x47,0xc1,0xd8,0x2b);
+ &LL(0x31,0x31,0xc4,0x31,0x95,0xf5,0x62,0xa4);
+ &LL(0x74,0x74,0xcd,0x74,0x87,0xb9,0xe8,0xf3);
+ &LL(0xf6,0xf6,0xff,0xf6,0xe3,0x09,0xf1,0x15);
+ &LL(0x46,0x46,0x05,0x46,0x0a,0x43,0x8c,0x4c);
+ &LL(0xac,0xac,0x8a,0xac,0x09,0x26,0x45,0xa5);
+ &LL(0x89,0x89,0x1e,0x89,0x3c,0x97,0x0f,0xb5);
+ &LL(0x14,0x14,0x50,0x14,0xa0,0x44,0x28,0xb4);
+ &LL(0xe1,0xe1,0xa3,0xe1,0x5b,0x42,0xdf,0xba);
+ &LL(0x16,0x16,0x58,0x16,0xb0,0x4e,0x2c,0xa6);
+ &LL(0x3a,0x3a,0xe8,0x3a,0xcd,0xd2,0x74,0xf7);
+ &LL(0x69,0x69,0xb9,0x69,0x6f,0xd0,0xd2,0x06);
+ &LL(0x09,0x09,0x24,0x09,0x48,0x2d,0x12,0x41);
+ &LL(0x70,0x70,0xdd,0x70,0xa7,0xad,0xe0,0xd7);
+ &LL(0xb6,0xb6,0xe2,0xb6,0xd9,0x54,0x71,0x6f);
+ &LL(0xd0,0xd0,0x67,0xd0,0xce,0xb7,0xbd,0x1e);
+ &LL(0xed,0xed,0x93,0xed,0x3b,0x7e,0xc7,0xd6);
+ &LL(0xcc,0xcc,0x17,0xcc,0x2e,0xdb,0x85,0xe2);
+ &LL(0x42,0x42,0x15,0x42,0x2a,0x57,0x84,0x68);
+ &LL(0x98,0x98,0x5a,0x98,0xb4,0xc2,0x2d,0x2c);
+ &LL(0xa4,0xa4,0xaa,0xa4,0x49,0x0e,0x55,0xed);
+ &LL(0x28,0x28,0xa0,0x28,0x5d,0x88,0x50,0x75);
+ &LL(0x5c,0x5c,0x6d,0x5c,0xda,0x31,0xb8,0x86);
+ &LL(0xf8,0xf8,0xc7,0xf8,0x93,0x3f,0xed,0x6b);
+ &LL(0x86,0x86,0x22,0x86,0x44,0xa4,0x11,0xc2);
+
+ &L(0x18,0x23,0xc6,0xe8,0x87,0xb8,0x01,0x4f); # rc[ROUNDS]
+ &L(0x36,0xa6,0xd2,0xf5,0x79,0x6f,0x91,0x52);
+ &L(0x60,0xbc,0x9b,0x8e,0xa3,0x0c,0x7b,0x35);
+ &L(0x1d,0xe0,0xd7,0xc2,0x2e,0x4b,0xfe,0x57);
+ &L(0x15,0x77,0x37,0xe5,0x9f,0xf0,0x4a,0xda);
+ &L(0x58,0xc9,0x29,0x0a,0xb1,0xa0,0x6b,0x85);
+ &L(0xbd,0x5d,0x10,0xf4,0xcb,0x3e,0x05,0x67);
+ &L(0xe4,0x27,0x41,0x8b,0xa7,0x7d,0x95,0xd8);
+ &L(0xfb,0xee,0x7c,0x66,0xdd,0x17,0x47,0x9e);
+ &L(0xca,0x2d,0xbf,0x07,0xad,0x5a,0x83,0x33);
+
+&function_end_B("whirlpool_block_mmx");
+&asm_finish();
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/Makefile
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/Makefile 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/Makefile 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,409 +0,0 @@
-#
-# OpenSSL/crypto/x509/Makefile
-#
-
-DIR= x509
-TOP= ../..
-CC= cc
-INCLUDES= -I.. -I$(TOP) -I../../include
-CFLAG=-g
-MAKEFILE= Makefile
-AR= ar r
-
-CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
-
-GENERAL=Makefile README
-TEST=
-APPS=
-
-LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
-LIBSRC= x509_def.c x509_d2.c x509_r2x.c x509_cmp.c \
- x509_obj.c x509_req.c x509spki.c x509_vfy.c \
- x509_set.c x509cset.c x509rset.c x509_err.c \
- x509name.c x509_v3.c x509_ext.c x509_att.c \
- x509type.c x509_lu.c x_all.c x509_txt.c \
- x509_trs.c by_file.c by_dir.c x509_vpm.c
-LIBOBJ= x509_def.o x509_d2.o x509_r2x.o x509_cmp.o \
- x509_obj.o x509_req.o x509spki.o x509_vfy.o \
- x509_set.o x509cset.o x509rset.o x509_err.o \
- x509name.o x509_v3.o x509_ext.o x509_att.o \
- x509type.o x509_lu.o x_all.o x509_txt.o \
- x509_trs.o by_file.o by_dir.o x509_vpm.o
-
-SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-
-EXHEADER= x509.h x509_vfy.h
-HEADER= $(EXHEADER)
-
-ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
-
-top:
- (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all)
-
-all: lib
-
-lib: $(LIBOBJ)
- $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ)
- $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind.
- @touch lib
-
-files:
- $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
-
-links:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST)
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS)
-
-install:
- @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
- @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \
- do \
- (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
- done;
-
-tags:
- ctags $(SRC)
-
-tests:
-
-lint:
- lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
-
-update: depend
-
-depend:
- @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
- $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
-
-dclean:
- $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
- mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
-
-clean:
- rm -f *.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
-
-# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
-
-by_dir.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h by_dir.c
-by_file.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-by_file.o: ../cryptlib.h by_file.c
-x509_att.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
-x509_att.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_att.c
-x509_cmp.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
-x509_cmp.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_cmp.c
-x509_d2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-x509_d2.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_d2.c
-x509_def.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_def.c
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h x509_err.c
-x509_ext.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
-x509_ext.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_ext.c
-x509_lu.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
-x509_lu.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_lu.c
-x509_obj.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_obj.c
-x509_r2x.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_r2x.c
-x509_req.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_req.c
-x509_set.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_set.c
-x509_trs.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
-x509_trs.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_trs.c
-x509_txt.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_txt.c
-x509_v3.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
-x509_v3.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_v3.c
-x509_vfy.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
-x509_vfy.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_vfy.c
-x509_vpm.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
-x509_vpm.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_vpm.c
-x509cset.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509cset.c
-x509name.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509name.c
-x509rset.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509rset.c
-x509spki.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509spki.c
-x509type.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509type.c
-x_all.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x_all.c
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/Makefile (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/Makefile)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/Makefile (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/Makefile 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
+#
+# OpenSSL/crypto/x509/Makefile
+#
+
+DIR= x509
+TOP= ../..
+CC= cc
+INCLUDES= -I.. -I$(TOP) -I../../include
+CFLAG=-g
+MAKEFILE= Makefile
+AR= ar r
+
+CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
+
+GENERAL=Makefile README
+TEST=verify_extra_test.c
+APPS=
+
+LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
+LIBSRC= x509_def.c x509_d2.c x509_r2x.c x509_cmp.c \
+ x509_obj.c x509_req.c x509spki.c x509_vfy.c \
+ x509_set.c x509cset.c x509rset.c x509_err.c \
+ x509name.c x509_v3.c x509_ext.c x509_att.c \
+ x509type.c x509_lu.c x_all.c x509_txt.c \
+ x509_trs.c by_file.c by_dir.c x509_vpm.c
+LIBOBJ= x509_def.o x509_d2.o x509_r2x.o x509_cmp.o \
+ x509_obj.o x509_req.o x509spki.o x509_vfy.o \
+ x509_set.o x509cset.o x509rset.o x509_err.o \
+ x509name.o x509_v3.o x509_ext.o x509_att.o \
+ x509type.o x509_lu.o x_all.o x509_txt.o \
+ x509_trs.o by_file.o by_dir.o x509_vpm.o
+
+SRC= $(LIBSRC)
+
+EXHEADER= x509.h x509_vfy.h
+HEADER= $(EXHEADER)
+
+ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
+
+top:
+ (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all)
+
+all: lib
+
+lib: $(LIBOBJ)
+ $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ)
+ $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind.
+ @touch lib
+
+files:
+ $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
+
+links:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST)
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS)
+
+install:
+ @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
+ @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \
+ do \
+ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
+ done;
+
+tags:
+ ctags $(SRC)
+
+tests:
+
+lint:
+ lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+
+update: depend
+
+depend:
+ @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
+ $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
+
+dclean:
+ $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
+ mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
+
+# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
+
+by_dir.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+by_dir.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h by_dir.c
+by_file.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+by_file.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+by_file.o: ../cryptlib.h by_file.c
+x509_att.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_att.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
+x509_att.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_att.c
+x509_cmp.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
+x509_cmp.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_cmp.c
+x509_d2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+x509_d2.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+x509_d2.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_d2.c
+x509_def.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_def.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_def.c
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_err.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h x509_err.c
+x509_ext.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_ext.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
+x509_ext.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_ext.c
+x509_lu.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_lu.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
+x509_lu.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_lu.c
+x509_obj.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_obj.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_obj.c
+x509_r2x.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_r2x.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_r2x.c
+x509_req.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_req.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_req.c
+x509_set.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_set.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_set.c
+x509_trs.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_trs.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
+x509_trs.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_trs.c
+x509_txt.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_txt.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509_txt.c
+x509_v3.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_v3.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
+x509_v3.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_v3.c
+x509_vfy.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
+x509_vfy.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_vfy.c
+x509_vpm.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h
+x509_vpm.o: ../cryptlib.h x509_vpm.c
+x509cset.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509cset.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509cset.c
+x509name.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509name.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509name.c
+x509rset.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509rset.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509rset.c
+x509spki.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509spki.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509spki.c
+x509type.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x509type.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x509type.c
+x_all.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+x_all.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h x_all.c
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+ BIO *bio;
+ X509 *x;
+
+ bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
+
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (certs == NULL) {
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ do {
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if (x != NULL && !sk_X509_push(certs, x)) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return NULL;
+ } else if (x == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We probably just ran out of certs, so ignore any errors
+ * generated
+ */
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ }
+ } while (x != NULL);
+
+ BIO_free(bio);
+
+ return certs;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery)
+ *
+ * Chain is as follows:
+ *
+ * rootCA (self-signed)
+ * |
+ * interCA
+ * |
+ * subinterCA subinterCA (self-signed)
+ * | |
+ * leaf ------------------
+ * |
+ * bad
+ *
+ * rootCA, interCA, subinterCA, subinterCA (ss) all have CA=TRUE
+ * leaf and bad have CA=FALSE
+ *
+ * subinterCA and subinterCA (ss) have the same subject name and keys
+ *
+ * interCA (but not rootCA) and subinterCA (ss) are in the trusted store
+ * (roots.pem)
+ * leaf and subinterCA are in the untrusted list (untrusted.pem)
+ * bad is the certificate being verified (bad.pem)
+ *
+ * Versions vulnerable to CVE-2015-1793 will fail to detect that leaf has
+ * CA=FALSE, and will therefore incorrectly verify bad
+ *
+ */
+static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL;
+ X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
+
+ store = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (store == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+ if (lookup == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if(!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, "certs/roots.pem", X509_FILETYPE_PEM))
+ goto err;
+
+ untrusted = load_certs_from_file("certs/untrusted.pem");
+
+ if ((bio = BIO_new_file("certs/bad.pem", "r")) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ if (sctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted))
+ goto err;
+
+ i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
+
+ if(i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx)
+ == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT) {
+ /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ err:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
+ X509_free(x);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+
+ if (!test_alt_chains_cert_forgery()) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Test alt chains cert forgery failed\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ EVP_cleanup();
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+ ERR_free_strings();
+ CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+
+ printf("PASS\n");
+ return 0;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,341 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
-{
- int i;
- X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
-
- ai = a->cert_info;
- bi = b->cert_info;
- i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
- if (i)
- return (i);
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
-{
- unsigned long ret = 0;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char md[16];
- char *f;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
- goto err;
- OPENSSL_free(f);
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
- (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
- (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
- goto err;
- ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
- ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
- ) & 0xffffffffL;
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
-{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
-}
-
-int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
-{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
-}
-
-int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
-{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
-{
- return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
-}
-#endif
-
-X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
-{
- return (a->cert_info->issuer);
-}
-
-unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
-{
- return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
-{
- return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
-}
-#endif
-
-X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
-{
- return (a->cert_info->subject);
-}
-
-ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
-{
- return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
-}
-
-unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
-{
- return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
-{
- return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-/*
- * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
- * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
- * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
- * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
- * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
- * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
- */
-int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
-{
- /* ensure hash is valid */
- X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
- X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
-
- return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-}
-#endif
-
-int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
-{
- int ret;
-
- /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
-
- if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
- ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
- if (ret < 0)
- return -2;
- }
-
- if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
- ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
- if (ret < 0)
- return -2;
- }
-
- ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
-
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
-
-}
-
-unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
-{
- unsigned long ret = 0;
- unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
- i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
- if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
- NULL))
- return 0;
-
- ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
- ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
- ) & 0xffffffffL;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-/*
- * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
- * this is reasonably efficient.
- */
-
-unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
-{
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- unsigned long ret = 0;
- unsigned char md[16];
-
- /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
- i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
- && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
- && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
- ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
- ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
- ) & 0xffffffffL;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
-X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
-{
- int i;
- X509_CINF cinf;
- X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
-
- if (!sk)
- return NULL;
-
- x.cert_info = &cinf;
- cinf.serialNumber = serial;
- cinf.issuer = name;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
- x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
- if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
- return (x509);
- }
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
-{
- X509 *x509;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
- x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
- return (x509);
- }
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
-{
- if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
- return (NULL);
- return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
-}
-
-ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
-{
- if (!x)
- return NULL;
- return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
-}
-
-int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *xk;
- int ret;
-
- xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-
- if (xk)
- ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
- else
- ret = -2;
-
- switch (ret) {
- case 1:
- break;
- case 0:
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
- break;
- case -1:
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
- break;
- case -2:
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
- }
- if (xk)
- EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
- if (ret > 0)
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
+
+ ai = a->cert_info;
+ bi = b->cert_info;
+ i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
+ if (i)
+ return (i);
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
+{
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char md[16];
+ char *f;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
+ goto err;
+ OPENSSL_free(f);
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
+ (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
+ (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+ ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
+}
+
+int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+{
+ return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
+{
+ return (a->cert_info->issuer);
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
+}
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
+{
+ return (a->cert_info->subject);
+}
+
+ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
+{
+ return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+/*
+ * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
+ * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
+ * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
+ * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
+ * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
+ * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
+ */
+int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ /* ensure hash is valid */
+ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
+ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
+
+ rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (rv)
+ return rv;
+ /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
+ if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
+ rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
+ if (rv)
+ return rv;
+ return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
+ a->cert_info->enc.len);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
+
+ if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
+ ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
+ ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
+
+}
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
+{
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
+ if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+ NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+ ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+/*
+ * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
+ * this is reasonably efficient.
+ */
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ unsigned char md[16];
+
+ /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+ && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+ && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
+ ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+ ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
+X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
+ ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_CINF cinf;
+ X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
+
+ if (!sk)
+ return NULL;
+
+ x.cert_info = &cinf;
+ cinf.serialNumber = serial;
+ cinf.issuer = name;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
+ return (x509);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ X509 *x509;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
+ return (x509);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
+{
+ if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
+ return (NULL);
+ return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
+}
+
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
+{
+ if (!x)
+ return NULL;
+ return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
+}
+
+int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *xk;
+ int ret;
+
+ xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+
+ if (xk)
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
+ else
+ ret = -2;
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 1:
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -2:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ }
+ if (xk)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,686 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/x509/x509_lu.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-X509_LOOKUP *X509_LOOKUP_new(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method)
-{
- X509_LOOKUP *ret;
-
- ret = (X509_LOOKUP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_LOOKUP));
- if (ret == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- ret->init = 0;
- ret->skip = 0;
- ret->method = method;
- ret->method_data = NULL;
- ret->store_ctx = NULL;
- if ((method->new_item != NULL) && !method->new_item(ret)) {
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-void X509_LOOKUP_free(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx == NULL)
- return;
- if ((ctx->method != NULL) && (ctx->method->free != NULL))
- (*ctx->method->free) (ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
-}
-
-int X509_LOOKUP_init(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx->method == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (ctx->method->init != NULL)
- return ctx->method->init(ctx);
- else
- return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx->method == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (ctx->method->shutdown != NULL)
- return ctx->method->shutdown(ctx);
- else
- return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_LOOKUP_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl,
- char **ret)
-{
- if (ctx->method == NULL)
- return -1;
- if (ctx->method->ctrl != NULL)
- return ctx->method->ctrl(ctx, cmd, argc, argl, ret);
- else
- return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, X509_NAME *name,
- X509_OBJECT *ret)
-{
- if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_subject == NULL))
- return X509_LU_FAIL;
- if (ctx->skip)
- return 0;
- return ctx->method->get_by_subject(ctx, type, name, ret);
-}
-
-int X509_LOOKUP_by_issuer_serial(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, X509_NAME *name,
- ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_OBJECT *ret)
-{
- if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial == NULL))
- return X509_LU_FAIL;
- return ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial(ctx, type, name, serial, ret);
-}
-
-int X509_LOOKUP_by_fingerprint(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type,
- unsigned char *bytes, int len,
- X509_OBJECT *ret)
-{
- if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint == NULL))
- return X509_LU_FAIL;
- return ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint(ctx, type, bytes, len, ret);
-}
-
-int X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, char *str, int len,
- X509_OBJECT *ret)
-{
- if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_alias == NULL))
- return X509_LU_FAIL;
- return ctx->method->get_by_alias(ctx, type, str, len, ret);
-}
-
-static int x509_object_cmp(const X509_OBJECT *const *a,
- const X509_OBJECT *const *b)
-{
- int ret;
-
- ret = ((*a)->type - (*b)->type);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- switch ((*a)->type) {
- case X509_LU_X509:
- ret = X509_subject_name_cmp((*a)->data.x509, (*b)->data.x509);
- break;
- case X509_LU_CRL:
- ret = X509_CRL_cmp((*a)->data.crl, (*b)->data.crl);
- break;
- default:
- /* abort(); */
- return 0;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void)
-{
- X509_STORE *ret;
-
- if ((ret = (X509_STORE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE))) == NULL)
- return NULL;
- ret->objs = sk_X509_OBJECT_new(x509_object_cmp);
- ret->cache = 1;
- ret->get_cert_methods = sk_X509_LOOKUP_new_null();
- ret->verify = 0;
- ret->verify_cb = 0;
-
- if ((ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- ret->get_issuer = 0;
- ret->check_issued = 0;
- ret->check_revocation = 0;
- ret->get_crl = 0;
- ret->check_crl = 0;
- ret->cert_crl = 0;
- ret->lookup_certs = 0;
- ret->lookup_crls = 0;
- ret->cleanup = 0;
-
- if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
- sk_X509_OBJECT_free(ret->objs);
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret->references = 1;
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void cleanup(X509_OBJECT *a)
-{
- if (!a)
- return;
- if (a->type == X509_LU_X509) {
- X509_free(a->data.x509);
- } else if (a->type == X509_LU_CRL) {
- X509_CRL_free(a->data.crl);
- } else {
- /* abort(); */
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(a);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_free(X509_STORE *vfy)
-{
- int i;
- STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk;
- X509_LOOKUP *lu;
-
- if (vfy == NULL)
- return;
-
- sk = vfy->get_cert_methods;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) {
- lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i);
- X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(lu);
- X509_LOOKUP_free(lu);
- }
- sk_X509_LOOKUP_free(sk);
- sk_X509_OBJECT_pop_free(vfy->objs, cleanup);
-
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, vfy, &vfy->ex_data);
- if (vfy->param)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vfy->param);
- OPENSSL_free(vfy);
-}
-
-X509_LOOKUP *X509_STORE_add_lookup(X509_STORE *v, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *m)
-{
- int i;
- STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk;
- X509_LOOKUP *lu;
-
- sk = v->get_cert_methods;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) {
- lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i);
- if (m == lu->method) {
- return lu;
- }
- }
- /* a new one */
- lu = X509_LOOKUP_new(m);
- if (lu == NULL)
- return NULL;
- else {
- lu->store_ctx = v;
- if (sk_X509_LOOKUP_push(v->get_cert_methods, lu))
- return lu;
- else {
- X509_LOOKUP_free(lu);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, int type, X509_NAME *name,
- X509_OBJECT *ret)
-{
- X509_STORE *ctx = vs->ctx;
- X509_LOOKUP *lu;
- X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp;
- int i, j;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- tmp = X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(ctx->objs, type, name);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
-
- if (tmp == NULL || type == X509_LU_CRL) {
- for (i = vs->current_method;
- i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(ctx->get_cert_methods); i++) {
- lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(ctx->get_cert_methods, i);
- j = X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(lu, type, name, &stmp);
- if (j < 0) {
- vs->current_method = j;
- return j;
- } else if (j) {
- tmp = &stmp;
- break;
- }
- }
- vs->current_method = 0;
- if (tmp == NULL)
- return 0;
- }
-
-/*- if (ret->data.ptr != NULL)
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(ret); */
-
- ret->type = tmp->type;
- ret->data.ptr = tmp->data.ptr;
-
- X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(ret);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
- X509_OBJECT *obj;
- int ret = 1;
-
- if (x == NULL)
- return 0;
- obj = (X509_OBJECT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT));
- if (obj == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- obj->type = X509_LU_X509;
- obj->data.x509 = x;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
-
- X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
-
- if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(ctx->objs, obj)) {
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
- OPENSSL_free(obj);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,
- X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
- ret = 0;
- } else
- sk_X509_OBJECT_push(ctx->objs, obj);
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x)
-{
- X509_OBJECT *obj;
- int ret = 1;
-
- if (x == NULL)
- return 0;
- obj = (X509_OBJECT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT));
- if (obj == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- obj->type = X509_LU_CRL;
- obj->data.crl = x;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
-
- X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
-
- if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(ctx->objs, obj)) {
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
- OPENSSL_free(obj);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
- ret = 0;
- } else
- sk_X509_OBJECT_push(ctx->objs, obj);
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-void X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(X509_OBJECT *a)
-{
- switch (a->type) {
- case X509_LU_X509:
- CRYPTO_add(&a->data.x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- break;
- case X509_LU_CRL:
- CRYPTO_add(&a->data.crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
- break;
- }
-}
-
-void X509_OBJECT_free_contents(X509_OBJECT *a)
-{
- switch (a->type) {
- case X509_LU_X509:
- X509_free(a->data.x509);
- break;
- case X509_LU_CRL:
- X509_CRL_free(a->data.crl);
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static int x509_object_idx_cnt(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, int type,
- X509_NAME *name, int *pnmatch)
-{
- X509_OBJECT stmp;
- X509 x509_s;
- X509_CINF cinf_s;
- X509_CRL crl_s;
- X509_CRL_INFO crl_info_s;
- int idx;
-
- stmp.type = type;
- switch (type) {
- case X509_LU_X509:
- stmp.data.x509 = &x509_s;
- x509_s.cert_info = &cinf_s;
- cinf_s.subject = name;
- break;
- case X509_LU_CRL:
- stmp.data.crl = &crl_s;
- crl_s.crl = &crl_info_s;
- crl_info_s.issuer = name;
- break;
- default:
- /* abort(); */
- return -1;
- }
-
- idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, &stmp);
- if (idx >= 0 && pnmatch) {
- int tidx;
- const X509_OBJECT *tobj, *pstmp;
- *pnmatch = 1;
- pstmp = &stmp;
- for (tidx = idx + 1; tidx < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); tidx++) {
- tobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, tidx);
- if (x509_object_cmp(&tobj, &pstmp))
- break;
- (*pnmatch)++;
- }
- }
- return idx;
-}
-
-int X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, int type,
- X509_NAME *name)
-{
- return x509_object_idx_cnt(h, type, name, NULL);
-}
-
-X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
- int type, X509_NAME *name)
-{
- int idx;
- idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(h, type, name);
- if (idx == -1)
- return NULL;
- return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx);
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_get1_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
-{
- int i, idx, cnt;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
- X509 *x;
- X509_OBJECT *obj;
- sk = sk_X509_new_null();
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt);
- if (idx < 0) {
- /*
- * Nothing found in cache: do lookup to possibly add new objects to
- * cache
- */
- X509_OBJECT xobj;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- if (!X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, nm, &xobj)) {
- sk_X509_free(sk);
- return NULL;
- }
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&xobj);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt);
- if (idx < 0) {
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- sk_X509_free(sk);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
- for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) {
- obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, idx);
- x = obj->data.x509;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- X509_free(x);
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- return sk;
-
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
-{
- int i, idx, cnt;
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk;
- X509_CRL *x;
- X509_OBJECT *obj, xobj;
- sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- /* Check cache first */
- idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt);
-
- /*
- * Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache
- */
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- if (!X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj)) {
- sk_X509_CRL_free(sk);
- return NULL;
- }
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&xobj);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt);
- if (idx < 0) {
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- sk_X509_CRL_free(sk);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) {
- obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, idx);
- x = obj->data.crl;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
- if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(sk, x)) {
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- X509_CRL_free(x);
- sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(sk, X509_CRL_free);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- return sk;
-}
-
-X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
- X509_OBJECT *x)
-{
- int idx, i;
- X509_OBJECT *obj;
- idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, x);
- if (idx == -1)
- return NULL;
- if ((x->type != X509_LU_X509) && (x->type != X509_LU_CRL))
- return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx);
- for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); i++) {
- obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, i);
- if (x509_object_cmp
- ((const X509_OBJECT **)&obj, (const X509_OBJECT **)&x))
- return NULL;
- if (x->type == X509_LU_X509) {
- if (!X509_cmp(obj->data.x509, x->data.x509))
- return obj;
- } else if (x->type == X509_LU_CRL) {
- if (!X509_CRL_match(obj->data.crl, x->data.crl))
- return obj;
- } else
- return obj;
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*-
- * Try to get issuer certificate from store. Due to limitations
- * of the API this can only retrieve a single certificate matching
- * a given subject name. However it will fill the cache with all
- * matching certificates, so we can examine the cache for all
- * matches.
- *
- * Return values are:
- * 1 lookup successful.
- * 0 certificate not found.
- * -1 some other error.
- */
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
- X509_NAME *xn;
- X509_OBJECT obj, *pobj;
- int i, ok, idx, ret;
- xn = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, xn, &obj);
- if (ok != X509_LU_X509) {
- if (ok == X509_LU_RETRY) {
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_GET1_ISSUER, X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY);
- return -1;
- } else if (ok != X509_LU_FAIL) {
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
- /* not good :-(, break anyway */
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- /* If certificate matches all OK */
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, obj.data.x509)) {
- *issuer = obj.data.x509;
- return 1;
- }
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-
- /* Else find index of first cert accepted by 'check_issued' */
- ret = 0;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, xn);
- if (idx != -1) { /* should be true as we've had at least one
- * match */
- /* Look through all matching certs for suitable issuer */
- for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(ctx->ctx->objs); i++) {
- pobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, i);
- /* See if we've run past the matches */
- if (pobj->type != X509_LU_X509)
- break;
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn, X509_get_subject_name(pobj->data.x509)))
- break;
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, pobj->data.x509)) {
- *issuer = pobj->data.x509;
- X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(pobj);
- ret = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_set_flags(X509_STORE *ctx, unsigned long flags)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_set_depth(X509_STORE *ctx, int depth)
-{
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_set_purpose(X509_STORE *ctx, int purpose)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_set_trust(X509_STORE *ctx, int trust)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx,
- int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
-{
- ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP)
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT)
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,684 @@
+/* crypto/x509/x509_lu.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+X509_LOOKUP *X509_LOOKUP_new(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method)
+{
+ X509_LOOKUP *ret;
+
+ ret = (X509_LOOKUP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_LOOKUP));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret->init = 0;
+ ret->skip = 0;
+ ret->method = method;
+ ret->method_data = NULL;
+ ret->store_ctx = NULL;
+ if ((method->new_item != NULL) && !method->new_item(ret)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void X509_LOOKUP_free(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return;
+ if ((ctx->method != NULL) && (ctx->method->free != NULL))
+ (*ctx->method->free) (ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_init(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->method == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (ctx->method->init != NULL)
+ return ctx->method->init(ctx);
+ else
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->method == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (ctx->method->shutdown != NULL)
+ return ctx->method->shutdown(ctx);
+ else
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl,
+ char **ret)
+{
+ if (ctx->method == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ if (ctx->method->ctrl != NULL)
+ return ctx->method->ctrl(ctx, cmd, argc, argl, ret);
+ else
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, X509_NAME *name,
+ X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_subject == NULL))
+ return X509_LU_FAIL;
+ if (ctx->skip)
+ return 0;
+ return ctx->method->get_by_subject(ctx, type, name, ret);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_issuer_serial(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, X509_NAME *name,
+ ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial == NULL))
+ return X509_LU_FAIL;
+ return ctx->method->get_by_issuer_serial(ctx, type, name, serial, ret);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_fingerprint(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type,
+ unsigned char *bytes, int len,
+ X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint == NULL))
+ return X509_LU_FAIL;
+ return ctx->method->get_by_fingerprint(ctx, type, bytes, len, ret);
+}
+
+int X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, char *str, int len,
+ X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ if ((ctx->method == NULL) || (ctx->method->get_by_alias == NULL))
+ return X509_LU_FAIL;
+ return ctx->method->get_by_alias(ctx, type, str, len, ret);
+}
+
+static int x509_object_cmp(const X509_OBJECT *const *a,
+ const X509_OBJECT *const *b)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ((*a)->type - (*b)->type);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ switch ((*a)->type) {
+ case X509_LU_X509:
+ ret = X509_subject_name_cmp((*a)->data.x509, (*b)->data.x509);
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_CRL:
+ ret = X509_CRL_cmp((*a)->data.crl, (*b)->data.crl);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* abort(); */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+X509_STORE *X509_STORE_new(void)
+{
+ X509_STORE *ret;
+
+ if ((ret = (X509_STORE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE))) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ ret->objs = sk_X509_OBJECT_new(x509_object_cmp);
+ ret->cache = 1;
+ ret->get_cert_methods = sk_X509_LOOKUP_new_null();
+ ret->verify = 0;
+ ret->verify_cb = 0;
+
+ if ((ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret->get_issuer = 0;
+ ret->check_issued = 0;
+ ret->check_revocation = 0;
+ ret->get_crl = 0;
+ ret->check_crl = 0;
+ ret->cert_crl = 0;
+ ret->lookup_certs = 0;
+ ret->lookup_crls = 0;
+ ret->cleanup = 0;
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
+ sk_X509_OBJECT_free(ret->objs);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret->references = 1;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void cleanup(X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+ if (!a)
+ return;
+ if (a->type == X509_LU_X509) {
+ X509_free(a->data.x509);
+ } else if (a->type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+ X509_CRL_free(a->data.crl);
+ } else {
+ /* abort(); */
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_free(X509_STORE *vfy)
+{
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lu;
+
+ if (vfy == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ sk = vfy->get_cert_methods;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) {
+ lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i);
+ X509_LOOKUP_shutdown(lu);
+ X509_LOOKUP_free(lu);
+ }
+ sk_X509_LOOKUP_free(sk);
+ sk_X509_OBJECT_pop_free(vfy->objs, cleanup);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE, vfy, &vfy->ex_data);
+ if (vfy->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vfy->param);
+ OPENSSL_free(vfy);
+}
+
+X509_LOOKUP *X509_STORE_add_lookup(X509_STORE *v, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *m)
+{
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *sk;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lu;
+
+ sk = v->get_cert_methods;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(sk); i++) {
+ lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(sk, i);
+ if (m == lu->method) {
+ return lu;
+ }
+ }
+ /* a new one */
+ lu = X509_LOOKUP_new(m);
+ if (lu == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ else {
+ lu->store_ctx = v;
+ if (sk_X509_LOOKUP_push(v->get_cert_methods, lu))
+ return lu;
+ else {
+ X509_LOOKUP_free(lu);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, int type, X509_NAME *name,
+ X509_OBJECT *ret)
+{
+ X509_STORE *ctx = vs->ctx;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lu;
+ X509_OBJECT stmp, *tmp;
+ int i, j;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ tmp = X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(ctx->objs, type, name);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+ if (tmp == NULL || type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+ for (i = vs->current_method;
+ i < sk_X509_LOOKUP_num(ctx->get_cert_methods); i++) {
+ lu = sk_X509_LOOKUP_value(ctx->get_cert_methods, i);
+ j = X509_LOOKUP_by_subject(lu, type, name, &stmp);
+ if (j < 0) {
+ vs->current_method = j;
+ return j;
+ } else if (j) {
+ tmp = &stmp;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ vs->current_method = 0;
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/*- if (ret->data.ptr != NULL)
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(ret); */
+
+ ret->type = tmp->type;
+ ret->data.ptr = tmp->data.ptr;
+
+ X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(ret);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_OBJECT *obj;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ obj = (X509_OBJECT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT));
+ if (obj == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ obj->type = X509_LU_X509;
+ obj->data.x509 = x;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+ X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
+
+ if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(ctx->objs, obj)) {
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
+ OPENSSL_free(obj);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,
+ X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
+ ret = 0;
+ } else
+ sk_X509_OBJECT_push(ctx->objs, obj);
+
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x)
+{
+ X509_OBJECT *obj;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ obj = (X509_OBJECT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT));
+ if (obj == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ obj->type = X509_LU_CRL;
+ obj->data.crl = x;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+ X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
+
+ if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(ctx->objs, obj)) {
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
+ OPENSSL_free(obj);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL, X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
+ ret = 0;
+ } else
+ sk_X509_OBJECT_push(ctx->objs, obj);
+
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+ switch (a->type) {
+ case X509_LU_X509:
+ CRYPTO_add(&a->data.x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_CRL:
+ CRYPTO_add(&a->data.crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+void X509_OBJECT_free_contents(X509_OBJECT *a)
+{
+ switch (a->type) {
+ case X509_LU_X509:
+ X509_free(a->data.x509);
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_CRL:
+ X509_CRL_free(a->data.crl);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static int x509_object_idx_cnt(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, int type,
+ X509_NAME *name, int *pnmatch)
+{
+ X509_OBJECT stmp;
+ X509 x509_s;
+ X509_CINF cinf_s;
+ X509_CRL crl_s;
+ X509_CRL_INFO crl_info_s;
+ int idx;
+
+ stmp.type = type;
+ switch (type) {
+ case X509_LU_X509:
+ stmp.data.x509 = &x509_s;
+ x509_s.cert_info = &cinf_s;
+ cinf_s.subject = name;
+ break;
+ case X509_LU_CRL:
+ stmp.data.crl = &crl_s;
+ crl_s.crl = &crl_info_s;
+ crl_info_s.issuer = name;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* abort(); */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, &stmp);
+ if (idx >= 0 && pnmatch) {
+ int tidx;
+ const X509_OBJECT *tobj, *pstmp;
+ *pnmatch = 1;
+ pstmp = &stmp;
+ for (tidx = idx + 1; tidx < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); tidx++) {
+ tobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, tidx);
+ if (x509_object_cmp(&tobj, &pstmp))
+ break;
+ (*pnmatch)++;
+ }
+ }
+ return idx;
+}
+
+int X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, int type,
+ X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ return x509_object_idx_cnt(h, type, name, NULL);
+}
+
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
+ int type, X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ int idx;
+ idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(h, type, name);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ return NULL;
+ return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_get1_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+ int i, idx, cnt;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
+ X509 *x;
+ X509_OBJECT *obj;
+ sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt);
+ if (idx < 0) {
+ /*
+ * Nothing found in cache: do lookup to possibly add new objects to
+ * cache
+ */
+ X509_OBJECT xobj;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ if (!X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, nm, &xobj)) {
+ sk_X509_free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&xobj);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, nm, &cnt);
+ if (idx < 0) {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ sk_X509_free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) {
+ obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, idx);
+ x = obj->data.x509;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ return sk;
+
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+ int i, idx, cnt;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk;
+ X509_CRL *x;
+ X509_OBJECT *obj, xobj;
+ sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+ /*
+ * Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache
+ */
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ if (!X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj)) {
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&xobj);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt);
+ if (idx < 0) {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, idx++) {
+ obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, idx);
+ x = obj->data.crl;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(sk, x)) {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ X509_CRL_free(x);
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(sk, X509_CRL_free);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ return sk;
+}
+
+X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h,
+ X509_OBJECT *x)
+{
+ int idx, i;
+ X509_OBJECT *obj;
+ idx = sk_X509_OBJECT_find(h, x);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((x->type != X509_LU_X509) && (x->type != X509_LU_CRL))
+ return sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, idx);
+ for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(h); i++) {
+ obj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(h, i);
+ if (x509_object_cmp
+ ((const X509_OBJECT **)&obj, (const X509_OBJECT **)&x))
+ return NULL;
+ if (x->type == X509_LU_X509) {
+ if (!X509_cmp(obj->data.x509, x->data.x509))
+ return obj;
+ } else if (x->type == X509_LU_CRL) {
+ if (!X509_CRL_match(obj->data.crl, x->data.crl))
+ return obj;
+ } else
+ return obj;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Try to get issuer certificate from store. Due to limitations
+ * of the API this can only retrieve a single certificate matching
+ * a given subject name. However it will fill the cache with all
+ * matching certificates, so we can examine the cache for all
+ * matches.
+ *
+ * Return values are:
+ * 1 lookup successful.
+ * 0 certificate not found.
+ * -1 some other error.
+ */
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_NAME *xn;
+ X509_OBJECT obj, *pobj;
+ int i, ok, idx, ret;
+ xn = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, xn, &obj);
+ if (ok != X509_LU_X509) {
+ if (ok == X509_LU_RETRY) {
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_GET1_ISSUER, X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (ok != X509_LU_FAIL) {
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+ /* not good :-(, break anyway */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* If certificate matches all OK */
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, obj.data.x509)) {
+ *issuer = obj.data.x509;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+
+ /* Else find index of first cert accepted by 'check_issued' */
+ ret = 0;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_X509, xn);
+ if (idx != -1) { /* should be true as we've had at least one
+ * match */
+ /* Look through all matching certs for suitable issuer */
+ for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(ctx->ctx->objs); i++) {
+ pobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, i);
+ /* See if we've run past the matches */
+ if (pobj->type != X509_LU_X509)
+ break;
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn, X509_get_subject_name(pobj->data.x509)))
+ break;
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, pobj->data.x509)) {
+ *issuer = pobj->data.x509;
+ X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(pobj);
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_flags(X509_STORE *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_depth(X509_STORE *ctx, int depth)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_purpose(X509_STORE *ctx, int purpose)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set_trust(X509_STORE *ctx, int trust)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE *ctx,
+ int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+{
+ ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP)
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT)
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2215 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-
-/* CRL score values */
-
-/* No unhandled critical extensions */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
-
-/* certificate is within CRL scope */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
-
-/* CRL times valid */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
-
-/* Issuer name matches certificate */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
-
-/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
-
-/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
-
-/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
-
-/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
-
-/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
-
-static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
-static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
-static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
-static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-
-static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
- unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
-static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
-static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
- int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
-static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
- int *pcrl_score);
-static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
- unsigned int *preasons);
-static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
-static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
- STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
-
-static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
-static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
-{
- return ok;
-}
-
-#if 0
-static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
-{
- return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
-}
-#endif
-
-int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
- int bad_chain = 0;
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
- int depth, i, ok = 0;
- int num, j, retry;
- int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
- STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
- if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
- return -1;
- }
-
- cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
- /*
- * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
- * the first entry is in place
- */
- if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
- if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
- (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
- }
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
- }
-
- /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
- if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
- && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
- }
-
- num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
- depth = param->depth;
-
- for (;;) {
- /* If we have enough, we break */
- if (depth < num)
- break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
- * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
- * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
- * later. */
-
- /* If we are self signed, we break */
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
- break;
-
- /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
- if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
- xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
- if (xtmp != NULL) {
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
- }
- CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
- ctx->last_untrusted++;
- x = xtmp;
- num++;
- /*
- * reparse the full chain for the next one
- */
- continue;
- }
- }
- break;
- }
-
- /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
- j = num;
- /*
- * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
- * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
- * complain.
- */
-
- do {
- /*
- * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
- */
- i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
- /* we have a self signed certificate */
- if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
- /*
- * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
- * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
- * possible impersonation.
- */
- ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
- if (ok == 1)
- X509_free(xtmp);
- bad_chain = 1;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- } else {
- /*
- * We have a match: replace certificate with store
- * version so we get any trust settings.
- */
- X509_free(x);
- x = xtmp;
- (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
- ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
- }
- } else {
- /*
- * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
- */
- chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
- ctx->last_untrusted--;
- num--;
- j--;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
- }
- }
- /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
- for (;;) {
- /* If we have enough, we break */
- if (depth < num)
- break;
- /* If we are self signed, we break */
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
- break;
- ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- if (ok < 0)
- return ok;
- if (ok == 0)
- break;
- x = xtmp;
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
- X509_free(xtmp);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- num++;
- }
-
- /*
- * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check
- * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this
- * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking
- */
- retry = 0;
- if (j == ctx->last_untrusted &&
- !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
- while (j-- > 1) {
- xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
- ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
- if (ok < 0)
- goto end;
- /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
- if (ok > 0) {
- /*
- * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
- */
- X509_free(xtmp);
-
- /*
- * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
- * alternate chain
- */
- while (num > j) {
- xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
- X509_free(xtmp);
- num--;
- ctx->last_untrusted--;
- }
- retry = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- } while (retry);
-
- /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
- if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
- if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
- if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
- else
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- } else {
-
- sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
- num++;
- ctx->last_untrusted = num;
- ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
- chain_ss = NULL;
- }
-
- ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
- bad_chain = 1;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
- ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
-
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
-
- /* Check name constraints */
-
- ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
-
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
-
- /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
-
- if (param->trust > 0)
- ok = check_trust(ctx);
-
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
-
- /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
- X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
-
- /*
- * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
- * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
- */
-
- ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
-
- /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
- if (ctx->verify != NULL)
- ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
- else
- ok = internal_verify(ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
- /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
- ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
-#endif
-
- /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
- if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
- ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- if (0) {
- end:
- X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
- }
- if (sktmp != NULL)
- sk_X509_free(sktmp);
- if (chain_ss != NULL)
- X509_free(chain_ss);
- return ok;
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
- */
-
-static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
-{
- int i;
- X509 *issuer;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
- issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
- return issuer;
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
-
-static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
-{
- int ret;
- ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
- if (ret == X509_V_OK)
- return 1;
- /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
- return 0;
-
- ctx->error = ret;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
-
-static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
- *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
- if (*issuer) {
- CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- return 1;
- } else
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
- * purpose
- */
-
-static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
- return 1;
-#else
- int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
- X509 *x;
- int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
- int proxy_path_length = 0;
- int purpose;
- int allow_proxy_certs;
- cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
- /*-
- * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
- * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
- * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
- * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
- * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
- * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
- * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
- */
- must_be_ca = -1;
-
- /* CRL path validation */
- if (ctx->parent) {
- allow_proxy_certs = 0;
- purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
- } else {
- allow_proxy_certs =
- ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
- /*
- * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
- * happy
- */
- if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
- allow_proxy_certs = 1;
- purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
- }
-
- /* Check all untrusted certificates */
- for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
- int ret;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- }
- if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- }
- ret = X509_check_ca(x);
- switch (must_be_ca) {
- case -1:
- if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
- && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
- ret = 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
- } else
- ret = 1;
- break;
- case 0:
- if (ret != 0) {
- ret = 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
- } else
- ret = 1;
- break;
- default:
- if ((ret == 0)
- || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
- && (ret != 1))) {
- ret = 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
- } else
- ret = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (ret == 0) {
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- }
- if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
- ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
- if ((ret == 0)
- || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
- && (ret != 1))) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- }
- }
- /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
- if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
- && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
- && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- }
- /* Increment path length if not self issued */
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
- plen++;
- /*
- * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
- * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
- * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
- */
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
- if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- }
- proxy_path_length++;
- must_be_ca = 0;
- } else
- must_be_ca = 1;
- }
- ok = 1;
- end:
- return ok;
-#endif
-}
-
-static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- X509 *x;
- int i, j, rv;
- /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
- for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
- if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
- continue;
- /*
- * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
- * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
- * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
- * to be obeyed.
- */
- for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
- NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
- if (nc) {
- rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
- if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
- ctx->error = rv;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
- return 1;
-#else
- int i, ok;
- X509 *x;
- int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
- cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
- i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
- if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
- return 1;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
- else
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- return ok;
-#endif
-}
-
-static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int i, last, ok;
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
- return 1;
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
- last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- else {
- /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
- if (ctx->parent)
- return 1;
- last = 0;
- }
- for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ok = check_cert(ctx);
- if (!ok)
- return ok;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
- X509 *x;
- int ok, cnum;
- unsigned int last_reasons;
- cnum = ctx->error_depth;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
- ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
- ctx->current_reasons = 0;
- while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
- last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
- /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
- if (ctx->get_crl)
- ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
- else
- ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
- /*
- * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
- */
- if (!ok) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- ctx->current_crl = crl;
- ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
-
- if (dcrl) {
- ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- } else
- ok = 1;
-
- /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
- if (ok != 2) {
- ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
-
- X509_CRL_free(crl);
- X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
- crl = NULL;
- dcrl = NULL;
- /*
- * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
- * so exit loop.
- */
- if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- err:
- X509_CRL_free(crl);
- X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
-
- ctx->current_crl = NULL;
- return ok;
-
-}
-
-/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
-
-static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
-{
- time_t *ptime;
- int i;
- if (notify)
- ctx->current_crl = crl;
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
- ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
- else
- ptime = NULL;
-
- i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
- if (i == 0) {
- if (!notify)
- return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (i > 0) {
- if (!notify)
- return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
- i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
-
- if (i == 0) {
- if (!notify)
- return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
- /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
- if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
- if (!notify)
- return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (notify)
- ctx->current_crl = NULL;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
- X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
-{
- int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
- unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
- X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
- X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
- X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
- crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
- reasons = *preasons;
- crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
-
- if (crl_score > best_score) {
- best_crl = crl;
- best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
- best_score = crl_score;
- best_reasons = reasons;
- }
- }
-
- if (best_crl) {
- if (*pcrl)
- X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
- *pcrl = best_crl;
- *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
- *pscore = best_score;
- *preasons = best_reasons;
- CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
- if (*pdcrl) {
- X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
- *pdcrl = NULL;
- }
- get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
- }
-
- if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
- * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
- */
-
-static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
-{
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
- int i;
- i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
- if (i >= 0) {
- /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
- if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
- return 0;
- exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
- } else
- exta = NULL;
-
- i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
-
- if (i >= 0) {
-
- if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
- return 0;
- extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
- } else
- extb = NULL;
-
- if (!exta && !extb)
- return 1;
-
- if (!exta || !extb)
- return 0;
-
- if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
-
-static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
-{
- /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
- if (!delta->base_crl_number)
- return 0;
- /* Base must have a CRL number */
- if (!base->crl_number)
- return 0;
- /* Issuer names must match */
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
- return 0;
- /* AKID and IDP must match */
- if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
- return 0;
- if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
- return 0;
- /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
- return 0;
- /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
- * retrieve a chain of deltas...
- */
-
-static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
- X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
-{
- X509_CRL *delta;
- int i;
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
- return;
- if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
- return;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
- delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
- if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
- if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
- *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
- CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
- *dcrl = delta;
- return;
- }
- }
- *dcrl = NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
- * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
- * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
- * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
- * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
- */
-
-static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
- unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
-{
-
- int crl_score = 0;
- unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
-
- /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
-
- /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
- return 0;
- /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
- if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
- return 0;
- } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
- /* If no new reasons reject */
- if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
- return 0;
- }
- /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
- else if (crl->base_crl_number)
- return 0;
- /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
- if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
- return 0;
- } else
- crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
-
- if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
- crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
-
- /* Check expiry */
- if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
- crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
-
- /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
- crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
-
- /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
-
- if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
- return 0;
-
- /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
-
- if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
- /* If no new reasons reject */
- if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
- return 0;
- tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
- crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
- }
-
- *preasons = tmp_reasons;
-
- return crl_score;
-
-}
-
-static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
- X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
-{
- X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
- X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
- int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
- int i;
-
- if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
- cidx++;
-
- crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
-
- if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
- if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
- *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
- *pissuer = crl_issuer;
- return;
- }
- }
-
- for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
- crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
- continue;
- if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
- *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
- *pissuer = crl_issuer;
- return;
- }
- }
-
- /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
-
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
- return;
-
- /*
- * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
- * untrusted certificates.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
- crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
- continue;
- if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
- *pissuer = crl_issuer;
- *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
- return;
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
- * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
- * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
- * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
- */
-
-static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
- X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
- int ret;
- /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
- if (ctx->parent)
- return 0;
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
- return -1;
-
- crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
- /* Copy verify params across */
- X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
-
- crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
- crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
- /* Verify CRL issuer */
- ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
-
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* Check chain is acceptable */
-
- ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
- err:
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
- * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
- * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
- * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
- * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
- * RFC5280 version
- */
-
-static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
- STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
-{
- X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
- cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
- crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
- if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*-
- * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
- * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
- * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
- * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
- * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
- */
-
-static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
-{
- X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
- GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
- GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
- int i, j;
- if (!a || !b)
- return 1;
- if (a->type == 1) {
- if (!a->dpname)
- return 0;
- /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
- if (b->type == 1) {
- if (!b->dpname)
- return 0;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
- }
- /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
- nm = a->dpname;
- gens = b->name.fullname;
- } else if (b->type == 1) {
- if (!b->dpname)
- return 0;
- /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
- gens = a->name.fullname;
- nm = b->dpname;
- }
-
- /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
- if (nm) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
- gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
- if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
- continue;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
- gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
- for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
- genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
- if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
-{
- int i;
- X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
- /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
- if (!dp->CRLissuer)
- return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
- GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
- if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
- continue;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
-
-static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
- unsigned int *preasons)
-{
- int i;
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
- return 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
- return 0;
- } else {
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
- return 0;
- }
- *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
- DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
- if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
- if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
- *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- }
- if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
- && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
- * to find a delta CRL too
- */
-
-static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
-{
- int ok;
- X509 *issuer = NULL;
- int crl_score = 0;
- unsigned int reasons;
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
- X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
- ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
- &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
-
- if (ok)
- goto done;
-
- /* Lookup CRLs from store */
-
- skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
-
- /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
- if (!skcrl && crl)
- goto done;
-
- get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
-
- sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
-
- done:
-
- /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
- if (crl) {
- ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
- ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
- ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
- *pcrl = crl;
- *pdcrl = dcrl;
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check CRL validity */
-static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
-{
- X509 *issuer = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
- int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
- cnum = ctx->error_depth;
- chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
- if (ctx->current_issuer)
- issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
-
- /*
- * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
- * certificate in chain.
- */
- else if (cnum < chnum)
- issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
- else {
- issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
- /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
- if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (issuer) {
- /*
- * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
- */
- if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
- /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
- if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
- !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
- if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
-
- }
-
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
- ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
- ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
-
- if (!ikey) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- } else {
- /* Verify CRL signature */
- if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ok = 1;
-
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
- return ok;
-}
-
-/* Check certificate against CRL */
-static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
-{
- int ok;
- X509_REVOKED *rev;
- /*
- * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
- * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
- * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
- * change the meaning of CRL entries.
- */
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
- * is not removeFromCRL.
- */
- if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
- if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
- return 2;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ret;
- if (ctx->parent)
- return 1;
- ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
- ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
- if (ret == 0) {
- X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
- if (ret == -1) {
- /*
- * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
- */
- X509 *x;
- int i;
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
- continue;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- if (ret == -2) {
- ctx->current_cert = NULL;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- }
-
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
- ctx->current_cert = NULL;
- ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
- time_t *ptime;
- int i;
-
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
- ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
- else
- ptime = NULL;
-
- i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
- if (i == 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (i > 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
- if (i == 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (i < 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int ok = 0, n;
- X509 *xs, *xi;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-
- cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
- n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
- n--;
- xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
-
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
- xs = xi;
- else {
- if (n <= 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
- ctx->current_cert = xi;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- goto end;
- } else {
- n--;
- ctx->error_depth = n;
- xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
- }
- }
-
-/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
- while (n >= 0) {
- ctx->error_depth = n;
-
- /*
- * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
- * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
- * time.
- */
- if (!xs->valid
- && (xs != xi
- || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
- if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
- ctx->current_cert = xi;
- ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
- } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
- ctx->current_cert = xs;
- ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
- if (!ok) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- goto end;
- }
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey = NULL;
- }
-
- xs->valid = 1;
-
- ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
-
- /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
- ctx->current_issuer = xi;
- ctx->current_cert = xs;
- ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
-
- n--;
- if (n >= 0) {
- xi = xs;
- xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
- }
- }
- ok = 1;
- end:
- return ok;
-}
-
-int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
-{
- return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
-}
-
-int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
-{
- char *str;
- ASN1_TIME atm;
- long offset;
- char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
- int i, j, remaining;
-
- p = buff1;
- remaining = ctm->length;
- str = (char *)ctm->data;
- /*
- * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
- * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
- * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
- * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
- */
- if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
- /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
- int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
- int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
- if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
- return 0;
- memcpy(p, str, 10);
- p += 10;
- str += 10;
- remaining -= 10;
- } else {
- /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
- int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
- int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
- if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
- return 0;
- memcpy(p, str, 12);
- p += 12;
- str += 12;
- remaining -= 12;
- }
-
- if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
- *(p++) = '0';
- *(p++) = '0';
- } else {
- /* SS (seconds) */
- if (remaining < 2)
- return 0;
- *(p++) = *(str++);
- *(p++) = *(str++);
- remaining -= 2;
- /*
- * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
- * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
- * Can we just kill them altogether?
- */
- if (remaining && *str == '.') {
- str++;
- remaining--;
- for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
- if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
- break;
- }
- }
-
- }
- *(p++) = 'Z';
- *(p++) = '\0';
-
- /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
- if (!remaining)
- return 0;
- if (*str == 'Z') {
- if (remaining != 1)
- return 0;
- offset = 0;
- } else {
- /* (+-)HHMM */
- if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
- return 0;
- /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
- if (remaining != 5)
- return 0;
- if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
- str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
- return 0;
- offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
- offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
- if (*str == '-')
- offset = -offset;
- }
- atm.type = ctm->type;
- atm.flags = 0;
- atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
- atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
-
- if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
- i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
- if (i < 50)
- i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
- j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
- if (j < 50)
- j += 100;
-
- if (i < j)
- return -1;
- if (i > j)
- return 1;
- }
- i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
- if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
- return -1;
- else
- return i;
-}
-
-ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
-{
- return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
-}
-
-ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
-{
- return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
-}
-
-ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
- int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
-{
- time_t t;
-
- if (in_tm)
- t = *in_tm;
- else
- time(&t);
-
- if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
- if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
- return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
- if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
- return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
- }
- return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
-}
-
-int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
- int i, j;
-
- if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
- return 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
- ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
- if (ktmp == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
- X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
- break;
- else {
- EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
- ktmp = NULL;
- }
- }
- if (ktmp == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
- X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* first, populate the other certs */
- for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
- ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
- }
-
- if (pkey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
- CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
- /*
- * This function is (usually) called only once, by
- * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
- */
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
-{
- return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
-}
-
-void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
-{
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->error;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
-{
- ctx->error = err;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->error_depth;
-}
-
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->current_cert;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->chain;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int i;
- X509 *x;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
- if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain)))
- return NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
- return chain;
-}
-
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->current_issuer;
-}
-
-X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->current_crl;
-}
-
-X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->parent;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
- ctx->cert = x;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-{
- ctx->untrusted = sk;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
-{
- ctx->crls = sk;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
-{
- return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
-{
- return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
-}
-
-/*
- * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
- * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
- * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
- * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
- * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
- * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
- * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
- * client/server.
- */
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
- int purpose, int trust)
-{
- int idx;
- /* If purpose not set use default */
- if (!purpose)
- purpose = def_purpose;
- /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
- if (purpose) {
- X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
- idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
- if (idx == -1) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
- X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
- return 0;
- }
- ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
- if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
- idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
- if (idx == -1) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
- X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
- return 0;
- }
- ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
- }
- /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
- if (!trust)
- trust = ptmp->trust;
- }
- if (trust) {
- idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
- if (idx == -1) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
- X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
- ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
- if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
- ctx->param->trust = trust;
- return 1;
-}
-
-X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
-{
- X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
- ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
- if (!ctx) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
- return ctx;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (!ctx)
- return;
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
-{
- int ret = 1;
- ctx->ctx = store;
- ctx->current_method = 0;
- ctx->cert = x509;
- ctx->untrusted = chain;
- ctx->crls = NULL;
- ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
- ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
- ctx->valid = 0;
- ctx->chain = NULL;
- ctx->error = 0;
- ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
- ctx->error_depth = 0;
- ctx->current_cert = NULL;
- ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
- ctx->current_crl = NULL;
- ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
- ctx->current_reasons = 0;
- ctx->tree = NULL;
- ctx->parent = NULL;
-
- ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-
- if (!ctx->param) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
- */
-
- if (store)
- ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
- else
- ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
-
- if (store) {
- ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
- ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
- } else
- ctx->cleanup = 0;
-
- if (ret)
- ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
-
- if (ret == 0) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (store && store->check_issued)
- ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
- else
- ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
-
- if (store && store->get_issuer)
- ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
- else
- ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
-
- if (store && store->verify_cb)
- ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
- else
- ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
-
- if (store && store->verify)
- ctx->verify = store->verify;
- else
- ctx->verify = internal_verify;
-
- if (store && store->check_revocation)
- ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
- else
- ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
-
- if (store && store->get_crl)
- ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
- else
- ctx->get_crl = NULL;
-
- if (store && store->check_crl)
- ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
- else
- ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
-
- if (store && store->cert_crl)
- ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
- else
- ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
-
- if (store && store->lookup_certs)
- ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
- else
- ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
-
- if (store && store->lookup_crls)
- ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
- else
- ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
-
- ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
-
- /*
- * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
- * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
- * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
- */
- /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
- if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
- &(ctx->ex_data))) {
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
- * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
- */
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-{
- ctx->other_ctx = sk;
- ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx->cleanup)
- ctx->cleanup(ctx);
- if (ctx->param != NULL) {
- if (ctx->parent == NULL)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
- ctx->param = NULL;
- }
- if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
- X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
- ctx->tree = NULL;
- }
- if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
- sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
- ctx->chain = NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
- memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
-{
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
-{
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
- time_t t)
-{
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
-{
- ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
-}
-
-X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->tree;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->explicit_policy;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
-{
- const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
- param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
- if (!param)
- return 0;
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
-}
-
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->param;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
-{
- if (ctx->param)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
- ctx->param = param;
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2221 @@
+/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+/* CRL score values */
+
+/* No unhandled critical extensions */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
+
+/* certificate is within CRL scope */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
+
+/* CRL times valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
+
+/* Issuer name matches certificate */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
+
+/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
+
+/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
+
+/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
+
+/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
+
+/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
+
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+ unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
+ int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
+ int *pcrl_score);
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+ unsigned int *preasons);
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
+{
+ return ok;
+}
+
+#if 0
+static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
+{
+ return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
+ int bad_chain = 0;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
+ int depth, i, ok = 0;
+ int num, j, retry;
+ int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+ if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+ * cannot do another one.
+ */
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+ /*
+ * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
+ * the first entry is in place
+ */
+ if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+ (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
+
+ /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
+ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
+ && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+ depth = param->depth;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If we have enough, we break */
+ if (depth < num)
+ break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
+ * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
+ * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
+ * later. */
+
+ /* If we are self signed, we break */
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
+ break;
+
+ /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
+ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
+ xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
+ if (xtmp != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
+ ctx->last_untrusted++;
+ x = xtmp;
+ num++;
+ /*
+ * reparse the full chain for the next one
+ */
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
+ j = num;
+ /*
+ * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
+ * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
+ * complain.
+ */
+
+ do {
+ /*
+ * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
+ */
+ i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
+ /* we have a self signed certificate */
+ if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
+ /*
+ * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
+ * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
+ * possible impersonation.
+ */
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
+ if (ok == 1)
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ bad_chain = 1;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We have a match: replace certificate with store
+ * version so we get any trust settings.
+ */
+ X509_free(x);
+ x = xtmp;
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+ ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
+ */
+ chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+ ctx->last_untrusted--;
+ num--;
+ j--;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+ }
+ }
+ /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If we have enough, we break */
+ if (depth < num)
+ break;
+ /* If we are self signed, we break */
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
+ break;
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ if (ok < 0)
+ return ok;
+ if (ok == 0)
+ break;
+ x = xtmp;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ num++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check
+ * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this
+ * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking
+ */
+ retry = 0;
+ if (num == ctx->last_untrusted &&
+ !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
+ while (j-- > 1) {
+ xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
+ if (ok < 0)
+ goto end;
+ /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
+ if (ok > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
+ */
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
+ * alternate chain
+ */
+ while (num > j) {
+ xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ num--;
+ }
+ ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ retry = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } while (retry);
+
+ /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
+ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
+ if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
+ if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
+ else
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ } else {
+
+ sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
+ num++;
+ ctx->last_untrusted = num;
+ ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
+ chain_ss = NULL;
+ }
+
+ ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
+ bad_chain = 1;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
+ ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Check name constraints */
+
+ ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
+
+ if (param->trust > 0)
+ ok = check_trust(ctx);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
+ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+
+ /*
+ * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
+ * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
+ */
+
+ ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
+ if (ctx->verify != NULL)
+ ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
+ else
+ ok = internal_verify(ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
+ ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+#endif
+
+ /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
+ if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
+ ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ if (0) {
+ end:
+ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+ }
+ if (sktmp != NULL)
+ sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+ if (chain_ss != NULL)
+ X509_free(chain_ss);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+ */
+
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509 *issuer;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
+ return issuer;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
+
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
+ if (ret == X509_V_OK)
+ return 1;
+ /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx->error = ret;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
+
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
+ if (*issuer) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ return 1;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
+ * purpose
+ */
+
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+ return 1;
+#else
+ int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
+ X509 *x;
+ int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+ int proxy_path_length = 0;
+ int purpose;
+ int allow_proxy_certs;
+ cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+ /*-
+ * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+ * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+ * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+ * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
+ * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+ * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
+ * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+ */
+ must_be_ca = -1;
+
+ /* CRL path validation */
+ if (ctx->parent) {
+ allow_proxy_certs = 0;
+ purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
+ } else {
+ allow_proxy_certs =
+ ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+ /*
+ * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
+ * happy
+ */
+ if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
+ allow_proxy_certs = 1;
+ purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
+ }
+
+ /* Check all untrusted certificates */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
+ int ret;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = X509_check_ca(x);
+ switch (must_be_ca) {
+ case -1:
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if ((ret == 0)
+ || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1))) {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
+ ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
+ if ((ret == 0)
+ || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1))) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
+ if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
+ && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+ && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Increment path length if not self issued */
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ plen++;
+ /*
+ * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
+ * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
+ * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
+ */
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ proxy_path_length++;
+ must_be_ca = 0;
+ } else
+ must_be_ca = 1;
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ end:
+ return ok;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509 *x;
+ int i, j, rv;
+ /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
+ for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
+ if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
+ * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
+ * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
+ * to be obeyed.
+ */
+ for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
+ NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
+ if (nc) {
+ rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+ ctx->error = rv;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+ return 1;
+#else
+ int i, ok;
+ X509 *x;
+ int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+ cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
+ i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+ if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+ return 1;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+ else
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ return ok;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i, last, ok;
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+ return 1;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+ last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ else {
+ /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
+ if (ctx->parent)
+ return 1;
+ last = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ok = check_cert(ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ int ok, cnum;
+ unsigned int last_reasons;
+ cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+ ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+ while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
+ last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+ /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+ if (ctx->get_crl)
+ ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+ else
+ ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
+ /*
+ * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
+ */
+ if (!ok) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ctx->current_crl = crl;
+ ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (dcrl) {
+ ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ ok = 1;
+
+ /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
+ if (ok != 2) {
+ ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+ crl = NULL;
+ dcrl = NULL;
+ /*
+ * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
+ * so exit loop.
+ */
+ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ err:
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+ return ok;
+
+}
+
+/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
+
+static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
+{
+ time_t *ptime;
+ int i;
+ if (notify)
+ ctx->current_crl = crl;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
+ if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (notify)
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
+ X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+ int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
+ unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
+ X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
+ X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
+ X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+ crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ reasons = *preasons;
+ crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
+
+ if (crl_score > best_score) {
+ best_crl = crl;
+ best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+ best_score = crl_score;
+ best_reasons = reasons;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (best_crl) {
+ if (*pcrl)
+ X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
+ *pcrl = best_crl;
+ *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
+ *pscore = best_score;
+ *preasons = best_reasons;
+ CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ if (*pdcrl) {
+ X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
+ *pdcrl = NULL;
+ }
+ get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
+ }
+
+ if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
+ * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
+ */
+
+static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
+ int i;
+ i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+ if (i >= 0) {
+ /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
+ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
+ return 0;
+ exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
+ } else
+ exta = NULL;
+
+ i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
+
+ if (i >= 0) {
+
+ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
+ return 0;
+ extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
+ } else
+ extb = NULL;
+
+ if (!exta && !extb)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!exta || !extb)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
+
+static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
+{
+ /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
+ if (!delta->base_crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* Base must have a CRL number */
+ if (!base->crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* Issuer names must match */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
+ return 0;
+ /* AKID and IDP must match */
+ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+ return 0;
+ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+ return 0;
+ /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
+ * retrieve a chain of deltas...
+ */
+
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
+ X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+ X509_CRL *delta;
+ int i;
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
+ return;
+ if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+ delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
+ if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
+ *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
+ CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ *dcrl = delta;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ *dcrl = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
+ * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
+ * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
+ * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
+ * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
+ */
+
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+ unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+{
+
+ int crl_score = 0;
+ unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
+
+ /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
+
+ /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ return 0;
+ /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
+ /* If no new reasons reject */
+ if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
+ else if (crl->base_crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
+ if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+ if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
+
+ /* Check expiry */
+ if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+ /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
+ crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
+
+ /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
+
+ if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
+
+ if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
+ /* If no new reasons reject */
+ if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+ return 0;
+ tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+ }
+
+ *preasons = tmp_reasons;
+
+ return crl_score;
+
+}
+
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
+{
+ X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+ int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+ int i;
+
+ if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+ cidx++;
+
+ crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+
+ if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+ if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
+ *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
+ *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
+ crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+ continue;
+ if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+ *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
+ *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
+
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
+ * untrusted certificates.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
+ crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+ continue;
+ if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+ *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+ *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
+ * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
+ * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
+ * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
+ int ret;
+ /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
+ if (ctx->parent)
+ return 0;
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
+ return -1;
+
+ crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
+ /* Copy verify params across */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
+
+ crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
+ crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+ /* Verify CRL issuer */
+ ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
+
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Check chain is acceptable */
+
+ ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
+ err:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
+ * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
+ * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
+ * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
+ * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
+ * RFC5280 version
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
+{
+ X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
+ cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+ crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+ if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
+ * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
+ * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
+ * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
+ * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
+ */
+
+static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
+{
+ X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
+ int i, j;
+ if (!a || !b)
+ return 1;
+ if (a->type == 1) {
+ if (!a->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
+ if (b->type == 1) {
+ if (!b->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+ nm = a->dpname;
+ gens = b->name.fullname;
+ } else if (b->type == 1) {
+ if (!b->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+ gens = a->name.fullname;
+ nm = b->dpname;
+ }
+
+ /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
+ if (nm) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+ gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+ if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
+ gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
+ genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
+ if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+ /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
+ if (!dp->CRLissuer)
+ return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+ if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
+
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+ unsigned int *preasons)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+ return 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+ DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+ if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
+ if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
+ *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
+ && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
+ * to find a delta CRL too
+ */
+
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
+{
+ int ok;
+ X509 *issuer = NULL;
+ int crl_score = 0;
+ unsigned int reasons;
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
+ X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+ ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
+ &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
+
+ if (ok)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Lookup CRLs from store */
+
+ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+
+ /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
+ if (!skcrl && crl)
+ goto done;
+
+ get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
+
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+ done:
+
+ /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
+ if (crl) {
+ ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+ ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
+ ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ *pdcrl = dcrl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check CRL validity */
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ X509 *issuer = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+ int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
+ cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
+ if (ctx->current_issuer)
+ issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
+
+ /*
+ * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
+ * certificate in chain.
+ */
+ else if (cnum < chnum)
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+ else {
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+ /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
+ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (issuer) {
+ /*
+ * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
+ */
+ if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
+ /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+ !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
+ if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
+ ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+ ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
+
+ if (!ikey) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ /* Verify CRL signature */
+ if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+/* Check certificate against CRL */
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+{
+ int ok;
+ X509_REVOKED *rev;
+ /*
+ * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
+ * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
+ * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
+ * change the meaning of CRL entries.
+ */
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
+ * is not removeFromCRL.
+ */
+ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
+ if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+ return 2;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+ if (ctx->parent)
+ return 1;
+ ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ /*
+ * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
+ */
+ X509 *x;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+ continue;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (ret == -2) {
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ time_t *ptime;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i < 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ok = 0, n;
+ X509 *xs, *xi;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+
+ cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+ n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
+ n--;
+ xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
+ xs = xi;
+ else {
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
+ ctx->current_cert = xi;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ n--;
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+ xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ }
+ }
+
+/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
+ while (n >= 0) {
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+
+ /*
+ * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
+ * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
+ * time.
+ */
+ if (!xs->valid
+ && (xs != xi
+ || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
+ if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ ctx->current_cert = xi;
+ ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+ ctx->current_cert = xs;
+ ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
+ if (!ok) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ xs->valid = 1;
+
+ ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+ ctx->current_issuer = xi;
+ ctx->current_cert = xs;
+ ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+
+ n--;
+ if (n >= 0) {
+ xi = xs;
+ xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ }
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ end:
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
+{
+ return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
+{
+ char *str;
+ ASN1_TIME atm;
+ long offset;
+ char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
+ int i, j, remaining;
+
+ p = buff1;
+ remaining = ctm->length;
+ str = (char *)ctm->data;
+ /*
+ * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
+ * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
+ * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ */
+ if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
+ /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(p, str, 10);
+ p += 10;
+ str += 10;
+ remaining -= 10;
+ } else {
+ /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(p, str, 12);
+ p += 12;
+ str += 12;
+ remaining -= 12;
+ }
+
+ if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
+ *(p++) = '0';
+ *(p++) = '0';
+ } else {
+ /* SS (seconds) */
+ if (remaining < 2)
+ return 0;
+ *(p++) = *(str++);
+ *(p++) = *(str++);
+ remaining -= 2;
+ /*
+ * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
+ * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
+ * Can we just kill them altogether?
+ */
+ if (remaining && *str == '.') {
+ str++;
+ remaining--;
+ for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
+ if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ *(p++) = 'Z';
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+
+ /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
+ if (!remaining)
+ return 0;
+ if (*str == 'Z') {
+ if (remaining != 1)
+ return 0;
+ offset = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* (+-)HHMM */
+ if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
+ return 0;
+ /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
+ if (remaining != 5)
+ return 0;
+ if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
+ str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
+ return 0;
+ offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
+ offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
+ if (*str == '-')
+ offset = -offset;
+ }
+ atm.type = ctm->type;
+ atm.flags = 0;
+ atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
+ atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
+
+ if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
+ i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
+ if (i < 50)
+ i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
+ j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
+ if (j < 50)
+ j += 100;
+
+ if (i < j)
+ return -1;
+ if (i > j)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
+ if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return i;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
+{
+ return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+{
+ return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
+ int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+{
+ time_t t;
+
+ if (in_tm)
+ t = *in_tm;
+ else
+ time(&t);
+
+ if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
+ if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+ return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+ if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+ return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+ }
+ return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+}
+
+int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
+ int i, j;
+
+ if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
+ if (ktmp == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
+ X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
+ break;
+ else {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
+ ktmp = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ktmp == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
+ X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* first, populate the other certs */
+ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+ ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
+ }
+
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+ CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+ /*
+ * This function is (usually) called only once, by
+ * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
+ */
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->error;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
+{
+ ctx->error = err;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->error_depth;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->current_cert;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->chain;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509 *x;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+ if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain)))
+ return NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+ return chain;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->current_issuer;
+}
+
+X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->current_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->parent;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ ctx->cert = x;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ ctx->untrusted = sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
+{
+ ctx->crls = sk;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
+{
+ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
+{
+ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
+ * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
+ * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
+ * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
+ * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
+ * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
+ * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
+ * client/server.
+ */
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
+ int purpose, int trust)
+{
+ int idx;
+ /* If purpose not set use default */
+ if (!purpose)
+ purpose = def_purpose;
+ /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
+ if (purpose) {
+ X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ }
+ /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
+ if (!trust)
+ trust = ptmp->trust;
+ }
+ if (trust) {
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
+ ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+ if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
+ ctx->param->trust = trust;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+ ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+ if (!ctx) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+ ctx->ctx = store;
+ ctx->current_method = 0;
+ ctx->cert = x509;
+ ctx->untrusted = chain;
+ ctx->crls = NULL;
+ ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+ ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
+ ctx->valid = 0;
+ ctx->chain = NULL;
+ ctx->error = 0;
+ ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+ ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+ ctx->tree = NULL;
+ ctx->parent = NULL;
+
+ ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+
+ if (!ctx->param) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
+ */
+
+ if (store)
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
+ else
+ ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
+
+ if (store) {
+ ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+ } else
+ ctx->cleanup = 0;
+
+ if (ret)
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (store && store->check_issued)
+ ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+ else
+ ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+
+ if (store && store->get_issuer)
+ ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+ else
+ ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+
+ if (store && store->verify_cb)
+ ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ else
+ ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+
+ if (store && store->verify)
+ ctx->verify = store->verify;
+ else
+ ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+
+ if (store && store->check_revocation)
+ ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+ else
+ ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+
+ if (store && store->get_crl)
+ ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->get_crl = NULL;
+
+ if (store && store->check_crl)
+ ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->cert_crl)
+ ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+ ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
+
+ if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+ ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
+
+ ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+
+ /*
+ * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
+ * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
+ * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
+ */
+ /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
+ if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+ &(ctx->ex_data))) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
+ * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
+ */
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ ctx->other_ctx = sk;
+ ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->cleanup)
+ ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+ if (ctx->param != NULL) {
+ if (ctx->parent == NULL)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
+ X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
+ ctx->tree = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+ ctx->chain = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
+ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+ time_t t)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+{
+ ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+}
+
+X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->tree;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->explicit_policy;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+ const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+ param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+ if (!param)
+ return 0;
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->param;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ if (ctx->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param = param;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,487 +0,0 @@
-/* v3_cpols.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 1999.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "pcy_int.h"
-
-/* Certificate policies extension support: this one is a bit complex... */
-
-static int i2r_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pol,
- BIO *out, int indent);
-static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
- X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *value);
-static void print_qualifiers(BIO *out, STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *quals,
- int indent);
-static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERNOTICE *notice, int indent);
-static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polstrs, int ia5org);
-static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot, int ia5org);
-static int nref_nos(STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *nnums, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos);
-
-const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_cpols = {
- NID_certificate_policies, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES),
- 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0,
- 0, 0,
- (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_certpol,
- (X509V3_EXT_R2I)r2i_certpol,
- NULL
-};
-
-ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES) =
- ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, CERTIFICATEPOLICIES, POLICYINFO)
-ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES)
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICYINFO) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYINFO, policyid, ASN1_OBJECT),
- ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(POLICYINFO, qualifiers, POLICYQUALINFO)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICYINFO)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYINFO)
-
-ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(policydefault) = ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.other, ASN1_ANY);
-
-ASN1_ADB(POLICYQUALINFO) = {
- ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_qt_cps, ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.cpsuri, ASN1_IA5STRING)),
- ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_qt_unotice, ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.usernotice, USERNOTICE))
-} ASN1_ADB_END(POLICYQUALINFO, 0, pqualid, 0, &policydefault_tt, NULL);
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICYQUALINFO) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, pqualid, ASN1_OBJECT),
- ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(POLICYQUALINFO)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICYQUALINFO)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYQUALINFO)
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(USERNOTICE) = {
- ASN1_OPT(USERNOTICE, noticeref, NOTICEREF),
- ASN1_OPT(USERNOTICE, exptext, DISPLAYTEXT)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(USERNOTICE)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(USERNOTICE)
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(NOTICEREF) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(NOTICEREF, organization, DISPLAYTEXT),
- ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(NOTICEREF, noticenos, ASN1_INTEGER)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NOTICEREF)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NOTICEREF)
-
-static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
- X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *value)
-{
- STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pols = NULL;
- char *pstr;
- POLICYINFO *pol;
- ASN1_OBJECT *pobj;
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals;
- CONF_VALUE *cnf;
- int i, ia5org;
- pols = sk_POLICYINFO_new_null();
- if (pols == NULL) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- vals = X509V3_parse_list(value);
- if (vals == NULL) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_X509V3_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ia5org = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) {
- cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i);
- if (cnf->value || !cnf->name) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL,
- X509V3_R_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIER);
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- pstr = cnf->name;
- if (!strcmp(pstr, "ia5org")) {
- ia5org = 1;
- continue;
- } else if (*pstr == '@') {
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polsect;
- polsect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, pstr + 1);
- if (!polsect) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION);
-
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- pol = policy_section(ctx, polsect, ia5org);
- X509V3_section_free(ctx, polsect);
- if (!pol)
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!(pobj = OBJ_txt2obj(cnf->name, 0))) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL,
- X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- pol = POLICYINFO_new();
- pol->policyid = pobj;
- }
- if (!sk_POLICYINFO_push(pols, pol)) {
- POLICYINFO_free(pol);
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
- return pols;
- err:
- sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
- sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(pols, POLICYINFO_free);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polstrs, int ia5org)
-{
- int i;
- CONF_VALUE *cnf;
- POLICYINFO *pol;
- POLICYQUALINFO *qual;
- if (!(pol = POLICYINFO_new()))
- goto merr;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(polstrs); i++) {
- cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(polstrs, i);
- if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "policyIdentifier")) {
- ASN1_OBJECT *pobj;
- if (!(pobj = OBJ_txt2obj(cnf->value, 0))) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION,
- X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- pol->policyid = pobj;
-
- } else if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "CPS")) {
- if (!pol->qualifiers)
- pol->qualifiers = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_new_null();
- if (!(qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()))
- goto merr;
- if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual))
- goto merr;
- if (!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps))) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!(qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new()))
- goto merr;
- if (!ASN1_STRING_set(qual->d.cpsuri, cnf->value,
- strlen(cnf->value)))
- goto merr;
- } else if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "userNotice")) {
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot;
- if (*cnf->value != '@') {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION,
- X509V3_R_EXPECTED_A_SECTION_NAME);
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- unot = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->value + 1);
- if (!unot) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION);
-
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- qual = notice_section(ctx, unot, ia5org);
- X509V3_section_free(ctx, unot);
- if (!qual)
- goto err;
- if (!pol->qualifiers)
- pol->qualifiers = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_new_null();
- if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual))
- goto merr;
- } else {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION);
-
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (!pol->policyid) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_NO_POLICY_IDENTIFIER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- return pol;
-
- merr:
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-
- err:
- POLICYINFO_free(pol);
- return NULL;
-
-}
-
-static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot, int ia5org)
-{
- int i, ret;
- CONF_VALUE *cnf;
- USERNOTICE *not;
- POLICYQUALINFO *qual;
- if (!(qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()))
- goto merr;
- if (!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice))) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!(not = USERNOTICE_new()))
- goto merr;
- qual->d.usernotice = not;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(unot); i++) {
- cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(unot, i);
- if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "explicitText")) {
- if (!(not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new()))
- goto merr;
- if (!ASN1_STRING_set(not->exptext, cnf->value,
- strlen(cnf->value)))
- goto merr;
- } else if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "organization")) {
- NOTICEREF *nref;
- if (!not->noticeref) {
- if (!(nref = NOTICEREF_new()))
- goto merr;
- not->noticeref = nref;
- } else
- nref = not->noticeref;
- if (ia5org)
- nref->organization->type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
- else
- nref->organization->type = V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING;
- if (!ASN1_STRING_set(nref->organization, cnf->value,
- strlen(cnf->value)))
- goto merr;
- } else if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "noticeNumbers")) {
- NOTICEREF *nref;
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos;
- if (!not->noticeref) {
- if (!(nref = NOTICEREF_new()))
- goto merr;
- not->noticeref = nref;
- } else
- nref = not->noticeref;
- nos = X509V3_parse_list(cnf->value);
- if (!nos || !sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nos)) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBERS);
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = nref_nos(nref->noticenos, nos);
- sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nos, X509V3_conf_free);
- if (!ret)
- goto err;
- } else {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION);
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (not->noticeref &&
- (!not->noticeref->noticenos || !not->noticeref->organization)) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION,
- X509V3_R_NEED_ORGANIZATION_AND_NUMBERS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- return qual;
-
- merr:
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-
- err:
- POLICYQUALINFO_free(qual);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int nref_nos(STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *nnums, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos)
-{
- CONF_VALUE *cnf;
- ASN1_INTEGER *aint;
-
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nos); i++) {
- cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nos, i);
- if (!(aint = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, cnf->name))) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_NREF_NOS, X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBER);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!sk_ASN1_INTEGER_push(nnums, aint))
- goto merr;
- }
- return 1;
-
- merr:
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_NREF_NOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-
- err:
- sk_ASN1_INTEGER_pop_free(nnums, ASN1_STRING_free);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int i2r_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pol,
- BIO *out, int indent)
-{
- int i;
- POLICYINFO *pinfo;
- /* First print out the policy OIDs */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(pol); i++) {
- pinfo = sk_POLICYINFO_value(pol, i);
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy: ", indent, "");
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pinfo->policyid);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- if (pinfo->qualifiers)
- print_qualifiers(out, pinfo->qualifiers, indent + 2);
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void print_qualifiers(BIO *out, STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *quals,
- int indent)
-{
- POLICYQUALINFO *qualinfo;
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(quals); i++) {
- qualinfo = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(quals, i);
- switch (OBJ_obj2nid(qualinfo->pqualid)) {
- case NID_id_qt_cps:
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sCPS: %s\n", indent, "",
- qualinfo->d.cpsuri->data);
- break;
-
- case NID_id_qt_unotice:
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sUser Notice:\n", indent, "");
- print_notice(out, qualinfo->d.usernotice, indent + 2);
- break;
-
- default:
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sUnknown Qualifier: ", indent + 2, "");
-
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, qualinfo->pqualid);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- break;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERNOTICE *notice, int indent)
-{
- int i;
- if (notice->noticeref) {
- NOTICEREF *ref;
- ref = notice->noticeref;
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sOrganization: %s\n", indent, "",
- ref->organization->data);
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sNumber%s: ", indent, "",
- sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(ref->noticenos) > 1 ? "s" : "");
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(ref->noticenos); i++) {
- ASN1_INTEGER *num;
- char *tmp;
- num = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value(ref->noticenos, i);
- if (i)
- BIO_puts(out, ", ");
- tmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, num);
- BIO_puts(out, tmp);
- OPENSSL_free(tmp);
- }
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- }
- if (notice->exptext)
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sExplicit Text: %s\n", indent, "",
- notice->exptext->data);
-}
-
-void X509_POLICY_NODE_print(BIO *out, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent)
-{
- const X509_POLICY_DATA *dat = node->data;
-
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy: ", indent, "");
-
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, dat->valid_policy);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s\n", indent + 2, "",
- node_data_critical(dat) ? "Critical" : "Non Critical");
- if (dat->qualifier_set)
- print_qualifiers(out, dat->qualifier_set, indent + 2);
- else
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Qualifiers\n", indent + 2, "");
-}
-
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE)
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA)
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,491 @@
+/* v3_cpols.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "pcy_int.h"
+
+/* Certificate policies extension support: this one is a bit complex... */
+
+static int i2r_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pol,
+ BIO *out, int indent);
+static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+ X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *value);
+static void print_qualifiers(BIO *out, STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *quals,
+ int indent);
+static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERNOTICE *notice, int indent);
+static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polstrs, int ia5org);
+static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot, int ia5org);
+static int nref_nos(STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *nnums, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_cpols = {
+ NID_certificate_policies, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES),
+ 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0,
+ 0, 0,
+ (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_certpol,
+ (X509V3_EXT_R2I)r2i_certpol,
+ NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES) =
+ ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, CERTIFICATEPOLICIES, POLICYINFO)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CERTIFICATEPOLICIES)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICYINFO) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYINFO, policyid, ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(POLICYINFO, qualifiers, POLICYQUALINFO)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICYINFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYINFO)
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(policydefault) = ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.other, ASN1_ANY);
+
+ASN1_ADB(POLICYQUALINFO) = {
+ ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_qt_cps, ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.cpsuri, ASN1_IA5STRING)),
+ ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_qt_unotice, ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, d.usernotice, USERNOTICE))
+} ASN1_ADB_END(POLICYQUALINFO, 0, pqualid, 0, &policydefault_tt, NULL);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(POLICYQUALINFO) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(POLICYQUALINFO, pqualid, ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(POLICYQUALINFO)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(POLICYQUALINFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(POLICYQUALINFO)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(USERNOTICE) = {
+ ASN1_OPT(USERNOTICE, noticeref, NOTICEREF),
+ ASN1_OPT(USERNOTICE, exptext, DISPLAYTEXT)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(USERNOTICE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(USERNOTICE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(NOTICEREF) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(NOTICEREF, organization, DISPLAYTEXT),
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(NOTICEREF, noticenos, ASN1_INTEGER)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NOTICEREF)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NOTICEREF)
+
+static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+ X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *value)
+{
+ STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pols = NULL;
+ char *pstr;
+ POLICYINFO *pol;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *pobj;
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals;
+ CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+ int i, ia5org;
+ pols = sk_POLICYINFO_new_null();
+ if (pols == NULL) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ vals = X509V3_parse_list(value);
+ if (vals == NULL) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_X509V3_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ia5org = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) {
+ cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i);
+ if (cnf->value || !cnf->name) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL,
+ X509V3_R_INVALID_POLICY_IDENTIFIER);
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pstr = cnf->name;
+ if (!strcmp(pstr, "ia5org")) {
+ ia5org = 1;
+ continue;
+ } else if (*pstr == '@') {
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polsect;
+ polsect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, pstr + 1);
+ if (!polsect) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION);
+
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pol = policy_section(ctx, polsect, ia5org);
+ X509V3_section_free(ctx, polsect);
+ if (!pol)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!(pobj = OBJ_txt2obj(cnf->name, 0))) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL,
+ X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pol = POLICYINFO_new();
+ if (pol == NULL) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pol->policyid = pobj;
+ }
+ if (!sk_POLICYINFO_push(pols, pol)) {
+ POLICYINFO_free(pol);
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
+ return pols;
+ err:
+ sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
+ sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(pols, POLICYINFO_free);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *polstrs, int ia5org)
+{
+ int i;
+ CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+ POLICYINFO *pol;
+ POLICYQUALINFO *qual;
+ if (!(pol = POLICYINFO_new()))
+ goto merr;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(polstrs); i++) {
+ cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(polstrs, i);
+ if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "policyIdentifier")) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *pobj;
+ if (!(pobj = OBJ_txt2obj(cnf->value, 0))) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION,
+ X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pol->policyid = pobj;
+
+ } else if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "CPS")) {
+ if (!pol->qualifiers)
+ pol->qualifiers = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_new_null();
+ if (!(qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()))
+ goto merr;
+ if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual))
+ goto merr;
+ if (!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps))) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new()))
+ goto merr;
+ if (!ASN1_STRING_set(qual->d.cpsuri, cnf->value,
+ strlen(cnf->value)))
+ goto merr;
+ } else if (!name_cmp(cnf->name, "userNotice")) {
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot;
+ if (*cnf->value != '@') {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION,
+ X509V3_R_EXPECTED_A_SECTION_NAME);
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ unot = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->value + 1);
+ if (!unot) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION);
+
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ qual = notice_section(ctx, unot, ia5org);
+ X509V3_section_free(ctx, unot);
+ if (!qual)
+ goto err;
+ if (!pol->qualifiers)
+ pol->qualifiers = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_new_null();
+ if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual))
+ goto merr;
+ } else {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION);
+
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!pol->policyid) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, X509V3_R_NO_POLICY_IDENTIFIER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return pol;
+
+ merr:
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+ POLICYINFO_free(pol);
+ return NULL;
+
+}
+
+static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *unot, int ia5org)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+ CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+ USERNOTICE *not;
+ POLICYQUALINFO *qual;
+ if (!(qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()))
+ goto merr;
+ if (!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice))) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(not = USERNOTICE_new()))
+ goto merr;
+ qual->d.usernotice = not;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(unot); i++) {
+ cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(unot, i);
+ if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "explicitText")) {
+ if (!(not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new()))
+ goto merr;
+ if (!ASN1_STRING_set(not->exptext, cnf->value,
+ strlen(cnf->value)))
+ goto merr;
+ } else if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "organization")) {
+ NOTICEREF *nref;
+ if (!not->noticeref) {
+ if (!(nref = NOTICEREF_new()))
+ goto merr;
+ not->noticeref = nref;
+ } else
+ nref = not->noticeref;
+ if (ia5org)
+ nref->organization->type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+ else
+ nref->organization->type = V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING;
+ if (!ASN1_STRING_set(nref->organization, cnf->value,
+ strlen(cnf->value)))
+ goto merr;
+ } else if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "noticeNumbers")) {
+ NOTICEREF *nref;
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos;
+ if (!not->noticeref) {
+ if (!(nref = NOTICEREF_new()))
+ goto merr;
+ not->noticeref = nref;
+ } else
+ nref = not->noticeref;
+ nos = X509V3_parse_list(cnf->value);
+ if (!nos || !sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nos)) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBERS);
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = nref_nos(nref->noticenos, nos);
+ sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nos, X509V3_conf_free);
+ if (!ret)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, X509V3_R_INVALID_OPTION);
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (not->noticeref &&
+ (!not->noticeref->noticenos || !not->noticeref->organization)) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION,
+ X509V3_R_NEED_ORGANIZATION_AND_NUMBERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return qual;
+
+ merr:
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+ POLICYQUALINFO_free(qual);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int nref_nos(STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *nnums, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nos)
+{
+ CONF_VALUE *cnf;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *aint;
+
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nos); i++) {
+ cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nos, i);
+ if (!(aint = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, cnf->name))) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_NREF_NOS, X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_ASN1_INTEGER_push(nnums, aint))
+ goto merr;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ merr:
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_NREF_NOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+ sk_ASN1_INTEGER_pop_free(nnums, ASN1_STRING_free);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int i2r_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *pol,
+ BIO *out, int indent)
+{
+ int i;
+ POLICYINFO *pinfo;
+ /* First print out the policy OIDs */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(pol); i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_POLICYINFO_value(pol, i);
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy: ", indent, "");
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pinfo->policyid);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ if (pinfo->qualifiers)
+ print_qualifiers(out, pinfo->qualifiers, indent + 2);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void print_qualifiers(BIO *out, STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *quals,
+ int indent)
+{
+ POLICYQUALINFO *qualinfo;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYQUALINFO_num(quals); i++) {
+ qualinfo = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(quals, i);
+ switch (OBJ_obj2nid(qualinfo->pqualid)) {
+ case NID_id_qt_cps:
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sCPS: %s\n", indent, "",
+ qualinfo->d.cpsuri->data);
+ break;
+
+ case NID_id_qt_unotice:
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sUser Notice:\n", indent, "");
+ print_notice(out, qualinfo->d.usernotice, indent + 2);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sUnknown Qualifier: ", indent + 2, "");
+
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, qualinfo->pqualid);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERNOTICE *notice, int indent)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (notice->noticeref) {
+ NOTICEREF *ref;
+ ref = notice->noticeref;
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sOrganization: %s\n", indent, "",
+ ref->organization->data);
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sNumber%s: ", indent, "",
+ sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(ref->noticenos) > 1 ? "s" : "");
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(ref->noticenos); i++) {
+ ASN1_INTEGER *num;
+ char *tmp;
+ num = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value(ref->noticenos, i);
+ if (i)
+ BIO_puts(out, ", ");
+ tmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, num);
+ BIO_puts(out, tmp);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ }
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ }
+ if (notice->exptext)
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sExplicit Text: %s\n", indent, "",
+ notice->exptext->data);
+}
+
+void X509_POLICY_NODE_print(BIO *out, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent)
+{
+ const X509_POLICY_DATA *dat = node->data;
+
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy: ", indent, "");
+
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, dat->valid_policy);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*s%s\n", indent + 2, "",
+ node_data_critical(dat) ? "Critical" : "Non Critical");
+ if (dat->qualifier_set)
+ print_qualifiers(out, dat->qualifier_set, indent + 2);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Qualifiers\n", indent + 2, "");
+}
+
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE)
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA)
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,477 +0,0 @@
-/* v3_ncons.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
- X509V3_CTX *ctx,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
-static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a,
- BIO *bp, int ind);
-static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
- STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees, BIO *bp,
- int ind, char *name);
-static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip);
-
-static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
-static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *sub, GENERAL_NAME *gen);
-static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *sub, X509_NAME *nm);
-static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *dns);
-static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *eml);
-static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base);
-
-const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_name_constraints = {
- NID_name_constraints, 0,
- ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS),
- 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0,
- 0, v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
- i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, 0,
- NULL
-};
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(GENERAL_SUBTREE) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(GENERAL_SUBTREE, base, GENERAL_NAME),
- ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, minimum, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
- ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, maximum, ASN1_INTEGER, 1)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = {
- ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, permittedSubtrees,
- GENERAL_SUBTREE, 0),
- ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, excludedSubtrees,
- GENERAL_SUBTREE, 1),
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
-
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
-
-static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
- X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
-{
- int i;
- CONF_VALUE tval, *val;
- STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) **ptree = NULL;
- NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = NULL;
- GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub = NULL;
- ncons = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new();
- if (!ncons)
- goto memerr;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
- val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
- if (!strncmp(val->name, "permitted", 9) && val->name[9]) {
- ptree = &ncons->permittedSubtrees;
- tval.name = val->name + 10;
- } else if (!strncmp(val->name, "excluded", 8) && val->name[8]) {
- ptree = &ncons->excludedSubtrees;
- tval.name = val->name + 9;
- } else {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX);
- goto err;
- }
- tval.value = val->value;
- sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new();
- if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1))
- goto err;
- if (!*ptree)
- *ptree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_new_null();
- if (!*ptree || !sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_push(*ptree, sub))
- goto memerr;
- sub = NULL;
- }
-
- return ncons;
-
- memerr:
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- err:
- if (ncons)
- NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ncons);
- if (sub)
- GENERAL_SUBTREE_free(sub);
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a,
- BIO *bp, int ind)
-{
- NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = a;
- do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->permittedSubtrees,
- bp, ind, "Permitted");
- do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->excludedSubtrees,
- bp, ind, "Excluded");
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
- STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees,
- BIO *bp, int ind, char *name)
-{
- GENERAL_SUBTREE *tree;
- int i;
- if (sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees) > 0)
- BIO_printf(bp, "%*s%s:\n", ind, "", name);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees); i++) {
- tree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(trees, i);
- BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind + 2, "");
- if (tree->base->type == GEN_IPADD)
- print_nc_ipadd(bp, tree->base->d.ip);
- else
- GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, tree->base);
- BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip)
-{
- int i, len;
- unsigned char *p;
- p = ip->data;
- len = ip->length;
- BIO_puts(bp, "IP:");
- if (len == 8) {
- BIO_printf(bp, "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d.%d.%d.%d",
- p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4], p[5], p[6], p[7]);
- } else if (len == 32) {
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
- BIO_printf(bp, "%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]);
- p += 2;
- if (i == 7)
- BIO_puts(bp, "/");
- else if (i != 15)
- BIO_puts(bp, ":");
- }
- } else
- BIO_printf(bp, "IP Address:<invalid>");
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*-
- * Check a certificate conforms to a specified set of constraints.
- * Return values:
- * X509_V_OK: All constraints obeyed.
- * X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: Permitted subtree violation.
- * X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: Excluded subtree violation.
- * X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: Min or max values present and matching type.
- * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: Unsupported constraint type.
- * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: bad unsupported constraint syntax.
- * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: bad or unsupported syntax of name
- */
-
-int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
-{
- int r, i;
- X509_NAME *nm;
-
- nm = X509_get_subject_name(x);
-
- if (X509_NAME_entry_count(nm) > 0) {
- GENERAL_NAME gntmp;
- gntmp.type = GEN_DIRNAME;
- gntmp.d.directoryName = nm;
-
- r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
-
- if (r != X509_V_OK)
- return r;
-
- gntmp.type = GEN_EMAIL;
-
- /* Process any email address attributes in subject name */
-
- for (i = -1;;) {
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
- i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i);
- if (i == -1)
- break;
- ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
- gntmp.d.rfc822Name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
- if (gntmp.d.rfc822Name->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
- return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
-
- r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
-
- if (r != X509_V_OK)
- return r;
- }
-
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname); i++) {
- GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(x->altname, i);
- r = nc_match(gen, nc);
- if (r != X509_V_OK)
- return r;
- }
-
- return X509_V_OK;
-
-}
-
-static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
-{
- GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub;
- int i, r, match = 0;
-
- /*
- * Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of matching the type at
- * least one subtree must match.
- */
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees); i++) {
- sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->permittedSubtrees, i);
- if (gen->type != sub->base->type)
- continue;
- if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum)
- return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
- /* If we already have a match don't bother trying any more */
- if (match == 2)
- continue;
- if (match == 0)
- match = 1;
- r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
- if (r == X509_V_OK)
- match = 2;
- else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
- return r;
- }
-
- if (match == 1)
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
-
- /* Excluded subtrees: must not match any of these */
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); i++) {
- sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->excludedSubtrees, i);
- if (gen->type != sub->base->type)
- continue;
- if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum)
- return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
-
- r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
- if (r == X509_V_OK)
- return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION;
- else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
- return r;
-
- }
-
- return X509_V_OK;
-
-}
-
-static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *gen, GENERAL_NAME *base)
-{
- switch (base->type) {
- case GEN_DIRNAME:
- return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName);
-
- case GEN_DNS:
- return nc_dns(gen->d.dNSName, base->d.dNSName);
-
- case GEN_EMAIL:
- return nc_email(gen->d.rfc822Name, base->d.rfc822Name);
-
- case GEN_URI:
- return nc_uri(gen->d.uniformResourceIdentifier,
- base->d.uniformResourceIdentifier);
-
- default:
- return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE;
- }
-
-}
-
-/*
- * directoryName name constraint matching. The canonical encoding of
- * X509_NAME makes this comparison easy. It is matched if the subtree is a
- * subset of the name.
- */
-
-static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *nm, X509_NAME *base)
-{
- /* Ensure canonical encodings are up to date. */
- if (nm->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) < 0)
- return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- if (base->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(base, NULL) < 0)
- return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- if (base->canon_enclen > nm->canon_enclen)
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
- if (memcmp(base->canon_enc, nm->canon_enc, base->canon_enclen))
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
- return X509_V_OK;
-}
-
-static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
-{
- char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
- char *dnsptr = (char *)dns->data;
- /* Empty matches everything */
- if (!*baseptr)
- return X509_V_OK;
- /*
- * Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS
- * and if dns is longer and expect '.' as preceding character.
- */
- if (dns->length > base->length) {
- dnsptr += dns->length - base->length;
- if (*baseptr != '.' && dnsptr[-1] != '.')
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
- }
-
- if (strcasecmp(baseptr, dnsptr))
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
-
- return X509_V_OK;
-
-}
-
-static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
-{
- const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
- const char *emlptr = (char *)eml->data;
-
- const char *baseat = strchr(baseptr, '@');
- const char *emlat = strchr(emlptr, '@');
- if (!emlat)
- return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
- /* Special case: inital '.' is RHS match */
- if (!baseat && (*baseptr == '.')) {
- if (eml->length > base->length) {
- emlptr += eml->length - base->length;
- if (!strcasecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
- return X509_V_OK;
- }
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
- }
-
- /* If we have anything before '@' match local part */
-
- if (baseat) {
- if (baseat != baseptr) {
- if ((baseat - baseptr) != (emlat - emlptr))
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
- /* Case sensitive match of local part */
- if (strncmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlat - emlptr))
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
- }
- /* Position base after '@' */
- baseptr = baseat + 1;
- }
- emlptr = emlat + 1;
- /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */
- if (strcasecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
-
- return X509_V_OK;
-
-}
-
-static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
-{
- const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
- const char *hostptr = (char *)uri->data;
- const char *p = strchr(hostptr, ':');
- int hostlen;
- /* Check for foo:// and skip past it */
- if (!p || (p[1] != '/') || (p[2] != '/'))
- return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
- hostptr = p + 3;
-
- /* Determine length of hostname part of URI */
-
- /* Look for a port indicator as end of hostname first */
-
- p = strchr(hostptr, ':');
- /* Otherwise look for trailing slash */
- if (!p)
- p = strchr(hostptr, '/');
-
- if (!p)
- hostlen = strlen(hostptr);
- else
- hostlen = p - hostptr;
-
- if (hostlen == 0)
- return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
-
- /* Special case: inital '.' is RHS match */
- if (*baseptr == '.') {
- if (hostlen > base->length) {
- p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length;
- if (!strncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length))
- return X509_V_OK;
- }
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
- }
-
- if ((base->length != (int)hostlen)
- || strncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen))
- return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
-
- return X509_V_OK;
-
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,479 @@
+/* v3_ncons.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+ X509V3_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval);
+static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a,
+ BIO *bp, int ind);
+static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees, BIO *bp,
+ int ind, char *name);
+static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip);
+
+static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
+static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *sub, GENERAL_NAME *gen);
+static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *sub, X509_NAME *nm);
+static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *dns);
+static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *eml);
+static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_name_constraints = {
+ NID_name_constraints, 0,
+ ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS),
+ 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0,
+ 0, v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
+ i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, 0,
+ NULL
+};
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(GENERAL_SUBTREE) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(GENERAL_SUBTREE, base, GENERAL_NAME),
+ ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, minimum, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
+ ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, maximum, ASN1_INTEGER, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = {
+ ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, permittedSubtrees,
+ GENERAL_SUBTREE, 0),
+ ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, excludedSubtrees,
+ GENERAL_SUBTREE, 1),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+ X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
+{
+ int i;
+ CONF_VALUE tval, *val;
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) **ptree = NULL;
+ NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = NULL;
+ GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub = NULL;
+ ncons = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new();
+ if (!ncons)
+ goto memerr;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) {
+ val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i);
+ if (!strncmp(val->name, "permitted", 9) && val->name[9]) {
+ ptree = &ncons->permittedSubtrees;
+ tval.name = val->name + 10;
+ } else if (!strncmp(val->name, "excluded", 8) && val->name[8]) {
+ ptree = &ncons->excludedSubtrees;
+ tval.name = val->name + 9;
+ } else {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tval.value = val->value;
+ sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new();
+ if (sub == NULL)
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (!*ptree)
+ *ptree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_new_null();
+ if (!*ptree || !sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_push(*ptree, sub))
+ goto memerr;
+ sub = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ncons;
+
+ memerr:
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+ if (ncons)
+ NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ncons);
+ if (sub)
+ GENERAL_SUBTREE_free(sub);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a,
+ BIO *bp, int ind)
+{
+ NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = a;
+ do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->permittedSubtrees,
+ bp, ind, "Permitted");
+ do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->excludedSubtrees,
+ bp, ind, "Excluded");
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees,
+ BIO *bp, int ind, char *name)
+{
+ GENERAL_SUBTREE *tree;
+ int i;
+ if (sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees) > 0)
+ BIO_printf(bp, "%*s%s:\n", ind, "", name);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees); i++) {
+ tree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(trees, i);
+ BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind + 2, "");
+ if (tree->base->type == GEN_IPADD)
+ print_nc_ipadd(bp, tree->base->d.ip);
+ else
+ GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, tree->base);
+ BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip)
+{
+ int i, len;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ p = ip->data;
+ len = ip->length;
+ BIO_puts(bp, "IP:");
+ if (len == 8) {
+ BIO_printf(bp, "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d.%d.%d.%d",
+ p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4], p[5], p[6], p[7]);
+ } else if (len == 32) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ BIO_printf(bp, "%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]);
+ p += 2;
+ if (i == 7)
+ BIO_puts(bp, "/");
+ else if (i != 15)
+ BIO_puts(bp, ":");
+ }
+ } else
+ BIO_printf(bp, "IP Address:<invalid>");
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check a certificate conforms to a specified set of constraints.
+ * Return values:
+ * X509_V_OK: All constraints obeyed.
+ * X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: Permitted subtree violation.
+ * X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: Excluded subtree violation.
+ * X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: Min or max values present and matching type.
+ * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: Unsupported constraint type.
+ * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: bad unsupported constraint syntax.
+ * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: bad or unsupported syntax of name
+ */
+
+int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
+{
+ int r, i;
+ X509_NAME *nm;
+
+ nm = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+
+ if (X509_NAME_entry_count(nm) > 0) {
+ GENERAL_NAME gntmp;
+ gntmp.type = GEN_DIRNAME;
+ gntmp.d.directoryName = nm;
+
+ r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
+
+ if (r != X509_V_OK)
+ return r;
+
+ gntmp.type = GEN_EMAIL;
+
+ /* Process any email address attributes in subject name */
+
+ for (i = -1;;) {
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
+ i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i);
+ if (i == -1)
+ break;
+ ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
+ gntmp.d.rfc822Name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
+ if (gntmp.d.rfc822Name->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+
+ r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc);
+
+ if (r != X509_V_OK)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname); i++) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(x->altname, i);
+ r = nc_match(gen, nc);
+ if (r != X509_V_OK)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
+
+static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
+{
+ GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub;
+ int i, r, match = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of matching the type at
+ * least one subtree must match.
+ */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees); i++) {
+ sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->permittedSubtrees, i);
+ if (gen->type != sub->base->type)
+ continue;
+ if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
+ /* If we already have a match don't bother trying any more */
+ if (match == 2)
+ continue;
+ if (match == 0)
+ match = 1;
+ r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
+ if (r == X509_V_OK)
+ match = 2;
+ else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (match == 1)
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
+ /* Excluded subtrees: must not match any of these */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); i++) {
+ sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->excludedSubtrees, i);
+ if (gen->type != sub->base->type)
+ continue;
+ if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
+
+ r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
+ if (r == X509_V_OK)
+ return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION;
+ else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
+ return r;
+
+ }
+
+ return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
+
+static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *gen, GENERAL_NAME *base)
+{
+ switch (base->type) {
+ case GEN_DIRNAME:
+ return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName);
+
+ case GEN_DNS:
+ return nc_dns(gen->d.dNSName, base->d.dNSName);
+
+ case GEN_EMAIL:
+ return nc_email(gen->d.rfc822Name, base->d.rfc822Name);
+
+ case GEN_URI:
+ return nc_uri(gen->d.uniformResourceIdentifier,
+ base->d.uniformResourceIdentifier);
+
+ default:
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE;
+ }
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * directoryName name constraint matching. The canonical encoding of
+ * X509_NAME makes this comparison easy. It is matched if the subtree is a
+ * subset of the name.
+ */
+
+static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *nm, X509_NAME *base)
+{
+ /* Ensure canonical encodings are up to date. */
+ if (nm->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) < 0)
+ return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ if (base->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(base, NULL) < 0)
+ return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ if (base->canon_enclen > nm->canon_enclen)
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+ if (memcmp(base->canon_enc, nm->canon_enc, base->canon_enclen))
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+ return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
+{
+ char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
+ char *dnsptr = (char *)dns->data;
+ /* Empty matches everything */
+ if (!*baseptr)
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ /*
+ * Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS
+ * and if dns is longer and expect '.' as preceding character.
+ */
+ if (dns->length > base->length) {
+ dnsptr += dns->length - base->length;
+ if (*baseptr != '.' && dnsptr[-1] != '.')
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+ }
+
+ if (strcasecmp(baseptr, dnsptr))
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
+ return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
+
+static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
+{
+ const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
+ const char *emlptr = (char *)eml->data;
+
+ const char *baseat = strchr(baseptr, '@');
+ const char *emlat = strchr(emlptr, '@');
+ if (!emlat)
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+ /* Special case: inital '.' is RHS match */
+ if (!baseat && (*baseptr == '.')) {
+ if (eml->length > base->length) {
+ emlptr += eml->length - base->length;
+ if (!strcasecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ }
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+ }
+
+ /* If we have anything before '@' match local part */
+
+ if (baseat) {
+ if (baseat != baseptr) {
+ if ((baseat - baseptr) != (emlat - emlptr))
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+ /* Case sensitive match of local part */
+ if (strncmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlat - emlptr))
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+ }
+ /* Position base after '@' */
+ baseptr = baseat + 1;
+ }
+ emlptr = emlat + 1;
+ /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */
+ if (strcasecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
+ return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
+
+static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
+{
+ const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
+ const char *hostptr = (char *)uri->data;
+ const char *p = strchr(hostptr, ':');
+ int hostlen;
+ /* Check for foo:// and skip past it */
+ if (!p || (p[1] != '/') || (p[2] != '/'))
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+ hostptr = p + 3;
+
+ /* Determine length of hostname part of URI */
+
+ /* Look for a port indicator as end of hostname first */
+
+ p = strchr(hostptr, ':');
+ /* Otherwise look for trailing slash */
+ if (!p)
+ p = strchr(hostptr, '/');
+
+ if (!p)
+ hostlen = strlen(hostptr);
+ else
+ hostlen = p - hostptr;
+
+ if (hostlen == 0)
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
+
+ /* Special case: inital '.' is RHS match */
+ if (*baseptr == '.') {
+ if (hostlen > base->length) {
+ p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length;
+ if (!strncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ }
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+ }
+
+ if ((base->length != (int)hostlen)
+ || strncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen))
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
+ return X509_V_OK;
+
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,317 +0,0 @@
-/* v3_pci.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/*
- * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
- * (richard at levitte.org)
- */
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H\xF6gskolan
- * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/conf.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *ext,
- BIO *out, int indent);
-static PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *r2i_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
- X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str);
-
-const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_pci =
- { NID_proxyCertInfo, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION),
- 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0,
- NULL, NULL,
- (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_pci,
- (X509V3_EXT_R2I)r2i_pci,
- NULL,
-};
-
-static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci,
- BIO *out, int indent)
-{
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sPath Length Constraint: ", indent, "");
- if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint)
- i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
- else
- BIO_printf(out, "infinite");
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Language: ", indent, "");
- i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage);
- BIO_puts(out, "\n");
- if (pci->proxyPolicy->policy && pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data)
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %s\n", indent, "",
- pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int process_pci_value(CONF_VALUE *val,
- ASN1_OBJECT **language, ASN1_INTEGER **pathlen,
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **policy)
-{
- int free_policy = 0;
-
- if (strcmp(val->name, "language") == 0) {
- if (*language) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
- X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!(*language = OBJ_txt2obj(val->value, 0))) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
- X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (strcmp(val->name, "pathlen") == 0) {
- if (*pathlen) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
- X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, pathlen)) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
- X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (strcmp(val->name, "policy") == 0) {
- unsigned char *tmp_data = NULL;
- long val_len;
- if (!*policy) {
- *policy = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- if (!*policy) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- return 0;
- }
- free_policy = 1;
- }
- if (strncmp(val->value, "hex:", 4) == 0) {
- unsigned char *tmp_data2 =
- string_to_hex(val->value + 4, &val_len);
-
- if (!tmp_data2) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
- X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- goto err;
- }
-
- tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
- (*policy)->length + val_len + 1);
- if (tmp_data) {
- (*policy)->data = tmp_data;
- memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length],
- tmp_data2, val_len);
- (*policy)->length += val_len;
- (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
- } else {
- OPENSSL_free(tmp_data2);
- /*
- * realloc failure implies the original data space is b0rked
- * too!
- */
- (*policy)->data = NULL;
- (*policy)->length = 0;
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(tmp_data2);
- } else if (strncmp(val->value, "file:", 5) == 0) {
- unsigned char buf[2048];
- int n;
- BIO *b = BIO_new_file(val->value + 5, "r");
- if (!b) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- goto err;
- }
- while ((n = BIO_read(b, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0
- || (n == 0 && BIO_should_retry(b))) {
- if (!n)
- continue;
-
- tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
- (*policy)->length + n + 1);
-
- if (!tmp_data)
- break;
-
- (*policy)->data = tmp_data;
- memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length], buf, n);
- (*policy)->length += n;
- (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
- }
- BIO_free_all(b);
-
- if (n < 0) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (strncmp(val->value, "text:", 5) == 0) {
- val_len = strlen(val->value + 5);
- tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
- (*policy)->length + val_len + 1);
- if (tmp_data) {
- (*policy)->data = tmp_data;
- memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length],
- val->value + 5, val_len);
- (*policy)->length += val_len;
- (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
- } else {
- /*
- * realloc failure implies the original data space is b0rked
- * too!
- */
- (*policy)->data = NULL;
- (*policy)->length = 0;
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
- X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!tmp_data) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- X509V3_conf_err(val);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- return 1;
- err:
- if (free_policy) {
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*policy);
- *policy = NULL;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *r2i_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
- X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *value)
-{
- PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci = NULL;
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals;
- ASN1_OBJECT *language = NULL;
- ASN1_INTEGER *pathlen = NULL;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *policy = NULL;
- int i, j;
-
- vals = X509V3_parse_list(value);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) {
- CONF_VALUE *cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i);
- if (!cnf->name || (*cnf->name != '@' && !cnf->value)) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,
- X509V3_R_INVALID_PROXY_POLICY_SETTING);
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- if (*cnf->name == '@') {
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect;
- int success_p = 1;
-
- sect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->name + 1);
- if (!sect) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION);
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- for (j = 0; success_p && j < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); j++) {
- success_p =
- process_pci_value(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, j),
- &language, &pathlen, &policy);
- }
- X509V3_section_free(ctx, sect);
- if (!success_p)
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (!process_pci_value(cnf, &language, &pathlen, &policy)) {
- X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* Language is mandatory */
- if (!language) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,
- X509V3_R_NO_PROXY_CERT_POLICY_LANGUAGE_DEFINED);
- goto err;
- }
- i = OBJ_obj2nid(language);
- if ((i == NID_Independent || i == NID_id_ppl_inheritAll) && policy) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,
- X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pci = PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_new();
- if (!pci) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage = language;
- language = NULL;
- pci->proxyPolicy->policy = policy;
- policy = NULL;
- pci->pcPathLengthConstraint = pathlen;
- pathlen = NULL;
- goto end;
- err:
- if (language) {
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(language);
- language = NULL;
- }
- if (pathlen) {
- ASN1_INTEGER_free(pathlen);
- pathlen = NULL;
- }
- if (policy) {
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(policy);
- policy = NULL;
- }
- if (pci) {
- PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
- pci = NULL;
- }
- end:
- sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
- return pci;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+/* v3_pci.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/*
+ * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
+ * (richard at levitte.org)
+ */
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *ext,
+ BIO *out, int indent);
+static PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *r2i_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+ X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *str);
+
+const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_pci =
+ { NID_proxyCertInfo, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION),
+ 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ (X509V3_EXT_I2R)i2r_pci,
+ (X509V3_EXT_R2I)r2i_pci,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci,
+ BIO *out, int indent)
+{
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sPath Length Constraint: ", indent, "");
+ if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint)
+ i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
+ else
+ BIO_printf(out, "infinite");
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Language: ", indent, "");
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage);
+ BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+ if (pci->proxyPolicy->policy && pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data)
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %s\n", indent, "",
+ pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int process_pci_value(CONF_VALUE *val,
+ ASN1_OBJECT **language, ASN1_INTEGER **pathlen,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **policy)
+{
+ int free_policy = 0;
+
+ if (strcmp(val->name, "language") == 0) {
+ if (*language) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+ X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(*language = OBJ_txt2obj(val->value, 0))) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+ X509V3_R_INVALID_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (strcmp(val->name, "pathlen") == 0) {
+ if (*pathlen) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+ X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!X509V3_get_value_int(val, pathlen)) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+ X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (strcmp(val->name, "policy") == 0) {
+ unsigned char *tmp_data = NULL;
+ long val_len;
+ if (!*policy) {
+ *policy = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (!*policy) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ free_policy = 1;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(val->value, "hex:", 4) == 0) {
+ unsigned char *tmp_data2 =
+ string_to_hex(val->value + 4, &val_len);
+
+ if (!tmp_data2) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+ X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
+ (*policy)->length + val_len + 1);
+ if (tmp_data) {
+ (*policy)->data = tmp_data;
+ memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length],
+ tmp_data2, val_len);
+ (*policy)->length += val_len;
+ (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_data2);
+ /*
+ * realloc failure implies the original data space is b0rked
+ * too!
+ */
+ (*policy)->data = NULL;
+ (*policy)->length = 0;
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_data2);
+ } else if (strncmp(val->value, "file:", 5) == 0) {
+ unsigned char buf[2048];
+ int n;
+ BIO *b = BIO_new_file(val->value + 5, "r");
+ if (!b) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ while ((n = BIO_read(b, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0
+ || (n == 0 && BIO_should_retry(b))) {
+ if (!n)
+ continue;
+
+ tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
+ (*policy)->length + n + 1);
+
+ if (!tmp_data)
+ break;
+
+ (*policy)->data = tmp_data;
+ memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length], buf, n);
+ (*policy)->length += n;
+ (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
+ }
+ BIO_free_all(b);
+
+ if (n < 0) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (strncmp(val->value, "text:", 5) == 0) {
+ val_len = strlen(val->value + 5);
+ tmp_data = OPENSSL_realloc((*policy)->data,
+ (*policy)->length + val_len + 1);
+ if (tmp_data) {
+ (*policy)->data = tmp_data;
+ memcpy(&(*policy)->data[(*policy)->length],
+ val->value + 5, val_len);
+ (*policy)->length += val_len;
+ (*policy)->data[(*policy)->length] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * realloc failure implies the original data space is b0rked
+ * too!
+ */
+ (*policy)->data = NULL;
+ (*policy)->length = 0;
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,
+ X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!tmp_data) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ X509V3_conf_err(val);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (free_policy) {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*policy);
+ *policy = NULL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *r2i_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+ X509V3_CTX *ctx, char *value)
+{
+ PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *language = NULL;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *pathlen = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *policy = NULL;
+ int i, j;
+
+ vals = X509V3_parse_list(value);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) {
+ CONF_VALUE *cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i);
+ if (!cnf->name || (*cnf->name != '@' && !cnf->value)) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,
+ X509V3_R_INVALID_PROXY_POLICY_SETTING);
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (*cnf->name == '@') {
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect;
+ int success_p = 1;
+
+ sect = X509V3_get_section(ctx, cnf->name + 1);
+ if (!sect) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, X509V3_R_INVALID_SECTION);
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; success_p && j < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); j++) {
+ success_p =
+ process_pci_value(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, j),
+ &language, &pathlen, &policy);
+ }
+ X509V3_section_free(ctx, sect);
+ if (!success_p)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!process_pci_value(cnf, &language, &pathlen, &policy)) {
+ X509V3_conf_err(cnf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Language is mandatory */
+ if (!language) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,
+ X509V3_R_NO_PROXY_CERT_POLICY_LANGUAGE_DEFINED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = OBJ_obj2nid(language);
+ if ((i == NID_Independent || i == NID_id_ppl_inheritAll) && policy) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI,
+ X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pci = PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_new();
+ if (!pci) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_PCI, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage = language;
+ language = NULL;
+ pci->proxyPolicy->policy = policy;
+ policy = NULL;
+ pci->pcPathLengthConstraint = pathlen;
+ pathlen = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ err:
+ if (language) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(language);
+ language = NULL;
+ }
+ if (pathlen) {
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(pathlen);
+ pathlen = NULL;
+ }
+ if (policy) {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(policy);
+ policy = NULL;
+ }
+ if (pci) {
+ PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
+ pci = NULL;
+ }
+ end:
+ sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free);
+ return pci;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-/* v3_pcia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/*
- * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
- * (richard at levitte.org)
- */
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H\xF6gskolan
- * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
- * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- * without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(PROXY_POLICY) =
- {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(PROXY_POLICY,policyLanguage,ASN1_OBJECT),
- ASN1_OPT(PROXY_POLICY,policy,ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PROXY_POLICY)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_POLICY)
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION) =
- {
- ASN1_OPT(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,pcPathLengthConstraint,ASN1_INTEGER),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,proxyPolicy,PROXY_POLICY)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION)
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* v3_pcia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/*
+ * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
+ * (richard at levitte.org)
+ */
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PROXY_POLICY) =
+ {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(PROXY_POLICY,policyLanguage,ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_OPT(PROXY_POLICY,policy,ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PROXY_POLICY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_POLICY)
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION) =
+ {
+ ASN1_OPT(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,pcPathLengthConstraint,ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION,proxyPolicy,PROXY_POLICY)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION)
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/easy_tls/README
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/demos/easy_tls/README 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/easy_tls/README 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-easy_tls - generic SSL/TLS proxy
-========
-
-(... and example for non-blocking SSL/TLS I/O multiplexing.)
-
-
- easy_tls.c, easy_tls.h:
-
- Small generic SSL/TLS proxy library: With a few function calls,
- an application socket will be replaced by a pipe handled by a
- separate SSL/TLS proxy process. This allows easily adding
- SSL/TLS support to many programs not originally designed for it.
-
- [Actually easy_tls.c is not a proper library: Customization
- requires defining preprocessor macros while compiling it.
- This is quite confusing, so I'll probably change it.]
-
- These files may be used under the OpenSSL license.
-
-
-
- test.c, test.h, Makefile, cert.pem, cacerts.pem:
-
- Rudimentary example program using the easy_tls library, and
- example key and certificates for it. Usage examples:
-
- $ ./test 8443 # create server listening at port 8443
- $ ./test 127.0.0.1 8443 # create client, connect to port 8443
- # at IP address 127.0.0.1
-
- 'test' will not automatically do SSL/TLS, or even read or write
- data -- it must be told to do so on input lines starting
- with a command letter. 'W' means write a line, 'R' means
- read a line, 'C' means close the connection, 'T' means
- start an SSL/TLS proxy. E.g. (user input tagged with '*'):
-
- * R
- <<< 220 mail.example.net
- * WSTARTTLS
- >>> STARTTLS
- * R
- <<< 220 Ready to start TLS
- * T
- test_process_init(fd = 3, client_p = 1, apparg = (nil))
- +++ `E:self signed certificate in certificate chain'
- +++ `<... certificate info ...>'
- * WHELO localhost
- >>> HELO localhost
- R
- <<< 250 mail.example.net
-
- You can even do SSL/TLS over SSL/TLS over SSL/TLS ... by using
- 'T' multiple times. I have no idea why you would want to though.
-
-
-This code is rather old. When I find time I will update anything that
-should be changed, and improve code comments. To compile the sample
-program 'test' on platforms other then Linux or Solaris, you will have
-to edit the Makefile.
-
-As noted above, easy_tls.c will be changed to become a library one
-day, which means that future revisions will not be fully compatible to
-the current version.
-
-Bodo M\xF6ller <bodo at openssl.org>
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/easy_tls/README (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/demos/easy_tls/README)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/easy_tls/README (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/easy_tls/README 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+easy_tls - generic SSL/TLS proxy
+========
+
+(... and example for non-blocking SSL/TLS I/O multiplexing.)
+
+
+ easy_tls.c, easy_tls.h:
+
+ Small generic SSL/TLS proxy library: With a few function calls,
+ an application socket will be replaced by a pipe handled by a
+ separate SSL/TLS proxy process. This allows easily adding
+ SSL/TLS support to many programs not originally designed for it.
+
+ [Actually easy_tls.c is not a proper library: Customization
+ requires defining preprocessor macros while compiling it.
+ This is quite confusing, so I'll probably change it.]
+
+ These files may be used under the OpenSSL license.
+
+
+
+ test.c, test.h, Makefile, cert.pem, cacerts.pem:
+
+ Rudimentary example program using the easy_tls library, and
+ example key and certificates for it. Usage examples:
+
+ $ ./test 8443 # create server listening at port 8443
+ $ ./test 127.0.0.1 8443 # create client, connect to port 8443
+ # at IP address 127.0.0.1
+
+ 'test' will not automatically do SSL/TLS, or even read or write
+ data -- it must be told to do so on input lines starting
+ with a command letter. 'W' means write a line, 'R' means
+ read a line, 'C' means close the connection, 'T' means
+ start an SSL/TLS proxy. E.g. (user input tagged with '*'):
+
+ * R
+ <<< 220 mail.example.net
+ * WSTARTTLS
+ >>> STARTTLS
+ * R
+ <<< 220 Ready to start TLS
+ * T
+ test_process_init(fd = 3, client_p = 1, apparg = (nil))
+ +++ `E:self signed certificate in certificate chain'
+ +++ `<... certificate info ...>'
+ * WHELO localhost
+ >>> HELO localhost
+ R
+ <<< 250 mail.example.net
+
+ You can even do SSL/TLS over SSL/TLS over SSL/TLS ... by using
+ 'T' multiple times. I have no idea why you would want to though.
+
+
+This code is rather old. When I find time I will update anything that
+should be changed, and improve code comments. To compile the sample
+program 'test' on platforms other then Linux or Solaris, you will have
+to edit the Makefile.
+
+As noted above, easy_tls.c will be changed to become a library one
+day, which means that future revisions will not be fully compatible to
+the current version.
+
+Bodo Möller <bodo at openssl.org>
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1809 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/engine/hw_zencod.c */
- /*
- * Written by Fred Donnat (frederic.donnat at zencod.com) for "zencod" * engine
- * integration in order to redirect crypto computing on a crypto * hardware
- * accelerator zenssl32 ;-) * * Date : 25 jun 2002 * Revision : 17 Ju7 2002
- * * Version : zencod_engine-0.9.7
- */
-
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-/* ENGINE general include */
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/dso.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_ZENCOD
-
-# ifdef FLAT_INC
-# include "hw_zencod.h"
-# else
-# include "vendor_defns/hw_zencod.h"
-# endif
-
-# define ZENCOD_LIB_NAME "zencod engine"
-# include "hw_zencod_err.c"
-
-# define FAIL_TO_SOFTWARE -15
-
-# define ZEN_LIBRARY "zenbridge"
-
-# if 0
-# define PERROR(s) perror(s)
-# define CHEESE() fputs("## [ZenEngine] ## " __FUNCTION__ "\n", stderr)
-# else
-# define PERROR(s)
-# define CHEESE()
-# endif
-
-/* Sorry ;) */
-# ifndef WIN32
-static inline void esrever(unsigned char *d, int l)
-{
- for (; --l > 0; --l, d++) {
- *d ^= *(d + l);
- *(d + l) ^= *d;
- *d ^= *(d + l);
- }
-}
-
-static inline void ypcmem(unsigned char *d, const unsigned char *s, int l)
-{
- for (d += l; l--;)
- *--d = *s++;
-}
-# else
-static __inline void esrever(unsigned char *d, int l)
-{
- for (; --l > 0; --l, d++) {
- *d ^= *(d + l);
- *(d + l) ^= *d;
- *d ^= *(d + l);
- }
-}
-
-static __inline void ypcmem(unsigned char *d, const unsigned char *s, int l)
-{
- for (d += l; l--;)
- *--d = *s++;
-}
-# endif
-
-# define BIGNUM2ZEN(n, bn) (ptr_zencod_init_number((n), \
- (unsigned long) ((bn)->top * BN_BITS2), \
- (unsigned char *) ((bn)->d)))
-
-# define ZEN_BITS(n, bytes) (ptr_zencod_bytes2bits((unsigned char *) (n), (unsigned long) (bytes)))
-# define ZEN_BYTES(bits) (ptr_zencod_bits2bytes((unsigned long) (bits)))
-
-/* Function for ENGINE detection and control */
-static int zencod_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-static int zencod_init(ENGINE *e);
-static int zencod_finish(ENGINE *e);
-static int zencod_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) ());
-
-/* BIGNUM stuff */
-static int zencod_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-/* RSA stuff */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static int RSA_zencod_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);
-static int RSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-# endif
-
-/* DSA stuff */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-static int DSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
- BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-
-static DSA_SIG *DSA_zencod_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
- DSA *dsa);
-static int DSA_zencod_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
-# endif
-
-/* DH stuff */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-static int DH_zencod_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-static int DH_zencod_generate_key(DH *dh);
-static int DH_zencod_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
- DH *dh);
-# endif
-
-/* Rand stuff */
-static void RAND_zencod_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-static int RAND_zencod_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-static int RAND_zencod_rand_status(void);
-
-/* Digest Stuff */
-static int engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids,
- int nid);
-
-/* Cipher Stuff */
-static int engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
- const int **nids, int nid);
-
-# define ZENCOD_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN zencod_cmd_defns[] = {
- {ZENCOD_CMD_SO_PATH,
- "SO_PATH",
- "Specifies the path to the 'zenbridge' shared library",
- ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
- {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-};
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/*
- * Our internal RSA_METHOD specific to zencod ENGINE providing pointers to
- * our function
- */
-static RSA_METHOD zencod_rsa = {
- "ZENCOD RSA method",
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- RSA_zencod_rsa_mod_exp,
- RSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- 0,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
-};
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-/*
- * Our internal DSA_METHOD specific to zencod ENGINE providing pointers to
- * our function
- */
-static DSA_METHOD zencod_dsa = {
- "ZENCOD DSA method",
- DSA_zencod_do_sign,
- NULL,
- DSA_zencod_do_verify,
- NULL,
- DSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- 0,
- NULL
-};
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/*
- * Our internal DH_METHOD specific to zencod ENGINE providing pointers to our
- * function
- */
-static DH_METHOD zencod_dh = {
- "ZENCOD DH method",
- DH_zencod_generate_key,
- DH_zencod_compute_key,
- DH_zencod_bn_mod_exp,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- 0,
- NULL
-};
-# endif
-
-/*
- * Our internal RAND_meth specific to zencod ZNGINE providing pointers to our
- * function
- */
-static RAND_METHOD zencod_rand = {
- RAND_zencod_seed,
- RAND_zencod_rand_bytes,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- RAND_zencod_rand_bytes,
- RAND_zencod_rand_status
-};
-
-/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-static const char *engine_zencod_id = "zencod";
-static const char *engine_zencod_name = "ZENCOD hardware engine support";
-
-/*
- * This internal function is used by ENGINE_zencod () and possibly by the
- * "dynamic" ENGINE support too ;-)
- */
-static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
-{
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- const RSA_METHOD *meth_rsa;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- const DSA_METHOD *meth_dsa;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- const DH_METHOD *meth_dh;
-# endif
-
- const RAND_METHOD *meth_rand;
-
- if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_zencod_id) ||
- !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_zencod_name) ||
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &zencod_rsa) ||
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- !ENGINE_set_DSA(e, &zencod_dsa) ||
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- !ENGINE_set_DH(e, &zencod_dh) ||
-# endif
- !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &zencod_rand) ||
- !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, zencod_destroy) ||
- !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, zencod_init) ||
- !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, zencod_finish) ||
- !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, zencod_ctrl) ||
- !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, zencod_cmd_defns) ||
- !ENGINE_set_digests(e, engine_digests) ||
- !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, engine_ciphers)) {
- return 0;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- /*
- * We know that the "PKCS1_SSLeay()" functions hook properly to the
- * Zencod-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use those functions. NB:
- * We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or anything "more generic" because
- * something like the RSAref code may not hook properly, and if you own
- * one of these cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it
- * anyway!
- */
- meth_rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-
- zencod_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth_rsa->rsa_pub_enc;
- zencod_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth_rsa->rsa_pub_dec;
- zencod_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth_rsa->rsa_priv_enc;
- zencod_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth_rsa->rsa_priv_dec;
- /* meth_rsa->rsa_mod_exp */
- /* meth_rsa->bn_mod_exp */
- zencod_rsa.init = meth_rsa->init;
- zencod_rsa.finish = meth_rsa->finish;
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- /*
- * We use OpenSSL meth to supply what we don't provide ;-*)
- */
- meth_dsa = DSA_OpenSSL();
-
- /* meth_dsa->dsa_do_sign */
- zencod_dsa.dsa_sign_setup = meth_dsa->dsa_sign_setup;
- /* meth_dsa->dsa_do_verify */
- zencod_dsa.dsa_mod_exp = meth_dsa->dsa_mod_exp;
- /* zencod_dsa.bn_mod_exp = meth_dsa->bn_mod_exp ; */
- zencod_dsa.init = meth_dsa->init;
- zencod_dsa.finish = meth_dsa->finish;
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- /*
- * We use OpenSSL meth to supply what we don't provide ;-*)
- */
- meth_dh = DH_OpenSSL();
-
- /* zencod_dh.generate_key = meth_dh->generate_key ; */
- /* zencod_dh.compute_key = meth_dh->compute_key ; */
- /* zencod_dh.bn_mod_exp = meth_dh->bn_mod_exp ; */
- zencod_dh.init = meth_dh->init;
- zencod_dh.finish = meth_dh->finish;
-
-# endif
-
- /*
- * We use OpenSSL (SSLeay) meth to supply what we don't provide ;-*)
- */
- meth_rand = RAND_SSLeay();
-
- /* meth_rand->seed ; */
- /* zencod_rand.seed = meth_rand->seed ; */
- /* meth_rand->bytes ; */
- /* zencod_rand.bytes = meth_rand->bytes ; */
- zencod_rand.cleanup = meth_rand->cleanup;
- zencod_rand.add = meth_rand->add;
- /* meth_rand->pseudorand ; */
- /* zencod_rand.pseudorand = meth_rand->pseudorand ; */
- /* zencod_rand.status = meth_rand->status ; */
- /* meth_rand->status ; */
-
- /* Ensure the zencod error handling is set up */
- ERR_load_ZENCOD_strings();
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * As this is only ever called once, there's no need for locking (indeed -
- * the lock will already be held by our caller!!!)
- */
-static ENGINE *ENGINE_zencod(void)
-{
-
- ENGINE *eng = ENGINE_new();
-
- if (!eng) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (!bind_helper(eng)) {
- ENGINE_free(eng);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return eng;
-}
-
-# ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-static
-# endif
-void ENGINE_load_zencod(void)
-{
- /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
- ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_zencod();
- if (!toadd)
- return;
- ENGINE_add(toadd);
- ENGINE_free(toadd);
- ERR_clear_error();
-}
-
-/*
- * This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading the
- * ZENBRIDGE library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an * init () or
- * finish () call (reference counts permitting) and they're * operating with
- * global locks, so this should be thread-safe * implicitly.
- */
-static DSO *zencod_dso = NULL;
-
-static t_zencod_test *ptr_zencod_test = NULL;
-static t_zencod_bytes2bits *ptr_zencod_bytes2bits = NULL;
-static t_zencod_bits2bytes *ptr_zencod_bits2bytes = NULL;
-static t_zencod_new_number *ptr_zencod_new_number = NULL;
-static t_zencod_init_number *ptr_zencod_init_number = NULL;
-
-static t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp *ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp = NULL;
-static t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt *ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt = NULL;
-static t_zencod_dsa_do_sign *ptr_zencod_dsa_do_sign = NULL;
-static t_zencod_dsa_do_verify *ptr_zencod_dsa_do_verify = NULL;
-static t_zencod_dh_generate_key *ptr_zencod_dh_generate_key = NULL;
-static t_zencod_dh_compute_key *ptr_zencod_dh_compute_key = NULL;
-static t_zencod_rand_bytes *ptr_zencod_rand_bytes = NULL;
-static t_zencod_math_mod_exp *ptr_zencod_math_mod_exp = NULL;
-
-static t_zencod_md5_init *ptr_zencod_md5_init = NULL;
-static t_zencod_md5_update *ptr_zencod_md5_update = NULL;
-static t_zencod_md5_do_final *ptr_zencod_md5_do_final = NULL;
-static t_zencod_sha1_init *ptr_zencod_sha1_init = NULL;
-static t_zencod_sha1_update *ptr_zencod_sha1_update = NULL;
-static t_zencod_sha1_do_final *ptr_zencod_sha1_do_final = NULL;
-
-static t_zencod_xdes_cipher *ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher = NULL;
-static t_zencod_rc4_cipher *ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher = NULL;
-
-/*
- * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and the
- * function symbol names to bind to.
- */
-static const char *ZENCOD_LIBNAME = ZEN_LIBRARY;
-
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_0 = "test_device";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_1 = "zenbridge_bytes2bits";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_2 = "zenbridge_bits2bytes";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_3 = "zenbridge_new_number";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_4 = "zenbridge_init_number";
-
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_exp_1 = "zenbridge_rsa_mod_exp";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_exp_2 = "zenbridge_rsa_mod_exp_crt";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_dsa_1 = "zenbridge_dsa_do_sign";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_dsa_2 = "zenbridge_dsa_do_verify";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_dh_1 = "zenbridge_dh_generate_key";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_dh_2 = "zenbridge_dh_compute_key";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_rand_1 = "zenbridge_rand_bytes";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_math_1 = "zenbridge_math_mod_exp";
-
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_md5_1 = "zenbridge_md5_init";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_md5_2 = "zenbridge_md5_update";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_md5_3 = "zenbridge_md5_do_final";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_1 = "zenbridge_sha1_init";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_2 = "zenbridge_sha1_update";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_3 = "zenbridge_sha1_do_final";
-
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_xdes_1 = "zenbridge_xdes_cipher";
-static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_rc4_1 = "zenbridge_rc4_cipher";
-
-/*
- * Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_zencod ()" constructor)
- */
-static int zencod_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-{
-
- ERR_unload_ZENCOD_strings();
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * (de)initialisation functions. Control Function
- */
-static int zencod_init(ENGINE *e)
-{
-
- t_zencod_test *ptr_0;
- t_zencod_bytes2bits *ptr_1;
- t_zencod_bits2bytes *ptr_2;
- t_zencod_new_number *ptr_3;
- t_zencod_init_number *ptr_4;
- t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp *ptr_exp_1;
- t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt *ptr_exp_2;
- t_zencod_dsa_do_sign *ptr_dsa_1;
- t_zencod_dsa_do_verify *ptr_dsa_2;
- t_zencod_dh_generate_key *ptr_dh_1;
- t_zencod_dh_compute_key *ptr_dh_2;
- t_zencod_rand_bytes *ptr_rand_1;
- t_zencod_math_mod_exp *ptr_math_1;
- t_zencod_md5_init *ptr_md5_1;
- t_zencod_md5_update *ptr_md5_2;
- t_zencod_md5_do_final *ptr_md5_3;
- t_zencod_sha1_init *ptr_sha1_1;
- t_zencod_sha1_update *ptr_sha1_2;
- t_zencod_sha1_do_final *ptr_sha1_3;
- t_zencod_xdes_cipher *ptr_xdes_1;
- t_zencod_rc4_cipher *ptr_rc4_1;
-
- CHEESE();
-
- /*
- * We Should add some tests for non NULL parameters or bad value !!
- * Stuff to be done ...
- */
-
- if (zencod_dso != NULL) {
- ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_INIT, ZENCOD_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Trying to load the Library "cryptozen"
- */
- zencod_dso = DSO_load(NULL, ZENCOD_LIBNAME, NULL, 0);
- if (zencod_dso == NULL) {
- ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_INIT, ZENCOD_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Trying to load Function from the Library
- */
- if (!
- (ptr_1 =
- (t_zencod_bytes2bits *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_1))
-|| !(ptr_2 = (t_zencod_bits2bytes *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_2))
-|| !(ptr_3 = (t_zencod_new_number *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_3))
-|| !(ptr_4 = (t_zencod_init_number *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_4))
-|| !(ptr_exp_1 =
- (t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_exp_1))
-|| !(ptr_exp_2 =
- (t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_exp_2))
-|| !(ptr_dsa_1 =
- (t_zencod_dsa_do_sign *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_dsa_1))
-|| !(ptr_dsa_2 =
- (t_zencod_dsa_do_verify *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_dsa_2))
-|| !(ptr_dh_1 =
- (t_zencod_dh_generate_key *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_dh_1))
-|| !(ptr_dh_2 =
- (t_zencod_dh_compute_key *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_dh_2))
-|| !(ptr_rand_1 =
- (t_zencod_rand_bytes *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_rand_1))
-|| !(ptr_math_1 =
- (t_zencod_math_mod_exp *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_math_1))
-|| !(ptr_0 = (t_zencod_test *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_0))
-|| !(ptr_md5_1 =
- (t_zencod_md5_init *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_md5_1))
-|| !(ptr_md5_2 =
- (t_zencod_md5_update *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_md5_2))
-|| !(ptr_md5_3 =
- (t_zencod_md5_do_final *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_md5_3))
-|| !(ptr_sha1_1 =
- (t_zencod_sha1_init *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_1))
-|| !(ptr_sha1_2 =
- (t_zencod_sha1_update *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_2))
-|| !(ptr_sha1_3 =
- (t_zencod_sha1_do_final *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_3))
-|| !(ptr_xdes_1 =
- (t_zencod_xdes_cipher *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_xdes_1))
-|| !(ptr_rc4_1 =
- (t_zencod_rc4_cipher *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_rc4_1))) {
-
- ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_INIT, ZENCOD_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * The function from "cryptozen" Library have been correctly loaded so
- * copy them
- */
- ptr_zencod_test = ptr_0;
- ptr_zencod_bytes2bits = ptr_1;
- ptr_zencod_bits2bytes = ptr_2;
- ptr_zencod_new_number = ptr_3;
- ptr_zencod_init_number = ptr_4;
- ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp = ptr_exp_1;
- ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt = ptr_exp_2;
- ptr_zencod_dsa_do_sign = ptr_dsa_1;
- ptr_zencod_dsa_do_verify = ptr_dsa_2;
- ptr_zencod_dh_generate_key = ptr_dh_1;
- ptr_zencod_dh_compute_key = ptr_dh_2;
- ptr_zencod_rand_bytes = ptr_rand_1;
- ptr_zencod_math_mod_exp = ptr_math_1;
- ptr_zencod_test = ptr_0;
- ptr_zencod_md5_init = ptr_md5_1;
- ptr_zencod_md5_update = ptr_md5_2;
- ptr_zencod_md5_do_final = ptr_md5_3;
- ptr_zencod_sha1_init = ptr_sha1_1;
- ptr_zencod_sha1_update = ptr_sha1_2;
- ptr_zencod_sha1_do_final = ptr_sha1_3;
- ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher = ptr_xdes_1;
- ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher = ptr_rc4_1;
-
- /*
- * We should peform a test to see if there is actually any unit runnig on
- * the system ... Even if the cryptozen library is loaded the module coul
- * not be loaded on the system ... For now we may just open and close the
- * device !!
- */
-
- if (ptr_zencod_test() != 0) {
- ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_INIT, ZENCOD_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- return 1;
- err:
- if (zencod_dso) {
- DSO_free(zencod_dso);
- }
- zencod_dso = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_bytes2bits = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_bits2bytes = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_new_number = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_init_number = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_dsa_do_sign = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_dsa_do_verify = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_dh_generate_key = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_dh_compute_key = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_rand_bytes = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_math_mod_exp = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_test = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_md5_init = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_md5_update = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_md5_do_final = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_sha1_init = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_sha1_update = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_sha1_do_final = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher = NULL;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int zencod_finish(ENGINE *e)
-{
-
- CHEESE();
-
- /*
- * We Should add some tests for non NULL parameters or bad value !!
- * Stuff to be done ...
- */
- if (zencod_dso == NULL) {
- ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_FINISH, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!DSO_free(zencod_dso)) {
- ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_FINISH, ZENCOD_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- zencod_dso = NULL;
-
- ptr_zencod_bytes2bits = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_bits2bytes = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_new_number = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_init_number = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_dsa_do_sign = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_dsa_do_verify = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_dh_generate_key = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_dh_compute_key = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_rand_bytes = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_math_mod_exp = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_test = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_md5_init = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_md5_update = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_md5_do_final = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_sha1_init = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_sha1_update = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_sha1_do_final = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher = NULL;
- ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher = NULL;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int zencod_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) ())
-{
-
- int initialised = ((zencod_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-
- CHEESE();
-
- /*
- * We Should add some tests for non NULL parameters or bad value !!
- * Stuff to be done ...
- */
- switch (cmd) {
- case ZENCOD_CMD_SO_PATH:
- if (p == NULL) {
- ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- if (initialised) {
- ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_CTRL, ZENCOD_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
- return 0;
- }
- ZENCOD_LIBNAME = (const char *)p;
- return 1;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_CTRL, ZENCOD_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * BIGNUM stuff Functions
- */
-static int zencod_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- zen_nb_t y, x, e, n;
- int ret;
-
- CHEESE();
-
- if (!zencod_dso) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_BN_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!bn_wexpand(r, m->top + 1)) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_BN_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
- return 0;
- }
-
- memset(r->d, 0, BN_num_bytes(m));
-
- ptr_zencod_init_number(&y, (r->dmax - 1) * sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8,
- (unsigned char *)r->d);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, a);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&e, p);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&n, m);
-
- /* Must invert x and e parameter due to BN mod exp prototype ... */
- ret = ptr_zencod_math_mod_exp(&y, &e, &x, &n);
-
- if (ret) {
- PERROR("zenbridge_math_mod_exp");
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_BN_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- r->top = (BN_num_bits(m) + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * RSA stuff Functions
- */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static int RSA_zencod_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa)
-{
-
- CHEESE();
-
- if (!zencod_dso) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP_CRT, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP_CRT,
- ZENCOD_R_BAD_KEY_COMPONENTS);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Do in software if argument is too large for hardware */
- if (RSA_size(rsa) * 8 > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_RSA_CRT) {
- const RSA_METHOD *meth;
-
- meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
- return meth->rsa_mod_exp(r0, i, rsa);
- } else {
- zen_nb_t y, x, p, q, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp;
-
- if (!bn_expand(r0, RSA_size(rsa) * 8)) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP_CRT,
- ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
- return 0;
- }
- r0->top = (RSA_size(rsa) * 8 + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2;
-
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, i);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, r0);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&p, rsa->p);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&q, rsa->q);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&dmp1, rsa->dmp1);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&dmq1, rsa->dmq1);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&iqmp, rsa->iqmp);
-
- if (ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt(&y, &x, &p, &q, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp) <
- 0) {
- PERROR("zenbridge_rsa_mod_exp_crt");
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP_CRT,
- ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * This function is aliased to RSA_mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped).
- */
-static int RSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
-{
-
- CHEESE();
-
- if (!zencod_dso) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Do in software if argument is too large for hardware */
- if (BN_num_bits(m) > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_RSA) {
- const RSA_METHOD *meth;
-
- meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
- return meth->bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx);
- } else {
- zen_nb_t y, x, e, n;
-
- if (!bn_expand(r, BN_num_bits(m))) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
- return 0;
- }
- r->top = (BN_num_bits(m) + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2;
-
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, a);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, r);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&e, p);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&n, m);
-
- if (ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp(&y, &x, &n, &e) < 0) {
- PERROR("zenbridge_rsa_mod_exp");
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-}
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-/*
- * DSA stuff Functions
- */
-static DSA_SIG *DSA_zencod_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
- DSA *dsa)
-{
- zen_nb_t p, q, g, x, y, r, s, data;
- DSA_SIG *sig;
- BIGNUM *bn_r = NULL;
- BIGNUM *bn_s = NULL;
- char msg[20];
-
- CHEESE();
-
- if (!zencod_dso) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
- goto FAILED;
- }
-
- if (dlen > 160) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- goto FAILED;
- }
-
- /* Do in software if argument is too large for hardware */
- if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_DSA_SIGN ||
- BN_num_bits(dsa->g) > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_DSA_SIGN) {
- const DSA_METHOD *meth;
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_BAD_KEY_COMPONENTS);
- meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
- return meth->dsa_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa);
- }
-
- if (!(bn_s = BN_new()) || !(bn_r = BN_new())) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_BAD_KEY_COMPONENTS);
- goto FAILED;
- }
-
- if (!bn_expand(bn_r, 160) || !bn_expand(bn_s, 160)) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
- goto FAILED;
- }
-
- bn_r->top = bn_s->top = (160 + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2;
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&p, dsa->p);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&q, dsa->q);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&g, dsa->g);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, dsa->priv_key);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, dsa->pub_key);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&r, bn_r);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&s, bn_s);
- q.len = x.len = 160;
-
- ypcmem(msg, dgst, 20);
- ptr_zencod_init_number(&data, 160, msg);
-
- if (ptr_zencod_dsa_do_sign(0, &data, &y, &p, &q, &g, &x, &r, &s) < 0) {
- PERROR("zenbridge_dsa_do_sign");
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- goto FAILED;
- }
-
- if (!(sig = DSA_SIG_new())) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- goto FAILED;
- }
- sig->r = bn_r;
- sig->s = bn_s;
- return sig;
-
- FAILED:
- if (bn_r)
- BN_free(bn_r);
- if (bn_s)
- BN_free(bn_s);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int DSA_zencod_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
- DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
-{
- zen_nb_t data, p, q, g, y, r, s, v;
- char msg[20];
- char v_data[20];
- int ret;
-
- CHEESE();
-
- if (!zencod_dso) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (dlen > 160) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Do in software if argument is too large for hardware */
- if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_DSA_SIGN ||
- BN_num_bits(dsa->g) > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_DSA_SIGN) {
- const DSA_METHOD *meth;
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_BAD_KEY_COMPONENTS);
- meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
- return meth->dsa_do_verify(dgst, dlen, sig, dsa);
- }
-
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&p, dsa->p);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&q, dsa->q);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&g, dsa->g);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, dsa->pub_key);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&r, sig->r);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&s, sig->s);
- ptr_zencod_init_number(&v, 160, v_data);
- ypcmem(msg, dgst, 20);
- ptr_zencod_init_number(&data, 160, msg);
-
- if ((ret =
- ptr_zencod_dsa_do_verify(0, &data, &p, &q, &g, &y, &r, &s,
- &v)) < 0) {
- PERROR("zenbridge_dsa_do_verify");
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return ((ret == 0) ? 1 : ret);
-}
-
-static int DSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
- BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
-{
- CHEESE();
-
- return zencod_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
-}
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-
-# ifndef OPENSSl_NO_DH
-/*
- * DH stuff Functions
- */
-static int DH_zencod_generate_key(DH *dh)
-{
- BIGNUM *bn_prv = NULL;
- BIGNUM *bn_pub = NULL;
- zen_nb_t y, x, g, p;
- int generate_x;
-
- CHEESE();
-
- if (!zencod_dso) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_GENERATE, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Private key */
- if (dh->priv_key) {
- bn_prv = dh->priv_key;
- generate_x = 0;
- } else {
- if (!(bn_prv = BN_new())) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_GENERATE, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
- goto FAILED;
- }
- generate_x = 1;
- }
-
- /* Public key */
- if (dh->pub_key)
- bn_pub = dh->pub_key;
- else if (!(bn_pub = BN_new())) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_GENERATE, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
- goto FAILED;
- }
-
- /* Expand */
- if (!bn_wexpand(bn_prv, dh->p->dmax) || !bn_wexpand(bn_pub, dh->p->dmax)) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_GENERATE, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
- goto FAILED;
- }
- bn_prv->top = dh->p->top;
- bn_pub->top = dh->p->top;
-
- /* Convert all keys */
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&p, dh->p);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&g, dh->g);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, bn_pub);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, bn_prv);
- x.len = DH_size(dh) * 8;
-
- /* Adjust the lengths of P and G */
- p.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(p.data, ZEN_BYTES(p.len));
- g.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(g.data, ZEN_BYTES(g.len));
-
- /* Send the request to the driver */
- if (ptr_zencod_dh_generate_key(&y, &x, &g, &p, generate_x) < 0) {
- perror("zenbridge_dh_generate_key");
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_GENERATE, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- goto FAILED;
- }
-
- dh->priv_key = bn_prv;
- dh->pub_key = bn_pub;
-
- return 1;
-
- FAILED:
- if (!dh->priv_key && bn_prv)
- BN_free(bn_prv);
- if (!dh->pub_key && bn_pub)
- BN_free(bn_pub);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int DH_zencod_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
- DH *dh)
-{
- zen_nb_t y, x, p, k;
-
- CHEESE();
-
- if (!zencod_dso) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_COMPUTE, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!dh->priv_key) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_COMPUTE, ZENCOD_R_BAD_KEY_COMPONENTS);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Convert all keys */
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, pub_key);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, dh->priv_key);
- BIGNUM2ZEN(&p, dh->p);
- ptr_zencod_init_number(&k, p.len, key);
-
- /* Adjust the lengths */
- p.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(p.data, ZEN_BYTES(p.len));
- y.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(y.data, ZEN_BYTES(y.len));
- x.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(x.data, ZEN_BYTES(x.len));
-
- /* Call the hardware */
- if (ptr_zencod_dh_compute_key(&k, &y, &x, &p) < 0) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_COMPUTE, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* The key must be written MSB -> LSB */
- k.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(k.data, ZEN_BYTES(k.len));
- esrever(key, ZEN_BYTES(k.len));
-
- return ZEN_BYTES(k.len);
-}
-
-static int DH_zencod_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
- const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
-{
- CHEESE();
-
- return zencod_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
-}
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-
-/*
- * RAND stuff Functions
- */
-static void RAND_zencod_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-{
- /*
- * Nothing to do cause our crypto accelerator provide a true random
- * generator
- */
-}
-
-static int RAND_zencod_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
- zen_nb_t r;
-
- CHEESE();
-
- if (!zencod_dso) {
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RAND, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- ptr_zencod_init_number(&r, num * 8, buf);
-
- if (ptr_zencod_rand_bytes(&r, ZENBRIDGE_RNG_DIRECT) < 0) {
- PERROR("zenbridge_rand_bytes");
- ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RAND, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int RAND_zencod_rand_status(void)
-{
- CHEESE();
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a
- * self-contained shared-library.
- */
-# ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-static int bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-{
-
- if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_zencod_id) != 0)) {
- return 0;
- }
- if (!bind_helper(e)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
- IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_fn)
-# endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
- /*
- * Adding "Digest" and "Cipher" tools ...
- * This is in development ... ;-)
- * In orfer to code this, i refer to hw_openbsd_dev_crypto and openssl engine made by Geoff Thorpe (if i'm rigth),
- * and evp, sha md5 definitions etc ...
- */
-/* First add some include ... */
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/sha.h>
-# include <openssl/md5.h>
-# include <openssl/rc4.h>
-# include <openssl/des.h>
-/* Some variables declaration ... */
- /*
- * DONS: Disable symetric computation except DES and 3DES, but let part
- * of the code
- */
-/* static int engine_digest_nids [ ] = { NID_sha1, NID_md5 } ; */
-static int engine_digest_nids[] = { };
-
-static int engine_digest_nids_num = 0;
-/*
- * static int engine_cipher_nids [ ] = { NID_rc4, NID_rc4_40, NID_des_cbc,
- * NID_des_ede3_cbc } ;
- */
-static int engine_cipher_nids[] = { NID_des_cbc, NID_des_ede3_cbc };
-
-static int engine_cipher_nids_num = 2;
-
-/* Function prototype ... */
-/* SHA stuff */
-static int engine_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-static int engine_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
- unsigned long count);
-static int engine_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
-
-/* MD5 stuff */
-static int engine_md5_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-static int engine_md5_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
- unsigned long count);
-static int engine_md5_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
-
-static int engine_md_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-static int engine_md_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
-
-/* RC4 Stuff */
-static int engine_rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-static int engine_rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-
-/* DES Stuff */
-static int engine_des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-static int engine_des_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-
-/* 3DES Stuff */
-static int engine_des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
- const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-static int engine_des_ede3_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int inl);
-
-static int engine_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); /* cleanup ctx */
-
-/* The one for SHA ... */
-static const EVP_MD engine_sha1_md = {
- NID_sha1,
- NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT,
- /*
- * 0,
- *//*
- * EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT = x0001 digest can only handle a single block *
- * XXX: set according to device info ...
- */
- engine_sha1_init,
- engine_sha1_update,
- engine_sha1_final,
- engine_md_copy, /* dev_crypto_sha_copy */
- engine_md_cleanup, /* dev_crypto_sha_cleanup */
- EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
- SHA_CBLOCK,
- /* sizeof ( EVP_MD * ) + sizeof ( SHA_CTX ) */
- sizeof(ZEN_MD_DATA)
- /*
- * sizeof ( MD_CTX_DATA ) The message digest data structure ...
- */
-};
-
-/* The one for MD5 ... */
-static const EVP_MD engine_md5_md = {
- NID_md5,
- NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT,
- /*
- * 0,
- *//*
- * EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT = x0001 digest can only handle a single block *
- * XXX: set according to device info ...
- */
- engine_md5_init,
- engine_md5_update,
- engine_md5_final,
- engine_md_copy, /* dev_crypto_md5_copy */
- engine_md_cleanup, /* dev_crypto_md5_cleanup */
- EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
- MD5_CBLOCK,
- /* sizeof ( EVP_MD * ) + sizeof ( MD5_CTX ) */
- sizeof(ZEN_MD_DATA)
- /*
- * sizeof ( MD_CTX_DATA ) The message digest data structure ...
- */
-};
-
-/* The one for RC4 ... */
-# define EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE 16
-
-/* Try something static ... */
-typedef struct {
- unsigned int len;
- unsigned int first;
- unsigned char rc4_state[260];
-} NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY;
-
-# define rc4_data(ctx) ( (EVP_RC4_KEY *) ( ctx )->cipher_data )
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER engine_rc4 = {
- NID_rc4,
- 1,
- 16, /* EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE should be 128 bits */
- 0, /* FIXME: key should be up to 256 bytes */
- EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
- engine_rc4_init_key,
- engine_rc4_cipher,
- engine_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof(NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY),
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
-};
-
-/* The one for RC4_40 ... */
-static const EVP_CIPHER engine_rc4_40 = {
- NID_rc4_40,
- 1,
- 5, /* 40 bits */
- 0,
- EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
- engine_rc4_init_key,
- engine_rc4_cipher,
- engine_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof(NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY),
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
-};
-
-/* The one for DES ... */
-
-/* Try something static ... */
-typedef struct {
- unsigned char des_key[24];
- unsigned char des_iv[8];
-} ZEN_DES_KEY;
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER engine_des_cbc = {
- NID_des_cbc,
- 8, 8, 8,
- 0 | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- engine_des_init_key,
- engine_des_cbc_cipher,
- engine_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof(ZEN_DES_KEY),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL,
- NULL
-};
-
-/* The one for 3DES ... */
-
-/* Try something static ... */
-typedef struct {
- unsigned char des3_key[24];
- unsigned char des3_iv[8];
-} ZEN_3DES_KEY;
-
-# define des_data(ctx) ( (DES_EDE_KEY *) ( ctx )->cipher_data )
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER engine_des_ede3_cbc = {
- NID_des_ede3_cbc,
- 8, 8, 8,
- 0 | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
- engine_des_ede3_init_key,
- engine_des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
- engine_cipher_cleanup,
- sizeof(ZEN_3DES_KEY),
- EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
- NULL,
- NULL
-};
-
-/* General function cloned on hw_openbsd_dev_crypto one ... */
-static int engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids,
- int nid)
-{
-
-# ifdef DEBUG_ZENCOD_MD
- fprintf(stderr, "\t=>Function : static int engine_digests () called !\n");
-# endif
-
- if (!digest) {
- /* We are returning a list of supported nids */
- *nids = engine_digest_nids;
- return engine_digest_nids_num;
- }
- /* We are being asked for a specific digest */
- if (nid == NID_md5) {
- *digest = &engine_md5_md;
- } else if (nid == NID_sha1) {
- *digest = &engine_sha1_md;
- } else {
- *digest = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * SHA stuff Functions
- */
-static int engine_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
-
- int to_return = 0;
-
- /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
- to_return = ptr_zencod_sha1_init((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data);
- to_return = !to_return;
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
- unsigned long count)
-{
-
- zen_nb_t input;
- int to_return = 0;
-
- /* Convert parameters ... */
- input.len = count;
- input.data = (unsigned char *)data;
-
- /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
- to_return =
- ptr_zencod_sha1_update((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data,
- (const zen_nb_t *)&input);
- to_return = !to_return;
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
-{
-
- zen_nb_t output;
- int to_return = 0;
-
- /* Convert parameters ... */
- output.len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- output.data = md;
-
- /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
- to_return =
- ptr_zencod_sha1_do_final((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data,
- (zen_nb_t *) & output);
- to_return = !to_return;
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-/*
- * MD5 stuff Functions
- */
-static int engine_md5_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
-
- int to_return = 0;
-
- /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
- to_return = ptr_zencod_md5_init((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data);
- to_return = !to_return;
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_md5_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
- unsigned long count)
-{
-
- zen_nb_t input;
- int to_return = 0;
-
- /* Convert parameters ... */
- input.len = count;
- input.data = (unsigned char *)data;
-
- /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
- to_return =
- ptr_zencod_md5_update((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data,
- (const zen_nb_t *)&input);
- to_return = !to_return;
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_md5_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
-{
-
- zen_nb_t output;
- int to_return = 0;
-
- /* Convert parameters ... */
- output.len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- output.data = md;
-
- /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
- to_return =
- ptr_zencod_md5_do_final((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data,
- (zen_nb_t *) & output);
- to_return = !to_return;
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_md_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
-
- ZEN_MD_DATA *zen_md_data = (ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data;
-
- if (zen_md_data->HashBuffer != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(zen_md_data->HashBuffer);
- zen_md_data->HashBufferSize = 0;
- ctx->md_data = NULL;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int engine_md_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
-{
- const ZEN_MD_DATA *from_md = (ZEN_MD_DATA *)from->md_data;
- ZEN_MD_DATA *to_md = (ZEN_MD_DATA *)to->md_data;
-
- to_md->HashBuffer = OPENSSL_malloc(from_md->HashBufferSize);
- memcpy(to_md->HashBuffer, from_md->HashBuffer, from_md->HashBufferSize);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* General function cloned on hw_openbsd_dev_crypto one ... */
-static int engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
- const int **nids, int nid)
-{
-
- if (!cipher) {
- /* We are returning a list of supported nids */
- *nids = engine_cipher_nids;
- return engine_cipher_nids_num;
- }
- /* We are being asked for a specific cipher */
- if (nid == NID_rc4) {
- *cipher = &engine_rc4;
- } else if (nid == NID_rc4_40) {
- *cipher = &engine_rc4_40;
- } else if (nid == NID_des_cbc) {
- *cipher = &engine_des_cbc;
- } else if (nid == NID_des_ede3_cbc) {
- *cipher = &engine_des_ede3_cbc;
- } else {
- *cipher = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int engine_rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
- int to_return = 0;
- int i = 0;
- int nb = 0;
- NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY *tmp_rc4_key = NULL;
-
- tmp_rc4_key = (NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data);
- tmp_rc4_key->first = 0;
- tmp_rc4_key->len = ctx->key_len;
- tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[0] = 0x00;
- tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[2] = 0x00;
- nb = 256 / ctx->key_len;
- for (i = 0; i < nb; i++) {
- memcpy(&(tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[4 + i * ctx->key_len]), key,
- ctx->key_len);
- }
-
- to_return = 1;
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, unsigned int in_len)
-{
-
- zen_nb_t output, input;
- zen_nb_t rc4key;
- int to_return = 0;
- NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY *tmp_rc4_key = NULL;
-
- /* Convert parameters ... */
- input.len = in_len;
- input.data = (unsigned char *)in;
- output.len = in_len;
- output.data = (unsigned char *)out;
-
- tmp_rc4_key = ((NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data));
- rc4key.len = 260;
- rc4key.data = &(tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[0]);
-
- /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
- to_return =
- ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher(&output, &input, (const zen_nb_t *)&rc4key,
- &(tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[0]),
- &(tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[3]),
- !tmp_rc4_key->first);
- to_return = !to_return;
-
- /* Update encryption state ... */
- tmp_rc4_key->first = 1;
- tmp_rc4_key = NULL;
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
-
- ZEN_DES_KEY *tmp_des_key = NULL;
- int to_return = 0;
-
- tmp_des_key = (ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data);
- memcpy(&(tmp_des_key->des_key[0]), key, 8);
- memcpy(&(tmp_des_key->des_key[8]), key, 8);
- memcpy(&(tmp_des_key->des_key[16]), key, 8);
- memcpy(&(tmp_des_key->des_iv[0]), iv, 8);
-
- to_return = 1;
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_des_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
-{
-
- zen_nb_t output, input;
- zen_nb_t deskey_1, deskey_2, deskey_3, iv;
- int to_return = 0;
-
- /* Convert parameters ... */
- input.len = inl;
- input.data = (unsigned char *)in;
- output.len = inl;
- output.data = out;
-
- /* Set key parameters ... */
- deskey_1.len = 8;
- deskey_2.len = 8;
- deskey_3.len = 8;
- deskey_1.data =
- (unsigned char *)((ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des_key;
- deskey_2.data =
- (unsigned char *)&((ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des_key[8];
- deskey_3.data =
- (unsigned char *)&((ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des_key[16];
-
- /* Key correct iv ... */
- memcpy(((ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des_iv, ctx->iv, 8);
- iv.len = 8;
- iv.data = (unsigned char *)((ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des_iv;
-
- if (ctx->encrypt == 0) {
- memcpy(ctx->iv, &(input.data[input.len - 8]), 8);
- }
-
- /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
- to_return = ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher(&output, &input,
- (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_1,
- (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_2,
- (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_3, &iv,
- ctx->encrypt);
- to_return = !to_return;
-
- /*
- * But we need to set up the rigth iv ... Test ENCRYPT or DECRYPT mode to
- * set iv ...
- */
- if (ctx->encrypt == 1) {
- memcpy(ctx->iv, &(output.data[output.len - 8]), 8);
- }
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
- const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
-
- ZEN_3DES_KEY *tmp_3des_key = NULL;
- int to_return = 0;
-
- tmp_3des_key = (ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data);
- memcpy(&(tmp_3des_key->des3_key[0]), key, 24);
- memcpy(&(tmp_3des_key->des3_iv[0]), iv, 8);
-
- to_return = 1;
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_des_ede3_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int in_len)
-{
-
- zen_nb_t output, input;
- zen_nb_t deskey_1, deskey_2, deskey_3, iv;
- int to_return = 0;
-
- /* Convert parameters ... */
- input.len = in_len;
- input.data = (unsigned char *)in;
- output.len = in_len;
- output.data = out;
-
- /* Set key ... */
- deskey_1.len = 8;
- deskey_2.len = 8;
- deskey_3.len = 8;
- deskey_1.data =
- (unsigned char *)((ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des3_key;
- deskey_2.data =
- (unsigned char *)&((ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des3_key[8];
- deskey_3.data =
- (unsigned char *)&((ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des3_key[16];
-
- /* Key correct iv ... */
- memcpy(((ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des3_iv, ctx->iv, 8);
- iv.len = 8;
- iv.data = (unsigned char *)((ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des3_iv;
-
- if (ctx->encrypt == 0) {
- memcpy(ctx->iv, &(input.data[input.len - 8]), 8);
- }
-
- /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
- to_return = ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher(&output, &input,
- (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_1,
- (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_2,
- (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_3, &iv,
- ctx->encrypt);
- to_return = !to_return;
-
- if (ctx->encrypt == 1) {
- memcpy(ctx->iv, &(output.data[output.len - 8]), 8);
- }
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int engine_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-{
-
- /* Set the key pointer ... */
- if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_rc4 || ctx->cipher->nid == NID_rc4_40) {
- } else if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_des_cbc) {
- } else if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_des_ede3_cbc) {
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_ZENCOD */
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1809 @@
+/* crypto/engine/hw_zencod.c */
+ /*
+ * Written by Fred Donnat (frederic.donnat at zencod.com) for "zencod" * engine
+ * integration in order to redirect crypto computing on a crypto * hardware
+ * accelerator zenssl32 ;-) * * Date : 25 jun 2002 * Revision : 17 Ju7 2002
+ * * Version : zencod_engine-0.9.7
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/* ENGINE general include */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_ZENCOD
+
+# ifdef FLAT_INC
+# include "hw_zencod.h"
+# else
+# include "vendor_defns/hw_zencod.h"
+# endif
+
+# define ZENCOD_LIB_NAME "zencod engine"
+# include "hw_zencod_err.c"
+
+# define FAIL_TO_SOFTWARE -15
+
+# define ZEN_LIBRARY "zenbridge"
+
+# if 0
+# define PERROR(s) perror(s)
+# define CHEESE() fputs("## [ZenEngine] ## " __FUNCTION__ "\n", stderr)
+# else
+# define PERROR(s)
+# define CHEESE()
+# endif
+
+/* Sorry ;) */
+# ifndef WIN32
+static inline void esrever(unsigned char *d, int l)
+{
+ for (; --l > 0; --l, d++) {
+ *d ^= *(d + l);
+ *(d + l) ^= *d;
+ *d ^= *(d + l);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void ypcmem(unsigned char *d, const unsigned char *s, int l)
+{
+ for (d += l; l--;)
+ *--d = *s++;
+}
+# else
+static __inline void esrever(unsigned char *d, int l)
+{
+ for (; --l > 0; --l, d++) {
+ *d ^= *(d + l);
+ *(d + l) ^= *d;
+ *d ^= *(d + l);
+ }
+}
+
+static __inline void ypcmem(unsigned char *d, const unsigned char *s, int l)
+{
+ for (d += l; l--;)
+ *--d = *s++;
+}
+# endif
+
+# define BIGNUM2ZEN(n, bn) (ptr_zencod_init_number((n), \
+ (unsigned long) ((bn)->top * BN_BITS2), \
+ (unsigned char *) ((bn)->d)))
+
+# define ZEN_BITS(n, bytes) (ptr_zencod_bytes2bits((unsigned char *) (n), (unsigned long) (bytes)))
+# define ZEN_BYTES(bits) (ptr_zencod_bits2bytes((unsigned long) (bits)))
+
+/* Function for ENGINE detection and control */
+static int zencod_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+static int zencod_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int zencod_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int zencod_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) ());
+
+/* BIGNUM stuff */
+static int zencod_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* RSA stuff */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static int RSA_zencod_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+# endif
+
+/* DSA stuff */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int DSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
+ BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+
+static DSA_SIG *DSA_zencod_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+ DSA *dsa);
+static int DSA_zencod_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+# endif
+
+/* DH stuff */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static int DH_zencod_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+static int DH_zencod_generate_key(DH *dh);
+static int DH_zencod_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+ DH *dh);
+# endif
+
+/* Rand stuff */
+static void RAND_zencod_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static int RAND_zencod_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int RAND_zencod_rand_status(void);
+
+/* Digest Stuff */
+static int engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids,
+ int nid);
+
+/* Cipher Stuff */
+static int engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+ const int **nids, int nid);
+
+# define ZENCOD_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN zencod_cmd_defns[] = {
+ {ZENCOD_CMD_SO_PATH,
+ "SO_PATH",
+ "Specifies the path to the 'zenbridge' shared library",
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+};
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+ * Our internal RSA_METHOD specific to zencod ENGINE providing pointers to
+ * our function
+ */
+static RSA_METHOD zencod_rsa = {
+ "ZENCOD RSA method",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ RSA_zencod_rsa_mod_exp,
+ RSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+};
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/*
+ * Our internal DSA_METHOD specific to zencod ENGINE providing pointers to
+ * our function
+ */
+static DSA_METHOD zencod_dsa = {
+ "ZENCOD DSA method",
+ DSA_zencod_do_sign,
+ NULL,
+ DSA_zencod_do_verify,
+ NULL,
+ DSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ 0,
+ NULL
+};
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/*
+ * Our internal DH_METHOD specific to zencod ENGINE providing pointers to our
+ * function
+ */
+static DH_METHOD zencod_dh = {
+ "ZENCOD DH method",
+ DH_zencod_generate_key,
+ DH_zencod_compute_key,
+ DH_zencod_bn_mod_exp,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ 0,
+ NULL
+};
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Our internal RAND_meth specific to zencod ZNGINE providing pointers to our
+ * function
+ */
+static RAND_METHOD zencod_rand = {
+ RAND_zencod_seed,
+ RAND_zencod_rand_bytes,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ RAND_zencod_rand_bytes,
+ RAND_zencod_rand_status
+};
+
+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+static const char *engine_zencod_id = "zencod";
+static const char *engine_zencod_name = "ZENCOD hardware engine support";
+
+/*
+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_zencod () and possibly by the
+ * "dynamic" ENGINE support too ;-)
+ */
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
+{
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ const RSA_METHOD *meth_rsa;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ const DSA_METHOD *meth_dsa;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ const DH_METHOD *meth_dh;
+# endif
+
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth_rand;
+
+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_zencod_id) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_zencod_name) ||
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &zencod_rsa) ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ !ENGINE_set_DSA(e, &zencod_dsa) ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ !ENGINE_set_DH(e, &zencod_dh) ||
+# endif
+ !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &zencod_rand) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, zencod_destroy) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, zencod_init) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, zencod_finish) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, zencod_ctrl) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, zencod_cmd_defns) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, engine_digests) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, engine_ciphers)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ /*
+ * We know that the "PKCS1_SSLeay()" functions hook properly to the
+ * Zencod-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use those functions. NB:
+ * We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or anything "more generic" because
+ * something like the RSAref code may not hook properly, and if you own
+ * one of these cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it
+ * anyway!
+ */
+ meth_rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+
+ zencod_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth_rsa->rsa_pub_enc;
+ zencod_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth_rsa->rsa_pub_dec;
+ zencod_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth_rsa->rsa_priv_enc;
+ zencod_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth_rsa->rsa_priv_dec;
+ /* meth_rsa->rsa_mod_exp */
+ /* meth_rsa->bn_mod_exp */
+ zencod_rsa.init = meth_rsa->init;
+ zencod_rsa.finish = meth_rsa->finish;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ /*
+ * We use OpenSSL meth to supply what we don't provide ;-*)
+ */
+ meth_dsa = DSA_OpenSSL();
+
+ /* meth_dsa->dsa_do_sign */
+ zencod_dsa.dsa_sign_setup = meth_dsa->dsa_sign_setup;
+ /* meth_dsa->dsa_do_verify */
+ zencod_dsa.dsa_mod_exp = meth_dsa->dsa_mod_exp;
+ /* zencod_dsa.bn_mod_exp = meth_dsa->bn_mod_exp ; */
+ zencod_dsa.init = meth_dsa->init;
+ zencod_dsa.finish = meth_dsa->finish;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ /*
+ * We use OpenSSL meth to supply what we don't provide ;-*)
+ */
+ meth_dh = DH_OpenSSL();
+
+ /* zencod_dh.generate_key = meth_dh->generate_key ; */
+ /* zencod_dh.compute_key = meth_dh->compute_key ; */
+ /* zencod_dh.bn_mod_exp = meth_dh->bn_mod_exp ; */
+ zencod_dh.init = meth_dh->init;
+ zencod_dh.finish = meth_dh->finish;
+
+# endif
+
+ /*
+ * We use OpenSSL (SSLeay) meth to supply what we don't provide ;-*)
+ */
+ meth_rand = RAND_SSLeay();
+
+ /* meth_rand->seed ; */
+ /* zencod_rand.seed = meth_rand->seed ; */
+ /* meth_rand->bytes ; */
+ /* zencod_rand.bytes = meth_rand->bytes ; */
+ zencod_rand.cleanup = meth_rand->cleanup;
+ zencod_rand.add = meth_rand->add;
+ /* meth_rand->pseudorand ; */
+ /* zencod_rand.pseudorand = meth_rand->pseudorand ; */
+ /* zencod_rand.status = meth_rand->status ; */
+ /* meth_rand->status ; */
+
+ /* Ensure the zencod error handling is set up */
+ ERR_load_ZENCOD_strings();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * As this is only ever called once, there's no need for locking (indeed -
+ * the lock will already be held by our caller!!!)
+ */
+static ENGINE *ENGINE_zencod(void)
+{
+
+ ENGINE *eng = ENGINE_new();
+
+ if (!eng) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!bind_helper(eng)) {
+ ENGINE_free(eng);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return eng;
+}
+
+# ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+static
+# endif
+void ENGINE_load_zencod(void)
+{
+ /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
+ ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_zencod();
+ if (!toadd)
+ return;
+ ENGINE_add(toadd);
+ ENGINE_free(toadd);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading the
+ * ZENBRIDGE library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an * init () or
+ * finish () call (reference counts permitting) and they're * operating with
+ * global locks, so this should be thread-safe * implicitly.
+ */
+static DSO *zencod_dso = NULL;
+
+static t_zencod_test *ptr_zencod_test = NULL;
+static t_zencod_bytes2bits *ptr_zencod_bytes2bits = NULL;
+static t_zencod_bits2bytes *ptr_zencod_bits2bytes = NULL;
+static t_zencod_new_number *ptr_zencod_new_number = NULL;
+static t_zencod_init_number *ptr_zencod_init_number = NULL;
+
+static t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp *ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp = NULL;
+static t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt *ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt = NULL;
+static t_zencod_dsa_do_sign *ptr_zencod_dsa_do_sign = NULL;
+static t_zencod_dsa_do_verify *ptr_zencod_dsa_do_verify = NULL;
+static t_zencod_dh_generate_key *ptr_zencod_dh_generate_key = NULL;
+static t_zencod_dh_compute_key *ptr_zencod_dh_compute_key = NULL;
+static t_zencod_rand_bytes *ptr_zencod_rand_bytes = NULL;
+static t_zencod_math_mod_exp *ptr_zencod_math_mod_exp = NULL;
+
+static t_zencod_md5_init *ptr_zencod_md5_init = NULL;
+static t_zencod_md5_update *ptr_zencod_md5_update = NULL;
+static t_zencod_md5_do_final *ptr_zencod_md5_do_final = NULL;
+static t_zencod_sha1_init *ptr_zencod_sha1_init = NULL;
+static t_zencod_sha1_update *ptr_zencod_sha1_update = NULL;
+static t_zencod_sha1_do_final *ptr_zencod_sha1_do_final = NULL;
+
+static t_zencod_xdes_cipher *ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher = NULL;
+static t_zencod_rc4_cipher *ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and the
+ * function symbol names to bind to.
+ */
+static const char *ZENCOD_LIBNAME = ZEN_LIBRARY;
+
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_0 = "test_device";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_1 = "zenbridge_bytes2bits";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_2 = "zenbridge_bits2bytes";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_3 = "zenbridge_new_number";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_4 = "zenbridge_init_number";
+
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_exp_1 = "zenbridge_rsa_mod_exp";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_exp_2 = "zenbridge_rsa_mod_exp_crt";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_dsa_1 = "zenbridge_dsa_do_sign";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_dsa_2 = "zenbridge_dsa_do_verify";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_dh_1 = "zenbridge_dh_generate_key";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_dh_2 = "zenbridge_dh_compute_key";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_rand_1 = "zenbridge_rand_bytes";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_math_1 = "zenbridge_math_mod_exp";
+
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_md5_1 = "zenbridge_md5_init";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_md5_2 = "zenbridge_md5_update";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_md5_3 = "zenbridge_md5_do_final";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_1 = "zenbridge_sha1_init";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_2 = "zenbridge_sha1_update";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_3 = "zenbridge_sha1_do_final";
+
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_xdes_1 = "zenbridge_xdes_cipher";
+static const char *ZENCOD_Fct_rc4_1 = "zenbridge_rc4_cipher";
+
+/*
+ * Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_zencod ()" constructor)
+ */
+static int zencod_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+
+ ERR_unload_ZENCOD_strings();
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * (de)initialisation functions. Control Function
+ */
+static int zencod_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+
+ t_zencod_test *ptr_0;
+ t_zencod_bytes2bits *ptr_1;
+ t_zencod_bits2bytes *ptr_2;
+ t_zencod_new_number *ptr_3;
+ t_zencod_init_number *ptr_4;
+ t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp *ptr_exp_1;
+ t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt *ptr_exp_2;
+ t_zencod_dsa_do_sign *ptr_dsa_1;
+ t_zencod_dsa_do_verify *ptr_dsa_2;
+ t_zencod_dh_generate_key *ptr_dh_1;
+ t_zencod_dh_compute_key *ptr_dh_2;
+ t_zencod_rand_bytes *ptr_rand_1;
+ t_zencod_math_mod_exp *ptr_math_1;
+ t_zencod_md5_init *ptr_md5_1;
+ t_zencod_md5_update *ptr_md5_2;
+ t_zencod_md5_do_final *ptr_md5_3;
+ t_zencod_sha1_init *ptr_sha1_1;
+ t_zencod_sha1_update *ptr_sha1_2;
+ t_zencod_sha1_do_final *ptr_sha1_3;
+ t_zencod_xdes_cipher *ptr_xdes_1;
+ t_zencod_rc4_cipher *ptr_rc4_1;
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ /*
+ * We Should add some tests for non NULL parameters or bad value !!
+ * Stuff to be done ...
+ */
+
+ if (zencod_dso != NULL) {
+ ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_INIT, ZENCOD_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Trying to load the Library "cryptozen"
+ */
+ zencod_dso = DSO_load(NULL, ZENCOD_LIBNAME, NULL, 0);
+ if (zencod_dso == NULL) {
+ ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_INIT, ZENCOD_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Trying to load Function from the Library
+ */
+ if (!
+ (ptr_1 =
+ (t_zencod_bytes2bits *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_1))
+|| !(ptr_2 = (t_zencod_bits2bytes *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_2))
+|| !(ptr_3 = (t_zencod_new_number *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_3))
+|| !(ptr_4 = (t_zencod_init_number *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_4))
+|| !(ptr_exp_1 =
+ (t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_exp_1))
+|| !(ptr_exp_2 =
+ (t_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_exp_2))
+|| !(ptr_dsa_1 =
+ (t_zencod_dsa_do_sign *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_dsa_1))
+|| !(ptr_dsa_2 =
+ (t_zencod_dsa_do_verify *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_dsa_2))
+|| !(ptr_dh_1 =
+ (t_zencod_dh_generate_key *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_dh_1))
+|| !(ptr_dh_2 =
+ (t_zencod_dh_compute_key *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_dh_2))
+|| !(ptr_rand_1 =
+ (t_zencod_rand_bytes *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_rand_1))
+|| !(ptr_math_1 =
+ (t_zencod_math_mod_exp *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_math_1))
+|| !(ptr_0 = (t_zencod_test *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_0))
+|| !(ptr_md5_1 =
+ (t_zencod_md5_init *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_md5_1))
+|| !(ptr_md5_2 =
+ (t_zencod_md5_update *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_md5_2))
+|| !(ptr_md5_3 =
+ (t_zencod_md5_do_final *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_md5_3))
+|| !(ptr_sha1_1 =
+ (t_zencod_sha1_init *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_1))
+|| !(ptr_sha1_2 =
+ (t_zencod_sha1_update *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_2))
+|| !(ptr_sha1_3 =
+ (t_zencod_sha1_do_final *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_sha1_3))
+|| !(ptr_xdes_1 =
+ (t_zencod_xdes_cipher *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_xdes_1))
+|| !(ptr_rc4_1 =
+ (t_zencod_rc4_cipher *) DSO_bind_func(zencod_dso, ZENCOD_Fct_rc4_1))) {
+
+ ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_INIT, ZENCOD_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The function from "cryptozen" Library have been correctly loaded so
+ * copy them
+ */
+ ptr_zencod_test = ptr_0;
+ ptr_zencod_bytes2bits = ptr_1;
+ ptr_zencod_bits2bytes = ptr_2;
+ ptr_zencod_new_number = ptr_3;
+ ptr_zencod_init_number = ptr_4;
+ ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp = ptr_exp_1;
+ ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt = ptr_exp_2;
+ ptr_zencod_dsa_do_sign = ptr_dsa_1;
+ ptr_zencod_dsa_do_verify = ptr_dsa_2;
+ ptr_zencod_dh_generate_key = ptr_dh_1;
+ ptr_zencod_dh_compute_key = ptr_dh_2;
+ ptr_zencod_rand_bytes = ptr_rand_1;
+ ptr_zencod_math_mod_exp = ptr_math_1;
+ ptr_zencod_test = ptr_0;
+ ptr_zencod_md5_init = ptr_md5_1;
+ ptr_zencod_md5_update = ptr_md5_2;
+ ptr_zencod_md5_do_final = ptr_md5_3;
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_init = ptr_sha1_1;
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_update = ptr_sha1_2;
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_do_final = ptr_sha1_3;
+ ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher = ptr_xdes_1;
+ ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher = ptr_rc4_1;
+
+ /*
+ * We should perform a test to see if there is actually any unit runnig on
+ * the system ... Even if the cryptozen library is loaded the module coul
+ * not be loaded on the system ... For now we may just open and close the
+ * device !!
+ */
+
+ if (ptr_zencod_test() != 0) {
+ ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_INIT, ZENCOD_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (zencod_dso) {
+ DSO_free(zencod_dso);
+ }
+ zencod_dso = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_bytes2bits = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_bits2bytes = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_new_number = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_init_number = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_dsa_do_sign = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_dsa_do_verify = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_dh_generate_key = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_dh_compute_key = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_rand_bytes = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_math_mod_exp = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_test = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_md5_init = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_md5_update = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_md5_do_final = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_init = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_update = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_do_final = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int zencod_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ /*
+ * We Should add some tests for non NULL parameters or bad value !!
+ * Stuff to be done ...
+ */
+ if (zencod_dso == NULL) {
+ ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_FINISH, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!DSO_free(zencod_dso)) {
+ ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_FINISH, ZENCOD_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ zencod_dso = NULL;
+
+ ptr_zencod_bytes2bits = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_bits2bytes = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_new_number = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_init_number = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_dsa_do_sign = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_dsa_do_verify = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_dh_generate_key = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_dh_compute_key = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_rand_bytes = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_math_mod_exp = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_test = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_md5_init = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_md5_update = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_md5_do_final = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_init = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_update = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_do_final = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher = NULL;
+ ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int zencod_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) ())
+{
+
+ int initialised = ((zencod_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ /*
+ * We Should add some tests for non NULL parameters or bad value !!
+ * Stuff to be done ...
+ */
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case ZENCOD_CMD_SO_PATH:
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (initialised) {
+ ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_CTRL, ZENCOD_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ZENCOD_LIBNAME = (const char *)p;
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ZENCODerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_CTRL, ZENCOD_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BIGNUM stuff Functions
+ */
+static int zencod_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ zen_nb_t y, x, e, n;
+ int ret;
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ if (!zencod_dso) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_BN_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!bn_wexpand(r, m->top + 1)) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_BN_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memset(r->d, 0, BN_num_bytes(m));
+
+ ptr_zencod_init_number(&y, (r->dmax - 1) * sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8,
+ (unsigned char *)r->d);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, a);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&e, p);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&n, m);
+
+ /* Must invert x and e parameter due to BN mod exp prototype ... */
+ ret = ptr_zencod_math_mod_exp(&y, &e, &x, &n);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ PERROR("zenbridge_math_mod_exp");
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_BN_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ r->top = (BN_num_bits(m) + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RSA stuff Functions
+ */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static int RSA_zencod_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa)
+{
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ if (!zencod_dso) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP_CRT, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP_CRT,
+ ZENCOD_R_BAD_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Do in software if argument is too large for hardware */
+ if (RSA_size(rsa) * 8 > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_RSA_CRT) {
+ const RSA_METHOD *meth;
+
+ meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+ return meth->rsa_mod_exp(r0, i, rsa);
+ } else {
+ zen_nb_t y, x, p, q, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp;
+
+ if (!bn_expand(r0, RSA_size(rsa) * 8)) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP_CRT,
+ ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r0->top = (RSA_size(rsa) * 8 + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2;
+
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, i);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, r0);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&p, rsa->p);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&q, rsa->q);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&dmp1, rsa->dmp1);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&dmq1, rsa->dmq1);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&iqmp, rsa->iqmp);
+
+ if (ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp_crt(&y, &x, &p, &q, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp) <
+ 0) {
+ PERROR("zenbridge_rsa_mod_exp_crt");
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP_CRT,
+ ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is aliased to RSA_mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped).
+ */
+static int RSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ if (!zencod_dso) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Do in software if argument is too large for hardware */
+ if (BN_num_bits(m) > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_RSA) {
+ const RSA_METHOD *meth;
+
+ meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+ return meth->bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx);
+ } else {
+ zen_nb_t y, x, e, n;
+
+ if (!bn_expand(r, BN_num_bits(m))) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r->top = (BN_num_bits(m) + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2;
+
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, a);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, r);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&e, p);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&n, m);
+
+ if (ptr_zencod_rsa_mod_exp(&y, &x, &n, &e) < 0) {
+ PERROR("zenbridge_rsa_mod_exp");
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RSA_MOD_EXP, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/*
+ * DSA stuff Functions
+ */
+static DSA_SIG *DSA_zencod_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+ DSA *dsa)
+{
+ zen_nb_t p, q, g, x, y, r, s, data;
+ DSA_SIG *sig;
+ BIGNUM *bn_r = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *bn_s = NULL;
+ char msg[20];
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ if (!zencod_dso) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ goto FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (dlen > 160) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ goto FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Do in software if argument is too large for hardware */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_DSA_SIGN ||
+ BN_num_bits(dsa->g) > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_DSA_SIGN) {
+ const DSA_METHOD *meth;
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_BAD_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+ meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
+ return meth->dsa_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa);
+ }
+
+ if (!(bn_s = BN_new()) || !(bn_r = BN_new())) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_BAD_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+ goto FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (!bn_expand(bn_r, 160) || !bn_expand(bn_s, 160)) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
+ goto FAILED;
+ }
+
+ bn_r->top = bn_s->top = (160 + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2;
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&p, dsa->p);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&q, dsa->q);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&g, dsa->g);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, dsa->priv_key);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, dsa->pub_key);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&r, bn_r);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&s, bn_s);
+ q.len = x.len = 160;
+
+ ypcmem(msg, dgst, 20);
+ ptr_zencod_init_number(&data, 160, msg);
+
+ if (ptr_zencod_dsa_do_sign(0, &data, &y, &p, &q, &g, &x, &r, &s) < 0) {
+ PERROR("zenbridge_dsa_do_sign");
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ goto FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (!(sig = DSA_SIG_new())) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ goto FAILED;
+ }
+ sig->r = bn_r;
+ sig->s = bn_s;
+ return sig;
+
+ FAILED:
+ if (bn_r)
+ BN_free(bn_r);
+ if (bn_s)
+ BN_free(bn_s);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int DSA_zencod_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
+{
+ zen_nb_t data, p, q, g, y, r, s, v;
+ char msg[20];
+ char v_data[20];
+ int ret;
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ if (!zencod_dso) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (dlen > 160) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Do in software if argument is too large for hardware */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_DSA_SIGN ||
+ BN_num_bits(dsa->g) > ZENBRIDGE_MAX_KEYSIZE_DSA_SIGN) {
+ const DSA_METHOD *meth;
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_SIGN, ZENCOD_R_BAD_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+ meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
+ return meth->dsa_do_verify(dgst, dlen, sig, dsa);
+ }
+
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&p, dsa->p);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&q, dsa->q);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&g, dsa->g);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, dsa->pub_key);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&r, sig->r);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&s, sig->s);
+ ptr_zencod_init_number(&v, 160, v_data);
+ ypcmem(msg, dgst, 20);
+ ptr_zencod_init_number(&data, 160, msg);
+
+ if ((ret =
+ ptr_zencod_dsa_do_verify(0, &data, &p, &q, &g, &y, &r, &s,
+ &v)) < 0) {
+ PERROR("zenbridge_dsa_do_verify");
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ((ret == 0) ? 1 : ret);
+}
+
+static int DSA_zencod_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
+ BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+ CHEESE();
+
+ return zencod_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+}
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSl_NO_DH
+/*
+ * DH stuff Functions
+ */
+static int DH_zencod_generate_key(DH *dh)
+{
+ BIGNUM *bn_prv = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *bn_pub = NULL;
+ zen_nb_t y, x, g, p;
+ int generate_x;
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ if (!zencod_dso) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_GENERATE, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Private key */
+ if (dh->priv_key) {
+ bn_prv = dh->priv_key;
+ generate_x = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (!(bn_prv = BN_new())) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_GENERATE, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
+ goto FAILED;
+ }
+ generate_x = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Public key */
+ if (dh->pub_key)
+ bn_pub = dh->pub_key;
+ else if (!(bn_pub = BN_new())) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_GENERATE, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
+ goto FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Expand */
+ if (!bn_wexpand(bn_prv, dh->p->dmax) || !bn_wexpand(bn_pub, dh->p->dmax)) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_GENERATE, ZENCOD_R_BN_EXPAND_FAIL);
+ goto FAILED;
+ }
+ bn_prv->top = dh->p->top;
+ bn_pub->top = dh->p->top;
+
+ /* Convert all keys */
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&p, dh->p);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&g, dh->g);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, bn_pub);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, bn_prv);
+ x.len = DH_size(dh) * 8;
+
+ /* Adjust the lengths of P and G */
+ p.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(p.data, ZEN_BYTES(p.len));
+ g.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(g.data, ZEN_BYTES(g.len));
+
+ /* Send the request to the driver */
+ if (ptr_zencod_dh_generate_key(&y, &x, &g, &p, generate_x) < 0) {
+ perror("zenbridge_dh_generate_key");
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_GENERATE, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ goto FAILED;
+ }
+
+ dh->priv_key = bn_prv;
+ dh->pub_key = bn_pub;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ FAILED:
+ if (!dh->priv_key && bn_prv)
+ BN_free(bn_prv);
+ if (!dh->pub_key && bn_pub)
+ BN_free(bn_pub);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int DH_zencod_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+ DH *dh)
+{
+ zen_nb_t y, x, p, k;
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ if (!zencod_dso) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_COMPUTE, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!dh->priv_key) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_COMPUTE, ZENCOD_R_BAD_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Convert all keys */
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&y, pub_key);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&x, dh->priv_key);
+ BIGNUM2ZEN(&p, dh->p);
+ ptr_zencod_init_number(&k, p.len, key);
+
+ /* Adjust the lengths */
+ p.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(p.data, ZEN_BYTES(p.len));
+ y.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(y.data, ZEN_BYTES(y.len));
+ x.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(x.data, ZEN_BYTES(x.len));
+
+ /* Call the hardware */
+ if (ptr_zencod_dh_compute_key(&k, &y, &x, &p) < 0) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_DH_COMPUTE, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* The key must be written MSB -> LSB */
+ k.len = ptr_zencod_bytes2bits(k.data, ZEN_BYTES(k.len));
+ esrever(key, ZEN_BYTES(k.len));
+
+ return ZEN_BYTES(k.len);
+}
+
+static int DH_zencod_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+ CHEESE();
+
+ return zencod_bn_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+}
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+/*
+ * RAND stuff Functions
+ */
+static void RAND_zencod_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+{
+ /*
+ * Nothing to do cause our crypto accelerator provide a true random
+ * generator
+ */
+}
+
+static int RAND_zencod_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ zen_nb_t r;
+
+ CHEESE();
+
+ if (!zencod_dso) {
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RAND, ZENCOD_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ptr_zencod_init_number(&r, num * 8, buf);
+
+ if (ptr_zencod_rand_bytes(&r, ZENBRIDGE_RNG_DIRECT) < 0) {
+ PERROR("zenbridge_rand_bytes");
+ ENGINEerr(ZENCOD_F_ZENCOD_RAND, ZENCOD_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int RAND_zencod_rand_status(void)
+{
+ CHEESE();
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a
+ * self-contained shared-library.
+ */
+# ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+static int bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+
+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_zencod_id) != 0)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!bind_helper(e)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+ IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_fn)
+# endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
+ /*
+ * Adding "Digest" and "Cipher" tools ...
+ * This is in development ... ;-)
+ * In orfer to code this, i refer to hw_openbsd_dev_crypto and openssl engine made by Geoff Thorpe (if i'm rigth),
+ * and evp, sha md5 definitions etc ...
+ */
+/* First add some include ... */
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+# include <openssl/md5.h>
+# include <openssl/rc4.h>
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+/* Some variables declaration ... */
+ /*
+ * DONS: Disable symetric computation except DES and 3DES, but let part
+ * of the code
+ */
+/* static int engine_digest_nids [ ] = { NID_sha1, NID_md5 } ; */
+static int engine_digest_nids[] = { };
+
+static int engine_digest_nids_num = 0;
+/*
+ * static int engine_cipher_nids [ ] = { NID_rc4, NID_rc4_40, NID_des_cbc,
+ * NID_des_ede3_cbc } ;
+ */
+static int engine_cipher_nids[] = { NID_des_cbc, NID_des_ede3_cbc };
+
+static int engine_cipher_nids_num = 2;
+
+/* Function prototype ... */
+/* SHA stuff */
+static int engine_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int engine_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+ unsigned long count);
+static int engine_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+
+/* MD5 stuff */
+static int engine_md5_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int engine_md5_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+ unsigned long count);
+static int engine_md5_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+
+static int engine_md_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int engine_md_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
+
+/* RC4 Stuff */
+static int engine_rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int engine_rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
+
+/* DES Stuff */
+static int engine_des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int engine_des_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
+
+/* 3DES Stuff */
+static int engine_des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int engine_des_ede3_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inl);
+
+static int engine_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); /* cleanup ctx */
+
+/* The one for SHA ... */
+static const EVP_MD engine_sha1_md = {
+ NID_sha1,
+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT,
+ /*
+ * 0,
+ *//*
+ * EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT = x0001 digest can only handle a single block *
+ * XXX: set according to device info ...
+ */
+ engine_sha1_init,
+ engine_sha1_update,
+ engine_sha1_final,
+ engine_md_copy, /* dev_crypto_sha_copy */
+ engine_md_cleanup, /* dev_crypto_sha_cleanup */
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+ SHA_CBLOCK,
+ /* sizeof ( EVP_MD * ) + sizeof ( SHA_CTX ) */
+ sizeof(ZEN_MD_DATA)
+ /*
+ * sizeof ( MD_CTX_DATA ) The message digest data structure ...
+ */
+};
+
+/* The one for MD5 ... */
+static const EVP_MD engine_md5_md = {
+ NID_md5,
+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT,
+ /*
+ * 0,
+ *//*
+ * EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT = x0001 digest can only handle a single block *
+ * XXX: set according to device info ...
+ */
+ engine_md5_init,
+ engine_md5_update,
+ engine_md5_final,
+ engine_md_copy, /* dev_crypto_md5_copy */
+ engine_md_cleanup, /* dev_crypto_md5_cleanup */
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+ MD5_CBLOCK,
+ /* sizeof ( EVP_MD * ) + sizeof ( MD5_CTX ) */
+ sizeof(ZEN_MD_DATA)
+ /*
+ * sizeof ( MD_CTX_DATA ) The message digest data structure ...
+ */
+};
+
+/* The one for RC4 ... */
+# define EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE 16
+
+/* Try something static ... */
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned int len;
+ unsigned int first;
+ unsigned char rc4_state[260];
+} NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY;
+
+# define rc4_data(ctx) ( (EVP_RC4_KEY *) ( ctx )->cipher_data )
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER engine_rc4 = {
+ NID_rc4,
+ 1,
+ 16, /* EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE should be 128 bits */
+ 0, /* FIXME: key should be up to 256 bytes */
+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+ engine_rc4_init_key,
+ engine_rc4_cipher,
+ engine_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof(NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY),
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+};
+
+/* The one for RC4_40 ... */
+static const EVP_CIPHER engine_rc4_40 = {
+ NID_rc4_40,
+ 1,
+ 5, /* 40 bits */
+ 0,
+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+ engine_rc4_init_key,
+ engine_rc4_cipher,
+ engine_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof(NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY),
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+};
+
+/* The one for DES ... */
+
+/* Try something static ... */
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char des_key[24];
+ unsigned char des_iv[8];
+} ZEN_DES_KEY;
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER engine_des_cbc = {
+ NID_des_cbc,
+ 8, 8, 8,
+ 0 | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ engine_des_init_key,
+ engine_des_cbc_cipher,
+ engine_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof(ZEN_DES_KEY),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+};
+
+/* The one for 3DES ... */
+
+/* Try something static ... */
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char des3_key[24];
+ unsigned char des3_iv[8];
+} ZEN_3DES_KEY;
+
+# define des_data(ctx) ( (DES_EDE_KEY *) ( ctx )->cipher_data )
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER engine_des_ede3_cbc = {
+ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
+ 8, 8, 8,
+ 0 | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+ engine_des_ede3_init_key,
+ engine_des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
+ engine_cipher_cleanup,
+ sizeof(ZEN_3DES_KEY),
+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+};
+
+/* General function cloned on hw_openbsd_dev_crypto one ... */
+static int engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids,
+ int nid)
+{
+
+# ifdef DEBUG_ZENCOD_MD
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t=>Function : static int engine_digests () called !\n");
+# endif
+
+ if (!digest) {
+ /* We are returning a list of supported nids */
+ *nids = engine_digest_nids;
+ return engine_digest_nids_num;
+ }
+ /* We are being asked for a specific digest */
+ if (nid == NID_md5) {
+ *digest = &engine_md5_md;
+ } else if (nid == NID_sha1) {
+ *digest = &engine_sha1_md;
+ } else {
+ *digest = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SHA stuff Functions
+ */
+static int engine_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+
+ int to_return = 0;
+
+ /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
+ to_return = ptr_zencod_sha1_init((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data);
+ to_return = !to_return;
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+ unsigned long count)
+{
+
+ zen_nb_t input;
+ int to_return = 0;
+
+ /* Convert parameters ... */
+ input.len = count;
+ input.data = (unsigned char *)data;
+
+ /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
+ to_return =
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_update((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data,
+ (const zen_nb_t *)&input);
+ to_return = !to_return;
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+
+ zen_nb_t output;
+ int to_return = 0;
+
+ /* Convert parameters ... */
+ output.len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ output.data = md;
+
+ /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
+ to_return =
+ ptr_zencod_sha1_do_final((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data,
+ (zen_nb_t *) & output);
+ to_return = !to_return;
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * MD5 stuff Functions
+ */
+static int engine_md5_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+
+ int to_return = 0;
+
+ /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
+ to_return = ptr_zencod_md5_init((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data);
+ to_return = !to_return;
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_md5_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+ unsigned long count)
+{
+
+ zen_nb_t input;
+ int to_return = 0;
+
+ /* Convert parameters ... */
+ input.len = count;
+ input.data = (unsigned char *)data;
+
+ /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
+ to_return =
+ ptr_zencod_md5_update((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data,
+ (const zen_nb_t *)&input);
+ to_return = !to_return;
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_md5_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+{
+
+ zen_nb_t output;
+ int to_return = 0;
+
+ /* Convert parameters ... */
+ output.len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ output.data = md;
+
+ /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
+ to_return =
+ ptr_zencod_md5_do_final((ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data,
+ (zen_nb_t *) & output);
+ to_return = !to_return;
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_md_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+
+ ZEN_MD_DATA *zen_md_data = (ZEN_MD_DATA *)ctx->md_data;
+
+ if (zen_md_data->HashBuffer != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(zen_md_data->HashBuffer);
+ zen_md_data->HashBufferSize = 0;
+ ctx->md_data = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int engine_md_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
+{
+ const ZEN_MD_DATA *from_md = (ZEN_MD_DATA *)from->md_data;
+ ZEN_MD_DATA *to_md = (ZEN_MD_DATA *)to->md_data;
+
+ to_md->HashBuffer = OPENSSL_malloc(from_md->HashBufferSize);
+ memcpy(to_md->HashBuffer, from_md->HashBuffer, from_md->HashBufferSize);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* General function cloned on hw_openbsd_dev_crypto one ... */
+static int engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+ const int **nids, int nid)
+{
+
+ if (!cipher) {
+ /* We are returning a list of supported nids */
+ *nids = engine_cipher_nids;
+ return engine_cipher_nids_num;
+ }
+ /* We are being asked for a specific cipher */
+ if (nid == NID_rc4) {
+ *cipher = &engine_rc4;
+ } else if (nid == NID_rc4_40) {
+ *cipher = &engine_rc4_40;
+ } else if (nid == NID_des_cbc) {
+ *cipher = &engine_des_cbc;
+ } else if (nid == NID_des_ede3_cbc) {
+ *cipher = &engine_des_ede3_cbc;
+ } else {
+ *cipher = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int engine_rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ int to_return = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+ int nb = 0;
+ NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY *tmp_rc4_key = NULL;
+
+ tmp_rc4_key = (NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data);
+ tmp_rc4_key->first = 0;
+ tmp_rc4_key->len = ctx->key_len;
+ tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[0] = 0x00;
+ tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[2] = 0x00;
+ nb = 256 / ctx->key_len;
+ for (i = 0; i < nb; i++) {
+ memcpy(&(tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[4 + i * ctx->key_len]), key,
+ ctx->key_len);
+ }
+
+ to_return = 1;
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int in_len)
+{
+
+ zen_nb_t output, input;
+ zen_nb_t rc4key;
+ int to_return = 0;
+ NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY *tmp_rc4_key = NULL;
+
+ /* Convert parameters ... */
+ input.len = in_len;
+ input.data = (unsigned char *)in;
+ output.len = in_len;
+ output.data = (unsigned char *)out;
+
+ tmp_rc4_key = ((NEW_ZEN_RC4_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data));
+ rc4key.len = 260;
+ rc4key.data = &(tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[0]);
+
+ /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
+ to_return =
+ ptr_zencod_rc4_cipher(&output, &input, (const zen_nb_t *)&rc4key,
+ &(tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[0]),
+ &(tmp_rc4_key->rc4_state[3]),
+ !tmp_rc4_key->first);
+ to_return = !to_return;
+
+ /* Update encryption state ... */
+ tmp_rc4_key->first = 1;
+ tmp_rc4_key = NULL;
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+
+ ZEN_DES_KEY *tmp_des_key = NULL;
+ int to_return = 0;
+
+ tmp_des_key = (ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data);
+ memcpy(&(tmp_des_key->des_key[0]), key, 8);
+ memcpy(&(tmp_des_key->des_key[8]), key, 8);
+ memcpy(&(tmp_des_key->des_key[16]), key, 8);
+ memcpy(&(tmp_des_key->des_iv[0]), iv, 8);
+
+ to_return = 1;
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_des_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
+{
+
+ zen_nb_t output, input;
+ zen_nb_t deskey_1, deskey_2, deskey_3, iv;
+ int to_return = 0;
+
+ /* Convert parameters ... */
+ input.len = inl;
+ input.data = (unsigned char *)in;
+ output.len = inl;
+ output.data = out;
+
+ /* Set key parameters ... */
+ deskey_1.len = 8;
+ deskey_2.len = 8;
+ deskey_3.len = 8;
+ deskey_1.data =
+ (unsigned char *)((ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des_key;
+ deskey_2.data =
+ (unsigned char *)&((ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des_key[8];
+ deskey_3.data =
+ (unsigned char *)&((ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des_key[16];
+
+ /* Key correct iv ... */
+ memcpy(((ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des_iv, ctx->iv, 8);
+ iv.len = 8;
+ iv.data = (unsigned char *)((ZEN_DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des_iv;
+
+ if (ctx->encrypt == 0) {
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, &(input.data[input.len - 8]), 8);
+ }
+
+ /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
+ to_return = ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher(&output, &input,
+ (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_1,
+ (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_2,
+ (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_3, &iv,
+ ctx->encrypt);
+ to_return = !to_return;
+
+ /*
+ * But we need to set up the rigth iv ... Test ENCRYPT or DECRYPT mode to
+ * set iv ...
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt == 1) {
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, &(output.data[output.len - 8]), 8);
+ }
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_des_ede3_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+
+ ZEN_3DES_KEY *tmp_3des_key = NULL;
+ int to_return = 0;
+
+ tmp_3des_key = (ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data);
+ memcpy(&(tmp_3des_key->des3_key[0]), key, 24);
+ memcpy(&(tmp_3des_key->des3_iv[0]), iv, 8);
+
+ to_return = 1;
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_des_ede3_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int in_len)
+{
+
+ zen_nb_t output, input;
+ zen_nb_t deskey_1, deskey_2, deskey_3, iv;
+ int to_return = 0;
+
+ /* Convert parameters ... */
+ input.len = in_len;
+ input.data = (unsigned char *)in;
+ output.len = in_len;
+ output.data = out;
+
+ /* Set key ... */
+ deskey_1.len = 8;
+ deskey_2.len = 8;
+ deskey_3.len = 8;
+ deskey_1.data =
+ (unsigned char *)((ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des3_key;
+ deskey_2.data =
+ (unsigned char *)&((ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des3_key[8];
+ deskey_3.data =
+ (unsigned char *)&((ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des3_key[16];
+
+ /* Key correct iv ... */
+ memcpy(((ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des3_iv, ctx->iv, 8);
+ iv.len = 8;
+ iv.data = (unsigned char *)((ZEN_3DES_KEY *) (ctx->cipher_data))->des3_iv;
+
+ if (ctx->encrypt == 0) {
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, &(input.data[input.len - 8]), 8);
+ }
+
+ /* Test with zenbridge library ... */
+ to_return = ptr_zencod_xdes_cipher(&output, &input,
+ (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_1,
+ (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_2,
+ (zen_nb_t *) & deskey_3, &iv,
+ ctx->encrypt);
+ to_return = !to_return;
+
+ if (ctx->encrypt == 1) {
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, &(output.data[output.len - 8]), 8);
+ }
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int engine_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+
+ /* Set the key pointer ... */
+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_rc4 || ctx->cipher->nid == NID_rc4_40) {
+ } else if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_des_cbc) {
+ } else if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_des_ede3_cbc) {
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_ZENCOD */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/apps/ciphers.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/ciphers.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,629 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-ciphers - SSL cipher display and cipher list tool.
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
-B<openssl> B<ciphers>
-[B<-v>]
-[B<-V>]
-[B<-ssl2>]
-[B<-ssl3>]
-[B<-tls1>]
-[B<cipherlist>]
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-The B<ciphers> command converts textual OpenSSL cipher lists into ordered
-SSL cipher preference lists. It can be used as a test tool to determine
-the appropriate cipherlist.
-
-=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<-v>
-
-Verbose option. List ciphers with a complete description of
-protocol version (SSLv2 or SSLv3; the latter includes TLS), key exchange,
-authentication, encryption and mac algorithms used along with any key size
-restrictions and whether the algorithm is classed as an "export" cipher.
-Note that without the B<-v> option, ciphers may seem to appear twice
-in a cipher list; this is when similar ciphers are available for
-SSL v2 and for SSL v3/TLS v1.
-
-=item B<-V>
-
-Like B<-v>, but include cipher suite codes in output (hex format).
-
-=item B<-ssl3>
-
-only include SSL v3 ciphers.
-
-=item B<-ssl2>
-
-only include SSL v2 ciphers.
-
-=item B<-tls1>
-
-only include TLS v1 ciphers.
-
-=item B<-h>, B<-?>
-
-print a brief usage message.
-
-=item B<cipherlist>
-
-a cipher list to convert to a cipher preference list. If it is not included
-then the default cipher list will be used. The format is described below.
-
-=back
-
-=head1 CIPHER LIST FORMAT
-
-The cipher list consists of one or more I<cipher strings> separated by colons.
-Commas or spaces are also acceptable separators but colons are normally used.
-
-The actual cipher string can take several different forms.
-
-It can consist of a single cipher suite such as B<RC4-SHA>.
-
-It can represent a list of cipher suites containing a certain algorithm, or
-cipher suites of a certain type. For example B<SHA1> represents all ciphers
-suites using the digest algorithm SHA1 and B<SSLv3> represents all SSL v3
-algorithms.
-
-Lists of cipher suites can be combined in a single cipher string using the
-B<+> character. This is used as a logical B<and> operation. For example
-B<SHA1+DES> represents all cipher suites containing the SHA1 B<and> the DES
-algorithms.
-
-Each cipher string can be optionally preceded by the characters B<!>,
-B<-> or B<+>.
-
-If B<!> is used then the ciphers are permanently deleted from the list.
-The ciphers deleted can never reappear in the list even if they are
-explicitly stated.
-
-If B<-> is used then the ciphers are deleted from the list, but some or
-all of the ciphers can be added again by later options.
-
-If B<+> is used then the ciphers are moved to the end of the list. This
-option doesn't add any new ciphers it just moves matching existing ones.
-
-If none of these characters is present then the string is just interpreted
-as a list of ciphers to be appended to the current preference list. If the
-list includes any ciphers already present they will be ignored: that is they
-will not moved to the end of the list.
-
-Additionally the cipher string B<@STRENGTH> can be used at any point to sort
-the current cipher list in order of encryption algorithm key length.
-
-=head1 CIPHER STRINGS
-
-The following is a list of all permitted cipher strings and their meanings.
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<DEFAULT>
-
-the default cipher list. This is determined at compile time and
-is normally B<ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2>. This must be the firstcipher string
-specified.
-
-=item B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT>
-
-the ciphers included in B<ALL>, but not enabled by default. Currently
-this is B<ADH> and B<AECDH>. Note that this rule does not cover B<eNULL>,
-which is not included by B<ALL> (use B<COMPLEMENTOFALL> if necessary).
-
-=item B<ALL>
-
-all cipher suites except the B<eNULL> ciphers which must be explicitly enabled;
-as of OpenSSL, the B<ALL> cipher suites are reasonably ordered by default
-
-=item B<COMPLEMENTOFALL>
-
-the cipher suites not enabled by B<ALL>, currently being B<eNULL>.
-
-=item B<HIGH>
-
-"high" encryption cipher suites. This currently means those with key lengths larger
-than 128 bits, and some cipher suites with 128-bit keys.
-
-=item B<MEDIUM>
-
-"medium" encryption cipher suites, currently some of those using 128 bit encryption.
-
-=item B<LOW>
-
-"low" encryption cipher suites, currently those using 64 or 56 bit encryption algorithms
-but excluding export cipher suites.
-
-=item B<EXP>, B<EXPORT>
-
-export encryption algorithms. Including 40 and 56 bits algorithms.
-
-=item B<EXPORT40>
-
-40 bit export encryption algorithms
-
-=item B<EXPORT56>
-
-56 bit export encryption algorithms. In OpenSSL 0.9.8c and later the set of
-56 bit export ciphers is empty unless OpenSSL has been explicitly configured
-with support for experimental ciphers.
-
-=item B<eNULL>, B<NULL>
-
-the "NULL" ciphers that is those offering no encryption. Because these offer no
-encryption at all and are a security risk they are disabled unless explicitly
-included.
-
-=item B<aNULL>
-
-the cipher suites offering no authentication. This is currently the anonymous
-DH algorithms and anonymous ECDH algorithms. These cipher suites are vulnerable
-to a "man in the middle" attack and so their use is normally discouraged.
-
-=item B<kRSA>, B<RSA>
-
-cipher suites using RSA key exchange.
-
-=item B<kDHr>, B<kDHd>, B<kDH>
-
-cipher suites using DH key agreement and DH certificates signed by CAs with RSA
-and DSS keys or either respectively. Not implemented.
-
-=item B<kEDH>
-
-cipher suites using ephemeral DH key agreement, including anonymous cipher
-suites.
-
-=item B<EDH>
-
-cipher suites using authenticated ephemeral DH key agreement.
-
-=item B<ADH>
-
-anonymous DH cipher suites, note that this does not include anonymous Elliptic
-Curve DH (ECDH) cipher suites.
-
-=item B<DH>
-
-cipher suites using DH, including anonymous DH, ephemeral DH and fixed DH.
-
-=item B<kECDHr>, B<kECDHe>, B<kECDH>
-
-cipher suites using fixed ECDH key agreement signed by CAs with RSA and ECDSA
-keys or either respectively.
-
-=item B<kEECDH>
-
-cipher suites using ephemeral ECDH key agreement, including anonymous
-cipher suites.
-
-=item B<EECDHE>
-
-cipher suites using authenticated ephemeral ECDH key agreement.
-
-=item B<AECDH>
-
-anonymous Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman cipher suites.
-
-=item B<ECDH>
-
-cipher suites using ECDH key exchange, including anonymous, ephemeral and
-fixed ECDH.
-
-=item B<aRSA>
-
-cipher suites using RSA authentication, i.e. the certificates carry RSA keys.
-
-=item B<aDSS>, B<DSS>
-
-cipher suites using DSS authentication, i.e. the certificates carry DSS keys.
-
-=item B<aDH>
-
-cipher suites effectively using DH authentication, i.e. the certificates carry
-DH keys. Not implemented.
-
-=item B<aECDH>
-
-cipher suites effectively using ECDH authentication, i.e. the certificates
-carry ECDH keys.
-
-=item B<aECDSA>, B<ECDSA>
-
-cipher suites using ECDSA authentication, i.e. the certificates carry ECDSA
-keys.
-
-=item B<kFZA>, B<aFZA>, B<eFZA>, B<FZA>
-
-ciphers suites using FORTEZZA key exchange, authentication, encryption or all
-FORTEZZA algorithms. Not implemented.
-
-=item B<TLSv1.2>, B<TLSv1>, B<SSLv3>, B<SSLv2>
-
-TLS v1.2, TLS v1.0, SSL v3.0 or SSL v2.0 cipher suites respectively. Note:
-there are no ciphersuites specific to TLS v1.1.
-
-=item B<AES128>, B<AES256>, B<AES>
-
-cipher suites using 128 bit AES, 256 bit AES or either 128 or 256 bit AES.
-
-=item B<AESGCM>
-
-AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM): these ciphersuites are only supported
-in TLS v1.2.
-
-=item B<CAMELLIA128>, B<CAMELLIA256>, B<CAMELLIA>
-
-cipher suites using 128 bit CAMELLIA, 256 bit CAMELLIA or either 128 or 256 bit
-CAMELLIA.
-
-=item B<3DES>
-
-cipher suites using triple DES.
-
-=item B<DES>
-
-cipher suites using DES (not triple DES).
-
-=item B<RC4>
-
-cipher suites using RC4.
-
-=item B<RC2>
-
-cipher suites using RC2.
-
-=item B<IDEA>
-
-cipher suites using IDEA.
-
-=item B<SEED>
-
-cipher suites using SEED.
-
-=item B<MD5>
-
-cipher suites using MD5.
-
-=item B<SHA1>, B<SHA>
-
-cipher suites using SHA1.
-
-=item B<SHA256>, B<SHA384>
-
-ciphersuites using SHA256 or SHA384.
-
-=item B<aGOST>
-
-cipher suites using GOST R 34.10 (either 2001 or 94) for authenticaction
-(needs an engine supporting GOST algorithms).
-
-=item B<aGOST01>
-
-cipher suites using GOST R 34.10-2001 authentication.
-
-=item B<aGOST94>
-
-cipher suites using GOST R 34.10-94 authentication (note that R 34.10-94
-standard has been expired so use GOST R 34.10-2001)
-
-=item B<kGOST>
-
-cipher suites, using VKO 34.10 key exchange, specified in the RFC 4357.
-
-=item B<GOST94>
-
-cipher suites, using HMAC based on GOST R 34.11-94.
-
-=item B<GOST89MAC>
-
-cipher suites using GOST 28147-89 MAC B<instead of> HMAC.
-
-=item B<PSK>
-
-cipher suites using pre-shared keys (PSK).
-
-=back
-
-=head1 CIPHER SUITE NAMES
-
-The following lists give the SSL or TLS cipher suites names from the
-relevant specification and their OpenSSL equivalents. It should be noted,
-that several cipher suite names do not include the authentication used,
-e.g. DES-CBC3-SHA. In these cases, RSA authentication is used.
-
-=head2 SSL v3.0 cipher suites.
-
- SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 NULL-MD5
- SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA NULL-SHA
- SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5
- SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 RC4-MD5
- SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RC4-SHA
- SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
- SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA IDEA-CBC-SHA
- SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-DES-CBC-SHA
- SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DES-CBC-SHA
- SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DES-CBC3-SHA
-
- SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
- SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-CBC-SHA
- SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
- SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
- SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
- SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
-
- SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5
- SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 ADH-RC4-MD5
- SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
- SSL_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
- SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA
-
- SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA Not implemented.
- SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA Not implemented.
-
-=head2 TLS v1.0 cipher suites.
-
- TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 NULL-MD5
- TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA NULL-SHA
- TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5
- TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 RC4-MD5
- TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RC4-SHA
- TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
- TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA IDEA-CBC-SHA
- TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-DES-CBC-SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DES-CBC-SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DES-CBC3-SHA
-
- TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-CBC-SHA
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
- TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
-
- TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 ADH-RC4-MD5
- TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA
-
-=head2 AES ciphersuites from RFC3268, extending TLS v1.0
-
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA AES128-SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA AES256-SHA
-
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
-
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
-
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ADH-AES128-SHA
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ADH-AES256-SHA
-
-=head2 Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132, extending TLS v1.0
-
- TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA CAMELLIA128-SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA CAMELLIA256-SHA
-
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
-
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA
-
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA
-
-=head2 SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162, extending TLS v1.0
-
- TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA SEED-SHA
-
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
-
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA
-
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA ADH-SEED-SHA
-
-=head2 GOST ciphersuites from draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls, extending TLS v1.0
-
-Note: these ciphers require an engine which including GOST cryptographic
-algorithms, such as the B<ccgost> engine, included in the OpenSSL distribution.
-
- TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT GOST94-GOST89-GOST89
- TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89
- TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 GOST94-NULL-GOST94
- TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 GOST2001-NULL-GOST94
-
-=head2 Additional Export 1024 and other cipher suites
-
-Note: these ciphers can also be used in SSL v3.
-
- TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA
- TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA EXP1024-RC4-SHA
- TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
- TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA
-
-=head2 Elliptic curve cipher suites.
-
- TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDH-RSA-NULL-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA
-
- TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
-
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
-
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
-
- TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA AECDH-NULL-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA AECDH-RC4-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA AECDH-AES128-SHA
- TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA AECDH-AES256-SHA
-
-=head2 TLS v1.2 cipher suites
-
- TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 NULL-SHA256
-
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 AES128-SHA256
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 AES256-SHA256
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 AES128-GCM-SHA256
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 AES256-GCM-SHA384
-
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Not implemented.
-
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Not implemented.
- TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Not implemented.
-
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
-
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256
- TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384
-
- TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256
- TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384
- TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
- TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
-
- TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256
- TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384
- TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
- TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
-
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
-
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
-
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ADH-AES128-SHA256
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 ADH-AES256-SHA256
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256
- TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384
-
-=head2 Pre shared keying (PSK) cipheruites
-
- TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA PSK-RC4-SHA
- TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
- TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
- TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
-
-=head2 Deprecated SSL v2.0 cipher suites.
-
- SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 RC4-MD5
- SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5
- SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 RC2-MD5
- SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 EXP-RC2-MD5
- SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 IDEA-CBC-MD5
- SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 DES-CBC-MD5
- SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 DES-CBC3-MD5
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-The non-ephemeral DH modes are currently unimplemented in OpenSSL
-because there is no support for DH certificates.
-
-Some compiled versions of OpenSSL may not include all the ciphers
-listed here because some ciphers were excluded at compile time.
-
-=head1 EXAMPLES
-
-Verbose listing of all OpenSSL ciphers including NULL ciphers:
-
- openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:eNULL'
-
-Include all ciphers except NULL and anonymous DH then sort by
-strength:
-
- openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:!ADH:@STRENGTH'
-
-Include all ciphers except ones with no encryption (eNULL) or no
-authentication (aNULL):
-
- openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:!aNULL'
-
-Include only 3DES ciphers and then place RSA ciphers last:
-
- openssl ciphers -v '3DES:+RSA'
-
-Include all RC4 ciphers but leave out those without authentication:
-
- openssl ciphers -v 'RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT'
-
-Include all chiphers with RSA authentication but leave out ciphers without
-encryption.
-
- openssl ciphers -v 'RSA:!COMPLEMENTOFALL'
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)>, L<s_server(1)|s_server(1)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-The B<COMPLENTOFALL> and B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT> selection options
-for cipherlist strings were added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.
-The B<-V> option for the B<ciphers> command was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/ciphers.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/apps/ciphers.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/ciphers.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/ciphers.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,629 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ciphers - SSL cipher display and cipher list tool.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<ciphers>
+[B<-v>]
+[B<-V>]
+[B<-ssl2>]
+[B<-ssl3>]
+[B<-tls1>]
+[B<cipherlist>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<ciphers> command converts textual OpenSSL cipher lists into ordered
+SSL cipher preference lists. It can be used as a test tool to determine
+the appropriate cipherlist.
+
+=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-v>
+
+Verbose option. List ciphers with a complete description of
+protocol version (SSLv2 or SSLv3; the latter includes TLS), key exchange,
+authentication, encryption and mac algorithms used along with any key size
+restrictions and whether the algorithm is classed as an "export" cipher.
+Note that without the B<-v> option, ciphers may seem to appear twice
+in a cipher list; this is when similar ciphers are available for
+SSL v2 and for SSL v3/TLS v1.
+
+=item B<-V>
+
+Like B<-v>, but include cipher suite codes in output (hex format).
+
+=item B<-ssl3>
+
+only include SSL v3 ciphers.
+
+=item B<-ssl2>
+
+only include SSL v2 ciphers.
+
+=item B<-tls1>
+
+only include TLS v1 ciphers.
+
+=item B<-h>, B<-?>
+
+print a brief usage message.
+
+=item B<cipherlist>
+
+a cipher list to convert to a cipher preference list. If it is not included
+then the default cipher list will be used. The format is described below.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CIPHER LIST FORMAT
+
+The cipher list consists of one or more I<cipher strings> separated by colons.
+Commas or spaces are also acceptable separators but colons are normally used.
+
+The actual cipher string can take several different forms.
+
+It can consist of a single cipher suite such as B<RC4-SHA>.
+
+It can represent a list of cipher suites containing a certain algorithm, or
+cipher suites of a certain type. For example B<SHA1> represents all ciphers
+suites using the digest algorithm SHA1 and B<SSLv3> represents all SSL v3
+algorithms.
+
+Lists of cipher suites can be combined in a single cipher string using the
+B<+> character. This is used as a logical B<and> operation. For example
+B<SHA1+DES> represents all cipher suites containing the SHA1 B<and> the DES
+algorithms.
+
+Each cipher string can be optionally preceded by the characters B<!>,
+B<-> or B<+>.
+
+If B<!> is used then the ciphers are permanently deleted from the list.
+The ciphers deleted can never reappear in the list even if they are
+explicitly stated.
+
+If B<-> is used then the ciphers are deleted from the list, but some or
+all of the ciphers can be added again by later options.
+
+If B<+> is used then the ciphers are moved to the end of the list. This
+option doesn't add any new ciphers it just moves matching existing ones.
+
+If none of these characters is present then the string is just interpreted
+as a list of ciphers to be appended to the current preference list. If the
+list includes any ciphers already present they will be ignored: that is they
+will not moved to the end of the list.
+
+Additionally the cipher string B<@STRENGTH> can be used at any point to sort
+the current cipher list in order of encryption algorithm key length.
+
+=head1 CIPHER STRINGS
+
+The following is a list of all permitted cipher strings and their meanings.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<DEFAULT>
+
+the default cipher list. This is determined at compile time and
+is normally B<ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2>. This must be the firstcipher string
+specified.
+
+=item B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT>
+
+the ciphers included in B<ALL>, but not enabled by default. Currently
+this is B<ADH> and B<AECDH>. Note that this rule does not cover B<eNULL>,
+which is not included by B<ALL> (use B<COMPLEMENTOFALL> if necessary).
+
+=item B<ALL>
+
+all cipher suites except the B<eNULL> ciphers which must be explicitly enabled;
+as of OpenSSL, the B<ALL> cipher suites are reasonably ordered by default
+
+=item B<COMPLEMENTOFALL>
+
+the cipher suites not enabled by B<ALL>, currently being B<eNULL>.
+
+=item B<HIGH>
+
+"high" encryption cipher suites. This currently means those with key lengths larger
+than 128 bits, and some cipher suites with 128-bit keys.
+
+=item B<MEDIUM>
+
+"medium" encryption cipher suites, currently some of those using 128 bit encryption.
+
+=item B<LOW>
+
+"low" encryption cipher suites, currently those using 64 or 56 bit encryption algorithms
+but excluding export cipher suites.
+
+=item B<EXP>, B<EXPORT>
+
+export encryption algorithms. Including 40 and 56 bits algorithms.
+
+=item B<EXPORT40>
+
+40 bit export encryption algorithms
+
+=item B<EXPORT56>
+
+56 bit export encryption algorithms. In OpenSSL 0.9.8c and later the set of
+56 bit export ciphers is empty unless OpenSSL has been explicitly configured
+with support for experimental ciphers.
+
+=item B<eNULL>, B<NULL>
+
+the "NULL" ciphers that is those offering no encryption. Because these offer no
+encryption at all and are a security risk they are disabled unless explicitly
+included.
+
+=item B<aNULL>
+
+the cipher suites offering no authentication. This is currently the anonymous
+DH algorithms and anonymous ECDH algorithms. These cipher suites are vulnerable
+to a "man in the middle" attack and so their use is normally discouraged.
+
+=item B<kRSA>, B<RSA>
+
+cipher suites using RSA key exchange.
+
+=item B<kDHr>, B<kDHd>, B<kDH>
+
+cipher suites using DH key agreement and DH certificates signed by CAs with RSA
+and DSS keys or either respectively. Not implemented.
+
+=item B<kEDH>
+
+cipher suites using ephemeral DH key agreement, including anonymous cipher
+suites.
+
+=item B<EDH>
+
+cipher suites using authenticated ephemeral DH key agreement.
+
+=item B<ADH>
+
+anonymous DH cipher suites, note that this does not include anonymous Elliptic
+Curve DH (ECDH) cipher suites.
+
+=item B<DH>
+
+cipher suites using DH, including anonymous DH, ephemeral DH and fixed DH.
+
+=item B<kECDHr>, B<kECDHe>, B<kECDH>
+
+cipher suites using fixed ECDH key agreement signed by CAs with RSA and ECDSA
+keys or either respectively.
+
+=item B<kEECDH>
+
+cipher suites using ephemeral ECDH key agreement, including anonymous
+cipher suites.
+
+=item B<EECDH>
+
+cipher suites using authenticated ephemeral ECDH key agreement.
+
+=item B<AECDH>
+
+anonymous Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman cipher suites.
+
+=item B<ECDH>
+
+cipher suites using ECDH key exchange, including anonymous, ephemeral and
+fixed ECDH.
+
+=item B<aRSA>
+
+cipher suites using RSA authentication, i.e. the certificates carry RSA keys.
+
+=item B<aDSS>, B<DSS>
+
+cipher suites using DSS authentication, i.e. the certificates carry DSS keys.
+
+=item B<aDH>
+
+cipher suites effectively using DH authentication, i.e. the certificates carry
+DH keys. Not implemented.
+
+=item B<aECDH>
+
+cipher suites effectively using ECDH authentication, i.e. the certificates
+carry ECDH keys.
+
+=item B<aECDSA>, B<ECDSA>
+
+cipher suites using ECDSA authentication, i.e. the certificates carry ECDSA
+keys.
+
+=item B<kFZA>, B<aFZA>, B<eFZA>, B<FZA>
+
+ciphers suites using FORTEZZA key exchange, authentication, encryption or all
+FORTEZZA algorithms. Not implemented.
+
+=item B<TLSv1.2>, B<TLSv1>, B<SSLv3>, B<SSLv2>
+
+TLS v1.2, TLS v1.0, SSL v3.0 or SSL v2.0 cipher suites respectively. Note:
+there are no ciphersuites specific to TLS v1.1.
+
+=item B<AES128>, B<AES256>, B<AES>
+
+cipher suites using 128 bit AES, 256 bit AES or either 128 or 256 bit AES.
+
+=item B<AESGCM>
+
+AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM): these ciphersuites are only supported
+in TLS v1.2.
+
+=item B<CAMELLIA128>, B<CAMELLIA256>, B<CAMELLIA>
+
+cipher suites using 128 bit CAMELLIA, 256 bit CAMELLIA or either 128 or 256 bit
+CAMELLIA.
+
+=item B<3DES>
+
+cipher suites using triple DES.
+
+=item B<DES>
+
+cipher suites using DES (not triple DES).
+
+=item B<RC4>
+
+cipher suites using RC4.
+
+=item B<RC2>
+
+cipher suites using RC2.
+
+=item B<IDEA>
+
+cipher suites using IDEA.
+
+=item B<SEED>
+
+cipher suites using SEED.
+
+=item B<MD5>
+
+cipher suites using MD5.
+
+=item B<SHA1>, B<SHA>
+
+cipher suites using SHA1.
+
+=item B<SHA256>, B<SHA384>
+
+ciphersuites using SHA256 or SHA384.
+
+=item B<aGOST>
+
+cipher suites using GOST R 34.10 (either 2001 or 94) for authenticaction
+(needs an engine supporting GOST algorithms).
+
+=item B<aGOST01>
+
+cipher suites using GOST R 34.10-2001 authentication.
+
+=item B<aGOST94>
+
+cipher suites using GOST R 34.10-94 authentication (note that R 34.10-94
+standard has been expired so use GOST R 34.10-2001)
+
+=item B<kGOST>
+
+cipher suites, using VKO 34.10 key exchange, specified in the RFC 4357.
+
+=item B<GOST94>
+
+cipher suites, using HMAC based on GOST R 34.11-94.
+
+=item B<GOST89MAC>
+
+cipher suites using GOST 28147-89 MAC B<instead of> HMAC.
+
+=item B<PSK>
+
+cipher suites using pre-shared keys (PSK).
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CIPHER SUITE NAMES
+
+The following lists give the SSL or TLS cipher suites names from the
+relevant specification and their OpenSSL equivalents. It should be noted,
+that several cipher suite names do not include the authentication used,
+e.g. DES-CBC3-SHA. In these cases, RSA authentication is used.
+
+=head2 SSL v3.0 cipher suites.
+
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 NULL-MD5
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA NULL-SHA
+ SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 RC4-MD5
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RC4-SHA
+ SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA IDEA-CBC-SHA
+ SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-DES-CBC-SHA
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DES-CBC-SHA
+ SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+ SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
+ SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-CBC-SHA
+ SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
+ SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
+ SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+ SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5
+ SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 ADH-RC4-MD5
+ SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
+ SSL_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
+ SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+ SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA Not implemented.
+ SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA Not implemented.
+
+=head2 TLS v1.0 cipher suites.
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 NULL-MD5
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA NULL-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 RC4-MD5
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RC4-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA IDEA-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-DES-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DES-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 ADH-RC4-MD5
+ TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA
+
+=head2 AES ciphersuites from RFC3268, extending TLS v1.0
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA AES128-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ADH-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ADH-AES256-SHA
+
+=head2 Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132, extending TLS v1.0
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA CAMELLIA128-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA CAMELLIA256-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA
+
+=head2 SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162, extending TLS v1.0
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA SEED-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA Not implemented.
+
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA
+
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA ADH-SEED-SHA
+
+=head2 GOST ciphersuites from draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls, extending TLS v1.0
+
+Note: these ciphers require an engine which including GOST cryptographic
+algorithms, such as the B<ccgost> engine, included in the OpenSSL distribution.
+
+ TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT GOST94-GOST89-GOST89
+ TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89
+ TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 GOST94-NULL-GOST94
+ TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 GOST2001-NULL-GOST94
+
+=head2 Additional Export 1024 and other cipher suites
+
+Note: these ciphers can also be used in SSL v3.
+
+ TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA EXP1024-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA
+
+=head2 Elliptic curve cipher suites.
+
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDH-RSA-NULL-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
+
+ TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA AECDH-NULL-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA AECDH-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA AECDH-AES128-SHA
+ TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA AECDH-AES256-SHA
+
+=head2 TLS v1.2 cipher suites
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 NULL-SHA256
+
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 AES256-SHA256
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Not implemented.
+
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Not implemented.
+ TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Not implemented.
+
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ADH-AES128-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 ADH-AES256-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+=head2 Pre shared keying (PSK) cipheruites
+
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA PSK-RC4-SHA
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
+ TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+
+=head2 Deprecated SSL v2.0 cipher suites.
+
+ SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 RC4-MD5
+ SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5
+ SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 RC2-MD5
+ SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 EXP-RC2-MD5
+ SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 IDEA-CBC-MD5
+ SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 DES-CBC-MD5
+ SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 DES-CBC3-MD5
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The non-ephemeral DH modes are currently unimplemented in OpenSSL
+because there is no support for DH certificates.
+
+Some compiled versions of OpenSSL may not include all the ciphers
+listed here because some ciphers were excluded at compile time.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Verbose listing of all OpenSSL ciphers including NULL ciphers:
+
+ openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:eNULL'
+
+Include all ciphers except NULL and anonymous DH then sort by
+strength:
+
+ openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:!ADH:@STRENGTH'
+
+Include all ciphers except ones with no encryption (eNULL) or no
+authentication (aNULL):
+
+ openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:!aNULL'
+
+Include only 3DES ciphers and then place RSA ciphers last:
+
+ openssl ciphers -v '3DES:+RSA'
+
+Include all RC4 ciphers but leave out those without authentication:
+
+ openssl ciphers -v 'RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT'
+
+Include all chiphers with RSA authentication but leave out ciphers without
+encryption.
+
+ openssl ciphers -v 'RSA:!COMPLEMENTOFALL'
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<s_client(1)|s_client(1)>, L<s_server(1)|s_server(1)>, L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+The B<COMPLENTOFALL> and B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT> selection options
+for cipherlist strings were added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.
+The B<-V> option for the B<ciphers> command was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/dgst.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/apps/dgst.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/dgst.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-dgst, sha, sha1, mdc2, ripemd160, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, md2, md4, md5, dss1 - message digests
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
-B<openssl> B<dgst>
-[B<-sha|-sha1|-mdc2|-ripemd160|-sha224|-sha256|-sha384|-sha512|-md2|-md4|-md5|-dss1>]
-[B<-c>]
-[B<-d>]
-[B<-hex>]
-[B<-binary>]
-[B<-r>]
-[B<-hmac arg>]
-[B<-non-fips-allow>]
-[B<-out filename>]
-[B<-sign filename>]
-[B<-keyform arg>]
-[B<-passin arg>]
-[B<-verify filename>]
-[B<-prverify filename>]
-[B<-signature filename>]
-[B<-hmac key>]
-[B<-non-fips-allow>]
-[B<-fips-fingerprint>]
-[B<file...>]
-
-B<openssl>
-[I<digest>]
-[B<...>]
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-The digest functions output the message digest of a supplied file or files
-in hexadecimal. The digest functions also generate and verify digital
-signatures using message digests.
-
-=head1 OPTIONS
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<-c>
-
-print out the digest in two digit groups separated by colons, only relevant if
-B<hex> format output is used.
-
-=item B<-d>
-
-print out BIO debugging information.
-
-=item B<-hex>
-
-digest is to be output as a hex dump. This is the default case for a "normal"
-digest as opposed to a digital signature. See NOTES below for digital
-signatures using B<-hex>.
-
-=item B<-binary>
-
-output the digest or signature in binary form.
-
-=item B<-r>
-
-output the digest in the "coreutils" format used by programs like B<sha1sum>.
-
-=item B<-hmac arg>
-
-set the HMAC key to "arg".
-
-=item B<-non-fips-allow>
-
-Allow use of non FIPS digest when in FIPS mode. This has no effect when not in
-FIPS mode.
-
-=item B<-out filename>
-
-filename to output to, or standard output by default.
-
-=item B<-sign filename>
-
-digitally sign the digest using the private key in "filename".
-
-=item B<-keyform arg>
-
-Specifies the key format to sign digest with. The DER, PEM, P12,
-and ENGINE formats are supported.
-
-=item B<-engine id>
-
-Use engine B<id> for operations (including private key storage).
-This engine is not used as source for digest algorithms, unless it is
-also specified in the configuration file.
-
-=item B<-sigopt nm:v>
-
-Pass options to the signature algorithm during sign or verify operations.
-Names and values of these options are algorithm-specific.
-
-
-=item B<-passin arg>
-
-the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
-see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
-
-=item B<-verify filename>
-
-verify the signature using the the public key in "filename".
-The output is either "Verification OK" or "Verification Failure".
-
-=item B<-prverify filename>
-
-verify the signature using the the private key in "filename".
-
-=item B<-signature filename>
-
-the actual signature to verify.
-
-=item B<-hmac key>
-
-create a hashed MAC using "key".
-
-=item B<-mac alg>
-
-create MAC (keyed Message Authentication Code). The most popular MAC
-algorithm is HMAC (hash-based MAC), but there are other MAC algorithms
-which are not based on hash, for instance B<gost-mac> algorithm,
-supported by B<ccgost> engine. MAC keys and other options should be set
-via B<-macopt> parameter.
-
-=item B<-macopt nm:v>
-
-Passes options to MAC algorithm, specified by B<-mac> key.
-Following options are supported by both by B<HMAC> and B<gost-mac>:
-
-=over 8
-
-=item B<key:string>
-
-Specifies MAC key as alphnumeric string (use if key contain printable
-characters only). String length must conform to any restrictions of
-the MAC algorithm for example exactly 32 chars for gost-mac.
-
-=item B<hexkey:string>
-
-Specifies MAC key in hexadecimal form (two hex digits per byte).
-Key length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm
-for example exactly 32 chars for gost-mac.
-
-=back
-
-=item B<-rand file(s)>
-
-a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
-generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>).
-Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character.
-The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
-all others.
-
-=item B<-non-fips-allow>
-
-enable use of non-FIPS algorithms such as MD5 even in FIPS mode.
-
-=item B<-fips-fingerprint>
-
-compute HMAC using a specific key
-for certain OpenSSL-FIPS operations.
-
-=item B<file...>
-
-file or files to digest. If no files are specified then standard input is
-used.
-
-=back
-
-
-=head1 EXAMPLES
-
-To create a hex-encoded message digest of a file:
- openssl dgst -md5 -hex file.txt
-
-To sign a file using SHA-256 with binary file output:
- openssl dgst -sha256 -sign privatekey.pem -out signature.sign file.txt
-
-To verify a signature:
- openssl dgst -sha256 -verify publickey.pem \
- -signature signature.sign \
- file.txt
-
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-The digest of choice for all new applications is SHA1. Other digests are
-however still widely used.
-
-When signing a file, B<dgst> will automatically determine the algorithm
-(RSA, ECC, etc) to use for signing based on the private key's ASN.1 info.
-When verifying signatures, it only handles the RSA, DSA, or ECDSA signature
-itself, not the related data to identify the signer and algorithm used in
-formats such as x.509, CMS, and S/MIME.
-
-A source of random numbers is required for certain signing algorithms, in
-particular ECDSA and DSA.
-
-The signing and verify options should only be used if a single file is
-being signed or verified.
-
-Hex signatures cannot be verified using B<openssl>. Instead, use "xxd -r"
-or similar program to transform the hex signature into a binary signature
-prior to verification.
-
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/dgst.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/apps/dgst.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/dgst.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/dgst.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+dgst, sha, sha1, mdc2, ripemd160, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, md2, md4, md5, dss1 - message digests
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<dgst>
+[B<-sha|-sha1|-mdc2|-ripemd160|-sha224|-sha256|-sha384|-sha512|-md2|-md4|-md5|-dss1>]
+[B<-c>]
+[B<-d>]
+[B<-hex>]
+[B<-binary>]
+[B<-r>]
+[B<-non-fips-allow>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-sign filename>]
+[B<-keyform arg>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-verify filename>]
+[B<-prverify filename>]
+[B<-signature filename>]
+[B<-hmac key>]
+[B<-non-fips-allow>]
+[B<-fips-fingerprint>]
+[B<file...>]
+
+B<openssl>
+[I<digest>]
+[B<...>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The digest functions output the message digest of a supplied file or files
+in hexadecimal. The digest functions also generate and verify digital
+signatures using message digests.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-c>
+
+print out the digest in two digit groups separated by colons, only relevant if
+B<hex> format output is used.
+
+=item B<-d>
+
+print out BIO debugging information.
+
+=item B<-hex>
+
+digest is to be output as a hex dump. This is the default case for a "normal"
+digest as opposed to a digital signature. See NOTES below for digital
+signatures using B<-hex>.
+
+=item B<-binary>
+
+output the digest or signature in binary form.
+
+=item B<-r>
+
+output the digest in the "coreutils" format used by programs like B<sha1sum>.
+
+=item B<-non-fips-allow>
+
+Allow use of non FIPS digest when in FIPS mode. This has no effect when not in
+FIPS mode.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+filename to output to, or standard output by default.
+
+=item B<-sign filename>
+
+digitally sign the digest using the private key in "filename".
+
+=item B<-keyform arg>
+
+Specifies the key format to sign digest with. The DER, PEM, P12,
+and ENGINE formats are supported.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+Use engine B<id> for operations (including private key storage).
+This engine is not used as source for digest algorithms, unless it is
+also specified in the configuration file.
+
+=item B<-sigopt nm:v>
+
+Pass options to the signature algorithm during sign or verify operations.
+Names and values of these options are algorithm-specific.
+
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-verify filename>
+
+verify the signature using the the public key in "filename".
+The output is either "Verification OK" or "Verification Failure".
+
+=item B<-prverify filename>
+
+verify the signature using the the private key in "filename".
+
+=item B<-signature filename>
+
+the actual signature to verify.
+
+=item B<-hmac key>
+
+create a hashed MAC using "key".
+
+=item B<-mac alg>
+
+create MAC (keyed Message Authentication Code). The most popular MAC
+algorithm is HMAC (hash-based MAC), but there are other MAC algorithms
+which are not based on hash, for instance B<gost-mac> algorithm,
+supported by B<ccgost> engine. MAC keys and other options should be set
+via B<-macopt> parameter.
+
+=item B<-macopt nm:v>
+
+Passes options to MAC algorithm, specified by B<-mac> key.
+Following options are supported by both by B<HMAC> and B<gost-mac>:
+
+=over 8
+
+=item B<key:string>
+
+Specifies MAC key as alphnumeric string (use if key contain printable
+characters only). String length must conform to any restrictions of
+the MAC algorithm for example exactly 32 chars for gost-mac.
+
+=item B<hexkey:string>
+
+Specifies MAC key in hexadecimal form (two hex digits per byte).
+Key length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm
+for example exactly 32 chars for gost-mac.
+
+=back
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-non-fips-allow>
+
+enable use of non-FIPS algorithms such as MD5 even in FIPS mode.
+
+=item B<-fips-fingerprint>
+
+compute HMAC using a specific key
+for certain OpenSSL-FIPS operations.
+
+=item B<file...>
+
+file or files to digest. If no files are specified then standard input is
+used.
+
+=back
+
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+To create a hex-encoded message digest of a file:
+ openssl dgst -md5 -hex file.txt
+
+To sign a file using SHA-256 with binary file output:
+ openssl dgst -sha256 -sign privatekey.pem -out signature.sign file.txt
+
+To verify a signature:
+ openssl dgst -sha256 -verify publickey.pem \
+ -signature signature.sign \
+ file.txt
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The digest of choice for all new applications is SHA1. Other digests are
+however still widely used.
+
+When signing a file, B<dgst> will automatically determine the algorithm
+(RSA, ECC, etc) to use for signing based on the private key's ASN.1 info.
+When verifying signatures, it only handles the RSA, DSA, or ECDSA signature
+itself, not the related data to identify the signer and algorithm used in
+formats such as x.509, CMS, and S/MIME.
+
+A source of random numbers is required for certain signing algorithms, in
+particular ECDSA and DSA.
+
+The signing and verify options should only be used if a single file is
+being signed or verified.
+
+Hex signatures cannot be verified using B<openssl>. Instead, use "xxd -r"
+or similar program to transform the hex signature into a binary signature
+prior to verification.
+
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/genrsa.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/apps/genrsa.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/genrsa.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-genrsa - generate an RSA private key
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
-B<openssl> B<genrsa>
-[B<-out filename>]
-[B<-passout arg>]
-[B<-aes128>]
-[B<-aes128>]
-[B<-aes192>]
-[B<-aes256>]
-[B<-camellia128>]
-[B<-camellia192>]
-[B<-camellia256>]
-[B<-aes192>]
-[B<-aes256>]
-[B<-camellia128>]
-[B<-camellia192>]
-[B<-camellia256>]
-[B<-des>]
-[B<-des3>]
-[B<-idea>]
-[B<-f4>]
-[B<-3>]
-[B<-rand file(s)>]
-[B<-engine id>]
-[B<numbits>]
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-The B<genrsa> command generates an RSA private key.
-
-=head1 OPTIONS
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<-out filename>
-
-the output filename. If this argument is not specified then standard output is
-used.
-
-=item B<-passout arg>
-
-the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
-see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
-
-=item B<-aes128|-aes192|-aes256|-camellia128|-camellia192|-camellia256|-des|-des3|-idea>
-
-These options encrypt the private key with specified
-cipher before outputting it. If none of these options is
-specified no encryption is used. If encryption is used a pass phrase is prompted
-for if it is not supplied via the B<-passout> argument.
-
-=item B<-F4|-3>
-
-the public exponent to use, either 65537 or 3. The default is 65537.
-
-=item B<-rand file(s)>
-
-a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
-generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>).
-Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character.
-The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
-all others.
-
-=item B<-engine id>
-
-specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<genrsa>
-to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
-thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
-for all available algorithms.
-
-=item B<numbits>
-
-the size of the private key to generate in bits. This must be the last option
-specified. The default is 512.
-
-=back
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-RSA private key generation essentially involves the generation of two prime
-numbers. When generating a private key various symbols will be output to
-indicate the progress of the generation. A B<.> represents each number which
-has passed an initial sieve test, B<+> means a number has passed a single
-round of the Miller-Rabin primality test. A newline means that the number has
-passed all the prime tests (the actual number depends on the key size).
-
-Because key generation is a random process the time taken to generate a key
-may vary somewhat.
-
-=head1 BUGS
-
-A quirk of the prime generation algorithm is that it cannot generate small
-primes. Therefore the number of bits should not be less that 64. For typical
-private keys this will not matter because for security reasons they will
-be much larger (typically 1024 bits).
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>
-
-=cut
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/genrsa.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/apps/genrsa.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/genrsa.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/genrsa.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+genrsa - generate an RSA private key
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<genrsa>
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-passout arg>]
+[B<-aes128>]
+[B<-aes192>]
+[B<-aes256>]
+[B<-camellia128>]
+[B<-camellia192>]
+[B<-camellia256>]
+[B<-des>]
+[B<-des3>]
+[B<-idea>]
+[B<-f4>]
+[B<-3>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+[B<numbits>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<genrsa> command generates an RSA private key.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+the output filename. If this argument is not specified then standard output is
+used.
+
+=item B<-passout arg>
+
+the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-aes128|-aes192|-aes256|-camellia128|-camellia192|-camellia256|-des|-des3|-idea>
+
+These options encrypt the private key with specified
+cipher before outputting it. If none of these options is
+specified no encryption is used. If encryption is used a pass phrase is prompted
+for if it is not supplied via the B<-passout> argument.
+
+=item B<-F4|-3>
+
+the public exponent to use, either 65537 or 3. The default is 65537.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<genrsa>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<numbits>
+
+the size of the private key to generate in bits. This must be the last option
+specified. The default is 512.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+RSA private key generation essentially involves the generation of two prime
+numbers. When generating a private key various symbols will be output to
+indicate the progress of the generation. A B<.> represents each number which
+has passed an initial sieve test, B<+> means a number has passed a single
+round of the Miller-Rabin primality test. A newline means that the number has
+passed all the prime tests (the actual number depends on the key size).
+
+Because key generation is a random process the time taken to generate a key
+may vary somewhat.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+A quirk of the prime generation algorithm is that it cannot generate small
+primes. Therefore the number of bits should not be less that 64. For typical
+private keys this will not matter because for security reasons they will
+be much larger (typically 1024 bits).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>
+
+=cut
+
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/req.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/apps/req.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/req.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,678 +0,0 @@
-
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-req - PKCS#10 certificate request and certificate generating utility.
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
-B<openssl> B<req>
-[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
-[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
-[B<-in filename>]
-[B<-passin arg>]
-[B<-out filename>]
-[B<-passout arg>]
-[B<-text>]
-[B<-pubkey>]
-[B<-noout>]
-[B<-verify>]
-[B<-modulus>]
-[B<-new>]
-[B<-rand file(s)>]
-[B<-newkey rsa:bits>]
-[B<-newkey alg:file>]
-[B<-nodes>]
-[B<-key filename>]
-[B<-keyform PEM|DER>]
-[B<-keyout filename>]
-[B<-keygen_engine id>]
-[B<-[digest]>]
-[B<-config filename>]
-[B<-subj arg>]
-[B<-multivalue-rdn>]
-[B<-x509>]
-[B<-days n>]
-[B<-set_serial n>]
-[B<-asn1-kludge>]
-[B<-no-asn1-kludge>]
-[B<-newhdr>]
-[B<-extensions section>]
-[B<-reqexts section>]
-[B<-utf8>]
-[B<-nameopt>]
-[B<-reqopt>]
-[B<-subject>]
-[B<-subj arg>]
-[B<-batch>]
-[B<-verbose>]
-[B<-engine id>]
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-The B<req> command primarily creates and processes certificate requests
-in PKCS#10 format. It can additionally create self signed certificates
-for use as root CAs for example.
-
-=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
-
-This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded
-form compatible with the PKCS#10. The B<PEM> form is the default format: it
-consists of the B<DER> format base64 encoded with additional header and
-footer lines.
-
-=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
-
-This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
-B<-inform> option.
-
-=item B<-in filename>
-
-This specifies the input filename to read a request from or standard input
-if this option is not specified. A request is only read if the creation
-options (B<-new> and B<-newkey>) are not specified.
-
-=item B<-passin arg>
-
-the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
-see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
-
-=item B<-out filename>
-
-This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
-default.
-
-=item B<-passout arg>
-
-the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
-see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
-
-=item B<-text>
-
-prints out the certificate request in text form.
-
-=item B<-subject>
-
-prints out the request subject (or certificate subject if B<-x509> is
-specified)
-
-=item B<-pubkey>
-
-outputs the public key.
-
-=item B<-noout>
-
-this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
-
-=item B<-modulus>
-
-this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key
-contained in the request.
-
-=item B<-verify>
-
-verifies the signature on the request.
-
-=item B<-new>
-
-this option generates a new certificate request. It will prompt
-the user for the relevant field values. The actual fields
-prompted for and their maximum and minimum sizes are specified
-in the configuration file and any requested extensions.
-
-If the B<-key> option is not used it will generate a new RSA private
-key using information specified in the configuration file.
-
-=item B<-subj arg>
-
-Replaces subject field of input request with specified data and outputs
-modified request. The arg must be formatted as
-I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
-characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped.
-
-=item B<-rand file(s)>
-
-a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
-generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>).
-Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character.
-The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
-all others.
-
-=item B<-newkey arg>
-
-this option creates a new certificate request and a new private
-key. The argument takes one of several forms. B<rsa:nbits>, where
-B<nbits> is the number of bits, generates an RSA key B<nbits>
-in size. If B<nbits> is omitted, i.e. B<-newkey rsa> specified,
-the default key size, specified in the configuration file is used.
-
-All other algorithms support the B<-newkey alg:file> form, where file may be
-an algorithm parameter file, created by the B<genpkey -genparam> command
-or and X.509 certificate for a key with approriate algorithm.
-
-B<param:file> generates a key using the parameter file or certificate B<file>,
-the algorithm is determined by the parameters. B<algname:file> use algorithm
-B<algname> and parameter file B<file>: the two algorithms must match or an
-error occurs. B<algname> just uses algorithm B<algname>, and parameters,
-if neccessary should be specified via B<-pkeyopt> parameter.
-
-B<dsa:filename> generates a DSA key using the parameters
-in the file B<filename>. B<ec:filename> generates EC key (usable both with
-ECDSA or ECDH algorithms), B<gost2001:filename> generates GOST R
-34.10-2001 key (requires B<ccgost> engine configured in the configuration
-file). If just B<gost2001> is specified a parameter set should be
-specified by B<-pkeyopt paramset:X>
-
-
-=item B<-pkeyopt opt:value>
-
-set the public key algorithm option B<opt> to B<value>. The precise set of
-options supported depends on the public key algorithm used and its
-implementation. See B<KEY GENERATION OPTIONS> in the B<genpkey> manual page
-for more details.
-
-=item B<-key filename>
-
-This specifies the file to read the private key from. It also
-accepts PKCS#8 format private keys for PEM format files.
-
-=item B<-keyform PEM|DER>
-
-the format of the private key file specified in the B<-key>
-argument. PEM is the default.
-
-=item B<-keyout filename>
-
-this gives the filename to write the newly created private key to.
-If this option is not specified then the filename present in the
-configuration file is used.
-
-=item B<-nodes>
-
-if this option is specified then if a private key is created it
-will not be encrypted.
-
-=item B<-[digest]>
-
-this specifies the message digest to sign the request with (such as
-B<-md5>, B<-sha1>). This overrides the digest algorithm specified in
-the configuration file.
-
-Some public key algorithms may override this choice. For instance, DSA
-signatures always use SHA1, GOST R 34.10 signatures always use
-GOST R 34.11-94 (B<-md_gost94>).
-
-=item B<-config filename>
-
-this allows an alternative configuration file to be specified,
-this overrides the compile time filename or any specified in
-the B<OPENSSL_CONF> environment variable.
-
-=item B<-subj arg>
-
-sets subject name for new request or supersedes the subject name
-when processing a request.
-The arg must be formatted as I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
-characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped.
-
-=item B<-multivalue-rdn>
-
-this option causes the -subj argument to be interpreted with full
-support for multivalued RDNs. Example:
-
-I</DC=org/DC=OpenSSL/DC=users/UID=123456+CN=John Doe>
-
-If -multi-rdn is not used then the UID value is I<123456+CN=John Doe>.
-
-=item B<-x509>
-
-this option outputs a self signed certificate instead of a certificate
-request. This is typically used to generate a test certificate or
-a self signed root CA. The extensions added to the certificate
-(if any) are specified in the configuration file. Unless specified
-using the B<set_serial> option B<0> will be used for the serial
-number.
-
-=item B<-days n>
-
-when the B<-x509> option is being used this specifies the number of
-days to certify the certificate for. The default is 30 days.
-
-=item B<-set_serial n>
-
-serial number to use when outputting a self signed certificate. This
-may be specified as a decimal value or a hex value if preceded by B<0x>.
-It is possible to use negative serial numbers but this is not recommended.
-
-=item B<-extensions section>
-
-=item B<-reqexts section>
-
-these options specify alternative sections to include certificate
-extensions (if the B<-x509> option is present) or certificate
-request extensions. This allows several different sections to
-be used in the same configuration file to specify requests for
-a variety of purposes.
-
-=item B<-utf8>
-
-this option causes field values to be interpreted as UTF8 strings, by
-default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that the field
-values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a
-configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings.
-
-=item B<-nameopt option>
-
-option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The
-B<option> argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by
-commas. Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to
-set multiple options. See the L<x509(1)|x509(1)> manual page for details.
-
-=item B<-reqopt>
-
-customise the output format used with B<-text>. The B<option> argument can be
-a single option or multiple options separated by commas.
-
-See discission of the B<-certopt> parameter in the L<B<x509>|x509(1)>
-command.
-
-
-=item B<-asn1-kludge>
-
-by default the B<req> command outputs certificate requests containing
-no attributes in the correct PKCS#10 format. However certain CAs will only
-accept requests containing no attributes in an invalid form: this
-option produces this invalid format.
-
-More precisely the B<Attributes> in a PKCS#10 certificate request
-are defined as a B<SET OF Attribute>. They are B<not OPTIONAL> so
-if no attributes are present then they should be encoded as an
-empty B<SET OF>. The invalid form does not include the empty
-B<SET OF> whereas the correct form does.
-
-It should be noted that very few CAs still require the use of this option.
-
-=item B<-no-asn1-kludge>
-
-Reverses effect of B<-asn1-kludge>
-
-=item B<-newhdr>
-
-Adds the word B<NEW> to the PEM file header and footer lines on the outputted
-request. Some software (Netscape certificate server) and some CAs need this.
-
-=item B<-batch>
-
-non-interactive mode.
-
-=item B<-verbose>
-
-print extra details about the operations being performed.
-
-=item B<-engine id>
-
-specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
-to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
-thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
-for all available algorithms.
-
-=item B<-keygen_engine id>
-
-specifies an engine (by its unique B<id> string) which would be used
-for key generation operations.
-
-=back
-
-=head1 CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT
-
-The configuration options are specified in the B<req> section of
-the configuration file. As with all configuration files if no
-value is specified in the specific section (i.e. B<req>) then
-the initial unnamed or B<default> section is searched too.
-
-The options available are described in detail below.
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<input_password output_password>
-
-The passwords for the input private key file (if present) and
-the output private key file (if one will be created). The
-command line options B<passin> and B<passout> override the
-configuration file values.
-
-=item B<default_bits>
-
-This specifies the default key size in bits. If not specified then
-512 is used. It is used if the B<-new> option is used. It can be
-overridden by using the B<-newkey> option.
-
-=item B<default_keyfile>
-
-This is the default filename to write a private key to. If not
-specified the key is written to standard output. This can be
-overridden by the B<-keyout> option.
-
-=item B<oid_file>
-
-This specifies a file containing additional B<OBJECT IDENTIFIERS>.
-Each line of the file should consist of the numerical form of the
-object identifier followed by white space then the short name followed
-by white space and finally the long name.
-
-=item B<oid_section>
-
-This specifies a section in the configuration file containing extra
-object identifiers. Each line should consist of the short name of the
-object identifier followed by B<=> and the numerical form. The short
-and long names are the same when this option is used.
-
-=item B<RANDFILE>
-
-This specifies a filename in which random number seed information is
-placed and read from, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>).
-It is used for private key generation.
-
-=item B<encrypt_key>
-
-If this is set to B<no> then if a private key is generated it is
-B<not> encrypted. This is equivalent to the B<-nodes> command line
-option. For compatibility B<encrypt_rsa_key> is an equivalent option.
-
-=item B<default_md>
-
-This option specifies the digest algorithm to use. Possible values
-include B<md5 sha1 mdc2>. If not present then MD5 is used. This
-option can be overridden on the command line.
-
-=item B<string_mask>
-
-This option masks out the use of certain string types in certain
-fields. Most users will not need to change this option.
-
-It can be set to several values B<default> which is also the default
-option uses PrintableStrings, T61Strings and BMPStrings if the
-B<pkix> value is used then only PrintableStrings and BMPStrings will
-be used. This follows the PKIX recommendation in RFC2459. If the
-B<utf8only> option is used then only UTF8Strings will be used: this
-is the PKIX recommendation in RFC2459 after 2003. Finally the B<nombstr>
-option just uses PrintableStrings and T61Strings: certain software has
-problems with BMPStrings and UTF8Strings: in particular Netscape.
-
-=item B<req_extensions>
-
-this specifies the configuration file section containing a list of
-extensions to add to the certificate request. It can be overridden
-by the B<-reqexts> command line switch. See the
-L<x509v3_config(5)|x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
-extension section format.
-
-=item B<x509_extensions>
-
-this specifies the configuration file section containing a list of
-extensions to add to certificate generated when the B<-x509> switch
-is used. It can be overridden by the B<-extensions> command line switch.
-
-=item B<prompt>
-
-if set to the value B<no> this disables prompting of certificate fields
-and just takes values from the config file directly. It also changes the
-expected format of the B<distinguished_name> and B<attributes> sections.
-
-=item B<utf8>
-
-if set to the value B<yes> then field values to be interpreted as UTF8
-strings, by default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that
-the field values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a
-configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings.
-
-=item B<attributes>
-
-this specifies the section containing any request attributes: its format
-is the same as B<distinguished_name>. Typically these may contain the
-challengePassword or unstructuredName types. They are currently ignored
-by OpenSSL's request signing utilities but some CAs might want them.
-
-=item B<distinguished_name>
-
-This specifies the section containing the distinguished name fields to
-prompt for when generating a certificate or certificate request. The format
-is described in the next section.
-
-=back
-
-=head1 DISTINGUISHED NAME AND ATTRIBUTE SECTION FORMAT
-
-There are two separate formats for the distinguished name and attribute
-sections. If the B<prompt> option is set to B<no> then these sections
-just consist of field names and values: for example,
-
- CN=My Name
- OU=My Organization
- emailAddress=someone at somewhere.org
-
-This allows external programs (e.g. GUI based) to generate a template file
-with all the field names and values and just pass it to B<req>. An example
-of this kind of configuration file is contained in the B<EXAMPLES> section.
-
-Alternatively if the B<prompt> option is absent or not set to B<no> then the
-file contains field prompting information. It consists of lines of the form:
-
- fieldName="prompt"
- fieldName_default="default field value"
- fieldName_min= 2
- fieldName_max= 4
-
-"fieldName" is the field name being used, for example commonName (or CN).
-The "prompt" string is used to ask the user to enter the relevant
-details. If the user enters nothing then the default value is used if no
-default value is present then the field is omitted. A field can
-still be omitted if a default value is present if the user just
-enters the '.' character.
-
-The number of characters entered must be between the fieldName_min and
-fieldName_max limits: there may be additional restrictions based
-on the field being used (for example countryName can only ever be
-two characters long and must fit in a PrintableString).
-
-Some fields (such as organizationName) can be used more than once
-in a DN. This presents a problem because configuration files will
-not recognize the same name occurring twice. To avoid this problem
-if the fieldName contains some characters followed by a full stop
-they will be ignored. So for example a second organizationName can
-be input by calling it "1.organizationName".
-
-The actual permitted field names are any object identifier short or
-long names. These are compiled into OpenSSL and include the usual
-values such as commonName, countryName, localityName, organizationName,
-organizationUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress
-is include as well as name, surname, givenName initials and dnQualifier.
-
-Additional object identifiers can be defined with the B<oid_file> or
-B<oid_section> options in the configuration file. Any additional fields
-will be treated as though they were a DirectoryString.
-
-
-=head1 EXAMPLES
-
-Examine and verify certificate request:
-
- openssl req -in req.pem -text -verify -noout
-
-Create a private key and then generate a certificate request from it:
-
- openssl genrsa -out key.pem 1024
- openssl req -new -key key.pem -out req.pem
-
-The same but just using req:
-
- openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
-
-Generate a self signed root certificate:
-
- openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
-
-Example of a file pointed to by the B<oid_file> option:
-
- 1.2.3.4 shortName A longer Name
- 1.2.3.6 otherName Other longer Name
-
-Example of a section pointed to by B<oid_section> making use of variable
-expansion:
-
- testoid1=1.2.3.5
- testoid2=${testoid1}.6
-
-Sample configuration file prompting for field values:
-
- [ req ]
- default_bits = 1024
- default_keyfile = privkey.pem
- distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
- attributes = req_attributes
- x509_extensions = v3_ca
-
- dirstring_type = nobmp
-
- [ req_distinguished_name ]
- countryName = Country Name (2 letter code)
- countryName_default = AU
- countryName_min = 2
- countryName_max = 2
-
- localityName = Locality Name (eg, city)
-
- organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
-
- commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
- commonName_max = 64
-
- emailAddress = Email Address
- emailAddress_max = 40
-
- [ req_attributes ]
- challengePassword = A challenge password
- challengePassword_min = 4
- challengePassword_max = 20
-
- [ v3_ca ]
-
- subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
- authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always
- basicConstraints = CA:true
-
-Sample configuration containing all field values:
-
-
- RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd
-
- [ req ]
- default_bits = 1024
- default_keyfile = keyfile.pem
- distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
- attributes = req_attributes
- prompt = no
- output_password = mypass
-
- [ req_distinguished_name ]
- C = GB
- ST = Test State or Province
- L = Test Locality
- O = Organization Name
- OU = Organizational Unit Name
- CN = Common Name
- emailAddress = test at email.address
-
- [ req_attributes ]
- challengePassword = A challenge password
-
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-The header and footer lines in the B<PEM> format are normally:
-
- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
- -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
-
-some software (some versions of Netscape certificate server) instead needs:
-
- -----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
- -----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
-
-which is produced with the B<-newhdr> option but is otherwise compatible.
-Either form is accepted transparently on input.
-
-The certificate requests generated by B<Xenroll> with MSIE have extensions
-added. It includes the B<keyUsage> extension which determines the type of
-key (signature only or general purpose) and any additional OIDs entered
-by the script in an extendedKeyUsage extension.
-
-=head1 DIAGNOSTICS
-
-The following messages are frequently asked about:
-
- Using configuration from /some/path/openssl.cnf
- Unable to load config info
-
-This is followed some time later by...
-
- unable to find 'distinguished_name' in config
- problems making Certificate Request
-
-The first error message is the clue: it can't find the configuration
-file! Certain operations (like examining a certificate request) don't
-need a configuration file so its use isn't enforced. Generation of
-certificates or requests however does need a configuration file. This
-could be regarded as a bug.
-
-Another puzzling message is this:
-
- Attributes:
- a0:00
-
-this is displayed when no attributes are present and the request includes
-the correct empty B<SET OF> structure (the DER encoding of which is 0xa0
-0x00). If you just see:
-
- Attributes:
-
-then the B<SET OF> is missing and the encoding is technically invalid (but
-it is tolerated). See the description of the command line option B<-asn1-kludge>
-for more information.
-
-=head1 ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
-
-The variable B<OPENSSL_CONF> if defined allows an alternative configuration
-file location to be specified, it will be overridden by the B<-config> command
-line switch if it is present. For compatibility reasons the B<SSLEAY_CONF>
-environment variable serves the same purpose but its use is discouraged.
-
-=head1 BUGS
-
-OpenSSL's handling of T61Strings (aka TeletexStrings) is broken: it effectively
-treats them as ISO-8859-1 (Latin 1), Netscape and MSIE have similar behaviour.
-This can cause problems if you need characters that aren't available in
-PrintableStrings and you don't want to or can't use BMPStrings.
-
-As a consequence of the T61String handling the only correct way to represent
-accented characters in OpenSSL is to use a BMPString: unfortunately Netscape
-currently chokes on these. If you have to use accented characters with Netscape
-and MSIE then you currently need to use the invalid T61String form.
-
-The current prompting is not very friendly. It doesn't allow you to confirm what
-you've just entered. Other things like extensions in certificate requests are
-statically defined in the configuration file. Some of these: like an email
-address in subjectAltName should be input by the user.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<x509(1)|x509(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>,
-L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>, L<config(5)|config(5)>,
-L<x509v3_config(5)|x509v3_config(5)>
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/req.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/apps/req.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/req.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/req.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
+
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+req - PKCS#10 certificate request and certificate generating utility.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<req>
+[B<-inform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-outform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-passout arg>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-pubkey>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-verify>]
+[B<-modulus>]
+[B<-new>]
+[B<-rand file(s)>]
+[B<-newkey rsa:bits>]
+[B<-newkey alg:file>]
+[B<-nodes>]
+[B<-key filename>]
+[B<-keyform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-keyout filename>]
+[B<-keygen_engine id>]
+[B<-[digest]>]
+[B<-config filename>]
+[B<-subj arg>]
+[B<-multivalue-rdn>]
+[B<-x509>]
+[B<-days n>]
+[B<-set_serial n>]
+[B<-asn1-kludge>]
+[B<-no-asn1-kludge>]
+[B<-newhdr>]
+[B<-extensions section>]
+[B<-reqexts section>]
+[B<-utf8>]
+[B<-nameopt>]
+[B<-reqopt>]
+[B<-subject>]
+[B<-subj arg>]
+[B<-batch>]
+[B<-verbose>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<req> command primarily creates and processes certificate requests
+in PKCS#10 format. It can additionally create self signed certificates
+for use as root CAs for example.
+
+=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the input format. The B<DER> option uses an ASN1 DER encoded
+form compatible with the PKCS#10. The B<PEM> form is the default format: it
+consists of the B<DER> format base64 encoded with additional header and
+footer lines.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read a request from or standard input
+if this option is not specified. A request is only read if the creation
+options (B<-new> and B<-newkey>) are not specified.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the input file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+default.
+
+=item B<-passout arg>
+
+the output file password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out the certificate request in text form.
+
+=item B<-subject>
+
+prints out the request subject (or certificate subject if B<-x509> is
+specified)
+
+=item B<-pubkey>
+
+outputs the public key.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
+
+=item B<-modulus>
+
+this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key
+contained in the request.
+
+=item B<-verify>
+
+verifies the signature on the request.
+
+=item B<-new>
+
+this option generates a new certificate request. It will prompt
+the user for the relevant field values. The actual fields
+prompted for and their maximum and minimum sizes are specified
+in the configuration file and any requested extensions.
+
+If the B<-key> option is not used it will generate a new RSA private
+key using information specified in the configuration file.
+
+=item B<-subj arg>
+
+Replaces subject field of input request with specified data and outputs
+modified request. The arg must be formatted as
+I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
+characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped.
+
+=item B<-rand file(s)>
+
+a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
+generator, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>).
+Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character.
+The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for
+all others.
+
+=item B<-newkey arg>
+
+this option creates a new certificate request and a new private
+key. The argument takes one of several forms. B<rsa:nbits>, where
+B<nbits> is the number of bits, generates an RSA key B<nbits>
+in size. If B<nbits> is omitted, i.e. B<-newkey rsa> specified,
+the default key size, specified in the configuration file is used.
+
+All other algorithms support the B<-newkey alg:file> form, where file may be
+an algorithm parameter file, created by the B<genpkey -genparam> command
+or and X.509 certificate for a key with approriate algorithm.
+
+B<param:file> generates a key using the parameter file or certificate B<file>,
+the algorithm is determined by the parameters. B<algname:file> use algorithm
+B<algname> and parameter file B<file>: the two algorithms must match or an
+error occurs. B<algname> just uses algorithm B<algname>, and parameters,
+if neccessary should be specified via B<-pkeyopt> parameter.
+
+B<dsa:filename> generates a DSA key using the parameters
+in the file B<filename>. B<ec:filename> generates EC key (usable both with
+ECDSA or ECDH algorithms), B<gost2001:filename> generates GOST R
+34.10-2001 key (requires B<ccgost> engine configured in the configuration
+file). If just B<gost2001> is specified a parameter set should be
+specified by B<-pkeyopt paramset:X>
+
+
+=item B<-pkeyopt opt:value>
+
+set the public key algorithm option B<opt> to B<value>. The precise set of
+options supported depends on the public key algorithm used and its
+implementation. See B<KEY GENERATION OPTIONS> in the B<genpkey> manual page
+for more details.
+
+=item B<-key filename>
+
+This specifies the file to read the private key from. It also
+accepts PKCS#8 format private keys for PEM format files.
+
+=item B<-keyform PEM|DER>
+
+the format of the private key file specified in the B<-key>
+argument. PEM is the default.
+
+=item B<-keyout filename>
+
+this gives the filename to write the newly created private key to.
+If this option is not specified then the filename present in the
+configuration file is used.
+
+=item B<-nodes>
+
+if this option is specified then if a private key is created it
+will not be encrypted.
+
+=item B<-[digest]>
+
+this specifies the message digest to sign the request with (such as
+B<-md5>, B<-sha1>). This overrides the digest algorithm specified in
+the configuration file.
+
+Some public key algorithms may override this choice. For instance, DSA
+signatures always use SHA1, GOST R 34.10 signatures always use
+GOST R 34.11-94 (B<-md_gost94>).
+
+=item B<-config filename>
+
+this allows an alternative configuration file to be specified,
+this overrides the compile time filename or any specified in
+the B<OPENSSL_CONF> environment variable.
+
+=item B<-subj arg>
+
+sets subject name for new request or supersedes the subject name
+when processing a request.
+The arg must be formatted as I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
+characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped.
+
+=item B<-multivalue-rdn>
+
+this option causes the -subj argument to be interpreted with full
+support for multivalued RDNs. Example:
+
+I</DC=org/DC=OpenSSL/DC=users/UID=123456+CN=John Doe>
+
+If -multi-rdn is not used then the UID value is I<123456+CN=John Doe>.
+
+=item B<-x509>
+
+this option outputs a self signed certificate instead of a certificate
+request. This is typically used to generate a test certificate or
+a self signed root CA. The extensions added to the certificate
+(if any) are specified in the configuration file. Unless specified
+using the B<set_serial> option B<0> will be used for the serial
+number.
+
+=item B<-days n>
+
+when the B<-x509> option is being used this specifies the number of
+days to certify the certificate for. The default is 30 days.
+
+=item B<-set_serial n>
+
+serial number to use when outputting a self signed certificate. This
+may be specified as a decimal value or a hex value if preceded by B<0x>.
+It is possible to use negative serial numbers but this is not recommended.
+
+=item B<-extensions section>
+
+=item B<-reqexts section>
+
+these options specify alternative sections to include certificate
+extensions (if the B<-x509> option is present) or certificate
+request extensions. This allows several different sections to
+be used in the same configuration file to specify requests for
+a variety of purposes.
+
+=item B<-utf8>
+
+this option causes field values to be interpreted as UTF8 strings, by
+default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that the field
+values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a
+configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings.
+
+=item B<-nameopt option>
+
+option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The
+B<option> argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by
+commas. Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to
+set multiple options. See the L<x509(1)|x509(1)> manual page for details.
+
+=item B<-reqopt>
+
+customise the output format used with B<-text>. The B<option> argument can be
+a single option or multiple options separated by commas.
+
+See discission of the B<-certopt> parameter in the L<B<x509>|x509(1)>
+command.
+
+
+=item B<-asn1-kludge>
+
+by default the B<req> command outputs certificate requests containing
+no attributes in the correct PKCS#10 format. However certain CAs will only
+accept requests containing no attributes in an invalid form: this
+option produces this invalid format.
+
+More precisely the B<Attributes> in a PKCS#10 certificate request
+are defined as a B<SET OF Attribute>. They are B<not OPTIONAL> so
+if no attributes are present then they should be encoded as an
+empty B<SET OF>. The invalid form does not include the empty
+B<SET OF> whereas the correct form does.
+
+It should be noted that very few CAs still require the use of this option.
+
+=item B<-no-asn1-kludge>
+
+Reverses effect of B<-asn1-kludge>
+
+=item B<-newhdr>
+
+Adds the word B<NEW> to the PEM file header and footer lines on the outputted
+request. Some software (Netscape certificate server) and some CAs need this.
+
+=item B<-batch>
+
+non-interactive mode.
+
+=item B<-verbose>
+
+print extra details about the operations being performed.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=item B<-keygen_engine id>
+
+specifies an engine (by its unique B<id> string) which would be used
+for key generation operations.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT
+
+The configuration options are specified in the B<req> section of
+the configuration file. As with all configuration files if no
+value is specified in the specific section (i.e. B<req>) then
+the initial unnamed or B<default> section is searched too.
+
+The options available are described in detail below.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<input_password output_password>
+
+The passwords for the input private key file (if present) and
+the output private key file (if one will be created). The
+command line options B<passin> and B<passout> override the
+configuration file values.
+
+=item B<default_bits>
+
+This specifies the default key size in bits. If not specified then
+512 is used. It is used if the B<-new> option is used. It can be
+overridden by using the B<-newkey> option.
+
+=item B<default_keyfile>
+
+This is the default filename to write a private key to. If not
+specified the key is written to standard output. This can be
+overridden by the B<-keyout> option.
+
+=item B<oid_file>
+
+This specifies a file containing additional B<OBJECT IDENTIFIERS>.
+Each line of the file should consist of the numerical form of the
+object identifier followed by white space then the short name followed
+by white space and finally the long name.
+
+=item B<oid_section>
+
+This specifies a section in the configuration file containing extra
+object identifiers. Each line should consist of the short name of the
+object identifier followed by B<=> and the numerical form. The short
+and long names are the same when this option is used.
+
+=item B<RANDFILE>
+
+This specifies a filename in which random number seed information is
+placed and read from, or an EGD socket (see L<RAND_egd(3)|RAND_egd(3)>).
+It is used for private key generation.
+
+=item B<encrypt_key>
+
+If this is set to B<no> then if a private key is generated it is
+B<not> encrypted. This is equivalent to the B<-nodes> command line
+option. For compatibility B<encrypt_rsa_key> is an equivalent option.
+
+=item B<default_md>
+
+This option specifies the digest algorithm to use. Possible values
+include B<md5 sha1 mdc2>. If not present then MD5 is used. This
+option can be overridden on the command line.
+
+=item B<string_mask>
+
+This option masks out the use of certain string types in certain
+fields. Most users will not need to change this option.
+
+It can be set to several values B<default> which is also the default
+option uses PrintableStrings, T61Strings and BMPStrings if the
+B<pkix> value is used then only PrintableStrings and BMPStrings will
+be used. This follows the PKIX recommendation in RFC2459. If the
+B<utf8only> option is used then only UTF8Strings will be used: this
+is the PKIX recommendation in RFC2459 after 2003. Finally the B<nombstr>
+option just uses PrintableStrings and T61Strings: certain software has
+problems with BMPStrings and UTF8Strings: in particular Netscape.
+
+=item B<req_extensions>
+
+this specifies the configuration file section containing a list of
+extensions to add to the certificate request. It can be overridden
+by the B<-reqexts> command line switch. See the
+L<x509v3_config(5)|x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
+extension section format.
+
+=item B<x509_extensions>
+
+this specifies the configuration file section containing a list of
+extensions to add to certificate generated when the B<-x509> switch
+is used. It can be overridden by the B<-extensions> command line switch.
+
+=item B<prompt>
+
+if set to the value B<no> this disables prompting of certificate fields
+and just takes values from the config file directly. It also changes the
+expected format of the B<distinguished_name> and B<attributes> sections.
+
+=item B<utf8>
+
+if set to the value B<yes> then field values to be interpreted as UTF8
+strings, by default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that
+the field values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a
+configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings.
+
+=item B<attributes>
+
+this specifies the section containing any request attributes: its format
+is the same as B<distinguished_name>. Typically these may contain the
+challengePassword or unstructuredName types. They are currently ignored
+by OpenSSL's request signing utilities but some CAs might want them.
+
+=item B<distinguished_name>
+
+This specifies the section containing the distinguished name fields to
+prompt for when generating a certificate or certificate request. The format
+is described in the next section.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 DISTINGUISHED NAME AND ATTRIBUTE SECTION FORMAT
+
+There are two separate formats for the distinguished name and attribute
+sections. If the B<prompt> option is set to B<no> then these sections
+just consist of field names and values: for example,
+
+ CN=My Name
+ OU=My Organization
+ emailAddress=someone at somewhere.org
+
+This allows external programs (e.g. GUI based) to generate a template file
+with all the field names and values and just pass it to B<req>. An example
+of this kind of configuration file is contained in the B<EXAMPLES> section.
+
+Alternatively if the B<prompt> option is absent or not set to B<no> then the
+file contains field prompting information. It consists of lines of the form:
+
+ fieldName="prompt"
+ fieldName_default="default field value"
+ fieldName_min= 2
+ fieldName_max= 4
+
+"fieldName" is the field name being used, for example commonName (or CN).
+The "prompt" string is used to ask the user to enter the relevant
+details. If the user enters nothing then the default value is used if no
+default value is present then the field is omitted. A field can
+still be omitted if a default value is present if the user just
+enters the '.' character.
+
+The number of characters entered must be between the fieldName_min and
+fieldName_max limits: there may be additional restrictions based
+on the field being used (for example countryName can only ever be
+two characters long and must fit in a PrintableString).
+
+Some fields (such as organizationName) can be used more than once
+in a DN. This presents a problem because configuration files will
+not recognize the same name occurring twice. To avoid this problem
+if the fieldName contains some characters followed by a full stop
+they will be ignored. So for example a second organizationName can
+be input by calling it "1.organizationName".
+
+The actual permitted field names are any object identifier short or
+long names. These are compiled into OpenSSL and include the usual
+values such as commonName, countryName, localityName, organizationName,
+organizationalUnitName, stateOrProvinceName. Additionally emailAddress
+is include as well as name, surname, givenName initials and dnQualifier.
+
+Additional object identifiers can be defined with the B<oid_file> or
+B<oid_section> options in the configuration file. Any additional fields
+will be treated as though they were a DirectoryString.
+
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Examine and verify certificate request:
+
+ openssl req -in req.pem -text -verify -noout
+
+Create a private key and then generate a certificate request from it:
+
+ openssl genrsa -out key.pem 1024
+ openssl req -new -key key.pem -out req.pem
+
+The same but just using req:
+
+ openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
+
+Generate a self signed root certificate:
+
+ openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
+
+Example of a file pointed to by the B<oid_file> option:
+
+ 1.2.3.4 shortName A longer Name
+ 1.2.3.6 otherName Other longer Name
+
+Example of a section pointed to by B<oid_section> making use of variable
+expansion:
+
+ testoid1=1.2.3.5
+ testoid2=${testoid1}.6
+
+Sample configuration file prompting for field values:
+
+ [ req ]
+ default_bits = 1024
+ default_keyfile = privkey.pem
+ distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
+ attributes = req_attributes
+ x509_extensions = v3_ca
+
+ dirstring_type = nobmp
+
+ [ req_distinguished_name ]
+ countryName = Country Name (2 letter code)
+ countryName_default = AU
+ countryName_min = 2
+ countryName_max = 2
+
+ localityName = Locality Name (eg, city)
+
+ organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
+
+ commonName = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+ commonName_max = 64
+
+ emailAddress = Email Address
+ emailAddress_max = 40
+
+ [ req_attributes ]
+ challengePassword = A challenge password
+ challengePassword_min = 4
+ challengePassword_max = 20
+
+ [ v3_ca ]
+
+ subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
+ authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always
+ basicConstraints = CA:true
+
+Sample configuration containing all field values:
+
+
+ RANDFILE = $ENV::HOME/.rnd
+
+ [ req ]
+ default_bits = 1024
+ default_keyfile = keyfile.pem
+ distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
+ attributes = req_attributes
+ prompt = no
+ output_password = mypass
+
+ [ req_distinguished_name ]
+ C = GB
+ ST = Test State or Province
+ L = Test Locality
+ O = Organization Name
+ OU = Organizational Unit Name
+ CN = Common Name
+ emailAddress = test at email.address
+
+ [ req_attributes ]
+ challengePassword = A challenge password
+
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The header and footer lines in the B<PEM> format are normally:
+
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+ -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+
+some software (some versions of Netscape certificate server) instead needs:
+
+ -----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+ -----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
+
+which is produced with the B<-newhdr> option but is otherwise compatible.
+Either form is accepted transparently on input.
+
+The certificate requests generated by B<Xenroll> with MSIE have extensions
+added. It includes the B<keyUsage> extension which determines the type of
+key (signature only or general purpose) and any additional OIDs entered
+by the script in an extendedKeyUsage extension.
+
+=head1 DIAGNOSTICS
+
+The following messages are frequently asked about:
+
+ Using configuration from /some/path/openssl.cnf
+ Unable to load config info
+
+This is followed some time later by...
+
+ unable to find 'distinguished_name' in config
+ problems making Certificate Request
+
+The first error message is the clue: it can't find the configuration
+file! Certain operations (like examining a certificate request) don't
+need a configuration file so its use isn't enforced. Generation of
+certificates or requests however does need a configuration file. This
+could be regarded as a bug.
+
+Another puzzling message is this:
+
+ Attributes:
+ a0:00
+
+this is displayed when no attributes are present and the request includes
+the correct empty B<SET OF> structure (the DER encoding of which is 0xa0
+0x00). If you just see:
+
+ Attributes:
+
+then the B<SET OF> is missing and the encoding is technically invalid (but
+it is tolerated). See the description of the command line option B<-asn1-kludge>
+for more information.
+
+=head1 ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+
+The variable B<OPENSSL_CONF> if defined allows an alternative configuration
+file location to be specified, it will be overridden by the B<-config> command
+line switch if it is present. For compatibility reasons the B<SSLEAY_CONF>
+environment variable serves the same purpose but its use is discouraged.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+OpenSSL's handling of T61Strings (aka TeletexStrings) is broken: it effectively
+treats them as ISO-8859-1 (Latin 1), Netscape and MSIE have similar behaviour.
+This can cause problems if you need characters that aren't available in
+PrintableStrings and you don't want to or can't use BMPStrings.
+
+As a consequence of the T61String handling the only correct way to represent
+accented characters in OpenSSL is to use a BMPString: unfortunately Netscape
+currently chokes on these. If you have to use accented characters with Netscape
+and MSIE then you currently need to use the invalid T61String form.
+
+The current prompting is not very friendly. It doesn't allow you to confirm what
+you've just entered. Other things like extensions in certificate requests are
+statically defined in the configuration file. Some of these: like an email
+address in subjectAltName should be input by the user.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<x509(1)|x509(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>,
+L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>, L<config(5)|config(5)>,
+L<x509v3_config(5)|x509v3_config(5)>
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/x509.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/apps/x509.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/x509.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,879 +0,0 @@
-
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-x509 - Certificate display and signing utility
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
-B<openssl> B<x509>
-[B<-inform DER|PEM|NET>]
-[B<-outform DER|PEM|NET>]
-[B<-keyform DER|PEM>]
-[B<-CAform DER|PEM>]
-[B<-CAkeyform DER|PEM>]
-[B<-in filename>]
-[B<-out filename>]
-[B<-serial>]
-[B<-hash>]
-[B<-subject_hash>]
-[B<-issuer_hash>]
-[B<-ocspid>]
-[B<-subject>]
-[B<-issuer>]
-[B<-nameopt option>]
-[B<-email>]
-[B<-ocsp_uri>]
-[B<-startdate>]
-[B<-enddate>]
-[B<-purpose>]
-[B<-dates>]
-[B<-checkend num>]
-[B<-modulus>]
-[B<-pubkey>]
-[B<-fingerprint>]
-[B<-alias>]
-[B<-noout>]
-[B<-trustout>]
-[B<-clrtrust>]
-[B<-clrreject>]
-[B<-addtrust arg>]
-[B<-addreject arg>]
-[B<-setalias arg>]
-[B<-days arg>]
-[B<-set_serial n>]
-[B<-signkey filename>]
-[B<-passin arg>]
-[B<-x509toreq>]
-[B<-req>]
-[B<-CA filename>]
-[B<-CAkey filename>]
-[B<-CAcreateserial>]
-[B<-CAserial filename>]
-[B<-text>]
-[B<-certopt option>]
-[B<-C>]
-[B<-md2|-md5|-sha1|-mdc2>]
-[B<-clrext>]
-[B<-extfile filename>]
-[B<-extensions section>]
-[B<-engine id>]
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-The B<x509> command is a multi purpose certificate utility. It can be
-used to display certificate information, convert certificates to
-various forms, sign certificate requests like a "mini CA" or edit
-certificate trust settings.
-
-Since there are a large number of options they will split up into
-various sections.
-
-=head1 OPTIONS
-
-=head2 INPUT, OUTPUT AND GENERAL PURPOSE OPTIONS
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<-inform DER|PEM|NET>
-
-This specifies the input format normally the command will expect an X509
-certificate but this can change if other options such as B<-req> are
-present. The DER format is the DER encoding of the certificate and PEM
-is the base64 encoding of the DER encoding with header and footer lines
-added. The NET option is an obscure Netscape server format that is now
-obsolete.
-
-=item B<-outform DER|PEM|NET>
-
-This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
-B<-inform> option.
-
-=item B<-in filename>
-
-This specifies the input filename to read a certificate from or standard input
-if this option is not specified.
-
-=item B<-out filename>
-
-This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
-default.
-
-=item B<-md2|-md5|-sha1|-mdc2>
-
-the digest to use. This affects any signing or display option that uses a message
-digest, such as the B<-fingerprint>, B<-signkey> and B<-CA> options. If not
-specified then SHA1 is used. If the key being used to sign with is a DSA key
-then this option has no effect: SHA1 is always used with DSA keys.
-
-=item B<-engine id>
-
-specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<x509>
-to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
-thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
-for all available algorithms.
-
-=back
-
-=head2 DISPLAY OPTIONS
-
-Note: the B<-alias> and B<-purpose> options are also display options
-but are described in the B<TRUST SETTINGS> section.
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<-text>
-
-prints out the certificate in text form. Full details are output including the
-public key, signature algorithms, issuer and subject names, serial number
-any extensions present and any trust settings.
-
-=item B<-certopt option>
-
-customise the output format used with B<-text>. The B<option> argument can be
-a single option or multiple options separated by commas. The B<-certopt> switch
-may be also be used more than once to set multiple options. See the B<TEXT OPTIONS>
-section for more information.
-
-=item B<-noout>
-
-this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
-
-=item B<-pubkey>
-
-outputs the the certificate's SubjectPublicKeyInfo block in PEM format.
-
-=item B<-modulus>
-
-this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key
-contained in the certificate.
-
-=item B<-serial>
-
-outputs the certificate serial number.
-
-=item B<-subject_hash>
-
-outputs the "hash" of the certificate subject name. This is used in OpenSSL to
-form an index to allow certificates in a directory to be looked up by subject
-name.
-
-=item B<-issuer_hash>
-
-outputs the "hash" of the certificate issuer name.
-
-=item B<-ocspid>
-
-outputs the OCSP hash values for the subject name and public key.
-
-=item B<-hash>
-
-synonym for "-subject_hash" for backward compatibility reasons.
-
-=item B<-subject_hash_old>
-
-outputs the "hash" of the certificate subject name using the older algorithm
-as used by OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0.
-
-=item B<-issuer_hash_old>
-
-outputs the "hash" of the certificate issuer name using the older algorithm
-as used by OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0.
-
-=item B<-subject>
-
-outputs the subject name.
-
-=item B<-issuer>
-
-outputs the issuer name.
-
-=item B<-nameopt option>
-
-option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The
-B<option> argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by
-commas. Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to
-set multiple options. See the B<NAME OPTIONS> section for more information.
-
-=item B<-email>
-
-outputs the email address(es) if any.
-
-=item B<-ocsp_uri>
-
-outputs the OCSP responder address(es) if any.
-
-=item B<-startdate>
-
-prints out the start date of the certificate, that is the notBefore date.
-
-=item B<-enddate>
-
-prints out the expiry date of the certificate, that is the notAfter date.
-
-=item B<-dates>
-
-prints out the start and expiry dates of a certificate.
-
-=item B<-checkend arg>
-
-checks if the certificate expires within the next B<arg> seconds and exits
-non-zero if yes it will expire or zero if not.
-
-=item B<-fingerprint>
-
-prints out the digest of the DER encoded version of the whole certificate
-(see digest options).
-
-=item B<-C>
-
-this outputs the certificate in the form of a C source file.
-
-=back
-
-=head2 TRUST SETTINGS
-
-Please note these options are currently experimental and may well change.
-
-A B<trusted certificate> is an ordinary certificate which has several
-additional pieces of information attached to it such as the permitted
-and prohibited uses of the certificate and an "alias".
-
-Normally when a certificate is being verified at least one certificate
-must be "trusted". By default a trusted certificate must be stored
-locally and must be a root CA: any certificate chain ending in this CA
-is then usable for any purpose.
-
-Trust settings currently are only used with a root CA. They allow a finer
-control over the purposes the root CA can be used for. For example a CA
-may be trusted for SSL client but not SSL server use.
-
-See the description of the B<verify> utility for more information on the
-meaning of trust settings.
-
-Future versions of OpenSSL will recognize trust settings on any
-certificate: not just root CAs.
-
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<-trustout>
-
-this causes B<x509> to output a B<trusted> certificate. An ordinary
-or trusted certificate can be input but by default an ordinary
-certificate is output and any trust settings are discarded. With the
-B<-trustout> option a trusted certificate is output. A trusted
-certificate is automatically output if any trust settings are modified.
-
-=item B<-setalias arg>
-
-sets the alias of the certificate. This will allow the certificate
-to be referred to using a nickname for example "Steve's Certificate".
-
-=item B<-alias>
-
-outputs the certificate alias, if any.
-
-=item B<-clrtrust>
-
-clears all the permitted or trusted uses of the certificate.
-
-=item B<-clrreject>
-
-clears all the prohibited or rejected uses of the certificate.
-
-=item B<-addtrust arg>
-
-adds a trusted certificate use. Any object name can be used here
-but currently only B<clientAuth> (SSL client use), B<serverAuth>
-(SSL server use) and B<emailProtection> (S/MIME email) are used.
-Other OpenSSL applications may define additional uses.
-
-=item B<-addreject arg>
-
-adds a prohibited use. It accepts the same values as the B<-addtrust>
-option.
-
-=item B<-purpose>
-
-this option performs tests on the certificate extensions and outputs
-the results. For a more complete description see the B<CERTIFICATE
-EXTENSIONS> section.
-
-=back
-
-=head2 SIGNING OPTIONS
-
-The B<x509> utility can be used to sign certificates and requests: it
-can thus behave like a "mini CA".
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<-signkey filename>
-
-this option causes the input file to be self signed using the supplied
-private key.
-
-If the input file is a certificate it sets the issuer name to the
-subject name (i.e. makes it self signed) changes the public key to the
-supplied value and changes the start and end dates. The start date is
-set to the current time and the end date is set to a value determined
-by the B<-days> option. Any certificate extensions are retained unless
-the B<-clrext> option is supplied.
-
-If the input is a certificate request then a self signed certificate
-is created using the supplied private key using the subject name in
-the request.
-
-=item B<-passin arg>
-
-the key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
-see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
-
-=item B<-clrext>
-
-delete any extensions from a certificate. This option is used when a
-certificate is being created from another certificate (for example with
-the B<-signkey> or the B<-CA> options). Normally all extensions are
-retained.
-
-=item B<-keyform PEM|DER>
-
-specifies the format (DER or PEM) of the private key file used in the
-B<-signkey> option.
-
-=item B<-days arg>
-
-specifies the number of days to make a certificate valid for. The default
-is 30 days.
-
-=item B<-x509toreq>
-
-converts a certificate into a certificate request. The B<-signkey> option
-is used to pass the required private key.
-
-=item B<-req>
-
-by default a certificate is expected on input. With this option a
-certificate request is expected instead.
-
-=item B<-set_serial n>
-
-specifies the serial number to use. This option can be used with either
-the B<-signkey> or B<-CA> options. If used in conjunction with the B<-CA>
-option the serial number file (as specified by the B<-CAserial> or
-B<-CAcreateserial> options) is not used.
-
-The serial number can be decimal or hex (if preceded by B<0x>). Negative
-serial numbers can also be specified but their use is not recommended.
-
-=item B<-CA filename>
-
-specifies the CA certificate to be used for signing. When this option is
-present B<x509> behaves like a "mini CA". The input file is signed by this
-CA using this option: that is its issuer name is set to the subject name
-of the CA and it is digitally signed using the CAs private key.
-
-This option is normally combined with the B<-req> option. Without the
-B<-req> option the input is a certificate which must be self signed.
-
-=item B<-CAkey filename>
-
-sets the CA private key to sign a certificate with. If this option is
-not specified then it is assumed that the CA private key is present in
-the CA certificate file.
-
-=item B<-CAserial filename>
-
-sets the CA serial number file to use.
-
-When the B<-CA> option is used to sign a certificate it uses a serial
-number specified in a file. This file consist of one line containing
-an even number of hex digits with the serial number to use. After each
-use the serial number is incremented and written out to the file again.
-
-The default filename consists of the CA certificate file base name with
-".srl" appended. For example if the CA certificate file is called
-"mycacert.pem" it expects to find a serial number file called "mycacert.srl".
-
-=item B<-CAcreateserial>
-
-with this option the CA serial number file is created if it does not exist:
-it will contain the serial number "02" and the certificate being signed will
-have the 1 as its serial number. Normally if the B<-CA> option is specified
-and the serial number file does not exist it is an error.
-
-=item B<-extfile filename>
-
-file containing certificate extensions to use. If not specified then
-no extensions are added to the certificate.
-
-=item B<-extensions section>
-
-the section to add certificate extensions from. If this option is not
-specified then the extensions should either be contained in the unnamed
-(default) section or the default section should contain a variable called
-"extensions" which contains the section to use. See the
-L<x509v3_config(5)|x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
-extension section format.
-
-=back
-
-=head2 NAME OPTIONS
-
-The B<nameopt> command line switch determines how the subject and issuer
-names are displayed. If no B<nameopt> switch is present the default "oneline"
-format is used which is compatible with previous versions of OpenSSL.
-Each option is described in detail below, all options can be preceded by
-a B<-> to turn the option off. Only the first four will normally be used.
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<compat>
-
-use the old format. This is equivalent to specifying no name options at all.
-
-=item B<RFC2253>
-
-displays names compatible with RFC2253 equivalent to B<esc_2253>, B<esc_ctrl>,
-B<esc_msb>, B<utf8>, B<dump_nostr>, B<dump_unknown>, B<dump_der>,
-B<sep_comma_plus>, B<dn_rev> and B<sname>.
-
-=item B<oneline>
-
-a oneline format which is more readable than RFC2253. It is equivalent to
-specifying the B<esc_2253>, B<esc_ctrl>, B<esc_msb>, B<utf8>, B<dump_nostr>,
-B<dump_der>, B<use_quote>, B<sep_comma_plus_space>, B<space_eq> and B<sname>
-options.
-
-=item B<multiline>
-
-a multiline format. It is equivalent B<esc_ctrl>, B<esc_msb>, B<sep_multiline>,
-B<space_eq>, B<lname> and B<align>.
-
-=item B<esc_2253>
-
-escape the "special" characters required by RFC2253 in a field That is
-B<,+"E<lt>E<gt>;>. Additionally B<#> is escaped at the beginning of a string
-and a space character at the beginning or end of a string.
-
-=item B<esc_ctrl>
-
-escape control characters. That is those with ASCII values less than
-0x20 (space) and the delete (0x7f) character. They are escaped using the
-RFC2253 \XX notation (where XX are two hex digits representing the
-character value).
-
-=item B<esc_msb>
-
-escape characters with the MSB set, that is with ASCII values larger than
-127.
-
-=item B<use_quote>
-
-escapes some characters by surrounding the whole string with B<"> characters,
-without the option all escaping is done with the B<\> character.
-
-=item B<utf8>
-
-convert all strings to UTF8 format first. This is required by RFC2253. If
-you are lucky enough to have a UTF8 compatible terminal then the use
-of this option (and B<not> setting B<esc_msb>) may result in the correct
-display of multibyte (international) characters. Is this option is not
-present then multibyte characters larger than 0xff will be represented
-using the format \UXXXX for 16 bits and \WXXXXXXXX for 32 bits.
-Also if this option is off any UTF8Strings will be converted to their
-character form first.
-
-=item B<ignore_type>
-
-this option does not attempt to interpret multibyte characters in any
-way. That is their content octets are merely dumped as though one octet
-represents each character. This is useful for diagnostic purposes but
-will result in rather odd looking output.
-
-=item B<show_type>
-
-show the type of the ASN1 character string. The type precedes the
-field contents. For example "BMPSTRING: Hello World".
-
-=item B<dump_der>
-
-when this option is set any fields that need to be hexdumped will
-be dumped using the DER encoding of the field. Otherwise just the
-content octets will be displayed. Both options use the RFC2253
-B<#XXXX...> format.
-
-=item B<dump_nostr>
-
-dump non character string types (for example OCTET STRING) if this
-option is not set then non character string types will be displayed
-as though each content octet represents a single character.
-
-=item B<dump_all>
-
-dump all fields. This option when used with B<dump_der> allows the
-DER encoding of the structure to be unambiguously determined.
-
-=item B<dump_unknown>
-
-dump any field whose OID is not recognised by OpenSSL.
-
-=item B<sep_comma_plus>, B<sep_comma_plus_space>, B<sep_semi_plus_space>,
-B<sep_multiline>
-
-these options determine the field separators. The first character is
-between RDNs and the second between multiple AVAs (multiple AVAs are
-very rare and their use is discouraged). The options ending in
-"space" additionally place a space after the separator to make it
-more readable. The B<sep_multiline> uses a linefeed character for
-the RDN separator and a spaced B<+> for the AVA separator. It also
-indents the fields by four characters.
-
-=item B<dn_rev>
-
-reverse the fields of the DN. This is required by RFC2253. As a side
-effect this also reverses the order of multiple AVAs but this is
-permissible.
-
-=item B<nofname>, B<sname>, B<lname>, B<oid>
-
-these options alter how the field name is displayed. B<nofname> does
-not display the field at all. B<sname> uses the "short name" form
-(CN for commonName for example). B<lname> uses the long form.
-B<oid> represents the OID in numerical form and is useful for
-diagnostic purpose.
-
-=item B<align>
-
-align field values for a more readable output. Only usable with
-B<sep_multiline>.
-
-=item B<space_eq>
-
-places spaces round the B<=> character which follows the field
-name.
-
-=back
-
-=head2 TEXT OPTIONS
-
-As well as customising the name output format, it is also possible to
-customise the actual fields printed using the B<certopt> options when
-the B<text> option is present. The default behaviour is to print all fields.
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<compatible>
-
-use the old format. This is equivalent to specifying no output options at all.
-
-=item B<no_header>
-
-don't print header information: that is the lines saying "Certificate" and "Data".
-
-=item B<no_version>
-
-don't print out the version number.
-
-=item B<no_serial>
-
-don't print out the serial number.
-
-=item B<no_signame>
-
-don't print out the signature algorithm used.
-
-=item B<no_validity>
-
-don't print the validity, that is the B<notBefore> and B<notAfter> fields.
-
-=item B<no_subject>
-
-don't print out the subject name.
-
-=item B<no_issuer>
-
-don't print out the issuer name.
-
-=item B<no_pubkey>
-
-don't print out the public key.
-
-=item B<no_sigdump>
-
-don't give a hexadecimal dump of the certificate signature.
-
-=item B<no_aux>
-
-don't print out certificate trust information.
-
-=item B<no_extensions>
-
-don't print out any X509V3 extensions.
-
-=item B<ext_default>
-
-retain default extension behaviour: attempt to print out unsupported certificate extensions.
-
-=item B<ext_error>
-
-print an error message for unsupported certificate extensions.
-
-=item B<ext_parse>
-
-ASN1 parse unsupported extensions.
-
-=item B<ext_dump>
-
-hex dump unsupported extensions.
-
-=item B<ca_default>
-
-the value used by the B<ca> utility, equivalent to B<no_issuer>, B<no_pubkey>, B<no_header>,
-B<no_version>, B<no_sigdump> and B<no_signame>.
-
-=back
-
-=head1 EXAMPLES
-
-Note: in these examples the '\' means the example should be all on one
-line.
-
-Display the contents of a certificate:
-
- openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text
-
-Display the certificate serial number:
-
- openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -serial
-
-Display the certificate subject name:
-
- openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject
-
-Display the certificate subject name in RFC2253 form:
-
- openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt RFC2253
-
-Display the certificate subject name in oneline form on a terminal
-supporting UTF8:
-
- openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt oneline,-esc_msb
-
-Display the certificate MD5 fingerprint:
-
- openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint
-
-Display the certificate SHA1 fingerprint:
-
- openssl x509 -sha1 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint
-
-Convert a certificate from PEM to DER format:
-
- openssl x509 -in cert.pem -inform PEM -out cert.der -outform DER
-
-Convert a certificate to a certificate request:
-
- openssl x509 -x509toreq -in cert.pem -out req.pem -signkey key.pem
-
-Convert a certificate request into a self signed certificate using
-extensions for a CA:
-
- openssl x509 -req -in careq.pem -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_ca \
- -signkey key.pem -out cacert.pem
-
-Sign a certificate request using the CA certificate above and add user
-certificate extensions:
-
- openssl x509 -req -in req.pem -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_usr \
- -CA cacert.pem -CAkey key.pem -CAcreateserial
-
-
-Set a certificate to be trusted for SSL client use and change set its alias to
-"Steve's Class 1 CA"
-
- openssl x509 -in cert.pem -addtrust clientAuth \
- -setalias "Steve's Class 1 CA" -out trust.pem
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-The PEM format uses the header and footer lines:
-
- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
-
-it will also handle files containing:
-
- -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE-----
- -----END X509 CERTIFICATE-----
-
-Trusted certificates have the lines
-
- -----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
- -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
-
-The conversion to UTF8 format used with the name options assumes that
-T61Strings use the ISO8859-1 character set. This is wrong but Netscape
-and MSIE do this as do many certificates. So although this is incorrect
-it is more likely to display the majority of certificates correctly.
-
-The B<-fingerprint> option takes the digest of the DER encoded certificate.
-This is commonly called a "fingerprint". Because of the nature of message
-digests the fingerprint of a certificate is unique to that certificate and
-two certificates with the same fingerprint can be considered to be the same.
-
-The Netscape fingerprint uses MD5 whereas MSIE uses SHA1.
-
-The B<-email> option searches the subject name and the subject alternative
-name extension. Only unique email addresses will be printed out: it will
-not print the same address more than once.
-
-=head1 CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS
-
-The B<-purpose> option checks the certificate extensions and determines
-what the certificate can be used for. The actual checks done are rather
-complex and include various hacks and workarounds to handle broken
-certificates and software.
-
-The same code is used when verifying untrusted certificates in chains
-so this section is useful if a chain is rejected by the verify code.
-
-The basicConstraints extension CA flag is used to determine whether the
-certificate can be used as a CA. If the CA flag is true then it is a CA,
-if the CA flag is false then it is not a CA. B<All> CAs should have the
-CA flag set to true.
-
-If the basicConstraints extension is absent then the certificate is
-considered to be a "possible CA" other extensions are checked according
-to the intended use of the certificate. A warning is given in this case
-because the certificate should really not be regarded as a CA: however
-it is allowed to be a CA to work around some broken software.
-
-If the certificate is a V1 certificate (and thus has no extensions) and
-it is self signed it is also assumed to be a CA but a warning is again
-given: this is to work around the problem of Verisign roots which are V1
-self signed certificates.
-
-If the keyUsage extension is present then additional restraints are
-made on the uses of the certificate. A CA certificate B<must> have the
-keyCertSign bit set if the keyUsage extension is present.
-
-The extended key usage extension places additional restrictions on the
-certificate uses. If this extension is present (whether critical or not)
-the key can only be used for the purposes specified.
-
-A complete description of each test is given below. The comments about
-basicConstraints and keyUsage and V1 certificates above apply to B<all>
-CA certificates.
-
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<SSL Client>
-
-The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web client
-authentication" OID. keyUsage must be absent or it must have the
-digitalSignature bit set. Netscape certificate type must be absent or it must
-have the SSL client bit set.
-
-=item B<SSL Client CA>
-
-The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web client
-authentication" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or it must have
-the SSL CA bit set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints
-extension is absent.
-
-=item B<SSL Server>
-
-The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web server
-authentication" and/or one of the SGC OIDs. keyUsage must be absent or it
-must have the digitalSignature, the keyEncipherment set or both bits set.
-Netscape certificate type must be absent or have the SSL server bit set.
-
-=item B<SSL Server CA>
-
-The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web server
-authentication" and/or one of the SGC OIDs. Netscape certificate type must
-be absent or the SSL CA bit must be set: this is used as a work around if the
-basicConstraints extension is absent.
-
-=item B<Netscape SSL Server>
-
-For Netscape SSL clients to connect to an SSL server it must have the
-keyEncipherment bit set if the keyUsage extension is present. This isn't
-always valid because some cipher suites use the key for digital signing.
-Otherwise it is the same as a normal SSL server.
-
-=item B<Common S/MIME Client Tests>
-
-The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "email
-protection" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or should have the
-S/MIME bit set. If the S/MIME bit is not set in netscape certificate type
-then the SSL client bit is tolerated as an alternative but a warning is shown:
-this is because some Verisign certificates don't set the S/MIME bit.
-
-=item B<S/MIME Signing>
-
-In addition to the common S/MIME client tests the digitalSignature bit must
-be set if the keyUsage extension is present.
-
-=item B<S/MIME Encryption>
-
-In addition to the common S/MIME tests the keyEncipherment bit must be set
-if the keyUsage extension is present.
-
-=item B<S/MIME CA>
-
-The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "email
-protection" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or must have the
-S/MIME CA bit set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints
-extension is absent.
-
-=item B<CRL Signing>
-
-The keyUsage extension must be absent or it must have the CRL signing bit
-set.
-
-=item B<CRL Signing CA>
-
-The normal CA tests apply. Except in this case the basicConstraints extension
-must be present.
-
-=back
-
-=head1 BUGS
-
-Extensions in certificates are not transferred to certificate requests and
-vice versa.
-
-It is possible to produce invalid certificates or requests by specifying the
-wrong private key or using inconsistent options in some cases: these should
-be checked.
-
-There should be options to explicitly set such things as start and end
-dates rather than an offset from the current time.
-
-The code to implement the verify behaviour described in the B<TRUST SETTINGS>
-is currently being developed. It thus describes the intended behaviour rather
-than the current behaviour. It is hoped that it will represent reality in
-OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>,
-L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>, L<verify(1)|verify(1)>,
-L<x509v3_config(5)|x509v3_config(5)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-Before OpenSSL 0.9.8, the default digest for RSA keys was MD5.
-
-The hash algorithm used in the B<-subject_hash> and B<-issuer_hash> options
-before OpenSSL 1.0.0 was based on the deprecated MD5 algorithm and the encoding
-of the distinguished name. In OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later it is based on a
-canonical version of the DN using SHA1. This means that any directories using
-the old form must have their links rebuilt using B<c_rehash> or similar.
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/x509.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/apps/x509.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/x509.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/apps/x509.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,880 @@
+
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+x509 - Certificate display and signing utility
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+B<openssl> B<x509>
+[B<-inform DER|PEM|NET>]
+[B<-outform DER|PEM|NET>]
+[B<-keyform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-CAform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-CAkeyform DER|PEM>]
+[B<-in filename>]
+[B<-out filename>]
+[B<-serial>]
+[B<-hash>]
+[B<-subject_hash>]
+[B<-issuer_hash>]
+[B<-ocspid>]
+[B<-subject>]
+[B<-issuer>]
+[B<-nameopt option>]
+[B<-email>]
+[B<-ocsp_uri>]
+[B<-startdate>]
+[B<-enddate>]
+[B<-purpose>]
+[B<-dates>]
+[B<-checkend num>]
+[B<-modulus>]
+[B<-pubkey>]
+[B<-fingerprint>]
+[B<-alias>]
+[B<-noout>]
+[B<-trustout>]
+[B<-clrtrust>]
+[B<-clrreject>]
+[B<-addtrust arg>]
+[B<-addreject arg>]
+[B<-setalias arg>]
+[B<-days arg>]
+[B<-set_serial n>]
+[B<-signkey filename>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
+[B<-x509toreq>]
+[B<-req>]
+[B<-CA filename>]
+[B<-CAkey filename>]
+[B<-CAcreateserial>]
+[B<-CAserial filename>]
+[B<-text>]
+[B<-certopt option>]
+[B<-C>]
+[B<-md2|-md5|-sha1|-mdc2>]
+[B<-clrext>]
+[B<-extfile filename>]
+[B<-extensions section>]
+[B<-engine id>]
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The B<x509> command is a multi purpose certificate utility. It can be
+used to display certificate information, convert certificates to
+various forms, sign certificate requests like a "mini CA" or edit
+certificate trust settings.
+
+Since there are a large number of options they will split up into
+various sections.
+
+=head1 OPTIONS
+
+=head2 INPUT, OUTPUT AND GENERAL PURPOSE OPTIONS
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-inform DER|PEM|NET>
+
+This specifies the input format normally the command will expect an X509
+certificate but this can change if other options such as B<-req> are
+present. The DER format is the DER encoding of the certificate and PEM
+is the base64 encoding of the DER encoding with header and footer lines
+added. The NET option is an obscure Netscape server format that is now
+obsolete.
+
+=item B<-outform DER|PEM|NET>
+
+This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the
+B<-inform> option.
+
+=item B<-in filename>
+
+This specifies the input filename to read a certificate from or standard input
+if this option is not specified.
+
+=item B<-out filename>
+
+This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by
+default.
+
+=item B<-md2|-md5|-sha1|-mdc2>
+
+the digest to use. This affects any signing or display option that uses a message
+digest, such as the B<-fingerprint>, B<-signkey> and B<-CA> options. If not
+specified then SHA1 is used. If the key being used to sign with is a DSA key
+then this option has no effect: SHA1 is always used with DSA keys.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<x509>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 DISPLAY OPTIONS
+
+Note: the B<-alias> and B<-purpose> options are also display options
+but are described in the B<TRUST SETTINGS> section.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-text>
+
+prints out the certificate in text form. Full details are output including the
+public key, signature algorithms, issuer and subject names, serial number
+any extensions present and any trust settings.
+
+=item B<-certopt option>
+
+customise the output format used with B<-text>. The B<option> argument can be
+a single option or multiple options separated by commas. The B<-certopt> switch
+may be also be used more than once to set multiple options. See the B<TEXT OPTIONS>
+section for more information.
+
+=item B<-noout>
+
+this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
+
+=item B<-pubkey>
+
+outputs the the certificate's SubjectPublicKeyInfo block in PEM format.
+
+=item B<-modulus>
+
+this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key
+contained in the certificate.
+
+=item B<-serial>
+
+outputs the certificate serial number.
+
+=item B<-subject_hash>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the certificate subject name. This is used in OpenSSL to
+form an index to allow certificates in a directory to be looked up by subject
+name.
+
+=item B<-issuer_hash>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the certificate issuer name.
+
+=item B<-ocspid>
+
+outputs the OCSP hash values for the subject name and public key.
+
+=item B<-hash>
+
+synonym for "-subject_hash" for backward compatibility reasons.
+
+=item B<-subject_hash_old>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the certificate subject name using the older algorithm
+as used by OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0.
+
+=item B<-issuer_hash_old>
+
+outputs the "hash" of the certificate issuer name using the older algorithm
+as used by OpenSSL versions before 1.0.0.
+
+=item B<-subject>
+
+outputs the subject name.
+
+=item B<-issuer>
+
+outputs the issuer name.
+
+=item B<-nameopt option>
+
+option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The
+B<option> argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by
+commas. Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to
+set multiple options. See the B<NAME OPTIONS> section for more information.
+
+=item B<-email>
+
+outputs the email address(es) if any.
+
+=item B<-ocsp_uri>
+
+outputs the OCSP responder address(es) if any.
+
+=item B<-startdate>
+
+prints out the start date of the certificate, that is the notBefore date.
+
+=item B<-enddate>
+
+prints out the expiry date of the certificate, that is the notAfter date.
+
+=item B<-dates>
+
+prints out the start and expiry dates of a certificate.
+
+=item B<-checkend arg>
+
+checks if the certificate expires within the next B<arg> seconds and exits
+non-zero if yes it will expire or zero if not.
+
+=item B<-fingerprint>
+
+prints out the digest of the DER encoded version of the whole certificate
+(see digest options).
+
+=item B<-C>
+
+this outputs the certificate in the form of a C source file.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 TRUST SETTINGS
+
+Please note these options are currently experimental and may well change.
+
+A B<trusted certificate> is an ordinary certificate which has several
+additional pieces of information attached to it such as the permitted
+and prohibited uses of the certificate and an "alias".
+
+Normally when a certificate is being verified at least one certificate
+must be "trusted". By default a trusted certificate must be stored
+locally and must be a root CA: any certificate chain ending in this CA
+is then usable for any purpose.
+
+Trust settings currently are only used with a root CA. They allow a finer
+control over the purposes the root CA can be used for. For example a CA
+may be trusted for SSL client but not SSL server use.
+
+See the description of the B<verify> utility for more information on the
+meaning of trust settings.
+
+Future versions of OpenSSL will recognize trust settings on any
+certificate: not just root CAs.
+
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-trustout>
+
+this causes B<x509> to output a B<trusted> certificate. An ordinary
+or trusted certificate can be input but by default an ordinary
+certificate is output and any trust settings are discarded. With the
+B<-trustout> option a trusted certificate is output. A trusted
+certificate is automatically output if any trust settings are modified.
+
+=item B<-setalias arg>
+
+sets the alias of the certificate. This will allow the certificate
+to be referred to using a nickname for example "Steve's Certificate".
+
+=item B<-alias>
+
+outputs the certificate alias, if any.
+
+=item B<-clrtrust>
+
+clears all the permitted or trusted uses of the certificate.
+
+=item B<-clrreject>
+
+clears all the prohibited or rejected uses of the certificate.
+
+=item B<-addtrust arg>
+
+adds a trusted certificate use. Any object name can be used here
+but currently only B<clientAuth> (SSL client use), B<serverAuth>
+(SSL server use) and B<emailProtection> (S/MIME email) are used.
+Other OpenSSL applications may define additional uses.
+
+=item B<-addreject arg>
+
+adds a prohibited use. It accepts the same values as the B<-addtrust>
+option.
+
+=item B<-purpose>
+
+this option performs tests on the certificate extensions and outputs
+the results. For a more complete description see the B<CERTIFICATE
+EXTENSIONS> section.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 SIGNING OPTIONS
+
+The B<x509> utility can be used to sign certificates and requests: it
+can thus behave like a "mini CA".
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<-signkey filename>
+
+this option causes the input file to be self signed using the supplied
+private key.
+
+If the input file is a certificate it sets the issuer name to the
+subject name (i.e. makes it self signed) changes the public key to the
+supplied value and changes the start and end dates. The start date is
+set to the current time and the end date is set to a value determined
+by the B<-days> option. Any certificate extensions are retained unless
+the B<-clrext> option is supplied.
+
+If the input is a certificate request then a self signed certificate
+is created using the supplied private key using the subject name in
+the request.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
+
+=item B<-clrext>
+
+delete any extensions from a certificate. This option is used when a
+certificate is being created from another certificate (for example with
+the B<-signkey> or the B<-CA> options). Normally all extensions are
+retained.
+
+=item B<-keyform PEM|DER>
+
+specifies the format (DER or PEM) of the private key file used in the
+B<-signkey> option.
+
+=item B<-days arg>
+
+specifies the number of days to make a certificate valid for. The default
+is 30 days.
+
+=item B<-x509toreq>
+
+converts a certificate into a certificate request. The B<-signkey> option
+is used to pass the required private key.
+
+=item B<-req>
+
+by default a certificate is expected on input. With this option a
+certificate request is expected instead.
+
+=item B<-set_serial n>
+
+specifies the serial number to use. This option can be used with either
+the B<-signkey> or B<-CA> options. If used in conjunction with the B<-CA>
+option the serial number file (as specified by the B<-CAserial> or
+B<-CAcreateserial> options) is not used.
+
+The serial number can be decimal or hex (if preceded by B<0x>). Negative
+serial numbers can also be specified but their use is not recommended.
+
+=item B<-CA filename>
+
+specifies the CA certificate to be used for signing. When this option is
+present B<x509> behaves like a "mini CA". The input file is signed by this
+CA using this option: that is its issuer name is set to the subject name
+of the CA and it is digitally signed using the CAs private key.
+
+This option is normally combined with the B<-req> option. Without the
+B<-req> option the input is a certificate which must be self signed.
+
+=item B<-CAkey filename>
+
+sets the CA private key to sign a certificate with. If this option is
+not specified then it is assumed that the CA private key is present in
+the CA certificate file.
+
+=item B<-CAserial filename>
+
+sets the CA serial number file to use.
+
+When the B<-CA> option is used to sign a certificate it uses a serial
+number specified in a file. This file consist of one line containing
+an even number of hex digits with the serial number to use. After each
+use the serial number is incremented and written out to the file again.
+
+The default filename consists of the CA certificate file base name with
+".srl" appended. For example if the CA certificate file is called
+"mycacert.pem" it expects to find a serial number file called "mycacert.srl".
+
+=item B<-CAcreateserial>
+
+with this option the CA serial number file is created if it does not exist:
+it will contain the serial number "02" and the certificate being signed will
+have the 1 as its serial number. Normally if the B<-CA> option is specified
+and the serial number file does not exist it is an error.
+
+=item B<-extfile filename>
+
+file containing certificate extensions to use. If not specified then
+no extensions are added to the certificate.
+
+=item B<-extensions section>
+
+the section to add certificate extensions from. If this option is not
+specified then the extensions should either be contained in the unnamed
+(default) section or the default section should contain a variable called
+"extensions" which contains the section to use. See the
+L<x509v3_config(5)|x509v3_config(5)> manual page for details of the
+extension section format.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 NAME OPTIONS
+
+The B<nameopt> command line switch determines how the subject and issuer
+names are displayed. If no B<nameopt> switch is present the default "oneline"
+format is used which is compatible with previous versions of OpenSSL.
+Each option is described in detail below, all options can be preceded by
+a B<-> to turn the option off. Only the first four will normally be used.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<compat>
+
+use the old format. This is equivalent to specifying no name options at all.
+
+=item B<RFC2253>
+
+displays names compatible with RFC2253 equivalent to B<esc_2253>, B<esc_ctrl>,
+B<esc_msb>, B<utf8>, B<dump_nostr>, B<dump_unknown>, B<dump_der>,
+B<sep_comma_plus>, B<dn_rev> and B<sname>.
+
+=item B<oneline>
+
+a oneline format which is more readable than RFC2253. It is equivalent to
+specifying the B<esc_2253>, B<esc_ctrl>, B<esc_msb>, B<utf8>, B<dump_nostr>,
+B<dump_der>, B<use_quote>, B<sep_comma_plus_space>, B<space_eq> and B<sname>
+options.
+
+=item B<multiline>
+
+a multiline format. It is equivalent B<esc_ctrl>, B<esc_msb>, B<sep_multiline>,
+B<space_eq>, B<lname> and B<align>.
+
+=item B<esc_2253>
+
+escape the "special" characters required by RFC2253 in a field That is
+B<,+"E<lt>E<gt>;>. Additionally B<#> is escaped at the beginning of a string
+and a space character at the beginning or end of a string.
+
+=item B<esc_ctrl>
+
+escape control characters. That is those with ASCII values less than
+0x20 (space) and the delete (0x7f) character. They are escaped using the
+RFC2253 \XX notation (where XX are two hex digits representing the
+character value).
+
+=item B<esc_msb>
+
+escape characters with the MSB set, that is with ASCII values larger than
+127.
+
+=item B<use_quote>
+
+escapes some characters by surrounding the whole string with B<"> characters,
+without the option all escaping is done with the B<\> character.
+
+=item B<utf8>
+
+convert all strings to UTF8 format first. This is required by RFC2253. If
+you are lucky enough to have a UTF8 compatible terminal then the use
+of this option (and B<not> setting B<esc_msb>) may result in the correct
+display of multibyte (international) characters. Is this option is not
+present then multibyte characters larger than 0xff will be represented
+using the format \UXXXX for 16 bits and \WXXXXXXXX for 32 bits.
+Also if this option is off any UTF8Strings will be converted to their
+character form first.
+
+=item B<ignore_type>
+
+this option does not attempt to interpret multibyte characters in any
+way. That is their content octets are merely dumped as though one octet
+represents each character. This is useful for diagnostic purposes but
+will result in rather odd looking output.
+
+=item B<show_type>
+
+show the type of the ASN1 character string. The type precedes the
+field contents. For example "BMPSTRING: Hello World".
+
+=item B<dump_der>
+
+when this option is set any fields that need to be hexdumped will
+be dumped using the DER encoding of the field. Otherwise just the
+content octets will be displayed. Both options use the RFC2253
+B<#XXXX...> format.
+
+=item B<dump_nostr>
+
+dump non character string types (for example OCTET STRING) if this
+option is not set then non character string types will be displayed
+as though each content octet represents a single character.
+
+=item B<dump_all>
+
+dump all fields. This option when used with B<dump_der> allows the
+DER encoding of the structure to be unambiguously determined.
+
+=item B<dump_unknown>
+
+dump any field whose OID is not recognised by OpenSSL.
+
+=item B<sep_comma_plus>, B<sep_comma_plus_space>, B<sep_semi_plus_space>,
+B<sep_multiline>
+
+these options determine the field separators. The first character is
+between RDNs and the second between multiple AVAs (multiple AVAs are
+very rare and their use is discouraged). The options ending in
+"space" additionally place a space after the separator to make it
+more readable. The B<sep_multiline> uses a linefeed character for
+the RDN separator and a spaced B<+> for the AVA separator. It also
+indents the fields by four characters. If no field separator is specified
+then B<sep_comma_plus_space> is used by default.
+
+=item B<dn_rev>
+
+reverse the fields of the DN. This is required by RFC2253. As a side
+effect this also reverses the order of multiple AVAs but this is
+permissible.
+
+=item B<nofname>, B<sname>, B<lname>, B<oid>
+
+these options alter how the field name is displayed. B<nofname> does
+not display the field at all. B<sname> uses the "short name" form
+(CN for commonName for example). B<lname> uses the long form.
+B<oid> represents the OID in numerical form and is useful for
+diagnostic purpose.
+
+=item B<align>
+
+align field values for a more readable output. Only usable with
+B<sep_multiline>.
+
+=item B<space_eq>
+
+places spaces round the B<=> character which follows the field
+name.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 TEXT OPTIONS
+
+As well as customising the name output format, it is also possible to
+customise the actual fields printed using the B<certopt> options when
+the B<text> option is present. The default behaviour is to print all fields.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<compatible>
+
+use the old format. This is equivalent to specifying no output options at all.
+
+=item B<no_header>
+
+don't print header information: that is the lines saying "Certificate" and "Data".
+
+=item B<no_version>
+
+don't print out the version number.
+
+=item B<no_serial>
+
+don't print out the serial number.
+
+=item B<no_signame>
+
+don't print out the signature algorithm used.
+
+=item B<no_validity>
+
+don't print the validity, that is the B<notBefore> and B<notAfter> fields.
+
+=item B<no_subject>
+
+don't print out the subject name.
+
+=item B<no_issuer>
+
+don't print out the issuer name.
+
+=item B<no_pubkey>
+
+don't print out the public key.
+
+=item B<no_sigdump>
+
+don't give a hexadecimal dump of the certificate signature.
+
+=item B<no_aux>
+
+don't print out certificate trust information.
+
+=item B<no_extensions>
+
+don't print out any X509V3 extensions.
+
+=item B<ext_default>
+
+retain default extension behaviour: attempt to print out unsupported certificate extensions.
+
+=item B<ext_error>
+
+print an error message for unsupported certificate extensions.
+
+=item B<ext_parse>
+
+ASN1 parse unsupported extensions.
+
+=item B<ext_dump>
+
+hex dump unsupported extensions.
+
+=item B<ca_default>
+
+the value used by the B<ca> utility, equivalent to B<no_issuer>, B<no_pubkey>, B<no_header>,
+B<no_version>, B<no_sigdump> and B<no_signame>.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Note: in these examples the '\' means the example should be all on one
+line.
+
+Display the contents of a certificate:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text
+
+Display the certificate serial number:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -serial
+
+Display the certificate subject name:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject
+
+Display the certificate subject name in RFC2253 form:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt RFC2253
+
+Display the certificate subject name in oneline form on a terminal
+supporting UTF8:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt oneline,-esc_msb
+
+Display the certificate MD5 fingerprint:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint
+
+Display the certificate SHA1 fingerprint:
+
+ openssl x509 -sha1 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint
+
+Convert a certificate from PEM to DER format:
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -inform PEM -out cert.der -outform DER
+
+Convert a certificate to a certificate request:
+
+ openssl x509 -x509toreq -in cert.pem -out req.pem -signkey key.pem
+
+Convert a certificate request into a self signed certificate using
+extensions for a CA:
+
+ openssl x509 -req -in careq.pem -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_ca \
+ -signkey key.pem -out cacert.pem
+
+Sign a certificate request using the CA certificate above and add user
+certificate extensions:
+
+ openssl x509 -req -in req.pem -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_usr \
+ -CA cacert.pem -CAkey key.pem -CAcreateserial
+
+
+Set a certificate to be trusted for SSL client use and change set its alias to
+"Steve's Class 1 CA"
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -addtrust clientAuth \
+ -setalias "Steve's Class 1 CA" -out trust.pem
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The PEM format uses the header and footer lines:
+
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+ -----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+it will also handle files containing:
+
+ -----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE-----
+ -----END X509 CERTIFICATE-----
+
+Trusted certificates have the lines
+
+ -----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+ -----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
+
+The conversion to UTF8 format used with the name options assumes that
+T61Strings use the ISO8859-1 character set. This is wrong but Netscape
+and MSIE do this as do many certificates. So although this is incorrect
+it is more likely to display the majority of certificates correctly.
+
+The B<-fingerprint> option takes the digest of the DER encoded certificate.
+This is commonly called a "fingerprint". Because of the nature of message
+digests the fingerprint of a certificate is unique to that certificate and
+two certificates with the same fingerprint can be considered to be the same.
+
+The Netscape fingerprint uses MD5 whereas MSIE uses SHA1.
+
+The B<-email> option searches the subject name and the subject alternative
+name extension. Only unique email addresses will be printed out: it will
+not print the same address more than once.
+
+=head1 CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS
+
+The B<-purpose> option checks the certificate extensions and determines
+what the certificate can be used for. The actual checks done are rather
+complex and include various hacks and workarounds to handle broken
+certificates and software.
+
+The same code is used when verifying untrusted certificates in chains
+so this section is useful if a chain is rejected by the verify code.
+
+The basicConstraints extension CA flag is used to determine whether the
+certificate can be used as a CA. If the CA flag is true then it is a CA,
+if the CA flag is false then it is not a CA. B<All> CAs should have the
+CA flag set to true.
+
+If the basicConstraints extension is absent then the certificate is
+considered to be a "possible CA" other extensions are checked according
+to the intended use of the certificate. A warning is given in this case
+because the certificate should really not be regarded as a CA: however
+it is allowed to be a CA to work around some broken software.
+
+If the certificate is a V1 certificate (and thus has no extensions) and
+it is self signed it is also assumed to be a CA but a warning is again
+given: this is to work around the problem of Verisign roots which are V1
+self signed certificates.
+
+If the keyUsage extension is present then additional restraints are
+made on the uses of the certificate. A CA certificate B<must> have the
+keyCertSign bit set if the keyUsage extension is present.
+
+The extended key usage extension places additional restrictions on the
+certificate uses. If this extension is present (whether critical or not)
+the key can only be used for the purposes specified.
+
+A complete description of each test is given below. The comments about
+basicConstraints and keyUsage and V1 certificates above apply to B<all>
+CA certificates.
+
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<SSL Client>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web client
+authentication" OID. keyUsage must be absent or it must have the
+digitalSignature bit set. Netscape certificate type must be absent or it must
+have the SSL client bit set.
+
+=item B<SSL Client CA>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web client
+authentication" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or it must have
+the SSL CA bit set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints
+extension is absent.
+
+=item B<SSL Server>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web server
+authentication" and/or one of the SGC OIDs. keyUsage must be absent or it
+must have the digitalSignature, the keyEncipherment set or both bits set.
+Netscape certificate type must be absent or have the SSL server bit set.
+
+=item B<SSL Server CA>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "web server
+authentication" and/or one of the SGC OIDs. Netscape certificate type must
+be absent or the SSL CA bit must be set: this is used as a work around if the
+basicConstraints extension is absent.
+
+=item B<Netscape SSL Server>
+
+For Netscape SSL clients to connect to an SSL server it must have the
+keyEncipherment bit set if the keyUsage extension is present. This isn't
+always valid because some cipher suites use the key for digital signing.
+Otherwise it is the same as a normal SSL server.
+
+=item B<Common S/MIME Client Tests>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "email
+protection" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or should have the
+S/MIME bit set. If the S/MIME bit is not set in netscape certificate type
+then the SSL client bit is tolerated as an alternative but a warning is shown:
+this is because some Verisign certificates don't set the S/MIME bit.
+
+=item B<S/MIME Signing>
+
+In addition to the common S/MIME client tests the digitalSignature bit must
+be set if the keyUsage extension is present.
+
+=item B<S/MIME Encryption>
+
+In addition to the common S/MIME tests the keyEncipherment bit must be set
+if the keyUsage extension is present.
+
+=item B<S/MIME CA>
+
+The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the "email
+protection" OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or must have the
+S/MIME CA bit set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints
+extension is absent.
+
+=item B<CRL Signing>
+
+The keyUsage extension must be absent or it must have the CRL signing bit
+set.
+
+=item B<CRL Signing CA>
+
+The normal CA tests apply. Except in this case the basicConstraints extension
+must be present.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Extensions in certificates are not transferred to certificate requests and
+vice versa.
+
+It is possible to produce invalid certificates or requests by specifying the
+wrong private key or using inconsistent options in some cases: these should
+be checked.
+
+There should be options to explicitly set such things as start and end
+dates rather than an offset from the current time.
+
+The code to implement the verify behaviour described in the B<TRUST SETTINGS>
+is currently being developed. It thus describes the intended behaviour rather
+than the current behaviour. It is hoped that it will represent reality in
+OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<req(1)|req(1)>, L<ca(1)|ca(1)>, L<genrsa(1)|genrsa(1)>,
+L<gendsa(1)|gendsa(1)>, L<verify(1)|verify(1)>,
+L<x509v3_config(5)|x509v3_config(5)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+Before OpenSSL 0.9.8, the default digest for RSA keys was MD5.
+
+The hash algorithm used in the B<-subject_hash> and B<-issuer_hash> options
+before OpenSSL 1.0.0 was based on the deprecated MD5 algorithm and the encoding
+of the distinguished name. In OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later it is based on a
+canonical version of the DN using SHA1. This means that any directories using
+the old form must have their links rebuilt using B<c_rehash> or similar.
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-BIO_read, BIO_write, BIO_gets, BIO_puts - BIO I/O functions
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/bio.h>
-
- int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *buf, int len);
- int BIO_gets(BIO *b,char *buf, int size);
- int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *buf, int len);
- int BIO_puts(BIO *b,const char *buf);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-BIO_read() attempts to read B<len> bytes from BIO B<b> and places
-the data in B<buf>.
-
-BIO_gets() performs the BIOs "gets" operation and places the data
-in B<buf>. Usually this operation will attempt to read a line of data
-from the BIO of maximum length B<len>. There are exceptions to this
-however, for example BIO_gets() on a digest BIO will calculate and
-return the digest and other BIOs may not support BIO_gets() at all.
-
-BIO_write() attempts to write B<len> bytes from B<buf> to BIO B<b>.
-
-BIO_puts() attempts to write a null terminated string B<buf> to BIO B<b>
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-All these functions return either the amount of data successfully read or
-written (if the return value is positive) or that no data was successfully
-read or written if the result is 0 or -1. If the return value is -2 then
-the operation is not implemented in the specific BIO type.
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-A 0 or -1 return is not necessarily an indication of an error. In
-particular when the source/sink is non-blocking or of a certain type
-it may merely be an indication that no data is currently available and that
-the application should retry the operation later.
-
-One technique sometimes used with blocking sockets is to use a system call
-(such as select(), poll() or equivalent) to determine when data is available
-and then call read() to read the data. The equivalent with BIOs (that is call
-select() on the underlying I/O structure and then call BIO_read() to
-read the data) should B<not> be used because a single call to BIO_read()
-can cause several reads (and writes in the case of SSL BIOs) on the underlying
-I/O structure and may block as a result. Instead select() (or equivalent)
-should be combined with non blocking I/O so successive reads will request
-a retry instead of blocking.
-
-See L<BIO_should_retry(3)|BIO_should_retry(3)> for details of how to
-determine the cause of a retry and other I/O issues.
-
-If the BIO_gets() function is not supported by a BIO then it possible to
-work around this by adding a buffering BIO L<BIO_f_buffer(3)|BIO_f_buffer(3)>
-to the chain.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<BIO_should_retry(3)|BIO_should_retry(3)>
-
-TBA
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BIO_read.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BIO_read, BIO_write, BIO_gets, BIO_puts - BIO I/O functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+
+ int BIO_read(BIO *b, void *buf, int len);
+ int BIO_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size);
+ int BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *buf, int len);
+ int BIO_puts(BIO *b, const char *buf);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BIO_read() attempts to read B<len> bytes from BIO B<b> and places
+the data in B<buf>.
+
+BIO_gets() performs the BIOs "gets" operation and places the data
+in B<buf>. Usually this operation will attempt to read a line of data
+from the BIO of maximum length B<len>. There are exceptions to this
+however, for example BIO_gets() on a digest BIO will calculate and
+return the digest and other BIOs may not support BIO_gets() at all.
+
+BIO_write() attempts to write B<len> bytes from B<buf> to BIO B<b>.
+
+BIO_puts() attempts to write a null terminated string B<buf> to BIO B<b>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All these functions return either the amount of data successfully read or
+written (if the return value is positive) or that no data was successfully
+read or written if the result is 0 or -1. If the return value is -2 then
+the operation is not implemented in the specific BIO type.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+A 0 or -1 return is not necessarily an indication of an error. In
+particular when the source/sink is non-blocking or of a certain type
+it may merely be an indication that no data is currently available and that
+the application should retry the operation later.
+
+One technique sometimes used with blocking sockets is to use a system call
+(such as select(), poll() or equivalent) to determine when data is available
+and then call read() to read the data. The equivalent with BIOs (that is call
+select() on the underlying I/O structure and then call BIO_read() to
+read the data) should B<not> be used because a single call to BIO_read()
+can cause several reads (and writes in the case of SSL BIOs) on the underlying
+I/O structure and may block as a result. Instead select() (or equivalent)
+should be combined with non blocking I/O so successive reads will request
+a retry instead of blocking.
+
+See L<BIO_should_retry(3)|BIO_should_retry(3)> for details of how to
+determine the cause of a retry and other I/O issues.
+
+If the BIO_gets() function is not supported by a BIO then it possible to
+work around this by adding a buffering BIO L<BIO_f_buffer(3)|BIO_f_buffer(3)>
+to the chain.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<BIO_should_retry(3)|BIO_should_retry(3)>
+
+TBA
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-BN_rand, BN_pseudo_rand - generate pseudo-random number
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
-
- int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
-
- int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
-
- int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
-
- int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-BN_rand() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of
-B<bits> bits in length and stores it in B<rnd>. If B<top> is -1, the
-most significant bit of the random number can be zero. If B<top> is 0,
-it is set to 1, and if B<top> is 1, the two most significant bits of
-the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random
-numbers will always have 2*B<bits> length. If B<bottom> is true, the
-number will be odd. The value of B<bits> must be zero or greater. If B<bits> is
-1 then B<top> cannot also be 1.
-
-BN_pseudo_rand() does the same, but pseudo-random numbers generated by
-this function are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used for
-non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic
-protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
-
-BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
-number B<rnd> in the range 0 <lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
-BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(),
-and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable.
-
-The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_rand() or BN_rand_range().
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-The functions return 1 on success, 0 on error.
-The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>,
-L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)|RAND_bytes(3)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-BN_rand() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.
-BN_pseudo_rand() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5. The B<top> == -1 case
-and the function BN_rand_range() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.6a.
-BN_pseudo_rand_range() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6c.
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BN_rand, BN_pseudo_rand - generate pseudo-random number
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
+
+ int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
+
+ int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
+
+ int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+BN_rand() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of
+B<bits> in length and stores it in B<rnd>. If B<top> is -1, the
+most significant bit of the random number can be zero. If B<top> is 0,
+it is set to 1, and if B<top> is 1, the two most significant bits of
+the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random
+numbers will always have 2*B<bits> length. If B<bottom> is true, the
+number will be odd. The value of B<bits> must be zero or greater. If B<bits> is
+1 then B<top> cannot also be 1.
+
+BN_pseudo_rand() does the same, but pseudo-random numbers generated by
+this function are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used for
+non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic
+protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
+
+BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
+number B<rnd> in the range 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
+BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(),
+and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable.
+
+The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling BN_rand() or BN_rand_range().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The functions return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<bn(3)|bn(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>,
+L<RAND_add(3)|RAND_add(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)|RAND_bytes(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BN_rand() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.
+BN_pseudo_rand() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5. The B<top> == -1 case
+and the function BN_rand_range() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.6a.
+BN_pseudo_rand_range() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6c.
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-DSA_generate_parameters - generate DSA parameters
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/dsa.h>
-
- DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed,
- int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
- void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-DSA_generate_parameters() generates primes p and q and a generator g
-for use in the DSA.
-
-B<bits> is the length of the prime to be generated; the DSS allows a
-maximum of 1024 bits.
-
-If B<seed> is B<NULL> or B<seed_len> E<lt> 20, the primes will be
-generated at random. Otherwise, the seed is used to generate
-them. If the given seed does not yield a prime q, a new random
-seed is chosen and placed at B<seed>.
-
-DSA_generate_parameters() places the iteration count in
-*B<counter_ret> and a counter used for finding a generator in
-*B<h_ret>, unless these are B<NULL>.
-
-A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress
-of the key generation. If B<callback> is not B<NULL>, it will be
-called as follows:
-
-=over 4
-
-=item *
-
-When a candidate for q is generated, B<callback(0, m++, cb_arg)> is called
-(m is 0 for the first candidate).
-
-=item *
-
-When a candidate for q has passed a test by trial division,
-B<callback(1, -1, cb_arg)> is called.
-While a candidate for q is tested by Miller-Rabin primality tests,
-B<callback(1, i, cb_arg)> is called in the outer loop
-(once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime);
-i is the loop counter (starting at 0).
-
-=item *
-
-When a prime q has been found, B<callback(2, 0, cb_arg)> and
-B<callback(3, 0, cb_arg)> are called.
-
-=item *
-
-Before a candidate for p (other than the first) is generated and tested,
-B<callback(0, counter, cb_arg)> is called.
-
-=item *
-
-When a candidate for p has passed the test by trial division,
-B<callback(1, -1, cb_arg)> is called.
-While it is tested by the Miller-Rabin primality test,
-B<callback(1, i, cb_arg)> is called in the outer loop
-(once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime).
-i is the loop counter (starting at 0).
-
-=item *
-
-When p has been found, B<callback(2, 1, cb_arg)> is called.
-
-=item *
-
-When the generator has been found, B<callback(3, 1, cb_arg)> is called.
-
-=back
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUE
-
-DSA_generate_parameters() returns a pointer to the DSA structure, or
-B<NULL> if the parameter generation fails. The error codes can be
-obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
-
-=head1 BUGS
-
-Seed lengths E<gt> 20 are not supported.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>,
-L<DSA_free(3)|DSA_free(3)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-DSA_generate_parameters() appeared in SSLeay 0.8. The B<cb_arg>
-argument was added in SSLeay 0.9.0.
-In versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.4, B<callback(1, ...)> was called
-in the inner loop of the Miller-Rabin test whenever it reached the
-squaring step (the parameters to B<callback> did not reveal how many
-witnesses had been tested); since OpenSSL 0.9.5, B<callback(1, ...)>
-is called as in BN_is_prime(3), i.e. once for each witness.
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/DSA_generate_parameters.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+DSA_generate_parameters - generate DSA parameters
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed,
+ int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
+ void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+DSA_generate_parameters() generates primes p and q and a generator g
+for use in the DSA.
+
+B<bits> is the length of the prime to be generated; the DSS allows a
+maximum of 1024 bits.
+
+If B<seed> is B<NULL> or B<seed_len> E<lt> 20, the primes will be
+generated at random. Otherwise, the seed is used to generate
+them. If the given seed does not yield a prime q, a new random
+seed is chosen.
+
+DSA_generate_parameters() places the iteration count in
+*B<counter_ret> and a counter used for finding a generator in
+*B<h_ret>, unless these are B<NULL>.
+
+A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress
+of the key generation. If B<callback> is not B<NULL>, it will be
+called as follows:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item *
+
+When a candidate for q is generated, B<callback(0, m++, cb_arg)> is called
+(m is 0 for the first candidate).
+
+=item *
+
+When a candidate for q has passed a test by trial division,
+B<callback(1, -1, cb_arg)> is called.
+While a candidate for q is tested by Miller-Rabin primality tests,
+B<callback(1, i, cb_arg)> is called in the outer loop
+(once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime);
+i is the loop counter (starting at 0).
+
+=item *
+
+When a prime q has been found, B<callback(2, 0, cb_arg)> and
+B<callback(3, 0, cb_arg)> are called.
+
+=item *
+
+Before a candidate for p (other than the first) is generated and tested,
+B<callback(0, counter, cb_arg)> is called.
+
+=item *
+
+When a candidate for p has passed the test by trial division,
+B<callback(1, -1, cb_arg)> is called.
+While it is tested by the Miller-Rabin primality test,
+B<callback(1, i, cb_arg)> is called in the outer loop
+(once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime).
+i is the loop counter (starting at 0).
+
+=item *
+
+When p has been found, B<callback(2, 1, cb_arg)> is called.
+
+=item *
+
+When the generator has been found, B<callback(3, 1, cb_arg)> is called.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUE
+
+DSA_generate_parameters() returns a pointer to the DSA structure, or
+B<NULL> if the parameter generation fails. The error codes can be
+obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Seed lengths E<gt> 20 are not supported.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<dsa(3)|dsa(3)>, L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<rand(3)|rand(3)>,
+L<DSA_free(3)|DSA_free(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+DSA_generate_parameters() appeared in SSLeay 0.8. The B<cb_arg>
+argument was added in SSLeay 0.9.0.
+In versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.4, B<callback(1, ...)> was called
+in the inner loop of the Miller-Rabin test whenever it reached the
+squaring step (the parameters to B<callback> did not reveal how many
+witnesses had been tested); since OpenSSL 0.9.5, B<callback(1, ...)>
+is called as in BN_is_prime(3), i.e. once for each witness.
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-EVP_DigestVerifyInit, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal - EVP signature verification functions
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
- const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
- int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt);
- int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital signatures.
-
-EVP_DigestVerifyInit() sets up verification context B<ctx> to use digest
-B<type> from ENGINE B<impl> and public key B<pkey>. B<ctx> must be initialized
-with EVP_MD_CTX_init() before calling this function. If B<pctx> is not NULL the
-EVP_PKEY_CTX of the verification operation will be written to B<*pctx>: this
-can be used to set alternative verification options.
-
-EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the
-verification context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the
-same B<ctx> to include additional data. This function is currently implemented
-using a macro.
-
-EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() verifies the data in B<ctx> against the signature in
-B<sig> of length B<siglen>.
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-EVP_DigestVerifyInit() and EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() return 1 for success and 0
-or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates
-the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
-
-Unlike other functions the return value 0 from EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() only
-indicates that the signature did not verify successfully (that is tbs did
-not match the original data or the signature was of invalid form) it is not an
-indication of a more serious error.
-
-The error codes can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-The B<EVP> interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in
-preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
-transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible.
-
-In previous versions of OpenSSL there was a link between message digest types
-and public key algorithms. This meant that "clone" digests such as EVP_dss1()
-needed to be used to sign using SHA1 and DSA. This is no longer necessary and
-the use of clone digest is now discouraged.
-
-For some key types and parameters the random number generator must be seeded
-or the operation will fail.
-
-The call to EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest
-context. This means that EVP_VerifyUpdate() and EVP_VerifyFinal() can
-be called later to digest and verify additional data.
-
-Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must
-be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak
-will occur.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)|EVP_DigestSignInit(3)>,
-L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>,
-L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<md2(3)|md2(3)>,
-L<md5(3)|md5(3)>, L<mdc2(3)|mdc2(3)>, L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>,
-L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-EVP_DigestVerifyInit(), EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() and EVP_DigestVerifyFinal()
-were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestVerifyInit.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyInit, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal - EVP signature verification functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+ const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *e, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt);
+ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital signatures.
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyInit() sets up verification context B<ctx> to use digest
+B<type> from ENGINE B<impl> and public key B<pkey>. B<ctx> must be initialized
+with EVP_MD_CTX_init() before calling this function. If B<pctx> is not NULL the
+EVP_PKEY_CTX of the verification operation will be written to B<*pctx>: this
+can be used to set alternative verification options.
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the
+verification context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the
+same B<ctx> to include additional data. This function is currently implemented
+using a macro.
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() verifies the data in B<ctx> against the signature in
+B<sig> of length B<siglen>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyInit() and EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() return 1 for success and 0
+or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2 indicates
+the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() returns 1 for success; any other value indicates
+failure. A return value of zero indicates that the signature did not verify
+successfully (that is, tbs did not match the original data or the signature had
+an invalid form), while other values indicate a more serious error (and
+sometimes also indicate an invalid signature form).
+
+The error codes can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<EVP> interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in
+preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
+transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible.
+
+In previous versions of OpenSSL there was a link between message digest types
+and public key algorithms. This meant that "clone" digests such as EVP_dss1()
+needed to be used to sign using SHA1 and DSA. This is no longer necessary and
+the use of clone digest is now discouraged.
+
+For some key types and parameters the random number generator must be seeded
+or the operation will fail.
+
+The call to EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest
+context. This means that EVP_VerifyUpdate() and EVP_VerifyFinal() can
+be called later to digest and verify additional data.
+
+Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must
+be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak
+will occur.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)|EVP_DigestSignInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>,
+L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<md2(3)|md2(3)>,
+L<md5(3)|md5(3)>, L<mdc2(3)|mdc2(3)>, L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>,
+L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+EVP_DigestVerifyInit(), EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate() and EVP_DigestVerifyFinal()
+were first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0.
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignUpdate, EVP_SignFinal - EVP signing functions
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- int EVP_SignInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl);
- int EVP_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt);
- int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-
- void EVP_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);
-
- int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital
-signatures.
-
-EVP_SignInit_ex() sets up signing context B<ctx> to use digest
-B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized with
-EVP_MD_CTX_init() before calling this function.
-
-EVP_SignUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the
-signature context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the
-same B<ctx> to include additional data.
-
-EVP_SignFinal() signs the data in B<ctx> using the private key B<pkey> and
-places the signature in B<sig>. B<sig> must be at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)
-bytes in size. B<s> is an OUT paramter, and not used as an IN parameter.
-The number of bytes of data written (i.e. the length of the signature)
-will be written to the integer at B<s>, at most EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes
-will be written.
-
-EVP_SignInit() initializes a signing context B<ctx> to use the default
-implementation of digest B<type>.
-
-EVP_PKEY_size() returns the maximum size of a signature in bytes. The actual
-signature returned by EVP_SignFinal() may be smaller.
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-EVP_SignInit_ex(), EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() return 1
-for success and 0 for failure.
-
-EVP_PKEY_size() returns the maximum size of a signature in bytes.
-
-The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-The B<EVP> interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in
-preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
-transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible.
-
-Due to the link between message digests and public key algorithms the correct
-digest algorithm must be used with the correct public key type. A list of
-algorithms and associated public key algorithms appears in
-L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>.
-
-When signing with DSA private keys the random number generator must be seeded
-or the operation will fail. The random number generator does not need to be
-seeded for RSA signatures.
-
-The call to EVP_SignFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest context.
-This means that calls to EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() can be called
-later to digest and sign additional data.
-
-Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must
-be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak
-will occur.
-
-=head1 BUGS
-
-Older versions of this documentation wrongly stated that calls to
-EVP_SignUpdate() could not be made after calling EVP_SignFinal().
-
-Since the private key is passed in the call to EVP_SignFinal() any error
-relating to the private key (for example an unsuitable key and digest
-combination) will not be indicated until after potentially large amounts of
-data have been passed through EVP_SignUpdate().
-
-It is not possible to change the signing parameters using these function.
-
-The previous two bugs are fixed in the newer EVP_SignDigest*() function.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<EVP_VerifyInit(3)|EVP_VerifyInit(3)>,
-L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>,
-L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<md2(3)|md2(3)>,
-L<md5(3)|md5(3)>, L<mdc2(3)|mdc2(3)>, L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>,
-L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-EVP_SignInit(), EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() are
-available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.
-
-EVP_SignInit_ex() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_SignInit, EVP_SignInit_ex, EVP_SignUpdate, EVP_SignFinal - EVP signing
+functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_SignInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl);
+ int EVP_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt);
+ int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+ void EVP_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital
+signatures.
+
+EVP_SignInit_ex() sets up signing context B<ctx> to use digest
+B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized with
+EVP_MD_CTX_init() before calling this function.
+
+EVP_SignUpdate() hashes B<cnt> bytes of data at B<d> into the
+signature context B<ctx>. This function can be called several times on the
+same B<ctx> to include additional data.
+
+EVP_SignFinal() signs the data in B<ctx> using the private key B<pkey> and
+places the signature in B<sig>. B<sig> must be at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)
+bytes in size. B<s> is an OUT paramter, and not used as an IN parameter.
+The number of bytes of data written (i.e. the length of the signature)
+will be written to the integer at B<s>, at most EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes
+will be written.
+
+EVP_SignInit() initializes a signing context B<ctx> to use the default
+implementation of digest B<type>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_size() returns the maximum size of a signature in bytes. The actual
+signature returned by EVP_SignFinal() may be smaller.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_SignInit_ex(), EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() return 1
+for success and 0 for failure.
+
+EVP_PKEY_size() returns the maximum size of a signature in bytes.
+
+The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<EVP> interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in
+preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
+transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible.
+
+Due to the link between message digests and public key algorithms the correct
+digest algorithm must be used with the correct public key type. A list of
+algorithms and associated public key algorithms appears in
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>.
+
+When signing with DSA private keys the random number generator must be seeded
+or the operation will fail. The random number generator does not need to be
+seeded for RSA signatures.
+
+The call to EVP_SignFinal() internally finalizes a copy of the digest context.
+This means that calls to EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() can be called
+later to digest and sign additional data.
+
+Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must
+be cleaned up after use by calling EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup() or a memory leak
+will occur.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Older versions of this documentation wrongly stated that calls to
+EVP_SignUpdate() could not be made after calling EVP_SignFinal().
+
+Since the private key is passed in the call to EVP_SignFinal() any error
+relating to the private key (for example an unsuitable key and digest
+combination) will not be indicated until after potentially large amounts of
+data have been passed through EVP_SignUpdate().
+
+It is not possible to change the signing parameters using these function.
+
+The previous two bugs are fixed in the newer EVP_SignDigest*() function.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_VerifyInit(3)|EVP_VerifyInit(3)>,
+L<EVP_DigestInit(3)|EVP_DigestInit(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>,
+L<evp(3)|evp(3)>, L<hmac(3)|hmac(3)>, L<md2(3)|md2(3)>,
+L<md5(3)|md5(3)>, L<mdc2(3)|mdc2(3)>, L<ripemd(3)|ripemd(3)>,
+L<sha(3)|sha(3)>, L<dgst(1)|dgst(1)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+EVP_SignInit(), EVP_SignUpdate() and EVP_SignFinal() are
+available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.
+
+EVP_SignInit_ex() was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_get_entry,
-X509_NAME_entry_count, X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ -
-X509_NAME lookup and enumeration functions
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
-
- int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name,int nid,int lastpos);
- int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name,ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
-
- int X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_NAME *name);
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc);
-
- int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf,int len);
- int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf,int len);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-These functions allow an B<X509_NAME> structure to be examined. The
-B<X509_NAME> structure is the same as the B<Name> type defined in
-RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used for example in certificate subject
-and issuer names.
-
-X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve
-the next index matching B<nid> or B<obj> after B<lastpos>. B<lastpos>
-should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned.
-
-X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B<name>.
-
-X509_NAME_get_entry() retrieves the B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> from B<name>
-corresponding to index B<loc>. Acceptable values for B<loc> run from
-0 to (X509_NAME_entry_count(name) - 1). The value returned is an
-internal pointer which must not be freed.
-
-X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(), X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() retrieve
-the "text" from the first entry in B<name> which matches B<nid> or
-B<obj>, if no such entry exists -1 is returned. At most B<len> bytes
-will be written and the text written to B<buf> will be null
-terminated. The length of the output string written is returned
-excluding the terminating null. If B<buf> is <NULL> then the amount
-of space needed in B<buf> (excluding the final null) is returned.
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() are
-legacy functions which have various limitations which make them
-of minimal use in practice. They can only find the first matching
-entry and will copy the contents of the field verbatim: this can
-be highly confusing if the target is a muticharacter string type
-like a BMPString or a UTF8String.
-
-For a more general solution X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() or
-X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() should be used followed by
-X509_NAME_get_entry() on any matching indices and then the
-various B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> utility functions on the result.
-
-The list of all relevant B<NID_*> and B<OBJ_* codes> can be found in
-the source code header files E<lt>openssl/obj_mac.hE<gt> and/or
-E<lt>openssl/objects.hE<gt>.
-
-=head1 EXAMPLES
-
-Process all entries:
-
- int i;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
-
- for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(nm); i++)
- {
- e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
- /* Do something with e */
- }
-
-Process all commonName entries:
-
- int loc;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
-
- loc = -1;
- for (;;)
- {
- lastpos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, lastpos);
- if (lastpos == -1)
- break;
- e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, lastpos);
- /* Do something with e */
- }
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ()
-return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found.
-
-X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries.
-
-X509_NAME_get_entry() returns an B<X509_NAME> pointer to the
-requested entry or B<NULL> if the index is invalid.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-TBA
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_get_entry,
+X509_NAME_entry_count, X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ -
+X509_NAME lookup and enumeration functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name,int nid,int lastpos);
+ int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name,ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+
+ int X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_NAME *name);
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc);
+
+ int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf,int len);
+ int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf,int len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions allow an B<X509_NAME> structure to be examined. The
+B<X509_NAME> structure is the same as the B<Name> type defined in
+RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used for example in certificate subject
+and issuer names.
+
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve
+the next index matching B<nid> or B<obj> after B<lastpos>. B<lastpos>
+should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned.
+If B<nid> is invalid (doesn't correspond to a valid OID) then -2 is returned.
+
+X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B<name>.
+
+X509_NAME_get_entry() retrieves the B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> from B<name>
+corresponding to index B<loc>. Acceptable values for B<loc> run from
+0 to (X509_NAME_entry_count(name) - 1). The value returned is an
+internal pointer which must not be freed.
+
+X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(), X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() retrieve
+the "text" from the first entry in B<name> which matches B<nid> or
+B<obj>, if no such entry exists -1 is returned. At most B<len> bytes
+will be written and the text written to B<buf> will be null
+terminated. The length of the output string written is returned
+excluding the terminating null. If B<buf> is <NULL> then the amount
+of space needed in B<buf> (excluding the final null) is returned.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() are
+legacy functions which have various limitations which make them
+of minimal use in practice. They can only find the first matching
+entry and will copy the contents of the field verbatim: this can
+be highly confusing if the target is a muticharacter string type
+like a BMPString or a UTF8String.
+
+For a more general solution X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() or
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() should be used followed by
+X509_NAME_get_entry() on any matching indices and then the
+various B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> utility functions on the result.
+
+The list of all relevant B<NID_*> and B<OBJ_* codes> can be found in
+the source code header files E<lt>openssl/obj_mac.hE<gt> and/or
+E<lt>openssl/objects.hE<gt>.
+
+Applications which could pass invalid NIDs to X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID()
+should check for the return value of -2. Alternatively the NID validity
+can be determined first by checking OBJ_nid2obj(nid) is not NULL.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Process all entries:
+
+ int i;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(nm); i++)
+ {
+ e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
+ /* Do something with e */
+ }
+
+Process all commonName entries:
+
+ int loc;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
+
+ loc = -1;
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ lastpos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, lastpos);
+ if (lastpos == -1)
+ break;
+ e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, lastpos);
+ /* Do something with e */
+ }
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ()
+return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found.
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() can also return -2 if the supplied
+NID is invalid.
+
+X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries.
+
+X509_NAME_get_entry() returns an B<X509_NAME> pointer to the
+requested entry or B<NULL> if the index is invalid.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_new, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, X509_STORE_CTX_free, X509_STORE_CTX_init, X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack, X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert, X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls, X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param, X509_STORE_CTX_set_default - X509_STORE_CTX initialisation
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
-
- X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void);
- void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
- void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-
- int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
- X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
-
- void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
-
- void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,X509 *x);
- void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
- void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk);
-
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
- void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
- int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-These functions initialise an B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure for subsequent use
-by X509_verify_cert().
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns a newly initialised B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() internally cleans up an B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure.
-The context can then be reused with an new call to X509_STORE_CTX_init().
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees up B<ctx>. After this call B<ctx>
-is no longer valid.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
-The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end entity certificate
-to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional certificates (which
-will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in B<chain>. Any or
-all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be B<NULL>.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B<ctx>
-to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates
-instead of using an B<X509_STORE>.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert() sets the certificate to be vertified in B<ctx> to
-B<x>.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain() sets the additional certificate chain used by B<ctx>
-to B<sk>.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() sets a set of CRLs to use to aid certificate
-verification to B<sk>. These CRLs will only be used if CRL verification is
-enabled in the associated B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM> structure. This might be
-used where additional "useful" CRLs are supplied as part of a protocol,
-for example in a PKCS#7 structure.
-
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() retrieves an intenal pointer
-to the verification parameters associated with B<ctx>.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() sets the intenal verification parameter pointer
-to B<param>. After this call B<param> should not be used.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() looks up and sets the default verification
-method to B<name>. This uses the function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() to
-find an appropriate set of parameters from B<name>.
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-The certificates and CRLs in a store are used internally and should B<not>
-be freed up until after the associated B<X509_STORE_CTX> is freed. Legacy
-applications might implicitly use an B<X509_STORE_CTX> like this:
-
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, cert, chain);
-
-this is B<not> recommended in new applications they should instead do:
-
- X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
- ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL)
- /* Bad error */
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, cert, chain);
-
-=head1 BUGS
-
-The certificates and CRLs in a context are used internally and should B<not>
-be freed up until after the associated B<X509_STORE_CTX> is freed. Copies
-should be made or reference counts increased instead.
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns an newly allocates context or B<NULL> is an
-error occurred.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_init() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() returns a pointer to an B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM>
-structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(), X509_STORE_CTX_free(), X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(),
-X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(), X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(),
-X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() and X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() do not return
-values.
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3)>
-L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)|X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_new, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, X509_STORE_CTX_free, X509_STORE_CTX_init, X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack, X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert, X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls, X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param, X509_STORE_CTX_set_default - X509_STORE_CTX initialisation
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
+ X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,X509 *x);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk);
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+ int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions initialise an B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure for subsequent use
+by X509_verify_cert().
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns a newly initialised B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() internally cleans up an B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure.
+The context can then be reused with an new call to X509_STORE_CTX_init().
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees up B<ctx>. After this call B<ctx>
+is no longer valid.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
+It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B<ctx> is only
+good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second
+certificate with the same B<ctx> then you must call X509_XTORE_CTX_cleanup()
+and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to
+X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end
+entity certificate to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional
+certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in
+B<chain>. Any or all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be
+B<NULL>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B<ctx>
+to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates
+instead of using an B<X509_STORE>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert() sets the certificate to be vertified in B<ctx> to
+B<x>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain() sets the additional certificate chain used by B<ctx>
+to B<sk>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() sets a set of CRLs to use to aid certificate
+verification to B<sk>. These CRLs will only be used if CRL verification is
+enabled in the associated B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM> structure. This might be
+used where additional "useful" CRLs are supplied as part of a protocol,
+for example in a PKCS#7 structure.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() retrieves an intenal pointer
+to the verification parameters associated with B<ctx>.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() sets the intenal verification parameter pointer
+to B<param>. After this call B<param> should not be used.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() looks up and sets the default verification
+method to B<name>. This uses the function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() to
+find an appropriate set of parameters from B<name>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The certificates and CRLs in a store are used internally and should B<not>
+be freed up until after the associated B<X509_STORE_CTX> is freed. Legacy
+applications might implicitly use an B<X509_STORE_CTX> like this:
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, cert, chain);
+
+this is B<not> recommended in new applications they should instead do:
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+ ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ /* Bad error */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, cert, chain);
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The certificates and CRLs in a context are used internally and should B<not>
+be freed up until after the associated B<X509_STORE_CTX> is freed. Copies
+should be made or reference counts increased instead.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns an newly allocates context or B<NULL> is an
+error occurred.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_init() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() returns a pointer to an B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM>
+structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(), X509_STORE_CTX_free(), X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(), X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(),
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() and X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() do not return
+values.
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3)>
+L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)|X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-X509_verify_cert - discover and verify X509 certificte chain
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
-
- int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-The X509_verify_cert() function attempts to discover and validate a
-certificate chain based on parameters in B<ctx>. A complete description of
-the process is contained in the L<verify(1)|verify(1)> manual page.
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-If a complete chain can be built and validated this function returns 1,
-otherwise it return zero, in exceptional circumstances it can also
-return a negative code.
-
-If the function fails additional error information can be obtained by
-examining B<ctx> using, for example X509_STORE_CTX_get_error().
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-Applications rarely call this function directly but it is used by
-OpenSSL internally for certificate validation, in both the S/MIME and
-SSL/TLS code.
-
-The negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can only occur if no
-certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error) or if a retry
-operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens with
-standard lookup methods). It is however recommended that application check
-for <= 0 return value on error.
-
-=head1 BUGS
-
-This function uses the header B<x509.h> as opposed to most chain verification
-functiosn which use B<x509_vfy.h>.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3)|X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-X509_verify_cert() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_verify_cert - discover and verify X509 certificte chain
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The X509_verify_cert() function attempts to discover and validate a
+certificate chain based on parameters in B<ctx>. A complete description of
+the process is contained in the L<verify(1)|verify(1)> manual page.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If a complete chain can be built and validated this function returns 1,
+otherwise it return zero, in exceptional circumstances it can also
+return a negative code.
+
+If the function fails additional error information can be obtained by
+examining B<ctx> using, for example X509_STORE_CTX_get_error().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Applications rarely call this function directly but it is used by
+OpenSSL internally for certificate validation, in both the S/MIME and
+SSL/TLS code.
+
+The negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can only occur if no
+certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error); if X509_verify_cert()
+twice without reinitialising B<ctx> in between; or if a retry
+operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens with
+standard lookup methods). It is however recommended that application check
+for <= 0 return value on error.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+This function uses the header B<x509.h> as opposed to most chain verification
+functiosn which use B<x509_vfy.h>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3)|X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_verify_cert() is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/buffer.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/buffer.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/buffer.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow, BUF_strdup - simple
-character arrays structure
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/buffer.h>
-
- BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void);
-
- void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a);
-
- int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len);
-
- char * BUF_strdup(const char *str);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for
-various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs.
-
-The library uses the BUF_MEM structure defined in buffer.h:
-
- typedef struct buf_mem_st
- {
- int length; /* current number of bytes */
- char *data;
- int max; /* size of buffer */
- } BUF_MEM;
-
-B<length> is the current size of the buffer in bytes, B<max> is the amount of
-memory allocated to the buffer. There are three functions which handle these
-and one "miscellaneous" function.
-
-BUF_MEM_new() allocates a new buffer of zero size.
-
-BUF_MEM_free() frees up an already existing buffer. The data is zeroed
-before freeing up in case the buffer contains sensitive data.
-
-BUF_MEM_grow() changes the size of an already existing buffer to
-B<len>. Any data already in the buffer is preserved if it increases in
-size.
-
-BUF_strdup() copies a null terminated string into a block of allocated
-memory and returns a pointer to the allocated block.
-Unlike the standard C library strdup() this function uses OPENSSL_malloc() and so
-should be used in preference to the standard library strdup() because it can
-be used for memory leak checking or replacing the malloc() function.
-
-The memory allocated from BUF_strdup() should be freed up using the OPENSSL_free()
-function.
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-BUF_MEM_new() returns the buffer or NULL on error.
-
-BUF_MEM_free() has no return value.
-
-BUF_MEM_grow() returns zero on error or the new size (i.e. B<len>).
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<bio(3)|bio(3)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-BUF_MEM_new(), BUF_MEM_free() and BUF_MEM_grow() are available in all
-versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. BUF_strdup() was added in SSLeay 0.8.
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/buffer.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/buffer.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/buffer.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/buffer.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+BUF_MEM_new, BUF_MEM_new_ex, BUF_MEM_free, BUF_MEM_grow - simple
+character array structure
+
+BUF_strdup, BUF_strndup, BUF_memdup, BUF_strlcpy, BUF_strlcat -
+standard C library equivalents
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+ BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void);
+
+ void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a);
+
+ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len);
+
+ char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
+
+ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
+
+ void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
+
+ size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size);
+
+ size_t BUF_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t size);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for
+various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs.
+
+BUF_MEM_new() allocates a new buffer of zero size.
+
+BUF_MEM_free() frees up an already existing buffer. The data is zeroed
+before freeing up in case the buffer contains sensitive data.
+
+BUF_MEM_grow() changes the size of an already existing buffer to
+B<len>. Any data already in the buffer is preserved if it increases in
+size.
+
+BUF_strdup(), BUF_strndup(), BUF_memdup(), BUF_strlcpy() and
+BUF_strlcat() are equivalents of the standard C library functions. The
+dup() functions use OPENSSL_malloc() underneath and so should be used
+in preference to the standard library for memory leak checking or
+replacing the malloc() function.
+
+Memory allocated from these functions should be freed up using the
+OPENSSL_free() function.
+
+BUF_strndup makes the explicit guarantee that it will never read past
+the first B<siz> bytes of B<str>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+BUF_MEM_new() returns the buffer or NULL on error.
+
+BUF_MEM_free() has no return value.
+
+BUF_MEM_grow() returns zero on error or the new size (i.e. B<len>).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<bio(3)|bio(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+BUF_MEM_new(), BUF_MEM_free() and BUF_MEM_grow() are available in all
+versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. BUF_strdup() was added in SSLeay 0.8.
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-d2i_X509_NAME, i2d_X509_NAME - X509_NAME encoding functions
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
-
- X509_NAME *d2i_X509_NAME(X509_NAME **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
- int i2d_X509_NAME(X509_NAME *a, unsigned char **pp);
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-These functions decode and encode an B<X509_NAME> structure which is the
-the same as the B<Name> type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used
-for example in certificate subject and issuer names.
-
-Othewise the functions behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
-described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
-
-=head1 HISTORY
-
-TBA
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_X509_NAME, i2d_X509_NAME - X509_NAME encoding functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509_NAME *d2i_X509_NAME(X509_NAME **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_X509_NAME(X509_NAME *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode an B<X509_NAME> structure which is the
+same as the B<Name> type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used
+for example in certificate subject and issuer names.
+
+Othewise the functions behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
+described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/dir-locals.example.el (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/dir-locals.example.el)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/dir-locals.example.el (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/dir-locals.example.el 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+;;; This is an example of what a .dir-locals.el suitable for OpenSSL
+;;; development could look like.
+;;;
+;;; Apart from setting the CC mode style to "OpenSSL-II", it also
+;;; makes sure that tabs are never used for indentation in any file,
+;;; and that the fill column is 78.
+;;;
+;;; For more information see (info "(emacs) Directory Variables")
+
+((nil
+ (indent-tabs-mode . nil)
+ (fill-column . 78)
+ )
+ (c-mode
+ (c-file-style . "OpenSSL-II")))
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/openssl-c-indent.el (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/openssl-c-indent.el)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/openssl-c-indent.el (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/openssl-c-indent.el 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+;;; This Emacs Lisp file defines a C indentation style for OpenSSL.
+;;;
+;;; This definition is for the "CC mode" package, which is the default
+;;; mode for editing C source files in Emacs 20, not for the older
+;;; c-mode.el (which was the default in less recent releaes of Emacs 19).
+;;;
+;;; Recommended use is to add this line in your .emacs:
+;;;
+;;; (load (expand-file-name "~/PATH/TO/openssl-c-indent.el"))
+;;;
+;;; To activate this indentation style, visit a C file, type
+;;; M-x c-set-style <RET> (or C-c . for short), and enter "eay".
+;;; To toggle the auto-newline feature of CC mode, type C-c C-a.
+;;;
+;;; If you're a OpenSSL developer, you might find it more comfortable
+;;; to have this style be permanent in your OpenSSL development
+;;; directory. To have that, please perform this:
+;;;
+;;; M-x add-dir-local-variable <RET> c-mode <RET> c-file-style <RET>
+;;; "OpenSSL-II" <RET>
+;;;
+;;; A new buffer with .dir-locals.el will appear. Save it (C-x C-s).
+;;;
+;;; Alternatively, have a look at dir-locals.example.el
+
+;;; For suggesting improvements, please send e-mail to levitte at openssl.org.
+
+;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
+;; Note, it could be easy to inherit from the "gnu" style... however,
+;; one never knows if that style will change somewhere in the future,
+;; so I've chosen to copy the "gnu" style values explicitely instead
+;; and mark them with a comment. // RLevitte 2015-08-31
+;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
+
+(c-add-style "OpenSSL-II"
+ '((c-basic-offset . 4)
+ (indent-tabs-mode . nil)
+ (fill-column . 78)
+ (comment-column . 33)
+ (c-comment-only-line-offset 0 . 0) ; From "gnu" style
+ (c-hanging-braces-alist ; From "gnu" style
+ (substatement-open before after) ; From "gnu" style
+ (arglist-cont-nonempty)) ; From "gnu" style
+ (c-offsets-alist
+ (statement-block-intro . +) ; From "gnu" style
+ (knr-argdecl-intro . 0)
+ (knr-argdecl . 0)
+ (substatement-open . +) ; From "gnu" style
+ (substatement-label . 0) ; From "gnu" style
+ (label . 1)
+ (statement-case-open . +) ; From "gnu" style
+ (statement-cont . +) ; From "gnu" style
+ (arglist-intro . c-lineup-arglist-intro-after-paren) ; From "gnu" style
+ (arglist-close . c-lineup-arglist) ; From "gnu" style
+ (inline-open . 0) ; From "gnu" style
+ (brace-list-open . +) ; From "gnu" style
+ (topmost-intro-cont first c-lineup-topmost-intro-cont
+ c-lineup-gnu-DEFUN-intro-cont) ; From "gnu" style
+ )
+ (c-special-indent-hook . c-gnu-impose-minimum) ; From "gnu" style
+ (c-block-comment-prefix . "* ")
+ ))
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-=pod
-
-=head1 NAME
-
-SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert - add certificate to chain
-
-=head1 SYNOPSIS
-
- #include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
- long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x509)
-
-=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
-SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B<x509> to the certificate
-chain presented together with the certificate. Several certificates
-can be added one after the other.
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-When constructing the certificate chain, the chain will be formed from
-these certificates explicitly specified. If no chain is specified,
-the library will try to complete the chain from the available CA
-certificates in the trusted CA storage, see
-L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>.
-
-The B<x509> certificate provided to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be freed by the library when the B<SSL_CTX> is destroyed. An application B<should not> free the B<x509> object.
-
-=head1 RESTRICTIONS
-
-Only one set of extra chain certificates can be specified per SSL_CTX
-structure. Different chains for different certificates (for example if both
-RSA and DSA certificates are specified by the same server) or different SSL
-structures with the same parent SSL_CTX cannot be specified using this
-function.
-
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() returns 1 on success. Check out the
-error stack to find out the reason for failure otherwise.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>,
-L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)|SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>,
-L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>,
-L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
-
-=cut
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert, SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs - add or clear
+extra chain certificates
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509);
+ long SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() adds the certificate B<x509> to the extra chain
+certificates associated with B<ctx>. Several certificates can be added one
+after another.
+
+SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() clears all extra chain certificates
+associated with B<ctx>.
+
+These functions are implemented as macros.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+When sending a certificate chain, extra chain certificates are sent in order
+following the end entity certificate.
+
+If no chain is specified, the library will try to complete the chain from the
+available CA certificates in the trusted CA storage, see
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>.
+
+The B<x509> certificate provided to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() will be
+freed by the library when the B<SSL_CTX> is destroyed. An application
+B<should not> free the B<x509> object.
+
+=head1 RESTRICTIONS
+
+Only one set of extra chain certificates can be specified per SSL_CTX
+structure. Different chains for different certificates (for example if both
+RSA and DSA certificates are specified by the same server) or different SSL
+structures with the same parent SSL_CTX cannot be specified using this
+function.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert() and SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs() return
+1 on success and 0 for failure. Check out the error stack to find out the
+reason for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)|SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3)>,
+L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)|SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>
+
+=cut
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/e_os.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/e_os.h 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/e_os.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,775 +0,0 @@
-/* e_os.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_E_OS_H
-# define HEADER_E_OS_H
-
-# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-/*
- * <openssl/e_os2.h> contains what we can justify to make visible to the
- * outside; this file e_os.h is not part of the exported interface.
- */
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* Used to checking reference counts, most while doing perl5 stuff :-) */
-# ifdef REF_PRINT
-# undef REF_PRINT
-# define REF_PRINT(a,b) fprintf(stderr,"%08X:%4d:%s\n",(int)b,b->references,a)
-# endif
-
-# ifndef DEVRANDOM
-/*
- * set this to a comma-separated list of 'random' device files to try out. My
- * default, we will try to read at least one of these files
- */
-# define DEVRANDOM "/dev/urandom","/dev/random","/dev/srandom"
-# endif
-# ifndef DEVRANDOM_EGD
-/*
- * set this to a comma-seperated list of 'egd' sockets to try out. These
- * sockets will be tried in the order listed in case accessing the device
- * files listed in DEVRANDOM did not return enough entropy.
- */
-# define DEVRANDOM_EGD "/var/run/egd-pool","/dev/egd-pool","/etc/egd-pool","/etc/entropy"
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
-# define NO_SYS_PARAM_H
-# define NO_CHMOD
-# define NO_SYSLOG
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC)
-# if macintosh==1
-# ifndef MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE
-# define MAC_OS_pre_X
-# define NO_SYS_TYPES_H
-# endif
-# define NO_SYS_PARAM_H
-# define NO_CHMOD
-# define NO_SYSLOG
-# undef DEVRANDOM
-# define GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
-# endif
-# endif
-
-/********************************************************************
- The Microsoft section
- ********************************************************************/
-/*
- * The following is used because of the small stack in some Microsoft
- * operating systems
- */
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32)
-# define MS_STATIC static
-# else
-# define MS_STATIC
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(WIN32)
-# define WIN32
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(WINDOWS)
-# define WINDOWS
-# endif
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(MSDOS)
-# define MSDOS
-# endif
-
-# if defined(MSDOS) && !defined(GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS)
-# define GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
-# endif
-
-# ifdef WIN32
-# define get_last_sys_error() GetLastError()
-# define clear_sys_error() SetLastError(0)
-# if !defined(WINNT)
-# define WIN_CONSOLE_BUG
-# endif
-# else
-# define get_last_sys_error() errno
-# define clear_sys_error() errno=0
-# endif
-
-# if defined(WINDOWS)
-# define get_last_socket_error() WSAGetLastError()
-# define clear_socket_error() WSASetLastError(0)
-# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0)
-# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0)
-# elif defined(__DJGPP__)
-# define WATT32
-# define get_last_socket_error() errno
-# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
-# define closesocket(s) close_s(s)
-# define readsocket(s,b,n) read_s(s,b,n)
-# define writesocket(s,b,n) send(s,b,n,0)
-# elif defined(MAC_OS_pre_X)
-# define get_last_socket_error() errno
-# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
-# define closesocket(s) MacSocket_close(s)
-# define readsocket(s,b,n) MacSocket_recv((s),(b),(n),true)
-# define writesocket(s,b,n) MacSocket_send((s),(b),(n))
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
-# define get_last_socket_error() errno
-# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
-# define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c)
-# define closesocket(s) close(s)
-# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0)
-# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0)
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
-# define get_last_socket_error() errno
-# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
-# define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl((a),(b),(int)(c))
-# define closesocket(s) close(s)
-# define readsocket(s,b,n) read((s),(b),(n))
-# define writesocket(s,b,n) write((s),(char *)(b),(n))
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
-# define get_last_socket_error() errno
-# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
-# define FIONBIO SO_NONBLOCK
-# define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) setsockopt((a),SOL_SOCKET,(b),(c),sizeof(*(c)))
-# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0)
-# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0)
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-# if defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)
-# define get_last_socket_error() errno
-# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
-# define closesocket(s) close(s)
-# define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c)
-# if defined(NETWARE_LIBC)
-# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0)
-# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0)
-# else
-# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(char*)(b),(n),0)
-# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(char*)(b),(n),0)
-# endif
-# else
-# define get_last_socket_error() WSAGetLastError()
-# define clear_socket_error() WSASetLastError(0)
-# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0)
-# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0)
-# endif
-# else
-# define get_last_socket_error() errno
-# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
-# define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c)
-# define closesocket(s) close(s)
-# define readsocket(s,b,n) read((s),(b),(n))
-# define writesocket(s,b,n) write((s),(b),(n))
-# endif
-
-# ifdef WIN16 /* never the case */
-# define MS_CALLBACK _far _loadds
-# define MS_FAR _far
-# else
-# define MS_CALLBACK
-# define MS_FAR
-# endif
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-# undef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-# define OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-# endif
-
-# if (defined(WINDOWS) || defined(MSDOS))
-
-# ifdef __DJGPP__
-# include <unistd.h>
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-# include <sys/socket.h>
-# include <tcp.h>
-# include <netdb.h>
-# define _setmode setmode
-# define _O_TEXT O_TEXT
-# define _O_BINARY O_BINARY
-# undef DEVRANDOM
-# define DEVRANDOM "/dev/urandom\x24"
-# endif /* __DJGPP__ */
-
-# ifndef S_IFDIR
-# define S_IFDIR _S_IFDIR
-# endif
-
-# ifndef S_IFMT
-# define S_IFMT _S_IFMT
-# endif
-
-# if !defined(WINNT) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
-# define NO_SYSLOG
-# endif
-# define NO_DIRENT
-
-# ifdef WINDOWS
-# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) && !defined(_WIN32_WINNT)
- /*
- * Defining _WIN32_WINNT here in e_os.h implies certain "discipline."
- * Most notably we ought to check for availability of each specific
- * routine with GetProcAddress() and/or guard NT-specific calls with
- * GetVersion() < 0x80000000. One can argue that in latter "or" case
- * we ought to /DELAYLOAD some .DLLs in order to protect ourselves
- * against run-time link errors. This doesn't seem to be necessary,
- * because it turned out that already Windows 95, first non-NT Win32
- * implementation, is equipped with at least NT 3.51 stubs, dummy
- * routines with same name, but which do nothing. Meaning that it's
- * apparently sufficient to guard "vanilla" NT calls with GetVersion
- * alone, while NT 4.0 and above interfaces ought to be linked with
- * GetProcAddress at run-time.
- */
-# define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
-# endif
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && defined(_WIN32_WINNT)
- /*
- * Just like defining _WIN32_WINNT including winsock2.h implies
- * certain "discipline" for maintaining [broad] binary compatibility.
- * As long as structures are invariant among Winsock versions,
- * it's sufficient to check for specific Winsock2 API availability
- * at run-time [DSO_global_lookup is recommended]...
- */
-# include <winsock2.h>
-# include <ws2tcpip.h>
- /* yes, they have to be #included prior to <windows.h> */
-# endif
-# include <windows.h>
-# include <stdio.h>
-# include <stddef.h>
-# include <errno.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# ifdef _WIN64
-# define strlen(s) _strlen31(s)
-/* cut strings to 2GB */
-static __inline unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str)
-{
- unsigned int len = 0;
- while (*str && len < 0x80000000U)
- str++, len++;
- return len & 0x7FFFFFFF;
-}
-# endif
-# include <malloc.h>
-# if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER<=1200 && defined(_MT) && defined(isspace)
- /* compensate for bug in VC6 ctype.h */
-# undef isspace
-# undef isdigit
-# undef isalnum
-# undef isupper
-# undef isxdigit
-# endif
-# if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_DLL) && defined(stdin)
-# if _MSC_VER>=1300
-# undef stdin
-# undef stdout
-# undef stderr
-FILE *__iob_func();
-# define stdin (&__iob_func()[0])
-# define stdout (&__iob_func()[1])
-# define stderr (&__iob_func()[2])
-# elif defined(I_CAN_LIVE_WITH_LNK4049)
-# undef stdin
-# undef stdout
-# undef stderr
- /*
- * pre-1300 has __p__iob(), but it's available only in msvcrt.lib,
- * or in other words with /MD. Declaring implicit import, i.e. with
- * _imp_ prefix, works correctly with all compiler options, but
- * without /MD results in LINK warning LNK4049: 'locally defined
- * symbol "__iob" imported'.
- */
-extern FILE *_imp___iob;
-# define stdin (&_imp___iob[0])
-# define stdout (&_imp___iob[1])
-# define stderr (&_imp___iob[2])
-# endif
-# endif
-# endif
-# include <io.h>
-# include <fcntl.h>
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
-# define OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
-# endif
-
-# if defined (__BORLANDC__)
-# define _setmode setmode
-# define _O_TEXT O_TEXT
-# define _O_BINARY O_BINARY
-# define _int64 __int64
-# define _kbhit kbhit
-# endif
-
-# define EXIT(n) exit(n)
-# define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ';'
-# ifndef X_OK
-# define X_OK 0
-# endif
-# ifndef W_OK
-# define W_OK 2
-# endif
-# ifndef R_OK
-# define R_OK 4
-# endif
-# define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf"
-# define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF
-# define NUL_DEV "nul"
-# define RFILE ".rnd"
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
-# define DEFAULT_HOME ""
-# else
-# define DEFAULT_HOME "C:"
-# endif
-
-/* Avoid Visual Studio 13 GetVersion deprecated problems */
-# if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1800
-# define check_winnt() (1)
-# define check_win_minplat(x) (1)
-# else
-# define check_winnt() (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
-# define check_win_minplat(x) (LOBYTE(LOWORD(GetVersion())) >= (x))
-# endif
-
-# else /* The non-microsoft world */
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-# define VMS 1
- /*
- * some programs don't include stdlib, so exit() and others give implicit
- * function warnings
- */
-# include <stdlib.h>
-# if defined(__DECC)
-# include <unistd.h>
-# else
-# include <unixlib.h>
-# endif
-# define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf"
-# define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF
-# define RFILE ".rnd"
-# define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ','
-# define NUL_DEV "NLA0:"
- /* We don't have any well-defined random devices on VMS, yet... */
-# undef DEVRANDOM
- /*-
- We need to do this since VMS has the following coding on status codes:
-
- Bits 0-2: status type: 0 = warning, 1 = success, 2 = error, 3 = info ...
- The important thing to know is that odd numbers are considered
- good, while even ones are considered errors.
- Bits 3-15: actual status number
- Bits 16-27: facility number. 0 is considered "unknown"
- Bits 28-31: control bits. If bit 28 is set, the shell won't try to
- output the message (which, for random codes, just looks ugly)
-
- So, what we do here is to change 0 to 1 to get the default success status,
- and everything else is shifted up to fit into the status number field, and
- the status is tagged as an error, which I believe is what is wanted here.
- -- Richard Levitte
- */
-# define EXIT(n) do { int __VMS_EXIT = n; \
- if (__VMS_EXIT == 0) \
- __VMS_EXIT = 1; \
- else \
- __VMS_EXIT = (n << 3) | 2; \
- __VMS_EXIT |= 0x10000000; \
- exit(__VMS_EXIT); } while(0)
-# define NO_SYS_PARAM_H
-
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-# include <fcntl.h>
-# include <unistd.h>
-# define NO_SYS_TYPES_H
-# undef DEVRANDOM
-# ifdef NETWARE_CLIB
-# define getpid GetThreadID
-extern int GetThreadID(void);
-/* # include <conio.h> */
-extern int kbhit(void);
-# else
-# include <screen.h>
-# endif
-# define NO_SYSLOG
-# define _setmode setmode
-# define _kbhit kbhit
-# define _O_TEXT O_TEXT
-# define _O_BINARY O_BINARY
-# define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf"
-# define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF
-# define RFILE ".rnd"
-# define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ';'
-# define EXIT(n) { if (n) printf("ERROR: %d\n", (int)n); exit(n); }
-
-# else
- /* !defined VMS */
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MPE
-# define NO_SYS_PARAM_H
-# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_UNISTD
-# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
-# else
-# include <unistd.h>
-# endif
-# ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# endif
-# if defined(NeXT) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NEWS4)
-# define pid_t int /* pid_t is missing on NEXTSTEP/OPENSTEP
- * (unless when compiling with
- * -D_POSIX_SOURCE, which doesn't work for
- * us) */
-# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NEWS4 /* setvbuf is missing on mips-sony-bsd */
-# define setvbuf(a, b, c, d) setbuffer((a), (b), (d))
-typedef unsigned long clock_t;
-# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN
-# include <io.h>
-# include <fcntl.h>
-# endif
-
-# define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf"
-# define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF
-# define RFILE ".rnd"
-# define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ':'
-# define NUL_DEV "/dev/null"
-# define EXIT(n) exit(n)
-# endif
-
-# define SSLeay_getpid() getpid()
-
-# endif
-
-/*************/
-
-# ifdef USE_SOCKETS
-# if defined(WINDOWS) || defined(MSDOS)
- /* windows world */
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
-# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) (-1)
-# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) (-1)
-# define SHUTDOWN(fd) close(fd)
-# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) close(fd)
-# elif !defined(__DJGPP__)
-# if defined(_WIN32_WCE) && _WIN32_WCE<410
-# define getservbyname _masked_declaration_getservbyname
-# endif
-# if !defined(IPPROTO_IP)
- /* winsock[2].h was included already? */
-# include <winsock.h>
-# endif
-# ifdef getservbyname
-# undef getservbyname
- /* this is used to be wcecompat/include/winsock_extras.h */
-struct servent *PASCAL getservbyname(const char *, const char *);
-# endif
-
-# ifdef _WIN64
-/*
- * Even though sizeof(SOCKET) is 8, it's safe to cast it to int, because
- * the value constitutes an index in per-process table of limited size
- * and not a real pointer.
- */
-# define socket(d,t,p) ((int)socket(d,t,p))
-# define accept(s,f,l) ((int)accept(s,f,l))
-# endif
-# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) send((a),(b),(c),0)
-# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) recv((a),(b),(c),0)
-# define SHUTDOWN(fd) { shutdown((fd),0); closesocket(fd); }
-# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) { shutdown((fd),2); closesocket(fd); }
-# else
-# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) write_s(a,b,c,0)
-# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) read_s(a,b,c)
-# define SHUTDOWN(fd) close_s(fd)
-# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) close_s(fd)
-# endif
-
-# elif defined(MAC_OS_pre_X)
-
-# include "MacSocket.h"
-# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) MacSocket_send((a),(b),(c))
-# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) MacSocket_recv((a),(b),(c),true)
-# define SHUTDOWN(fd) MacSocket_close(fd)
-# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) MacSocket_close(fd)
-
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
- /*
- * NetWare uses the WinSock2 interfaces by default, but can be
- * configured for BSD
- */
-# if defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)
-# include <sys/socket.h>
-# include <netinet/in.h>
-# include <sys/time.h>
-# if defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
-# include <sys/bsdskt.h>
-# else
-# include <sys/select.h>
-# endif
-# define INVALID_SOCKET (int)(~0)
-# else
-# include <novsock2.h>
-# endif
-# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) send((a),(b),(c),0)
-# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) recv((a),(b),(c),0)
-# define SHUTDOWN(fd) { shutdown((fd),0); closesocket(fd); }
-# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) { shutdown((fd),2); closesocket(fd); }
-
-# else
-
-# ifndef NO_SYS_PARAM_H
-# include <sys/param.h>
-# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS
-# include <time.h>
-# elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MPE)
-# include <sys/time.h> /* Needed under linux for FD_XXX */
-# endif
-
-# include <netdb.h>
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_NODECC)
-# include <socket.h>
-# include <in.h>
-# include <inet.h>
-# else
-# include <sys/socket.h>
-# ifdef FILIO_H
-# include <sys/filio.h> /* Added for FIONBIO under unixware */
-# endif
-# include <netinet/in.h>
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
-# include <arpa/inet.h>
-# endif
-# endif
-
-# if defined(NeXT) || defined(_NEXT_SOURCE)
-# include <sys/fcntl.h>
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# endif
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_AIX
-# include <sys/select.h>
-# endif
-
-# ifdef __QNX__
-# include <sys/select.h>
-# endif
-
-# if defined(sun)
-# include <sys/filio.h>
-# else
-# ifndef VMS
-# include <sys/ioctl.h>
-# else
- /* ioctl is only in VMS > 7.0 and when socketshr is not used */
-# if !defined(TCPIP_TYPE_SOCKETSHR) && defined(__VMS_VER) && (__VMS_VER > 70000000)
-# include <sys/ioctl.h>
-# endif
-# endif
-# endif
-
-# ifdef VMS
-# include <unixio.h>
-# if defined(TCPIP_TYPE_SOCKETSHR)
-# include <socketshr.h>
-# endif
-# endif
-
-# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) read((a),(b),(c))
-# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) write((a),(b),(c))
-# define SHUTDOWN(fd) { shutdown((fd),0); closesocket((fd)); }
-# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) { shutdown((fd),2); closesocket((fd)); }
-# ifndef INVALID_SOCKET
-# define INVALID_SOCKET (-1)
-# endif /* INVALID_SOCKET */
-# endif
-
-/*
- * Some IPv6 implementations are broken, disable them in known bad versions.
- */
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_USE_IPV6)
-# if defined(AF_INET6) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_BONE) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
-# define OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 1
-# else
-# define OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 0
-# endif
-# endif
-
-# endif
-
-# if defined(sun) && !defined(__svr4__) && !defined(__SVR4)
- /* include headers first, so our defines don't break it */
-# include <stdlib.h>
-# include <string.h>
- /* bcopy can handle overlapping moves according to SunOS 4.1.4 manpage */
-# define memmove(s1,s2,n) bcopy((s2),(s1),(n))
-# define strtoul(s,e,b) ((unsigned long int)strtol((s),(e),(b)))
-extern char *sys_errlist[];
-extern int sys_nerr;
-# define strerror(errnum) \
- (((errnum)<0 || (errnum)>=sys_nerr) ? NULL : sys_errlist[errnum])
- /* Being signed SunOS 4.x memcpy breaks ASN1_OBJECT table lookup */
-# include "crypto/o_str.h"
-# define memcmp OPENSSL_memcmp
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_EXIT
-# if defined(MONOLITH) && !defined(OPENSSL_C)
-# define OPENSSL_EXIT(n) return(n)
-# else
-# define OPENSSL_EXIT(n) do { EXIT(n); return(n); } while(0)
-# endif
-# endif
-
-/***********************************************/
-
-# define DG_GCC_BUG /* gcc < 2.6.3 on DGUX */
-
-# ifdef sgi
-# define IRIX_CC_BUG /* all version of IRIX I've tested (4.* 5.*) */
-# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_SNI
-# define IRIX_CC_BUG /* CDS++ up to V2.0Bsomething suffered from
- * the same bug. */
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
-# define strcasecmp _stricmp
-# define strncasecmp _strnicmp
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
-/* VMS below version 7.0 doesn't have strcasecmp() */
-# include "o_str.h"
-# define strcasecmp OPENSSL_strcasecmp
-# define strncasecmp OPENSSL_strncasecmp
-# define OPENSSL_IMPLEMENTS_strncasecmp
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && defined(__EMX__)
-# define strcasecmp stricmp
-# define strncasecmp strnicmp
-# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-# include <string.h>
-# if defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
-# define strcasecmp stricmp
-# define strncasecmp strnicmp
-# endif /* NETWARE_CLIB */
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && defined(__EMX__)
-# include <io.h>
-# include <fcntl.h>
-# define NO_SYSLOG
-# endif
-
-/* vxworks */
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
-# include <ioLib.h>
-# include <tickLib.h>
-# include <sysLib.h>
-
-# define TTY_STRUCT int
-
-# define sleep(a) taskDelay((a) * sysClkRateGet())
-
-# include <vxWorks.h>
-# include <sockLib.h>
-# include <taskLib.h>
-
-# define getpid taskIdSelf
-
-/*
- * NOTE: these are implemented by helpers in database app! if the database is
- * not linked, we need to implement them elswhere
- */
-struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *name);
-struct hostent *gethostbyaddr(const char *addr, int length, int type);
-struct servent *getservbyname(const char *name, const char *proto);
-
-# endif
-/* end vxworks */
-
-/* beos */
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
-# define SO_ERROR 0
-# define NO_SYS_UN
-# define IPPROTO_IP 0
-# include <OS.h>
-# endif
-
-# if !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
-# if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__>=199901L
- /* do nothing, inline works */
-# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
-# define inline __inline__
-# elif defined(_MSC_VER)
- /*
- * Visual Studio: inline is available in C++ only, however
- * __inline is available for C, see
- * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx
- */
-# define inline __inline
-# else
-# define inline
-# endif
-# endif
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/e_os.h (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/e_os.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/e_os.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/e_os.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,775 @@
+/* e_os.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_E_OS_H
+# define HEADER_E_OS_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+/*
+ * <openssl/e_os2.h> contains what we can justify to make visible to the
+ * outside; this file e_os.h is not part of the exported interface.
+ */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Used to checking reference counts, most while doing perl5 stuff :-) */
+# ifdef REF_PRINT
+# undef REF_PRINT
+# define REF_PRINT(a,b) fprintf(stderr,"%08X:%4d:%s\n",(int)b,b->references,a)
+# endif
+
+# ifndef DEVRANDOM
+/*
+ * set this to a comma-separated list of 'random' device files to try out. My
+ * default, we will try to read at least one of these files
+ */
+# define DEVRANDOM "/dev/urandom","/dev/random","/dev/srandom"
+# endif
+# ifndef DEVRANDOM_EGD
+/*
+ * set this to a comma-seperated list of 'egd' sockets to try out. These
+ * sockets will be tried in the order listed in case accessing the device
+ * files listed in DEVRANDOM did not return enough entropy.
+ */
+# define DEVRANDOM_EGD "/var/run/egd-pool","/dev/egd-pool","/etc/egd-pool","/etc/entropy"
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# define NO_SYS_PARAM_H
+# define NO_CHMOD
+# define NO_SYSLOG
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC)
+# if macintosh==1
+# ifndef MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE
+# define MAC_OS_pre_X
+# define NO_SYS_TYPES_H
+# endif
+# define NO_SYS_PARAM_H
+# define NO_CHMOD
+# define NO_SYSLOG
+# undef DEVRANDOM
+# define GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
+# endif
+# endif
+
+/********************************************************************
+ The Microsoft section
+ ********************************************************************/
+/*
+ * The following is used because of the small stack in some Microsoft
+ * operating systems
+ */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32)
+# define MS_STATIC static
+# else
+# define MS_STATIC
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(WIN32)
+# define WIN32
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(WINDOWS)
+# define WINDOWS
+# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(MSDOS)
+# define MSDOS
+# endif
+
+# if defined(MSDOS) && !defined(GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS)
+# define GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
+# endif
+
+# ifdef WIN32
+# define get_last_sys_error() GetLastError()
+# define clear_sys_error() SetLastError(0)
+# if !defined(WINNT)
+# define WIN_CONSOLE_BUG
+# endif
+# else
+# define get_last_sys_error() errno
+# define clear_sys_error() errno=0
+# endif
+
+# if defined(WINDOWS)
+# define get_last_socket_error() WSAGetLastError()
+# define clear_socket_error() WSASetLastError(0)
+# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0)
+# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0)
+# elif defined(__DJGPP__)
+# define WATT32
+# define get_last_socket_error() errno
+# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
+# define closesocket(s) close_s(s)
+# define readsocket(s,b,n) read_s(s,b,n)
+# define writesocket(s,b,n) send(s,b,n,0)
+# elif defined(MAC_OS_pre_X)
+# define get_last_socket_error() errno
+# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
+# define closesocket(s) MacSocket_close(s)
+# define readsocket(s,b,n) MacSocket_recv((s),(b),(n),true)
+# define writesocket(s,b,n) MacSocket_send((s),(b),(n))
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+# define get_last_socket_error() errno
+# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
+# define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c)
+# define closesocket(s) close(s)
+# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0)
+# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0)
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# define get_last_socket_error() errno
+# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
+# define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl((a),(b),(int)(c))
+# define closesocket(s) close(s)
+# define readsocket(s,b,n) read((s),(b),(n))
+# define writesocket(s,b,n) write((s),(char *)(b),(n))
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+# define get_last_socket_error() errno
+# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
+# define FIONBIO SO_NONBLOCK
+# define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) setsockopt((a),SOL_SOCKET,(b),(c),sizeof(*(c)))
+# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0)
+# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0)
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+# if defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)
+# define get_last_socket_error() errno
+# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
+# define closesocket(s) close(s)
+# define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c)
+# if defined(NETWARE_LIBC)
+# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0)
+# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0)
+# else
+# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(char*)(b),(n),0)
+# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(char*)(b),(n),0)
+# endif
+# else
+# define get_last_socket_error() WSAGetLastError()
+# define clear_socket_error() WSASetLastError(0)
+# define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0)
+# define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0)
+# endif
+# else
+# define get_last_socket_error() errno
+# define clear_socket_error() errno=0
+# define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c)
+# define closesocket(s) close(s)
+# define readsocket(s,b,n) read((s),(b),(n))
+# define writesocket(s,b,n) write((s),(b),(n))
+# endif
+
+# ifdef WIN16 /* never the case */
+# define MS_CALLBACK _far _loadds
+# define MS_FAR _far
+# else
+# define MS_CALLBACK
+# define MS_FAR
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+# undef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+# define OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+# endif
+
+# if (defined(WINDOWS) || defined(MSDOS))
+
+# ifdef __DJGPP__
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+# include <tcp.h>
+# include <netdb.h>
+# define _setmode setmode
+# define _O_TEXT O_TEXT
+# define _O_BINARY O_BINARY
+# undef DEVRANDOM
+# define DEVRANDOM "/dev/urandom\x24"
+# endif /* __DJGPP__ */
+
+# ifndef S_IFDIR
+# define S_IFDIR _S_IFDIR
+# endif
+
+# ifndef S_IFMT
+# define S_IFMT _S_IFMT
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(WINNT) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
+# define NO_SYSLOG
+# endif
+# define NO_DIRENT
+
+# ifdef WINDOWS
+# if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) && !defined(_WIN32_WINNT)
+ /*
+ * Defining _WIN32_WINNT here in e_os.h implies certain "discipline."
+ * Most notably we ought to check for availability of each specific
+ * routine with GetProcAddress() and/or guard NT-specific calls with
+ * GetVersion() < 0x80000000. One can argue that in latter "or" case
+ * we ought to /DELAYLOAD some .DLLs in order to protect ourselves
+ * against run-time link errors. This doesn't seem to be necessary,
+ * because it turned out that already Windows 95, first non-NT Win32
+ * implementation, is equipped with at least NT 3.51 stubs, dummy
+ * routines with same name, but which do nothing. Meaning that it's
+ * apparently sufficient to guard "vanilla" NT calls with GetVersion
+ * alone, while NT 4.0 and above interfaces ought to be linked with
+ * GetProcAddress at run-time.
+ */
+# define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
+# endif
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && defined(_WIN32_WINNT)
+ /*
+ * Just like defining _WIN32_WINNT including winsock2.h implies
+ * certain "discipline" for maintaining [broad] binary compatibility.
+ * As long as structures are invariant among Winsock versions,
+ * it's sufficient to check for specific Winsock2 API availability
+ * at run-time [DSO_global_lookup is recommended]...
+ */
+# include <winsock2.h>
+# include <ws2tcpip.h>
+ /* yes, they have to be #included prior to <windows.h> */
+# endif
+# include <windows.h>
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <stddef.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# ifdef _WIN64
+# define strlen(s) _strlen31(s)
+/* cut strings to 2GB */
+static __inline unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str)
+{
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+ while (*str && len < 0x80000000U)
+ str++, len++;
+ return len & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+}
+# endif
+# include <malloc.h>
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER<=1200 && defined(_MT) && defined(isspace)
+ /* compensate for bug in VC6 ctype.h */
+# undef isspace
+# undef isdigit
+# undef isalnum
+# undef isupper
+# undef isxdigit
+# endif
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_DLL) && defined(stdin)
+# if _MSC_VER>=1300 && _MSC_VER<1600
+# undef stdin
+# undef stdout
+# undef stderr
+FILE *__iob_func();
+# define stdin (&__iob_func()[0])
+# define stdout (&__iob_func()[1])
+# define stderr (&__iob_func()[2])
+# elif _MSC_VER<1300 && defined(I_CAN_LIVE_WITH_LNK4049)
+# undef stdin
+# undef stdout
+# undef stderr
+ /*
+ * pre-1300 has __p__iob(), but it's available only in msvcrt.lib,
+ * or in other words with /MD. Declaring implicit import, i.e. with
+ * _imp_ prefix, works correctly with all compiler options, but
+ * without /MD results in LINK warning LNK4049: 'locally defined
+ * symbol "__iob" imported'.
+ */
+extern FILE *_imp___iob;
+# define stdin (&_imp___iob[0])
+# define stdout (&_imp___iob[1])
+# define stderr (&_imp___iob[2])
+# endif
+# endif
+# endif
+# include <io.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+# define OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# endif
+
+# if defined (__BORLANDC__)
+# define _setmode setmode
+# define _O_TEXT O_TEXT
+# define _O_BINARY O_BINARY
+# define _int64 __int64
+# define _kbhit kbhit
+# endif
+
+# define EXIT(n) exit(n)
+# define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ';'
+# ifndef X_OK
+# define X_OK 0
+# endif
+# ifndef W_OK
+# define W_OK 2
+# endif
+# ifndef R_OK
+# define R_OK 4
+# endif
+# define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf"
+# define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF
+# define NUL_DEV "nul"
+# define RFILE ".rnd"
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE
+# define DEFAULT_HOME ""
+# else
+# define DEFAULT_HOME "C:"
+# endif
+
+/* Avoid Visual Studio 13 GetVersion deprecated problems */
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1800
+# define check_winnt() (1)
+# define check_win_minplat(x) (1)
+# else
+# define check_winnt() (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+# define check_win_minplat(x) (LOBYTE(LOWORD(GetVersion())) >= (x))
+# endif
+
+# else /* The non-microsoft world */
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# define VMS 1
+ /*
+ * some programs don't include stdlib, so exit() and others give implicit
+ * function warnings
+ */
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# if defined(__DECC)
+# include <unistd.h>
+# else
+# include <unixlib.h>
+# endif
+# define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf"
+# define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF
+# define RFILE ".rnd"
+# define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ','
+# define NUL_DEV "NLA0:"
+ /* We don't have any well-defined random devices on VMS, yet... */
+# undef DEVRANDOM
+ /*-
+ We need to do this since VMS has the following coding on status codes:
+
+ Bits 0-2: status type: 0 = warning, 1 = success, 2 = error, 3 = info ...
+ The important thing to know is that odd numbers are considered
+ good, while even ones are considered errors.
+ Bits 3-15: actual status number
+ Bits 16-27: facility number. 0 is considered "unknown"
+ Bits 28-31: control bits. If bit 28 is set, the shell won't try to
+ output the message (which, for random codes, just looks ugly)
+
+ So, what we do here is to change 0 to 1 to get the default success status,
+ and everything else is shifted up to fit into the status number field, and
+ the status is tagged as an error, which I believe is what is wanted here.
+ -- Richard Levitte
+ */
+# define EXIT(n) do { int __VMS_EXIT = n; \
+ if (__VMS_EXIT == 0) \
+ __VMS_EXIT = 1; \
+ else \
+ __VMS_EXIT = (n << 3) | 2; \
+ __VMS_EXIT |= 0x10000000; \
+ exit(__VMS_EXIT); } while(0)
+# define NO_SYS_PARAM_H
+
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# define NO_SYS_TYPES_H
+# undef DEVRANDOM
+# ifdef NETWARE_CLIB
+# define getpid GetThreadID
+extern int GetThreadID(void);
+/* # include <conio.h> */
+extern int kbhit(void);
+# else
+# include <screen.h>
+# endif
+# define NO_SYSLOG
+# define _setmode setmode
+# define _kbhit kbhit
+# define _O_TEXT O_TEXT
+# define _O_BINARY O_BINARY
+# define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf"
+# define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF
+# define RFILE ".rnd"
+# define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ';'
+# define EXIT(n) { if (n) printf("ERROR: %d\n", (int)n); exit(n); }
+
+# else
+ /* !defined VMS */
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MPE
+# define NO_SYS_PARAM_H
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_UNISTD
+# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+# else
+# include <unistd.h>
+# endif
+# ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# endif
+# if defined(NeXT) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NEWS4)
+# define pid_t int /* pid_t is missing on NEXTSTEP/OPENSTEP
+ * (unless when compiling with
+ * -D_POSIX_SOURCE, which doesn't work for
+ * us) */
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NEWS4 /* setvbuf is missing on mips-sony-bsd */
+# define setvbuf(a, b, c, d) setbuffer((a), (b), (d))
+typedef unsigned long clock_t;
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN
+# include <io.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# endif
+
+# define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf"
+# define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF
+# define RFILE ".rnd"
+# define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ':'
+# define NUL_DEV "/dev/null"
+# define EXIT(n) exit(n)
+# endif
+
+# define SSLeay_getpid() getpid()
+
+# endif
+
+/*************/
+
+# ifdef USE_SOCKETS
+# if defined(WINDOWS) || defined(MSDOS)
+ /* windows world */
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) (-1)
+# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) (-1)
+# define SHUTDOWN(fd) close(fd)
+# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) close(fd)
+# elif !defined(__DJGPP__)
+# if defined(_WIN32_WCE) && _WIN32_WCE<410
+# define getservbyname _masked_declaration_getservbyname
+# endif
+# if !defined(IPPROTO_IP)
+ /* winsock[2].h was included already? */
+# include <winsock.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef getservbyname
+# undef getservbyname
+ /* this is used to be wcecompat/include/winsock_extras.h */
+struct servent *PASCAL getservbyname(const char *, const char *);
+# endif
+
+# ifdef _WIN64
+/*
+ * Even though sizeof(SOCKET) is 8, it's safe to cast it to int, because
+ * the value constitutes an index in per-process table of limited size
+ * and not a real pointer.
+ */
+# define socket(d,t,p) ((int)socket(d,t,p))
+# define accept(s,f,l) ((int)accept(s,f,l))
+# endif
+# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) send((a),(b),(c),0)
+# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) recv((a),(b),(c),0)
+# define SHUTDOWN(fd) { shutdown((fd),0); closesocket(fd); }
+# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) { shutdown((fd),2); closesocket(fd); }
+# else
+# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) write_s(a,b,c,0)
+# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) read_s(a,b,c)
+# define SHUTDOWN(fd) close_s(fd)
+# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) close_s(fd)
+# endif
+
+# elif defined(MAC_OS_pre_X)
+
+# include "MacSocket.h"
+# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) MacSocket_send((a),(b),(c))
+# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) MacSocket_recv((a),(b),(c),true)
+# define SHUTDOWN(fd) MacSocket_close(fd)
+# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) MacSocket_close(fd)
+
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+ /*
+ * NetWare uses the WinSock2 interfaces by default, but can be
+ * configured for BSD
+ */
+# if defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK)
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+# include <netinet/in.h>
+# include <sys/time.h>
+# if defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
+# include <sys/bsdskt.h>
+# else
+# include <sys/select.h>
+# endif
+# define INVALID_SOCKET (int)(~0)
+# else
+# include <novsock2.h>
+# endif
+# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) send((a),(b),(c),0)
+# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) recv((a),(b),(c),0)
+# define SHUTDOWN(fd) { shutdown((fd),0); closesocket(fd); }
+# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) { shutdown((fd),2); closesocket(fd); }
+
+# else
+
+# ifndef NO_SYS_PARAM_H
+# include <sys/param.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS
+# include <time.h>
+# elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MPE)
+# include <sys/time.h> /* Needed under linux for FD_XXX */
+# endif
+
+# include <netdb.h>
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_NODECC)
+# include <socket.h>
+# include <in.h>
+# include <inet.h>
+# else
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+# ifdef FILIO_H
+# include <sys/filio.h> /* Added for FIONBIO under unixware */
+# endif
+# include <netinet/in.h>
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+# include <arpa/inet.h>
+# endif
+# endif
+
+# if defined(NeXT) || defined(_NEXT_SOURCE)
+# include <sys/fcntl.h>
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_AIX
+# include <sys/select.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef __QNX__
+# include <sys/select.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(__sun) || defined(sun)
+# include <sys/filio.h>
+# else
+# ifndef VMS
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+# else
+ /* ioctl is only in VMS > 7.0 and when socketshr is not used */
+# if !defined(TCPIP_TYPE_SOCKETSHR) && defined(__VMS_VER) && (__VMS_VER > 70000000)
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+# endif
+# endif
+# endif
+
+# ifdef VMS
+# include <unixio.h>
+# if defined(TCPIP_TYPE_SOCKETSHR)
+# include <socketshr.h>
+# endif
+# endif
+
+# define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) read((a),(b),(c))
+# define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) write((a),(b),(c))
+# define SHUTDOWN(fd) { shutdown((fd),0); closesocket((fd)); }
+# define SHUTDOWN2(fd) { shutdown((fd),2); closesocket((fd)); }
+# ifndef INVALID_SOCKET
+# define INVALID_SOCKET (-1)
+# endif /* INVALID_SOCKET */
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * Some IPv6 implementations are broken, disable them in known bad versions.
+ */
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_USE_IPV6)
+# if defined(AF_INET6) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_BONE) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
+# define OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 1
+# else
+# define OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 0
+# endif
+# endif
+
+# endif
+
+# if (defined(__sun) || defined(sun)) && !defined(__svr4__) && !defined(__SVR4)
+ /* include headers first, so our defines don't break it */
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <string.h>
+ /* bcopy can handle overlapping moves according to SunOS 4.1.4 manpage */
+# define memmove(s1,s2,n) bcopy((s2),(s1),(n))
+# define strtoul(s,e,b) ((unsigned long int)strtol((s),(e),(b)))
+extern char *sys_errlist[];
+extern int sys_nerr;
+# define strerror(errnum) \
+ (((errnum)<0 || (errnum)>=sys_nerr) ? NULL : sys_errlist[errnum])
+ /* Being signed SunOS 4.x memcpy breaks ASN1_OBJECT table lookup */
+# include "crypto/o_str.h"
+# define memcmp OPENSSL_memcmp
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_EXIT
+# if defined(MONOLITH) && !defined(OPENSSL_C)
+# define OPENSSL_EXIT(n) return(n)
+# else
+# define OPENSSL_EXIT(n) do { EXIT(n); return(n); } while(0)
+# endif
+# endif
+
+/***********************************************/
+
+# define DG_GCC_BUG /* gcc < 2.6.3 on DGUX */
+
+# ifdef sgi
+# define IRIX_CC_BUG /* all version of IRIX I've tested (4.* 5.*) */
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_SNI
+# define IRIX_CC_BUG /* CDS++ up to V2.0Bsomething suffered from
+ * the same bug. */
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+# define strcasecmp _stricmp
+# define strncasecmp _strnicmp
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+/* VMS below version 7.0 doesn't have strcasecmp() */
+# include "o_str.h"
+# define strcasecmp OPENSSL_strcasecmp
+# define strncasecmp OPENSSL_strncasecmp
+# define OPENSSL_IMPLEMENTS_strncasecmp
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && defined(__EMX__)
+# define strcasecmp stricmp
+# define strncasecmp strnicmp
+# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+# include <string.h>
+# if defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
+# define strcasecmp stricmp
+# define strncasecmp strnicmp
+# endif /* NETWARE_CLIB */
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && defined(__EMX__)
+# include <io.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# define NO_SYSLOG
+# endif
+
+/* vxworks */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# include <ioLib.h>
+# include <tickLib.h>
+# include <sysLib.h>
+
+# define TTY_STRUCT int
+
+# define sleep(a) taskDelay((a) * sysClkRateGet())
+
+# include <vxWorks.h>
+# include <sockLib.h>
+# include <taskLib.h>
+
+# define getpid taskIdSelf
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: these are implemented by helpers in database app! if the database is
+ * not linked, we need to implement them elswhere
+ */
+struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *name);
+struct hostent *gethostbyaddr(const char *addr, int length, int type);
+struct servent *getservbyname(const char *name, const char *proto);
+
+# endif
+/* end vxworks */
+
+/* beos */
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
+# define SO_ERROR 0
+# define NO_SYS_UN
+# define IPPROTO_IP 0
+# include <OS.h>
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
+# if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__>=199901L
+ /* do nothing, inline works */
+# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
+# define inline __inline__
+# elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+ /*
+ * Visual Studio: inline is available in C++ only, however
+ * __inline is available for C, see
+ * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx
+ */
+# define inline __inline
+# else
+# define inline
+# endif
+# endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/engines/e_chil.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/engines/e_chil.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/engines/e_chil.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1339 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/engine/e_chil.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/*
- * Written by Richard Levitte (richard at levitte.org), Geoff Thorpe
- * (geoff at geoffthorpe.net) and Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for
- * the OpenSSL project 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/dso.h>
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#include <openssl/ui.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_CHIL
-
-/*-
- * Attribution notice: nCipher have said several times that it's OK for
- * us to implement a general interface to their boxes, and recently declared
- * their HWCryptoHook to be public, and therefore available for us to use.
- * Thanks, nCipher.
- *
- * The hwcryptohook.h included here is from May 2000.
- * [Richard Levitte]
- */
-# ifdef FLAT_INC
-# include "hwcryptohook.h"
-# else
-# include "vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h"
-# endif
-
-# define HWCRHK_LIB_NAME "CHIL engine"
-# include "e_chil_err.c"
-
-static int hwcrhk_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-static int hwcrhk_init(ENGINE *e);
-static int hwcrhk_finish(ENGINE *e);
-static int hwcrhk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void));
-
-/* Functions to handle mutexes */
-static int hwcrhk_mutex_init(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *,
- HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *);
-static int hwcrhk_mutex_lock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
-static void hwcrhk_mutex_unlock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
-static void hwcrhk_mutex_destroy(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
-
-/* BIGNUM stuff */
-static int hwcrhk_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* RSA stuff */
-static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
- BN_CTX *ctx);
-/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
-static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-static int hwcrhk_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa);
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/* DH stuff */
-/* This function is alised to mod_exp (with the DH and mont dropped). */
-static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
- const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-# endif
-
-/* RAND stuff */
-static int hwcrhk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-static int hwcrhk_rand_status(void);
-
-/* KM stuff */
-static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method,
- void *callback_data);
-static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method,
- void *callback_data);
-
-/* Interaction stuff */
-static int hwcrhk_insert_card(const char *prompt_info,
- const char *wrong_info,
- HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
- HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
-static int hwcrhk_get_pass(const char *prompt_info,
- int *len_io, char *buf,
- HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
- HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
-static void hwcrhk_log_message(void *logstr, const char *message);
-
-/* The definitions for control commands specific to this engine */
-# define HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-# define HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1)
-# define HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 2)
-# define HWCRHK_CMD_SET_USER_INTERFACE (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 3)
-# define HWCRHK_CMD_SET_CALLBACK_DATA (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 4)
-static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN hwcrhk_cmd_defns[] = {
- {HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH,
- "SO_PATH",
- "Specifies the path to the 'hwcrhk' shared library",
- ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
- {HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK,
- "FORK_CHECK",
- "Turns fork() checking on (non-zero) or off (zero)",
- ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
- {HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING,
- "THREAD_LOCKING",
- "Turns thread-safe locking on (zero) or off (non-zero)",
- ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
- {HWCRHK_CMD_SET_USER_INTERFACE,
- "SET_USER_INTERFACE",
- "Set the global user interface (internal)",
- ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL},
- {HWCRHK_CMD_SET_CALLBACK_DATA,
- "SET_CALLBACK_DATA",
- "Set the global user interface extra data (internal)",
- ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL},
- {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-};
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-static RSA_METHOD hwcrhk_rsa = {
- "CHIL RSA method",
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp,
- hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont,
- NULL,
- hwcrhk_rsa_finish,
- 0,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
-};
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
-static DH_METHOD hwcrhk_dh = {
- "CHIL DH method",
- NULL,
- NULL,
- hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- 0,
- NULL,
- NULL
-};
-# endif
-
-static RAND_METHOD hwcrhk_rand = {
- /* "CHIL RAND method", */
- NULL,
- hwcrhk_rand_bytes,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- hwcrhk_rand_bytes,
- hwcrhk_rand_status,
-};
-
-/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-static const char *engine_hwcrhk_id = "chil";
-static const char *engine_hwcrhk_name = "CHIL hardware engine support";
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
-/* Compatibility hack, the dynamic library uses this form in the path */
-static const char *engine_hwcrhk_id_alt = "ncipher";
-# endif
-
-/* Internal stuff for HWCryptoHook */
-
-/* Some structures needed for proper use of thread locks */
-/*
- * hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue
- * into HWCryptoHook_Mutex
- */
-struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue {
- int lockid;
-};
-
-/*
- * hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn struct
- * HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue into HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext
- */
-struct HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue {
- UI_METHOD *ui_method;
- void *callback_data;
-};
-
-/*
- * hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn struct
- * HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue into HWCryptoHook_CallerContext
- */
-struct HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue {
- pem_password_cb *password_callback; /* Deprecated! Only present for
- * backward compatibility! */
- UI_METHOD *ui_method;
- void *callback_data;
-};
-
-/*
- * The MPI structure in HWCryptoHook is pretty compatible with OpenSSL
- * BIGNUM's, so lets define a couple of conversion macros
- */
-# define BN2MPI(mp, bn) \
- {mp.size = bn->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG); mp.buf = (unsigned char *)bn->d;}
-# define MPI2BN(bn, mp) \
- {mp.size = bn->dmax * sizeof(BN_ULONG); mp.buf = (unsigned char *)bn->d;}
-
-static BIO *logstream = NULL;
-static int disable_mutex_callbacks = 0;
-
-/*
- * One might wonder why these are needed, since one can pass down at least a
- * UI_METHOD and a pointer to callback data to the key-loading functions. The
- * thing is that the ModExp and RSAImmed functions can load keys as well, if
- * the data they get is in a special, nCipher-defined format (hint: if you
- * look at the private exponent of the RSA data as a string, you'll see this
- * string: "nCipher KM tool key id", followed by some bytes, followed a key
- * identity string, followed by more bytes. This happens when you use
- * "embed" keys instead of "hwcrhk" keys). Unfortunately, those functions do
- * not take any passphrase or caller context, and our functions can't really
- * take any callback data either. Still, the "insert_card" and
- * "get_passphrase" callbacks may be called down the line, and will need to
- * know what user interface callbacks to call, and having callback data from
- * the application may be a nice thing as well, so we need to keep track of
- * that globally.
- */
-static HWCryptoHook_CallerContext password_context = { NULL, NULL, NULL };
-
-/* Stuff to pass to the HWCryptoHook library */
-static HWCryptoHook_InitInfo hwcrhk_globals = {
- HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck, /* Flags */
- &logstream, /* logstream */
- sizeof(BN_ULONG), /* limbsize */
- 0, /* mslimb first: false for BNs */
- -1, /* msbyte first: use native */
- 0, /* Max mutexes, 0 = no small limit */
- 0, /* Max simultaneous, 0 = default */
-
- /*
- * The next few are mutex stuff: we write wrapper functions around the OS
- * mutex functions. We initialise them to 0 here, and change that to
- * actual function pointers in hwcrhk_init() if dynamic locks are
- * supported (that is, if the application programmer has made sure of
- * setting up callbacks bafore starting this engine) *and* if
- * disable_mutex_callbacks hasn't been set by a call to
- * ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING).
- */
- sizeof(HWCryptoHook_Mutex),
- 0,
- 0,
- 0,
- 0,
-
- /*
- * The next few are condvar stuff: we write wrapper functions round the
- * OS functions. Currently not implemented and not and absolute
- * necessity even in threaded programs, therefore 0'ed. Will hopefully
- * be implemented some day, since it enhances the efficiency of
- * HWCryptoHook.
- */
- 0, /* sizeof(HWCryptoHook_CondVar), */
- 0, /* hwcrhk_cv_init, */
- 0, /* hwcrhk_cv_wait, */
- 0, /* hwcrhk_cv_signal, */
- 0, /* hwcrhk_cv_broadcast, */
- 0, /* hwcrhk_cv_destroy, */
-
- hwcrhk_get_pass, /* pass phrase */
- hwcrhk_insert_card, /* insert a card */
- hwcrhk_log_message /* Log message */
-};
-
-/* Now, to our own code */
-
-/*
- * This internal function is used by ENGINE_chil() and possibly by the
- * "dynamic" ENGINE support too
- */
-static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
-{
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- const DH_METHOD *meth2;
-# endif
- if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_hwcrhk_id) ||
- !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_hwcrhk_name) ||
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &hwcrhk_rsa) ||
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- !ENGINE_set_DH(e, &hwcrhk_dh) ||
-# endif
- !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &hwcrhk_rand) ||
- !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, hwcrhk_destroy) ||
- !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, hwcrhk_init) ||
- !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, hwcrhk_finish) ||
- !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, hwcrhk_ctrl) ||
- !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, hwcrhk_load_privkey) ||
- !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, hwcrhk_load_pubkey) ||
- !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, hwcrhk_cmd_defns))
- return 0;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- /*
- * We know that the "PKCS1_SSLeay()" functions hook properly to the
- * cswift-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use those functions. NB:
- * We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or anything "more generic" because
- * something like the RSAref code may not hook properly, and if you own
- * one of these cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it
- * anyway!
- */
- meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
- hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
- hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
- hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc;
- hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec;
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- /* Much the same for Diffie-Hellman */
- meth2 = DH_OpenSSL();
- hwcrhk_dh.generate_key = meth2->generate_key;
- hwcrhk_dh.compute_key = meth2->compute_key;
-# endif
-
- /* Ensure the hwcrhk error handling is set up */
- ERR_load_HWCRHK_strings();
- return 1;
-}
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
-static ENGINE *engine_chil(void)
-{
- ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
- if (!ret)
- return NULL;
- if (!bind_helper(ret)) {
- ENGINE_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-void ENGINE_load_chil(void)
-{
- /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
- ENGINE *toadd = engine_chil();
- if (!toadd)
- return;
- ENGINE_add(toadd);
- ENGINE_free(toadd);
- ERR_clear_error();
-}
-# endif
-
-/*
- * This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading the
- * HWCryptoHook library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an init() or
- * finish() call (reference counts permitting) and they're operating with
- * global locks, so this should be thread-safe implicitly.
- */
-static DSO *hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
-static HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwcrhk_context = 0;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* Index for KM handle. Not really used yet. */
-static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
-# endif
-
-/*
- * These are the function pointers that are (un)set when the library has
- * successfully (un)loaded.
- */
-static HWCryptoHook_Init_t *p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
-static HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
-static HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
-# endif
-static HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
-static HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
-static HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
-# endif
-static HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
-
-/* Used in the DSO operations. */
-static const char *HWCRHK_LIBNAME = NULL;
-static void free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(void)
-{
- if (HWCRHK_LIBNAME)
- OPENSSL_free((void *)HWCRHK_LIBNAME);
- HWCRHK_LIBNAME = NULL;
-}
-
-static const char *get_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(void)
-{
- if (HWCRHK_LIBNAME)
- return HWCRHK_LIBNAME;
- return "nfhwcrhk";
-}
-
-static long set_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-{
- free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME();
- return (((HWCRHK_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL) ? 1 : 0);
-}
-
-static const char *n_hwcrhk_Init = "HWCryptoHook_Init";
-static const char *n_hwcrhk_Finish = "HWCryptoHook_Finish";
-static const char *n_hwcrhk_ModExp = "HWCryptoHook_ModExp";
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSA = "HWCryptoHook_RSA";
-# endif
-static const char *n_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = "HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes";
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey";
-static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey";
-static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey";
-# endif
-static const char *n_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = "HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT";
-
-/*
- * HWCryptoHook library functions and mechanics - these are used by the
- * higher-level functions further down. NB: As and where there's no error
- * checking, take a look lower down where these functions are called, the
- * checking and error handling is probably down there.
- */
-
-/* utility function to obtain a context */
-static int get_context(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle * hac,
- HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cac)
-{
- char tempbuf[1024];
- HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
-
- rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
- rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
-
- *hac = p_hwcrhk_Init(&hwcrhk_globals, sizeof(hwcrhk_globals), &rmsg, cac);
- if (!*hac)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* similarly to release one. */
-static void release_context(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hac)
-{
- p_hwcrhk_Finish(hac);
-}
-
-/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_chil()" constructor) */
-static int hwcrhk_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-{
- free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME();
- ERR_unload_HWCRHK_strings();
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* (de)initialisation functions. */
-static int hwcrhk_init(ENGINE *e)
-{
- HWCryptoHook_Init_t *p1;
- HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *p2;
- HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *p3;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *p4;
- HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *p5;
- HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *p6;
- HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *p7;
-# endif
- HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *p8;
- HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *p9;
-
- if (hwcrhk_dso != NULL) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Attempt to load libnfhwcrhk.so/nfhwcrhk.dll/whatever. */
- hwcrhk_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
- if (hwcrhk_dso == NULL) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!(p1 = (HWCryptoHook_Init_t *)
- DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_Init)) ||
- !(p2 = (HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *)
- DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_Finish)) ||
- !(p3 = (HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *)
- DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_ModExp)) ||
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- !(p4 = (HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *)
- DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSA)) ||
- !(p5 = (HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *)
- DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey)) ||
- !(p6 = (HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *)
- DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey)) ||
- !(p7 = (HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *)
- DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey)) ||
-# endif
- !(p8 = (HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *)
- DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RandomBytes)) ||
- !(p9 = (HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *)
- DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT))) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Copy the pointers */
- p_hwcrhk_Init = p1;
- p_hwcrhk_Finish = p2;
- p_hwcrhk_ModExp = p3;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- p_hwcrhk_RSA = p4;
- p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = p5;
- p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = p6;
- p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = p7;
-# endif
- p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = p8;
- p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = p9;
-
- /*
- * Check if the application decided to support dynamic locks, and if it
- * does, use them.
- */
- if (disable_mutex_callbacks == 0) {
- if (CRYPTO_get_dynlock_create_callback() != NULL &&
- CRYPTO_get_dynlock_lock_callback() != NULL &&
- CRYPTO_get_dynlock_destroy_callback() != NULL) {
- hwcrhk_globals.mutex_init = hwcrhk_mutex_init;
- hwcrhk_globals.mutex_acquire = hwcrhk_mutex_lock;
- hwcrhk_globals.mutex_release = hwcrhk_mutex_unlock;
- hwcrhk_globals.mutex_destroy = hwcrhk_mutex_destroy;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Try and get a context - if not, we may have a DSO but no accelerator!
- */
- if (!get_context(&hwcrhk_context, &password_context)) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Everything's fine. */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
- hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
- "nFast HWCryptoHook RSA key handle",
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
-# endif
- return 1;
- err:
- if (hwcrhk_dso)
- DSO_free(hwcrhk_dso);
- hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
-# endif
- p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int hwcrhk_finish(ENGINE *e)
-{
- int to_return = 1;
- free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME();
- if (hwcrhk_dso == NULL) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_FINISH, HWCRHK_R_NOT_LOADED);
- to_return = 0;
- goto err;
- }
- release_context(hwcrhk_context);
- if (!DSO_free(hwcrhk_dso)) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_FINISH, HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE);
- to_return = 0;
- goto err;
- }
- err:
- if (logstream)
- BIO_free(logstream);
- hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
-# endif
- p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
- p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int hwcrhk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
-{
- int to_return = 1;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH:
- if (hwcrhk_dso) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL, HWCRHK_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
- return 0;
- }
- if (p == NULL) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- return set_HWCRHK_LIBNAME((const char *)p);
- case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM:
- {
- BIO *bio = (BIO *)p;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- if (logstream) {
- BIO_free(logstream);
- logstream = NULL;
- }
- if (CRYPTO_add(&bio->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO) > 1)
- logstream = bio;
- else
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL, HWCRHK_R_BIO_WAS_FREED);
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- break;
- case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_PASSWORD_CALLBACK:
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- password_context.password_callback = (pem_password_cb *)f;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- break;
- case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_USER_INTERFACE:
- case HWCRHK_CMD_SET_USER_INTERFACE:
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- password_context.ui_method = (UI_METHOD *)p;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- break;
- case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK_DATA:
- case HWCRHK_CMD_SET_CALLBACK_DATA:
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- password_context.callback_data = p;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- break;
- /*
- * this enables or disables the "SimpleForkCheck" flag used in the
- * initialisation structure.
- */
- case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_SET_FORKCHECK:
- case HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK:
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- if (i)
- hwcrhk_globals.flags |= HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck;
- else
- hwcrhk_globals.flags &= ~HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- break;
- /*
- * This will prevent the initialisation function from "installing"
- * the mutex-handling callbacks, even if they are available from
- * within the library (or were provided to the library from the
- * calling application). This is to remove any baggage for
- * applications not using multithreading.
- */
- case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING:
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- disable_mutex_callbacks = 1;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- break;
- case HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING:
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- disable_mutex_callbacks = ((i == 0) ? 0 : 1);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
- break;
-
- /* The command isn't understood by this engine */
- default:
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL,
- HWCRHK_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
- to_return = 0;
- break;
- }
-
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method,
- void *callback_data)
-{
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA *rtmp = NULL;
-# endif
- EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- HWCryptoHook_MPI e, n;
- HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
-# endif
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
- char tempbuf[1024];
- HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
- HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext ppctx;
-# endif
-
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
- rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
- rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
-# endif
-
- if (!hwcrhk_context) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
- goto err;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle));
- if (!hptr) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- ppctx.ui_method = ui_method;
- ppctx.callback_data = callback_data;
- if (p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey(hwcrhk_context, key_id, hptr, &rmsg, &ppctx)) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!*hptr) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_NO_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- rtmp = RSA_new_method(eng);
- RSA_set_ex_data(rtmp, hndidx_rsa, (char *)hptr);
- rtmp->e = BN_new();
- rtmp->n = BN_new();
- rtmp->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
- MPI2BN(rtmp->e, e);
- MPI2BN(rtmp->n, n);
- if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(*hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg)
- != HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
- goto err;
- }
-
- bn_expand2(rtmp->e, e.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
- bn_expand2(rtmp->n, n.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
- MPI2BN(rtmp->e, e);
- MPI2BN(rtmp->n, n);
-
- if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(*hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg)) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
- goto err;
- }
- rtmp->e->top = e.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
- bn_fix_top(rtmp->e);
- rtmp->n->top = n.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
- bn_fix_top(rtmp->n);
-
- res = EVP_PKEY_new();
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rtmp);
-# endif
-
- if (!res)
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
- HWCRHK_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHMS_DISABLED);
-
- return res;
- err:
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (rtmp)
- RSA_free(rtmp);
-# endif
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
- UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- res = hwcrhk_load_privkey(eng, key_id, ui_method, callback_data);
-# endif
-
- if (res)
- switch (res->type) {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
- {
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- rsa = res->pkey.rsa;
- res->pkey.rsa = RSA_new();
- res->pkey.rsa->n = rsa->n;
- res->pkey.rsa->e = rsa->e;
- rsa->n = NULL;
- rsa->e = NULL;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- }
- break;
-# endif
- default:
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,
- HWCRHK_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- return res;
- err:
- if (res)
- EVP_PKEY_free(res);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* A little mod_exp */
-static int hwcrhk_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- char tempbuf[1024];
- HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
- /*
- * Since HWCryptoHook_MPI is pretty compatible with BIGNUM's, we use them
- * directly, plus a little macro magic. We only thing we need to make
- * sure of is that enough space is allocated.
- */
- HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_p, m_n, m_r;
- int to_return, ret;
-
- to_return = 0; /* expect failure */
- rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
- rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
-
- if (!hwcrhk_context) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Prepare the params */
- bn_expand2(r, m->top); /* Check for error !! */
- BN2MPI(m_a, a);
- BN2MPI(m_p, p);
- BN2MPI(m_n, m);
- MPI2BN(r, m_r);
-
- /* Perform the operation */
- ret = p_hwcrhk_ModExp(hwcrhk_context, m_a, m_p, m_n, &m_r, &rmsg);
-
- /* Convert the response */
- r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
- bn_fix_top(r);
-
- if (ret < 0) {
- /*
- * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
- * that falling back to software computation might be a good thing.
- */
- if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
- } else {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- }
- ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
- goto err;
- }
-
- to_return = 1;
- err:
- return to_return;
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- char tempbuf[1024];
- HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
- HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
- int to_return = 0, ret;
-
- rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
- rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
-
- if (!hwcrhk_context) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * This provides support for nForce keys. Since that's opaque data all
- * we do is provide a handle to the proper key and let HWCryptoHook take
- * care of the rest.
- */
- if ((hptr =
- (HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *) RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa))
- != NULL) {
- HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_r;
-
- if (!rsa->n) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
- HWCRHK_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Prepare the params */
- bn_expand2(r, rsa->n->top); /* Check for error !! */
- BN2MPI(m_a, I);
- MPI2BN(r, m_r);
-
- /* Perform the operation */
- ret = p_hwcrhk_RSA(m_a, *hptr, &m_r, &rmsg);
-
- /* Convert the response */
- r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
- bn_fix_top(r);
-
- if (ret < 0) {
- /*
- * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
- * that falling back to software computation might be a good
- * thing.
- */
- if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
- HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
- } else {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
- HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- }
- ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_p, m_q, m_dmp1, m_dmq1, m_iqmp, m_r;
-
- if (!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
- HWCRHK_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Prepare the params */
- bn_expand2(r, rsa->n->top); /* Check for error !! */
- BN2MPI(m_a, I);
- BN2MPI(m_p, rsa->p);
- BN2MPI(m_q, rsa->q);
- BN2MPI(m_dmp1, rsa->dmp1);
- BN2MPI(m_dmq1, rsa->dmq1);
- BN2MPI(m_iqmp, rsa->iqmp);
- MPI2BN(r, m_r);
-
- /* Perform the operation */
- ret = p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT(hwcrhk_context, m_a, m_p, m_q,
- m_dmp1, m_dmq1, m_iqmp, &m_r, &rmsg);
-
- /* Convert the response */
- r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
- bn_fix_top(r);
-
- if (ret < 0) {
- /*
- * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
- * that falling back to software computation might be a good
- * thing.
- */
- if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
- HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
- } else {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
- HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- }
- ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /*
- * If we're here, we must be here with some semblance of success :-)
- */
- to_return = 1;
- err:
- return to_return;
-}
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
-static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
-{
- return hwcrhk_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
-}
-
-static int hwcrhk_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
-{
- HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
-
- hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
- if (hptr) {
- p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey(*hptr, NULL);
- OPENSSL_free(hptr);
- RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, NULL);
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the dh and mont dropped). */
-static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
- const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
-{
- return hwcrhk_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
-}
-# endif
-
-/* Random bytes are good */
-static int hwcrhk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
- char tempbuf[1024];
- HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
- int to_return = 0; /* assume failure */
- int ret;
-
- rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
- rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
-
- if (!hwcrhk_context) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes(hwcrhk_context, buf, num, &rmsg);
- if (ret < 0) {
- /*
- * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
- * that falling back to software computation might be a good thing.
- */
- if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
- } else {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
- }
- ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
- goto err;
- }
- to_return = 1;
- err:
- return to_return;
-}
-
-static int hwcrhk_rand_status(void)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Mutex calls: since the HWCryptoHook model closely follows the POSIX model
- * these just wrap the POSIX functions and add some logging.
- */
-
-static int hwcrhk_mutex_init(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt,
- HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx)
-{
- mt->lockid = CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid();
- if (mt->lockid == 0)
- return 1; /* failure */
- return 0; /* success */
-}
-
-static int hwcrhk_mutex_lock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt)
-{
- CRYPTO_w_lock(mt->lockid);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void hwcrhk_mutex_unlock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt)
-{
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(mt->lockid);
-}
-
-static void hwcrhk_mutex_destroy(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt)
-{
- CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid(mt->lockid);
-}
-
-static int hwcrhk_get_pass(const char *prompt_info,
- int *len_io, char *buf,
- HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
- HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx)
-{
- pem_password_cb *callback = NULL;
- void *callback_data = NULL;
- UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL;
- /*
- * Despite what the documentation says prompt_info can be an empty
- * string.
- */
- if (prompt_info && !*prompt_info)
- prompt_info = NULL;
-
- if (cactx) {
- if (cactx->ui_method)
- ui_method = cactx->ui_method;
- if (cactx->password_callback)
- callback = cactx->password_callback;
- if (cactx->callback_data)
- callback_data = cactx->callback_data;
- }
- if (ppctx) {
- if (ppctx->ui_method) {
- ui_method = ppctx->ui_method;
- callback = NULL;
- }
- if (ppctx->callback_data)
- callback_data = ppctx->callback_data;
- }
- if (callback == NULL && ui_method == NULL) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_GET_PASS, HWCRHK_R_NO_CALLBACK);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (ui_method) {
- UI *ui = UI_new_method(ui_method);
- if (ui) {
- int ok;
- char *prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui,
- "pass phrase", prompt_info);
-
- ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt,
- UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD,
- buf, 0, (*len_io) - 1);
- UI_add_user_data(ui, callback_data);
- UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0);
-
- if (ok >= 0)
- do {
- ok = UI_process(ui);
- }
- while (ok < 0 && UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE, 0, 0, 0));
-
- if (ok >= 0)
- *len_io = strlen(buf);
-
- UI_free(ui);
- OPENSSL_free(prompt);
- }
- } else {
- *len_io = callback(buf, *len_io, 0, callback_data);
- }
- if (!*len_io)
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int hwcrhk_insert_card(const char *prompt_info,
- const char *wrong_info,
- HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
- HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx)
-{
- int ok = -1;
- UI *ui;
- void *callback_data = NULL;
- UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL;
-
- if (cactx) {
- if (cactx->ui_method)
- ui_method = cactx->ui_method;
- if (cactx->callback_data)
- callback_data = cactx->callback_data;
- }
- if (ppctx) {
- if (ppctx->ui_method)
- ui_method = ppctx->ui_method;
- if (ppctx->callback_data)
- callback_data = ppctx->callback_data;
- }
- if (ui_method == NULL) {
- HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INSERT_CARD, HWCRHK_R_NO_CALLBACK);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ui = UI_new_method(ui_method);
-
- if (ui) {
- char answer;
- char buf[BUFSIZ];
- /*
- * Despite what the documentation says wrong_info can be an empty
- * string.
- */
- if (wrong_info && *wrong_info)
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1,
- "Current card: \"%s\"\n", wrong_info);
- else
- buf[0] = 0;
- ok = UI_dup_info_string(ui, buf);
- if (ok >= 0 && prompt_info) {
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1,
- "Insert card \"%s\"", prompt_info);
- ok = UI_dup_input_boolean(ui, buf,
- "\n then hit <enter> or C<enter> to cancel\n",
- "\r\n", "Cc", UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO,
- &answer);
- }
- UI_add_user_data(ui, callback_data);
-
- if (ok >= 0)
- ok = UI_process(ui);
- UI_free(ui);
-
- if (ok == -2 || (ok >= 0 && answer == 'C'))
- ok = 1;
- else if (ok < 0)
- ok = -1;
- else
- ok = 0;
- }
- return ok;
-}
-
-static void hwcrhk_log_message(void *logstr, const char *message)
-{
- BIO *lstream = NULL;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
- if (logstr)
- lstream = *(BIO **)logstr;
- if (lstream) {
- BIO_printf(lstream, "%s\n", message);
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
-}
-
-/*
- * This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a
- * self-contained shared-library.
- */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
-static int bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-{
- if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_hwcrhk_id) != 0) &&
- (strcmp(id, engine_hwcrhk_id_alt) != 0))
- return 0;
- if (!bind_helper(e))
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
- IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_fn)
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE */
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_CHIL */
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/engines/e_chil.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/engines/e_chil.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/engines/e_chil.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/engines/e_chil.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1343 @@
+/* crypto/engine/e_chil.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/*
+ * Written by Richard Levitte (richard at levitte.org), Geoff Thorpe
+ * (geoff at geoffthorpe.net) and Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for
+ * the OpenSSL project 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_CHIL
+
+/*-
+ * Attribution notice: nCipher have said several times that it's OK for
+ * us to implement a general interface to their boxes, and recently declared
+ * their HWCryptoHook to be public, and therefore available for us to use.
+ * Thanks, nCipher.
+ *
+ * The hwcryptohook.h included here is from May 2000.
+ * [Richard Levitte]
+ */
+# ifdef FLAT_INC
+# include "hwcryptohook.h"
+# else
+# include "vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h"
+# endif
+
+# define HWCRHK_LIB_NAME "CHIL engine"
+# include "e_chil_err.c"
+
+static int hwcrhk_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+static int hwcrhk_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int hwcrhk_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int hwcrhk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void));
+
+/* Functions to handle mutexes */
+static int hwcrhk_mutex_init(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *,
+ HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *);
+static int hwcrhk_mutex_lock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
+static void hwcrhk_mutex_unlock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
+static void hwcrhk_mutex_destroy(HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
+
+/* BIGNUM stuff */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* RSA stuff */
+static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+static int hwcrhk_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* DH stuff */
+/* This function is alised to mod_exp (with the DH and mont dropped). */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
+ const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
+# endif
+
+/* RAND stuff */
+static int hwcrhk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int hwcrhk_rand_status(void);
+
+/* KM stuff */
+static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+ void *callback_data);
+static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+ void *callback_data);
+
+/* Interaction stuff */
+static int hwcrhk_insert_card(const char *prompt_info,
+ const char *wrong_info,
+ HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
+ HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
+static int hwcrhk_get_pass(const char *prompt_info,
+ int *len_io, char *buf,
+ HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
+ HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
+static void hwcrhk_log_message(void *logstr, const char *message);
+
+/* The definitions for control commands specific to this engine */
+# define HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+# define HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1)
+# define HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 2)
+# define HWCRHK_CMD_SET_USER_INTERFACE (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 3)
+# define HWCRHK_CMD_SET_CALLBACK_DATA (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 4)
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN hwcrhk_cmd_defns[] = {
+ {HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH,
+ "SO_PATH",
+ "Specifies the path to the 'hwcrhk' shared library",
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+ {HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK,
+ "FORK_CHECK",
+ "Turns fork() checking on (non-zero) or off (zero)",
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+ {HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING,
+ "THREAD_LOCKING",
+ "Turns thread-safe locking on (zero) or off (non-zero)",
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC},
+ {HWCRHK_CMD_SET_USER_INTERFACE,
+ "SET_USER_INTERFACE",
+ "Set the global user interface (internal)",
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL},
+ {HWCRHK_CMD_SET_CALLBACK_DATA,
+ "SET_CALLBACK_DATA",
+ "Set the global user interface extra data (internal)",
+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL},
+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+};
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static RSA_METHOD hwcrhk_rsa = {
+ "CHIL RSA method",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp,
+ hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont,
+ NULL,
+ hwcrhk_rsa_finish,
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+};
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DH_METHOD hwcrhk_dh = {
+ "CHIL DH method",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ NULL
+};
+# endif
+
+static RAND_METHOD hwcrhk_rand = {
+ /* "CHIL RAND method", */
+ NULL,
+ hwcrhk_rand_bytes,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ hwcrhk_rand_bytes,
+ hwcrhk_rand_status,
+};
+
+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+static const char *engine_hwcrhk_id = "chil";
+static const char *engine_hwcrhk_name = "CHIL hardware engine support";
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+/* Compatibility hack, the dynamic library uses this form in the path */
+static const char *engine_hwcrhk_id_alt = "ncipher";
+# endif
+
+/* Internal stuff for HWCryptoHook */
+
+/* Some structures needed for proper use of thread locks */
+/*
+ * hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue
+ * into HWCryptoHook_Mutex
+ */
+struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue {
+ int lockid;
+};
+
+/*
+ * hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn struct
+ * HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue into HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext
+ */
+struct HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue {
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method;
+ void *callback_data;
+};
+
+/*
+ * hwcryptohook.h has some typedefs that turn struct
+ * HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue into HWCryptoHook_CallerContext
+ */
+struct HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue {
+ pem_password_cb *password_callback; /* Deprecated! Only present for
+ * backward compatibility! */
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method;
+ void *callback_data;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The MPI structure in HWCryptoHook is pretty compatible with OpenSSL
+ * BIGNUM's, so lets define a couple of conversion macros
+ */
+# define BN2MPI(mp, bn) \
+ {mp.size = bn->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG); mp.buf = (unsigned char *)bn->d;}
+# define MPI2BN(bn, mp) \
+ {mp.size = bn->dmax * sizeof(BN_ULONG); mp.buf = (unsigned char *)bn->d;}
+
+static BIO *logstream = NULL;
+static int disable_mutex_callbacks = 0;
+
+/*
+ * One might wonder why these are needed, since one can pass down at least a
+ * UI_METHOD and a pointer to callback data to the key-loading functions. The
+ * thing is that the ModExp and RSAImmed functions can load keys as well, if
+ * the data they get is in a special, nCipher-defined format (hint: if you
+ * look at the private exponent of the RSA data as a string, you'll see this
+ * string: "nCipher KM tool key id", followed by some bytes, followed a key
+ * identity string, followed by more bytes. This happens when you use
+ * "embed" keys instead of "hwcrhk" keys). Unfortunately, those functions do
+ * not take any passphrase or caller context, and our functions can't really
+ * take any callback data either. Still, the "insert_card" and
+ * "get_passphrase" callbacks may be called down the line, and will need to
+ * know what user interface callbacks to call, and having callback data from
+ * the application may be a nice thing as well, so we need to keep track of
+ * that globally.
+ */
+static HWCryptoHook_CallerContext password_context = { NULL, NULL, NULL };
+
+/* Stuff to pass to the HWCryptoHook library */
+static HWCryptoHook_InitInfo hwcrhk_globals = {
+ HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck, /* Flags */
+ &logstream, /* logstream */
+ sizeof(BN_ULONG), /* limbsize */
+ 0, /* mslimb first: false for BNs */
+ -1, /* msbyte first: use native */
+ 0, /* Max mutexes, 0 = no small limit */
+ 0, /* Max simultaneous, 0 = default */
+
+ /*
+ * The next few are mutex stuff: we write wrapper functions around the OS
+ * mutex functions. We initialise them to 0 here, and change that to
+ * actual function pointers in hwcrhk_init() if dynamic locks are
+ * supported (that is, if the application programmer has made sure of
+ * setting up callbacks bafore starting this engine) *and* if
+ * disable_mutex_callbacks hasn't been set by a call to
+ * ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING).
+ */
+ sizeof(HWCryptoHook_Mutex),
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+
+ /*
+ * The next few are condvar stuff: we write wrapper functions round the
+ * OS functions. Currently not implemented and not and absolute
+ * necessity even in threaded programs, therefore 0'ed. Will hopefully
+ * be implemented some day, since it enhances the efficiency of
+ * HWCryptoHook.
+ */
+ 0, /* sizeof(HWCryptoHook_CondVar), */
+ 0, /* hwcrhk_cv_init, */
+ 0, /* hwcrhk_cv_wait, */
+ 0, /* hwcrhk_cv_signal, */
+ 0, /* hwcrhk_cv_broadcast, */
+ 0, /* hwcrhk_cv_destroy, */
+
+ hwcrhk_get_pass, /* pass phrase */
+ hwcrhk_insert_card, /* insert a card */
+ hwcrhk_log_message /* Log message */
+};
+
+/* Now, to our own code */
+
+/*
+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_chil() and possibly by the
+ * "dynamic" ENGINE support too
+ */
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
+{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ const DH_METHOD *meth2;
+# endif
+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_hwcrhk_id) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_hwcrhk_name) ||
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &hwcrhk_rsa) ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ !ENGINE_set_DH(e, &hwcrhk_dh) ||
+# endif
+ !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &hwcrhk_rand) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, hwcrhk_destroy) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, hwcrhk_init) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, hwcrhk_finish) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, hwcrhk_ctrl) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, hwcrhk_load_privkey) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, hwcrhk_load_pubkey) ||
+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, hwcrhk_cmd_defns))
+ return 0;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ /*
+ * We know that the "PKCS1_SSLeay()" functions hook properly to the
+ * cswift-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use those functions. NB:
+ * We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or anything "more generic" because
+ * something like the RSAref code may not hook properly, and if you own
+ * one of these cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it
+ * anyway!
+ */
+ meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+ hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
+ hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
+ hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc;
+ hwcrhk_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ /* Much the same for Diffie-Hellman */
+ meth2 = DH_OpenSSL();
+ hwcrhk_dh.generate_key = meth2->generate_key;
+ hwcrhk_dh.compute_key = meth2->compute_key;
+# endif
+
+ /* Ensure the hwcrhk error handling is set up */
+ ERR_load_HWCRHK_strings();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static ENGINE *engine_chil(void)
+{
+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+ if (!ret)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!bind_helper(ret)) {
+ ENGINE_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void ENGINE_load_chil(void)
+{
+ /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
+ ENGINE *toadd = engine_chil();
+ if (!toadd)
+ return;
+ ENGINE_add(toadd);
+ ENGINE_free(toadd);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+}
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading the
+ * HWCryptoHook library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an init() or
+ * finish() call (reference counts permitting) and they're operating with
+ * global locks, so this should be thread-safe implicitly.
+ */
+static DSO *hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
+static HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwcrhk_context = 0;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* Index for KM handle. Not really used yet. */
+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * These are the function pointers that are (un)set when the library has
+ * successfully (un)loaded.
+ */
+static HWCryptoHook_Init_t *p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
+static HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
+static HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
+# endif
+static HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
+static HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
+static HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
+# endif
+static HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
+
+/* Used in the DSO operations. */
+static const char *HWCRHK_LIBNAME = NULL;
+static void free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(void)
+{
+ if (HWCRHK_LIBNAME)
+ OPENSSL_free((void *)HWCRHK_LIBNAME);
+ HWCRHK_LIBNAME = NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *get_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(void)
+{
+ if (HWCRHK_LIBNAME)
+ return HWCRHK_LIBNAME;
+ return "nfhwcrhk";
+}
+
+static long set_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(const char *name)
+{
+ free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME();
+ return (((HWCRHK_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_Init = "HWCryptoHook_Init";
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_Finish = "HWCryptoHook_Finish";
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_ModExp = "HWCryptoHook_ModExp";
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSA = "HWCryptoHook_RSA";
+# endif
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = "HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes";
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey";
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey";
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = "HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey";
+# endif
+static const char *n_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = "HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT";
+
+/*
+ * HWCryptoHook library functions and mechanics - these are used by the
+ * higher-level functions further down. NB: As and where there's no error
+ * checking, take a look lower down where these functions are called, the
+ * checking and error handling is probably down there.
+ */
+
+/* utility function to obtain a context */
+static int get_context(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle * hac,
+ HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cac)
+{
+ char tempbuf[1024];
+ HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
+
+ rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
+ rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
+
+ *hac = p_hwcrhk_Init(&hwcrhk_globals, sizeof(hwcrhk_globals), &rmsg, cac);
+ if (!*hac)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* similarly to release one. */
+static void release_context(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hac)
+{
+ p_hwcrhk_Finish(hac);
+}
+
+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_chil()" constructor) */
+static int hwcrhk_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME();
+ ERR_unload_HWCRHK_strings();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* (de)initialisation functions. */
+static int hwcrhk_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ HWCryptoHook_Init_t *p1;
+ HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *p2;
+ HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *p3;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *p4;
+ HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *p5;
+ HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *p6;
+ HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *p7;
+# endif
+ HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *p8;
+ HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *p9;
+
+ if (hwcrhk_dso != NULL) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Attempt to load libnfhwcrhk.so/nfhwcrhk.dll/whatever. */
+ hwcrhk_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_HWCRHK_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
+ if (hwcrhk_dso == NULL) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!(p1 = (HWCryptoHook_Init_t *)
+ DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_Init)) ||
+ !(p2 = (HWCryptoHook_Finish_t *)
+ DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_Finish)) ||
+ !(p3 = (HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t *)
+ DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_ModExp)) ||
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ !(p4 = (HWCryptoHook_RSA_t *)
+ DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSA)) ||
+ !(p5 = (HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t *)
+ DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey)) ||
+ !(p6 = (HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t *)
+ DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey)) ||
+ !(p7 = (HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t *)
+ DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey)) ||
+# endif
+ !(p8 = (HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t *)
+ DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_RandomBytes)) ||
+ !(p9 = (HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t *)
+ DSO_bind_func(hwcrhk_dso, n_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT))) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Copy the pointers */
+ p_hwcrhk_Init = p1;
+ p_hwcrhk_Finish = p2;
+ p_hwcrhk_ModExp = p3;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ p_hwcrhk_RSA = p4;
+ p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = p5;
+ p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = p6;
+ p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = p7;
+# endif
+ p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = p8;
+ p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = p9;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the application decided to support dynamic locks, and if it
+ * does, use them.
+ */
+ if (disable_mutex_callbacks == 0) {
+ if (CRYPTO_get_dynlock_create_callback() != NULL &&
+ CRYPTO_get_dynlock_lock_callback() != NULL &&
+ CRYPTO_get_dynlock_destroy_callback() != NULL) {
+ hwcrhk_globals.mutex_init = hwcrhk_mutex_init;
+ hwcrhk_globals.mutex_acquire = hwcrhk_mutex_lock;
+ hwcrhk_globals.mutex_release = hwcrhk_mutex_unlock;
+ hwcrhk_globals.mutex_destroy = hwcrhk_mutex_destroy;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Try and get a context - if not, we may have a DSO but no accelerator!
+ */
+ if (!get_context(&hwcrhk_context, &password_context)) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INIT, HWCRHK_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Everything's fine. */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
+ "nFast HWCryptoHook RSA key handle",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+# endif
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (hwcrhk_dso)
+ DSO_free(hwcrhk_dso);
+ hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
+# endif
+ p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+ int to_return = 1;
+ free_HWCRHK_LIBNAME();
+ if (hwcrhk_dso == NULL) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_FINISH, HWCRHK_R_NOT_LOADED);
+ to_return = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ release_context(hwcrhk_context);
+ if (!DSO_free(hwcrhk_dso)) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_FINISH, HWCRHK_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+ to_return = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ err:
+ if (logstream)
+ BIO_free(logstream);
+ hwcrhk_dso = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_Init = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_Finish = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_ModExp = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ p_hwcrhk_RSA = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey = NULL;
+# endif
+ p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT = NULL;
+ p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes = NULL;
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))
+{
+ int to_return = 1;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case HWCRHK_CMD_SO_PATH:
+ if (hwcrhk_dso) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL, HWCRHK_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return set_HWCRHK_LIBNAME((const char *)p);
+ case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM:
+ {
+ BIO *bio = (BIO *)p;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ if (logstream) {
+ BIO_free(logstream);
+ logstream = NULL;
+ }
+ if (CRYPTO_add(&bio->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO) > 1)
+ logstream = bio;
+ else
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL, HWCRHK_R_BIO_WAS_FREED);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ break;
+ case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_PASSWORD_CALLBACK:
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ password_context.password_callback = (pem_password_cb *)f;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ break;
+ case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_USER_INTERFACE:
+ case HWCRHK_CMD_SET_USER_INTERFACE:
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ password_context.ui_method = (UI_METHOD *)p;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ break;
+ case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK_DATA:
+ case HWCRHK_CMD_SET_CALLBACK_DATA:
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ password_context.callback_data = p;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ break;
+ /*
+ * this enables or disables the "SimpleForkCheck" flag used in the
+ * initialisation structure.
+ */
+ case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_SET_FORKCHECK:
+ case HWCRHK_CMD_FORK_CHECK:
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ if (i)
+ hwcrhk_globals.flags |= HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck;
+ else
+ hwcrhk_globals.flags &= ~HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ break;
+ /*
+ * This will prevent the initialisation function from "installing"
+ * the mutex-handling callbacks, even if they are available from
+ * within the library (or were provided to the library from the
+ * calling application). This is to remove any baggage for
+ * applications not using multithreading.
+ */
+ case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING:
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ disable_mutex_callbacks = 1;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ break;
+ case HWCRHK_CMD_THREAD_LOCKING:
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ disable_mutex_callbacks = ((i == 0) ? 0 : 1);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+ break;
+
+ /* The command isn't understood by this engine */
+ default:
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_CTRL,
+ HWCRHK_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ to_return = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_privkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method,
+ void *callback_data)
+{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rtmp = NULL;
+# endif
+ EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ HWCryptoHook_MPI e, n;
+ HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
+# endif
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+ char tempbuf[1024];
+ HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
+ HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext ppctx;
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+ rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
+ rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
+# endif
+
+ if (!hwcrhk_context) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle));
+ if (!hptr) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ppctx.ui_method = ui_method;
+ ppctx.callback_data = callback_data;
+ if (p_hwcrhk_RSALoadKey(hwcrhk_context, key_id, hptr, &rmsg, &ppctx)) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!*hptr) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_NO_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ rtmp = RSA_new_method(eng);
+ RSA_set_ex_data(rtmp, hndidx_rsa, (char *)hptr);
+ rtmp->e = BN_new();
+ rtmp->n = BN_new();
+ rtmp->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
+ MPI2BN(rtmp->e, e);
+ MPI2BN(rtmp->n, n);
+ if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(*hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg)
+ != HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ bn_expand2(rtmp->e, e.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ bn_expand2(rtmp->n, n.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ MPI2BN(rtmp->e, e);
+ MPI2BN(rtmp->n, n);
+
+ if (p_hwcrhk_RSAGetPublicKey(*hptr, &n, &e, &rmsg)) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rtmp->e->top = e.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+ bn_fix_top(rtmp->e);
+ rtmp->n->top = n.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+ bn_fix_top(rtmp->n);
+
+ res = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (res == NULL) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, HWCRHK_R_CHIL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rtmp);
+# endif
+
+ if (!res)
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
+ HWCRHK_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHMS_DISABLED);
+
+ return res;
+ err:
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (rtmp)
+ RSA_free(rtmp);
+# endif
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *hwcrhk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *eng, const char *key_id,
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ res = hwcrhk_load_privkey(eng, key_id, ui_method, callback_data);
+# endif
+
+ if (res)
+ switch (res->type) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ {
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ rsa = res->pkey.rsa;
+ res->pkey.rsa = RSA_new();
+ res->pkey.rsa->n = rsa->n;
+ res->pkey.rsa->e = rsa->e;
+ rsa->n = NULL;
+ rsa->e = NULL;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ }
+ break;
+# endif
+ default:
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_LOAD_PUBKEY,
+ HWCRHK_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return res;
+ err:
+ if (res)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(res);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* A little mod_exp */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ char tempbuf[1024];
+ HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
+ /*
+ * Since HWCryptoHook_MPI is pretty compatible with BIGNUM's, we use them
+ * directly, plus a little macro magic. We only thing we need to make
+ * sure of is that enough space is allocated.
+ */
+ HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_p, m_n, m_r;
+ int to_return, ret;
+
+ to_return = 0; /* expect failure */
+ rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
+ rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
+
+ if (!hwcrhk_context) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Prepare the params */
+ bn_expand2(r, m->top); /* Check for error !! */
+ BN2MPI(m_a, a);
+ BN2MPI(m_p, p);
+ BN2MPI(m_n, m);
+ MPI2BN(r, m_r);
+
+ /* Perform the operation */
+ ret = p_hwcrhk_ModExp(hwcrhk_context, m_a, m_p, m_n, &m_r, &rmsg);
+
+ /* Convert the response */
+ r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+ bn_fix_top(r);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
+ * that falling back to software computation might be a good thing.
+ */
+ if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
+ } else {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ }
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ to_return = 1;
+ err:
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ char tempbuf[1024];
+ HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
+ HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
+ int to_return = 0, ret;
+
+ rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
+ rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
+
+ if (!hwcrhk_context) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This provides support for nForce keys. Since that's opaque data all
+ * we do is provide a handle to the proper key and let HWCryptoHook take
+ * care of the rest.
+ */
+ if ((hptr =
+ (HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *) RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa))
+ != NULL) {
+ HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_r;
+
+ if (!rsa->n) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+ HWCRHK_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare the params */
+ bn_expand2(r, rsa->n->top); /* Check for error !! */
+ BN2MPI(m_a, I);
+ MPI2BN(r, m_r);
+
+ /* Perform the operation */
+ ret = p_hwcrhk_RSA(m_a, *hptr, &m_r, &rmsg);
+
+ /* Convert the response */
+ r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+ bn_fix_top(r);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
+ * that falling back to software computation might be a good
+ * thing.
+ */
+ if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+ HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
+ } else {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+ HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ }
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ HWCryptoHook_MPI m_a, m_p, m_q, m_dmp1, m_dmq1, m_iqmp, m_r;
+
+ if (!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+ HWCRHK_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Prepare the params */
+ bn_expand2(r, rsa->n->top); /* Check for error !! */
+ BN2MPI(m_a, I);
+ BN2MPI(m_p, rsa->p);
+ BN2MPI(m_q, rsa->q);
+ BN2MPI(m_dmp1, rsa->dmp1);
+ BN2MPI(m_dmq1, rsa->dmq1);
+ BN2MPI(m_iqmp, rsa->iqmp);
+ MPI2BN(r, m_r);
+
+ /* Perform the operation */
+ ret = p_hwcrhk_ModExpCRT(hwcrhk_context, m_a, m_p, m_q,
+ m_dmp1, m_dmq1, m_iqmp, &m_r, &rmsg);
+
+ /* Convert the response */
+ r->top = m_r.size / sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+ bn_fix_top(r);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
+ * that falling back to software computation might be a good
+ * thing.
+ */
+ if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+ HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
+ } else {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RSA_MOD_EXP,
+ HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ }
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we're here, we must be here with some semblance of success :-)
+ */
+ to_return = 1;
+ err:
+ return to_return;
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+ return hwcrhk_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *hptr;
+
+ hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
+ if (hptr) {
+ p_hwcrhk_RSAUnloadKey(*hptr, NULL);
+ OPENSSL_free(hptr);
+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, NULL);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the dh and mont dropped). */
+static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
+ const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+ return hwcrhk_mod_exp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+}
+# endif
+
+/* Random bytes are good */
+static int hwcrhk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ char tempbuf[1024];
+ HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
+ int to_return = 0; /* assume failure */
+ int ret;
+
+ rmsg.buf = tempbuf;
+ rmsg.size = sizeof(tempbuf);
+
+ if (!hwcrhk_context) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES, HWCRHK_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = p_hwcrhk_RandomBytes(hwcrhk_context, buf, num, &rmsg);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: When this error is returned, HWCryptoHook is telling us
+ * that falling back to software computation might be a good thing.
+ */
+ if (ret == HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
+ } else {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_RAND_BYTES, HWCRHK_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+ }
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, rmsg.buf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ to_return = 1;
+ err:
+ return to_return;
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_rand_status(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Mutex calls: since the HWCryptoHook model closely follows the POSIX model
+ * these just wrap the POSIX functions and add some logging.
+ */
+
+static int hwcrhk_mutex_init(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt,
+ HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx)
+{
+ mt->lockid = CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid();
+ if (mt->lockid == 0)
+ return 1; /* failure */
+ return 0; /* success */
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_mutex_lock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt)
+{
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(mt->lockid);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void hwcrhk_mutex_unlock(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt)
+{
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(mt->lockid);
+}
+
+static void hwcrhk_mutex_destroy(HWCryptoHook_Mutex * mt)
+{
+ CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid(mt->lockid);
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_get_pass(const char *prompt_info,
+ int *len_io, char *buf,
+ HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
+ HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx)
+{
+ pem_password_cb *callback = NULL;
+ void *callback_data = NULL;
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL;
+ /*
+ * Despite what the documentation says prompt_info can be an empty
+ * string.
+ */
+ if (prompt_info && !*prompt_info)
+ prompt_info = NULL;
+
+ if (cactx) {
+ if (cactx->ui_method)
+ ui_method = cactx->ui_method;
+ if (cactx->password_callback)
+ callback = cactx->password_callback;
+ if (cactx->callback_data)
+ callback_data = cactx->callback_data;
+ }
+ if (ppctx) {
+ if (ppctx->ui_method) {
+ ui_method = ppctx->ui_method;
+ callback = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ppctx->callback_data)
+ callback_data = ppctx->callback_data;
+ }
+ if (callback == NULL && ui_method == NULL) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_GET_PASS, HWCRHK_R_NO_CALLBACK);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ui_method) {
+ UI *ui = UI_new_method(ui_method);
+ if (ui) {
+ int ok;
+ char *prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui,
+ "pass phrase", prompt_info);
+
+ ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt,
+ UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD,
+ buf, 0, (*len_io) - 1);
+ UI_add_user_data(ui, callback_data);
+ UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0);
+
+ if (ok >= 0)
+ do {
+ ok = UI_process(ui);
+ }
+ while (ok < 0 && UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE, 0, 0, 0));
+
+ if (ok >= 0)
+ *len_io = strlen(buf);
+
+ UI_free(ui);
+ OPENSSL_free(prompt);
+ }
+ } else {
+ *len_io = callback(buf, *len_io, 0, callback_data);
+ }
+ if (!*len_io)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int hwcrhk_insert_card(const char *prompt_info,
+ const char *wrong_info,
+ HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
+ HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx)
+{
+ int ok = -1;
+ UI *ui;
+ void *callback_data = NULL;
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL;
+
+ if (cactx) {
+ if (cactx->ui_method)
+ ui_method = cactx->ui_method;
+ if (cactx->callback_data)
+ callback_data = cactx->callback_data;
+ }
+ if (ppctx) {
+ if (ppctx->ui_method)
+ ui_method = ppctx->ui_method;
+ if (ppctx->callback_data)
+ callback_data = ppctx->callback_data;
+ }
+ if (ui_method == NULL) {
+ HWCRHKerr(HWCRHK_F_HWCRHK_INSERT_CARD, HWCRHK_R_NO_CALLBACK);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ui = UI_new_method(ui_method);
+
+ if (ui) {
+ char answer;
+ char buf[BUFSIZ];
+ /*
+ * Despite what the documentation says wrong_info can be an empty
+ * string.
+ */
+ if (wrong_info && *wrong_info)
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1,
+ "Current card: \"%s\"\n", wrong_info);
+ else
+ buf[0] = 0;
+ ok = UI_dup_info_string(ui, buf);
+ if (ok >= 0 && prompt_info) {
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1,
+ "Insert card \"%s\"", prompt_info);
+ ok = UI_dup_input_boolean(ui, buf,
+ "\n then hit <enter> or C<enter> to cancel\n",
+ "\r\n", "Cc", UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO,
+ &answer);
+ }
+ UI_add_user_data(ui, callback_data);
+
+ if (ok >= 0)
+ ok = UI_process(ui);
+ UI_free(ui);
+
+ if (ok == -2 || (ok >= 0 && answer == 'C'))
+ ok = 1;
+ else if (ok < 0)
+ ok = -1;
+ else
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+ return ok;
+}
+
+static void hwcrhk_log_message(void *logstr, const char *message)
+{
+ BIO *lstream = NULL;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+ if (logstr)
+ lstream = *(BIO **)logstr;
+ if (lstream) {
+ BIO_printf(lstream, "%s\n", message);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a
+ * self-contained shared-library.
+ */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+static int bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+{
+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_hwcrhk_id) != 0) &&
+ (strcmp(id, engine_hwcrhk_id_alt) != 0))
+ return 0;
+ if (!bind_helper(e))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+ IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_fn)
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE */
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_CHIL */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/openssl.spec
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/openssl.spec 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/openssl.spec 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
-%define _unpackaged_files_terminate_build 0
-
-Release: 1
-
-%define openssldir /var/ssl
-
-Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
-Name: openssl
-#Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
-Version: 1.0.1o
-Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
-License: OpenSSL
-Group: System Environment/Libraries
-Provides: SSL
-URL: http://www.openssl.org/
-Packager: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-BuildRoot: /var/tmp/%{name}-%{version}-root
-
-%description
-The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
-commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
-Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
-protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
-The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
-Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL tookit and its related
-documentation.
-
-OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A.
-Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under an
-Apache-style licence, which basically means that you are free to get and
-use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
-
-This package contains the base OpenSSL cryptography and SSL/TLS
-libraries and tools.
-
-%package devel
-Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography static libraries and headers
-Group: Development/Libraries
-Requires: openssl
-%description devel
-The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
-commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
-Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
-protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
-The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
-Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL tookit and its related
-documentation.
-
-OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A.
-Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under an
-Apache-style licence, which basically means that you are free to get and
-use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
-
-This package contains the the OpenSSL cryptography and SSL/TLS
-static libraries and header files required when developing applications.
-
-%package doc
-Summary: OpenSSL miscellaneous files
-Group: Documentation
-Requires: openssl
-%description doc
-The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
-commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
-Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
-protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
-The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
-Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL tookit and its related
-documentation.
-
-OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A.
-Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under an
-Apache-style licence, which basically means that you are free to get and
-use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
-
-This package contains the the OpenSSL cryptography and SSL/TLS extra
-documentation and POD files from which the man pages were produced.
-
-%prep
-
-%setup -q
-
-%build
-
-%define CONFIG_FLAGS -DSSL_ALLOW_ADH --prefix=/usr --openssldir=%{openssldir}
-
-perl util/perlpath.pl /usr/bin/perl
-
-%ifarch i386 i486 i586 i686
-./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-elf shared
-%endif
-%ifarch ppc
-./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-ppc shared
-%endif
-%ifarch alpha
-./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-alpha shared
-%endif
-%ifarch x86_64
-./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-x86_64 shared
-%endif
-LD_LIBRARY_PATH=`pwd` make
-LD_LIBRARY_PATH=`pwd` make rehash
-LD_LIBRARY_PATH=`pwd` make test
-
-%install
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-make MANDIR=/usr/man MANSUFFIX=ssl INSTALL_PREFIX="$RPM_BUILD_ROOT" install
-
-# Make backwards-compatibility symlink to ssleay
-ln -sf /usr/bin/openssl $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/bin/ssleay
-
-%clean
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-
-%files
-%defattr(0644,root,root,0755)
-%doc CHANGES CHANGES.SSLeay LICENSE NEWS README
-
-%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/*
-%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/lib/*.so*
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{openssldir}/misc/*
-%attr(0644,root,root) /usr/man/man[157]/*
-
-%config %attr(0644,root,root) %{openssldir}/openssl.cnf
-%dir %attr(0755,root,root) %{openssldir}/certs
-%dir %attr(0755,root,root) %{openssldir}/misc
-%dir %attr(0750,root,root) %{openssldir}/private
-
-%files devel
-%defattr(0644,root,root,0755)
-%doc CHANGES CHANGES.SSLeay LICENSE NEWS README
-
-%attr(0644,root,root) /usr/lib/*.a
-%attr(0644,root,root) /usr/lib/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
-%attr(0644,root,root) /usr/include/openssl/*
-%attr(0644,root,root) /usr/man/man[3]/*
-
-%files doc
-%defattr(0644,root,root,0755)
-%doc CHANGES CHANGES.SSLeay LICENSE NEWS README
-%doc doc
-
-%post
-ldconfig
-
-%postun
-ldconfig
-
-%changelog
-* Sun Jun 6 2005 Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org>
-- Remove the incorrect installation of '%{openssldir}/lib'.
-* Wed May 7 2003 Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org>
-- Add /usr/lib/pkgconfig/openssl.pc to the development section.
-* Thu Mar 22 2001 Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org>
-- Removed redundant subsection that re-installed libcrypto.a and libssl.a
- as well. Also remove RSAref stuff completely, since it's not needed
- any more.
-* Thu Mar 15 2001 Jeremiah Johnson <jjohnson at penguincomputing.com>
-- Removed redundant subsection that re-installed libcrypto.so.0.9.6 and
- libssl.so.0.9.6. As well as the subsection that created symlinks for
- these. make install handles all this.
-* Sat Oct 21 2000 Horms <horms at vergenet.net>
-- Make sure symlinks are created by using -f flag to ln.
- Otherwise some .so libraries are copied rather than
- linked in the resulting binary RPM. This causes the package
- to be larger than neccessary and makes ldconfig complain.
-* Fri Oct 13 2000 Horms <horms at vergenet.net>
-- Make defattr is set for files in all packages so packages built as
- non-root will still be installed with files owned by root.
-* Thu Sep 14 2000 Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org>
-- Changed to adapt to the new (supported) way of making shared libraries
-- Installs all static libraries, not just libRSAglue.a
-- Extra documents now end up in a separate document package
-* Sun Feb 27 2000 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Merged patches to spec
-- Updated to 0.9.5beta2 (now with manpages)
-* Sat Feb 5 2000 Michal Jaegermann <michal at harddata.com>
-- added 'linux-alpha' to configuration
-- fixed nasty absolute links
-* Tue Jan 25 2000 Bennett Todd <bet at rahul.net>
-- Added -DSSL_ALLOW_ADH, bumped Release to 4
-* Thu Oct 14 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Set default permissions
-- Removed documentation from devel sub-package
-* Thu Sep 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
-- Added "make test" stage
-- GPG signed
-* Tue Sep 10 1999 Damien Miller <damien at ibs.com.au>
-- Updated to version 0.9.4
-* Tue May 25 1999 Damien Miller <damien at ibs.com.au>
-- Updated to version 0.9.3
-- Added attributes for all files
-- Paramatised openssl directory
-* Sat Mar 20 1999 Carlo M. Arenas Belon <carenas at jmconsultores.com.pe>
-- Added "official" bnrec patch and taking other out
-- making a link from ssleay to openssl binary
-- putting all changelog together on SPEC file
-* Fri Mar 5 1999 Henri Gomez <gomez at slib.fr>
-- Added bnrec patch
-* Tue Dec 29 1998 Jonathan Ruano <kobalt at james.encomix.es>
-- minimum spec and patches changes for openssl
-- modified for openssl sources
-* Sat Aug 8 1998 Khimenko Victor <khim at sch57.msk.ru>
-- shared library creating process honours $RPM_OPT_FLAGS
-- shared libarry supports threads (as well as static library)
-* Wed Jul 22 1998 Khimenko Victor <khim at sch57.msk.ru>
-- building of shared library completely reworked
-* Tue Jul 21 1998 Khimenko Victor <khim at sch57.msk.ru>
-- RPM is BuildRoot'ed
-* Tue Feb 10 1998 Khimenko Victor <khim at sch57.msk.ru>
-- all stuff is moved out of /usr/local
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/openssl.spec (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/openssl.spec)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/openssl.spec (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/openssl.spec 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+%define _unpackaged_files_terminate_build 0
+
+Release: 1
+
+%define openssldir /var/ssl
+
+Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
+Name: openssl
+#Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
+Version: 1.0.1q
+Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
+License: OpenSSL
+Group: System Environment/Libraries
+Provides: SSL
+URL: http://www.openssl.org/
+Packager: Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+BuildRoot: /var/tmp/%{name}-%{version}-root
+
+%description
+The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
+commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
+Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
+protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
+The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
+Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL tookit and its related
+documentation.
+
+OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A.
+Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under an
+Apache-style licence, which basically means that you are free to get and
+use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
+
+This package contains the base OpenSSL cryptography and SSL/TLS
+libraries and tools.
+
+%package devel
+Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography static libraries and headers
+Group: Development/Libraries
+Requires: openssl
+%description devel
+The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
+commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
+Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
+protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
+The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
+Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL tookit and its related
+documentation.
+
+OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A.
+Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under an
+Apache-style licence, which basically means that you are free to get and
+use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
+
+This package contains the the OpenSSL cryptography and SSL/TLS
+static libraries and header files required when developing applications.
+
+%package doc
+Summary: OpenSSL miscellaneous files
+Group: Documentation
+Requires: openssl
+%description doc
+The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
+commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
+Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
+protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
+The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
+Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL tookit and its related
+documentation.
+
+OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A.
+Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under an
+Apache-style licence, which basically means that you are free to get and
+use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
+
+This package contains the the OpenSSL cryptography and SSL/TLS extra
+documentation and POD files from which the man pages were produced.
+
+%prep
+
+%setup -q
+
+%build
+
+%define CONFIG_FLAGS -DSSL_ALLOW_ADH --prefix=/usr --openssldir=%{openssldir}
+
+perl util/perlpath.pl /usr/bin/perl
+
+%ifarch i386 i486 i586 i686
+./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-elf shared
+%endif
+%ifarch ppc
+./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-ppc shared
+%endif
+%ifarch alpha
+./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-alpha shared
+%endif
+%ifarch x86_64
+./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-x86_64 shared
+%endif
+LD_LIBRARY_PATH=`pwd` make
+LD_LIBRARY_PATH=`pwd` make rehash
+LD_LIBRARY_PATH=`pwd` make test
+
+%install
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+make MANDIR=/usr/man MANSUFFIX=ssl INSTALL_PREFIX="$RPM_BUILD_ROOT" install
+
+# Make backwards-compatibility symlink to ssleay
+ln -sf /usr/bin/openssl $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/bin/ssleay
+
+%clean
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+%files
+%defattr(0644,root,root,0755)
+%doc CHANGES CHANGES.SSLeay LICENSE NEWS README
+
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/*
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/lib/*.so*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{openssldir}/misc/*
+%attr(0644,root,root) /usr/man/man[157]/*
+
+%config %attr(0644,root,root) %{openssldir}/openssl.cnf
+%dir %attr(0755,root,root) %{openssldir}/certs
+%dir %attr(0755,root,root) %{openssldir}/misc
+%dir %attr(0750,root,root) %{openssldir}/private
+
+%files devel
+%defattr(0644,root,root,0755)
+%doc CHANGES CHANGES.SSLeay LICENSE NEWS README
+
+%attr(0644,root,root) /usr/lib/*.a
+%attr(0644,root,root) /usr/lib/pkgconfig/openssl.pc
+%attr(0644,root,root) /usr/include/openssl/*
+%attr(0644,root,root) /usr/man/man[3]/*
+
+%files doc
+%defattr(0644,root,root,0755)
+%doc CHANGES CHANGES.SSLeay LICENSE NEWS README
+%doc doc
+
+%post
+ldconfig
+
+%postun
+ldconfig
+
+%changelog
+* Sun Jun 6 2005 Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org>
+- Remove the incorrect installation of '%{openssldir}/lib'.
+* Wed May 7 2003 Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org>
+- Add /usr/lib/pkgconfig/openssl.pc to the development section.
+* Thu Mar 22 2001 Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org>
+- Removed redundant subsection that re-installed libcrypto.a and libssl.a
+ as well. Also remove RSAref stuff completely, since it's not needed
+ any more.
+* Thu Mar 15 2001 Jeremiah Johnson <jjohnson at penguincomputing.com>
+- Removed redundant subsection that re-installed libcrypto.so.0.9.6 and
+ libssl.so.0.9.6. As well as the subsection that created symlinks for
+ these. make install handles all this.
+* Sat Oct 21 2000 Horms <horms at vergenet.net>
+- Make sure symlinks are created by using -f flag to ln.
+ Otherwise some .so libraries are copied rather than
+ linked in the resulting binary RPM. This causes the package
+ to be larger than neccessary and makes ldconfig complain.
+* Fri Oct 13 2000 Horms <horms at vergenet.net>
+- Make defattr is set for files in all packages so packages built as
+ non-root will still be installed with files owned by root.
+* Thu Sep 14 2000 Richard Levitte <richard at levitte.org>
+- Changed to adapt to the new (supported) way of making shared libraries
+- Installs all static libraries, not just libRSAglue.a
+- Extra documents now end up in a separate document package
+* Sun Feb 27 2000 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Merged patches to spec
+- Updated to 0.9.5beta2 (now with manpages)
+* Sat Feb 5 2000 Michal Jaegermann <michal at harddata.com>
+- added 'linux-alpha' to configuration
+- fixed nasty absolute links
+* Tue Jan 25 2000 Bennett Todd <bet at rahul.net>
+- Added -DSSL_ALLOW_ADH, bumped Release to 4
+* Thu Oct 14 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Set default permissions
+- Removed documentation from devel sub-package
+* Thu Sep 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>
+- Added "make test" stage
+- GPG signed
+* Tue Sep 10 1999 Damien Miller <damien at ibs.com.au>
+- Updated to version 0.9.4
+* Tue May 25 1999 Damien Miller <damien at ibs.com.au>
+- Updated to version 0.9.3
+- Added attributes for all files
+- Paramatised openssl directory
+* Sat Mar 20 1999 Carlo M. Arenas Belon <carenas at jmconsultores.com.pe>
+- Added "official" bnrec patch and taking other out
+- making a link from ssleay to openssl binary
+- putting all changelog together on SPEC file
+* Fri Mar 5 1999 Henri Gomez <gomez at slib.fr>
+- Added bnrec patch
+* Tue Dec 29 1998 Jonathan Ruano <kobalt at james.encomix.es>
+- minimum spec and patches changes for openssl
+- modified for openssl sources
+* Sat Aug 8 1998 Khimenko Victor <khim at sch57.msk.ru>
+- shared library creating process honours $RPM_OPT_FLAGS
+- shared libarry supports threads (as well as static library)
+* Wed Jul 22 1998 Khimenko Victor <khim at sch57.msk.ru>
+- building of shared library completely reworked
+* Tue Jul 21 1998 Khimenko Victor <khim at sch57.msk.ru>
+- RPM is BuildRoot'ed
+* Tue Feb 10 1998 Khimenko Victor <khim at sch57.msk.ru>
+- all stuff is moved out of /usr/local
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/Makefile
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/Makefile 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/Makefile 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1085 +0,0 @@
-#
-# OpenSSL/ssl/Makefile
-#
-
-DIR= ssl
-TOP= ..
-CC= cc
-INCLUDES= -I../crypto -I$(TOP) -I../include $(KRB5_INCLUDES)
-CFLAG=-g
-MAKEFILE= Makefile
-AR= ar r
-# KRB5 stuff
-KRB5_INCLUDES=
-
-CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
-
-GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com
-TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c
-APPS=
-
-LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
-SHARED_LIB= libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
-LIBSRC= \
- s2_meth.c s2_srvr.c s2_clnt.c s2_lib.c s2_enc.c s2_pkt.c \
- s3_meth.c s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c s3_lib.c s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c s3_cbc.c \
- s23_meth.c s23_srvr.c s23_clnt.c s23_lib.c s23_pkt.c \
- t1_meth.c t1_srvr.c t1_clnt.c t1_lib.c t1_enc.c \
- d1_meth.c d1_srvr.c d1_clnt.c d1_lib.c d1_pkt.c \
- d1_both.c d1_enc.c d1_srtp.c \
- ssl_lib.c ssl_err2.c ssl_cert.c ssl_sess.c \
- ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \
- ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_algs.c \
- bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c tls_srp.c t1_reneg.c ssl_utst.c
-LIBOBJ= \
- s2_meth.o s2_srvr.o s2_clnt.o s2_lib.o s2_enc.o s2_pkt.o \
- s3_meth.o s3_srvr.o s3_clnt.o s3_lib.o s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o s3_cbc.o \
- s23_meth.o s23_srvr.o s23_clnt.o s23_lib.o s23_pkt.o \
- t1_meth.o t1_srvr.o t1_clnt.o t1_lib.o t1_enc.o \
- d1_meth.o d1_srvr.o d1_clnt.o d1_lib.o d1_pkt.o \
- d1_both.o d1_enc.o d1_srtp.o\
- ssl_lib.o ssl_err2.o ssl_cert.o ssl_sess.o \
- ssl_ciph.o ssl_stat.o ssl_rsa.o \
- ssl_asn1.o ssl_txt.o ssl_algs.o \
- bio_ssl.o ssl_err.o kssl.o tls_srp.o t1_reneg.o ssl_utst.o
-
-SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-
-EXHEADER= ssl.h ssl2.h ssl3.h ssl23.h tls1.h dtls1.h kssl.h srtp.h
-HEADER= $(EXHEADER) ssl_locl.h kssl_lcl.h
-
-ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
-
-top:
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=$(DIR) all)
-
-all: shared
-
-lib: $(LIBOBJ)
- $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ)
- $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind.
- @touch lib
-
-shared: lib
- if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) $(SHARED_LIB)); \
- fi
-
-files:
- $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
-
-links:
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../test $(TEST)
- @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../apps $(APPS)
-
-install:
- @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
- @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \
- do \
- (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
- chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
- done;
-
-tags:
- ctags $(SRC)
-
-tests:
-
-lint:
- lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
-
-update: local_depend
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
-
-depend: local_depend
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
-local_depend:
- @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
-
-dclean:
- $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
- mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
-
-clean:
- rm -f *.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
-
-# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
-
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h bio_ssl.c
-d1_both.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_both.c ssl_locl.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_clnt.c
-d1_clnt.o: kssl_lcl.h ssl_locl.h
-d1_enc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_enc.c
-d1_enc.o: ssl_locl.h
-d1_lib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_lib.c
-d1_lib.o: ssl_locl.h
-d1_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_meth.c
-d1_meth.o: ssl_locl.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_pkt.c ssl_locl.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_srtp.c
-d1_srtp.o: srtp.h ssl_locl.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_srvr.c
-d1_srvr.o: ssl_locl.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-kssl.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
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-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h s3_clnt.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_enc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_enc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_enc.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_lib.o: ../crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-s3_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h
-s3_lib.o: s3_lib.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-s3_meth.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_meth.c
-s3_meth.o: ssl_locl.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_pkt.c ssl_locl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h
-s3_srvr.o: s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_algs.c
-ssl_algs.o: ssl_locl.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/asn1_mac.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_asn1.c ssl_locl.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../crypto/o_dir.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h ssl_cert.c ssl_locl.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_ciph.c ssl_locl.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_err.c
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_err2.c
-ssl_lib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h kssl_lcl.h
-ssl_lib.o: ssl_lib.c ssl_locl.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-ssl_rsa.o: ssl_rsa.c
-ssl_sess.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-ssl_sess.o: ssl_sess.c
-ssl_stat.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-ssl_stat.o: ssl_stat.c
-ssl_txt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-ssl_txt.o: ssl_txt.c
-ssl_utst.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-ssl_utst.o: ssl_utst.c
-t1_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h t1_clnt.c
-t1_enc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-t1_enc.o: t1_enc.c
-t1_lib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h ssl_locl.h
-t1_lib.o: t1_lib.c
-t1_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-t1_meth.o: t1_meth.c
-t1_reneg.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
-t1_reneg.o: t1_reneg.c
-t1_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h t1_srvr.c
-tls_srp.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/srp.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h tls_srp.c
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/Makefile (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/Makefile)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/Makefile (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/Makefile 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1085 @@
+#
+# OpenSSL/ssl/Makefile
+#
+
+DIR= ssl
+TOP= ..
+CC= cc
+INCLUDES= -I../crypto -I$(TOP) -I../include $(KRB5_INCLUDES)
+CFLAG=-g
+MAKEFILE= Makefile
+AR= ar r
+# KRB5 stuff
+KRB5_INCLUDES=
+
+CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
+
+GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com
+TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c clienthellotest.c
+APPS=
+
+LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
+SHARED_LIB= libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
+LIBSRC= \
+ s2_meth.c s2_srvr.c s2_clnt.c s2_lib.c s2_enc.c s2_pkt.c \
+ s3_meth.c s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c s3_lib.c s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c s3_cbc.c \
+ s23_meth.c s23_srvr.c s23_clnt.c s23_lib.c s23_pkt.c \
+ t1_meth.c t1_srvr.c t1_clnt.c t1_lib.c t1_enc.c \
+ d1_meth.c d1_srvr.c d1_clnt.c d1_lib.c d1_pkt.c \
+ d1_both.c d1_enc.c d1_srtp.c \
+ ssl_lib.c ssl_err2.c ssl_cert.c ssl_sess.c \
+ ssl_ciph.c ssl_stat.c ssl_rsa.c \
+ ssl_asn1.c ssl_txt.c ssl_algs.c \
+ bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c tls_srp.c t1_reneg.c ssl_utst.c
+LIBOBJ= \
+ s2_meth.o s2_srvr.o s2_clnt.o s2_lib.o s2_enc.o s2_pkt.o \
+ s3_meth.o s3_srvr.o s3_clnt.o s3_lib.o s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o s3_cbc.o \
+ s23_meth.o s23_srvr.o s23_clnt.o s23_lib.o s23_pkt.o \
+ t1_meth.o t1_srvr.o t1_clnt.o t1_lib.o t1_enc.o \
+ d1_meth.o d1_srvr.o d1_clnt.o d1_lib.o d1_pkt.o \
+ d1_both.o d1_enc.o d1_srtp.o\
+ ssl_lib.o ssl_err2.o ssl_cert.o ssl_sess.o \
+ ssl_ciph.o ssl_stat.o ssl_rsa.o \
+ ssl_asn1.o ssl_txt.o ssl_algs.o \
+ bio_ssl.o ssl_err.o kssl.o tls_srp.o t1_reneg.o ssl_utst.o
+
+SRC= $(LIBSRC)
+
+EXHEADER= ssl.h ssl2.h ssl3.h ssl23.h tls1.h dtls1.h kssl.h srtp.h
+HEADER= $(EXHEADER) ssl_locl.h kssl_lcl.h
+
+ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
+
+top:
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=$(DIR) all)
+
+all: shared
+
+lib: $(LIBOBJ)
+ $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ)
+ $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind.
+ @touch lib
+
+shared: lib
+ if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) $(SHARED_LIB)); \
+ fi
+
+files:
+ $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
+
+links:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../test $(TEST)
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../apps $(APPS)
+
+install:
+ @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
+ @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \
+ do \
+ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
+ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
+ done;
+
+tags:
+ ctags $(SRC)
+
+tests:
+
+lint:
+ lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+
+update: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+
+depend: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
+
+dclean:
+ $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
+ mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
+
+# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
+
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+bio_ssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h bio_ssl.c
+d1_both.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+d1_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_both.c ssl_locl.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+d1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_clnt.c
+d1_clnt.o: kssl_lcl.h ssl_locl.h
+d1_enc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+d1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_enc.c
+d1_enc.o: ssl_locl.h
+d1_lib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+d1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_lib.c
+d1_lib.o: ssl_locl.h
+d1_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+d1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_meth.c
+d1_meth.o: ssl_locl.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+d1_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_pkt.c ssl_locl.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+d1_srtp.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_srtp.c
+d1_srtp.o: srtp.h ssl_locl.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+d1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h d1_srvr.c
+d1_srvr.o: ssl_locl.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+kssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl.c
+kssl.o: kssl_lcl.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+s23_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s23_clnt.c ssl_locl.h
+s23_lib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s23_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s23_lib.c
+s23_lib.o: ssl_locl.h
+s23_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s23_meth.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s23_meth.c
+s23_meth.o: ssl_locl.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s23_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
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+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+s3_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_pkt.c ssl_locl.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s3_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h kssl_lcl.h
+s3_srvr.o: s3_srvr.c ssl_locl.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssl_algs.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_algs.c
+ssl_algs.o: ssl_locl.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/asn1_mac.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+ssl_asn1.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_asn1.c ssl_locl.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../crypto/o_dir.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+ssl_cert.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h ssl_cert.c ssl_locl.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+ssl_ciph.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_ciph.c ssl_locl.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssl_err.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_err.c
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssl_err2.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_err2.c
+ssl_lib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dh.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+ssl_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h kssl_lcl.h
+ssl_lib.o: ssl_lib.c ssl_locl.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
+ssl_rsa.o: ssl_rsa.c
+ssl_sess.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssl_sess.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
+ssl_sess.o: ssl_sess.c
+ssl_stat.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssl_stat.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
+ssl_stat.o: ssl_stat.c
+ssl_txt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssl_txt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
+ssl_txt.o: ssl_txt.c
+ssl_utst.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssl_utst.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
+ssl_utst.o: ssl_utst.c
+t1_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+t1_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h t1_clnt.c
+t1_enc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+t1_enc.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
+t1_enc.o: t1_enc.c
+t1_lib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/conf.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+t1_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h ssl_locl.h
+t1_lib.o: t1_lib.c
+t1_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+t1_meth.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
+t1_meth.o: t1_meth.c
+t1_reneg.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+t1_reneg.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h
+t1_reneg.o: t1_reneg.c
+t1_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+t1_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h t1_srvr.c
+tls_srp.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/srp.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+tls_srp.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ssl_locl.h tls_srp.c
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/bio_ssl.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/bio_ssl.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/bio_ssl.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,587 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/bio_ssl.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-static int ssl_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
-static int ssl_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
-static int ssl_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
-static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
-static int ssl_new(BIO *h);
-static int ssl_free(BIO *data);
-static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp);
-typedef struct bio_ssl_st {
- SSL *ssl; /* The ssl handle :-) */
- /* re-negotiate every time the total number of bytes is this size */
- int num_renegotiates;
- unsigned long renegotiate_count;
- unsigned long byte_count;
- unsigned long renegotiate_timeout;
- unsigned long last_time;
-} BIO_SSL;
-
-static BIO_METHOD methods_sslp = {
- BIO_TYPE_SSL, "ssl",
- ssl_write,
- ssl_read,
- ssl_puts,
- NULL, /* ssl_gets, */
- ssl_ctrl,
- ssl_new,
- ssl_free,
- ssl_callback_ctrl,
-};
-
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void)
-{
- return (&methods_sslp);
-}
-
-static int ssl_new(BIO *bi)
-{
- BIO_SSL *bs;
-
- bs = (BIO_SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_SSL));
- if (bs == NULL) {
- BIOerr(BIO_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- memset(bs, 0, sizeof(BIO_SSL));
- bi->init = 0;
- bi->ptr = (char *)bs;
- bi->flags = 0;
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int ssl_free(BIO *a)
-{
- BIO_SSL *bs;
-
- if (a == NULL)
- return (0);
- bs = (BIO_SSL *)a->ptr;
- if (bs->ssl != NULL)
- SSL_shutdown(bs->ssl);
- if (a->shutdown) {
- if (a->init && (bs->ssl != NULL))
- SSL_free(bs->ssl);
- a->init = 0;
- a->flags = 0;
- }
- if (a->ptr != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
-{
- int ret = 1;
- BIO_SSL *sb;
- SSL *ssl;
- int retry_reason = 0;
- int r = 0;
-
- if (out == NULL)
- return (0);
- sb = (BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
- ssl = sb->ssl;
-
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-
-#if 0
- if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ssl)) {
-/* ret=SSL_do_handshake(ssl); */
- if (ret > 0) {
-
- outflags = (BIO_FLAGS_READ | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
-/* if (ret > 0) */
- ret = SSL_read(ssl, out, outl);
-
- switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
- if (ret <= 0)
- break;
- if (sb->renegotiate_count > 0) {
- sb->byte_count += ret;
- if (sb->byte_count > sb->renegotiate_count) {
- sb->byte_count = 0;
- sb->num_renegotiates++;
- SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
- r = 1;
- }
- }
- if ((sb->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) {
- unsigned long tm;
-
- tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- if (tm > sb->last_time + sb->renegotiate_timeout) {
- sb->last_time = tm;
- sb->num_renegotiates++;
- SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
- }
- }
-
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- BIO_set_retry_read(b);
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- BIO_set_retry_write(b);
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
- BIO_set_retry_special(b);
- retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT:
- BIO_set_retry_special(b);
- retry_reason = BIO_RR_ACCEPT;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
- BIO_set_retry_special(b);
- retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- b->retry_reason = retry_reason;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int ssl_write(BIO *b, const char *out, int outl)
-{
- int ret, r = 0;
- int retry_reason = 0;
- SSL *ssl;
- BIO_SSL *bs;
-
- if (out == NULL)
- return (0);
- bs = (BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
- ssl = bs->ssl;
-
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-
- /*
- * ret=SSL_do_handshake(ssl); if (ret > 0)
- */
- ret = SSL_write(ssl, out, outl);
-
- switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
- if (ret <= 0)
- break;
- if (bs->renegotiate_count > 0) {
- bs->byte_count += ret;
- if (bs->byte_count > bs->renegotiate_count) {
- bs->byte_count = 0;
- bs->num_renegotiates++;
- SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
- r = 1;
- }
- }
- if ((bs->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) {
- unsigned long tm;
-
- tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- if (tm > bs->last_time + bs->renegotiate_timeout) {
- bs->last_time = tm;
- bs->num_renegotiates++;
- SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
- }
- }
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- BIO_set_retry_write(b);
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- BIO_set_retry_read(b);
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
- BIO_set_retry_special(b);
- retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
- BIO_set_retry_special(b);
- retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
- case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- b->retry_reason = retry_reason;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
-{
- SSL **sslp, *ssl;
- BIO_SSL *bs;
- BIO *dbio, *bio;
- long ret = 1;
-
- bs = (BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
- ssl = bs->ssl;
- if ((ssl == NULL) && (cmd != BIO_C_SET_SSL))
- return (0);
- switch (cmd) {
- case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
- SSL_shutdown(ssl);
-
- if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_connect)
- SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
- else if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_accept)
- SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
-
- SSL_clear(ssl);
-
- if (b->next_bio != NULL)
- ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
- else if (ssl->rbio != NULL)
- ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
- else
- ret = 1;
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
- ret = 0;
- break;
- case BIO_C_SSL_MODE:
- if (num) /* client mode */
- SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
- else
- SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
- break;
- case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT:
- ret = bs->renegotiate_timeout;
- if (num < 60)
- num = 5;
- bs->renegotiate_timeout = (unsigned long)num;
- bs->last_time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- break;
- case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES:
- ret = bs->renegotiate_count;
- if ((long)num >= 512)
- bs->renegotiate_count = (unsigned long)num;
- break;
- case BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES:
- ret = bs->num_renegotiates;
- break;
- case BIO_C_SET_SSL:
- if (ssl != NULL) {
- ssl_free(b);
- if (!ssl_new(b))
- return 0;
- }
- b->shutdown = (int)num;
- ssl = (SSL *)ptr;
- ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->ssl = ssl;
- bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
- if (bio != NULL) {
- if (b->next_bio != NULL)
- BIO_push(bio, b->next_bio);
- b->next_bio = bio;
- CRYPTO_add(&bio->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
- }
- b->init = 1;
- break;
- case BIO_C_GET_SSL:
- if (ptr != NULL) {
- sslp = (SSL **)ptr;
- *sslp = ssl;
- } else
- ret = 0;
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
- ret = b->shutdown;
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
- b->shutdown = (int)num;
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
- ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr);
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
- ret = SSL_pending(ssl);
- if (ret == 0)
- ret = BIO_pending(ssl->rbio);
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
- ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr);
- BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
- if ((b->next_bio != NULL) && (b->next_bio != ssl->rbio)) {
- SSL_set_bio(ssl, b->next_bio, b->next_bio);
- CRYPTO_add(&b->next_bio->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
- }
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_POP:
- /* Only detach if we are the BIO explicitly being popped */
- if (b == ptr) {
- /*
- * Shouldn't happen in practice because the rbio and wbio are the
- * same when pushed.
- */
- if (ssl->rbio != ssl->wbio)
- BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
- if (b->next_bio != NULL)
- CRYPTO_add(&b->next_bio->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
- ssl->wbio = NULL;
- ssl->rbio = NULL;
- }
- break;
- case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-
- b->retry_reason = 0;
- ret = (int)SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
-
- switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, (int)ret)) {
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_READ | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_WRITE | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
- break;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
- BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
- b->retry_reason = b->next_bio->retry_reason;
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
- dbio = (BIO *)ptr;
- if (((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl != NULL)
- SSL_free(((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl);
- ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl = SSL_dup(ssl);
- ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->renegotiate_count =
- ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->renegotiate_count;
- ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->byte_count = ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->byte_count;
- ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->renegotiate_timeout =
- ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->renegotiate_timeout;
- ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->last_time = ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->last_time;
- ret = (((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl != NULL);
- break;
- case BIO_C_GET_FD:
- ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
- {
-#if 0 /* FIXME: Should this be used? -- Richard
- * Levitte */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- ret = -1;
-#else
- ret = 0;
-#endif
- }
- break;
- case BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK:
- {
- void (**fptr) (const SSL *xssl, int type, int val);
-
- fptr = (void (**)(const SSL *xssl, int type, int val))ptr;
- *fptr = SSL_get_info_callback(ssl);
- }
- break;
- default:
- ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
- break;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp)
-{
- SSL *ssl;
- BIO_SSL *bs;
- long ret = 1;
-
- bs = (BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
- ssl = bs->ssl;
- switch (cmd) {
- case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
- {
- /*
- * FIXME: setting this via a completely different prototype seems
- * like a crap idea
- */
- SSL_set_info_callback(ssl, (void (*)(const SSL *, int, int))fp);
- }
- break;
- default:
- ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, fp);
- break;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int ssl_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
-{
- int n, ret;
-
- n = strlen(str);
- ret = BIO_write(bp, str, n);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
- BIO *ret = NULL, *buf = NULL, *ssl = NULL;
-
- if ((buf = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((ret = BIO_push(buf, ssl)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- return (ret);
- err:
- if (buf != NULL)
- BIO_free(buf);
- if (ssl != NULL)
- BIO_free(ssl);
-#endif
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
- BIO *ret = NULL, *con = NULL, *ssl = NULL;
-
- if ((con = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((ret = BIO_push(ssl, con)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- return (ret);
- err:
- if (con != NULL)
- BIO_free(con);
-#endif
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client)
-{
- BIO *ret;
- SSL *ssl;
-
- if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl())) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
- BIO_free(ret);
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (client)
- SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
- else
- SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
-
- BIO_set_ssl(ret, ssl, BIO_CLOSE);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *t, BIO *f)
-{
- t = BIO_find_type(t, BIO_TYPE_SSL);
- f = BIO_find_type(f, BIO_TYPE_SSL);
- if ((t == NULL) || (f == NULL))
- return (0);
- if ((((BIO_SSL *)t->ptr)->ssl == NULL) ||
- (((BIO_SSL *)f->ptr)->ssl == NULL))
- return (0);
- SSL_copy_session_id(((BIO_SSL *)t->ptr)->ssl, ((BIO_SSL *)f->ptr)->ssl);
- return (1);
-}
-
-void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *b)
-{
- SSL *s;
-
- while (b != NULL) {
- if (b->method->type == BIO_TYPE_SSL) {
- s = ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->ssl;
- SSL_shutdown(s);
- break;
- }
- b = b->next_bio;
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/bio_ssl.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/bio_ssl.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/bio_ssl.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/bio_ssl.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
+/* ssl/bio_ssl.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+static int ssl_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
+static int ssl_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int ssl_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
+static int ssl_new(BIO *h);
+static int ssl_free(BIO *data);
+static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp);
+typedef struct bio_ssl_st {
+ SSL *ssl; /* The ssl handle :-) */
+ /* re-negotiate every time the total number of bytes is this size */
+ int num_renegotiates;
+ unsigned long renegotiate_count;
+ unsigned long byte_count;
+ unsigned long renegotiate_timeout;
+ unsigned long last_time;
+} BIO_SSL;
+
+static BIO_METHOD methods_sslp = {
+ BIO_TYPE_SSL, "ssl",
+ ssl_write,
+ ssl_read,
+ ssl_puts,
+ NULL, /* ssl_gets, */
+ ssl_ctrl,
+ ssl_new,
+ ssl_free,
+ ssl_callback_ctrl,
+};
+
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void)
+{
+ return (&methods_sslp);
+}
+
+static int ssl_new(BIO *bi)
+{
+ BIO_SSL *bs;
+
+ bs = (BIO_SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_SSL));
+ if (bs == NULL) {
+ BIOerr(BIO_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ memset(bs, 0, sizeof(BIO_SSL));
+ bi->init = 0;
+ bi->ptr = (char *)bs;
+ bi->flags = 0;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int ssl_free(BIO *a)
+{
+ BIO_SSL *bs;
+
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ bs = (BIO_SSL *)a->ptr;
+ if (bs->ssl != NULL)
+ SSL_shutdown(bs->ssl);
+ if (a->shutdown) {
+ if (a->init && (bs->ssl != NULL))
+ SSL_free(bs->ssl);
+ a->init = 0;
+ a->flags = 0;
+ }
+ if (a->ptr != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+ BIO_SSL *sb;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ int retry_reason = 0;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ if (out == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ sb = (BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
+ ssl = sb->ssl;
+
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+#if 0
+ if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ssl)) {
+/* ret=SSL_do_handshake(ssl); */
+ if (ret > 0) {
+
+ outflags = (BIO_FLAGS_READ | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+/* if (ret > 0) */
+ ret = SSL_read(ssl, out, outl);
+
+ switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ break;
+ if (sb->renegotiate_count > 0) {
+ sb->byte_count += ret;
+ if (sb->byte_count > sb->renegotiate_count) {
+ sb->byte_count = 0;
+ sb->num_renegotiates++;
+ SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+ r = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((sb->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) {
+ unsigned long tm;
+
+ tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ if (tm > sb->last_time + sb->renegotiate_timeout) {
+ sb->last_time = tm;
+ sb->num_renegotiates++;
+ SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+ }
+ }
+
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ retry_reason = BIO_RR_ACCEPT;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ b->retry_reason = retry_reason;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ssl_write(BIO *b, const char *out, int outl)
+{
+ int ret, r = 0;
+ int retry_reason = 0;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ BIO_SSL *bs;
+
+ if (out == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ bs = (BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
+ ssl = bs->ssl;
+
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+ /*
+ * ret=SSL_do_handshake(ssl); if (ret > 0)
+ */
+ ret = SSL_write(ssl, out, outl);
+
+ switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ break;
+ if (bs->renegotiate_count > 0) {
+ bs->byte_count += ret;
+ if (bs->byte_count > bs->renegotiate_count) {
+ bs->byte_count = 0;
+ bs->num_renegotiates++;
+ SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+ r = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((bs->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) {
+ unsigned long tm;
+
+ tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ if (tm > bs->last_time + bs->renegotiate_timeout) {
+ bs->last_time = tm;
+ bs->num_renegotiates++;
+ SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ BIO_set_retry_write(b);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ BIO_set_retry_read(b);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ b->retry_reason = retry_reason;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
+{
+ SSL **sslp, *ssl;
+ BIO_SSL *bs;
+ BIO *dbio, *bio;
+ long ret = 1;
+
+ bs = (BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
+ ssl = bs->ssl;
+ if ((ssl == NULL) && (cmd != BIO_C_SET_SSL))
+ return (0);
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
+ SSL_shutdown(ssl);
+
+ if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_connect)
+ SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+ else if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_accept)
+ SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+
+ SSL_clear(ssl);
+
+ if (b->next_bio != NULL)
+ ret = BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio, cmd, num, ptr);
+ else if (ssl->rbio != NULL)
+ ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_SSL_MODE:
+ if (num) /* client mode */
+ SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+ else
+ SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT:
+ ret = bs->renegotiate_timeout;
+ if (num < 60)
+ num = 5;
+ bs->renegotiate_timeout = (unsigned long)num;
+ bs->last_time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES:
+ ret = bs->renegotiate_count;
+ if ((long)num >= 512)
+ bs->renegotiate_count = (unsigned long)num;
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES:
+ ret = bs->num_renegotiates;
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_SET_SSL:
+ if (ssl != NULL) {
+ ssl_free(b);
+ if (!ssl_new(b))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ b->shutdown = (int)num;
+ ssl = (SSL *)ptr;
+ ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->ssl = ssl;
+ bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
+ if (bio != NULL) {
+ if (b->next_bio != NULL)
+ BIO_push(bio, b->next_bio);
+ b->next_bio = bio;
+ CRYPTO_add(&bio->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+ }
+ b->init = 1;
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_GET_SSL:
+ if (ptr != NULL) {
+ sslp = (SSL **)ptr;
+ *sslp = ssl;
+ } else
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+ ret = b->shutdown;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
+ b->shutdown = (int)num;
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
+ ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
+ ret = SSL_pending(ssl);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = BIO_pending(ssl->rbio);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+ ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr);
+ BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_PUSH:
+ if ((b->next_bio != NULL) && (b->next_bio != ssl->rbio)) {
+ SSL_set_bio(ssl, b->next_bio, b->next_bio);
+ CRYPTO_add(&b->next_bio->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+ }
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_POP:
+ /* Only detach if we are the BIO explicitly being popped */
+ if (b == ptr) {
+ /*
+ * Shouldn't happen in practice because the rbio and wbio are the
+ * same when pushed.
+ */
+ if (ssl->rbio != ssl->wbio)
+ BIO_free_all(ssl->wbio);
+ if (b->next_bio != NULL)
+ CRYPTO_add(&b->next_bio->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+ ssl->wbio = NULL;
+ ssl->rbio = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
+
+ b->retry_reason = 0;
+ ret = (int)SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+
+ switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, (int)ret)) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_READ | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_WRITE | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
+ BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY);
+ b->retry_reason = b->next_bio->retry_reason;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+ b->retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
+ dbio = (BIO *)ptr;
+ if (((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl != NULL)
+ SSL_free(((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl);
+ ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl = SSL_dup(ssl);
+ ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->renegotiate_count =
+ ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->renegotiate_count;
+ ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->byte_count = ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->byte_count;
+ ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->renegotiate_timeout =
+ ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->renegotiate_timeout;
+ ((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->last_time = ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->last_time;
+ ret = (((BIO_SSL *)dbio->ptr)->ssl != NULL);
+ break;
+ case BIO_C_GET_FD:
+ ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
+ {
+#if 0 /* FIXME: Should this be used? -- Richard
+ * Levitte */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ ret = -1;
+#else
+ ret = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_GET_CALLBACK:
+ {
+ void (**fptr) (const SSL *xssl, int type, int val);
+
+ fptr = (void (**)(const SSL *xssl, int type, int val))ptr;
+ *fptr = SSL_get_info_callback(ssl);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr);
+ break;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp)
+{
+ SSL *ssl;
+ BIO_SSL *bs;
+ long ret = 1;
+
+ bs = (BIO_SSL *)b->ptr;
+ ssl = bs->ssl;
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK:
+ {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: setting this via a completely different prototype seems
+ * like a crap idea
+ */
+ SSL_set_info_callback(ssl, (void (*)(const SSL *, int, int))fp);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, fp);
+ break;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ssl_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
+{
+ int n, ret;
+
+ n = strlen(str);
+ ret = BIO_write(bp, str, n);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+ BIO *ret = NULL, *buf = NULL, *ssl = NULL;
+
+ if ((buf = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((ret = BIO_push(buf, ssl)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return (ret);
+ err:
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BIO_free(buf);
+ if (ssl != NULL)
+ BIO_free(ssl);
+#endif
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+ BIO *ret = NULL, *con = NULL, *ssl = NULL;
+
+ if ((con = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((ret = BIO_push(ssl, con)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return (ret);
+ err:
+ if (con != NULL)
+ BIO_free(con);
+#endif
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client)
+{
+ BIO *ret;
+ SSL *ssl;
+
+ if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl())) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
+ BIO_free(ret);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (client)
+ SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
+ else
+ SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
+
+ BIO_set_ssl(ret, ssl, BIO_CLOSE);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *t, BIO *f)
+{
+ t = BIO_find_type(t, BIO_TYPE_SSL);
+ f = BIO_find_type(f, BIO_TYPE_SSL);
+ if ((t == NULL) || (f == NULL))
+ return (0);
+ if ((((BIO_SSL *)t->ptr)->ssl == NULL) ||
+ (((BIO_SSL *)f->ptr)->ssl == NULL))
+ return (0);
+ SSL_copy_session_id(((BIO_SSL *)t->ptr)->ssl, ((BIO_SSL *)f->ptr)->ssl);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *b)
+{
+ SSL *s;
+
+ while (b != NULL) {
+ if (b->method->type == BIO_TYPE_SSL) {
+ s = ((BIO_SSL *)b->ptr)->ssl;
+ SSL_shutdown(s);
+ break;
+ }
+ b = b->next_bio;
+ }
+}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/clienthellotest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/clienthellotest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/clienthellotest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/clienthellotest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/* Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL Project */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+
+#define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN 2
+#define SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN 1
+#define CIPHERS_LEN_LEN 2
+#define COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN 1
+#define EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN 2
+#define EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN 2
+#define EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN 2
+
+
+#define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS 2
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for TLS1.2
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2 0
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for a negotiated SSL/TLS version
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG 1
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *con;
+ BIO *rbio;
+ BIO *wbio;
+ BIO *err;
+ long len;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned char *dataend;
+ char *dummytick = "Hello World!";
+ unsigned int tmplen;
+ unsigned int type;
+ unsigned int size;
+ int testresult = 0;
+ int currtest = 0;
+
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+ /*
+ * For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets
+ * produced when we try to connect
+ */
+ for (; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) {
+ testresult = 0;
+ if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2) {
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_2_method());
+ } else {
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+ }
+ con = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+ rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+ if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
+ || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+ if (!SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick, strlen(dummytick)))
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_connect(con) > 0) {
+ /* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
+ dataend = data + len;
+
+ /* Skip the record header */
+ data += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ /* Skip the handshake message header */
+ data += SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ /* Skip client version and random */
+ data += CLIENT_VERSION_LEN + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ if (data + SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+ goto end;
+ /* Skip session id */
+ tmplen = *data;
+ data += SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+ if (data + CIPHERS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+ goto end;
+ /* Skip ciphers */
+ tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+ data += CIPHERS_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+ if (data + COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+ goto end;
+ /* Skip compression */
+ tmplen = *data;
+ data += COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+ if (data + EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+ goto end;
+ /* Extensions len */
+ tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+ data += EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN;
+ if (data + tmplen > dataend)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Loop through all extensions */
+ while (tmplen > EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN) {
+ type = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+ data += EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN;
+ size = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+ data += EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN;
+ if (data + size > dataend)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
+ || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+ if (size == strlen(dummytick)
+ && memcmp(data, dummytick, size) == 0) {
+ /* Ticket data is as we expected */
+ testresult = 1;
+ } else {
+ printf("Received session ticket is not as expected\n");
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tmplen -= EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN + size;
+ data += size;
+ }
+
+ end:
+ SSL_free(con);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (!testresult) {
+ printf("ClientHello test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ERR_free_strings();
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+ EVP_cleanup();
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err);
+
+ return testresult?0:1;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_both.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/d1_both.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_both.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1667 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/d1_both.c */
-/*
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra at cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
-
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
- if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
- long ii; \
- for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
- } else { \
- long ii; \
- bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
- for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
- bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
- } }
-
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
- long ii; \
- OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
- is_complete = 1; \
- if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
- if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
- if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
-
-#if 0
-# define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
- long ii; \
- printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
- printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
- printf("\n"); }
-#endif
-
-static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] =
- { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80 };
-static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] =
- { 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f };
-
-/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
-static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
-
-static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len);
-static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
-static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
- unsigned long len,
- unsigned short seq_num,
- unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len);
-static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max,
- int *ok);
-
-static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len,
- int reassembly)
-{
- hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
- unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
-
- frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
- if (frag == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- if (frag_len) {
- buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
- if (buf == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(frag);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
-
- /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
- frag->fragment = buf;
-
- /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
- if (reassembly) {
- bitmask =
- (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
- if (bitmask == NULL) {
- if (buf != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- OPENSSL_free(frag);
- return NULL;
- }
- memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
- }
-
- frag->reassembly = bitmask;
-
- return frag;
-}
-
-void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
-{
-
- if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.
- saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.
- saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
- }
- if (frag->fragment)
- OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
- if (frag->reassembly)
- OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
- OPENSSL_free(frag);
-}
-
-static int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
- s->d1->mtu =
- s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
- }
-
- /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
- if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
- s->d1->mtu =
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
-
- /*
- * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
- * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
- */
- if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
- /* Set to min mtu */
- s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
- s->d1->mtu, NULL);
- }
- } else
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
- * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
- */
-int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned int curr_mtu;
- int retry = 1;
- unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
-
- if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
- return -1;
-
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s)); /* should have something
- * reasonable now */
-
- if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
- (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
- if (s->write_hash)
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- else
- mac_size = 0;
-
- if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
- (EVP_CIPHER_mode(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
- blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
- else
- blocksize = 0;
-
- frag_off = 0;
- /* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
- while (s->init_num > 0) {
- used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
- + mac_size + blocksize;
- if (s->d1->mtu > used_len)
- curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
- else
- curr_mtu = 0;
-
- if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /*
- * grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
- */
- ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- if (ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
- if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
- } else {
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe
- */
- if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
- len = curr_mtu;
- else
- len = s->init_num;
-
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- if (len > INT_MAX)
- len = INT_MAX;
-
- /*
- * XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part
- */
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- if (s->init_off != 0) {
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
- s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- /*
- * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should
- * be safe
- */
- if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
- len = curr_mtu;
- else
- len = s->init_num;
- }
-
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- if (len > INT_MAX)
- len = INT_MAX;
-
- if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /*
- * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
- * so fail
- */
- return -1;
- }
- dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
- len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
- dtls1_write_message_header(s,
- (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->
- data[s->init_off]);
- }
-
- ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- /*
- * might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which
- * previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really
- * retransmit anything. continue as if everything is fine and
- * wait for an alert to handle the retransmit
- */
- if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
- BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) {
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
- if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
- return -1;
- /* Have one more go */
- retry = 0;
- } else
- return -1;
- } else {
- return (-1);
- }
- } else {
-
- /*
- * bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message
- * got sent. but why would this happen?
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
-
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) {
- /*
- * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
- * we'll ignore the result anyway
- */
- unsigned char *p =
- (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
- const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
- int xlen;
-
- if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- /*
- * reconstruct message header is if it is being sent in
- * single fragment
- */
- *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
- l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
- s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
- l2n3(0, p);
- l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
- p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- xlen = ret;
- } else {
- p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- }
-
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
- }
-
- if (ret == s->init_num) {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
- (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- return (1);
- }
- s->init_off += ret;
- s->init_num -= ret;
- frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
- }
- }
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), maximum
- * acceptable body length 'max'. Read an entire handshake message. Handshake
- * messages arrive in fragments.
- */
-long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
-{
- int i, al;
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned long msg_len;
-
- /*
- * s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused by the
- * absence of an optional handshake message
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
- if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- *ok = 1;
- s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
- return s->init_num;
- }
-
- msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
- memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
-
- again:
- i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
- if (i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) {
- /* bad fragment received */
- goto again;
- } else if (i <= 0 && !*ok) {
- return i;
- }
-
- if (mt >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
-
- /* reconstruct message header */
- *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
- l2n3(msg_len, p);
- s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
- l2n3(0, p);
- l2n3(msg_len, p);
- if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- }
-
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
-
- /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
- if (!s->d1->listen)
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-
- s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- return s->init_num;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- *ok = 0;
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
- int max)
-{
- size_t frag_off, frag_len, msg_len;
-
- msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
- frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
- frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
-
- /* sanity checking */
- if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- if ((frag_off + frag_len) > (unsigned long)max) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { /* first fragment */
- /*
- * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against max
- * above
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
- (s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
- } else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) {
- /*
- * They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce upper limit
- * would open possibility for buffer overrun.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- return 0; /* no error */
-}
-
-static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
-{
- /*-
- * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
- * if so:
- * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
- * (2) update s->init_num
- */
- pitem *item;
- hm_fragment *frag;
- int al;
-
- *ok = 0;
- item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
- if (item == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-
- /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
- if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) {
- unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
- pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
-
- al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header, max);
-
- if (al == 0) { /* no alert */
- unsigned char *p =
- (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment,
- frag->msg_header.frag_len);
- }
-
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- pitem_free(item);
-
- if (al == 0) {
- *ok = 1;
- return frag_len;
- }
-
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- s->init_num = 0;
- *ok = 0;
- return -1;
- } else
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
- * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but
- * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it.
- */
-static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned long max_len =
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
- if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
- return s->max_cert_list;
- return max_len;
-}
-
-static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok)
-{
- hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
- pitem *item = NULL;
- int i = -1, is_complete;
- unsigned char seq64be[8];
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
-
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
- msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
- goto err;
-
- if (frag_len == 0)
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-
- /* Try to find item in queue */
- memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq;
- item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
-
- if (item == NULL) {
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
- if (frag == NULL)
- goto err;
- memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
- frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
- frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
- } else {
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) {
- item = NULL;
- frag = NULL;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * If message is already reassembled, this must be a retransmit and can
- * be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag does not need to be
- * freed.
- */
- if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
- unsigned char devnull[256];
-
- while (frag_len) {
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- devnull,
- frag_len >
- sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
- frag_len, 0);
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
- frag_len -= i;
- }
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
- }
-
- /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,
- frag_len, 0);
- if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
- i = -1;
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
- (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
-
- RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
- is_complete);
-
- if (is_complete) {
- OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
- frag->reassembly = NULL;
- }
-
- if (item == NULL) {
- item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
- if (item == NULL) {
- i = -1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
- /*
- * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However,
- * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above,
- * would have returned it and control would never have reached this
- * branch.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
- }
-
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-
- err:
- if (frag != NULL && item == NULL)
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
-}
-
-static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
- int *ok)
-{
- int i = -1;
- hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
- pitem *item = NULL;
- unsigned char seq64be[8];
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
-
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
- goto err;
-
- /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
- memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq;
- item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
-
- /*
- * If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, don't discard
- * it and rather try to reassemble it.
- */
- if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
- item = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is too far
- * in the future, already in the queue or if we received a FINISHED
- * before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale retransmit.
- */
- if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
- msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
- (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
- {
- unsigned char devnull[256];
-
- while (frag_len) {
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- devnull,
- frag_len >
- sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
- frag_len, 0);
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
- frag_len -= i;
- }
- } else {
- if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
- return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
-
- if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
- goto err;
-
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
- if (frag == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
-
- if (frag_len) {
- /*
- * read the body of the fragment (header has already been read
- */
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- frag->fragment, frag_len, 0);
- if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
- i = -1;
- if (i <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
-
- item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
- if (item == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
- /*
- * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However,
- * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above,
- * would have returned it. Then, either |frag_len| !=
- * |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set to NULL and it will
- * have been processed with |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or
- * the record will have been discarded.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
- }
-
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-
- err:
- if (frag != NULL && item == NULL)
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
-}
-
-static long
-dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
-{
- unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
- unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
- int i, al;
- struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
-
- redo:
- /* see if we have the required fragment already */
- if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, max, ok)) || *ok) {
- if (*ok)
- s->init_num = frag_len;
- return frag_len;
- }
-
- /* read handshake message header */
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, wire,
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
- if (i <= 0) { /* nbio, or an error */
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
- }
- /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
- if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* parse the message fragment header */
- dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
-
- len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
- frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
- frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
-
- /*
- * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read.
- * Fragments must not span records.
- */
- if (frag_len > s->s3->rrec.length) {
- al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
- * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
- * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
- * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
- */
- if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq
- && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
- return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
-
- if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
- return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
-
- if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
- wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
- /*
- * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are
- * doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is
- * correct. Does not count for 'Finished' MAC.
- */
- if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- goto redo;
- } else { /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
-
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, max)))
- goto f_err;
-
- if (frag_len > 0) {
- unsigned char *p =
- (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0);
-
- /*
- * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked
- * that we have enough data in the record
- */
- if (i <= 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
- }
- } else
- i = 0;
-
- /*
- * XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the handshake
- * to fail
- */
- if (i != (int)frag_len) {
- al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- *ok = 1;
- s->state = stn;
-
- /*
- * Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
- * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' lengths: as
- * soon as they sum up to handshake packet length, we assume we have got
- * all the fragments.
- */
- s->init_num = frag_len;
- return frag_len;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- *ok = 0;
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
-{
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int i;
- unsigned long l;
-
- if (s->state == a) {
- d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- sender, slen,
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
- memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
- p += i;
- l = i;
-
- /*
- * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
- */
- if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
- } else {
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
- }
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
- /*
- * MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless I do
- * this.
- */
- l &= 0xffff;
-#endif
-
- d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
- s->init_num = (int)l + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-
- s->state = b;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-/*-
- * for these 2 messages, we need to
- * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
- * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
- * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
- * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
- * ssl->session->read_compression assign
- * ssl->session->read_hash assign
- */
-int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (s->state == a) {
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *p++ = SSL3_MT_CCS;
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
- s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
- s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, p);
- s->init_num += 2;
- }
-
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
-
- s->state = b;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
-}
-
-static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
-{
- int n;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
- l2n3(n, p);
- i2d_X509(x, &p);
- *l += n + 3;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
- int i;
- unsigned long l = 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
-
- /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
- buf = s->init_buf;
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
- if (x != NULL) {
- X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
-
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, s->ctx->cert_store, x, NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-
- X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
- /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
- ERR_clear_error();
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
-
- if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) {
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
- }
- /* Thawte special :-) */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs, i);
- if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
- return 0;
- }
-
- l -= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
- p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
- l2n3(l, p);
- l += 3;
- p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
- p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
-
- l += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- return (l);
-}
-
-int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
-{
- if (code > 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
- /*
- * not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle
- * this. in fact it's probably an error
- */
- return code;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending)
-#else
- /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s))
-#endif
- {
- BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
- return code;
- }
-#if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one
- * record number */
- item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
- if (item) {
- /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
- } else
-#endif
-
-#if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the
- * last set of messages */
- if (state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
- DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
-#endif
-
- return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
-}
-
-int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
-{
- /*
- * The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence
- * number, since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake.
- * However, the ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so
- * using only the sequence will result in the CCS and Finished having the
- * same index. To prevent this, the sequence number is multiplied by 2.
- * In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted. This does not only differ CSS and
- * Finished, it also maintains the order of the index (important for
- * priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
- */
- return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
-}
-
-int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
-{
- pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
- piterator iter;
- pitem *item;
- hm_fragment *frag;
- int found = 0;
-
- iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
-
- for (item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) {
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, (unsigned short)
- dtls1_get_queue_priority
- (frag->msg_header.seq,
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs), 0,
- &found) <= 0 && found) {
- fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
-{
- pitem *item;
- hm_fragment *frag;
- unsigned char seq64be[8];
-
- /*
- * this function is called immediately after a message has been
- * serialized
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
-
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
- if (!frag)
- return 0;
-
- memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
-
- if (is_ccs) {
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- ((s->version ==
- DTLS1_VERSION) ? DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH : 3) ==
- (unsigned int)s->init_num);
- } else {
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
- }
-
- frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
- frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
- frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
- frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
- frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
-
- /* save current state */
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
-
- memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] =
- (unsigned
- char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs) >> 8);
- seq64be[7] =
- (unsigned
- char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
-
- item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
- if (item == NULL) {
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- return 0;
- }
-#if 0
- fprintf(stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
- fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
- fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
-#endif
-
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int
-dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
- int *found)
-{
- int ret;
- /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
- pitem *item;
- hm_fragment *frag;
- unsigned long header_length;
- unsigned char seq64be[8];
- struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
- unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
-
- /*-
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
- */
-
- /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
- memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
-
- item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
- if (item == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
- *found = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
- *found = 1;
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-
- if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
- header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
- else
- header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
- frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
- s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
-
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
- frag->msg_header.msg_len,
- frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
- frag->msg_header.frag_len);
-
- /* save current state */
- saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
- saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
- saved_state.compress = s->compress;
- saved_state.session = s->session;
- saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
- saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
-
- s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
-
- /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
- s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
- s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
- s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
- s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
- s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
-
- if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch ==
- saved_state.epoch - 1) {
- memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence,
- sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
- memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence,
- sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
- }
-
- ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
- SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-
- /* restore current state */
- s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
- s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
- s->compress = saved_state.compress;
- s->session = saved_state.session;
- s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
-
- if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch ==
- saved_state.epoch - 1) {
- memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence,
- sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
- memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence,
- sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
- }
-
- s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
-
- (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
-void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
-{
- pitem *item;
-
- for (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
- item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) {
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
- pitem_free(item);
- }
-}
-
-unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
- unsigned char mt, unsigned long len,
- unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len)
-{
- /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
- if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen) {
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
- s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
- }
-
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
- frag_off, frag_len);
-
- return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-}
-
-/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
-static void
-dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
- unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num,
- unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
-{
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
-
- msg_hdr->type = mt;
- msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
- msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
- msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
- msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
-}
-
-static void
-dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len)
-{
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
-
- msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
- msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
-}
-
-static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
-{
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
-
- *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
- l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
-
- s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
- l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
- l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
-
- return p;
-}
-
-unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
-{
- return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
- sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
-}
-
-unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
-{
- return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
-}
-
-void
-dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
-{
- memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
- msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
- n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
-
- n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
- n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
- n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
-}
-
-void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
-{
- memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
-
- ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
-}
-
-int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
- !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
- ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- if (ret < 0)
- return -1;
-
- if (ret == 0)
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1,
- NULL);
- }
-#endif
- ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
-#endif
- return ret;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
- unsigned short hbtype;
- unsigned int payload;
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
- return 0; /* silently discard */
- if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
-
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
- return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
- pl = p;
-
- if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
- unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
- unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
- 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
- payload + padding;
- int r;
-
- if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type,
- * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
- */
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
- bp = buffer;
-
- /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
- *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
- s2n(payload, bp);
- memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
- bp += payload;
- /* Random padding */
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
- return -1;
- }
-
- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
-
- if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
-
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
- unsigned int seq;
-
- /*
- * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
- * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
- */
- n2s(pl, seq);
-
- if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *buf, *p;
- int ret = -1;
- unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
- /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
- if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
- s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
- * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
-
- /*-
- * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
- * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
- * some random stuff.
- * - Message Type, 1 byte
- * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
- * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
- * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
- * - Padding
- */
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
- p = buf;
- /* Message Type */
- *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
- /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
- s2n(payload, p);
- /* Sequence number */
- s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
- /* 16 random bytes */
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0)
- goto err;
- p += 16;
- /* Random padding */
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0)
- goto err;
-
- ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
- if (ret >= 0) {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buf, 3 + payload + padding,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
- }
-
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_both.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/d1_both.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_both.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_both.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1670 @@
+/* ssl/d1_both.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra at cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
+ if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
+ long ii; \
+ for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
+ } else { \
+ long ii; \
+ bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
+ for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
+ bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
+ } }
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
+ long ii; \
+ OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
+ is_complete = 1; \
+ if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
+ if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
+ if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
+
+#if 0
+# define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
+ long ii; \
+ printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
+ printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
+ printf("\n"); }
+#endif
+
+static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] =
+ { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80 };
+static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] =
+ { 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f };
+
+/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
+static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
+
+static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len);
+static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
+static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
+ unsigned long len,
+ unsigned short seq_num,
+ unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len);
+static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max,
+ int *ok);
+
+static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len,
+ int reassembly)
+{
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
+
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
+ if (frag == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (frag_len) {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
+ frag->fragment = buf;
+
+ /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
+ if (reassembly) {
+ bitmask =
+ (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+ if (bitmask == NULL) {
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+ }
+
+ frag->reassembly = bitmask;
+
+ return frag;
+}
+
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
+{
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.
+ saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.
+ saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
+ }
+ if (frag->fragment)
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+ if (frag->reassembly)
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+}
+
+static int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
+ s->d1->mtu =
+ s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
+ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
+ if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+ s->d1->mtu =
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
+ * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
+ */
+ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
+ /* Set to min mtu */
+ s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
+ s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+ }
+ } else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
+ * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ */
+int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int curr_mtu;
+ int retry = 1;
+ unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
+
+ if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s)); /* should have something
+ * reasonable now */
+
+ if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
+ (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ if (s->write_hash)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ else
+ mac_size = 0;
+
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
+ (EVP_CIPHER_mode(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
+ blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
+ else
+ blocksize = 0;
+
+ frag_off = 0;
+ /* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
+ while (s->init_num > 0) {
+ used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ + mac_size + blocksize;
+ if (s->d1->mtu > used_len)
+ curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+ else
+ curr_mtu = 0;
+
+ if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /*
+ * grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
+ */
+ ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
+ if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
+ } else {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe
+ */
+ if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
+ len = curr_mtu;
+ else
+ len = s->init_num;
+
+ /* Shouldn't ever happen */
+ if (len > INT_MAX)
+ len = INT_MAX;
+
+ /*
+ * XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part
+ */
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ if (s->init_off != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ /*
+ * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should
+ * be safe
+ */
+ if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
+ len = curr_mtu;
+ else
+ len = s->init_num;
+ }
+
+ /* Shouldn't ever happen */
+ if (len > INT_MAX)
+ len = INT_MAX;
+
+ if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /*
+ * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
+ * so fail
+ */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
+ len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ dtls1_write_message_header(s,
+ (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->
+ data[s->init_off]);
+ }
+
+ ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+ len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /*
+ * might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which
+ * previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really
+ * retransmit anything. continue as if everything is fine and
+ * wait for an alert to handle the retransmit
+ */
+ if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) {
+ if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+ if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
+ return -1;
+ /* Have one more go */
+ retry = 0;
+ } else
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ } else {
+
+ /*
+ * bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message
+ * got sent. but why would this happen?
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
+
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) {
+ /*
+ * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+ * we'll ignore the result anyway
+ */
+ unsigned char *p =
+ (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
+ const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+ int xlen;
+
+ if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ /*
+ * reconstruct message header is if it is being sent in
+ * single fragment
+ */
+ *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+ s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+ l2n3(0, p);
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+ p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ xlen = ret;
+ } else {
+ p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
+ }
+
+ if (ret == s->init_num) {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
+ (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+ s->init_off += ret;
+ s->init_num -= ret;
+ frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ }
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), maximum
+ * acceptable body length 'max'. Read an entire handshake message. Handshake
+ * messages arrive in fragments.
+ */
+long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
+{
+ int i, al;
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned long msg_len;
+
+ /*
+ * s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused by the
+ * absence of an optional handshake message
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+ if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ *ok = 1;
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+ return s->init_num;
+ }
+
+ msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+ again:
+ i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
+ if (i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) {
+ /* bad fragment received */
+ goto again;
+ } else if (i <= 0 && !*ok) {
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ if (mt >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+
+ /* reconstruct message header */
+ *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_len, p);
+ s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+ l2n3(0, p);
+ l2n3(msg_len, p);
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+ /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
+ if (!s->d1->listen)
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ return s->init_num;
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
+ int max)
+{
+ size_t frag_off, frag_len, msg_len;
+
+ msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+ frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
+ frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+ /* sanity checking */
+ if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ((frag_off + frag_len) > (unsigned long)max) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { /* first fragment */
+ /*
+ * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against max
+ * above
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
+ (s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
+ s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
+ } else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) {
+ /*
+ * They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce upper limit
+ * would open possibility for buffer overrun.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ return 0; /* no error */
+}
+
+static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
+{
+ /*-
+ * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
+ * if so:
+ * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
+ * (2) update s->init_num
+ */
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag;
+ int al;
+
+ *ok = 0;
+ item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+ if (item == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+ /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
+ if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) {
+ unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+ pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+
+ al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header, max);
+
+ if (al == 0) { /* no alert */
+ unsigned char *p =
+ (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment,
+ frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+ }
+
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ pitem_free(item);
+
+ if (al == 0) {
+ *ok = 1;
+ return frag_len;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return -1;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but
+ * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it.
+ */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned long max_len =
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+ if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+ return max_len;
+}
+
+static int
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok)
+{
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ int i = -1, is_complete;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (frag_len == 0)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ /* Try to find item in queue */
+ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq;
+ item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+ if (item == NULL) {
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
+ if (frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+ frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
+ frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ } else {
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) {
+ item = NULL;
+ frag = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If message is already reassembled, this must be a retransmit and can
+ * be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag does not need to be
+ * freed.
+ */
+ if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
+ unsigned char devnull[256];
+
+ while (frag_len) {
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ devnull,
+ frag_len >
+ sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
+ frag_len, 0);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ frag_len -= i;
+ }
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+ }
+
+ /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,
+ frag_len, 0);
+ if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
+ i = -1;
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
+ (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
+
+ RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
+ is_complete);
+
+ if (is_complete) {
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+ frag->reassembly = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (item == NULL) {
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if (item == NULL) {
+ i = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /*
+ * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However,
+ * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above,
+ * would have returned it and control would never have reached this
+ * branch.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ err:
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL)
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+}
+
+static int
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
+ int *ok)
+{
+ int i = -1;
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
+ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq;
+ item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+ /*
+ * If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, don't discard
+ * it and rather try to reassemble it.
+ */
+ if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ item = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is too far
+ * in the future, already in the queue or if we received a FINISHED
+ * before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale retransmit.
+ */
+ if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
+ msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
+ (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
+ {
+ unsigned char devnull[256];
+
+ while (frag_len) {
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ devnull,
+ frag_len >
+ sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
+ frag_len, 0);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ frag_len -= i;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
+ if (frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+
+ if (frag_len) {
+ /*
+ * read the body of the fragment (header has already been read
+ */
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ frag->fragment, frag_len, 0);
+ if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
+ i = -1;
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if (item == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /*
+ * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However,
+ * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above,
+ * would have returned it. Then, either |frag_len| !=
+ * |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set to NULL and it will
+ * have been processed with |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or
+ * the record will have been discarded.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ err:
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL)
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+}
+
+static long
+dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+{
+ unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
+ unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
+ int i, al;
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
+ redo:
+ /* see if we have the required fragment already */
+ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, max, ok)) || *ok) {
+ if (*ok)
+ s->init_num = frag_len;
+ return frag_len;
+ }
+
+ /* read handshake message header */
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, wire,
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
+ if (i <= 0) { /* nbio, or an error */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
+ if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* parse the message fragment header */
+ dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
+
+ len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+ frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
+
+ /*
+ * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read.
+ * Fragments must not span records.
+ */
+ if (frag_len > s->s3->rrec.length) {
+ al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
+ * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
+ * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
+ * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
+ */
+ if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq
+ && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
+ return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
+ wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
+ /*
+ * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are
+ * doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is
+ * correct. Does not count for 'Finished' MAC.
+ */
+ if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ goto redo;
+ } else { /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, max)))
+ goto f_err;
+
+ if (frag_len > 0) {
+ unsigned char *p =
+ (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked
+ * that we have enough data in the record
+ */
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ } else
+ i = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the handshake
+ * to fail
+ */
+ if (i != (int)frag_len) {
+ al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ *ok = 1;
+ s->state = stn;
+
+ /*
+ * Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
+ * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' lengths: as
+ * soon as they sum up to handshake packet length, we assume we have got
+ * all the fragments.
+ */
+ s->init_num = frag_len;
+ return frag_len;
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ *ok = 0;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == a) {
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender, slen,
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ p += i;
+ l = i;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
+ */
+ if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
+ /*
+ * MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless I do
+ * this.
+ */
+ l &= 0xffff;
+#endif
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
+ s->init_num = (int)l + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+ s->state = b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+/*-
+ * for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
+ * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash assign
+ */
+int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == a) {
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *p++ = SSL3_MT_CCS;
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+ s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+ s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, p);
+ s->init_num += 2;
+ }
+
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
+
+ s->state = b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
+}
+
+static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+{
+ int n;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+ l2n3(n, p);
+ i2d_X509(x, &p);
+ *l += n + 3;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l = 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+ /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+ buf = s->init_buf;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (x != NULL) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, s->ctx->cert_store, x, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+ if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ }
+ /* Thawte special :-) */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs, i);
+ if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ l -= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ l2n3(l, p);
+ l += 3;
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
+ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
+
+ l += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ return (l);
+}
+
+int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
+{
+ if (code > 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
+ /*
+ * not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle
+ * this. in fact it's probably an error
+ */
+ return code;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+#else
+ /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s))
+#endif
+ {
+ BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
+ return code;
+ }
+#if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one
+ * record number */
+ item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
+ if (item) {
+ /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
+ } else
+#endif
+
+#if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the
+ * last set of messages */
+ if (state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
+ DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+#endif
+
+ return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
+}
+
+int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
+{
+ /*
+ * The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence
+ * number, since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake.
+ * However, the ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so
+ * using only the sequence will result in the CCS and Finished having the
+ * same index. To prevent this, the sequence number is multiplied by 2.
+ * In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted. This does not only differ CSS and
+ * Finished, it also maintains the order of the index (important for
+ * priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
+ */
+ return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
+}
+
+int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
+{
+ pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
+ piterator iter;
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
+
+ for (item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) {
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+ if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, (unsigned short)
+ dtls1_get_queue_priority
+ (frag->msg_header.seq,
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs), 0,
+ &found) <= 0 && found) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
+{
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+
+ /*
+ * this function is called immediately after a message has been
+ * serialized
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
+ if (!frag)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
+
+ if (is_ccs) {
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ ((s->version ==
+ DTLS1_VERSION) ? DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH : 3) ==
+ (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+ }
+
+ frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
+ frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
+ frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
+
+ /* save current state */
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+
+ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] =
+ (unsigned
+ char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs) >> 8);
+ seq64be[7] =
+ (unsigned
+ char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
+
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if (item == NULL) {
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#if 0
+ fprintf(stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
+#endif
+
+ pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
+ int *found)
+{
+ int ret;
+ /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag;
+ unsigned long header_length;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
+ unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
+
+ /*-
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+ */
+
+ /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
+ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
+
+ item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
+ if (item == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
+ *found = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *found = 1;
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
+ header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ else
+ header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
+ frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
+ s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
+ frag->msg_header.msg_len,
+ frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
+ frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+
+ /* save current state */
+ saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+ saved_state.compress = s->compress;
+ saved_state.session = s->session;
+ saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+ saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+
+ s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
+
+ /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
+ s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
+ s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
+ s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
+ s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
+ s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch ==
+ saved_state.epoch - 1) {
+ memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence,
+ sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence,
+ sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
+ ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
+ SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+
+ /* restore current state */
+ s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
+ s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
+ s->compress = saved_state.compress;
+ s->session = saved_state.session;
+ s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch ==
+ saved_state.epoch - 1) {
+ memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence,
+ sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence,
+ sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
+ s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
+
+ (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
+void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ pitem *item;
+
+ for (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
+ item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) {
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+}
+
+unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+ unsigned char mt, unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len)
+{
+ /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
+ if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen) {
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
+ frag_off, frag_len);
+
+ return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+}
+
+/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
+static void
+dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
+ unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num,
+ unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
+{
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+ msg_hdr->type = mt;
+ msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
+ msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
+ msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+ msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+}
+
+static void
+dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len)
+{
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+ msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+ msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+ *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+
+ s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
+{
+ return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
+ sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
+}
+
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
+{
+ return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+}
+
+void
+dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
+{
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+ msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
+ n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
+
+ n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
+ n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
+ n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
+}
+
+void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
+{
+ memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
+
+ ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
+}
+
+int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ BIO *wbio;
+
+ wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+ if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
+ !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
+ ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1,
+ NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+ ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
+#endif
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
+ unsigned short hbtype;
+ unsigned int payload;
+ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
+ if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
+ unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+ unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
+ 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
+ payload + padding;
+ int r;
+
+ if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type,
+ * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
+ */
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
+ bp = buffer;
+
+ /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+ *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
+ s2n(payload, bp);
+ memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
+ bp += payload;
+ /* Random padding */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
+
+ if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
+ unsigned int seq;
+
+ /*
+ * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
+ * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
+ */
+ n2s(pl, seq);
+
+ if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+ int ret = -1;
+ unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
+ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+ /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
+ if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
+ * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
+
+ /*-
+ * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+ * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
+ * some random stuff.
+ * - Message Type, 1 byte
+ * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
+ * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
+ * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
+ * - Padding
+ */
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ p = buf;
+ /* Message Type */
+ *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+ /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
+ s2n(payload, p);
+ /* Sequence number */
+ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
+ /* 16 random bytes */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ p += 16;
+ /* Random padding */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buf, 3 + payload + padding,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
+ }
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_clnt.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/d1_clnt.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_clnt.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1702 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/d1_clnt.c */
-/*
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra at cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-# include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#endif
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver);
-static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s);
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver)
-{
- if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- return (DTLSv1_client_method());
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_client_method,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- dtls1_connect, dtls1_get_client_method)
-
-int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
-{
- BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
- unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
- int new_state, state, skip = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
- char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
-#endif
-
- RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
- ERR_clear_error();
- clear_sys_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
- SSL_clear(s);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream
- * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
- s->in_handshake, NULL);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /*
- * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
- * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
- * handshakes anyway.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- }
-#endif
-
- for (;;) {
- state = s->state;
-
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
- /* break */
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
- case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
- case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-
- s->server = 0;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-
- if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
- (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
- s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
- if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_buf = buf;
- buf = NULL;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* setup buffing BIO */
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
- s->init_num = 0;
- /* mark client_random uninitialized */
- memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
- s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
- s->hit = 0;
- s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
- /*
- * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
- */
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
- break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK:
-
- if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK:
- /* read app data until dry event */
-
- ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- if (ret < 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (ret == 0) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->state = s->d1->next_state;
- break;
-#endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
- s->shutdown = 0;
-
- /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (s->d1->send_cookie) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- } else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
- if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
-#endif
- /*
- * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
- */
- if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
- s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- }
-#endif
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- else {
- if (s->hit) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- snprintf((char *)labelbuffer,
- sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
- DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
-
- SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey),
- labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
- 0);
-
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
- BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
-#endif
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- } else
- s->state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
- case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
-
- ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
- if (s->d1->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
- !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- } else {
- skip = 1;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
-#else
- } else
- skip = 1;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /*
- * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
- * the server
- */
- if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
- state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
- s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK;
- else
-#endif
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
- * used.
- */
- snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
- DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
-
- SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
-
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
-#endif
-
- /*
- * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
- */
- /*
- * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
- * sent, but no verify packet is sent
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
- } else {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
- } else
-#endif
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- }
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_client_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
- } else
-#endif
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
- if (!s->hit)
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
- SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
-#else
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
- else
- s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
- {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (s->hit) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
-#endif
-
- dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
- if (!s->hit)
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_finished(s,
- SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
-
- /* clear flags */
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
- if (s->hit) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
- }
-#endif
- if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- s->d1->next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
- s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
- }
-#endif
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
- s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
- }
- } else {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /*
- * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
- */
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
-#endif
-
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-#endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
- s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
- ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-
- if (s->hit)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
- state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
- s->d1->next_state = s->state;
- s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
- }
-#endif
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
- /*
- * If the write error was fatal, stop trying
- */
- if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- }
-
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-#if 0
- if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
- * buffering now
- */
- if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
- /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->renegotiate = 0;
- s->new_session = 0;
-
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
- if (s->hit)
- s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
- ret = 1;
- /* s->server=0; */
- s->handshake_func = dtls1_connect;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
-
- /* done with handshaking */
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
- s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
-
- case SSL_ST_ERR:
- default:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- /* did we do anything */
- if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
- if (s->debug) {
- if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
-
- if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
- new_state = s->state;
- s->state = state;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
- s->state = new_state;
- }
- }
- skip = 0;
- }
- end:
- s->in_handshake--;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and allow stream
- * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
- s->in_handshake, NULL);
-#endif
-
- if (buf != NULL)
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *buf;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- unsigned int i, j;
- unsigned long l;
- SSL_COMP *comp;
-
- buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
- SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- !sess->session_id_length ||
-#else
- (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
-#endif
- (s->session->not_resumable)) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
- goto err;
- }
- /* else use the pre-loaded session */
-
- p = s->s3->client_random;
-
- /*
- * if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are required to use
- * same upon reply to HelloVerify
- */
- for (i = 0; p[i] == '\0' && i < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); i++) ;
- if (i == sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
- ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
-
- /* Do the message type and length last */
- d = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
- s->client_version = s->version;
-
- /* Random stuff */
- memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* Session ID */
- if (s->new_session)
- i = 0;
- else
- i = s->session->session_id_length;
- *(p++) = i;
- if (i != 0) {
- if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
- p += i;
- }
-
- /* cookie stuff */
- if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
- memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
- p += s->d1->cookie_len;
-
- /* Ciphers supported */
- i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
- if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(i, p);
- p += i;
-
- /* COMPRESSION */
- if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL)
- j = 0;
- else
- j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
- *(p++) = 1 + j;
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
- *(p++) = comp->id;
- }
- *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* TLS extensions */
- if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((p =
- ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
- buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
- NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-#endif
-
- l = (p - d);
- d = buf;
-
- d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l, 0, l);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = p - buf;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- err:
- return (-1);
-}
-
-static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s)
-{
- int n, al, ok = 0;
- unsigned char *data;
- unsigned int cookie_len;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A,
- DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B,
- -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
- s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return (1);
- }
-
- data = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- if ((data[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (data[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | data[1];
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- data += 2;
-
- cookie_len = *(data++);
- if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- memcpy(s->d1->cookie, data, cookie_len);
- s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
-
- s->d1->send_cookie = 1;
- return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int n;
- unsigned long alg_k;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned char *q;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
- const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encoded_pt_len = 0;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-#endif
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /* Fool emacs indentation */
- if (0) {
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- RSA *rsa;
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- /*
- * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
- rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
- else {
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
- x509);
- if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
- || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- }
-
- tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
-
- q = p;
- /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
- p += 2;
- n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
- tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
- p[1]++;
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
- tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
-# endif
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
- s2n(n, q);
- n += 2;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- authp = NULL;
-# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
- if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
- authp = &authenticator;
-# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
- }
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5rc) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*-
- * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
- ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
- **
- ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- **
- ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
- ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw at sxw.org.uk>)
- ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
- ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
- ** Example:
- ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
- ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
- ** optional authenticator omitted.
- */
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
- s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
- memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
- p += enc_ticket->length;
- n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
- if (authp && authp->length) {
- s2n(authp->length, p);
- memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
- p += authp->length;
- n += authp->length + 2;
-
- free(authp->data);
- authp->data = NULL;
- authp->length = 0;
- } else {
- s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
- n += 2;
- }
-
- if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*-
- * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- * kssl_ctx->length);
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
- s2n(outl, p);
- memcpy(p, epms, outl);
- p += outl;
- n += outl + 2;
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
- DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
- dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
- else {
- /* we get them from the cert */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* generate a new random key */
- if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
- * clear it out afterwards
- */
-
- n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
-
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* generate master key from the result */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, n);
- /* clean up */
- memset(p, 0, n);
-
- /* send off the data */
- n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
- s2n(n, p);
- BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
- n += 2;
-
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
-
- /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
- const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
- EC_KEY *tkey;
- int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
- int field_size = 0;
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
- * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
- * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
- */
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
- * using ECDH certificates. To add such support, one needs to
- * add code that checks for appropriate conditions and sets
- * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. For example, the cert have an ECC key
- * on the same curve as the server's and the key should be
- * authorized for key agreement. One also needs to add code
- * in ssl3_connect to skip sending the certificate verify
- * message. if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
- * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
- * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
- */
- }
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
- tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
- } else {
- /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
- srvr_pub_pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
- if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
- || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
- || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
- }
-
- srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
-
- if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
- /*
- * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
- * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
- */
- const BIGNUM *priv_key;
- tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
- priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
- if (priv_key == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
- if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
- * clear it out afterwards
- */
-
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
- if (field_size <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
- clnt_ecdh, NULL);
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* generate master key from the result */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, n);
-
- memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
-
- if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
- /* Send empty client key exch message */
- n = 0;
- } else {
- /*
- * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
- * accordingly.
- */
- encoded_pt_len =
- EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Encode the public key */
- n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
-
- *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
- /* Encoded point will be copied here */
- p += 1;
- /* copy the point */
- memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
- /* increment n to account for length field */
- n += 1;
- }
-
- /* Free allocated memory */
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- if (encodedPoint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
- }
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
- unsigned char *t = NULL;
- unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
- unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
- int psk_err = 1;
-
- n = 0;
- if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
- identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- } else if (psk_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
- pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
- t = psk_or_pre_ms;
- memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
- s2n(psk_len, t);
- memset(t, 0, psk_len);
- t += psk_len;
- s2n(psk_len, t);
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- s->session->psk_identity_hint =
- BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
- && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
- if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- pre_ms_len);
- n = strlen(identity);
- s2n(n, p);
- memcpy(p, identity, n);
- n += 2;
- psk_err = 0;
- psk_err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- if (psk_err != 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
- else {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
- /*-
- *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
- l2n3(n,d);
- l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
- */
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- if (encodedPoint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
-#endif
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned u = 0;
-#endif
- unsigned long n;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
- int j;
-#endif
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
- d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
- pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
-
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- NID_sha1,
- &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
- if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u, p);
- n = u + 2;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
- &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
- &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n, 0, n);
-
- s->init_num = (int)n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
- }
-
- /* s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- err:
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
-{
- X509 *x509 = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int i;
- unsigned long l;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
- if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
- (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
- (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
- }
-
- /* We need to get a client cert */
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
- /*
- * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- * return(-1); We then get retied later
- */
- i = 0;
- i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
- if (i < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return (-1);
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
- if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
- i = 0;
- } else if (i == 1) {
- i = 0;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
- }
-
- if (x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(x509);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (i == 0) {
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
- return (1);
- } else {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
- }
- }
-
- /* Ok, we have a cert */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
- }
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
- l = dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,
- (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
- 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
- if (!l) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- s->init_num = (int)l;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- /* set header called by dtls1_output_cert_chain() */
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
- }
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_clnt.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/d1_clnt.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_clnt.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_clnt.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1713 @@
+/* ssl/d1_clnt.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra at cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+# include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#endif
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver);
+static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver)
+{
+ if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return (DTLSv1_client_method());
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ dtls1_connect, dtls1_get_client_method)
+
+int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int new_state, state, skip = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+ char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+#endif
+
+ RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+ SSL_clear(s);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream
+ * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
+ s->in_handshake, NULL);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /*
+ * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
+ * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
+ * handshakes anyway.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (;;) {
+ state = s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+ /* break */
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+ s->server = 0;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+ if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
+ (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+ s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* setup buffing BIO */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ /* mark client_random uninitialized */
+ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+ s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
+ s->hit = 0;
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+ /*
+ * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
+ */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK:
+
+ if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK:
+ /* read app data until dry event */
+
+ ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->state = s->d1->next_state;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+
+ /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (s->d1->send_cookie) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ } else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
+ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+#endif
+ /*
+ * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
+ */
+ if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
+ s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ }
+#endif
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ else {
+ if (s->hit) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ snprintf((char *)labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
+ DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey),
+ labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
+ 0) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+#endif
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ /* receive renewed session ticket */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ }
+ } else
+ s->state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
+ case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
+
+ ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ if (s->d1->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or PSK */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
+ } else
+ skip = 1;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
+ * the server
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+ state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
+ s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK;
+ else
+#endif
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
+ * used.
+ */
+ snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
+ DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
+ */
+ /*
+ * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
+ * sent, but no verify packet is sent
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ } else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+ s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
+ } else
+#endif
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_client_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+ s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
+ } else
+#endif
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+ if (!s->hit)
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+ else
+ s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+ if (!s->hit)
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+
+ /* clear flags */
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ if (s->hit) {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+ s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+ s->d1->next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
+ }
+#endif
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /*
+ * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+#endif
+
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+ ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+ state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
+ s->d1->next_state = s->state;
+ s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * If the write error was fatal, stop trying
+ */
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ }
+
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+#if 0
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
+ * buffering now
+ */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->renegotiate = 0;
+ s->new_session = 0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ /* s->server=0; */
+ s->handshake_func = dtls1_connect;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+
+ /* done with handshaking */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ /* did we do anything */
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
+ if (s->debug) {
+ if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
+ new_state = s->state;
+ s->state = state;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+ s->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip = 0;
+ }
+ end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and allow stream
+ * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
+ s->in_handshake, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned long l;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ !sess->session_id_length ||
+#else
+ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+ (s->session->not_resumable)) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+ p = s->s3->client_random;
+
+ /*
+ * if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are required to use
+ * same upon reply to HelloVerify
+ */
+ for (i = 0; p[i] == '\0' && i < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); i++) ;
+ if (i == sizeof(s->s3->client_random))
+ ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+ s->client_version = s->version;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* Session ID */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ i = 0;
+ else
+ i = s->session->session_id_length;
+ *(p++) = i;
+ if (i != 0) {
+ if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
+ p += i;
+ }
+
+ /* cookie stuff */
+ if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
+ memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+ p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i, p);
+ p += i;
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+ if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL)
+ j = 0;
+ else
+ j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ *(p++) = 1 + j;
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
+ *(p++) = comp->id;
+ }
+ *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((p =
+ ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
+ buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
+ NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ l = (p - d);
+ d = buf;
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l, 0, l);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = p - buf;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s)
+{
+ int n, al, ok = 0;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A,
+ DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ data = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((data[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (data[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | data[1];
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ data += 2;
+
+ cookie_len = *(data++);
+ if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(s->d1->cookie, data, cookie_len);
+ s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
+
+ s->d1->send_cookie = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int n;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
+ const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /* Fool emacs indentation */
+ if (0) {
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else {
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
+ x509);
+ if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
+
+ q = p;
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ p += 2;
+ n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
+ tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
+ p[1]++;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
+ tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
+# endif
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and [incidentally] DTLS */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ s2n(n, q);
+ n += 2;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
+ krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ authp = NULL;
+# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+ if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
+ authp = &authenticator;
+# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ }
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (krb5rc) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+ ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+ **
+ ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ **
+ ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+ ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw at sxw.org.uk>)
+ ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+ ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+ ** Example:
+ ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+ ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
+ ** optional authenticator omitted.
+ */
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
+ s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
+ memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+ p += enc_ticket->length;
+ n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
+ if (authp && authp->length) {
+ s2n(authp->length, p);
+ memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+ p += authp->length;
+ n += authp->length + 2;
+
+ free(authp->data);
+ authp->data = NULL;
+ authp->length = 0;
+ } else {
+ s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
+ n += 2;
+ }
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*-
+ * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
+ * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+ * kssl_ctx->length);
+ * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+ */
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
+ s2n(outl, p);
+ memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+ p += outl;
+ n += outl + 2;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ else {
+ /* we get them from the cert */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate a new random key */
+ if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
+ * clear it out afterwards
+ */
+
+ n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
+
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, n);
+ /* clean up */
+ memset(p, 0, n);
+
+ /* send off the data */
+ n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
+ s2n(n, p);
+ BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
+ n += 2;
+
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+
+ /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *tkey;
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ */
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
+ * using ECDH certificates. To add such support, one needs to
+ * add code that checks for appropriate conditions and sets
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. For example, the cert have an ECC key
+ * on the same curve as the server's and the key should be
+ * authorized for key agreement. One also needs to add code
+ * in ssl3_connect to skip sending the certificate verify
+ * message. if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+ * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+ */
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
+ tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
+ } else {
+ /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
+ srvr_pub_pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+ if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
+ || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
+ }
+
+ srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
+
+ if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
+ /*
+ * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
+ * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
+ */
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+ if (priv_key == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
+ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
+ * clear it out afterwards
+ */
+
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
+ if (field_size <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
+ clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, n);
+
+ memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
+
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
+ /* Send empty client key exch message */
+ n = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
+ * accordingly.
+ */
+ encoded_pt_len =
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key */
+ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
+
+ *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
+ /* Encoded point will be copied here */
+ p += 1;
+ /* copy the point */
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+ /* increment n to account for length field */
+ n += 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Free allocated memory */
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+
+ n = 0;
+ if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+ identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
+ psk_or_pre_ms,
+ sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ } else if (psk_len == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t += psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint =
+ BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
+ && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ psk_or_pre_ms,
+ pre_ms_len);
+ n = strlen(identity);
+ s2n(n, p);
+ memcpy(p, identity, n);
+ n += 2;
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ else {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
+ /*-
+ *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ l2n3(n,d);
+ l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+ */
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+#endif
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned u = 0;
+#endif
+ unsigned long n;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+ int j;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_sha1,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n = u + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j, p);
+ n = j + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j, p);
+ n = j + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n, 0, n);
+
+ s->init_num = (int)n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
+ }
+
+ /* s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
+ if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to get a client cert */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
+ /*
+ * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ * return(-1); We then get retied later
+ */
+ i = 0;
+ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
+ i = 0;
+ } else if (i == 1) {
+ i = 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ }
+
+ if (x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(x509);
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ok, we have a cert */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
+ l = dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,
+ (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
+ 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
+ if (!l) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->init_num = (int)l;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ /* set header called by dtls1_output_cert_chain() */
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_srvr.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/d1_srvr.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_srvr.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1738 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */
-/*
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra at cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
-static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
-{
- if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
- return (DTLSv1_server_method());
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
- dtls1_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function, dtls1_get_server_method)
-
-int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
-{
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- unsigned long alg_k;
- int ret = -1;
- int new_state, state, skip = 0;
- int listen;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
- char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
-#endif
-
- RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
- ERR_clear_error();
- clear_sys_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- listen = s->d1->listen;
-
- /* init things to blank */
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
- SSL_clear(s);
-
- s->d1->listen = listen;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream
- * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
- s->in_handshake, NULL);
-#endif
-
- if (s->cert == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
- return (-1);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /*
- * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
- * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
- * handshakes anyway.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- }
-#endif
-
- for (;;) {
- state = s->state;
-
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
-
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
- case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
- s->server = 1;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-
- if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
- if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_buf = buf;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
- /*
- * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
- */
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
-
- if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
- /*
- * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
- * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) ...but not with
- * SCTP :-)
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
-#endif
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
- } else {
- /*
- * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
- * HelloRequest
- */
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
- }
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
-
- s->shutdown = 0;
- dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-
- s->shutdown = 0;
- ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
-
- if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
- s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /*
- * Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while
- * listening
- */
- if (listen) {
- memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence,
- sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
- }
-
- /* If we're just listening, stop here */
- if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
- ret = 2;
- s->d1->listen = 0;
- /*
- * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake.
- */
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
- s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- break;
-
- case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
- case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
-
- ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-
- /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK:
-
- if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-
- case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK:
- ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- if (ret < 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (ret == 0) {
- if (s->d1->next_state != SSL_ST_OK) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- s->state = s->d1->next_state;
- break;
-#endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- s->renegotiate = 2;
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (s->hit) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
- * SCTP used.
- */
- snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
- DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
-
- SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
-
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-#else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-#endif
- } else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- } else {
- skip = 1;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
-#else
- } else
- skip = 1;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /*
- * clear this, it may get reset by
- * send_server_key_exchange
- */
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
-
- /*
- * only send if a DH key exchange or RSA but we have a sign only
- * certificate
- */
- if (0
- /*
- * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
- * provided
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
-#endif
- || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
- || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
- || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
- [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
- 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- )
- )
- )
- ) {
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- } else
- skip = 1;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
- if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
- /*
- * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
- * during re-negotiation:
- */
- ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
- /*
- * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
- * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
- * RFC 2246):
- */
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
- /*
- * ... except when the application insists on
- * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
- * this for SSL 3)
- */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
- /*
- * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
- */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
- /*
- * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
- * are omitted
- */
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- /* no cert request */
- skip = 1;
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
- }
-#endif
- } else {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
- }
-# endif
-#else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
- }
-# endif
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
- dtls1_start_timer(s);
- ret = dtls1_send_server_done(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
- /*
- * If the write error was fatal, stop trying
- */
- if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- }
-
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
- /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
- ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (ret == 2) {
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
- } else {
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
- ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
- * used.
- */
- snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
- DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
-
- SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
- sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
-
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
- sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
-#endif
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- if (ret == 2) {
- /*
- * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
- * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
- * not sent.
- */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /*
- * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
- * it can be verified
- */
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- NID_md5,
- &(s->s3->
- tmp.cert_verify_md
- [0]));
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1,
- &(s->s3->
- tmp.cert_verify_md
- [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
- state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
- s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK;
- else
-#endif
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- /*
- * Enable CCS. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
- * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
- * cautious.
- * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
- * processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
- * the client's Finished message is read.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
- ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- dtls1_stop_timer(s);
- if (s->hit)
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-#endif
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret = dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
-#endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ret = dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
- SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
-
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (!s->hit) {
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
- }
-#endif
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
- {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
- ret = dtls1_send_finished(s,
- SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (s->hit) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
- * no SCTP used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
- 0, NULL);
-#endif
- } else {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
- s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
- }
-#endif
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-#if 0
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
-#endif
-
- /* remove buffering on output */
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
- * HelloRequest */
- s->renegotiate = 0;
- s->new_session = 0;
-
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
- /* s->server=1; */
- s->handshake_func = dtls1_accept;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- /* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
- /* next message is server hello */
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
- s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
-
- case SSL_ST_ERR:
- default:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
- if (s->debug) {
- if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
-
- if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
- new_state = s->state;
- s->state = state;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
- s->state = new_state;
- }
- }
- skip = 0;
- }
- end:
- /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
-
- s->in_handshake--;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
- /*
- * Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and prevent stream
- * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
- */
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
- s->in_handshake, NULL);
-#endif
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- /*
- * no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit
- * requests for it
- */
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned int msg_len;
- unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
-
- if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A) {
- buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
-
- if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
- s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
- &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- *(p++) = (unsigned char)s->d1->cookie_len;
- memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
- p += s->d1->cookie_len;
- msg_len = p - msg;
-
- dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
- DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0,
- msg_len);
-
- s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = p - buf;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *buf;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int i;
- unsigned int sl;
- unsigned long l;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
- buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p = s->s3->server_random;
- ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- /* Do the message type and length last */
- d = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
-
- /* Random stuff */
- memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /*
- * now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the session id.
- * If it is a re-use, we send back the old session-id, if it is a new
- * session, we send back the new session-id or we send back a 0
- * length session-id if we want it to be single use. Currently I will
- * not implement the '0' length session-id 12-Jan-98 - I'll now
- * support the '0' length stuff.
- */
- if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
- s->session->session_id_length = 0;
-
- sl = s->session->session_id_length;
- if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- *(p++) = sl;
- memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
- p += sl;
-
- /* put the cipher */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
- return -1;
- i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
- p += i;
-
- /* put the compression method */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- *(p++) = 0;
-#else
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- *(p++) = 0;
- else
- *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return -1;
- }
- if ((p =
- ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
- buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
- NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
-
- /* do the header */
- l = (p - d);
- d = buf;
-
- d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = p - buf;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- /* do the header */
- p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned char *q;
- int j, num;
- RSA *rsa;
- unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned int u;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encodedlen = 0;
- int curve_id = 0;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-#endif
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int al, i;
- unsigned long type;
- int n;
- CERT *cert;
- BIGNUM *r[4];
- int nr[4], kn;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- cert = s->cert;
-
- buf = s->init_buf;
-
- r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
- n = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
- rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
- if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
- rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher));
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- RSA_up_ref(rsa);
- cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
- }
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- r[0] = rsa->n;
- r[1] = rsa->e;
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
- dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
- if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
- dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher));
- if (dhp == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
- DH_free(dh);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
- if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
- dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
- dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
- if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- r[0] = dh->p;
- r[1] = dh->g;
- r[2] = dh->pub_key;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
- const EC_GROUP *group;
-
- ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
- if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
- ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
- s3->tmp.new_cipher));
- }
- if (ecdhp == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
- if (ecdhp == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
- if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
- if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
- * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
- * non-zero.
- */
- if ((curve_id =
- tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
- == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
- * allocate memory accordingly.
- */
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
-
- if (encodedlen == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
-
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
- * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
- * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
- * structure.
- */
- n = 4 + encodedlen;
-
- /*
- * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
- * can set these to NULLs
- */
- r[0] = NULL;
- r[1] = NULL;
- r[2] = NULL;
- r[3] = NULL;
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
- /*
- * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
- */
- n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
- {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) {
- nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
- n += 2 + nr[i];
- }
-
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, NULL))
- == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- } else {
- pkey = NULL;
- kn = 0;
- }
-
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + kn)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
- goto err;
- }
- d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
- for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) {
- s2n(nr[i], p);
- BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
- p += nr[i];
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
- * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
- * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
- * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
- */
- *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
- p += 1;
- *p = 0;
- p += 1;
- *p = curve_id;
- p += 1;
- *p = encodedlen;
- p += 1;
- memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
- (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- encodedPoint = NULL;
- p += encodedlen;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* copy PSK identity hint */
- s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
- strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
- strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
- p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* not anonymous */
- if (pkey != NULL) {
- /*
- * n is the length of the params, they start at
- * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space at the
- * end.
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- q = md_buf;
- j = 0;
- for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
- ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),
- n);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
- q += i;
- j += i;
- }
- if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
- &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u, p);
- n += u + 2;
- } else
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- /* lets do DSS */
- EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_dss1(), NULL);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n);
- if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_DSA);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(i, p);
- n += i + 2;
- } else
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- /* let's do ECDSA */
- EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n);
- if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(i, p);
- n += i + 2;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- /* Is this error check actually needed? */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
- SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
-
- /*
- * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
- */
- s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (encodedPoint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-#endif
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int i, j, nl, off, n;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
- X509_NAME *name;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned int msg_len;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
- buf = s->init_buf;
-
- d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
- /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
- p++;
- n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
- d[0] = n;
- p += n;
- n++;
-
- off = n;
- p += 2;
- n += 2;
-
- sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
- nl = 0;
- if (sk != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
- name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
- j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
- (buf, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + n + j + 2)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + n]);
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
- s2n(j, p);
- i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
- n += 2 + j;
- nl += 2 + j;
- } else {
- d = p;
- i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
- j -= 2;
- s2n(j, d);
- j += 2;
- n += j;
- nl += j;
- }
- }
- }
- /* else no CA names */
- p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + off]);
- s2n(nl, p);
-
- d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
- *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
- l2n3(n, d);
- s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, d);
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
-
- /*
- * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
- */
-
- s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_off = 0;
-#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-/* XXX: what to do about this? */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 0;
- s->init_num += 4;
-#endif
-
- /* XDTLS: set message header ? */
- msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0,
- msg_len);
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- err:
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned long l;
- X509 *x;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
- x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
- if (x == NULL) {
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return (0);
- }
- }
-
- l = dtls1_output_cert_chain(s, x);
- if (!l) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return (0);
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
- s->init_num = (int)l;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
- unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
- int len, slen;
- unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char key_name[16];
-
- /* get session encoding length */
- slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
- /*
- * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
- * long
- */
- if (slen > 0xFF00)
- return -1;
- /*
- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows 12
- * (DTLS handshake message header) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2
- * (ticket length) + 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
- * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session length)
- * + max_md_size (HMAC).
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
- EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
- return -1;
- senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
- if (!senc)
- return -1;
- p = senc;
- i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
-
- p = (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- /*
- * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
- * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
- */
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
- &hctx, 1) < 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- return -1;
- }
- } else {
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
- }
- l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
- /* Skip ticket length for now */
- p += 2;
- /* Output key name */
- macstart = p;
- memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
- p += 16;
- /* output IV */
- memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
- p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- /* Encrypt session data */
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
- p += len;
- EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
- p += len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-
- p += hlen;
- /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
- /* Total length */
- len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data);
- /* Ticket length */
- p = (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
- s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p);
-
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = len;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
- s->init_off = 0;
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
-
- /* XDTLS: set message header ? */
- msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
- SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0,
- msg_len);
-
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
- return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_srvr.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/d1_srvr.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_srvr.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/d1_srvr.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1759 @@
+/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra at cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver);
+static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver)
+{
+ if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ return (DTLSv1_server_method());
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method,
+ dtls1_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function, dtls1_get_server_method)
+
+int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int new_state, state, skip = 0;
+ int listen;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+ char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+#endif
+
+ RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ listen = s->d1->listen;
+
+ /* init things to blank */
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+ SSL_clear(s);
+
+ s->d1->listen = listen;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream
+ * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
+ s->in_handshake, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ if (s->cert == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /*
+ * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
+ * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
+ * handshakes anyway.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (;;) {
+ state = s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+ s->server = 1;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+ if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf = buf;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+ /*
+ * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
+ */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+
+ if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
+ /*
+ * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
+ * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) ...but not with
+ * SCTP :-)
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+#endif
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ !(s->options &
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ /*
+ * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
+ * support secure renegotiation.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
+ * HelloRequest
+ */
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+
+ if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
+ s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while
+ * listening
+ */
+ if (listen) {
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence,
+ sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
+ /* If we're just listening, stop here */
+ if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
+ ret = 2;
+ s->d1->listen = 0;
+ /*
+ * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake.
+ */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
+ case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
+
+ ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+
+ /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK:
+
+ if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+
+ case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK:
+ ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ if (s->d1->next_state != SSL_ST_OK) {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->state = s->d1->next_state;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ s->renegotiate = 2;
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (s->hit) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
+ * SCTP used.
+ */
+ snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
+ DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
+ } else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
+ } else
+ skip = 1;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /*
+ * clear this, it may get reset by
+ * send_server_key_exchange
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * only send if a DH key exchange or RSA but we have a sign only
+ * certificate
+ */
+ if (0
+ /*
+ * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
+ * provided
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
+ [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
+ 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ ) {
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ skip = 1;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+ if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ /*
+ * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
+ * during re-negotiation:
+ */
+ ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+ /*
+ * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
+ * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
+ * RFC 2246):
+ */
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ /*
+ * ... except when the application insists on
+ * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
+ * this for SSL 3)
+ */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+ /*
+ * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
+ */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+ /*
+ * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
+ * are omitted
+ */
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ /* no cert request */
+ skip = 1;
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+ s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
+ }
+#endif
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+ s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
+ }
+# endif
+#else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+ s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ ret = dtls1_send_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * If the write error was fatal, stop trying
+ */
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ }
+
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+ /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
+ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 2) {
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+ } else {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
+ * used.
+ */
+ snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
+ DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+#endif
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (ret == 2) {
+ /*
+ * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
+ * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
+ * not sent.
+ */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ } else {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
+ * it can be verified
+ */
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_md5,
+ &(s->s3->
+ tmp.cert_verify_md
+ [0]));
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1,
+ &(s->s3->
+ tmp.cert_verify_md
+ [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+ state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
+ s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK;
+ else
+#endif
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+ /*
+ * Enable CCS. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
+ * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
+ * cautious.
+ * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+ * processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
+ * the client's Finished message is read.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
+ ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret = dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret = dtls1_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ if (s->hit) {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
+ s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+#if 0
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ /* remove buffering on output */
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
+ * HelloRequest */
+ s->renegotiate = 0;
+ s->new_session = 0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* s->server=1; */
+ s->handshake_func = dtls1_accept;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ /* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+ /* next message is server hello */
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
+ if (s->debug) {
+ if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
+ new_state = s->state;
+ s->state = state;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+ s->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip = 0;
+ }
+ end:
+ /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+
+ s->in_handshake--;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and prevent stream
+ * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE,
+ s->in_handshake, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit
+ * requests for it
+ */
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned int msg_len;
+ unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
+
+ if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A) {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF;
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
+ s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
+ &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *(p++) = (unsigned char)s->d1->cookie_len;
+ memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+ p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+ msg_len = p - msg;
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
+ DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0,
+ msg_len);
+
+ s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = p - buf;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int sl;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = s->s3->server_random;
+ ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the session id.
+ * If it is a re-use, we send back the old session-id, if it is a new
+ * session, we send back the new session-id or we send back a 0
+ * length session-id if we want it to be single use. Currently I will
+ * not implement the '0' length session-id 12-Jan-98 - I'll now
+ * support the '0' length stuff.
+ */
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
+ s->session->session_id_length = 0;
+
+ sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *(p++) = sl;
+ memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
+ p += sl;
+
+ /* put the cipher */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
+ p += i;
+
+ /* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++) = 0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ else
+ *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((p =
+ ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
+ buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
+ NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* do the header */
+ l = (p - d);
+ d = buf;
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = p - buf;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ int j, num;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int u;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encodedlen = 0;
+ int curve_id = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int al, i;
+ unsigned long type;
+ int n;
+ CERT *cert;
+ BIGNUM *r[4];
+ int nr[4], kn;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+ type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ cert = s->cert;
+
+ buf = s->init_buf;
+
+ r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
+ n = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
+ rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
+ if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
+ rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ r[0] = rsa->n;
+ r[1] = rsa->e;
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
+ dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
+ if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (dhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
+ if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+ dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+ dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+ if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ r[0] = dh->p;
+ r[1] = dh->g;
+ r[2] = dh->pub_key;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
+ ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
+ s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ }
+ if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+ if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
+ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
+ * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
+ * non-zero.
+ */
+ if ((curve_id =
+ tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+ == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+ if (encodedlen == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ bn_ctx = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
+ * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
+ * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+ * structure.
+ */
+ n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+ /*
+ * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
+ * can set these to NULLs
+ */
+ r[0] = NULL;
+ r[1] = NULL;
+ r[2] = NULL;
+ r[3] = NULL;
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /*
+ * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
+ */
+ n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+ n += 2 + nr[i];
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, NULL))
+ == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ } else {
+ pkey = NULL;
+ kn = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + kn)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ s2n(nr[i], p);
+ BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
+ p += nr[i];
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
+ * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
+ * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
+ * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
+ */
+ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = curve_id;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = encodedlen;
+ p += 1;
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
+ (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ encodedPoint = NULL;
+ p += encodedlen;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+ strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+ p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* not anonymous */
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * n is the length of the params, they start at
+ * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space at the
+ * end.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ q = md_buf;
+ j = 0;
+ for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
+ ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),
+ n);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
+ q += i;
+ j += i;
+ }
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n += u + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ /* lets do DSS */
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_dss1(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_DSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i, p);
+ n += i + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ /* let's do ECDSA */
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i, p);
+ n += i + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ /* Is this error check actually needed? */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
+ SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
+
+ /*
+ * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
+ */
+ s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i, j, nl, off, n;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned int msg_len;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
+ buf = s->init_buf;
+
+ d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+ p++;
+ n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
+ d[0] = n;
+ p += n;
+ n++;
+
+ off = n;
+ p += 2;
+ n += 2;
+
+ sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ nl = 0;
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+ j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
+ (buf, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + n + j + 2)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + n]);
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
+ s2n(j, p);
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+ n += 2 + j;
+ nl += 2 + j;
+ } else {
+ d = p;
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+ j -= 2;
+ s2n(j, d);
+ j += 2;
+ n += j;
+ nl += j;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* else no CA names */
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + off]);
+ s2n(nl, p);
+
+ d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+ l2n3(n, d);
+ s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, d);
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+
+ /*
+ * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
+ */
+
+ s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+/* XXX: what to do about this? */
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ s->init_num += 4;
+#endif
+
+ /* XDTLS: set message header ? */
+ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0,
+ msg_len);
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ X509 *x;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
+ x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) ||
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ l = dtls1_output_cert_chain(s, x);
+ if (!l) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+ s->init_num = (int)l;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
+ unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+ int len, slen;
+ unsigned int hlen, msg_len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /*
+ * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
+ * long
+ */
+ if (slen > 0xFF00)
+ return -1;
+ /*
+ * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows 12
+ * (DTLS handshake message header) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2
+ * (ticket length) + 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session length)
+ * + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ return -1;
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+ if (!senc)
+ return -1;
+ p = senc;
+ i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ /*
+ * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
+ * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+ l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data);
+ /* Ticket length */
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4;
+ s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p);
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = len;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+
+ /* XDTLS: set message header ? */
+ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data,
+ SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0,
+ msg_len);
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s23_clnt.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,797 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s23_clnt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver);
-static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
- if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
- return (SSLv2_client_method());
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
- return (SSLv3_client_method());
-#endif
- if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
- return (TLSv1_client_method());
- else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
- return (TLSv1_1_client_method());
- else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
- return (TLSv1_2_client_method());
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_client_method,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl23_connect, ssl23_get_client_method)
-
-int ssl23_connect(SSL *s)
-{
- BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
- unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
- int new_state, state;
-
- RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
- ERR_clear_error();
- clear_sys_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
- SSL_clear(s);
-
- for (;;) {
- state = s->state;
-
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
- case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
- case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-
- if (s->session != NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT,
- SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->server = 0;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-
- /* s->version=TLS1_VERSION; */
- s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
- if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_buf = buf;
- buf = NULL;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-
- s->state = SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
- s->shutdown = 0;
- ret = ssl23_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- break;
-
- case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- ret = ssl23_get_server_hello(s);
- if (ret >= 0)
- cb = NULL;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
-
- default:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- if (s->debug) {
- (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
- }
-
- if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
- new_state = s->state;
- s->state = state;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
- s->state = new_state;
- }
- }
- end:
- s->in_handshake--;
- if (buf != NULL)
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(SSL *s)
-{
- SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
- int i;
- ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
- cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
- if (cipher->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2)
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Fill a ClientRandom or ServerRandom field of length len. Returns <= 0 on
- * failure, 1 on success.
- */
-int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
-{
- int send_time = 0;
-
- if (len < 4)
- return 0;
- if (server)
- send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0;
- else
- send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
- if (send_time) {
- unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- unsigned char *p = result;
- l2n(Time, p);
- return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len - 4);
- } else
- return RAND_pseudo_bytes(result, len);
-}
-
-static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *buf;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int i, ch_len;
- unsigned long l;
- int ssl2_compat;
- int version = 0, version_major, version_minor;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- int j;
- SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
- int ret;
- unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
-
- ssl2_compat = (options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) ? 0 : 1;
-
- if (ssl2_compat && ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(s))
- ssl2_compat = 0;
-
- /*
- * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
- * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
- * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
- * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
- * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
- * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
- */
- mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
- | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
- | (ssl2_compat ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 : 0)
-#endif
- ;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
- version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
-
- if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) && (options & mask) != mask)
- version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
-#else
- version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
-#endif
- mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
- if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
- version = TLS1_VERSION;
- mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
- if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
- version = SSL3_VERSION;
- mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
-#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
- if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) && (options & mask) != mask)
- version = SSL2_VERSION;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (version != SSL2_VERSION) {
- /*
- * have to disable SSL 2.0 compatibility if we need TLS extensions
- */
-
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
- ssl2_compat = 0;
- if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1)
- ssl2_compat = 0;
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0
- || s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
- ssl2_compat = 0;
-# endif
- }
-#endif
-
- buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
-#if 0
- /* don't reuse session-id's */
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
- return (-1);
- }
-#endif
-
- p = s->s3->client_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
- return -1;
-
- if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- version_major = TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR;
- version_minor = TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR;
- } else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
- version_major = TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR;
- version_minor = TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR;
- } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
- version_major = TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
- version_minor = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
- }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- else if (FIPS_mode()) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
- else if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- version_major = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
- version_minor = SSL3_VERSION_MINOR;
- } else if (version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- version_major = SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR;
- version_minor = SSL2_VERSION_MINOR;
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- s->client_version = version;
-
- if (ssl2_compat) {
- /* create SSL 2.0 compatible Client Hello */
-
- /* two byte record header will be written last */
- d = &(buf[2]);
- p = d + 9; /* leave space for message type, version,
- * individual length fields */
-
- *(d++) = SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
- *(d++) = version_major;
- *(d++) = version_minor;
-
- /* Ciphers supported */
- i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), p, 0);
- if (i == 0) {
- /* no ciphers */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
- return -1;
- }
- s2n(i, d);
- p += i;
-
- /*
- * put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse)
- */
-#if 0
- s->session->session_id_length = 0;
-#endif
- s2n(0, d);
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
- ch_len = SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
- else
- ch_len = SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
-
- /* write out sslv2 challenge */
- /*
- * Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32), because it
- * is one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32) or
- * SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (16), but leave the check in for
- * futurproofing
- */
- if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
- i = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- else
- i = ch_len;
- s2n(i, d);
- memset(&(s->s3->client_random[0]), 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes
- (&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i) <= 0)
- return -1;
-
- memcpy(p, &(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i);
- p += i;
-
- i = p - &(buf[2]);
- buf[0] = ((i >> 8) & 0xff) | 0x80;
- buf[1] = (i & 0xff);
-
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = i + 2;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, &(buf[2]), i);
- } else {
- /* create Client Hello in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format */
-
- /*
- * do the record header (5 bytes) and handshake message header (4
- * bytes) last
- */
- d = p = &(buf[9]);
-
- *(p++) = version_major;
- *(p++) = version_minor;
-
- /* Random stuff */
- memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* Session ID (zero since there is no reuse) */
- *(p++) = 0;
-
- /* Ciphers supported (using SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format) */
- i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]),
- ssl3_put_cipher_by_char);
- if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
- return -1;
- }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
- /*
- * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack
- * workaround chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well
- * below this if we use TLS v1.2
- */
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
- && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
- i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
-#endif
- s2n(i, p);
- p += i;
-
- /* COMPRESSION */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- *(p++) = 1;
-#else
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
- || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
- j = 0;
- else
- j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
- *(p++) = 1 + j;
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
- *(p++) = comp->id;
- }
-#endif
- *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* TLS extensions */
- if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return -1;
- }
- if ((p =
- ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
- buf +
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
- NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
-
- l = p - d;
-
- /* fill in 4-byte handshake header */
- d = &(buf[5]);
- *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
- l2n3(l, d);
-
- l += 4;
-
- if (l > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* fill in 5-byte record header */
- d = buf;
- *(d++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
- *(d++) = version_major;
- /*
- * Some servers hang if we use long client hellos and a record
- * number > TLS 1.0.
- */
- if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
- *(d++) = 1;
- else
- *(d++) = version_minor;
- s2n((int)l, d);
-
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = p - buf;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, &(buf[5]), s->init_num - 5);
- }
-
- s->state = SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
- ret = ssl23_write_bytes(s);
-
- if ((ret >= 2) && s->msg_callback) {
- /* Client Hello has been sent; tell msg_callback */
-
- if (ssl2_compat)
- s->msg_callback(1, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data + 2,
- ret - 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- else
- s->msg_callback(1, version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- s->init_buf->data + 5, ret - 5, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- char buf[8];
- unsigned char *p;
- int i;
- int n;
-
- n = ssl23_read_bytes(s, 7);
-
- if (n != 7)
- return (n);
- p = s->packet;
-
- memcpy(buf, p, n);
-
- if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO) &&
- (p[5] == 0x00) && (p[6] == 0x02)) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
-#else
- /* we are talking sslv2 */
- /*
- * we need to clean up the SSLv3 setup and put in the sslv2 stuff.
- */
- int ch_len;
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->s2 == NULL) {
- if (!ssl2_new(s))
- goto err;
- } else
- ssl2_clear(s);
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
- ch_len = SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
- else
- ch_len = SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
-
- /* write out sslv2 challenge */
- /*
- * Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32), because it is
- * one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32) or SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH
- * (16), but leave the check in for futurproofing
- */
- i = (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
- ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : ch_len;
- s->s2->challenge_length = i;
- memcpy(s->s2->challenge,
- &(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i);
-
- if (s->s3 != NULL)
- ssl3_free(s);
-
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
- SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A;
- if (!(s->client_version == SSL2_VERSION))
- /*
- * use special padding (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2)
- */
- s->s2->ssl2_rollback = 1;
-
- /*
- * setup the 7 bytes we have read so we get them from the sslv2
- * buffer
- */
- s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- s->packet_length = n;
- s->packet = &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
- memcpy(s->packet, buf, n);
- s->s2->rbuf_left = n;
- s->s2->rbuf_offs = 0;
-
- /* we have already written one */
- s->s2->write_sequence = 1;
-
- s->method = SSLv2_client_method();
- s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
-#endif
- } else if (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
- p[2] <= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
- ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && p[5] == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
- (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[3] == 0 && p[4] == 2))) {
- /* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode()) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
- goto err;
- }
-# endif
- s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
- s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
- } else
-#endif
- if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
- s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
- s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
- } else if ((p[2] == TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
- s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
- } else if ((p[2] == TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR) &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
- s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
- OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
-
- if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
- /* fatal alert */
-
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- int j;
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- i = p[5];
- if (cb != NULL) {
- j = (i << 8) | p[6];
- cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
- }
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, p + 5, 2, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + p[6]);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1))
- goto err;
-
- /* we are in this state */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-
- /*
- * put the 7 bytes we have read into the input buffer for SSLv3
- */
- s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- s->packet_length = n;
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
- goto err;
- s->packet = &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
- memcpy(s->packet, buf, n);
- s->s3->rbuf.left = n;
- s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
-
- s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /*
- * Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not reusing a
- * session-id
- */
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
- goto err;
-
- return (SSL_connect(s));
- err:
- return (-1);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s23_clnt.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s23_clnt.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s23_clnt.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,790 @@
+/* ssl/s23_clnt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver);
+static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s);
+static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return (SSLv2_client_method());
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return (SSLv3_client_method());
+#endif
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return (TLSv1_client_method());
+ else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ return (TLSv1_1_client_method());
+ else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ return (TLSv1_2_client_method());
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl23_connect, ssl23_get_client_method)
+
+int ssl23_connect(SSL *s)
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int new_state, state;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+ SSL_clear(s);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ state = s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+ if (s->session != NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT,
+ SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->server = 0;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+ /* s->version=TLS1_VERSION; */
+ s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ s->state = SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ ret = ssl23_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret = ssl23_get_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ cb = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if (s->debug) {
+ (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
+ new_state = s->state;
+ s->state = state;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+ s->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(SSL *s)
+{
+ SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+ int i;
+ ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+ cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+ if (cipher->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fill a ClientRandom or ServerRandom field of length len. Returns <= 0 on
+ * failure, 1 on success.
+ */
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
+{
+ int send_time = 0;
+
+ if (len < 4)
+ return 0;
+ if (server)
+ send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+ else
+ send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+ if (send_time) {
+ unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ unsigned char *p = result;
+ l2n(Time, p);
+ return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len - 4);
+ } else
+ return RAND_pseudo_bytes(result, len);
+}
+
+static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i, ch_len;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int ssl2_compat;
+ int version = 0, version_major, version_minor;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int j;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+ int ret;
+ unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
+
+ ssl2_compat = (options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) ? 0 : 1;
+
+ if (ssl2_compat && ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(s))
+ ssl2_compat = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
+ * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
+ * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
+ * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
+ * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
+ * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+ */
+ mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+ | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
+ | (ssl2_compat ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 : 0)
+#endif
+ ;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
+ version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+
+ if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) && (options & mask) != mask)
+ version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+#else
+ version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+#endif
+ mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+ if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
+ version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+ if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
+ version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
+ if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) && (options & mask) != mask)
+ version = SSL2_VERSION;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (version != SSL2_VERSION) {
+ /*
+ * have to disable SSL 2.0 compatibility if we need TLS extensions
+ */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+ ssl2_compat = 0;
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1)
+ ssl2_compat = 0;
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0
+ || s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ ssl2_compat = 0;
+# endif
+ }
+#endif
+
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+ /*
+ * Since we're sending s23 client hello, we're not reusing a session, as
+ * we'd be using the method from the saved session instead
+ */
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ p = s->s3->client_random;
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ version_major = TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ version_minor = TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR;
+ } else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+ version_major = TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ version_minor = TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR;
+ } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ version_major = TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ version_minor = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ else if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ version_major = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ version_minor = SSL3_VERSION_MINOR;
+ } else if (version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ version_major = SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR;
+ version_minor = SSL2_VERSION_MINOR;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ s->client_version = version;
+
+ if (ssl2_compat) {
+ /* create SSL 2.0 compatible Client Hello */
+
+ /* two byte record header will be written last */
+ d = &(buf[2]);
+ p = d + 9; /* leave space for message type, version,
+ * individual length fields */
+
+ *(d++) = SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ *(d++) = version_major;
+ *(d++) = version_minor;
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), p, 0);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ /* no ciphers */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s2n(i, d);
+ p += i;
+
+ /*
+ * put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse)
+ */
+ s2n(0, d);
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
+ ch_len = SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+ else
+ ch_len = SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+
+ /* write out sslv2 challenge */
+ /*
+ * Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32), because it
+ * is one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32) or
+ * SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (16), but leave the check in for
+ * futurproofing
+ */
+ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
+ i = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ else
+ i = ch_len;
+ s2n(i, d);
+ memset(&(s->s3->client_random[0]), 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes
+ (&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ memcpy(p, &(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i);
+ p += i;
+
+ i = p - &(buf[2]);
+ buf[0] = ((i >> 8) & 0xff) | 0x80;
+ buf[1] = (i & 0xff);
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = i + 2;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, &(buf[2]), i);
+ } else {
+ /* create Client Hello in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format */
+
+ /*
+ * do the record header (5 bytes) and handshake message header (4
+ * bytes) last
+ */
+ d = p = &(buf[9]);
+
+ *(p++) = version_major;
+ *(p++) = version_minor;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* Session ID (zero since there is no reuse) */
+ *(p++) = 0;
+
+ /* Ciphers supported (using SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 format) */
+ i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]),
+ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+ /*
+ * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack
+ * workaround chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well
+ * below this if we use TLS v1.2
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
+ i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+#endif
+ s2n(i, p);
+ p += i;
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++) = 1;
+#else
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
+ j = 0;
+ else
+ j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ *(p++) = 1 + j;
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
+ *(p++) = comp->id;
+ }
+#endif
+ *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((p =
+ ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
+ buf +
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
+ NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ l = p - d;
+
+ /* fill in 4-byte handshake header */
+ d = &(buf[5]);
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ l2n3(l, d);
+
+ l += 4;
+
+ if (l > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* fill in 5-byte record header */
+ d = buf;
+ *(d++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ *(d++) = version_major;
+ /*
+ * Some servers hang if we use long client hellos and a record
+ * number > TLS 1.0.
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
+ *(d++) = 1;
+ else
+ *(d++) = version_minor;
+ s2n((int)l, d);
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = p - buf;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, &(buf[5]), s->init_num - 5);
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ ret = ssl23_write_bytes(s);
+
+ if ((ret >= 2) && s->msg_callback) {
+ /* Client Hello has been sent; tell msg_callback */
+
+ if (ssl2_compat)
+ s->msg_callback(1, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data + 2,
+ ret - 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ else
+ s->msg_callback(1, version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ s->init_buf->data + 5, ret - 5, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ char buf[8];
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ int n;
+
+ n = ssl23_read_bytes(s, 7);
+
+ if (n != 7)
+ return (n);
+ p = s->packet;
+
+ memcpy(buf, p, n);
+
+ if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO) &&
+ (p[5] == 0x00) && (p[6] == 0x02)) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+#else
+ /* we are talking sslv2 */
+ /*
+ * we need to clean up the SSLv3 setup and put in the sslv2 stuff.
+ */
+ int ch_len;
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->s2 == NULL) {
+ if (!ssl2_new(s))
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ ssl2_clear(s);
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
+ ch_len = SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+ else
+ ch_len = SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
+
+ /* write out sslv2 challenge */
+ /*
+ * Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32), because it is
+ * one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32) or SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH
+ * (16), but leave the check in for futurproofing
+ */
+ i = (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
+ ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : ch_len;
+ s->s2->challenge_length = i;
+ memcpy(s->s2->challenge,
+ &(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i);
+
+ if (s->s3 != NULL)
+ ssl3_free(s);
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
+ SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_A;
+ if (!(s->client_version == SSL2_VERSION))
+ /*
+ * use special padding (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2)
+ */
+ s->s2->ssl2_rollback = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * setup the 7 bytes we have read so we get them from the sslv2
+ * buffer
+ */
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ s->packet_length = n;
+ s->packet = &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
+ memcpy(s->packet, buf, n);
+ s->s2->rbuf_left = n;
+ s->s2->rbuf_offs = 0;
+
+ /* we have already written one */
+ s->s2->write_sequence = 1;
+
+ s->method = SSLv2_client_method();
+ s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
+#endif
+ } else if (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
+ p[2] <= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
+ ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && p[5] == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
+ (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[3] == 0 && p[4] == 2))) {
+ /* we have sslv3 or tls1 (server hello or alert) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if ((p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+# endif
+ s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
+ } else
+#endif
+ if ((p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
+ } else if ((p[2] == TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
+ } else if ((p[2] == TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
+
+ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
+ if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+ /* fatal alert */
+
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int j;
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ i = p[5];
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ j = (i << 8) | p[6];
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+ }
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, p + 5, 2, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + p[6]);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* we are in this state */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+
+ /*
+ * put the 7 bytes we have read into the input buffer for SSLv3
+ */
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ s->packet_length = n;
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ goto err;
+ s->packet = &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
+ memcpy(s->packet, buf, n);
+ s->s3->rbuf.left = n;
+ s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
+
+ s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ return (SSL_connect(s));
+ err:
+ return (-1);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_cbc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_cbc.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_cbc.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,805 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-/*
- * MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's
- * length field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.)
- */
-#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
-
-/*
- * MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
- * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
- * supported by TLS.)
- */
-#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
-
-/*-
- * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
- * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
- *
- * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
- * returns:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
- * 1: if the padding was valid
- * -1: otherwise.
- */
-int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
- SSL3_RECORD *rec,
- unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
-{
- unsigned padding_length, good;
- const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
-
- /*
- * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time.
- */
- if (overhead > rec->length)
- return 0;
-
- padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
- good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead);
- /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
- good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1);
- padding_length = good & (padding_length + 1);
- rec->length -= padding_length;
- rec->type |= padding_length << 8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
- return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
-}
-
-/*-
- * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
- * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
- * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record
- * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the
- * padding was removed.
- *
- * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
- * returns:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
- * 1: if the padding was valid
- * -1: otherwise.
- */
-int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
- SSL3_RECORD *rec,
- unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
-{
- unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
- const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
- /* Check if version requires explicit IV */
- if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- /*
- * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
- * time.
- */
- if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
- return 0;
- /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
- rec->data += block_size;
- rec->input += block_size;
- rec->length -= block_size;
- } else if (overhead > rec->length)
- return 0;
-
- padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
-
- /*
- * NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of even
- * length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug
- * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either
- * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve]
- */
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand) {
- /* First packet is even in size, so check */
- if ((CRYPTO_memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8) == 0) &&
- !(padding_length & 1)) {
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
- }
- if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) && padding_length > 0) {
- padding_length--;
- }
- }
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
- /* padding is already verified */
- rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
- return 1;
- }
-
- good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
- /*
- * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
- * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length
- * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of
- * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that
- * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the
- * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record
- * is public information so we can use it.)
- */
- to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
- if (to_check > rec->length - 1)
- to_check = rec->length - 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
- unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
- unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i];
- /*
- * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
- * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero.
- */
- good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b));
- }
-
- /*
- * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one
- * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
- */
- good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
- padding_length = good & (padding_length + 1);
- rec->length -= padding_length;
- rec->type |= padding_length << 8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
-
- return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
-}
-
-/*-
- * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
- * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may
- * vary within a 256-byte window).
- *
- * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to
- * this function.
- *
- * On entry:
- * rec->orig_len >= md_size
- * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
- *
- * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with
- * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into
- * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't
- * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are
- * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
- */
-#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
-
-void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
- const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
- unsigned md_size, unsigned orig_len)
-{
-#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
- unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char *rotated_mac;
-#else
- unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-#endif
-
- /*
- * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC.
- */
- unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
- unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
- /*
- * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the
- * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
- */
- unsigned scan_start = 0;
- unsigned i, j;
- unsigned div_spoiler;
- unsigned rotate_offset;
-
- OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-
-#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
- rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63);
-#endif
-
- /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
- if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
- scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
- /*
- * div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
- * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
- * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
- * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't
- * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it to
- * prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it.
- */
- div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;
- div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler) - 1) * 8;
- rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
-
- memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
- for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++) {
- unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
- unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
- unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
- rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
- j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size);
- }
-
- /* Now rotate the MAC */
-#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
- j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
- /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
- ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32];
- out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
- rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
- }
-#else
- memset(out, 0, md_size);
- rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
- rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
- for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
- for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
- out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
- rotate_offset++;
- rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
- }
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
- * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four.
- */
-#define u32toLE(n, p) \
- (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
- *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
- *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
- *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
-
-/*
- * These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the
- * standard "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such
- * a function typically does.
- */
-static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
-{
- MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;
- u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
- u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
- u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
- u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
-}
-
-static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
-{
- SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
- l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
- l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
- l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
- l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
- l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
-}
-
-#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
-{
- SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
- unsigned i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
- }
-}
-
-# undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
-# define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
-static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
-{
- SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
- unsigned i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
- }
-}
-
-# undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
-# define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
-#endif
-
-/*
- * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
- * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
- */
-char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return 0;
-#endif
- switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
- case NID_md5:
- case NID_sha1:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
- case NID_sha224:
- case NID_sha256:
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
- case NID_sha384:
- case NID_sha512:
-#endif
- return 1;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-/*-
- * ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
- * record.
- *
- * ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
- * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
- * md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
- * md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
- * header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
- * data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV.
- * data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
- * once the padding has been removed.
- * data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
- * record, including padding.
- * is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
- *
- * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
- * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
- * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
- * padding too. )
- */
-void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *md_out,
- size_t *md_out_size,
- const unsigned char header[13],
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_plus_mac_size,
- size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
- const unsigned char *mac_secret,
- unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3)
-{
- union {
- double align;
- unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];
- } md_state;
- void (*md_final_raw) (void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
- void (*md_transform) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
- unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
- unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
- len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
- num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
- unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */
- unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
- /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
- unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
- unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
- unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- /*
- * mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that
- * terminates * the hash.
- */
- unsigned md_length_size = 8;
- char length_is_big_endian = 1;
-
- /*
- * This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
- * many possible overflows later in this function.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024);
-
- switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
- case NID_md5:
- MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c);
- md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
- md_transform =
- (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform;
- md_size = 16;
- sslv3_pad_length = 48;
- length_is_big_endian = 0;
- break;
- case NID_sha1:
- SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c);
- md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
- md_transform =
- (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform;
- md_size = 20;
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
- case NID_sha224:
- SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c);
- md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
- md_transform =
- (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
- md_size = 224 / 8;
- break;
- case NID_sha256:
- SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c);
- md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
- md_transform =
- (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
- md_size = 32;
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
- case NID_sha384:
- SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c);
- md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
- md_transform =
- (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
- md_size = 384 / 8;
- md_block_size = 128;
- md_length_size = 16;
- break;
- case NID_sha512:
- SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c);
- md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
- md_transform =
- (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
- md_size = 64;
- md_block_size = 128;
- md_length_size = 16;
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- /*
- * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
- * check that the hash function is supported.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(0);
- if (md_out_size)
- *md_out_size = -1;
- return;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-
- header_length = 13;
- if (is_sslv3) {
- header_length = mac_secret_length + sslv3_pad_length + 8 /* sequence
- * number */ +
- 1 /* record type */ +
- 2 /* record length */ ;
- }
-
- /*
- * variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
- * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
- * padding value. In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of
- * the plaintext varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively
- * assume that the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes
- * of hash termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final
- * block, we say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
- * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
- * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks can
- * vary based on the padding. Later in the function, if the message is
- * short and there obviously cannot be this many blocks then
- * variance_blocks can be reduced.
- */
- variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
- /*
- * From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
- * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
- * (SSLv3)
- */
- len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
- /*
- * max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC,
- * including * |header|, assuming that there's no padding.
- */
- max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
- /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
- num_blocks =
- (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size -
- 1) / md_block_size;
- /*
- * In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle the
- * final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the end
- * to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we can't
- * leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can be hashed
- * right away because no padding value can affect whether they are
- * plaintext.
- */
- num_starting_blocks = 0;
- /*
- * k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
- * we start processing.
- */
- k = 0;
- /*
- * mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be MACed.
- */
- mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
- /*
- * c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that contains
- * application data.
- */
- c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
- /*
- * index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
- * value.
- */
- index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
- /*
- * index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash length,
- * in bits.
- */
- index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
- /*
- * bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash block
- * for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of SSLv3.
- */
-
- /*
- * For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need at
- * least two because the header is larger than a single block.
- */
- if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) {
- num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
- k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks;
- }
-
- bits = 8 * mac_end_offset;
- if (!is_sslv3) {
- /*
- * Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and secret
- * bytes are included in |header| because they take more than a
- * single block.
- */
- bits += 8 * md_block_size;
- memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
- memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
- for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
- hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
-
- md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
- }
-
- if (length_is_big_endian) {
- memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
- length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
- length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
- length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
- length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (unsigned char)bits;
- } else {
- memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size);
- length_bytes[md_length_size - 5] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
- length_bytes[md_length_size - 6] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
- length_bytes[md_length_size - 7] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
- length_bytes[md_length_size - 8] = (unsigned char)bits;
- }
-
- if (k > 0) {
- if (is_sslv3) {
- unsigned overhang;
-
- /*
- * The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is
- * the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header
- * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no
- * ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and
- * therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be
- * greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just
- * in case
- */
- if (header_length <= md_block_size) {
- /* Should never happen */
- return;
- }
- overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
- md_transform(md_state.c, header);
- memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
- memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang);
- md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
- for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size - 1; i++)
- md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - overhang);
- } else {
- /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
- memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
- memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
- md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
- for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++)
- md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - 13);
- }
- }
-
- memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
-
- /*
- * We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct it
- * in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
- * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
- * constant time, to |mac_out|.
- */
- for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks;
- i++) {
- unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
- unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
- unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
- for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
- unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
- if (k < header_length)
- b = header[k];
- else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
- b = data[k - header_length];
- k++;
-
- is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
- is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c + 1);
- /*
- * If this is the block containing the end of the application
- * data, and we are at the offset for the 0x80 value, then
- * overwrite b with 0x80.
- */
- b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
- /*
- * If this the the block containing the end of the application
- * data and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero.
- */
- b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
- /*
- * If this is index_b (the final block), but not index_a (the end
- * of the data), then the 64-bit length didn't fit into index_a
- * and we're having to add an extra block of zeros.
- */
- b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
-
- /*
- * The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the length.
- */
- if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
- /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
- b = constant_time_select_8(is_block_b,
- length_bytes[j -
- (md_block_size -
- md_length_size)], b);
- }
- block[j] = b;
- }
-
- md_transform(md_state.c, block);
- md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
- /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
- for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
- mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */ );
- if (is_sslv3) {
- /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
- memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
-
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
- } else {
- /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
- for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
- hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
-
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
- }
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
- if (md_out_size)
- *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-
-/*
- * Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but
- * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases by
- * digesting additional data.
- */
-
-void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
- EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_len, size_t orig_len)
-{
- size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- return;
- block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
- /*-
- * We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
- * digests and TLS to deal with.
- * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
- * otherwise.
- * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
- * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
- * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
- * So we have:
- * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
- * equivalently:
- * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
- * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
- * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
- * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
- * for SHA384/SHA512 and
- * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
- * otherwise.
- */
- digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
- blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
- blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
- /*
- * MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original and
- * actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a no op.
- * The "data" pointer should always have enough space to perform this
- * operation as it is large enough for a maximum length TLS buffer.
- */
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data,
- (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size);
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_cbc.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_cbc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_cbc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_cbc.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,820 @@
+/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+/*
+ * MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's
+ * length field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.)
+ */
+#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
+
+/*
+ * MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
+ * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
+ * supported by TLS.)
+ */
+#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+
+/*-
+ * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC
+ * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ * 1: if the padding was valid
+ * -1: otherwise.
+ */
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+ unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
+{
+ unsigned padding_length, good;
+ const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+
+ /*
+ * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time.
+ */
+ if (overhead > rec->length)
+ return 0;
+
+ padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
+ good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead);
+ /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
+ good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1);
+ padding_length = good & (padding_length + 1);
+ rec->length -= padding_length;
+ rec->type |= padding_length << 8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
+ * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
+ * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record
+ * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the
+ * padding was removed.
+ *
+ * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
+ * returns:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
+ * 1: if the padding was valid
+ * -1: otherwise.
+ */
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+ unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
+{
+ unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
+ const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+ /* Check if version requires explicit IV */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ /*
+ * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
+ * time.
+ */
+ if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
+ return 0;
+ /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
+ rec->data += block_size;
+ rec->input += block_size;
+ rec->length -= block_size;
+ } else if (overhead > rec->length)
+ return 0;
+
+ padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
+
+ /*
+ * NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of even
+ * length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug
+ * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either
+ * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve]
+ */
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand) {
+ /* First packet is even in size, so check */
+ if ((CRYPTO_memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8) == 0) &&
+ !(padding_length & 1)) {
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
+ }
+ if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) && padding_length > 0) {
+ padding_length--;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+ /* padding is already verified */
+ rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
+ /*
+ * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
+ * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length
+ * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of
+ * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that
+ * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the
+ * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record
+ * is public information so we can use it.)
+ */
+ to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
+ if (to_check > rec->length - 1)
+ to_check = rec->length - 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
+ unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
+ unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i];
+ /*
+ * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
+ * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero.
+ */
+ good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one
+ * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
+ */
+ good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
+ padding_length = good & (padding_length + 1);
+ rec->length -= padding_length;
+ rec->type |= padding_length << 8; /* kludge: pass padding length */
+
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
+ * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may
+ * vary within a 256-byte window).
+ *
+ * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * On entry:
+ * rec->orig_len >= md_size
+ * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ *
+ * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with
+ * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into
+ * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't
+ * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are
+ * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
+ */
+#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
+
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
+ const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+ unsigned md_size, unsigned orig_len)
+{
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+ unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *rotated_mac;
+#else
+ unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC.
+ */
+ unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
+ unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+ /*
+ * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the
+ * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
+ */
+ unsigned scan_start = 0;
+ unsigned i, j;
+ unsigned div_spoiler;
+ unsigned rotate_offset;
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);
+ OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+ rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63);
+#endif
+
+ /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
+ if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
+ scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
+ /*
+ * div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
+ * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
+ * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
+ * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't
+ * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it to
+ * prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it.
+ */
+ div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;
+ div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler) - 1) * 8;
+ rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
+
+ memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
+ for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++) {
+ unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
+ unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
+ unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
+ rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
+ j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size);
+ }
+
+ /* Now rotate the MAC */
+#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
+ /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
+ ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32];
+ out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
+ rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+ }
+#else
+ memset(out, 0, md_size);
+ rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
+ rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+ for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+ out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
+ rotate_offset++;
+ rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
+ * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four.
+ */
+#define u32toLE(n, p) \
+ (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
+ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
+ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
+ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
+
+/*
+ * These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the
+ * standard "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such
+ * a function typically does.
+ */
+static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+{
+ MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;
+ u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
+ u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
+ u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
+ u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
+}
+
+static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+{
+ SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
+ l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
+ l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
+ l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
+ l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
+ l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
+}
+
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+{
+ SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
+ }
+}
+
+# undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+# define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
+{
+ SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
+ }
+}
+
+# undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+# define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
+ * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
+ */
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
+ case NID_md5:
+ case NID_sha1:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ case NID_sha224:
+ case NID_sha256:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ case NID_sha384:
+ case NID_sha512:
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
+ * record.
+ *
+ * ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
+ * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
+ * md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
+ * md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
+ * header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
+ * data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV.
+ * data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
+ * once the padding has been removed.
+ * data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
+ * record, including padding.
+ * is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
+ *
+ * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
+ * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
+ * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
+ * padding too. )
+ * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error
+ */
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *md_out,
+ size_t *md_out_size,
+ const unsigned char header[13],
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+ const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+ unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3)
+{
+ union {
+ double align;
+ unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];
+ } md_state;
+ void (*md_final_raw) (void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
+ void (*md_transform) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
+ unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
+ unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
+ len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
+ num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
+ unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */
+ unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
+ /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
+ unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ /*
+ * mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that
+ * terminates * the hash.
+ */
+ unsigned md_length_size = 8;
+ char length_is_big_endian = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
+ * many possible overflows later in this function.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024);
+
+ switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
+ case NID_md5:
+ if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
+ md_transform =
+ (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform;
+ md_size = 16;
+ sslv3_pad_length = 48;
+ length_is_big_endian = 0;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha1:
+ if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
+ md_transform =
+ (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform;
+ md_size = 20;
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ case NID_sha224:
+ if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+ md_transform =
+ (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
+ md_size = 224 / 8;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha256:
+ if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+ md_transform =
+ (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
+ md_size = 32;
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ case NID_sha384:
+ if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+ md_transform =
+ (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
+ md_size = 384 / 8;
+ md_block_size = 128;
+ md_length_size = 16;
+ break;
+ case NID_sha512:
+ if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+ md_transform =
+ (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
+ md_size = 64;
+ md_block_size = 128;
+ md_length_size = 16;
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ /*
+ * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
+ * check that the hash function is supported.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ if (md_out_size)
+ *md_out_size = -1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
+ OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ header_length = 13;
+ if (is_sslv3) {
+ header_length = mac_secret_length + sslv3_pad_length + 8 /* sequence
+ * number */ +
+ 1 /* record type */ +
+ 2 /* record length */ ;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
+ * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
+ * padding value. In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of
+ * the plaintext varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively
+ * assume that the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes
+ * of hash termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final
+ * block, we say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
+ * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
+ * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks can
+ * vary based on the padding. Later in the function, if the message is
+ * short and there obviously cannot be this many blocks then
+ * variance_blocks can be reduced.
+ */
+ variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
+ /*
+ * From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
+ * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
+ * (SSLv3)
+ */
+ len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
+ /*
+ * max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC,
+ * including * |header|, assuming that there's no padding.
+ */
+ max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
+ /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
+ num_blocks =
+ (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size -
+ 1) / md_block_size;
+ /*
+ * In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle the
+ * final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the end
+ * to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we can't
+ * leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can be hashed
+ * right away because no padding value can affect whether they are
+ * plaintext.
+ */
+ num_starting_blocks = 0;
+ /*
+ * k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
+ * we start processing.
+ */
+ k = 0;
+ /*
+ * mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be MACed.
+ */
+ mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
+ /*
+ * c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that contains
+ * application data.
+ */
+ c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
+ /*
+ * index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
+ * value.
+ */
+ index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
+ /*
+ * index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash length,
+ * in bits.
+ */
+ index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
+ /*
+ * bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash block
+ * for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of SSLv3.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need at
+ * least two because the header is larger than a single block.
+ */
+ if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) {
+ num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
+ k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks;
+ }
+
+ bits = 8 * mac_end_offset;
+ if (!is_sslv3) {
+ /*
+ * Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and secret
+ * bytes are included in |header| because they take more than a
+ * single block.
+ */
+ bits += 8 * md_block_size;
+ memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+ memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+ for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+ hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
+
+ md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
+ }
+
+ if (length_is_big_endian) {
+ memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
+ length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
+ length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
+ length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
+ length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (unsigned char)bits;
+ } else {
+ memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size);
+ length_bytes[md_length_size - 5] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
+ length_bytes[md_length_size - 6] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
+ length_bytes[md_length_size - 7] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
+ length_bytes[md_length_size - 8] = (unsigned char)bits;
+ }
+
+ if (k > 0) {
+ if (is_sslv3) {
+ unsigned overhang;
+
+ /*
+ * The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is
+ * the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header
+ * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no
+ * ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and
+ * therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be
+ * greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just
+ * in case
+ */
+ if (header_length <= md_block_size) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
+ md_transform(md_state.c, header);
+ memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
+ memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang);
+ md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+ for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size - 1; i++)
+ md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - overhang);
+ } else {
+ /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
+ memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
+ memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
+ md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+ for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++)
+ md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - 13);
+ }
+ }
+
+ memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
+
+ /*
+ * We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct it
+ * in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
+ * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
+ * constant time, to |mac_out|.
+ */
+ for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks;
+ i++) {
+ unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
+ unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
+ for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
+ unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
+ if (k < header_length)
+ b = header[k];
+ else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
+ b = data[k - header_length];
+ k++;
+
+ is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
+ is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c + 1);
+ /*
+ * If this is the block containing the end of the application
+ * data, and we are at the offset for the 0x80 value, then
+ * overwrite b with 0x80.
+ */
+ b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
+ /*
+ * If this the the block containing the end of the application
+ * data and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero.
+ */
+ b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
+ /*
+ * If this is index_b (the final block), but not index_a (the end
+ * of the data), then the 64-bit length didn't fit into index_a
+ * and we're having to add an extra block of zeros.
+ */
+ b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
+
+ /*
+ * The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the length.
+ */
+ if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
+ /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
+ b = constant_time_select_8(is_block_b,
+ length_bytes[j -
+ (md_block_size -
+ md_length_size)], b);
+ }
+ block[j] = b;
+ }
+
+ md_transform(md_state.c, block);
+ md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
+ /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
+ for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
+ mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (is_sslv3) {
+ /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
+ memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
+
+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
+ for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
+ hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
+
+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
+ if (md_out_size)
+ *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+ return 1;
+err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+/*
+ * Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but
+ * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases by
+ * digesting additional data.
+ */
+
+void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_len, size_t orig_len)
+{
+ size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ return;
+ block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
+ /*-
+ * We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
+ * digests and TLS to deal with.
+ * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
+ * otherwise.
+ * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
+ * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
+ * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
+ * So we have:
+ * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
+ * equivalently:
+ * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
+ * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
+ * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
+ * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
+ * for SHA384/SHA512 and
+ * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+ digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
+ blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
+ blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
+ /*
+ * MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original and
+ * actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a no op.
+ * The "data" pointer should always have enough space to perform this
+ * operation as it is large enough for a maximum length TLS buffer.
+ */
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data,
+ (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size);
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_clnt.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,3523 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# include <openssl/fips.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-
-static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
-{
- if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
- return (SSLv3_client_method());
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
-#endif
-int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
-{
- BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
- unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
- int new_state, state, skip = 0;
-
- RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
- ERR_clear_error();
- clear_sys_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
- SSL_clear(s);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /*
- * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
- * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
- * handshakes anyway.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- }
-#endif
-
- for (;;) {
- state = s->state;
-
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
- /* break */
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
- case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
- case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-
- s->server = 0;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-
- if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
- s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
- if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_buf = buf;
- buf = NULL;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* setup buffing BIO */
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- /*
- * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
- */
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
- s->shutdown = 0;
- ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
- if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
- s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (s->hit) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- /* receive renewed session ticket */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- }
-#endif
- } else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
- ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto end;
- if (ret == 1) {
- s->hit = 1;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
- }
-#endif
- /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
- /* or PSK */
- if (!
- (s->s3->tmp.
- new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- } else {
- skip = 1;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
-#else
- } else
- skip = 1;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /*
- * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
- * the server
- */
- if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
- if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
- ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- /*
- * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
- */
- /*
- * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
- * sent, but no verify packet is sent
- */
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
- * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
- * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
- * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- }
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- }
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
- SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
-#else
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
- else
- s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
- {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- break;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-#endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
- SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
-
- /* clear flags */
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
- if (s->hit) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
- if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
- s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
- }
- } else {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /*
- * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
- */
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
-#endif
-
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-#endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (s->hit)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
- * buffering now
- */
- if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
- /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->renegotiate = 0;
- s->new_session = 0;
-
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
- if (s->hit)
- s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
- ret = 1;
- /* s->server=0; */
- s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
-
- goto end;
- /* break; */
-
- case SSL_ST_ERR:
- default:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- /* did we do anything */
- if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
- if (s->debug) {
- if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
-
- if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
- new_state = s->state;
- s->state = state;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
- s->state = new_state;
- }
- }
- skip = 0;
- }
- end:
- s->in_handshake--;
- if (buf != NULL)
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *buf;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int i;
- unsigned long l;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- int j;
- SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
-
- buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
- SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
- if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- !sess->session_id_length ||
-#else
- /*
- * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
- * "ticket" without a session ID.
- */
- (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
-#endif
- (sess->not_resumable)) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
- goto err;
- }
- /* else use the pre-loaded session */
-
- p = s->s3->client_random;
-
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* Do the message type and length last */
- d = p = &(buf[4]);
-
- /*-
- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
- * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
- * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
- * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
- * choke if we initially report a higher version then
- * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
- * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
- * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
- * 1.0.
- *
- * Possible scenario with previous logic:
- * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
- * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
- * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
- * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
- * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
- * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
- * know that is maximum server supports.
- * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
- * containing version 1.0.
- *
- * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
- * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
- * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
- * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
- * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
- * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
- * the negotiated version.
- */
-#if 0
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
- s->client_version = s->version;
-#else
- *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
-#endif
-
- /* Random stuff */
- memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* Session ID */
- if (s->new_session)
- i = 0;
- else
- i = s->session->session_id_length;
- *(p++) = i;
- if (i != 0) {
- if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
- p += i;
- }
-
- /* Ciphers supported */
- i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
- if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
- goto err;
- }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
- /*
- * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
- * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
- * use TLS v1.2
- */
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
- && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
- i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
-#endif
- s2n(i, p);
- p += i;
-
- /* COMPRESSION */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- *(p++) = 1;
-#else
-
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
- || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
- j = 0;
- else
- j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
- *(p++) = 1 + j;
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
- *(p++) = comp->id;
- }
-#endif
- *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* TLS extensions */
- if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((p =
- ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
- buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
- NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-#endif
-
- l = (p - d);
- d = buf;
- *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
- l2n3(l, d);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = p - buf;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- err:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int i, al, ok;
- unsigned int j;
- long n;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
- if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return 1;
- } else { /* already sent a cookie */
-
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- p += 2;
-
- /* load the server hello data */
- /* load the server random */
- memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- s->hit = 0;
-
- /* get the session-id */
- j = *(p++);
-
- if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /*
- * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
- * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
- * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
- * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
- * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
- * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
- * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
- * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
- * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
- * server wants to resume.
- */
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
- s->session->tlsext_tick) {
- SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
- s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
- &s->session->master_key_length,
- NULL, &pref_cipher,
- s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
- s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
- pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
- if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
- && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
- if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
- || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
- /* actually a client application bug */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->hit = 1;
- } else {
- /*
- * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
- * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
- * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
- * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
- * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
- */
- if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- s->session->session_id_length = j;
- memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
- }
- p += j;
- c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
- if (c == NULL) {
- /* unknown cipher */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
- if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
- (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
- !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
- p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
-
- sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
- i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
- if (i < 0) {
- /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
- * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
- * set and use it for comparison.
- */
- if (s->session->cipher)
- s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
- if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
-/* Workaround is now obsolete */
-#if 0
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
-#endif
- {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
- /*
- * Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for client
- * authentication.
- */
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
- && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* lets get the compression algorithm */
- /* COMPRESSION */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (*(p++) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /*
- * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
- * using compression.
- */
- if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#else
- j = *(p++);
- if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (j == 0)
- comp = NULL;
- else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
- goto f_err;
- } else
- comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
-
- if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto f_err;
- } else {
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* TLS extensions */
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
- /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if (p != (d + n)) {
- /* wrong packet length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- return (1);
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
-{
- int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
- unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- const unsigned char *q, *p;
- unsigned char *d;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
- SESS_CERT *sc;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
- * KRB5 */
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
- -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return (1);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- n2l3(p, llen);
- if (llen + 3 != n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
- n2l3(p, l);
- if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- q = p;
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
- if (x == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (q != (p + l)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- x = NULL;
- nc += l + 3;
- p = q;
- }
-
- i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
- if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- ) {
- al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
-
- sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (sc == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert)
- ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
- s->session->sess_cert = sc;
-
- sc->cert_chain = sk;
- /*
- * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
- * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
- */
- x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
- sk = NULL;
- /*
- * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
- */
-
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
- ? 0 : 1;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
- fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
- x = NULL;
- al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
- if (need_cert && i < 0) {
- x = NULL;
- al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (need_cert) {
- sc->peer_cert_type = i;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- /*
- * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
- * of lines ago.
- */
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
- sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
- sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- s->session->peer = x;
- } else {
- sc->peer_cert_type = i;
- sc->peer_key = NULL;
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer = NULL;
- }
- s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
- x = NULL;
- ret = 1;
-
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- X509_free(x);
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
-#endif
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- unsigned char *param, *p;
- int al, j, ok;
- long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
- EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- int curve_nid = 0;
- int encoded_pt_len = 0;
-#endif
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
- /*
- * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
- * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
- */
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
- -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- /*
- * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
- * ciphersuite.
- */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /*
- * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
- * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
- * problems later.
- */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
- OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- }
-#endif
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return (1);
- }
-
- param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
- RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
- DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
- EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
- }
-#endif
- } else {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- }
-
- /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
- param_len = 0;
-
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-
- param_len = 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2s(p, i);
-
- /*
- * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
- * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
- * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
- * identity.
- */
- if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (i > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += i;
-
- /*
- * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
- * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
- * so create a NULL-terminated string.
- */
- memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
- memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- p += i;
- n -= param_len;
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- param_len = 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2s(p, i);
-
- if (i > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += i;
-
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- if (2 > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += 2;
-
- n2s(p, i);
-
- if (i > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += i;
-
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- if (1 > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += 1;
-
- i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
- p++;
-
- if (i > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += i;
-
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- if (2 > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += 2;
-
- n2s(p, i);
-
- if (i > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += i;
-
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
- n -= param_len;
-
- if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
-/* We must check if there is a certificate */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-# else
- if (0) ;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
- x509);
-# endif
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
- if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- param_len = 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2s(p, i);
-
- if (i > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += i;
-
- if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- if (2 > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += 2;
-
- n2s(p, i);
-
- if (i > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += i;
-
- if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
- n -= param_len;
-
- /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
- rsa = NULL;
- }
-#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
- if (0) ;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- param_len = 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2s(p, i);
-
- if (i > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += i;
-
- if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- if (2 > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += 2;
-
- n2s(p, i);
-
- if (i > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += i;
-
- if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- if (2 > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += 2;
-
- n2s(p, i);
-
- if (i > n - param_len) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += i;
-
- if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
- n -= param_len;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-# else
- if (0) ;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
- x509);
-# endif
- /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
-
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
- dh = NULL;
- } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
- EC_GROUP *ngroup;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
-
- if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
- * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
- * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
- */
-
- /*
- * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
- * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
- * byte for the length of the encoded point
- */
- param_len = 4;
- if (param_len > n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
- ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
- if (ngroup == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
-
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
-
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
- al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- p += 3;
-
- /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
- if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
- ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
- p += 1;
-
- if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
- (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
- p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- param_len += encoded_pt_len;
-
- n -= param_len;
- p += encoded_pt_len;
-
- /*
- * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
- * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
- * and ECDSA.
- */
- if (0) ;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
-# endif
- /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
- EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
- ecdh = NULL;
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
- EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
- srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- } else if (alg_k) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
- /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
-
- /* if it was signed, check the signature */
- if (pkey != NULL) {
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- int sigalg;
- if (2 > n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
- /* Should never happen */
- if (sigalg == -1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
- if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
- if (md == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- p += 2;
- n -= 2;
- } else
- md = EVP_sha1();
-
- if (2 > n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2s(p, i);
- n -= 2;
- j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-
- /*
- * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
- */
- if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
- /* wrong packet length */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
- && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- int num;
- unsigned int size;
-
- j = 0;
- q = md_buf;
- for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
- ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
- q += size;
- j += size;
- }
- i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
- if (i < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- /* bad signature */
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else
-#endif
- {
- EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
- /* bad signature */
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- } else {
- /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
- if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* still data left over */
- if (n != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return (1);
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (rsa != NULL)
- RSA_free(rsa);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (dh != NULL)
- DH_free(dh);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
- if (ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
-#endif
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok, ret = 0;
- unsigned long n, nc, l;
- unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
- X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
- const unsigned char *p, *q;
- unsigned char *d;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
- -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- /*
- * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
- * wont be doing client auth.
- */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- goto err;
- }
- return (1);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* get the certificate types */
- ctype_num = *(p++);
- if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
- ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
- for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
- s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
- p += ctype_num;
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- n2s(p, llen);
- /*
- * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
- * length value.
- */
- if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- p += llen;
- }
-
- /* get the CA RDNs */
- n2s(p, llen);
-#if 0
- {
- FILE *out;
- out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
- fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
- fclose(out);
- }
-#endif
-
- if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
- n2s(p, l);
- if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
- goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- q = p;
-
- if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
- /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
- goto cont;
- else {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (q != (p + l)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- p += l;
- nc += l + 2;
- }
-
- if (0) {
- cont:
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
-
- /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
- s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
- if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
- s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
- ca_sk = NULL;
-
- ret = 1;
- goto done;
- err:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- done:
- if (ca_sk != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
-{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
- long n;
- const unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *d;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
- SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- if (n < 6) {
- /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
- int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
- SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
- /*
- * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
- * one
- */
- if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
- /*
- * Remove the old session from the cache
- */
- if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
- if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
- s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
- s->session);
- } else {
- /* We carry on if this fails */
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
- }
- }
-
- if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = new_sess;
- }
-
- n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
- n2s(p, ticklen);
- /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
- if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
- s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
- s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
- /*
- * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
- * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
- * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
- * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
- * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
- * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
- * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
- * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
- * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
- */
- EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
- s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
- EVP_sha256(), NULL);
-# else
- EVP_sha1(), NULL);
-# endif
- ret = 1;
- return (ret);
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok, al;
- unsigned long resplen, n;
- const unsigned char *p;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
- if (n < 4) {
- /* need at least status type + length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2l3(p, resplen);
- if (resplen + 4 != n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
- int ret;
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- if (ret == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (ret < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- return 1;
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
-}
-#endif
-
-int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok, ret = 0;
- long n;
-
- /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
- SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
- if (n > 0) {
- /* should contain no data */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- ret = 1;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int n;
- unsigned long alg_k;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned char *q;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
- const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encoded_pt_len = 0;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-#endif
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p = &(d[4]);
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /* Fool emacs indentation */
- if (0) {
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- RSA *rsa;
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- /*
- * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
- rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
- else {
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
- x509);
- if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
- || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- }
-
- tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
-
- q = p;
- /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
- p += 2;
- n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
- tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
- p[1]++;
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
- tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
-# endif
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
- s2n(n, q);
- n += 2;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- authp = NULL;
-# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
- if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
- authp = &authenticator;
-# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
- kssl_err.text);
- }
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5rc) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*-
- * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
- * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
- *
- * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- *
- * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
- * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw at sxw.org.uk>)
- * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
- * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
- * Example:
- * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
- * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
- * optional authenticator omitted.
- */
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
- s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
- memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
- p += enc_ticket->length;
- n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
- if (authp && authp->length) {
- s2n(authp->length, p);
- memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
- p += authp->length;
- n += authp->length + 2;
-
- free(authp->data);
- authp->data = NULL;
- authp->length = 0;
- } else {
- s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
- n += 2;
- }
-
- tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*-
- * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- * kssl_ctx->length);
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
- s2n(outl, p);
- memcpy(p, epms, outl);
- p += outl;
- n += outl + 2;
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
- DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
- dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
- else {
- /* we get them from the cert */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* generate a new random key */
- if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
- * clear it out afterwards
- */
-
- n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
-
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* generate master key from the result */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, n);
- /* clean up */
- memset(p, 0, n);
-
- /* send off the data */
- n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
- s2n(n, p);
- BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
- n += 2;
-
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
- const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
- EC_KEY *tkey;
- int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
- int field_size = 0;
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
- * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
- * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
- */
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
- /*-
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client
- * authentication using ECDH certificates.
- * To add such support, one needs to add
- * code that checks for appropriate
- * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
- * For example, the cert have an ECC
- * key on the same curve as the server's
- * and the key should be authorized for
- * key agreement.
- *
- * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
- * to skip sending the certificate verify
- * message.
- *
- * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
- * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
- * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
- * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
- */
- }
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
- tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
- } else {
- /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
- srvr_pub_pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
- if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
- || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
- || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
- }
-
- srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
-
- if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
- /*
- * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
- * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
- */
- const BIGNUM *priv_key;
- tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
- priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
- if (priv_key == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
- if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
- * clear it out afterwards
- */
-
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
- if (field_size <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
- clnt_ecdh, NULL);
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* generate master key from the result */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, n);
-
- memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
-
- if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
- /* Send empty client key exch message */
- n = 0;
- } else {
- /*
- * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
- * accordingly.
- */
- encoded_pt_len =
- EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Encode the public key */
- n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
-
- *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
- /* Encoded point will be copied here */
- p += 1;
- /* copy the point */
- memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
- /* increment n to account for length field */
- n += 1;
- }
-
- /* Free allocated memory */
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- if (encodedPoint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
- }
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
- /* GOST key exchange message creation */
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
- X509 *peer_cert;
- size_t msglen;
- unsigned int md_len;
- int keytype;
- unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
- EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
- EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
-
- /*
- * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
- */
- peer_cert =
- s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
- if (!peer_cert)
- peer_cert =
- s->session->
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
- if (!peer_cert) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
- X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
- /*
- * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
- *
- * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
- * certificate key for key exchange
- */
-
- /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
-
- EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
- /* Generate session key */
- if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
- (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
- /*
- * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
- * * would be used
- */
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- }
- /*
- * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
- * data
- */
- ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
- EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
- (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
- shared_ukm) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
- /*
- * Encapsulate it into sequence
- */
- *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
- msglen = 255;
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
- < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (msglen >= 0x80) {
- *(p++) = 0x81;
- *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
- n = msglen + 3;
- } else {
- *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
- n = msglen + 2;
- }
- memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
- /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
- (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
- /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- premaster_secret,
- 32);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
-
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
- /* send off the data */
- n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
- s2n(n, p);
- BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
- n += 2;
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) <
- 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- /*
- * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
- * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
- * strnlen.
- */
- char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
- size_t identity_len;
- unsigned char *t = NULL;
- unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
- unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
- int psk_err = 1;
-
- n = 0;
- if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
- psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
- identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- } else if (psk_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
- identity_len = strlen(identity);
- if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
- pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
- t = psk_or_pre_ms;
- memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
- s2n(psk_len, t);
- memset(t, 0, psk_len);
- t += psk_len;
- s2n(psk_len, t);
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- s->session->psk_identity_hint =
- BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
- && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
- if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- pre_ms_len);
- s2n(identity_len, p);
- memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
- n = 2 + identity_len;
- psk_err = 0;
- psk_err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- if (psk_err != 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
- else {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
- l2n3(n, d);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = n + 4;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- if (encodedPoint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
-#endif
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
- unsigned u = 0;
- unsigned long n;
- int j;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
- d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p = &(d[4]);
- pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
-/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- NID_sha1,
- &(data
- [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
- } else {
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- /*
- * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
- * digest and cached handshake records.
- */
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- long hdatalen = 0;
- void *hdata;
- const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- p += 2;
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
- EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
- || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
- || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u, p);
- n = u + 4;
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- goto err;
- } else
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
- if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u, p);
- n = u + 2;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
- &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
- &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
- } else
-#endif
- if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
- || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
- unsigned char signbuf[64];
- int i;
- size_t sigsize = 64;
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
- if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
- p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
- }
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
- l2n3(n, d);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
- s->init_num = (int)n + 4;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
-{
- X509 *x509 = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int i;
- unsigned long l;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
- if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
- (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
- (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
- }
-
- /* We need to get a client cert */
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
- /*
- * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- * return(-1); We then get retied later
- */
- i = 0;
- i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
- if (i < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return (-1);
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
- if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
- i = 0;
- } else if (i == 1) {
- i = 0;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
- }
-
- if (x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(x509);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (i == 0) {
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
- return (1);
- } else {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
- }
- }
-
- /* Ok, we have a cert */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
- }
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
- l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
- (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
- 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
- if (!l) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->init_num = (int)l;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
-
-int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
-{
- int i, idx;
- long alg_k, alg_a;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int pkey_bits;
- SESS_CERT *sc;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA *rsa;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh;
-#endif
- int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /* we don't have a certificate */
- if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH | SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
- return (1);
-
- sc = s->session->sess_cert;
- if (sc == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
-#endif
-
- /* This is the passed certificate */
-
- idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
- if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
- /* check failed */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- } else {
- return 1;
- }
- }
-#endif
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
- pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
- i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
- /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
- if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (rsa != NULL) {
- /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-# endif
-
- /* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
- int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
- if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
- || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
- al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
- if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
- al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
- /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
- al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- return (1);
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return (0);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-/*
- * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
- * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
- * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
- * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
- * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
- * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
- * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
- */
-static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok = 0;
-
- if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
- !s->session->tlsext_tick)
- return 0;
-
- /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- /*
- * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
- * so permit appropriate message length.
- * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
- * and not its length.
- */
- s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
- -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-
- if (!ok)
- return -1;
-
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
- return 1;
-
- /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned int len, padding_len;
- unsigned char *d;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
- len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
- padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
- d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- d[4] = len;
- memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
- d[5 + len] = padding_len;
- memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
- *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
- l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
- s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
-{
- int i = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
- i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
- SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
- px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (i != 0)
- return i;
- }
-#endif
- if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
- i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
- return i;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_clnt.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_clnt.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_clnt.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,3561 @@
+/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
+{
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return (SSLv3_client_method());
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
+#endif
+int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int new_state, state, skip = 0;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+ SSL_clear(s);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /*
+ * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
+ * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
+ * handshakes anyway.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (;;) {
+ state = s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+ /* break */
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+ s->server = 0;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+ if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+ s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* setup buffing BIO */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
+ */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
+ if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
+ s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (s->hit) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ /* receive renewed session ticket */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ }
+#endif
+ } else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
+ ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
+ /* or PSK */
+ if (!
+ (s->s3->tmp.
+ new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
+ } else
+ skip = 1;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
+ * the server
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
+ ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ /*
+ * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
+ */
+ /*
+ * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
+ * sent, but no verify packet is sent
+ */
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
+ * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
+ * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
+ * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ } else {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+ else
+ s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+
+ /* clear flags */
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ if (s->hit) {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /*
+ * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+#endif
+
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
+ * buffering now
+ */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->renegotiate = 0;
+ s->new_session = 0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ /* s->server=0; */
+ s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ /* did we do anything */
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
+ if (s->debug) {
+ if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
+ new_state = s->state;
+ s->state = state;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+ s->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip = 0;
+ }
+ end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int j;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+ if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ !sess->session_id_length ||
+#else
+ /*
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
+ * "ticket" without a session ID.
+ */
+ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+ (sess->not_resumable)) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+ p = s->s3->client_random;
+
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d = p = &(buf[4]);
+
+ /*-
+ * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+ * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+ * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+ * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+ * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+ * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+ * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+ * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+ * 1.0.
+ *
+ * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+ * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+ * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+ * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+ * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+ * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+ * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+ * know that is maximum server supports.
+ * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+ * containing version 1.0.
+ *
+ * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+ * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+ * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+ * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+ * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+ * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+ * the negotiated version.
+ */
+#if 0
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+ s->client_version = s->version;
+#else
+ *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
+#endif
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* Session ID */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ i = 0;
+ else
+ i = s->session->session_id_length;
+ *(p++) = i;
+ if (i != 0) {
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
+ p += i;
+ }
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+ /*
+ * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
+ * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
+ * use TLS v1.2
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
+ i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+#endif
+ s2n(i, p);
+ p += i;
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++) = 1;
+#else
+
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
+ j = 0;
+ else
+ j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ *(p++) = 1 + j;
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
+ *(p++) = comp->id;
+ }
+#endif
+ *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((p =
+ ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
+ buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
+ NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ l = (p - d);
+ d = buf;
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ l2n3(l, d);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = p - buf;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i, al, ok;
+ unsigned int j;
+ long n;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return 1;
+ } else { /* already sent a cookie */
+
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p += 2;
+
+ /* load the server hello data */
+ /* load the server random */
+ memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ /* get the session-id */
+ j = *(p++);
+
+ if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /*
+ * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
+ * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
+ * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
+ * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
+ * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
+ * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
+ * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
+ * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
+ * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
+ * server wants to resume.
+ */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
+ s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+ SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+ s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ &s->session->master_key_length,
+ NULL, &pref_cipher,
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
+ s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
+ pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+ if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+ && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
+ || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
+ /* actually a client application bug */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->hit = 1;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
+ * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
+ * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
+ * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
+ */
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ s->session->session_id_length = j;
+ memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
+ }
+ p += j;
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ /* unknown cipher */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
+ if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
+ (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+ !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+ p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
+
+ sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
+ i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
+ * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
+ * set and use it for comparison.
+ */
+ if (s->session->cipher)
+ s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
+/* Workaround is now obsolete */
+#if 0
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
+#endif
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+ /*
+ * Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for client
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* lets get the compression algorithm */
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (*(p++) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+ * using compression.
+ */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#else
+ j = *(p++);
+ if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (j == 0)
+ comp = NULL;
+ else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
+ comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
+
+ if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
+ /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (p != (d + n)) {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
+ unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *q, *p;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ SESS_CERT *sc;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
+ * KRB5 */
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ n2l3(p, llen);
+ if (llen + 3 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
+ n2l3(p, l);
+ if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ q = p;
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (q != (p + l)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x = NULL;
+ nc += l + 3;
+ p = q;
+ }
+
+ i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ ) {
+ al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+
+ sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert)
+ ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ s->session->sess_cert = sc;
+
+ sc->cert_chain = sk;
+ /*
+ * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
+ * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
+ */
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ sk = NULL;
+ /*
+ * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
+ */
+
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+ ? 0 : 1;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
+ fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
+ if (need_cert && i < 0) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (need_cert) {
+ sc->peer_cert_type = i;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ /*
+ * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
+ * of lines ago.
+ */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
+ sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->peer = x;
+ } else {
+ sc->peer_cert_type = i;
+ sc->peer_key = NULL;
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer = NULL;
+ }
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ x = NULL;
+ ret = 1;
+
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ unsigned char *param, *p;
+ int al, j, ok;
+ long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ int curve_nid = 0;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
+ * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
+ */
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ /*
+ * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
+ * ciphersuite.
+ */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /*
+ * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
+ * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
+ * problems later.
+ */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
+ RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
+ DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ } else {
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ }
+
+ /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
+ param_len = 0;
+
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ param_len = 2;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ /*
+ * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
+ * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
+ * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
+ * identity.
+ */
+ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p += i;
+ n -= param_len;
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ param_len = 2;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (1 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 1;
+
+ i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
+ p++;
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+ n -= param_len;
+
+ if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+/* We must check if there is a certificate */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+# else
+ if (0) ;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
+ x509);
+# endif
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
+ if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ param_len = 2;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+ n -= param_len;
+
+ /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
+ rsa = NULL;
+ }
+#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+ if (0) ;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ param_len = 2;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(dh->p)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(dh->g)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+ n -= param_len;
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+# else
+ if (0) ;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
+ x509);
+# endif
+ /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
+ dh = NULL;
+ } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ EC_GROUP *ngroup;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
+ * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
+ * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
+ * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
+ * byte for the length of the encoded point
+ */
+ param_len = 4;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
+ ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
+ if (ngroup == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p += 3;
+
+ /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
+ if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
+ ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
+ p += 1;
+
+ if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
+ (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
+ p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += encoded_pt_len;
+
+ n -= param_len;
+ p += encoded_pt_len;
+
+ /*
+ * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
+ * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
+ * and ECDSA.
+ */
+ if (0) ;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+# endif
+ /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+ EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
+ ecdh = NULL;
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+ srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ } else if (alg_k) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+ /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
+
+ /* if it was signed, check the signature */
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ int sigalg;
+ if (2 > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (sigalg == -1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+ if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ p += 2;
+ n -= 2;
+ } else
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+
+ if (2 > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+ n -= 2;
+ j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
+ */
+ if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ int num;
+ unsigned int size;
+
+ j = 0;
+ q = md_buf;
+ for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
+ (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1,
+ NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ q += size;
+ j += size;
+ }
+ i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
+ if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* still data left over */
+ if (n != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return (1);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (dh != NULL)
+ DH_free(dh);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+ if (ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok, ret = 0;
+ unsigned long n, nc, l;
+ unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ /*
+ * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
+ * wont be doing client auth.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* get the certificate types */
+ ctype_num = *(p++);
+ if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
+ ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
+ for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
+ p += ctype_num;
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ n2s(p, llen);
+ /*
+ * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
+ * length value.
+ */
+ if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += llen;
+ }
+
+ /* get the CA RDNs */
+ n2s(p, llen);
+#if 0
+ {
+ FILE *out;
+ out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
+ fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
+ fclose(out);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
+ n2s(p, l);
+ if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+ goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ q = p;
+
+ if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
+ /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
+ goto cont;
+ else {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (q != (p + l)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p += l;
+ nc += l + 2;
+ }
+
+ if (0) {
+ cont:
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+
+ /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
+ ca_sk = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ done:
+ if (ca_sk != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
+ long n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
+ SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if (n < 6) {
+ /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint);
+ n2s(p, ticklen);
+ /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
+ if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
+ if (ticklen == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+ /*
+ * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+ * one
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
+ /*
+ * Remove the old session from the cache
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
+ if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
+ s->session);
+ } else {
+ /* We carry on if this fails */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
+ s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+ /*
+ * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
+ * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
+ * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
+ * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
+ * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
+ * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
+ * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
+ * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
+ * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
+ */
+ EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
+ s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+# else
+ EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+# endif
+ ret = 1;
+ return (ret);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok, al;
+ unsigned long resplen, n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+ if (n < 4) {
+ /* need at least status type + length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2l3(p, resplen);
+ if (resplen + 4 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
+ int ret;
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok, ret = 0;
+ long n;
+
+ /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
+ SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+ if (n > 0) {
+ /* should contain no data */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int n;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
+ const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = &(d[4]);
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /* Fool emacs indentation */
+ if (0) {
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else {
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
+ x509);
+ if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
+
+ q = p;
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ p += 2;
+ n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
+ tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
+ p[1]++;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
+ tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
+# endif
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ s2n(n, q);
+ n += 2;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
+ krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ authp = NULL;
+# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+ if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
+ authp = &authenticator;
+# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
+ kssl_err.text);
+ }
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (krb5rc) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+ * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+ *
+ * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ *
+ * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+ * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw at sxw.org.uk>)
+ * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+ * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+ * Example:
+ * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+ * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
+ * optional authenticator omitted.
+ */
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
+ s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
+ memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+ p += enc_ticket->length;
+ n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
+ if (authp && authp->length) {
+ s2n(authp->length, p);
+ memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+ p += authp->length;
+ n += authp->length + 2;
+
+ free(authp->data);
+ authp->data = NULL;
+ authp->length = 0;
+ } else {
+ s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
+ n += 2;
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*-
+ * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
+ * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+ * kssl_ctx->length);
+ * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+ */
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
+ s2n(outl, p);
+ memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+ p += outl;
+ n += outl + 2;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ else {
+ /* we get them from the cert */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate a new random key */
+ if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
+ * clear it out afterwards
+ */
+
+ n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
+
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, n);
+ /* clean up */
+ memset(p, 0, n);
+
+ /* send off the data */
+ n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
+ s2n(n, p);
+ BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
+ n += 2;
+
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *tkey;
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ */
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
+ /*-
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication using ECDH certificates.
+ * To add such support, one needs to add
+ * code that checks for appropriate
+ * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ * For example, the cert have an ECC
+ * key on the same curve as the server's
+ * and the key should be authorized for
+ * key agreement.
+ *
+ * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
+ * to skip sending the certificate verify
+ * message.
+ *
+ * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+ * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
+ * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+ */
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
+ tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
+ } else {
+ /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
+ srvr_pub_pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+ if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
+ || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
+ }
+
+ srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
+
+ if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
+ /*
+ * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
+ * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
+ */
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+ if (priv_key == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
+ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
+ * clear it out afterwards
+ */
+
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
+ if (field_size <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
+ clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, n);
+
+ memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
+
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
+ /* Send empty client key exch message */
+ n = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
+ * accordingly.
+ */
+ encoded_pt_len =
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key */
+ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
+
+ *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
+ /* Encoded point will be copied here */
+ p += 1;
+ /* copy the point */
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+ /* increment n to account for length field */
+ n += 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Free allocated memory */
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+ /* GOST key exchange message creation */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+ X509 *peer_cert;
+ size_t msglen;
+ unsigned int md_len;
+ int keytype;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
+ EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
+
+ /*
+ * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
+ */
+ peer_cert =
+ s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
+ if (!peer_cert)
+ peer_cert =
+ s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
+ if (!peer_cert) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
+ X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
+ *
+ * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
+ * certificate key for key exchange
+ */
+
+ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
+
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL
+ || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
+ /* Generate session key */
+ || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
+ (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
+ * * would be used
+ */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
+ * data
+ */
+ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
+ EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
+ (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
+ shared_ukm) < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
+ /*
+ * Encapsulate it into sequence
+ */
+ *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+ msglen = 255;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
+ <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (msglen >= 0x80) {
+ *(p++) = 0x81;
+ *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
+ n = msglen + 3;
+ } else {
+ *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
+ n = msglen + 2;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
+ /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
+ (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
+ /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ premaster_secret,
+ 32);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
+
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
+ /* send off the data */
+ n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
+ s2n(n, p);
+ BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
+ n += 2;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->session->master_key_length =
+ SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key)) <
+ 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /*
+ * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
+ * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
+ * strnlen.
+ */
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
+ size_t identity_len;
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+
+ n = 0;
+ if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+ psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+ identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+ psk_or_pre_ms,
+ sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ } else if (psk_len == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
+ identity_len = strlen(identity);
+ if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t += psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint =
+ BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
+ && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ psk_or_pre_ms,
+ pre_ms_len);
+ s2n(identity_len, p);
+ memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
+ n = 2 + identity_len;
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ else {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ l2n3(n, d);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = n + 4;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+#endif
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ unsigned u = 0;
+ unsigned long n;
+ int j;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = &(d[4]);
+ pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
+/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_sha1,
+ &(data
+ [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ } else {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ /*
+ * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
+ * digest and cached handshake records.
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ long hdatalen = 0;
+ void *hdata;
+ const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += 2;
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
+ EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+ || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
+ || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n = u + 4;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ goto err;
+ } else
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n = u + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j, p);
+ n = j + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j, p);
+ n = j + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
+ || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ unsigned char signbuf[64];
+ int i;
+ size_t sigsize = 64;
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
+ p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
+ }
+ s2n(j, p);
+ n = j + 2;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+ l2n3(n, d);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
+ s->init_num = (int)n + 4;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
+ if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
+ (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to get a client cert */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
+ /*
+ * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ * return(-1); We then get retied later
+ */
+ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
+ i = 0;
+ } else if (i == 1) {
+ i = 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ }
+
+ if (x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(x509);
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ok, we have a cert */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
+ l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
+ (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
+ 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
+ if (!l) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->init_num = (int)l;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
+
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i, idx;
+ long alg_k, alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int pkey_bits;
+ SESS_CERT *sc;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh;
+#endif
+ int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ /* we don't have a certificate */
+ if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH | SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
+ return (1);
+
+ sc = s->session->sess_cert;
+ if (sc == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+#endif
+
+ /* This is the passed certificate */
+
+ idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
+ if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
+ /* check failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+ pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+ i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+ /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (rsa != NULL) {
+ /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ /* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+ int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
+ if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ return (1);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ return (0);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/*
+ * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
+ * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
+ * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
+ * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
+ * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
+ * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
+ * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
+ */
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
+ !s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
+ * so permit appropriate message length.
+ * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
+ * and not its length.
+ */
+ s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return -1;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned int len, padding_len;
+ unsigned char *d;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
+ len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+ padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ d[4] = len;
+ memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
+ d[5 + len] = padding_len;
+ memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
+ l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
+ s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
+ i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
+ SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
+ px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (i != 0)
+ return i;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
+ i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
+ return i;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_enc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_enc.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_enc.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,916 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_enc.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
-static unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
-};
-
-static unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
-};
-
-static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
- const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p);
-static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
-{
- EVP_MD_CTX m5;
- EVP_MD_CTX s1;
- unsigned char buf[16], smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char c = 'A';
- unsigned int i, j, k;
-
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- c = os_toascii[c]; /* 'A' in ASCII */
-#endif
- k = 0;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m5);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&m5, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s1);
- for (i = 0; (int)i < num; i += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
- k++;
- if (k > sizeof buf) {
- /* bug: 'buf' is too small for this ciphersuite */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- for (j = 0; j < k; j++)
- buf[j] = c;
- c++;
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&s1, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, buf, k);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&s1, smd, NULL);
-
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&m5, EVP_md5(), NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5, smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- if ((int)(i + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num) {
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5, smd, NULL);
- memcpy(km, smd, (num - i));
- } else
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5, km, NULL);
-
- km += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- }
- OPENSSL_cleanse(smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m5);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&s1);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
-{
- unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
- unsigned char exp_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char exp_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv, *er1, *er2;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- COMP_METHOD *comp;
-#endif
- const EVP_MD *m;
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
- int is_exp, n, i, j, k, cl;
- int reuse_dd = 0;
-
- is_exp = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
- m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
- /* m == NULL will lead to a crash later */
- OPENSSL_assert(m);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- comp = NULL;
- else
- comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->method;
-#endif
-
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
- reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_read_ctx =
- OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
- goto err;
- else
- /*
- * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
- */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
- dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
-
- ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- /* COMPRESS */
- if (s->expand != NULL) {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand = NULL;
- }
- if (comp != NULL) {
- s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
- if (s->expand == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
-#endif
- memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
- mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
- } else {
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
- reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_write_ctx =
- OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
- goto err;
- else
- /*
- * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
- */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
- dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
- ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- /* COMPRESS */
- if (s->compress != NULL) {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress = NULL;
- }
- if (comp != NULL) {
- s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
- if (s->compress == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- }
-#endif
- memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
- mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
- }
-
- if (reuse_dd)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
-
- p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
- i = EVP_MD_size(m);
- if (i < 0)
- goto err2;
- cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- j = is_exp ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
- cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
- /* Was j=(is_exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
- k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
- (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
- ms = &(p[0]);
- n = i + i;
- key = &(p[n]);
- n += j + j;
- iv = &(p[n]);
- n += k + k;
- er1 = &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
- er2 = &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
- } else {
- n = i;
- ms = &(p[n]);
- n += i + j;
- key = &(p[n]);
- n += j + k;
- iv = &(p[n]);
- n += k;
- er1 = &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
- er2 = &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
- }
-
- if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md);
- memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
- if (is_exp) {
- /*
- * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value
- * since only the correct one will be used :-).
- */
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md, EVP_md5(), NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, key, j);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er1, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er2, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md, &(exp_key[0]), NULL);
- key = &(exp_key[0]);
-
- if (k > 0) {
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md, EVP_md5(), NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er1, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er2, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md, &(exp_iv[0]), NULL);
- iv = &(exp_iv[0]);
- }
- }
-
- s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
-
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_key[0]), sizeof(exp_key));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_iv[0]), sizeof(exp_iv));
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md);
- return (1);
- err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- err2:
- return (0);
-}
-
-int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
- const EVP_MD *hash;
- int num;
- int ret = 0;
- SSL_COMP *comp;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
- return (1);
-
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, &comp)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
- s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
-#else
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
-#endif
-
- num = EVP_MD_size(hash);
- if (num < 0)
- return 0;
-
- num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + num + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- num *= 2;
-
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
- s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
-
- ret = ssl3_generate_key_block(s, p, num);
-
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) {
- /*
- * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
- * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
- */
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
-
- if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-#endif
- }
- }
-
- return ret;
-
- err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
-}
-
-void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->s3->tmp.key_block != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3->tmp.key_block, s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.key_block);
- s->s3->tmp.key_block = NULL;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = 0;
-}
-
-/*-
- * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
- * short etc).
- * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
- * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
- * occured.
- */
-int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
- unsigned long l;
- int bs, i, mac_size = 0;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
- if (send) {
- ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
- rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
- if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
- } else {
- ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
- rec = &(s->s3->rrec);
- if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
- }
-
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
- memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
- rec->input = rec->data;
- } else {
- l = rec->length;
- bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
- /* COMPRESS */
-
- if ((bs != 1) && send) {
- i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
-
- /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
- l += i;
- /*
- * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
- * padding length.
- */
- memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
- rec->length += i;
- rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1);
- }
-
- if (!send) {
- if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
- return 0;
- /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
- }
-
- if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1)
- return -1;
-
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst)
- ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- (void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE);
-}
-
-void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s)
-{
- int i;
- if (!s->s3->handshake_dgst)
- return;
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->handshake_dgst);
- s->s3->handshake_dgst = NULL;
-}
-
-void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
-{
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer
- && !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) {
- BIO_write(s->s3->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len);
- } else {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] != NULL)
- EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], buf, len);
- }
- }
-}
-
-int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s)
-{
- int i;
- long mask;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- long hdatalen;
- void *hdata;
-
- /* Allocate handshake_dgst array */
- ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
- s->s3->handshake_dgst =
- OPENSSL_malloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
- memset(s->s3->handshake_dgst, 0, SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Loop through bitso of algorithm2 field and create MD_CTX-es */
- for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++) {
- if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) && md) {
- s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (EVP_MD_nid(md) == NID_md5) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],
- EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- }
-#endif
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], md, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], hdata, hdatalen);
- } else {
- s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] = NULL;
- }
- }
- if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) {
- /* Free handshake_buffer BIO */
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p)
-{
- return (ssl3_handshake_mac(s, md_nid, NULL, 0, p));
-}
-
-int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
- const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
-{
- int ret, sha1len;
- ret = ssl3_handshake_mac(s, NID_md5, sender, len, p);
- if (ret == 0)
- return 0;
-
- p += ret;
-
- sha1len = ssl3_handshake_mac(s, NID_sha1, sender, len, p);
- if (sha1len == 0)
- return 0;
-
- ret += sha1len;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
- const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
-{
- unsigned int ret;
- int npad, n;
- unsigned int i;
- unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Search for digest of specified type in the handshake_dgst array
- */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]
- && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
- d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!d) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
- n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(&ctx);
- if (n < 0)
- return 0;
-
- npad = (48 / n) * n;
- if (sender != NULL)
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i);
-
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- return ((int)ret);
-}
-
-int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
-{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
- unsigned char *p, rec_char;
- size_t md_size, orig_len;
- int npad;
- int t;
-
- if (send) {
- rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
- mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
- seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
- hash = ssl->write_hash;
- } else {
- rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
- mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
- seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
- hash = ssl->read_hash;
- }
-
- t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
- if (t < 0)
- return -1;
- md_size = t;
- npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
-
- /*
- * kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type
- */
- orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8);
- rec->type &= 0xff;
-
- if (!send &&
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
- /*
- * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
- * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
- * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
- */
-
- /*-
- * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
- * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
- *
- * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
- * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
- * total size.
- */
- unsigned char header[75];
- unsigned j = 0;
- memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
- j += md_size;
- memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
- j += npad;
- memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
- j += 8;
- header[j++] = rec->type;
- header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
- header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
-
- /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
- ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
- md, &md_size,
- header, rec->input,
- rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
- mac_sec, md_size, 1);
- } else {
- unsigned int md_size_u;
- /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8);
- rec_char = rec->type;
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1);
- p = md;
- s2n(rec->length, p);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u);
- md_size = md_size_u;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- }
-
- ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
- return (md_size);
-}
-
-void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
-}
-
-int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
- int len)
-{
- static const unsigned char *salt[3] = {
-#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- (const unsigned char *)"A",
- (const unsigned char *)"BB",
- (const unsigned char *)"CCC",
-#else
- (const unsigned char *)"\x41",
- (const unsigned char *)"\x42\x42",
- (const unsigned char *)"\x43\x43\x43",
-#endif
- };
- unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- int i, ret = 0;
- unsigned int n;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i], strlen((const char *)salt[i]));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n);
-
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n);
- out += n;
- ret += n;
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof buf);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
-{
- switch (code) {
- case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
- return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
- case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
- return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
- return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
- return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
- return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
- return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
- return (SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
- return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
- case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
- return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
- return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
- return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
- return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
- case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
- return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
- return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
- case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
- return (-1); /* Don't send it :-) */
- case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
- return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
- case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
- return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- default:
- return (-1);
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_enc.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_enc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_enc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_enc.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,934 @@
+/* ssl/s3_enc.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+static unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
+ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
+};
+
+static unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
+};
+
+static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
+ const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p);
+static int ssl3_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, int num)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX m5;
+ EVP_MD_CTX s1;
+ unsigned char buf[16], smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char c = 'A';
+ unsigned int i, j, k;
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ c = os_toascii[c]; /* 'A' in ASCII */
+#endif
+ k = 0;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&m5, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s1);
+ for (i = 0; (int)i < num; i += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ k++;
+ if (k > sizeof buf) {
+ /* bug: 'buf' is too small for this ciphersuite */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < k; j++)
+ buf[j] = c;
+ c++;
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&s1, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, buf, k);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&s1, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&s1, smd, NULL);
+
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&m5, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5, smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if ((int)(i + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num) {
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5, smd, NULL);
+ memcpy(km, smd, (num - i));
+ } else
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5, km, NULL);
+
+ km += MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(smd, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&s1);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
+ unsigned char exp_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char exp_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv, *er1, *er2;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_METHOD *comp;
+#endif
+ const EVP_MD *m;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ int is_exp, n, i, j, k, cl;
+ int reuse_dd = 0;
+
+ is_exp = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+ /* m == NULL will lead to a crash later */
+ OPENSSL_assert(m);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ comp = NULL;
+ else
+ comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->method;
+#endif
+
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_read_ctx =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /*
+ * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
+
+ if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ /* COMPRESS */
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand = NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
+ if (s->expand == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+ mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ } else {
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /*
+ * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ /* COMPRESS */
+ if (s->compress != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress = NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
+ if (s->compress == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+ mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (reuse_dd)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+
+ p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+ i = EVP_MD_size(m);
+ if (i < 0)
+ goto err2;
+ cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ j = is_exp ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
+ cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+ /* Was j=(is_exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
+ k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+ (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ ms = &(p[0]);
+ n = i + i;
+ key = &(p[n]);
+ n += j + j;
+ iv = &(p[n]);
+ n += k + k;
+ er1 = &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
+ er2 = &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
+ } else {
+ n = i;
+ ms = &(p[n]);
+ n += i + j;
+ key = &(p[n]);
+ n += j + k;
+ iv = &(p[n]);
+ n += k;
+ er1 = &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
+ er2 = &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md);
+ memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
+ if (is_exp) {
+ /*
+ * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value
+ * since only the correct one will be used :-).
+ */
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, key, j);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er1, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er2, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md, &(exp_key[0]), NULL);
+ key = &(exp_key[0]);
+
+ if (k > 0) {
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er1, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, er2, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md, &(exp_iv[0]), NULL);
+ iv = &(exp_iv[0]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
+
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_key[0]), sizeof(exp_key));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&(exp_iv[0]), sizeof(exp_iv));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md);
+ return (1);
+ err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *hash;
+ int num;
+ int ret = 0;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+ return (1);
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, &comp)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
+#else
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+#endif
+
+ num = EVP_MD_size(hash);
+ if (num < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + num + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ num *= 2;
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
+
+ ret = ssl3_generate_key_block(s, p, num);
+
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) {
+ /*
+ * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
+ * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+
+ err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3->tmp.key_block, s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.key_block);
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block = NULL;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * short etc).
+ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
+ * occured.
+ */
+int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+{
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int bs, i, mac_size = 0;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+
+ if (send) {
+ ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ } else {
+ ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
+ rec = &(s->s3->rrec);
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
+ memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
+ rec->input = rec->data;
+ } else {
+ l = rec->length;
+ bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+
+ /* COMPRESS */
+
+ if ((bs != 1) && send) {
+ i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
+
+ /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
+ l += i;
+ /*
+ * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
+ * padding length.
+ */
+ memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
+ rec->length += i;
+ rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1);
+ }
+
+ if (!send) {
+ if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if ((bs != 1) && !send)
+ return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst)
+ ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ (void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE);
+}
+
+void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (!s->s3->handshake_dgst)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->handshake_dgst);
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst = NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer
+ && !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) {
+ BIO_write(s->s3->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len);
+ } else {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] != NULL)
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i;
+ long mask;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ long hdatalen;
+ void *hdata;
+
+ /* Allocate handshake_dgst array */
+ ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
+ memset(s->s3->handshake_dgst, 0, SSL_MAX_DIGEST * sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Loop through bitso of algorithm2 field and create MD_CTX-es */
+ for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++) {
+ if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) && md) {
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (EVP_MD_nid(md) == NID_md5) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],
+ EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ }
+#endif
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], md, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], hdata, hdatalen);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) {
+ /* Free handshake_buffer BIO */
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ return (ssl3_handshake_mac(s, md_nid, NULL, 0, p));
+}
+
+int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
+ const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ int ret, sha1len;
+ ret = ssl3_handshake_mac(s, NID_md5, sender, len, p);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ p += ret;
+
+ sha1len = ssl3_handshake_mac(s, NID_sha1, sender, len, p);
+ if (sha1len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret += sha1len;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
+ const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ unsigned int ret;
+ int npad, n;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Search for digest of specified type in the handshake_dgst array
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]
+ && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
+ d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
+ n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(&ctx);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ npad = (48 / n) * n;
+ if ((sender != NULL && EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, sender, len) <= 0)
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_buf, &i) <= 0
+
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx), NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_buf, i) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &ret) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ return ((int)ret);
+}
+
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+{
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+ unsigned char *p, rec_char;
+ size_t md_size, orig_len;
+ int npad;
+ int t;
+
+ if (send) {
+ rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+ mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
+ hash = ssl->write_hash;
+ } else {
+ rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+ mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
+ hash = ssl->read_hash;
+ }
+
+ t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ if (t < 0)
+ return -1;
+ md_size = t;
+ npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
+
+ /*
+ * kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type
+ */
+ orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8);
+ rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+ if (!send &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
+ /*
+ * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
+ * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
+ */
+
+ /*-
+ * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+ * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
+ *
+ * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
+ * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
+ * total size.
+ */
+ unsigned char header[75];
+ unsigned j = 0;
+ memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
+ j += md_size;
+ memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
+ j += npad;
+ memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
+ j += 8;
+ header[j++] = rec->type;
+ header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
+ header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
+
+ /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
+ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+ mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ unsigned int md_size_u;
+ /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+ rec_char = rec->type;
+ p = md;
+ s2n(rec->length, p);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ md_size = md_size_u;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ }
+
+ ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
+ return (md_size);
+}
+
+void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
+ int len)
+{
+ static const unsigned char *salt[3] = {
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ (const unsigned char *)"A",
+ (const unsigned char *)"BB",
+ (const unsigned char *)"CCC",
+#else
+ (const unsigned char *)"\x41",
+ (const unsigned char *)"\x42\x42",
+ (const unsigned char *)"\x43\x43\x43",
+#endif
+ };
+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ unsigned int n;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt[i],
+ strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, buf, &n) <= 0
+
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, p, len) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, buf, n) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &n) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ out += n;
+ ret += n;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof buf);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
+{
+ switch (code) {
+ case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+ case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+ case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+ return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+ return (-1); /* Don't send it :-) */
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+ return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
+ return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ default:
+ return (-1);
+ }
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_lib.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_lib.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,4323 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-# include "../crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h"
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-
-const char ssl3_version_str[] = "SSLv3" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
-#define SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS (sizeof(ssl3_ciphers)/sizeof(SSL_CIPHER))
-
-/* list of available SSLv3 ciphers (sorted by id) */
-OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
-
-/* The RSA ciphers */
-/* Cipher 01 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- 0,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 02 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- 0,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 03 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 04 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 05 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 06 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_RC2,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 07 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_IDEA,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-#endif
-
-/* Cipher 08 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 09 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 0A */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* The DH ciphers */
-/* Cipher 0B */
- {
- 0,
- SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 0C */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 0D */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 0E */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 0F */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 10 */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* The Ephemeral DH ciphers */
-/* Cipher 11 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 12 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 13 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 14 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 15 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 16 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 17 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 18 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 19 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 1A */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 1B */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* Fortezza ciphersuite from SSL 3.0 spec */
-#if 0
-/* Cipher 1C */
- {
- 0,
- SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA,
- SSL_kFZA,
- SSL_aFZA,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- 0,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 1D */
- {
- 0,
- SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA,
- SSL_kFZA,
- SSL_aFZA,
- SSL_eFZA,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- 0,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 1E */
- {
- 0,
- SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA,
- SSL_kFZA,
- SSL_aFZA,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-/* The Kerberos ciphers*/
-/* Cipher 1E */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 1F */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 20 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 21 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_IDEA,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 22 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 23 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 24 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 25 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_IDEA,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 26 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 27 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC2,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 28 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 29 */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 56,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 2A */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC2,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 2B */
- {
- 1,
- SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
- SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
- SSL_kKRB5,
- SSL_aKRB5,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_SSLV3,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 40,
- 128,
- },
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-/* New AES ciphersuites */
-/* Cipher 2F */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-/* Cipher 30 */
- {
- 0,
- TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-/* Cipher 31 */
- {
- 0,
- TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-/* Cipher 32 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-/* Cipher 33 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-/* Cipher 34 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 35 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-/* Cipher 36 */
- {
- 0,
- TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 37 */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 38 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
-/* Cipher 39 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 3A */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
- /* Cipher 3B */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- 0,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 3C */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 3D */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 3E */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 3F */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 40 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
- /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (128-bit portion) */
-
- /* Cipher 41 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_CAMELLIA128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 42 */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_CAMELLIA128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 43 */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_CAMELLIA128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 44 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_CAMELLIA128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 45 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_CAMELLIA128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 46 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_CAMELLIA128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
-
-#if TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES
- /* New TLS Export CipherSuites from expired ID */
-# if 0
- /* Cipher 60 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 61 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_RC2,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 128,
- },
-# endif
-
- /* Cipher 62 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 63 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 56,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 64 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 65 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 56,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 66 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-#endif
-
- /* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
- /* Cipher 67 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 68 */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 69 */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 6A */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 6B */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 6C */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 6D */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* GOST Ciphersuites */
-
- {
- 1,
- "GOST94-GOST89-GOST89",
- 0x3000080,
- SSL_kGOST,
- SSL_aGOST94,
- SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
- SSL_GOST89MAC,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
- 256,
- 256},
- {
- 1,
- "GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89",
- 0x3000081,
- SSL_kGOST,
- SSL_aGOST01,
- SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
- SSL_GOST89MAC,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
- 256,
- 256},
- {
- 1,
- "GOST94-NULL-GOST94",
- 0x3000082,
- SSL_kGOST,
- SSL_aGOST94,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_GOST94,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94,
- 0,
- 0},
- {
- 1,
- "GOST2001-NULL-GOST94",
- 0x3000083,
- SSL_kGOST,
- SSL_aGOST01,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_GOST94,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94,
- 0,
- 0},
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
- /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (256-bit portion) */
-
- /* Cipher 84 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_CAMELLIA256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
- /* Cipher 85 */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_CAMELLIA256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 86 */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_CAMELLIA256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 87 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_CAMELLIA256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 88 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_CAMELLIA256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 89 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_CAMELLIA256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* Cipher 8A */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kPSK,
- SSL_aPSK,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 8B */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kPSK,
- SSL_aPSK,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 8C */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kPSK,
- SSL_aPSK,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 8D */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kPSK,
- SSL_aPSK,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
- /* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
-
- /* Cipher 96 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_SEED,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 97 */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_SEED,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 98 */
- {
- 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
- TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_SEED,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 99 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_SEED,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 9A */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_SEED,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 9B */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_SEED,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */
-
- /* GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
-
- /* Cipher 9C */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 9D */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 9E */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher 9F */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher A0 */
- {
- 0,
- TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES128GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher A1 */
- {
- 0,
- TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- SSL_kDHr,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES256GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher A2 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES128GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher A3 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES256GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher A4 */
- {
- 0,
- TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES128GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher A5 */
- {
- 0,
- TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- SSL_kDHd,
- SSL_aDH,
- SSL_AES256GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher A6 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES128GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher A7 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- SSL_kEDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES256GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- /* Cipher C001 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- SSL_kECDHe,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- 0,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C002 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kECDHe,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C003 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kECDHe,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C004 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kECDHe,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C005 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kECDHe,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C006 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aECDSA,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- 0,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C007 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aECDSA,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C008 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aECDSA,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C009 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aECDSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C00A */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aECDSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C00B */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- SSL_kECDHr,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- 0,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C00C */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kECDHr,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C00D */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kECDHr,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C00E */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kECDHr,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C00F */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kECDHr,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C010 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- 0,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C011 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C012 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C013 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C014 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C015 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_eNULL,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- 0,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C016 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_RC4,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C017 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C018 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C019 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aNULL,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* Cipher C01A */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aSRP,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01B */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01C */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_3DES,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 112,
- 168,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01D */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aSRP,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01E */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C01F */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C020 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aSRP,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C021 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C022 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- SSL_kSRP,
- SSL_aDSS,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA1,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-
- /* HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-
- /* Cipher C023 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aECDSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C024 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aECDSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA384,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C025 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- SSL_kECDHe,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C026 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
- SSL_kECDHe,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA384,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C027 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C028 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA384,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C029 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
- SSL_kECDHr,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES128,
- SSL_SHA256,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C02A */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
- SSL_kECDHr,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES256,
- SSL_SHA384,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-
- /* Cipher C02B */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aECDSA,
- SSL_AES128GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C02C */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aECDSA,
- SSL_AES256GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C02D */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- SSL_kECDHe,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES128GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C02E */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- SSL_kECDHe,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES256GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C02F */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES128GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C030 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- SSL_kEECDH,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_AES256GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C031 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- SSL_kECDHr,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES128GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
- 128,
- 128,
- },
-
- /* Cipher C032 */
- {
- 1,
- TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- SSL_kECDHr,
- SSL_aECDH,
- SSL_AES256GCM,
- SSL_AEAD,
- SSL_TLSV1_2,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-
-#ifdef TEMP_GOST_TLS
-/* Cipher FF00 */
- {
- 1,
- "GOST-MD5",
- 0x0300ff00,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
- SSL_MD5,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256,
- },
- {
- 1,
- "GOST-GOST94",
- 0x0300ff01,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
- SSL_GOST94,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256},
- {
- 1,
- "GOST-GOST89MAC",
- 0x0300ff02,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
- SSL_GOST89MAC,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
- 256,
- 256},
- {
- 1,
- "GOST-GOST89STREAM",
- 0x0300ff03,
- SSL_kRSA,
- SSL_aRSA,
- SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
- SSL_GOST89MAC,
- SSL_TLSV1,
- SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF | TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
- 256,
- 256},
-#endif
-
-/* end of list */
-};
-
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data = {
- ssl3_enc,
- n_ssl3_mac,
- ssl3_setup_key_block,
- ssl3_generate_master_secret,
- ssl3_change_cipher_state,
- ssl3_final_finish_mac,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- ssl3_cert_verify_mac,
- SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST, 4,
- SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST, 4,
- ssl3_alert_code,
- (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
- size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
- int use_context))ssl_undefined_function,
-};
-
-long ssl3_default_timeout(void)
-{
- /*
- * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the SSLv3 spec is way too long for
- * http, the cache would over fill
- */
- return (60 * 60 * 2);
-}
-
-int ssl3_num_ciphers(void)
-{
- return (SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
-}
-
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
-{
- if (u < SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS)
- return (&(ssl3_ciphers[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS - 1 - u]));
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
- return 0;
-
- return (s->s3->rrec.type ==
- SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) ? s->s3->rrec.length : 0;
-}
-
-int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
-{
- SSL3_STATE *s3;
-
- if ((s3 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s3)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- memset(s3, 0, sizeof *s3);
- memset(s3->rrec.seq_num, 0, sizeof(s3->rrec.seq_num));
- memset(s3->wrec.seq_num, 0, sizeof(s3->wrec.seq_num));
-
- s->s3 = s3;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s);
-#endif
- s->method->ssl_clear(s);
- return (1);
- err:
- return (0);
-}
-
-void ssl3_free(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return;
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
-#endif
-
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
- if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL)
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
- DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
-#endif
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- }
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst)
- ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s);
-#endif
- OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3, sizeof *s->s3);
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3);
- s->s3 = NULL;
-}
-
-void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *rp, *wp;
- size_t rlen, wlen;
- int init_extra;
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
-#endif
-
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
- if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
-
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp);
- s->s3->rrec.comp = NULL;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
- DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
- s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = 0;
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
- rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
- wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
- rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len;
- wlen = s->s3->wbuf.len;
- init_extra = s->s3->init_extra;
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
- }
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) {
- ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
- }
- memset(s->s3, 0, sizeof *s->s3);
- s->s3->rbuf.buf = rp;
- s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp;
- s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen;
- s->s3->wbuf.len = wlen;
- s->s3->init_extra = init_extra;
-
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
- s->packet_length = 0;
- s->s3->renegotiate = 0;
- s->s3->total_renegotiations = 0;
- s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0;
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 0;
- s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- if (s->next_proto_negotiated) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
- s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
- }
-#endif
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-static char *MS_CALLBACK srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-{
- return BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info);
-}
-#endif
-
-long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
- if (
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
-# endif
- 0) {
- if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
- ret = s->hit;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST:
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
- ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
- ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
- s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS:
- ret = s->s3->total_renegotiations;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS:
- ret = (int)(s->s3->flags);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
- if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
- ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
- (EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) >
- (512 / 8))))
- ret = 1;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
- {
- RSA *rsa = (RSA *)parg;
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (ret);
- }
- if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- return (ret);
- }
- if (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
- RSA_free(s->cert->rsa_tmp);
- s->cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
- ret = 1;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (ret);
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
- {
- DH *dh = (DH *)parg;
- if (dh == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (ret);
- }
- if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- return (ret);
- }
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- DH_free(dh);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- return (ret);
- }
- }
- if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
- DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
- s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
- ret = 1;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (ret);
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH:
- {
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
-
- if (parg == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (ret);
- }
- if (!EC_KEY_up_ref((EC_KEY *)parg)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- return (ret);
- }
- ecdh = (EC_KEY *)parg;
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
- if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
- EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- return (ret);
- }
- }
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(s->cert->ecdh_tmp);
- s->cert->ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
- ret = 1;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (ret);
- }
- break;
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME:
- if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
- s->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
-
- ret = 1;
- if (parg == NULL)
- break;
- if (strlen((char *)parg) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE);
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG:
- s->tlsext_debug_arg = parg;
- ret = 1;
- break;
-
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT:
- if (larg > 12288) { /* actual internal limit is 2^16 for the
- * complete hello message * (including the
- * cert chain and everything) */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
- break;
- }
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
- if ((size_t)larg == 0)
- s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte
- * just to get
- * non-NULL */
- else
- s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(parg, (size_t)larg);
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
- s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = (size_t)larg;
- ret = 1;
- } else
- s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = 0;
- break;
-# endif
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE:
- s->tlsext_status_type = larg;
- ret = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS:
- *(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_exts;
- ret = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS:
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = parg;
- ret = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS:
- *(STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_ids;
- ret = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS:
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = parg;
- ret = 1;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
- *(unsigned char **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp;
- return s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = parg;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = larg;
- ret = 1;
- break;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- case SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT:
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION
- || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- ret = dtls1_heartbeat(s);
- else
- ret = tls1_heartbeat(s);
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING:
- ret = s->tlsext_hb_pending;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS:
- if (larg)
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS;
- else
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS;
- ret = 1;
- break;
-# endif
-
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
- case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
- /*
- * For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol is the
- * highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method, as version
- * negotiation may have changed s->method).
- */
- if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
- return 1;
- /*
- * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
- * highest protocol version).
- */
- if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version) {
-#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
-# error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
-#endif
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
- return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION;
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
- return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION;
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
- return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
- return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
- return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
- }
- return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
-
- default:
- break;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
- if (
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
-# endif
- 0) {
- if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- switch (cmd) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
- {
- s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
- {
- s->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
- {
- s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB:
- s->tlsext_debug_cb = (void (*)(SSL *, int, int,
- unsigned char *, int, void *))fp;
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- break;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
-{
- CERT *cert;
-
- cert = ctx->cert;
-
- switch (cmd) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
- if ((cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
- ((cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
- (EVP_PKEY_size(cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) >
- (512 / 8)))
- )
- return (1);
- else
- return (0);
- /* break; */
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
- {
- RSA *rsa;
- int i;
-
- rsa = (RSA *)parg;
- i = 1;
- if (rsa == NULL)
- i = 0;
- else {
- if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL)
- i = 0;
- }
- if (!i) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- return (0);
- } else {
- if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
- RSA_free(cert->rsa_tmp);
- cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
- return (1);
- }
- }
- /* break; */
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (0);
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
- {
- DH *new = NULL, *dh;
-
- dh = (DH *)parg;
- if ((new = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(new)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- DH_free(new);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
- DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
- cert->dh_tmp = new;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * break;
- */
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (0);
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH:
- {
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
-
- if (parg == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- ecdh = EC_KEY_dup((EC_KEY *)parg);
- if (ecdh == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
- if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
- EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
- EC_KEY_free(cert->ecdh_tmp);
- }
- cert->ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
- return 1;
- }
- /* break; */
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (0);
- }
- break;
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG:
- ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = parg;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS:
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS:
- {
- unsigned char *keys = parg;
- if (!keys)
- return 48;
- if (larg != 48) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS) {
- memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, keys, 16);
- memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, keys + 16, 16);
- memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, keys + 32, 16);
- } else {
- memcpy(keys, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
- memcpy(keys + 16, ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16);
- memcpy(keys + 32, ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16);
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG:
- ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg = parg;
- return 1;
-# endif
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG:
- ctx->tlsext_status_arg = parg;
- return 1;
- break;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
- if (ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
- ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
- if (parg == NULL)
- break;
- if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255
- || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD:
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
- srp_password_from_info_cb;
- ctx->srp_ctx.info = parg;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = parg;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH:
- ctx->srp_ctx.strength = larg;
- break;
-# endif
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
- /* A Thawte special :-) */
- case SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT:
- if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL) {
- if ((ctx->extra_certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
- return (0);
- }
- sk_X509_push(ctx->extra_certs, (X509 *)parg);
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS:
- *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->extra_certs;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS:
- if (ctx->extra_certs) {
- sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
- ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
-{
- CERT *cert;
-
- cert = ctx->cert;
-
- switch (cmd) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
- {
- cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
- {
- cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
- {
- cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
- }
- break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB:
- ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp;
- break;
-
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB:
- ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback =
- (int (*)(SSL *, void *, size_t, void *))fp;
- break;
-# endif
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB:
- ctx->tlsext_status_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
- break;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB:
- ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *,
- unsigned char *,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
- HMAC_CTX *, int))fp;
- break;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback =
- (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp;
- break;
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB:
- ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
- ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
- (char *(*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
- break;
-# endif
-#endif
-
- default:
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-/*
- * This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually
- * available
- */
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
-{
- SSL_CIPHER c;
- const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
- unsigned long id;
-
- id = 0x03000000L | ((unsigned long)p[0] << 8L) | (unsigned long)p[1];
- c.id = id;
- cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES
- if (cp == NULL)
- fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher ID %x\n", (p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
-#endif
- if (cp == NULL || cp->valid == 0)
- return NULL;
- else
- return cp;
-}
-
-int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
-{
- long l;
-
- if (p != NULL) {
- l = c->id;
- if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x03000000)
- return (0);
- p[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xFF;
- p[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xFF;
- }
- return (2);
-}
-
-SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr)
-{
- SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
- int i, ii, ok;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
- unsigned int j;
- int ec_ok, ec_nid;
- unsigned char ec_search1 = 0, ec_search2 = 0;
-#endif
- CERT *cert;
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a;
-
- /* Let's see which ciphers we can support */
- cert = s->cert;
-
-#if 0
- /*
- * Do not set the compare functions, because this may lead to a
- * reordering by "id". We want to keep the original ordering. We may pay
- * a price in performance during sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(), but would have to
- * pay with the price of sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup().
- */
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(srvr, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(clnt, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr),
- (void *)srvr);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr); ++i) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr, i);
- fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name);
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt),
- (void *)clnt);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt); ++i) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt, i);
- fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name);
- }
-#endif
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
- prio = srvr;
- allow = clnt;
- } else {
- prio = clnt;
- allow = srvr;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i);
-
- /* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
- if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
- (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
- continue;
-
- ssl_set_cert_masks(cert, c);
- mask_k = cert->mask_k;
- mask_a = cert->mask_a;
- emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
- emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
- emask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
- mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
- emask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- /*
- * fprintf(stderr,"ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n",
- * i,c->algorithms);
- */
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- if (!kssl_keytab_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
- continue;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* with PSK there must be server callback set */
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
- continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) {
- ok = (alg_k & emask_k) && (alg_a & emask_a);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n",
- ok, alg_k, alg_a, emask_k, emask_a, (void *)c, c->name);
-#endif
- } else {
- ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n", ok, alg_k,
- alg_a, mask_k, mask_a, (void *)c, c->name);
-#endif
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (
- /*
- * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our
- * certificate
- */
- (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA || alg_a & SSL_aECDH)
- /* and we have an ECC certificate */
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL)
- /*
- * and the client specified a Supported Point Formats
- * extension
- */
- && ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL))
- /* and our certificate's point is compressed */
- && ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info != NULL)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key !=
- NULL)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->
- key->public_key != NULL)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->
- key->public_key->data != NULL)
- &&
- ((*
- (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->
- key->public_key->data) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
- ||
- (*
- (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->
- key->public_key->data) ==
- POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED + 1)
- )
- )
- ) {
- ec_ok = 0;
- /*
- * if our certificate's curve is over a field type that the
- * client does not support then do not allow this cipher suite to
- * be negotiated
- */
- if ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec != NULL)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group !=
- NULL)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->
- group->meth != NULL)
- &&
- (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
- (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->
- group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
- ) {
- for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- j++) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[j] ==
- TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime) {
- ec_ok = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- } else
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
- (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->
- group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
- for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- j++) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[j] ==
- TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2) {
- ec_ok = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- ok = ok && ec_ok;
- }
- if (
- /*
- * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our
- * certificate
- */
- (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA || alg_a & SSL_aECDH)
- /* and we have an ECC certificate */
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL)
- /*
- * and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension
- */
- && ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL))
- ) {
- ec_ok = 0;
- if ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec != NULL)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group !=
- NULL)
- ) {
- ec_nid =
- EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->
- pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->
- pkey.ec->group);
- if ((ec_nid == 0)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.
- ec->group->meth != NULL)
- ) {
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
- (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.
- ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
- ec_search1 = 0xFF;
- ec_search2 = 0x01;
- } else
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
- (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->
- pkey.ec->group->meth) ==
- NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
- ec_search1 = 0xFF;
- ec_search2 = 0x02;
- }
- } else {
- ec_search1 = 0x00;
- ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid);
- }
- if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0)) {
- for (j = 0;
- j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2;
- j++) {
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2 * j] ==
- ec_search1)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2 * j +
- 1] ==
- ec_search2)) {
- ec_ok = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- ok = ok && ec_ok;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (
- /*
- * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an
- * ephemeral EC key
- */
- (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
- /* and we have an ephemeral EC key */
- && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
- /*
- * and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension
- */
- && ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL))
- ) {
- ec_ok = 0;
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group != NULL) {
- ec_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group);
- if ((ec_nid == 0)
- && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth != NULL)
- ) {
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
- (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) ==
- NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
- ec_search1 = 0xFF;
- ec_search2 = 0x01;
- } else
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
- (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) ==
- NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
- ec_search1 = 0xFF;
- ec_search2 = 0x02;
- }
- } else {
- ec_search1 = 0x00;
- ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid);
- }
- if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0)) {
- for (j = 0;
- j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2;
- j++) {
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2 * j] ==
- ec_search1)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2 * j +
- 1] ==
- ec_search2)) {
- ec_ok = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- ok = ok && ec_ok;
- }
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
- if (!ok)
- continue;
- ii = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, c);
- if (ii >= 0) {
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- && s->s3->is_probably_safari) {
- if (!ret)
- ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii);
- continue;
- }
-#endif
- ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii);
- break;
- }
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- unsigned long alg_k;
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
- if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
- p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN;
- p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN;
- return (ret);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kEDH)) {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
-# endif
- }
- if ((s->version == SSL3_VERSION) &&
- (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHr))) {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH;
-# endif
- }
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)) {
- p[ret++] = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH;
- p[ret++] = TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- /*
- * ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites as well so we don't
- * need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kEECDH
- */
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
- p[ret++] = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
- }
-#endif
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret;
-
- /*
- * Don't do anything much if we have not done the handshake or we don't
- * want to send messages :-)
- */
- if ((s->quiet_shutdown) || (s->state == SSL_ST_BEFORE)) {
- s->shutdown = (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
- return (1);
- }
-
- if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
- s->shutdown |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN;
-#if 1
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
-#endif
- /*
- * our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs to be
- * written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true
- */
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
- return (-1); /* return WANT_WRITE */
- } else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
- /* resend it if not sent */
-#if 1
- ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- if (ret == -1) {
- /*
- * we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must
- * have already signalled return 0 upon a previous invoation,
- * return WANT_WRITE
- */
- return (ret);
- }
-#endif
- } else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) {
- /*
- * If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed
- */
- s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, 0, NULL, 0, 0);
- if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) {
- return (-1); /* return WANT_READ */
- }
- }
-
- if ((s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) &&
- !s->s3->alert_dispatch)
- return (1);
- else
- return (0);
-}
-
-int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
-{
- int ret, n;
-
-#if 0
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- return (0);
- }
-#endif
- clear_sys_error();
- if (s->s3->renegotiate)
- ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
-
- /*
- * This is an experimental flag that sends the last handshake message in
- * the same packet as the first use data - used to see if it helps the
- * TCP protocol during session-id reuse
- */
- /* The second test is because the buffer may have been removed */
- if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio)) {
- /* First time through, we write into the buffer */
- if (s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret == 0) {
- ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return (ret);
-
- s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = ret;
- }
-
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- n = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
- if (n <= 0)
- return (n);
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-
- /* We have flushed the buffer, so remove it */
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-
- ret = s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret;
- s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
- } else {
- ret = s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
- buf, len);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return (ret);
- }
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
-{
- int ret;
-
- clear_sys_error();
- if (s->s3->renegotiate)
- ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 1;
- ret =
- s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len,
- peek);
- if ((ret == -1) && (s->s3->in_read_app_data == 2)) {
- /*
- * ssl3_read_bytes decided to call s->handshake_func, which called
- * ssl3_read_bytes to read handshake data. However, ssl3_read_bytes
- * actually found application data and thinks that application data
- * makes sense here; so disable handshake processing and try to read
- * application data again.
- */
- s->in_handshake++;
- ret =
- s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len,
- peek);
- s->in_handshake--;
- } else
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 0;
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
-{
- return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0);
-}
-
-int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
-{
- return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
- return (1);
-
- if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)
- return (0);
-
- s->s3->renegotiate = 1;
- return (1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (s->s3->renegotiate) {
- if ((s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) &&
- (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) && !SSL_in_init(s)) {
- /*
- * if we are the server, and we have sent a 'RENEGOTIATE'
- * message, we need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT.
- */
- /* SSL_ST_ACCEPT */
- s->state = SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE;
- s->s3->renegotiate = 0;
- s->s3->num_renegotiations++;
- s->s3->total_renegotiations++;
- ret = 1;
- }
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * If we are using TLS v1.2 or later and default SHA1+MD5 algorithms switch
- * to new SHA256 PRF and handshake macs
- */
-long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
-{
- long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
- if (s->method->version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
- alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF))
- return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
- return alg2;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_lib.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_lib.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_lib.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,4323 @@
+/* ssl/s3_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# include "../crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h"
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+const char ssl3_version_str[] = "SSLv3" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+#define SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS (sizeof(ssl3_ciphers)/sizeof(SSL_CIPHER))
+
+/* list of available SSLv3 ciphers (sorted by id) */
+OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
+
+/* The RSA ciphers */
+/* Cipher 01 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 02 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 03 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 04 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 05 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 06 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC2,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 07 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_IDEA,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif
+
+/* Cipher 08 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 09 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 0A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* The DH ciphers */
+/* Cipher 0B */
+ {
+ 0,
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 0C */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 0D */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 0E */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 0F */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 10 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* The Ephemeral DH ciphers */
+/* Cipher 11 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 12 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 13 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 14 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 15 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 16 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 17 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 18 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 19 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 1A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 1B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Fortezza ciphersuite from SSL 3.0 spec */
+#if 0
+/* Cipher 1C */
+ {
+ 0,
+ SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kFZA,
+ SSL_aFZA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 1D */
+ {
+ 0,
+ SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA,
+ SSL_kFZA,
+ SSL_aFZA,
+ SSL_eFZA,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 1E */
+ {
+ 0,
+ SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA,
+ SSL_kFZA,
+ SSL_aFZA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+/* The Kerberos ciphers*/
+/* Cipher 1E */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 1F */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 20 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 21 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_IDEA,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 22 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 23 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 24 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 25 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_IDEA,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 26 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 27 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC2,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 28 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 29 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 2A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC2,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 2B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
+ SSL_kKRB5,
+ SSL_aKRB5,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_SSLV3,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 40,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+/* New AES ciphersuites */
+/* Cipher 2F */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+/* Cipher 30 */
+ {
+ 0,
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+/* Cipher 31 */
+ {
+ 0,
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+/* Cipher 32 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+/* Cipher 33 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+/* Cipher 34 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 35 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+/* Cipher 36 */
+ {
+ 0,
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 37 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 38 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+/* Cipher 39 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 3A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+ /* Cipher 3B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 3C */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 3D */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 3E */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 3F */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 40 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+ /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (128-bit portion) */
+
+ /* Cipher 41 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 42 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 43 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 44 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 45 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 46 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
+
+#if TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES
+ /* New TLS Export CipherSuites from expired ID */
+# if 0
+ /* Cipher 60 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 61 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC2,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 128,
+ },
+# endif
+
+ /* Cipher 62 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 63 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 56,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 64 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 65 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 56,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 66 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+#endif
+
+ /* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+ /* Cipher 67 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 68 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 69 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 6A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 6B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 6C */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 6D */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* GOST Ciphersuites */
+
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST94-GOST89-GOST89",
+ 0x3000080,
+ SSL_kGOST,
+ SSL_aGOST94,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_GOST89MAC,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
+ 256,
+ 256},
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89",
+ 0x3000081,
+ SSL_kGOST,
+ SSL_aGOST01,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_GOST89MAC,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
+ 256,
+ 256},
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST94-NULL-GOST94",
+ 0x3000082,
+ SSL_kGOST,
+ SSL_aGOST94,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_GOST94,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94,
+ 0,
+ 0},
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST2001-NULL-GOST94",
+ 0x3000083,
+ SSL_kGOST,
+ SSL_aGOST01,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_GOST94,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94,
+ 0,
+ 0},
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
+ /* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 (256-bit portion) */
+
+ /* Cipher 84 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+ /* Cipher 85 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 86 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 87 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 88 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 89 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* Cipher 8A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kPSK,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 8B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kPSK,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 8C */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kPSK,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 8D */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kPSK,
+ SSL_aPSK,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
+ /* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
+
+ /* Cipher 96 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 97 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 98 */
+ {
+ 0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 99 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 9A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 9B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_SEED,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */
+
+ /* GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
+
+ /* Cipher 9C */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 9D */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 9E */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher 9F */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher A0 */
+ {
+ 0,
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher A1 */
+ {
+ 0,
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kDHr,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher A2 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher A3 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher A4 */
+ {
+ 0,
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher A5 */
+ {
+ 0,
+ TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kDHd,
+ SSL_aDH,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher A6 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher A7 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kEDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ /* Cipher C001 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C002 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C003 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C004 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C005 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C006 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C007 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C008 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C009 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00C */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00D */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00E */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C00F */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C010 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C011 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C012 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C013 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C014 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C015 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_eNULL,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C016 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_RC4,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C017 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C018 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C019 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aNULL,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* Cipher C01A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+ SSL_aSRP,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C01B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C01C */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 112,
+ 168,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C01D */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+ SSL_aSRP,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C01E */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C01F */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C020 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+ SSL_aSRP,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C021 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C022 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+ SSL_aDSS,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+
+ /* HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+ /* Cipher C023 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C024 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA384,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C025 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C026 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA384,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C027 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C028 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA384,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C029 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA256,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C02A */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA384,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+ /* Cipher C02B */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C02C */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aECDSA,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C02D */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C02E */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kECDHe,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C02F */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C030 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kEECDH,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C031 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES128GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+ 128,
+ 128,
+ },
+
+ /* Cipher C032 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ SSL_kECDHr,
+ SSL_aECDH,
+ SSL_AES256GCM,
+ SSL_AEAD,
+ SSL_TLSV1_2,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+#ifdef TEMP_GOST_TLS
+/* Cipher FF00 */
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST-MD5",
+ 0x0300ff00,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_MD5,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256,
+ },
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST-GOST94",
+ 0x0300ff01,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_GOST94,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256},
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST-GOST89MAC",
+ 0x0300ff02,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_GOST89MAC,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+ 256,
+ 256},
+ {
+ 1,
+ "GOST-GOST89STREAM",
+ 0x0300ff03,
+ SSL_kRSA,
+ SSL_aRSA,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT,
+ SSL_GOST89MAC,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+ SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF | TLS1_STREAM_MAC,
+ 256,
+ 256},
+#endif
+
+/* end of list */
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data = {
+ ssl3_enc,
+ n_ssl3_mac,
+ ssl3_setup_key_block,
+ ssl3_generate_master_secret,
+ ssl3_change_cipher_state,
+ ssl3_final_finish_mac,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_cert_verify_mac,
+ SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST, 4,
+ SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST, 4,
+ ssl3_alert_code,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
+ size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
+ int use_context))ssl_undefined_function,
+};
+
+long ssl3_default_timeout(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the SSLv3 spec is way too long for
+ * http, the cache would over fill
+ */
+ return (60 * 60 * 2);
+}
+
+int ssl3_num_ciphers(void)
+{
+ return (SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
+{
+ if (u < SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS)
+ return (&(ssl3_ciphers[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS - 1 - u]));
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
+ return 0;
+
+ return (s->s3->rrec.type ==
+ SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) ? s->s3->rrec.length : 0;
+}
+
+int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
+{
+ SSL3_STATE *s3;
+
+ if ((s3 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *s3)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memset(s3, 0, sizeof *s3);
+ memset(s3->rrec.seq_num, 0, sizeof(s3->rrec.seq_num));
+ memset(s3->wrec.seq_num, 0, sizeof(s3->wrec.seq_num));
+
+ s->s3 = s3;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s);
+#endif
+ s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+ return (1);
+ err:
+ return (0);
+}
+
+void ssl3_free(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL || s->s3 == NULL)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+#endif
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL)
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+#endif
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ }
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst)
+ ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3, sizeof *s->s3);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3);
+ s->s3 = NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *rp, *wp;
+ size_t rlen, wlen;
+ int init_extra;
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp);
+ s->s3->rrec.comp = NULL;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ s->s3->is_probably_safari = 0;
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+ rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
+ wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
+ rlen = s->s3->rbuf.len;
+ wlen = s->s3->wbuf.len;
+ init_extra = s->s3->init_extra;
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst) {
+ ssl3_free_digest_list(s);
+ }
+ memset(s->s3, 0, sizeof *s->s3);
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf = rp;
+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = wp;
+ s->s3->rbuf.len = rlen;
+ s->s3->wbuf.len = wlen;
+ s->s3->init_extra = init_extra;
+
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ s->s3->renegotiate = 0;
+ s->s3->total_renegotiations = 0;
+ s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0;
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 0;
+ s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static char *MS_CALLBACK srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+ return BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info);
+}
+#endif
+
+long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+ if (
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
+# endif
+ 0) {
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
+ ret = s->hit;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST:
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
+ ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
+ ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
+ s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS:
+ ret = s->s3->total_renegotiations;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS:
+ ret = (int)(s->s3->flags);
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
+ if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
+ ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
+ (EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) >
+ (512 / 8))))
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
+ {
+ RSA *rsa = (RSA *)parg;
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ if (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(s->cert->rsa_tmp);
+ s->cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
+ {
+ DH *dh = (DH *)parg;
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
+ s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH:
+ {
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+
+ if (parg == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_up_ref((EC_KEY *)parg)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ ecdh = (EC_KEY *)parg;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
+ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(s->cert->ecdh_tmp);
+ s->cert->ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME:
+ if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ s->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ if (parg == NULL)
+ break;
+ if (strlen((char *)parg) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((s->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG:
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg = parg;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT:
+ if (larg > 12288) { /* actual internal limit is 2^16 for the
+ * complete hello message * (including the
+ * cert chain and everything) */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
+ if ((size_t)larg == 0)
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte
+ * just to get
+ * non-NULL */
+ else
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(parg, (size_t)larg);
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = (size_t)larg;
+ ret = 1;
+ } else
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len = 0;
+ break;
+# endif
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE:
+ s->tlsext_status_type = larg;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS:
+ *(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_exts;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS:
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = parg;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS:
+ *(STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_ids;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS:
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = parg;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
+ *(unsigned char **)parg = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp;
+ return s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = parg;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = larg;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ case SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT:
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION
+ || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ret = dtls1_heartbeat(s);
+ else
+ ret = tls1_heartbeat(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING:
+ ret = s->tlsext_hb_pending;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS:
+ if (larg)
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS;
+ else
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+# endif
+
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+ /*
+ * For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol is the
+ * highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method, as version
+ * negotiation may have changed s->method).
+ */
+ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
+ * highest protocol version).
+ */
+ if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version) {
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
+# error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
+#endif
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
+ return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+ return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+ return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
+ }
+ return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+ if (
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
+# endif
+ 0) {
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
+ {
+ s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+ {
+ s->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
+ {
+ s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB:
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb = (void (*)(SSL *, int, int,
+ unsigned char *, int, void *))fp;
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+ CERT *cert;
+
+ cert = ctx->cert;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
+ if ((cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
+ ((cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
+ (EVP_PKEY_size(cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) >
+ (512 / 8)))
+ )
+ return (1);
+ else
+ return (0);
+ /* break; */
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
+ {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ int i;
+
+ rsa = (RSA *)parg;
+ i = 1;
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ i = 0;
+ else {
+ if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL)
+ i = 0;
+ }
+ if (!i) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ } else {
+ if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(cert->rsa_tmp);
+ cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
+ return (1);
+ }
+ }
+ /* break; */
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
+ {
+ DH *new = NULL, *dh;
+
+ dh = (DH *)parg;
+ if ((new = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
+ if (!DH_generate_key(new)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ DH_free(new);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
+ cert->dh_tmp = new;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * break;
+ */
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH:
+ {
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+
+ if (parg == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ecdh = EC_KEY_dup((EC_KEY *)parg);
+ if (ecdh == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
+ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
+ EC_KEY_free(cert->ecdh_tmp);
+ }
+ cert->ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* break; */
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG:
+ ctx->tlsext_servername_arg = parg;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS:
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS:
+ {
+ unsigned char *keys = parg;
+ if (!keys)
+ return 48;
+ if (larg != 48) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS) {
+ memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, keys, 16);
+ memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, keys + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, keys + 32, 16);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(keys, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ memcpy(keys + 16, ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16);
+ memcpy(keys + 32, ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16);
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG:
+ ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+# endif
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG:
+ ctx->tlsext_status_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+ break;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME:
+ ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+ if (ctx->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login);
+ ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+ if (parg == NULL)
+ break;
+ if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255
+ || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD:
+ ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
+ srp_password_from_info_cb;
+ ctx->srp_ctx.info = parg;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG:
+ ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+ ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = parg;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH:
+ ctx->srp_ctx.strength = larg;
+ break;
+# endif
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+ /* A Thawte special :-) */
+ case SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT:
+ if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL) {
+ if ((ctx->extra_certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ }
+ sk_X509_push(ctx->extra_certs, (X509 *)parg);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS:
+ *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->extra_certs;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS:
+ if (ctx->extra_certs) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
+ ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+ CERT *cert;
+
+ cert = ctx->cert;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
+ {
+ cert->rsa_tmp_cb = (RSA *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB:
+ {
+ cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB:
+ {
+ cert->ecdh_tmp_cb = (EC_KEY *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB:
+ ctx->tlsext_servername_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp;
+ break;
+
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB:
+ ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback =
+ (int (*)(SSL *, void *, size_t, void *))fp;
+ break;
+# endif
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB:
+ ctx->tlsext_status_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB:
+ ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *,
+ HMAC_CTX *, int))fp;
+ break;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB:
+ ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+ ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB:
+ ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+ ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback =
+ (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB:
+ ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+ ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback =
+ (char *(*)(SSL *, void *))fp;
+ break;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually
+ * available
+ */
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p)
+{
+ SSL_CIPHER c;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+ unsigned long id;
+
+ id = 0x03000000L | ((unsigned long)p[0] << 8L) | (unsigned long)p[1];
+ c.id = id;
+ cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher ID %x\n", (p[0] << 8) | p[1]);
+#endif
+ if (cp == NULL || cp->valid == 0)
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ return cp;
+}
+
+int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ long l;
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ l = c->id;
+ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x03000000)
+ return (0);
+ p[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xFF;
+ p[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xFF;
+ }
+ return (2);
+}
+
+SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr)
+{
+ SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
+ int i, ii, ok;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+ unsigned int j;
+ int ec_ok, ec_nid;
+ unsigned char ec_search1 = 0, ec_search2 = 0;
+#endif
+ CERT *cert;
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a;
+
+ /* Let's see which ciphers we can support */
+ cert = s->cert;
+
+#if 0
+ /*
+ * Do not set the compare functions, because this may lead to a
+ * reordering by "id". We want to keep the original ordering. We may pay
+ * a price in performance during sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(), but would have to
+ * pay with the price of sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup().
+ */
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(srvr, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(clnt, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr),
+ (void *)srvr);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr); ++i) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr, i);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt),
+ (void *)clnt);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt); ++i) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt, i);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
+ prio = srvr;
+ allow = clnt;
+ } else {
+ prio = clnt;
+ allow = srvr;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i);
+
+ /* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
+ if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
+ (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
+ continue;
+
+ ssl_set_cert_masks(cert, c);
+ mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+ mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+ emask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
+ emask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+ emask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ /*
+ * fprintf(stderr,"ssl3_choose_cipher %d alg= %lx\n",
+ * i,c->algorithms);
+ */
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
+ if (!kssl_keytab_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* with PSK there must be server callback set */
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
+ continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) {
+ ok = (alg_k & emask_k) && (alg_a & emask_a);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s (export)\n",
+ ok, alg_k, alg_a, emask_k, emask_a, (void *)c, c->name);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n", ok, alg_k,
+ alg_a, mask_k, mask_a, (void *)c, c->name);
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (
+ /*
+ * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our
+ * certificate
+ */
+ (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA || alg_a & SSL_aECDH)
+ /* and we have an ECC certificate */
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL)
+ /*
+ * and the client specified a Supported Point Formats
+ * extension
+ */
+ && ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL))
+ /* and our certificate's point is compressed */
+ && ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info != NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->key !=
+ NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->
+ key->public_key != NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->
+ key->public_key->data != NULL)
+ &&
+ ((*
+ (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->
+ key->public_key->data) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
+ ||
+ (*
+ (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509->cert_info->
+ key->public_key->data) ==
+ POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED + 1)
+ )
+ )
+ ) {
+ ec_ok = 0;
+ /*
+ * if our certificate's curve is over a field type that the
+ * client does not support then do not allow this cipher suite to
+ * be negotiated
+ */
+ if ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec != NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group !=
+ NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->
+ group->meth != NULL)
+ &&
+ (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
+ (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->
+ group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+ ) {
+ for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ j++) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[j] ==
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime) {
+ ec_ok = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
+ (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->
+ group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
+ for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ j++) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[j] ==
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2) {
+ ec_ok = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ok = ok && ec_ok;
+ }
+ if (
+ /*
+ * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our
+ * certificate
+ */
+ (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA || alg_a & SSL_aECDH)
+ /* and we have an ECC certificate */
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL)
+ /*
+ * and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension
+ */
+ && ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL))
+ ) {
+ ec_ok = 0;
+ if ((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec != NULL)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec->group !=
+ NULL)
+ ) {
+ ec_nid =
+ EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->
+ pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->
+ pkey.ec->group);
+ if ((ec_nid == 0)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.
+ ec->group->meth != NULL)
+ ) {
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
+ (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.
+ ec->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ ec_search1 = 0xFF;
+ ec_search2 = 0x01;
+ } else
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
+ (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->
+ pkey.ec->group->meth) ==
+ NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
+ ec_search1 = 0xFF;
+ ec_search2 = 0x02;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ec_search1 = 0x00;
+ ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid);
+ }
+ if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0)) {
+ for (j = 0;
+ j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2;
+ j++) {
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2 * j] ==
+ ec_search1)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2 * j +
+ 1] ==
+ ec_search2)) {
+ ec_ok = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ok = ok && ec_ok;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (
+ /*
+ * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an
+ * ephemeral EC key
+ */
+ (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ /* and we have an ephemeral EC key */
+ && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ /*
+ * and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension
+ */
+ && ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL))
+ ) {
+ ec_ok = 0;
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group != NULL) {
+ ec_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group);
+ if ((ec_nid == 0)
+ && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth != NULL)
+ ) {
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
+ (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) ==
+ NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ ec_search1 = 0xFF;
+ ec_search2 = 0x01;
+ } else
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type
+ (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) ==
+ NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
+ ec_search1 = 0xFF;
+ ec_search2 = 0x02;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ec_search1 = 0x00;
+ ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid);
+ }
+ if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0)) {
+ for (j = 0;
+ j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2;
+ j++) {
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2 * j] ==
+ ec_search1)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2 * j +
+ 1] ==
+ ec_search2)) {
+ ec_ok = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ok = ok && ec_ok;
+ }
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+ if (!ok)
+ continue;
+ ii = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, c);
+ if (ii >= 0) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+ && s->s3->is_probably_safari) {
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii);
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
+ ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+ p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN;
+ p[ret++] = TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN;
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kEDH)) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
+# endif
+ }
+ if ((s->version == SSL3_VERSION) &&
+ (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHr))) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH;
+# endif
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ p[ret++] = SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)) {
+ p[ret++] = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH;
+ p[ret++] = TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ /*
+ * ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites as well so we don't
+ * need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kEECDH
+ */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
+ p[ret++] = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
+ }
+#endif
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't do anything much if we have not done the handshake or we don't
+ * want to send messages :-)
+ */
+ if ((s->quiet_shutdown) || (s->state == SSL_ST_BEFORE)) {
+ s->shutdown = (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN;
+#if 1
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs to be
+ * written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true
+ */
+ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+ return (-1); /* return WANT_WRITE */
+ } else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+ /* resend it if not sent */
+#if 1
+ ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ /*
+ * we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must
+ * have already signalled return 0 upon a previous invoation,
+ * return WANT_WRITE
+ */
+ return (ret);
+ }
+#endif
+ } else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) {
+ /*
+ * If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed
+ */
+ s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, 0, NULL, 0, 0);
+ if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) {
+ return (-1); /* return WANT_READ */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) &&
+ !s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+ return (1);
+ else
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
+{
+ int ret, n;
+
+#if 0
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ return (0);
+ }
+#endif
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->s3->renegotiate)
+ ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
+
+ /*
+ * This is an experimental flag that sends the last handshake message in
+ * the same packet as the first use data - used to see if it helps the
+ * TCP protocol during session-id reuse
+ */
+ /* The second test is because the buffer may have been removed */
+ if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio)) {
+ /* First time through, we write into the buffer */
+ if (s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret == 0) {
+ ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return (ret);
+
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = ret;
+ }
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ n = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n);
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ /* We have flushed the buffer, so remove it */
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+
+ ret = s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret;
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ ret = s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
+ buf, len);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->s3->renegotiate)
+ ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 1;
+ ret =
+ s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len,
+ peek);
+ if ((ret == -1) && (s->s3->in_read_app_data == 2)) {
+ /*
+ * ssl3_read_bytes decided to call s->handshake_func, which called
+ * ssl3_read_bytes to read handshake data. However, ssl3_read_bytes
+ * actually found application data and thinks that application data
+ * makes sense here; so disable handshake processing and try to read
+ * application data again.
+ */
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ ret =
+ s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len,
+ peek);
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ } else
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 0;
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+{
+ return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0);
+}
+
+int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+{
+ return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
+ return (1);
+
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)
+ return (0);
+
+ s->s3->renegotiate = 1;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3->renegotiate) {
+ if ((s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) &&
+ (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) && !SSL_in_init(s)) {
+ /*
+ * if we are the server, and we have sent a 'RENEGOTIATE'
+ * message, we need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT.
+ */
+ /* SSL_ST_ACCEPT */
+ s->state = SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE;
+ s->s3->renegotiate = 0;
+ s->s3->num_renegotiations++;
+ s->s3->total_renegotiations++;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If we are using TLS v1.2 or later and default SHA1+MD5 algorithms switch
+ * to new SHA256 PRF and handshake macs
+ */
+long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
+{
+ long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
+ if (s->method->version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
+ alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF))
+ return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
+ return alg2;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_srvr.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,3630 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
-#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
-{
- if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
- return (SSLv3_server_method());
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
-{
- int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
-
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
- (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
- if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
- /*
- * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
- * login name
- */
- ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- } else {
- ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
- }
- }
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
-int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
-{
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
- int new_state, state, skip = 0;
-
- RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
- ERR_clear_error();
- clear_sys_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- /* init things to blank */
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
- SSL_clear(s);
-
- if (s->cert == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
- return (-1);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /*
- * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
- * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
- * handshakes anyway.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- }
-#endif
-
- for (;;) {
- state = s->state;
-
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
-
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
- case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
- s->server = 1;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-
- if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
- if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_buf = buf;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- /*
- * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
- */
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
-
- if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
- /*
- * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
- * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
- */
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
- } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- !(s->options &
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- /*
- * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
- * support secure renegotiation.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- } else {
- /*
- * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
- * HelloRequest
- */
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
-
- s->shutdown = 0;
- ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-
- s->shutdown = 0;
- if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
- ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- {
- int al;
- if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
- /*
- * callback indicates firther work to be done
- */
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- goto end;
- }
- if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- /*
- * This is not really an error but the only means to for
- * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
- */
- if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- s->renegotiate = 2;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->hit) {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- }
-#else
- if (s->hit)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-#endif
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
- /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
- if (!
- (s->s3->tmp.
- new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
- SSL_aSRP))
-&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- } else {
- skip = 1;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
-#else
- } else
- skip = 1;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /*
- * clear this, it may get reset by
- * send_server_key_exchange
- */
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
-
- /*
- * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
- * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
- * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
- * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
- * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
- * key exchange.
- */
- if (0
- /*
- * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
- * provided
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
- || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-#endif
- || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH))
- || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
- || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
- [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
- 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- )
- )
- )
- ) {
- ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- } else
- skip = 1;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
- if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
- /*
- * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
- * during re-negotiation:
- */
- ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
- /*
- * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
- * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
- * RFC 2246):
- */
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
- /*
- * ... except when the application insists on
- * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
- * this for SSL 3)
- */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
- /*
- * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
- */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
- /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
- /*
- * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
- * are omitted
- */
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- /* no cert request */
- skip = 1;
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- }
- } else {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
- ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-#else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-
- /*
- * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
- * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
- * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
- * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
- * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
- * unconditionally.
- */
-
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
- /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
- ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (ret == 2)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
- else {
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
- ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (ret == 2) {
- /*
- * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
- * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
- * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
- * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
- */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- if (!s->session->peer)
- break;
- /*
- * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
- * digest cached records.
- */
- if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- } else {
- int offset = 0;
- int dgst_num;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /*
- * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
- * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
- * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
- * step
- */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- }
- for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
- int dgst_size;
-
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- EVP_MD_CTX_type
- (s->
- s3->handshake_dgst
- [dgst_num]),
- &(s->s3->
- tmp.cert_verify_md
- [offset]));
- dgst_size =
- EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
- if (dgst_size < 0) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- offset += dgst_size;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
- /*
- * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
- * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
- * cautious.
- * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
- * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
- * the client's Finished message is read.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-
- ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-#endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- /*
- * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
- * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
- * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
- * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
- * the client's Finished message is read.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (s->hit)
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-#endif
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
-#endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
- SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
-
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
- {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
- SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (s->hit) {
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- } else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
- } else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
-
- /* remove buffering on output */
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
- * HelloRequest */
- s->renegotiate = 0;
- s->new_session = 0;
-
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
- /* s->server=1; */
- s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
-
- case SSL_ST_ERR:
- default:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
- if (s->debug) {
- if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
-
- if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
- new_state = s->state;
- s->state = state;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
- s->state = new_state;
- }
- }
- skip = 0;
- }
- end:
- /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
-
- s->in_handshake--;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 0;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = 4;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok;
- long n;
-
- /*
- * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
- * so permit appropriate message length
- */
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
- -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
- /*
- * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
- * negotiation.
- */
- if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
- * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
- DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
- s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
- }
-#endif
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
- return 2;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
- unsigned int cookie_len;
- long n;
- unsigned long id;
- unsigned char *p, *d, *q;
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
-#endif
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
-
- /*
- * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
- * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
- * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
- * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
- */
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- }
- s->first_packet = 1;
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
- s->first_packet = 0;
- d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- /*
- * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
- * for session id length
- */
- if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
- * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
- */
- s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
- p += 2;
-
- if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
- (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
- !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
- /*
- * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
- * number
- */
- s->version = s->client_version;
- }
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
- * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
- * cookie length...
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
-
- session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
-
- if (cookie_length == 0)
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* load the client random */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* get the session-id */
- j = *(p++);
-
- if (p + j > d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- s->hit = 0;
- /*
- * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
- * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
- * ignore resumption requests with flag
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
- * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
- * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
- * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
- * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
- * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
- */
- if ((s->new_session
- && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
- } else {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
- /*
- * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
- * version.
- * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
- * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
- * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
- * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
- * will abort the handshake with an error.
- */
- if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
- * session */
- s->hit = 1;
- } else if (i == -1)
- goto err;
- else { /* i == 0 */
-
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- p += j;
-
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- /* cookie stuff */
- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- cookie_len = *(p++);
-
- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
- * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
- * does not cause an overflow.
- */
- if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
- /* too much data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
- memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
-
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
- cookie_len) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* else cookie verification succeeded */
- }
- /* default verification */
- else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
- s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ret = 2;
- }
-
- p += cookie_len;
- }
-
- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2s(p, i);
-
- if (i == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
- if (s->hit) {
- j = 0;
- id = s->session->cipher->id;
-
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
-#endif
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
-#endif
- if (c->id == id) {
- j = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
- * CVE-2010-4180.
- */
-#if 0
- if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
- && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
- /*
- * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
- * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
- * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
- * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
- * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
- */
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
- s->session->cipher = c;
- j = 1;
- }
- }
-#endif
- if (j == 0) {
- /*
- * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
- * to reuse it
- */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* compression */
- i = *(p++);
- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- q = p;
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
- if (p[j] == 0)
- break;
- }
-
- p += i;
- if (j >= i) {
- /* no compress */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* TLS extensions */
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
- /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
- * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
- * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
- * processing to use it in key derivation.
- */
- {
- unsigned char *pos;
- pos = s->s3->server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
- SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
-
- s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
- &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
- &pref_cipher,
- s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
- s->hit = 1;
- s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
- s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-
- ciphers = NULL;
-
- /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
- pref_cipher =
- pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
- s->
- session->ciphers,
- SSL_get_ciphers
- (s));
- if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
-
- if (s->cipher_list)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
-
- if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-
- s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
- s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
- * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
- * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
- */
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
- if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
- int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
- /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
- /* Can't disable compression */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Look for resumed compression method */
- for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
- if (comp_id == comp->id) {
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
- for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
- if (q[m] == comp_id)
- break;
- }
- if (m >= i) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else if (s->hit)
- comp = NULL;
- else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
- /* See if we have a match */
- int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
-
- nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
- for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
- comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
- v = comp->id;
- for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
- if (v == q[o]) {
- done = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (done)
- break;
- }
- if (done)
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
- else
- comp = NULL;
- }
-#else
- /*
- * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
- * using compression.
- */
- if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
- */
-
- if (!s->hit) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- s->session->compress_meth = 0;
-#else
- s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
-#endif
- if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
- s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
- if (ciphers == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- ciphers = NULL;
- c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
-
- if (c == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
- } else {
- /* Session-id reuse */
-#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
- SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
- sk = s->session->ciphers;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
- if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
- nc = c;
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
- ec = c;
- }
- if (nc != NULL)
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
- else if (ec != NULL)
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
- } else
-#endif
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
- }
-
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
- || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /*-
- * we now have the following setup.
- * client_random
- * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
- * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
- * compression - basically ignored right now
- * ssl version is set - sslv3
- * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
- * s->hit - session reuse flag
- * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
- */
-
- /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (ret < 0)
- ret = 1;
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- }
-
- if (ciphers != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *buf;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int i, sl;
- unsigned long l;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
- buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- p = s->s3->server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
- /* Do the message type and length last */
- d = p = &(buf[4]);
-
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
-
- /* Random stuff */
- memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /*-
- * There are several cases for the session ID to send
- * back in the server hello:
- * - For session reuse from the session cache,
- * we send back the old session ID.
- * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
- * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
- * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
- * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
- * session ID.
- * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
- * we send back a 0-length session ID.
- * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
- * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
- * to send back.
- */
- if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
- && !s->hit)
- s->session->session_id_length = 0;
-
- sl = s->session->session_id_length;
- if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- *(p++) = sl;
- memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
- p += sl;
-
- /* put the cipher */
- i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
- p += i;
-
- /* put the compression method */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- *(p++) = 0;
-#else
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- *(p++) = 0;
- else
- *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- if ((p =
- ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
- buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
- NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
- /* do the header */
- l = (p - d);
- d = buf;
- *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
- l2n3(l, d);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = p - buf;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 0;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = 4;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned char *q;
- int j, num;
- RSA *rsa;
- unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned int u;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encodedlen = 0;
- int curve_id = 0;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-#endif
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int al, i;
- unsigned long type;
- int n;
- CERT *cert;
- BIGNUM *r[4];
- int nr[4], kn;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- cert = s->cert;
-
- buf = s->init_buf;
-
- r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
- n = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
- rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
- if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
- rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher));
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- RSA_up_ref(rsa);
- cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
- }
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- r[0] = rsa->n;
- r[1] = rsa->e;
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
- dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
- if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
- dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher));
- if (dhp == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
- if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
- dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
- dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
- if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- r[0] = dh->p;
- r[1] = dh->g;
- r[2] = dh->pub_key;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
- const EC_GROUP *group;
-
- ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
- if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
- ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
- s3->tmp.new_cipher));
- }
- if (ecdhp == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
- if (ecdhp == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
- if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
- if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
- * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
- * non-zero.
- */
- if ((curve_id =
- tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
- == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
- * allocate memory accordingly.
- */
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
-
- if (encodedlen == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
-
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
- * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
- * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
- * structure.
- */
- n = 4 + encodedlen;
-
- /*
- * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
- * can set these to NULLs
- */
- r[0] = NULL;
- r[1] = NULL;
- r[2] = NULL;
- r[3] = NULL;
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
- /*
- * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
- */
- n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
- if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
- goto err;
- }
- r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
- r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
- r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
- r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
- nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
- n += 1 + nr[i];
- else
-#endif
- n += 2 + nr[i];
- }
-
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
- == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- } else {
- pkey = NULL;
- kn = 0;
- }
-
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
- goto err;
- }
- d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p = &(d[4]);
-
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
- *p = nr[i];
- p++;
- } else
-#endif
- s2n(nr[i], p);
- BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
- p += nr[i];
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
- * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
- * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
- * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
- */
- *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
- p += 1;
- *p = 0;
- p += 1;
- *p = curve_id;
- p += 1;
- *p = encodedlen;
- p += 1;
- memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
- (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- encodedPoint = NULL;
- p += encodedlen;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* copy PSK identity hint */
- s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
- strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
- strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
- p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* not anonymous */
- if (pkey != NULL) {
- /*
- * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
- * points to the space at the end.
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
- && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- q = md_buf;
- j = 0;
- for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
- EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
- ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
- q += i;
- j += i;
- }
- if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
- &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u, p);
- n += u + 2;
- } else
-#endif
- if (md) {
- /*
- * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
- */
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
- /* Should never happen */
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p += 2;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
- if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(i, p);
- n += i + 2;
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- n += 2;
- } else {
- /* Is this error check actually needed? */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
- l2n3(n, d);
-
- /*
- * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
- */
- s->init_num = n + 4;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (encodedPoint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-#endif
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p, *d;
- int i, j, nl, off, n;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
- X509_NAME *name;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
- buf = s->init_buf;
-
- d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
-
- /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
- p++;
- n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
- d[0] = n;
- p += n;
- n++;
-
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
- s2n(nl, p);
- p += nl + 2;
- n += nl + 2;
- }
-
- off = n;
- p += 2;
- n += 2;
-
- sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
- nl = 0;
- if (sk != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
- name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
- j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]);
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
- s2n(j, p);
- i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
- n += 2 + j;
- nl += 2 + j;
- } else {
- d = p;
- i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
- j -= 2;
- s2n(j, d);
- j += 2;
- n += j;
- nl += j;
- }
- }
- }
- /* else no CA names */
- p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]);
- s2n(nl, p);
-
- d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
- *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
- l2n3(n, d);
-
- /*
- * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
- */
-
- s->init_num = n + 4;
- s->init_off = 0;
-#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 0;
- s->init_num += 4;
-#endif
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- err:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-{
- int i, al, ok;
- long n;
- unsigned long alg_k;
- unsigned char *p;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
- DH *dh_srvr;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
- EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-#endif
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- int decrypt_len;
- unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
- size_t j;
-
- /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
- if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
- if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
- rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
- /*
- * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
- */
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
- goto f_err;
-
- }
- } else {
- pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
- if ((pkey == NULL) ||
- (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
- }
-
- /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- n2s(p, i);
- if (n != i + 2) {
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto f_err;
- } else
- p -= 2;
- } else
- n = i;
- }
-
- /*
- * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
- * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
- * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
- * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
- * bound is sufficient to be safe.
- */
- if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
- * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
- * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
- * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
- * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
- */
-
- /*
- * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
- */
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
- goto err;
- decrypt_len =
- RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- /*
- * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
- * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
- */
- decrypt_good =
- constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
-
- /*
- * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
- * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
- * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
- * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
- * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
- */
- version_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
- version_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
-
- /*
- * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
- * version instead if the server does not support the requested
- * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
- * clients.
- */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
- unsigned char workaround_good;
- workaround_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
- workaround_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
- version_good |= workaround_good;
- }
-
- /*
- * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
- * remain non-zero (0xff).
- */
- decrypt_good &= version_good;
-
- /*
- * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
- * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
- * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
- * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
- */
- for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
- p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
- rand_premaster_secret[j]);
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p,
- sizeof
- (rand_premaster_secret));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
- n2s(p, i);
- if (n != i + 2) {
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto err;
- } else {
- p -= 2;
- i = (int)n;
- }
- }
-
- if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
- goto f_err;
- } else {
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- } else
- dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
- }
-
- pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
- if (pub == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
-
- if (i <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- goto err;
- }
-
- DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
- s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
-
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- pub = NULL;
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, i);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- krb5_data enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator;
- krb5_data enc_pms;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl;
- krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
- krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
- int kerr = 0;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
- if (!kssl_ctx)
- kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-
- n2s(p, i);
- enc_ticket.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
- p += enc_ticket.length;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- authenticator.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- authenticator.data = (char *)p;
- p += authenticator.length;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- enc_pms.length = i;
- enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
- p += enc_pms.length;
-
- /*
- * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
- */
- if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
- enc_pms.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
- &kssl_err)) != 0) {
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
- * return authtime == 0.
- */
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
- &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
- goto err;
- }
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
-
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
- (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- kerr = 1;
- goto kclean;
- }
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- kerr = 1;
- goto kclean;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- kerr = 1;
- goto kclean;
- }
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- kerr = 1;
- goto kclean;
- }
- if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
- && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
- /*
- * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
- * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
- * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
- * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
- * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
- * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
- * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
- * cipher)
- */
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- kerr = 1;
- goto kclean;
- }
- }
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- pms, outl);
-
- if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
- size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
- if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
- s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
- memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
- len);
- }
- }
-
- /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
- * but it caused problems for apache.
- * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
- * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
- */
-
- kclean:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
- if (kerr)
- goto err;
- } else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
- int ret = 1;
- int field_size = 0;
- const EC_KEY *tkey;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-
- /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
- if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Let's get server private key and group information */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
- /* use the certificate */
- tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
- } else {
- /*
- * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
- * ServerKeyExchange msg.
- */
- tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
- }
-
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
- !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Let's get client's public key */
- if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n == 0L) {
- /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
- == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
- * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
- * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
- * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
- * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
- * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
- */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
- pkey.ec)) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
- } else {
- /*
- * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
- * ClientKeyExchange message.
- */
- if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Get encoded point length */
- i = *p;
- p += 1;
- if (n != 1 + i) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
- * to the start
- */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- }
-
- /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
- if (field_size <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
- NULL);
- if (i <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
-
- /* Compute the master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, i);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- return (ret);
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- unsigned char *t = NULL;
- unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
- unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
- int psk_err = 1;
- char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- if (n != i + 2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
- */
- memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
- memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
- psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
-
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- } else if (psk_len == 0) {
- /*
- * PSK related to the given identity not found
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
- pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
- t = psk_or_pre_ms;
- memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
- s2n(psk_len, t);
- memset(t, 0, psk_len);
- t += psk_len;
- s2n(psk_len, t);
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
- if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
- s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- pre_ms_len);
- psk_err = 0;
- psk_err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- if (psk_err != 0)
- goto f_err;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- int param_len;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len = i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
- || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- p += i;
- } else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
- int ret = 0;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
- EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
- unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
- size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
- unsigned long alg_a;
- int Ttag, Tclass;
- long Tlen;
-
- /* Get our certificate private key */
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
-
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
- /*
- * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
- * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
- * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
- * client certificate for authorization only.
- */
- client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if (client_pub_pkey) {
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- /* Decrypt session key */
- if (ASN1_get_object
- ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
- n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
- || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto gerr;
- }
- start = p;
- inlen = Tlen;
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
- (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto gerr;
- }
- /* Generate master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- premaster_secret, 32);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
- /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
- (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
- ret = 2;
- else
- ret = 1;
- gerr:
- EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- else
- goto err;
- } else {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- return (1);
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
- err:
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-#endif
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char *p;
- int al, ok, ret = 0;
- long n;
- int type = 0, i, j;
- X509 *peer;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
-
- /*
- * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
- * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
- * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
- * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
- * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
- * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
- */
- if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- peer = s->session->peer;
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
- type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
-
- if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
- /*
- * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
- * length field
- */
- if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
- pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
- i = 64;
- } else {
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
- /* Should never happen */
- if (sigalg == -1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
- if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
- if (md == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- p += 2;
- n -= 2;
- }
- n2s(p, i);
- n -= 2;
- if (i > n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- long hdatalen = 0;
- void *hdata;
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
- EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
- || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
- pkey->pkey.rsa);
- if (i < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
- if (j <= 0) {
- /* bad signature */
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
- if (j <= 0) {
- /* bad signature */
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else
-#endif
- if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
- || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
- unsigned char signature[64];
- int idx;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
- if (i != 64) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
- }
- for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
- signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
- }
- j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
- 32);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- if (j <= 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- }
- end:
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
-{
- int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
- const unsigned char *p, *q;
- unsigned char *d;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
- -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /*
- * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
- */
- if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return (1);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- n2l3(p, llen);
- if (llen + 3 != n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
- n2l3(p, l);
- if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- q = p;
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
- if (x == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (p != (q + l)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- x = NULL;
- nc += l + 3;
- }
-
- if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
- /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
- else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
- if (i <= 0) {
- al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
- s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
- /*
- * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
- * arrive here.
- */
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
- s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
- /*
- * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
- * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
- */
-
- sk = NULL;
-
- ret = 1;
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- }
-
- if (x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
- if (sk != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned long l;
- X509 *x;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
- x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
- if (x == NULL) {
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (0);
- }
- }
-
- l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
- if (!l) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (0);
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
- s->init_num = (int)l;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
-int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *senc = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
- unsigned char *p, *macstart;
- const unsigned char *const_p;
- int len, slen_full, slen;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned int hlen;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char key_name[16];
-
- /* get session encoding length */
- slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
- /*
- * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
- * long
- */
- if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
- if (!senc) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-
- p = senc;
- if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
- goto err;
-
- /*
- * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
- */
- const_p = senc;
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
- if (sess == NULL)
- goto err;
- sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
-
- slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
- if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
- goto err;
- }
- p = senc;
- if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
-
- /*-
- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
- * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
- * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
- * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
- * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
- 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
- EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
- goto err;
-
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- /* do the header */
- *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
- /* Skip message length for now */
- p += 3;
- /*
- * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
- * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
- */
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
- &hctx, 1) < 0)
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
- goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
- goto err;
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
- }
-
- /*
- * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
- * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
- * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
- */
- l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
-
- /* Skip ticket length for now */
- p += 2;
- /* Output key name */
- macstart = p;
- memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
- p += 16;
- /* output IV */
- memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
- p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- /* Encrypt session data */
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
- goto err;
- p += len;
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
- goto err;
- p += len;
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
- goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
- goto err;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-
- p += hlen;
- /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
- /* Total length */
- len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
- l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
- p += 4;
- s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
-
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = len;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
- s->init_off = 0;
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- err:
- if (senc)
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
- unsigned char *p;
- /*-
- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
- * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
- * + (ocsp response)
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
- /* message length */
- l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
- /* status type */
- *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
- /* length of OCSP response */
- l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
- /* actual response */
- memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/*
- * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
- * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
- */
-int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok;
- int proto_len, padding_len;
- long n;
- const unsigned char *p;
-
- /*
- * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
- * extension in their ClientHello
- */
- if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
- SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* See the payload format below */
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
- SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- /*
- * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
- * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
- * ssl3_get_finished).
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (n < 2) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- /*-
- * The payload looks like:
- * uint8 proto_len;
- * uint8 proto[proto_len];
- * uint8 padding_len;
- * uint8 padding[padding_len];
- */
- proto_len = p[0];
- if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
- }
- padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
- if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
- if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
-
- return 1;
-}
-# endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_srvr.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/s3_srvr.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_srvr.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,3654 @@
+/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
+#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
+{
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return (SSLv3_server_method());
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+ (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
+ * login name
+ */
+ ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ } else {
+ ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int new_state, state, skip = 0;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ /* init things to blank */
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+ SSL_clear(s);
+
+ if (s->cert == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /*
+ * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
+ * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
+ * handshakes anyway.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (;;) {
+ state = s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+ s->server = 1;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+ if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf = buf;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
+ */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+
+ if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
+ /*
+ * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
+ * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
+ */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ !(s->options &
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ /*
+ * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
+ * support secure renegotiation.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
+ * HelloRequest
+ */
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ {
+ int al;
+ if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
+ /*
+ * callback indicates firther work to be done
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ /*
+ * This is not really an error but the only means to for
+ * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
+ */
+ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s->renegotiate = 2;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->hit) {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+#else
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
+ /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
+ if (!
+ (s->s3->tmp.
+ new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
+ SSL_aSRP))
+&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
+ } else
+ skip = 1;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /*
+ * clear this, it may get reset by
+ * send_server_key_exchange
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
+ * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
+ * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
+ * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
+ * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
+ * key exchange.
+ */
+ if (0
+ /*
+ * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
+ * provided
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+#endif
+ || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH))
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
+ [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
+ 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ ) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ skip = 1;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+ if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ /*
+ * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
+ * during re-negotiation:
+ */
+ ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+ /*
+ * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
+ * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
+ * RFC 2246):
+ */
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ /*
+ * ... except when the application insists on
+ * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
+ * this for SSL 3)
+ */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+ /*
+ * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
+ */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
+ /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
+ /*
+ * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
+ * are omitted
+ */
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ /* no cert request */
+ skip = 1;
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+ ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+
+ /*
+ * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
+ * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
+ * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
+ * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
+ * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
+ * unconditionally.
+ */
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+ /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
+ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 2)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+ else {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 2) {
+ /*
+ * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
+ * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
+ * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
+ * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
+ */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ if (!s->session->peer)
+ break;
+ /*
+ * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
+ * digest cached records.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ int offset = 0;
+ int dgst_num;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
+ * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
+ * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
+ * step
+ */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
+ int dgst_size;
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ EVP_MD_CTX_type
+ (s->
+ s3->handshake_dgst
+ [dgst_num]),
+ &(s->s3->
+ tmp.cert_verify_md
+ [offset]));
+ dgst_size =
+ EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+ if (dgst_size < 0) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ offset += dgst_size;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+ /*
+ * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
+ * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
+ * cautious.
+ * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+ * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+ * the client's Finished message is read.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+ ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+ /*
+ * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
+ * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+ * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+ * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+ * the client's Finished message is read.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ if (s->hit) {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ } else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ } else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+
+ /* remove buffering on output */
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
+ * HelloRequest */
+ s->renegotiate = 0;
+ s->new_session = 0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* s->server=1; */
+ s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
+ if (s->debug) {
+ if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
+ new_state = s->state;
+ s->state = state;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+ s->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip = 0;
+ }
+ end:
+ /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 4;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok;
+ long n;
+
+ /*
+ * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
+ * so permit appropriate message length
+ */
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ /*
+ * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+ * negotiation.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
+ * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+ return 2;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
+ long n;
+ unsigned long id;
+ unsigned char *p, *d, *q;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+#endif
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
+ * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
+ * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
+ * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+ s->first_packet = 1;
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+ s->first_packet = 0;
+ d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ /*
+ * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
+ * for session id length
+ */
+ if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
+ * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
+ */
+ s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
+ p += 2;
+
+ if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
+ (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
+ !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
+ /*
+ * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
+ * number
+ */
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ }
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
+ * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
+ * cookie length...
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+ unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
+
+ session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+ if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
+
+ if (cookie_length == 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* load the client random */
+ memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* get the session-id */
+ j = *(p++);
+
+ if (p + j > d + n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->hit = 0;
+ /*
+ * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+ * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+ * ignore resumption requests with flag
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+ * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
+ * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
+ * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
+ * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
+ * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
+ */
+ if ((s->new_session
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
+ /*
+ * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+ * version.
+ * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+ * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+ * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+ * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+ * will abort the handshake with an error.
+ */
+ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
+ * session */
+ s->hit = 1;
+ } else if (i == -1)
+ goto err;
+ else { /* i == 0 */
+
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p += j;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ /* cookie stuff */
+ if (p + 1 > d + n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+ if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+ * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+ * does not cause an overflow.
+ */
+ if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
+ /* too much data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
+ memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+ cookie_len) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ }
+ /* default verification */
+ else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ cookie_valid = 1;
+ }
+
+ p += cookie_len;
+ }
+
+ if (p + 2 > d + n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
+ if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
+ if (s->hit) {
+ j = 0;
+ id = s->session->cipher->id;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
+#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+ i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+#endif
+ if (c->id == id) {
+ j = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
+ * CVE-2010-4180.
+ */
+#if 0
+ if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
+ && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
+ /*
+ * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
+ * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
+ * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
+ * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
+ * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
+ */
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
+ s->session->cipher = c;
+ j = 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (j == 0) {
+ /*
+ * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
+ * to reuse it
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* compression */
+ i = *(p++);
+ if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ q = p;
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ if (p[j] == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ p += i;
+ if (j >= i) {
+ /* no compress */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n, &al)) {
+ /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
+ * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
+ * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
+ * processing to use it in key derivation.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char *pos;
+ pos = s->s3->server_random;
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
+ &pref_cipher,
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+ s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+ ciphers = NULL;
+
+ /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+ pref_cipher =
+ pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
+ s->
+ session->ciphers,
+ SSL_get_ciphers
+ (s));
+ if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
+
+ if (s->cipher_list)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+ s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
+ * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
+ * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+ int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+ /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
+ /* Can't disable compression */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Look for resumed compression method */
+ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
+ if (comp_id == comp->id) {
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
+ for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
+ if (q[m] == comp_id)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (m >= i) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else if (s->hit)
+ comp = NULL;
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
+ /* See if we have a match */
+ int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
+
+ nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
+ v = comp->id;
+ for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
+ if (v == q[o]) {
+ done = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (done)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (done)
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ else
+ comp = NULL;
+ }
+#else
+ /*
+ * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+ * using compression.
+ */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
+ */
+
+ if (!s->hit) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+#else
+ s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
+#endif
+ if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+ if (ciphers == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ciphers = NULL;
+ c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+ } else {
+ /* Session-id reuse */
+#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
+ SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
+ sk = s->session->ciphers;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
+ nc = c;
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
+ ec = c;
+ }
+ if (nc != NULL)
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
+ else if (ec != NULL)
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+ } else
+#endif
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+ }
+
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
+ || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * we now have the following setup.
+ * client_random
+ * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
+ * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
+ * compression - basically ignored right now
+ * ssl version is set - sslv3
+ * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
+ * s->hit - session reuse flag
+ * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
+ */
+
+ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ }
+
+ if (ciphers != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i, sl;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ p = s->s3->server_random;
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d = p = &(buf[4]);
+
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /*-
+ * There are several cases for the session ID to send
+ * back in the server hello:
+ * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+ * we send back the old session ID.
+ * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+ * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+ * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+ * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+ * session ID.
+ * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+ * we send back a 0-length session ID.
+ * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+ * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+ * to send back.
+ */
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+ && !s->hit)
+ s->session->session_id_length = 0;
+
+ sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *(p++) = sl;
+ memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
+ p += sl;
+
+ /* put the cipher */
+ i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
+ p += i;
+
+ /* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++) = 0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ else
+ *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((p =
+ ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
+ buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
+ NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* do the header */
+ l = (p - d);
+ d = buf;
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
+ l2n3(l, d);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = p - buf;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 4;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ int j, num;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int u;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encodedlen = 0;
+ int curve_id = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int al, i;
+ unsigned long type;
+ int n;
+ CERT *cert;
+ BIGNUM *r[4];
+ int nr[4], kn;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+ type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ cert = s->cert;
+
+ buf = s->init_buf;
+
+ r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
+ n = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
+ rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
+ if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
+ rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ r[0] = rsa->n;
+ r[1] = rsa->e;
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
+ dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
+ if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (dhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
+ if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+ dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+ dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+ if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ r[0] = dh->p;
+ r[1] = dh->g;
+ r[2] = dh->pub_key;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
+ ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
+ s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ }
+ if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+ if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
+ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
+ * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
+ * non-zero.
+ */
+ if ((curve_id =
+ tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+ == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+ if (encodedlen == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ bn_ctx = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
+ * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
+ * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+ * structure.
+ */
+ n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+ /*
+ * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
+ * can set these to NULLs
+ */
+ r[0] = NULL;
+ r[1] = NULL;
+ r[2] = NULL;
+ r[3] = NULL;
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /*
+ * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
+ */
+ n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+ (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+ (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
+ r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
+ r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
+ r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+ n += 1 + nr[i];
+ else
+#endif
+ n += 2 + nr[i];
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
+ == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ } else {
+ pkey = NULL;
+ kn = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = &(d[4]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
+ *p = nr[i];
+ p++;
+ } else
+#endif
+ s2n(nr[i], p);
+ BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
+ p += nr[i];
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
+ * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
+ * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
+ * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
+ */
+ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = curve_id;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = encodedlen;
+ p += 1;
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
+ (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ encodedPoint = NULL;
+ p += encodedlen;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+ strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+ p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* not anonymous */
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
+ * points to the space at the end.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ q = md_buf;
+ j = 0;
+ for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+ EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
+ (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
+ : s->ctx->sha1,
+ NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
+ (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ q += i;
+ j += i;
+ }
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n += u + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (md) {
+ /*
+ * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p += 2;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0
+ || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s2n(i, p);
+ n += i + 2;
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ n += 2;
+ } else {
+ /* Is this error check actually needed? */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ l2n3(n, d);
+
+ /*
+ * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
+ */
+ s->init_num = n + 4;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i, j, nl, off, n;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
+ buf = s->init_buf;
+
+ d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
+
+ /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+ p++;
+ n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
+ d[0] = n;
+ p += n;
+ n++;
+
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
+ s2n(nl, p);
+ p += nl + 2;
+ n += nl + 2;
+ }
+
+ off = n;
+ p += 2;
+ n += 2;
+
+ sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ nl = 0;
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+ j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]);
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
+ s2n(j, p);
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+ n += 2 + j;
+ nl += 2 + j;
+ } else {
+ d = p;
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+ j -= 2;
+ s2n(j, d);
+ j += 2;
+ n += j;
+ nl += j;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* else no CA names */
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]);
+ s2n(nl, p);
+
+ d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+ l2n3(n, d);
+
+ /*
+ * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
+ */
+
+ s->init_num = n + 4;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ s->init_num += 4;
+#endif
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i, al, ok;
+ long n;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ unsigned char *p;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
+ DH *dh_srvr;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ int decrypt_len;
+ unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+ size_t j;
+
+ /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
+ if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
+ rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
+ /*
+ * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
+ */
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
+ goto f_err;
+
+ }
+ } else {
+ pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
+ if ((pkey == NULL) ||
+ (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ n2s(p, i);
+ if (n != i + 2) {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
+ p -= 2;
+ } else
+ n = i;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
+ * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
+ * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
+ * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
+ * bound is sufficient to be safe.
+ */
+ if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+ * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+ * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
+ * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
+ * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
+ */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ decrypt_len =
+ RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /*
+ * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
+ * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
+ */
+ decrypt_good =
+ constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+ /*
+ * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
+ * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
+ * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
+ * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
+ * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
+ */
+ version_good =
+ constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
+ version_good &=
+ constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
+
+ /*
+ * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+ * version instead if the server does not support the requested
+ * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
+ * clients.
+ */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
+ unsigned char workaround_good;
+ workaround_good =
+ constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
+ workaround_good &=
+ constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
+ version_good |= workaround_good;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
+ * remain non-zero (0xff).
+ */
+ decrypt_good &= version_good;
+
+ /*
+ * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
+ * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
+ * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
+ * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
+ p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
+ rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p,
+ sizeof
+ (rand_premaster_secret));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ n2s(p, i);
+ if (n != i + 2) {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ p -= 2;
+ i = (int)n;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
+ dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
+ }
+
+ pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
+ if (pub == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
+
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
+ pub = NULL;
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, i);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ krb5_data enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator;
+ krb5_data enc_pms;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl;
+ krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
+ krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
+ int kerr = 0;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx)
+ kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ enc_ticket.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
+ p += enc_ticket.length;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ authenticator.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ authenticator.data = (char *)p;
+ p += authenticator.length;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ enc_pms.length = i;
+ enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
+ p += enc_pms.length;
+
+ /*
+ * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
+ */
+ if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+ enc_pms.length + 6)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+ &kssl_err)) != 0) {
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
+ * return authtime == 0.
+ */
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
+ &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ goto err;
+ }
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
+ (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ kerr = 1;
+ goto kclean;
+ }
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ kerr = 1;
+ goto kclean;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ kerr = 1;
+ goto kclean;
+ }
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ kerr = 1;
+ goto kclean;
+ }
+ if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
+ && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
+ /*
+ * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
+ * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
+ * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
+ * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
+ * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
+ * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
+ * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
+ * cipher)
+ */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ kerr = 1;
+ goto kclean;
+ }
+ }
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ pms, outl);
+
+ if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
+ size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
+ s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
+ memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
+ len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+ * but it caused problems for apache.
+ * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+ * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+ */
+
+ kclean:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
+ if (kerr)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ int ret = 1;
+ int field_size = 0;
+ const EC_KEY *tkey;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+ /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get server private key and group information */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ /* use the certificate */
+ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
+ * ServerKeyExchange msg.
+ */
+ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+ }
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+ !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get client's public key */
+ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0L) {
+ /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+ == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
+ * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
+ * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
+ * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
+ * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
+ * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
+ pkey.ec)) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
+ * ClientKeyExchange message.
+ */
+ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get encoded point length */
+ i = *p;
+ p += 1;
+ if (n != 1 + i) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
+ * to the start
+ */
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+ if (field_size <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
+ NULL);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+
+ /* Compute the master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, i);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+ return (ret);
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+ char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ if (n != i + 2) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
+ */
+ memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
+ memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
+ psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
+ psk_or_pre_ms,
+ sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
+
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ } else if (psk_len == 0) {
+ /*
+ * PSK related to the given identity not found
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t += psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ psk_or_pre_ms,
+ pre_ms_len);
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0)
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ int param_len;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ param_len = i + 2;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
+ || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->session->master_key_length =
+ SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p += i;
+ } else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
+ size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
+ unsigned long alg_a;
+ int Ttag, Tclass;
+ long Tlen;
+
+ /* Get our certificate private key */
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
+ * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
+ * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
+ * client certificate for authorization only.
+ */
+ client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ if (client_pub_pkey) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ /* Decrypt session key */
+ if (ASN1_get_object
+ ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
+ n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
+ || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ start = p;
+ inlen = Tlen;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
+ (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ /* Generate master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ premaster_secret, 32);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
+ /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
+ (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+ ret = 2;
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ gerr:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ else
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
+ err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int al, ok, ret = 0;
+ long n;
+ int type = 0, i, j;
+ X509 *peer;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+
+ /*
+ * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
+ * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
+ * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
+ * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
+ * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
+ * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
+ */
+ if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ peer = s->session->peer;
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+ type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
+
+ if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
+ /*
+ * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
+ * length field
+ */
+ if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
+ pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
+ i = 64;
+ } else {
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (sigalg == -1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+ if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ p += 2;
+ n -= 2;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+ n -= 2;
+ if (i > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ long hdatalen = 0;
+ void *hdata;
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
+ EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+ || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
+ pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
+ if (j <= 0) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
+ if (j <= 0) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
+ || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ unsigned char signature[64];
+ int idx;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i != 64) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
+ }
+ for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
+ signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
+ }
+ j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
+ 32);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ if (j <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ }
+ end:
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
+ */
+ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ n2l3(p, llen);
+ if (llen + 3 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
+ n2l3(p, l);
+ if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ q = p;
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (p != (q + l)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x = NULL;
+ nc += l + 3;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
+ /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ /*
+ * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
+ * arrive here.
+ */
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
+ /*
+ * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
+ * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
+ */
+
+ sk = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ }
+
+ if (x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (sk != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ X509 *x;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
+ x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
+ if (!l) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+ s->init_num = (int)l;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
+int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *senc = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
+ unsigned char *p, *macstart;
+ const unsigned char *const_p;
+ int len, slen_full, slen;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned int hlen;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /*
+ * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
+ * long
+ */
+ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
+ if (!senc) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+
+ p = senc;
+ if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
+ */
+ const_p = senc;
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
+ if (sess == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
+
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
+ if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = senc;
+ if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
+ /*-
+ * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
+ * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ goto err;
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
+ /* Skip message length for now */
+ p += 3;
+ /*
+ * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
+ * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
+ * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
+ * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
+ */
+ l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
+ goto err;
+ p += len;
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
+ goto err;
+ p += len;
+
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
+ goto err;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
+ l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
+ p += 4;
+ s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = len;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+ if (senc)
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ /*-
+ * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+ * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+ * + (ocsp response)
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+ /* message length */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
+ /* status type */
+ *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
+ /* length of OCSP response */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+ /* actual response */
+ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
+ * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
+ */
+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok;
+ int proto_len, padding_len;
+ long n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ /*
+ * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
+ * extension in their ClientHello
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
+ SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* See the payload format below */
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
+ SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ /*
+ * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
+ * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
+ * ssl3_get_finished).
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (n < 2) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ /*-
+ * The payload looks like:
+ * uint8 proto_len;
+ * uint8 proto[proto_len];
+ * uint8 padding_len;
+ * uint8 padding[padding_len];
+ */
+ proto_len = p[0];
+ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
+ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+# endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl.h 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2766 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_SSL_H
-# define HEADER_SSL_H
-
-# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-# include <openssl/comp.h>
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-# include <openssl/bio.h>
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509
-# include <openssl/x509.h>
-# endif
-# include <openssl/crypto.h>
-# include <openssl/lhash.h>
-# include <openssl/buffer.h>
-# endif
-# include <openssl/pem.h>
-# include <openssl/hmac.h>
-
-# include <openssl/kssl.h>
-# include <openssl/safestack.h>
-# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* SSLeay version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */
-/*-
- * Version 0 - initial version
- * Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate
- */
-# define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001
-
-/* text strings for the ciphers */
-# define SSL_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA
-
-/*
- * VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries
- */
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5
-
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5
-
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5
-# define SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH 256
-
-# define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32
-# define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH 32
-
-# define SSL_MIN_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH_IN_BYTES (512/8)
-# define SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH 8
-# define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 48
-
-/* These are used to specify which ciphers to use and not to use */
-
-# define SSL_TXT_EXP40 "EXPORT40"
-# define SSL_TXT_EXP56 "EXPORT56"
-# define SSL_TXT_LOW "LOW"
-# define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM "MEDIUM"
-# define SSL_TXT_HIGH "HIGH"
-# define SSL_TXT_FIPS "FIPS"
-
-# define SSL_TXT_kFZA "kFZA"/* unused! */
-# define SSL_TXT_aFZA "aFZA"/* unused! */
-# define SSL_TXT_eFZA "eFZA"/* unused! */
-# define SSL_TXT_FZA "FZA"/* unused! */
-
-# define SSL_TXT_aNULL "aNULL"
-# define SSL_TXT_eNULL "eNULL"
-# define SSL_TXT_NULL "NULL"
-
-# define SSL_TXT_kRSA "kRSA"
-# define SSL_TXT_kDHr "kDHr"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-# define SSL_TXT_kDHd "kDHd"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-# define SSL_TXT_kDH "kDH"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-# define SSL_TXT_kEDH "kEDH"
-# define SSL_TXT_kKRB5 "kKRB5"
-# define SSL_TXT_kECDHr "kECDHr"
-# define SSL_TXT_kECDHe "kECDHe"
-# define SSL_TXT_kECDH "kECDH"
-# define SSL_TXT_kEECDH "kEECDH"
-# define SSL_TXT_kPSK "kPSK"
-# define SSL_TXT_kGOST "kGOST"
-# define SSL_TXT_kSRP "kSRP"
-
-# define SSL_TXT_aRSA "aRSA"
-# define SSL_TXT_aDSS "aDSS"
-# define SSL_TXT_aDH "aDH"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-# define SSL_TXT_aECDH "aECDH"
-# define SSL_TXT_aKRB5 "aKRB5"
-# define SSL_TXT_aECDSA "aECDSA"
-# define SSL_TXT_aPSK "aPSK"
-# define SSL_TXT_aGOST94 "aGOST94"
-# define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01"
-# define SSL_TXT_aGOST "aGOST"
-# define SSL_TXT_aSRP "aSRP"
-
-# define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS"
-# define SSL_TXT_DH "DH"
-# define SSL_TXT_EDH "EDH"/* same as "kEDH:-ADH" */
-# define SSL_TXT_ADH "ADH"
-# define SSL_TXT_RSA "RSA"
-# define SSL_TXT_ECDH "ECDH"
-# define SSL_TXT_EECDH "EECDH"/* same as "kEECDH:-AECDH" */
-# define SSL_TXT_AECDH "AECDH"
-# define SSL_TXT_ECDSA "ECDSA"
-# define SSL_TXT_KRB5 "KRB5"
-# define SSL_TXT_PSK "PSK"
-# define SSL_TXT_SRP "SRP"
-
-# define SSL_TXT_DES "DES"
-# define SSL_TXT_3DES "3DES"
-# define SSL_TXT_RC4 "RC4"
-# define SSL_TXT_RC2 "RC2"
-# define SSL_TXT_IDEA "IDEA"
-# define SSL_TXT_SEED "SEED"
-# define SSL_TXT_AES128 "AES128"
-# define SSL_TXT_AES256 "AES256"
-# define SSL_TXT_AES "AES"
-# define SSL_TXT_AES_GCM "AESGCM"
-# define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128 "CAMELLIA128"
-# define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256 "CAMELLIA256"
-# define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA "CAMELLIA"
-
-# define SSL_TXT_MD5 "MD5"
-# define SSL_TXT_SHA1 "SHA1"
-# define SSL_TXT_SHA "SHA"/* same as "SHA1" */
-# define SSL_TXT_GOST94 "GOST94"
-# define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC "GOST89MAC"
-# define SSL_TXT_SHA256 "SHA256"
-# define SSL_TXT_SHA384 "SHA384"
-
-# define SSL_TXT_SSLV2 "SSLv2"
-# define SSL_TXT_SSLV3 "SSLv3"
-# define SSL_TXT_TLSV1 "TLSv1"
-# define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1 "TLSv1.1"
-# define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2 "TLSv1.2"
-
-# define SSL_TXT_EXP "EXP"
-# define SSL_TXT_EXPORT "EXPORT"
-
-# define SSL_TXT_ALL "ALL"
-
-/*-
- * COMPLEMENTOF* definitions. These identifiers are used to (de-select)
- * ciphers normally not being used.
- * Example: "RC4" will activate all ciphers using RC4 including ciphers
- * without authentication, which would normally disabled by DEFAULT (due
- * the "!ADH" being part of default). Therefore "RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT"
- * will make sure that it is also disabled in the specific selection.
- * COMPLEMENTOF* identifiers are portable between version, as adjustments
- * to the default cipher setup will also be included here.
- *
- * COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT does not experience the same special treatment that
- * DEFAULT gets, as only selection is being done and no sorting as needed
- * for DEFAULT.
- */
-# define SSL_TXT_CMPALL "COMPLEMENTOFALL"
-# define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT"
-
-/*
- * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when
- * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'.
- */
-# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
-/*
- * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always
- * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is
- * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites! (The latter are not
- * actually enabled by ALL, but "ALL:RSA" would enable some of them.)
- */
-
-/* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */
-# define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN 1
-# define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN 2
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-# if (defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-# endif
-
-# define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 X509_FILETYPE_ASN1
-# define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM X509_FILETYPE_PEM
-
-/*
- * This is needed to stop compilers complaining about the 'struct ssl_st *'
- * function parameters used to prototype callbacks in SSL_CTX.
- */
-typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st;
-typedef struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT;
-typedef struct ssl_method_st SSL_METHOD;
-typedef struct ssl_cipher_st SSL_CIPHER;
-typedef struct ssl_session_st SSL_SESSION;
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
-
-/* SRTP protection profiles for use with the use_srtp extension (RFC 5764)*/
-typedef struct srtp_protection_profile_st {
- const char *name;
- unsigned long id;
-} SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE;
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)
-
-typedef int (*tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn) (SSL *s,
- const unsigned char *data,
- int len, void *arg);
-typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn) (SSL *s, void *secret,
- int *secret_len,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
- SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-/* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */
-struct ssl_cipher_st {
- int valid;
- const char *name; /* text name */
- unsigned long id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */
- /*
- * changed in 0.9.9: these four used to be portions of a single value
- * 'algorithms'
- */
- unsigned long algorithm_mkey; /* key exchange algorithm */
- unsigned long algorithm_auth; /* server authentication */
- unsigned long algorithm_enc; /* symmetric encryption */
- unsigned long algorithm_mac; /* symmetric authentication */
- unsigned long algorithm_ssl; /* (major) protocol version */
- unsigned long algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */
- unsigned long algorithm2; /* Extra flags */
- int strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */
- int alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */
-};
-
-/* Used to hold functions for SSLv2 or SSLv3/TLSv1 functions */
-struct ssl_method_st {
- int version;
- int (*ssl_new) (SSL *s);
- void (*ssl_clear) (SSL *s);
- void (*ssl_free) (SSL *s);
- int (*ssl_accept) (SSL *s);
- int (*ssl_connect) (SSL *s);
- int (*ssl_read) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
- int (*ssl_peek) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
- int (*ssl_write) (SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
- int (*ssl_shutdown) (SSL *s);
- int (*ssl_renegotiate) (SSL *s);
- int (*ssl_renegotiate_check) (SSL *s);
- long (*ssl_get_message) (SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long
- max, int *ok);
- int (*ssl_read_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len,
- int peek);
- int (*ssl_write_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len);
- int (*ssl_dispatch_alert) (SSL *s);
- long (*ssl_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
- long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
- const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char) (const unsigned char *ptr);
- int (*put_cipher_by_char) (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned char *ptr);
- int (*ssl_pending) (const SSL *s);
- int (*num_ciphers) (void);
- const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher) (unsigned ncipher);
- const struct ssl_method_st *(*get_ssl_method) (int version);
- long (*get_timeout) (void);
- struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */
- int (*ssl_version) (void);
- long (*ssl_callback_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void));
- long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void));
-};
-
-/*-
- * Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows
- * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE {
- * version INTEGER, -- structure version number
- * SSLversion INTEGER, -- SSL version number
- * Cipher OCTET STRING, -- the 3 byte cipher ID
- * Session_ID OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID
- * Master_key OCTET STRING, -- the master key
- * KRB5_principal OCTET STRING -- optional Kerberos principal
- * Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the optional Key argument
- * Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Start Time
- * Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Timeout ins seconds
- * Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT X509, -- optional Peer Certificate
- * Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID context
- * Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- X509_V_... code for `Peer'
- * HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension
- * PSK_identity_hint [ 7 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint
- * PSK_identity [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity
- * Ticket_lifetime_hint [9] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- server's lifetime hint for session ticket
- * Ticket [10] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- session ticket (clients only)
- * Compression_meth [11] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional compression method
- * SRP_username [ 12 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional SRP username
- * }
- * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details
- * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-).
- */
-struct ssl_session_st {
- int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is being
- * kept in here? */
- /* only really used in SSLv2 */
- unsigned int key_arg_length;
- unsigned char key_arg[SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH];
- int master_key_length;
- unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- /* session_id - valid? */
- unsigned int session_id_length;
- unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH];
- /*
- * this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in the
- * appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this, via
- * SSL_new
- */
- unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
- unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len;
- unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH];
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- char *psk_identity_hint;
- char *psk_identity;
-# endif
- /*
- * Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed. Applications
- * can also set this bit for a new session via not_resumable_session_cb
- * to disable session caching and tickets.
- */
- int not_resumable;
- /* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */
- struct sess_cert_st /* SESS_CERT */ *sess_cert;
- /*
- * This is the cert for the other end. On clients, it will be the same as
- * sess_cert->peer_key->x509 (the latter is not enough as sess_cert is
- * not retained in the external representation of sessions, see
- * ssl_asn1.c).
- */
- X509 *peer;
- /*
- * when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's
- * certificate is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse:
- */
- long verify_result; /* only for servers */
- int references;
- long timeout;
- long time;
- unsigned int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
- unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used
- * to load the 'cipher' structure */
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */
- CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */
- /*
- * These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to
- * implement a maximum cache size.
- */
- struct ssl_session_st *prev, *next;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- char *tlsext_hostname;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* peer's list */
- size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* peer's list */
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
- /* RFC4507 info */
- unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */
- size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */
- long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- char *srp_username;
-# endif
-};
-
-# endif
-
-# define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0x00000001L
-# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0x00000002L
-/* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */
-# define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0x00000004L
-# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L
-# define SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING 0x00000010L
-# define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L
-# define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L
-# define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L
-# define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L
-# define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L
-
-/* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */
-# define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x0
-/* Refers to ancient SSLREF and SSLv2, retained for compatibility */
-# define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x0
-
-/*
- * Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added in
- * OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol) the
- * workaround is not needed. Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS
- * implementations cannot handle it at all, which is why we include it in
- * SSL_OP_ALL.
- */
-/* added in 0.9.6e */
-# define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 0x00000800L
-
-/*
- * SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless. This
- * used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7.
- */
-# define SSL_OP_ALL 0x80000BFFL
-
-/* DTLS options */
-# define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU 0x00001000L
-/* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */
-# define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE 0x00002000L
-/* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */
-# define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000L
-/* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER (as client) */
-# define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT 0x00008000L
-
-/* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */
-# define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000L
-/* Don't use compression even if supported */
-# define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0x00020000L
-/* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */
-# define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
-/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */
-# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L
-/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
-# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L
-/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
-# define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0
-/*
- * Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's preferences
- */
-# define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0x00400000L
-/*
- * If set, a server will allow a client to issue a SSLv3.0 version number as
- * latest version supported in the premaster secret, even when TLSv1.0
- * (version 3.1) was announced in the client hello. Normally this is
- * forbidden to prevent version rollback attacks.
- */
-# define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0x00800000L
-
-# define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 0x01000000L
-# define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 0x02000000L
-# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 0x04000000L
-# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 0x08000000L
-# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 0x10000000L
-
-/*
- * These next two were never actually used for anything since SSLeay zap so
- * we have some more flags.
- */
-/*
- * The next flag deliberately changes the ciphertest, this is a check for the
- * PKCS#1 attack
- */
-# define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 0x0
-# define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 0x0
-
-# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG 0x20000000L
-# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x40000000L
-/*
- * Make server add server-hello extension from early version of cryptopro
- * draft, when GOST ciphersuite is negotiated. Required for interoperability
- * with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
- */
-# define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG 0x80000000L
-
-/*
- * Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success
- * when just a single record has been written):
- */
-# define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE 0x00000001L
-/*
- * Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location (buffer
- * contents must stay the same!); this is not the default to avoid the
- * misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like non-blocking
- * write():
- */
-# define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002L
-/*
- * Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking:
- */
-# define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004L
-/* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */
-# define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008L
-/*
- * Save RAM by releasing read and write buffers when they're empty. (SSL3 and
- * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context or
- * just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len).
- */
-# define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
-/*
- * Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and
- * ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations
- * that require it.
- */
-# define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
-# define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
-/*
- * Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. To be set only by applications
- * that reconnect with a downgraded protocol version; see
- * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your
- * application attempts a normal handshake. Only use this in explicit
- * fallback retries, following the guidance in
- * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00.
- */
-# define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
-
-/*
- * Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, they
- * cannot be used to clear bits.
- */
-
-# define SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,op) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx,op) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_set_options(ssl,op) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
-# define SSL_clear_options(ssl,op) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
-# define SSL_get_options(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL)
-
-# define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
-# define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
-# define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
-# define DTLS_set_link_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
-# define DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU,0,NULL)
-
-# define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL)
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-# define SSL_heartbeat(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT,0,NULL)
-# endif
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
- int content_type, const void *buf,
- size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
-void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
- void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
- int content_type, const void *buf,
- size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
-# define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
-# define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-typedef struct srp_ctx_st {
- /* param for all the callbacks */
- void *SRP_cb_arg;
- /* set client Hello login callback */
- int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *);
- /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
- int (*SRP_verify_param_callback) (SSL *, void *);
- /* set SRP client passwd callback */
- char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback) (SSL *, void *);
- char *login;
- BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A;
- BIGNUM *a, *b, *v;
- char *info;
- int strength;
- unsigned long srp_Mask;
-} SRP_CTX;
-
-# endif
-
-/* see tls_srp.c */
-int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s);
-int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx);
-int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad);
-int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key);
-int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s);
-int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key);
-
-# endif
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
-# define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*30
- /* 30k max cert list :-) */
-# else
-# define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100
- /* 100k max cert list :-) */
-# endif
-
-# define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (1024*20)
-
-/*
- * This callback type is used inside SSL_CTX, SSL, and in the functions that
- * set them. It is used to override the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs in
- * a server. Return value should be zero on an error, non-zero to proceed.
- * Also, callbacks should themselves check if the id they generate is unique
- * otherwise the SSL handshake will fail with an error - callbacks can do
- * this using the 'ssl' value they're passed by;
- * SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) The length value passed in
- * is set at the maximum size the session ID can be. In SSLv2 this is 16
- * bytes, whereas SSLv3/TLSv1 it is 32 bytes. The callback can alter this
- * length to be less if desired, but under SSLv2 session IDs are supposed to
- * be fixed at 16 bytes so the id will be padded after the callback returns
- * in this case. It is also an error for the callback to set the size to
- * zero.
- */
-typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB) (const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
- unsigned int *id_len);
-
-typedef struct ssl_comp_st SSL_COMP;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-struct ssl_comp_st {
- int id;
- const char *name;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- COMP_METHOD *method;
-# else
- char *method;
-# endif
-};
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
-DECLARE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION);
-
-struct ssl_ctx_st {
- const SSL_METHOD *method;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
- /* same as above but sorted for lookup */
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
- struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store;
- LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions;
- /*
- * Most session-ids that will be cached, default is
- * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited.
- */
- unsigned long session_cache_size;
- struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head;
- struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail;
- /*
- * This can have one of 2 values, ored together, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT,
- * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which
- * means only SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS.
- */
- int session_cache_mode;
- /*
- * If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set when
- * SSL_new() is called. This has been put in to make life easier to set
- * things up
- */
- long session_timeout;
- /*
- * If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id
- * is added to the cache. If this function returns 1, it means that the
- * callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it.
- * Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If
- * remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is
- * removed from the cache. After the call, OpenSSL will
- * SSL_SESSION_free() it.
- */
- int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
- void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
- SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
- unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy);
- struct {
- int sess_connect; /* SSL new conn - started */
- int sess_connect_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */
- int sess_connect_good; /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */
- int sess_accept; /* SSL new accept - started */
- int sess_accept_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */
- int sess_accept_good; /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */
- int sess_miss; /* session lookup misses */
- int sess_timeout; /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */
- int sess_cache_full; /* session removed due to full cache */
- int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */
- int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not in the cache was
- * passed back via the callback. This
- * indicates that the application is
- * supplying session-id's from other
- * processes - spooky :-) */
- } stats;
-
- int references;
-
- /* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */
- int (*app_verify_callback) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *);
- void *app_verify_arg;
- /*
- * before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored
- * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument)
- */
-
- /* Default password callback. */
- pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback;
-
- /* Default password callback user data. */
- void *default_passwd_callback_userdata;
-
- /* get client cert callback */
- int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
-
- /* cookie generate callback */
- int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
- unsigned int *cookie_len);
-
- /* verify cookie callback */
- int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
- unsigned int cookie_len);
-
- CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
-
- const EVP_MD *rsa_md5; /* For SSLv2 - name is 'ssl2-md5' */
- const EVP_MD *md5; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */
- const EVP_MD *sha1; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */
-
- STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
- STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */
-
- /* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */
-
- /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */
- void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val);
-
- /* what we put in client cert requests */
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
-
- /*
- * Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by
- * SSL_new)
- */
-
- unsigned long options;
- unsigned long mode;
- long max_cert_list;
-
- struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
- int read_ahead;
-
- /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
- void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
- const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
- void *msg_callback_arg;
-
- int verify_mode;
- unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
- unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
- /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */
- int (*default_verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-
- /* Default generate session ID callback. */
- GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
-
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
-
-# if 0
- int purpose; /* Purpose setting */
- int trust; /* Trust setting */
-# endif
-
- int quiet_shutdown;
-
- /*
- * Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can
- * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads.
- */
- unsigned int max_send_fragment;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- /*
- * Engine to pass requests for client certs to
- */
- ENGINE *client_cert_engine;
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* TLS extensions servername callback */
- int (*tlsext_servername_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *);
- void *tlsext_servername_arg;
- /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */
- unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16];
- unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[16];
- unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[16];
- /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */
- int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb) (SSL *ssl,
- unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx,
- HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc);
-
- /* certificate status request info */
- /* Callback for status request */
- int (*tlsext_status_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg);
- void *tlsext_status_arg;
-
- /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
- int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback) (SSL *, void *peerinput,
- size_t len, void *arg);
- void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- char *psk_identity_hint;
- unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
- char *identity,
- unsigned int max_identity_len,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len);
- unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len);
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-# define SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT 32
- unsigned int freelist_max_len;
- struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *wbuf_freelist;
- struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *rbuf_freelist;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* Next protocol negotiation information */
- /* (for experimental NPN extension). */
-
- /*
- * For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
- * advertised protocols can be provided.
- */
- int (*next_protos_advertised_cb) (SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
- unsigned int *len, void *arg);
- void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
- /*
- * For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the next
- * protocol from the list provided by the server.
- */
- int (*next_proto_select_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
- unsigned char *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int inlen, void *arg);
- void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
-# endif
- /* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */
- STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;
-# endif
-};
-
-# endif
-
-# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF 0x0000
-# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT 0x0001
-# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER 0x0002
-# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH (SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
-# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR 0x0080
-/* enough comments already ... see SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3) */
-# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP 0x0100
-# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE 0x0200
-# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \
- (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
-
-LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL)
-
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
- SSL_SESSION *sess));
-int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
- SSL_SESSION *sess);
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st
- *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION
- *sess));
-void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION *sess);
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st
- *ssl,
- unsigned char
- *data, int len,
- int *copy));
-SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
- unsigned char *Data,
- int len, int *copy);
-void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
- int val));
-void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
- int val);
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey));
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e);
-# endif
-void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl,
- unsigned char
- *cookie,
- unsigned int
- *cookie_len));
-void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl,
- unsigned char
- *cookie,
- unsigned int
- cookie_len));
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
- int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
- const unsigned char
- **out,
- unsigned int *outlen,
- void *arg), void *arg);
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
- int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
- unsigned char **out,
- unsigned char *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int inlen,
- void *arg), void *arg);
-
-int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
- const unsigned char *client,
- unsigned int client_len);
-void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
- unsigned *len);
-
-# define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0
-# define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1
-# define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-/*
- * the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the
- * resulting identity/psk
- */
-# define PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 128
-# define PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN 256
-void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL
- *ssl,
- const
- char
- *hint,
- char
- *identity,
- unsigned
- int
- max_identity_len,
- unsigned
- char
- *psk,
- unsigned
- int
- max_psk_len));
-void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl,
- unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL
- *ssl,
- const
- char
- *hint,
- char
- *identity,
- unsigned
- int
- max_identity_len,
- unsigned
- char
- *psk,
- unsigned
- int
- max_psk_len));
-void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL
- *ssl,
- const
- char
- *identity,
- unsigned
- char
- *psk,
- unsigned
- int
- max_psk_len));
-void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl,
- unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL
- *ssl,
- const
- char
- *identity,
- unsigned
- char
- *psk,
- unsigned
- int
- max_psk_len));
-int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint);
-int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint);
-const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s);
-# endif
-
-# define SSL_NOTHING 1
-# define SSL_WRITING 2
-# define SSL_READING 3
-# define SSL_X509_LOOKUP 4
-
-/* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */
-# define SSL_want_nothing(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_NOTHING)
-# define SSL_want_read(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING)
-# define SSL_want_write(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING)
-# define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
-
-# define SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM 1
-# define SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM 2
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-struct ssl_st {
- /*
- * protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION,
- * DTLS1_VERSION)
- */
- int version;
- /* SSL_ST_CONNECT or SSL_ST_ACCEPT */
- int type;
- /* SSLv3 */
- const SSL_METHOD *method;
- /*
- * There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same. This
- * is so data can be read and written to different handlers
- */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
- /* used by SSL_read */
- BIO *rbio;
- /* used by SSL_write */
- BIO *wbio;
- /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate messages */
- BIO *bbio;
-# else
- /* used by SSL_read */
- char *rbio;
- /* used by SSL_write */
- char *wbio;
- char *bbio;
-# endif
- /*
- * This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1
- * is returned. This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what
- * request needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect
- */
- int rwstate;
- /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */
- int in_handshake;
- int (*handshake_func) (SSL *);
- /*
- * Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is switched as soon
- * as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state is called for the first time, so
- * that "state" and "handshake_func" are properly initialized. But as
- * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this test instead of an
- * "init" member.
- */
- /* are we the server side? - mostly used by SSL_clear */
- int server;
- /*
- * Generate a new session or reuse an old one.
- * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously
- * cached session or even the previous session unless
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set
- */
- int new_session;
- /* don't send shutdown packets */
- int quiet_shutdown;
- /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02 for received */
- int shutdown;
- /* where we are */
- int state;
- /* where we are when reading */
- int rstate;
- BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */
- void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by
- * ssl3_get_message() */
- int init_num; /* amount read/written */
- int init_off; /* amount read/written */
- /* used internally to point at a raw packet */
- unsigned char *packet;
- unsigned int packet_length;
- struct ssl2_state_st *s2; /* SSLv2 variables */
- struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */
- struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */
- int read_ahead; /* Read as many input bytes as possible (for
- * non-blocking reads) */
- /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
- void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
- const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
- void *msg_callback_arg;
- int hit; /* reusing a previous session */
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
-# if 0
- int purpose; /* Purpose setting */
- int trust; /* Trust setting */
-# endif
- /* crypto */
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
- /*
- * These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are the ones to
- * be 'copied' into these ones
- */
- int mac_flags;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
- EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- COMP_CTX *expand; /* uncompress */
-# else
- char *expand;
-# endif
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
- EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */
-# else
- char *compress;
-# endif
- /* session info */
- /* client cert? */
- /* This is used to hold the server certificate used */
- struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
- /*
- * the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused in
- * the appropriate context
- */
- unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
- unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
- /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */
- SSL_SESSION *session;
- /* Default generate session ID callback. */
- GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
- /* Used in SSL2 and SSL3 */
- /*
- * 0 don't care about verify failure.
- * 1 fail if verify fails
- */
- int verify_mode;
- /* fail if callback returns 0 */
- int (*verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
- /* optional informational callback */
- void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val);
- /* error bytes to be written */
- int error;
- /* actual code */
- int error_code;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- /* Kerberos 5 context */
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx;
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
- char *identity,
- unsigned int max_identity_len,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len);
- unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len);
-# endif
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- /*
- * set this flag to 1 and a sleep(1) is put into all SSL_read() and
- * SSL_write() calls, good for nbio debuging :-)
- */
- int debug;
- /* extra application data */
- long verify_result;
- CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
- /* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
- int references;
- /* protocol behaviour */
- unsigned long options;
- /* API behaviour */
- unsigned long mode;
- long max_cert_list;
- int first_packet;
- /* what was passed, used for SSLv3/TLS rollback check */
- int client_version;
- unsigned int max_send_fragment;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* TLS extension debug callback */
- void (*tlsext_debug_cb) (SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
- unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg);
- void *tlsext_debug_arg;
- char *tlsext_hostname;
- /*-
- * no further mod of servername
- * 0 : call the servername extension callback.
- * 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback.
- * 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello
- */
- int servername_done;
- /* certificate status request info */
- /* Status type or -1 if no status type */
- int tlsext_status_type;
- /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */
- int tlsext_status_expected;
- /* OCSP status request only */
- STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids;
- X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts;
- /* OCSP response received or to be sent */
- unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp;
- int tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
- /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */
- int tlsext_ticket_expected;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- /* our list */
- unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- /* our list */
- unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
- /*
- * draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information to be used for
- * handshakes
- */
- void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input;
- size_t tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
- /* TLS Session Ticket extension override */
- TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *tlsext_session_ticket;
- /* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */
- tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn tls_session_ticket_ext_cb;
- void *tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg;
- /* TLS pre-shared secret session resumption */
- tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb;
- void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg;
- SSL_CTX *initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /*
- * Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
- * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
- * extensions. For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
- * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, before
- * the Finished message.
- */
- unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated;
- unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len;
-# endif
-# define session_ctx initial_ctx
- /* What we'll do */
- STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;
- /* What's been chosen */
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile;
- /*-
- * Is use of the Heartbeat extension negotiated?
- * 0: disabled
- * 1: enabled
- * 2: enabled, but not allowed to send Requests
- */
- unsigned int tlsext_heartbeat;
- /* Indicates if a HeartbeatRequest is in flight */
- unsigned int tlsext_hb_pending;
- /* HeartbeatRequest sequence number */
- unsigned int tlsext_hb_seq;
-# else
-# define session_ctx ctx
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
- /*-
- * 1 if we are renegotiating.
- * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
- * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest)
- */
- int renegotiate;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* ctx for SRP authentication */
- SRP_CTX srp_ctx;
-# endif
-};
-
-# endif
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-# include <openssl/ssl2.h>
-# include <openssl/ssl3.h>
-# include <openssl/tls1.h> /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */
-# include <openssl/dtls1.h> /* Datagram TLS */
-# include <openssl/ssl23.h>
-# include <openssl/srtp.h> /* Support for the use_srtp extension */
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* compatibility */
-# define SSL_set_app_data(s,arg) (SSL_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)arg))
-# define SSL_get_app_data(s) (SSL_get_ex_data(s,0))
-# define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s,a) (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)a))
-# define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s) (SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s,0))
-# define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) (SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0))
-# define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,arg) (SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,(char *)arg))
-
-/*
- * The following are the possible values for ssl->state are are used to
- * indicate where we are up to in the SSL connection establishment. The
- * macros that follow are about the only things you should need to use and
- * even then, only when using non-blocking IO. It can also be useful to work
- * out where you were when the connection failed
- */
-
-# define SSL_ST_CONNECT 0x1000
-# define SSL_ST_ACCEPT 0x2000
-# define SSL_ST_MASK 0x0FFF
-# define SSL_ST_INIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL_ST_BEFORE 0x4000
-# define SSL_ST_OK 0x03
-# define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT)
-# define SSL_ST_ERR 0x05
-
-# define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01
-# define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02
-# define SSL_CB_READ 0x04
-# define SSL_CB_WRITE 0x08
-# define SSL_CB_ALERT 0x4000/* used in callback */
-# define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ)
-# define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE)
-# define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
-# define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
-# define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
-# define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
-# define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START 0x10
-# define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20
-
-/* Is the SSL_connection established? */
-# define SSL_get_state(a) SSL_state(a)
-# define SSL_is_init_finished(a) (SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK)
-# define SSL_in_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT)
-# define SSL_in_before(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE)
-# define SSL_in_connect_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL_in_accept_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-
-/*
- * The following 2 states are kept in ssl->rstate when reads fail, you should
- * not need these
- */
-# define SSL_ST_READ_HEADER 0xF0
-# define SSL_ST_READ_BODY 0xF1
-# define SSL_ST_READ_DONE 0xF2
-
-/*-
- * Obtain latest Finished message
- * -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished)
- * -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished).
- * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes.
- */
-size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
-size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
-
-/*
- * use either SSL_VERIFY_NONE or SSL_VERIFY_PEER, the last 2 options are
- * 'ored' with SSL_VERIFY_PEER if they are desired
- */
-# define SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0x00
-# define SSL_VERIFY_PEER 0x01
-# define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x02
-# define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 0x04
-
-# define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init()
-# define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init()
-
-/* this is for backward compatibility */
-# if 0 /* NEW_SSLEAY */
-# define SSL_CTX_set_default_verify(a,b,c) SSL_CTX_set_verify(a,b,c)
-# define SSL_set_pref_cipher(c,n) SSL_set_cipher_list(c,n)
-# define SSL_add_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_add_session((a),(b))
-# define SSL_remove_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_remove_session((a),(b))
-# define SSL_flush_sessions(a,b) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions((a),(b))
-# endif
-/* More backward compatibility */
-# define SSL_get_cipher(s) \
- SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
-# define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \
- SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np)
-# define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \
- SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
-# define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \
- SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
-# define SSL_get_time(a) SSL_SESSION_get_time(a)
-# define SSL_set_time(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_time((a),(b))
-# define SSL_get_timeout(a) SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(a)
-# define SSL_set_timeout(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((a),(b))
-
-# define d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,SSL_SESSION_new,d2i_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id)
-# define i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id)
-
-DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
-# define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET 1000/* offset to get SSL_R_... value
- * from SSL_AD_... */
-/* These alert types are for SSLv3 and TLSv1 */
-# define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
-# define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
-# define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
-/* Not for TLS */
-# define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
-# define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
-# define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
-# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
-# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
-# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
-# define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
-# define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED
-# define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
-# define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
-# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE
-# define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
-# define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
-# define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
-/* fatal */
-# define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
-# define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0
-# define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1
-# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ 2
-# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE 3
-# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP 4
-# define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 5/* look at error stack/return
- * value/errno */
-# define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN 6
-# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT 7
-# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT 8
-# define SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA 1
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA 2
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH 3
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH 4
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB 5
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB 6
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB 7
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED 8
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST 9
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 10
-# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 11
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS 12
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS 13
-# define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT 14
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK 15
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG 16
-/* only applies to datagram connections */
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU 17
-/* Stats */
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER 20
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT 21
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD 22
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE 23
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT 24
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD 25
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE 26
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT 27
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT 28
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES 29
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS 30
-# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL 31
-# define SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS 32
-# define SSL_CTRL_MODE 33
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD 40
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD 41
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 42
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 43
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 44
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 45
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST 50
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST 51
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT 52
-/* see tls1.h for macros based on these */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB 53
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG 54
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME 55
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB 56
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG 57
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 58
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 59
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT 60
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB 61
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG 62
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB 63
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG 64
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE 65
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 66
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 67
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 68
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 69
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 70
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 71
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB 72
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB 75
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB 76
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB 77
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG 78
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME 79
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH 80
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD 81
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-# define SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT 85
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 86
-# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS 87
-# endif
-# endif
-# define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT 73
-# define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 74
-# define DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN 75
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT 76
-# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS 77
-# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE 78
-# define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 82
-# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83
-# define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119
-# define DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU 120
-# define DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU 121
-# define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
- SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
-# define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,0, NULL)
-# define DTLSv1_listen(ssl, peer) \
- SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN,0, (void *)peer)
-# define SSL_session_reused(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_clear_num_renegotiations(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx,rsa) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa)
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh)
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
-# define SSL_need_tmp_RSA(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_set_tmp_rsa(ssl,rsa) \
- SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa)
-# define SSL_set_tmp_dh(ssl,dh) \
- SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh)
-# define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \
- SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
-# define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
-# define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509)
-# define SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,NULL)
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);
-BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client);
-BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to, BIO *from);
-void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *ssl_bio);
-
-# endif
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *, const char *str);
-SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth);
-void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *);
-long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t);
-long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *);
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *, X509_STORE *);
-int SSL_want(const SSL *s);
-int SSL_clear(SSL *s);
-
-void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm);
-
-const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s);
-int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits);
-char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
-const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
-unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
-
-int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s);
-int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
-int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n);
-char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len);
-int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s);
-int SSL_pending(const SSL *s);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
-int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd);
-int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd);
-int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd);
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio);
-BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s);
-BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s);
-# endif
-int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str);
-void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes);
-int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s);
-int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s);
-int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
-void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
- int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx));
-void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa);
-# endif
-int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len);
-int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d,
- long len);
-int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
-int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
-int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
-int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
-/* PEM type */
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file);
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file);
-int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs,
- const char *file);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-/* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! [was: #ifndef MAC_OS_pre_X] */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC
-int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs,
- const char *dir);
-# endif
-# endif
-
-# endif
-
-void SSL_load_error_strings(void);
-const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s);
-long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s);
-long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
-long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s);
-long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
-void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to, const SSL *from);
-X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s);
-int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
- unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
-
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void);
-const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
- unsigned int *len);
-unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
-int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses);
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
-int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses);
-# endif
-void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses);
-int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp);
-int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session);
-int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c);
-int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *, SSL_SESSION *c);
-int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
-int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
-int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
- unsigned int id_len);
-SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
- long length);
-
-# ifdef HEADER_X509_H
-X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s);
-# endif
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s);
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int,
- X509_STORE_CTX *);
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
- int (*callback) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
- void *arg);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa);
-# endif
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d,
- long len);
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx,
- const unsigned char *d, long len);
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len,
- const unsigned char *d);
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb);
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u);
-
-int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ctx);
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
- unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
-
-SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
- unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose);
-int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose);
-int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust);
-int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust);
-
-int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
-int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength);
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- char *(*cb) (SSL *, void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb) (SSL *, void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb) (SSL *, int *, void *));
-int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
-
-int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
- BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info);
-int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass,
- const char *grp);
-
-BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s);
-BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s);
-
-char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s);
-char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s);
-# endif
-
-void SSL_free(SSL *ssl);
-int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl);
-int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl);
-int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
-int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
-int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num);
-long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int, void (*)(void));
-long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int, void (*)(void));
-
-int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int ret_code);
-const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s);
-
-/* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */
-int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
-# endif
-
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS
- * version */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available
- * SSL/TLS version */
-const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available
- * SSL/TLS version */
-
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
-
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */
-
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */
-const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */
-
-const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */
-const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */
-const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */
-
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s);
-
-int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s);
-int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s);
-int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s);
-int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s);
-int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s);
-
-const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s);
-int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method);
-const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value);
-const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value);
-const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value);
-const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value);
-
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list);
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list);
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s);
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *s);
-int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
-int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
-
-void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s);
-void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s);
-
-long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s);
-
-int SSL_library_init(void);
-
-char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *, char *buf, int size);
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk);
-
-SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *ssl);
-
-X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl);
-/*
- * EVP_PKEY
- */ struct evp_pkey_st *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *ssl);
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode);
-int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
-void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode);
-int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
-void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode);
-int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
-int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl);
-int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx);
-int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
- const char *CApath);
-# define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session/* just peek at pointer */
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl);
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */
-SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl);
-SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx);
-void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val));
-void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
- int val);
-int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl);
-void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state);
-
-void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long v);
-long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl);
-
-int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data);
-void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx);
-int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
-
-int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx, void *data);
-void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx);
-int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
- CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx, void *data);
-void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx);
-int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
-
-int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void);
-
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,t) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,t,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,m) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,m,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,0,NULL)
-
-# define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx)
-# define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m)
-# define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD,m,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(ctx) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(ctx,m) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL)
-# define SSL_get_max_cert_list(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_set_max_cert_list(ssl,m) \
- SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL)
-
-# define SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx,m) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
-# define SSL_set_max_send_fragment(ssl,m) \
- SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
-
- /* NB: the keylength is only applicable when is_export is true */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
- int keylength));
-
-void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,
- RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
- int keylength));
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
- int keylength));
-void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,
- DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
- int keylength));
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
- int keylength));
-void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,
- EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
- int keylength));
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s);
-const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp);
-STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void);
-int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm);
-# else
-const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s);
-const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s);
-const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp);
-void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void);
-int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm);
-# endif
-
-/* TLS extensions functions */
-int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len);
-
-int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
- void *arg);
-
-/* Pre-shared secret session resumption functions */
-int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
- tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb,
- void *arg);
-
-void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug);
-int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
-const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void);
-# endif
-
-/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-/*
- * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
- * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
- */
-void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
-
-/* Error codes for the SSL functions. */
-
-/* Function codes. */
-# define SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 100
-# define SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED 167
-# define SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO 101
-# define SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 102
-# define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION 103
-# define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE 245
-# define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE 104
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT 246
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 295
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD 247
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM 316
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO 248
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT 249
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC 250
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY 251
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE 252
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 297
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT 305
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED 259
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 260
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 261
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 262
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 263
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 264
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 265
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 266
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 267
-# define SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES 268
-# define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED 105
-# define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 106
-# define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 107
-# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED 108
-# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO 109
-# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY 110
-# define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION 111
-# define SSL_F_READ_N 112
-# define SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 113
-# define SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH 239
-# define SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO 114
-# define SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY 240
-# define SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT 115
-# define SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO 116
-# define SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT 117
-# define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 118
-# define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO 119
-# define SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK 237
-# define SSL_F_SSL23_READ 120
-# define SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE 121
-# define SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT 122
-# define SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT 123
-# define SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT 124
-# define SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL 241
-# define SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK 234
-# define SSL_F_SSL2_READ 125
-# define SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL 236
-# define SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE 126
-# define SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE 127
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT 128
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 296
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL 233
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 304
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED 339
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL 133
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS 293
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 292
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 289
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 137
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 138
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 139
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED 140
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 306
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO 146
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC 285
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 287
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 147
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK 235
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES 148
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N 149
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 150
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 151
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 152
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 153
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 154
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 242
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 155
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER 156
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER 291
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159
-# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 298
-# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 277
-# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 307
-# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 215
-# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 216
-# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 299
-# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 278
-# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 308
-# define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD 160
-# define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST 161
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP 221
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST 222
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE 214
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW 162
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 163
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 280
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG 279
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR 230
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT 231
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR 164
-# define SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD 165
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST 166
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL 232
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 168
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES 309
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW 169
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST 269
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE 290
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE 226
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 219
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION 170
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST 229
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE 171
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 172
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE 220
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 173
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY 174
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 175
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 176
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 272
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 177
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 178
-# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 179
-# define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE 180
-# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181
-# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION 217
-# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT 182
-# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY 317
-# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY 183
-# define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184
-# define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185
-# define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186
-# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 300
-# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 302
-# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 310
-# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 301
-# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 303
-# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 311
-# define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270
-# define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 281
-# define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 282
-# define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223
-# define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187
-# define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP 348
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 312
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW 225
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT 191
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST 271
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD 192
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY 193
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE 227
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD 194
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION 195
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 218
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT 294
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST 228
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD 196
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN 224
-# define SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT 313
-# define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION 243
-# define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION 197
-# define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244
-# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE 198
-# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 199
-# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 200
-# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY 201
-# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 202
-# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 203
-# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 273
-# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 204
-# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 205
-# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 206
-# define SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN 207
-# define SSL_F_SSL_WRITE 208
-# define SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC 286
-# define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 209
-# define SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 274
-# define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC 210
-# define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL 314
-# define SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT 315
-# define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 275
-# define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 276
-# define SSL_F_TLS1_PRF 284
-# define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 211
-# define SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING 212
-
-/* Reason codes. */
-# define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100
-# define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 272
-# define SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD 101
-# define SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE 102
-# define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 103
-# define SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM 104
-# define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106
-# define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107
-# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108
-# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109
-# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110
-# define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111
-# define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112
-# define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304
-# define SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE 305
-# define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT 306
-# define SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH 332
-# define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST 105
-# define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH 271
-# define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE 113
-# define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_LENGTH 333
-# define SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE 114
-# define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH 115
-# define SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER 116
-# define SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH 316
-# define SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT 117
-# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT 118
-# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT 119
-# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH 120
-# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH 121
-# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE 122
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 123
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH 347
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH 348
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH 349
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH 350
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS 371
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH 351
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE 352
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 353
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE 124
-# define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 125
-# define SSL_R_BAD_STATE 126
-# define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY 127
-# define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET 128
-# define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG 129
-# define SSL_R_BN_LIB 130
-# define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH 131
-# define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG 132
-# define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY 133
-# define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED 134
-# define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 135
-# define SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT 136
-# define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH 137
-# define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE 138
-# define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR 139
-# define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 226
-# define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 140
-# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED 343
-# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE 141
-# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE 307
-# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR 142
-# define SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 143
-# define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET 144
-# define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH 308
-# define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED 145
-# define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146
-# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147
-# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281
-# define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL 372
-# define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148
-# define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149
-# define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 334
-# define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID 309
-# define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT 317
-# define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING 318
-# define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE 322
-# define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE 323
-# define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER 310
-# define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 354
-# define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150
-# define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY 282
-# define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 151
-# define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152
-# define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153
-# define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154
-# define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 355
-# define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 356
-# define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
-# define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
-# define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
-# define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373
-# define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
-# define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158
-# define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
-# define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 341
-# define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278
-# define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME 357
-# define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE 328
-# define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 325
-# define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST 279
-# define SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG 284
-# define SSL_R_KRB5 285
-# define SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC 286
-# define SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED 287
-# define SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT 288
-# define SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ 289
-# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET 290
-# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT 291
-# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ 292
-# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED 293
-# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV 294
-# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW 295
-# define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159
-# define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160
-# define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274
-# define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 161
-# define SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG 296
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT 162
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY 163
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT 164
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT 165
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY 166
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY 167
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE 168
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT 169
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT 170
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM 358
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY 171
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY 311
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY 172
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY 173
-# define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE 174
-# define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS 346
-# define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET 175
-# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176
-# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177
-# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED 178
-# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET 179
-# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED 180
-# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE 181
-# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED 182
-# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED 183
-# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST 184
-# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH 185
-# define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD 331
-# define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED 186
-# define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED 187
-# define SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER 330
-# define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED 188
-# define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY 189
-# define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED 190
-# define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE 191
-# define SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY 192
-# define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 339
-# define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST 324
-# define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 193
-# define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES 359
-# define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK 194
-# define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 195
-# define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196
-# define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197
-# define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344
-# define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 297
-# define SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG 327
-# define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198
-# define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT 227
-# define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG 270
-# define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE 199
-# define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR 200
-# define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE 201
-# define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE 202
-# define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER 203
-# define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 204
-# define SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 205
-# define SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS 206
-# define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN 207
-# define SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 223
-# define SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB 224
-# define SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB 225
-# define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR 208
-# define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA 209
-# define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 210
-# define SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET 211
-# define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED 312
-# define SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE 212
-# define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH 213
-# define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE 214
-# define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL 298
-# define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG 335
-# define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR 336
-# define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH 337
-# define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING 215
-# define SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING 342
-# define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO 216
-# define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO 217
-# define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO 218
-# define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 345
-# define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275
-# define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277
-# define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219
-# define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR 360
-# define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220
-# define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC 361
-# define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES 362
-# define SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG 363
-# define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE 364
-# define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221
-# define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG 299
-# define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT 321
-# define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME 319
-# define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE 320
-# define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 300
-# define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT 222
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 1045
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 1044
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 1046
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 1030
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 1040
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 1047
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE 1041
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010
-# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 1043
-# define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION 228
-# define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 229
-# define SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 230
-# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED 301
-# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT 302
-# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG 273
-# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH 303
-# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 231
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 1049
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 1050
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 1022
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112
-# define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110
-# define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232
-# define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT 365
-# define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 366
-# define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL 367
-# define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 157
-# define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233
-# define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 234
-# define SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 235
-# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS 236
-# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS 313
-# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY 237
-# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS 238
-# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS 314
-# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS 239
-# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD 240
-# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES 241
-# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES 242
-# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES 243
-# define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 244
-# define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD 245
-# define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED 276
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE 246
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 247
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED 248
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE 249
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 368
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE 250
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE 251
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL 252
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE 253
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION 254
-# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE 255
-# define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 338
-# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 256
-# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 257
-# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE 326
-# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 315
-# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 258
-# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION 259
-# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329
-# define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED 369
-# define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET 260
-# define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261
-# define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 262
-# define SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS 263
-# define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 264
-# define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE 265
-# define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE 370
-# define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION 266
-# define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 267
-# define SSL_R_X509_LIB 268
-# define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS 269
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl.h (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2770 @@
+/* ssl/ssl.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL_H
+# define HEADER_SSL_H
+
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# include <openssl/comp.h>
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/lhash.h>
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/pem.h>
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+# include <openssl/kssl.h>
+# include <openssl/safestack.h>
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* SSLeay version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */
+/*-
+ * Version 0 - initial version
+ * Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate
+ */
+# define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001
+
+/* text strings for the ciphers */
+# define SSL_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA
+
+/*
+ * VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries
+ */
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5
+
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5
+
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5
+# define SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH 256
+
+# define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32
+# define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH 32
+
+# define SSL_MIN_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH_IN_BYTES (512/8)
+# define SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH 8
+# define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 48
+
+/* These are used to specify which ciphers to use and not to use */
+
+# define SSL_TXT_EXP40 "EXPORT40"
+# define SSL_TXT_EXP56 "EXPORT56"
+# define SSL_TXT_LOW "LOW"
+# define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM "MEDIUM"
+# define SSL_TXT_HIGH "HIGH"
+# define SSL_TXT_FIPS "FIPS"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_kFZA "kFZA"/* unused! */
+# define SSL_TXT_aFZA "aFZA"/* unused! */
+# define SSL_TXT_eFZA "eFZA"/* unused! */
+# define SSL_TXT_FZA "FZA"/* unused! */
+
+# define SSL_TXT_aNULL "aNULL"
+# define SSL_TXT_eNULL "eNULL"
+# define SSL_TXT_NULL "NULL"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_kRSA "kRSA"
+# define SSL_TXT_kDHr "kDHr"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+# define SSL_TXT_kDHd "kDHd"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+# define SSL_TXT_kDH "kDH"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+# define SSL_TXT_kEDH "kEDH"
+# define SSL_TXT_kKRB5 "kKRB5"
+# define SSL_TXT_kECDHr "kECDHr"
+# define SSL_TXT_kECDHe "kECDHe"
+# define SSL_TXT_kECDH "kECDH"
+# define SSL_TXT_kEECDH "kEECDH"
+# define SSL_TXT_kPSK "kPSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_kGOST "kGOST"
+# define SSL_TXT_kSRP "kSRP"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_aRSA "aRSA"
+# define SSL_TXT_aDSS "aDSS"
+# define SSL_TXT_aDH "aDH"/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+# define SSL_TXT_aECDH "aECDH"
+# define SSL_TXT_aKRB5 "aKRB5"
+# define SSL_TXT_aECDSA "aECDSA"
+# define SSL_TXT_aPSK "aPSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_aGOST94 "aGOST94"
+# define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01"
+# define SSL_TXT_aGOST "aGOST"
+# define SSL_TXT_aSRP "aSRP"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS"
+# define SSL_TXT_DH "DH"
+# define SSL_TXT_EDH "EDH"/* same as "kEDH:-ADH" */
+# define SSL_TXT_ADH "ADH"
+# define SSL_TXT_RSA "RSA"
+# define SSL_TXT_ECDH "ECDH"
+# define SSL_TXT_EECDH "EECDH"/* same as "kEECDH:-AECDH" */
+# define SSL_TXT_AECDH "AECDH"
+# define SSL_TXT_ECDSA "ECDSA"
+# define SSL_TXT_KRB5 "KRB5"
+# define SSL_TXT_PSK "PSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_SRP "SRP"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_DES "DES"
+# define SSL_TXT_3DES "3DES"
+# define SSL_TXT_RC4 "RC4"
+# define SSL_TXT_RC2 "RC2"
+# define SSL_TXT_IDEA "IDEA"
+# define SSL_TXT_SEED "SEED"
+# define SSL_TXT_AES128 "AES128"
+# define SSL_TXT_AES256 "AES256"
+# define SSL_TXT_AES "AES"
+# define SSL_TXT_AES_GCM "AESGCM"
+# define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128 "CAMELLIA128"
+# define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256 "CAMELLIA256"
+# define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA "CAMELLIA"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_MD5 "MD5"
+# define SSL_TXT_SHA1 "SHA1"
+# define SSL_TXT_SHA "SHA"/* same as "SHA1" */
+# define SSL_TXT_GOST94 "GOST94"
+# define SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC "GOST89MAC"
+# define SSL_TXT_SHA256 "SHA256"
+# define SSL_TXT_SHA384 "SHA384"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_SSLV2 "SSLv2"
+# define SSL_TXT_SSLV3 "SSLv3"
+# define SSL_TXT_TLSV1 "TLSv1"
+# define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1 "TLSv1.1"
+# define SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2 "TLSv1.2"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_EXP "EXP"
+# define SSL_TXT_EXPORT "EXPORT"
+
+# define SSL_TXT_ALL "ALL"
+
+/*-
+ * COMPLEMENTOF* definitions. These identifiers are used to (de-select)
+ * ciphers normally not being used.
+ * Example: "RC4" will activate all ciphers using RC4 including ciphers
+ * without authentication, which would normally disabled by DEFAULT (due
+ * the "!ADH" being part of default). Therefore "RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT"
+ * will make sure that it is also disabled in the specific selection.
+ * COMPLEMENTOF* identifiers are portable between version, as adjustments
+ * to the default cipher setup will also be included here.
+ *
+ * COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT does not experience the same special treatment that
+ * DEFAULT gets, as only selection is being done and no sorting as needed
+ * for DEFAULT.
+ */
+# define SSL_TXT_CMPALL "COMPLEMENTOFALL"
+# define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT"
+
+/*
+ * The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when
+ * an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'.
+ */
+# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
+/*
+ * As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always
+ * starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is
+ * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites! (The latter are not
+ * actually enabled by ALL, but "ALL:RSA" would enable some of them.)
+ */
+
+/* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */
+# define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN 1
+# define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN 2
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# if (defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+# endif
+
+# define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 X509_FILETYPE_ASN1
+# define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM X509_FILETYPE_PEM
+
+/*
+ * This is needed to stop compilers complaining about the 'struct ssl_st *'
+ * function parameters used to prototype callbacks in SSL_CTX.
+ */
+typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st;
+typedef struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT;
+typedef struct ssl_method_st SSL_METHOD;
+typedef struct ssl_cipher_st SSL_CIPHER;
+typedef struct ssl_session_st SSL_SESSION;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+
+/* SRTP protection profiles for use with the use_srtp extension (RFC 5764)*/
+typedef struct srtp_protection_profile_st {
+ const char *name;
+ unsigned long id;
+} SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)
+
+typedef int (*tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn) (SSL *s,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ int len, void *arg);
+typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn) (SSL *s, void *secret,
+ int *secret_len,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
+ SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
+/* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */
+struct ssl_cipher_st {
+ int valid;
+ const char *name; /* text name */
+ unsigned long id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */
+ /*
+ * changed in 0.9.9: these four used to be portions of a single value
+ * 'algorithms'
+ */
+ unsigned long algorithm_mkey; /* key exchange algorithm */
+ unsigned long algorithm_auth; /* server authentication */
+ unsigned long algorithm_enc; /* symmetric encryption */
+ unsigned long algorithm_mac; /* symmetric authentication */
+ unsigned long algorithm_ssl; /* (major) protocol version */
+ unsigned long algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */
+ unsigned long algorithm2; /* Extra flags */
+ int strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */
+ int alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */
+};
+
+/* Used to hold functions for SSLv2 or SSLv3/TLSv1 functions */
+struct ssl_method_st {
+ int version;
+ int (*ssl_new) (SSL *s);
+ void (*ssl_clear) (SSL *s);
+ void (*ssl_free) (SSL *s);
+ int (*ssl_accept) (SSL *s);
+ int (*ssl_connect) (SSL *s);
+ int (*ssl_read) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+ int (*ssl_peek) (SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+ int (*ssl_write) (SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
+ int (*ssl_shutdown) (SSL *s);
+ int (*ssl_renegotiate) (SSL *s);
+ int (*ssl_renegotiate_check) (SSL *s);
+ long (*ssl_get_message) (SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long
+ max, int *ok);
+ int (*ssl_read_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len,
+ int peek);
+ int (*ssl_write_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len);
+ int (*ssl_dispatch_alert) (SSL *s);
+ long (*ssl_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+ long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+ const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char) (const unsigned char *ptr);
+ int (*put_cipher_by_char) (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned char *ptr);
+ int (*ssl_pending) (const SSL *s);
+ int (*num_ciphers) (void);
+ const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher) (unsigned ncipher);
+ const struct ssl_method_st *(*get_ssl_method) (int version);
+ long (*get_timeout) (void);
+ struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */
+ int (*ssl_version) (void);
+ long (*ssl_callback_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void));
+ long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void));
+};
+
+/*-
+ * Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows
+ * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version INTEGER, -- structure version number
+ * SSLversion INTEGER, -- SSL version number
+ * Cipher OCTET STRING, -- the 3 byte cipher ID
+ * Session_ID OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID
+ * Master_key OCTET STRING, -- the master key
+ * KRB5_principal OCTET STRING -- optional Kerberos principal
+ * Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the optional Key argument
+ * Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Start Time
+ * Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Timeout ins seconds
+ * Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT X509, -- optional Peer Certificate
+ * Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID context
+ * Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- X509_V_... code for `Peer'
+ * HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension
+ * PSK_identity_hint [ 7 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint
+ * PSK_identity [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity
+ * Ticket_lifetime_hint [9] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- server's lifetime hint for session ticket
+ * Ticket [10] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- session ticket (clients only)
+ * Compression_meth [11] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional compression method
+ * SRP_username [ 12 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional SRP username
+ * }
+ * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details
+ * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-).
+ */
+struct ssl_session_st {
+ int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is being
+ * kept in here? */
+ /* only really used in SSLv2 */
+ unsigned int key_arg_length;
+ unsigned char key_arg[SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH];
+ int master_key_length;
+ unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ /* session_id - valid? */
+ unsigned int session_id_length;
+ unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH];
+ /*
+ * this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in the
+ * appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this, via
+ * SSL_new
+ */
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
+ unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len;
+ unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH];
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ char *psk_identity_hint;
+ char *psk_identity;
+# endif
+ /*
+ * Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed. Applications
+ * can also set this bit for a new session via not_resumable_session_cb
+ * to disable session caching and tickets.
+ */
+ int not_resumable;
+ /* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */
+ struct sess_cert_st /* SESS_CERT */ *sess_cert;
+ /*
+ * This is the cert for the other end. On clients, it will be the same as
+ * sess_cert->peer_key->x509 (the latter is not enough as sess_cert is
+ * not retained in the external representation of sessions, see
+ * ssl_asn1.c).
+ */
+ X509 *peer;
+ /*
+ * when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's
+ * certificate is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse:
+ */
+ long verify_result; /* only for servers */
+ int references;
+ long timeout;
+ long time;
+ unsigned int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used
+ * to load the 'cipher' structure */
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */
+ /*
+ * These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to
+ * implement a maximum cache size.
+ */
+ struct ssl_session_st *prev, *next;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ char *tlsext_hostname;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* peer's list */
+ size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* peer's list */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ /* RFC4507 info */
+ unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */
+ size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */
+ long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ char *srp_username;
+# endif
+};
+
+# endif
+
+# define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0x00000001L
+# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0x00000002L
+/* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */
+# define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0x00000004L
+# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L
+# define SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING 0x00000010L
+# define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L
+# define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L
+# define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L
+# define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L
+# define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L
+
+/* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */
+# define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x0
+/* Refers to ancient SSLREF and SSLv2, retained for compatibility */
+# define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x0
+
+/*
+ * Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added in
+ * OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol) the
+ * workaround is not needed. Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS
+ * implementations cannot handle it at all, which is why we include it in
+ * SSL_OP_ALL.
+ */
+/* added in 0.9.6e */
+# define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 0x00000800L
+
+/*
+ * SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless. This
+ * used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7.
+ */
+# define SSL_OP_ALL 0x80000BFFL
+
+/* DTLS options */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU 0x00001000L
+/* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */
+# define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE 0x00002000L
+/* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000L
+/* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER (as client) */
+# define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT 0x00008000L
+
+/* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000L
+/* Don't use compression even if supported */
+# define SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION 0x00020000L
+/* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */
+# define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
+/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */
+# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L
+/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
+# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L
+/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
+# define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0
+/*
+ * Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's preferences
+ */
+# define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0x00400000L
+/*
+ * If set, a server will allow a client to issue a SSLv3.0 version number as
+ * latest version supported in the premaster secret, even when TLSv1.0
+ * (version 3.1) was announced in the client hello. Normally this is
+ * forbidden to prevent version rollback attacks.
+ */
+# define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0x00800000L
+
+# define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 0x01000000L
+# define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 0x02000000L
+# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 0x04000000L
+# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 0x08000000L
+# define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 0x10000000L
+
+/*
+ * These next two were never actually used for anything since SSLeay zap so
+ * we have some more flags.
+ */
+/*
+ * The next flag deliberately changes the ciphertest, this is a check for the
+ * PKCS#1 attack
+ */
+# define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 0x0
+# define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 0x0
+
+# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG 0x20000000L
+# define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x40000000L
+/*
+ * Make server add server-hello extension from early version of cryptopro
+ * draft, when GOST ciphersuite is negotiated. Required for interoperability
+ * with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
+ */
+# define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG 0x80000000L
+
+/*
+ * Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success
+ * when just a single record has been written):
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE 0x00000001L
+/*
+ * Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location (buffer
+ * contents must stay the same!); this is not the default to avoid the
+ * misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like non-blocking
+ * write():
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002L
+/*
+ * Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking:
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004L
+/* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */
+# define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008L
+/*
+ * Save RAM by releasing read and write buffers when they're empty. (SSL3 and
+ * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context or
+ * just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len).
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
+/*
+ * Send the current time in the Random fields of the ClientHello and
+ * ServerHello records for compatibility with hypothetical implementations
+ * that require it.
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME 0x00000020L
+# define SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME 0x00000040L
+/*
+ * Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. To be set only by applications
+ * that reconnect with a downgraded protocol version; see
+ * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your
+ * application attempts a normal handshake. Only use this in explicit
+ * fallback retries, following the guidance in
+ * draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00.
+ */
+# define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
+
+/*
+ * Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, they
+ * cannot be used to clear bits.
+ */
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,op) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx,op) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_options(ssl,op) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_clear_options(ssl,op) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_get_options(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
+# define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+# define DTLS_set_link_mtu(ssl, mtu) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU,(mtu),NULL)
+# define DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU,0,NULL)
+
+# define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL)
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+# define SSL_heartbeat(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT,0,NULL)
+# endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+ int content_type, const void *buf,
+ size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+ int content_type, const void *buf,
+ size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+# define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
+# define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg))
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
+typedef struct srp_ctx_st {
+ /* param for all the callbacks */
+ void *SRP_cb_arg;
+ /* set client Hello login callback */
+ int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *);
+ /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */
+ int (*SRP_verify_param_callback) (SSL *, void *);
+ /* set SRP client passwd callback */
+ char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback) (SSL *, void *);
+ char *login;
+ BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A;
+ BIGNUM *a, *b, *v;
+ char *info;
+ int strength;
+ unsigned long srp_Mask;
+} SRP_CTX;
+
+# endif
+
+/* see tls_srp.c */
+int SSL_SRP_CTX_init(SSL *s);
+int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_SRP_CTX_free(SSL *ctx);
+int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(SSL *s, int *ad);
+int SRP_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key);
+int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s);
+int SRP_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *master_key);
+
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+# define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*30
+ /* 30k max cert list :-) */
+# else
+# define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100
+ /* 100k max cert list :-) */
+# endif
+
+# define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (1024*20)
+
+/*
+ * This callback type is used inside SSL_CTX, SSL, and in the functions that
+ * set them. It is used to override the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs in
+ * a server. Return value should be zero on an error, non-zero to proceed.
+ * Also, callbacks should themselves check if the id they generate is unique
+ * otherwise the SSL handshake will fail with an error - callbacks can do
+ * this using the 'ssl' value they're passed by;
+ * SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) The length value passed in
+ * is set at the maximum size the session ID can be. In SSLv2 this is 16
+ * bytes, whereas SSLv3/TLSv1 it is 32 bytes. The callback can alter this
+ * length to be less if desired, but under SSLv2 session IDs are supposed to
+ * be fixed at 16 bytes so the id will be padded after the callback returns
+ * in this case. It is also an error for the callback to set the size to
+ * zero.
+ */
+typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB) (const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int *id_len);
+
+typedef struct ssl_comp_st SSL_COMP;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
+struct ssl_comp_st {
+ int id;
+ const char *name;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_METHOD *method;
+# else
+ char *method;
+# endif
+};
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+DECLARE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION);
+
+struct ssl_ctx_st {
+ const SSL_METHOD *method;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
+ /* same as above but sorted for lookup */
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
+ struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store;
+ LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions;
+ /*
+ * Most session-ids that will be cached, default is
+ * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited.
+ */
+ unsigned long session_cache_size;
+ struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head;
+ struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail;
+ /*
+ * This can have one of 2 values, ored together, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT,
+ * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which
+ * means only SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS.
+ */
+ int session_cache_mode;
+ /*
+ * If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set when
+ * SSL_new() is called. This has been put in to make life easier to set
+ * things up
+ */
+ long session_timeout;
+ /*
+ * If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id
+ * is added to the cache. If this function returns 1, it means that the
+ * callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it.
+ * Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If
+ * remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is
+ * removed from the cache. After the call, OpenSSL will
+ * SSL_SESSION_free() it.
+ */
+ int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+ void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
+ SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy);
+ struct {
+ int sess_connect; /* SSL new conn - started */
+ int sess_connect_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */
+ int sess_connect_good; /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */
+ int sess_accept; /* SSL new accept - started */
+ int sess_accept_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */
+ int sess_accept_good; /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */
+ int sess_miss; /* session lookup misses */
+ int sess_timeout; /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */
+ int sess_cache_full; /* session removed due to full cache */
+ int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */
+ int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not in the cache was
+ * passed back via the callback. This
+ * indicates that the application is
+ * supplying session-id's from other
+ * processes - spooky :-) */
+ } stats;
+
+ int references;
+
+ /* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */
+ int (*app_verify_callback) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *);
+ void *app_verify_arg;
+ /*
+ * before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored
+ * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument)
+ */
+
+ /* Default password callback. */
+ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback;
+
+ /* Default password callback user data. */
+ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+
+ /* get client cert callback */
+ int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+
+ /* cookie generate callback */
+ int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int *cookie_len);
+
+ /* verify cookie callback */
+ int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int cookie_len);
+
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+
+ const EVP_MD *rsa_md5; /* For SSLv2 - name is 'ssl2-md5' */
+ const EVP_MD *md5; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */
+ const EVP_MD *sha1; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */
+
+ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */
+
+ /* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */
+
+ /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */
+ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val);
+
+ /* what we put in client cert requests */
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
+
+ /*
+ * Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by
+ * SSL_new)
+ */
+
+ unsigned long options;
+ unsigned long mode;
+ long max_cert_list;
+
+ struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
+ int read_ahead;
+
+ /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
+ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+ void *msg_callback_arg;
+
+ int verify_mode;
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
+ unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
+ /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */
+ int (*default_verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+ /* Default generate session ID callback. */
+ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+
+# if 0
+ int purpose; /* Purpose setting */
+ int trust; /* Trust setting */
+# endif
+
+ int quiet_shutdown;
+
+ /*
+ * Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can
+ * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads.
+ */
+ unsigned int max_send_fragment;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ /*
+ * Engine to pass requests for client certs to
+ */
+ ENGINE *client_cert_engine;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions servername callback */
+ int (*tlsext_servername_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *);
+ void *tlsext_servername_arg;
+ /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */
+ unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16];
+ unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[16];
+ unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[16];
+ /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */
+ int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx,
+ HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc);
+
+ /* certificate status request info */
+ /* Callback for status request */
+ int (*tlsext_status_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+ void *tlsext_status_arg;
+
+ /* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
+ int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback) (SSL *, void *peerinput,
+ size_t len, void *arg);
+ void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ char *psk_identity_hint;
+ unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+ char *identity,
+ unsigned int max_identity_len,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len);
+ unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+# define SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT 32
+ unsigned int freelist_max_len;
+ struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *wbuf_freelist;
+ struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st *rbuf_freelist;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /* Next protocol negotiation information */
+ /* (for experimental NPN extension). */
+
+ /*
+ * For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
+ * advertised protocols can be provided.
+ */
+ int (*next_protos_advertised_cb) (SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
+ unsigned int *len, void *arg);
+ void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
+ /*
+ * For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the next
+ * protocol from the list provided by the server.
+ */
+ int (*next_proto_select_cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg);
+ void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
+# endif
+ /* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;
+# endif
+};
+
+# endif
+
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF 0x0000
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT 0x0001
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER 0x0002
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH (SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR 0x0080
+/* enough comments already ... see SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3) */
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP 0x0100
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE 0x0200
+# define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \
+ (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL)
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ SSL_SESSION *sess));
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ SSL_SESSION *sess);
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st
+ *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION
+ *sess));
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION *sess);
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st
+ *ssl,
+ unsigned char
+ *data, int len,
+ int *copy));
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ unsigned char *Data,
+ int len, int *copy);
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
+ int val));
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
+ int val);
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey));
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e);
+# endif
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char
+ *cookie,
+ unsigned int
+ *cookie_len));
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char
+ *cookie,
+ unsigned int
+ cookie_len));
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const unsigned char
+ **out,
+ unsigned int *outlen,
+ void *arg), void *arg);
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg), void *arg);
+
+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ const unsigned char *client,
+ unsigned int client_len);
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned *len);
+
+# define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED 0
+# define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED 1
+# define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP 2
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+/*
+ * the maximum length of the buffer given to callbacks containing the
+ * resulting identity/psk
+ */
+# define PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN 128
+# define PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN 256
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL
+ *ssl,
+ const
+ char
+ *hint,
+ char
+ *identity,
+ unsigned
+ int
+ max_identity_len,
+ unsigned
+ char
+ *psk,
+ unsigned
+ int
+ max_psk_len));
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL
+ *ssl,
+ const
+ char
+ *hint,
+ char
+ *identity,
+ unsigned
+ int
+ max_identity_len,
+ unsigned
+ char
+ *psk,
+ unsigned
+ int
+ max_psk_len));
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL
+ *ssl,
+ const
+ char
+ *identity,
+ unsigned
+ char
+ *psk,
+ unsigned
+ int
+ max_psk_len));
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL
+ *ssl,
+ const
+ char
+ *identity,
+ unsigned
+ char
+ *psk,
+ unsigned
+ int
+ max_psk_len));
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint);
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint);
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s);
+# endif
+
+# define SSL_NOTHING 1
+# define SSL_WRITING 2
+# define SSL_READING 3
+# define SSL_X509_LOOKUP 4
+
+/* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */
+# define SSL_want_nothing(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_NOTHING)
+# define SSL_want_read(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING)
+# define SSL_want_write(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING)
+# define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
+
+# define SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM 1
+# define SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM 2
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
+struct ssl_st {
+ /*
+ * protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION,
+ * DTLS1_VERSION)
+ */
+ int version;
+ /* SSL_ST_CONNECT or SSL_ST_ACCEPT */
+ int type;
+ /* SSLv3 */
+ const SSL_METHOD *method;
+ /*
+ * There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same. This
+ * is so data can be read and written to different handlers
+ */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+ /* used by SSL_read */
+ BIO *rbio;
+ /* used by SSL_write */
+ BIO *wbio;
+ /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate messages */
+ BIO *bbio;
+# else
+ /* used by SSL_read */
+ char *rbio;
+ /* used by SSL_write */
+ char *wbio;
+ char *bbio;
+# endif
+ /*
+ * This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1
+ * is returned. This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what
+ * request needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect
+ */
+ int rwstate;
+ /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */
+ int in_handshake;
+ int (*handshake_func) (SSL *);
+ /*
+ * Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is switched as soon
+ * as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state is called for the first time, so
+ * that "state" and "handshake_func" are properly initialized. But as
+ * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this test instead of an
+ * "init" member.
+ */
+ /* are we the server side? - mostly used by SSL_clear */
+ int server;
+ /*
+ * Generate a new session or reuse an old one.
+ * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously
+ * cached session or even the previous session unless
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set
+ */
+ int new_session;
+ /* don't send shutdown packets */
+ int quiet_shutdown;
+ /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02 for received */
+ int shutdown;
+ /* where we are */
+ int state;
+ /* where we are when reading */
+ int rstate;
+ BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */
+ void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by
+ * ssl3_get_message() */
+ int init_num; /* amount read/written */
+ int init_off; /* amount read/written */
+ /* used internally to point at a raw packet */
+ unsigned char *packet;
+ unsigned int packet_length;
+ struct ssl2_state_st *s2; /* SSLv2 variables */
+ struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */
+ struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */
+ int read_ahead; /* Read as many input bytes as possible (for
+ * non-blocking reads) */
+ /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
+ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
+ void *msg_callback_arg;
+ int hit; /* reusing a previous session */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+# if 0
+ int purpose; /* Purpose setting */
+ int trust; /* Trust setting */
+# endif
+ /* crypto */
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id;
+ /*
+ * These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are the ones to
+ * be 'copied' into these ones
+ */
+ int mac_flags;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_CTX *expand; /* uncompress */
+# else
+ char *expand;
+# endif
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */
+# else
+ char *compress;
+# endif
+ /* session info */
+ /* client cert? */
+ /* This is used to hold the server certificate used */
+ struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
+ /*
+ * the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused in
+ * the appropriate context
+ */
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
+ unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
+ /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */
+ SSL_SESSION *session;
+ /* Default generate session ID callback. */
+ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id;
+ /* Used in SSL2 and SSL3 */
+ /*
+ * 0 don't care about verify failure.
+ * 1 fail if verify fails
+ */
+ int verify_mode;
+ /* fail if callback returns 0 */
+ int (*verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ /* optional informational callback */
+ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val);
+ /* error bytes to be written */
+ int error;
+ /* actual code */
+ int error_code;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ /* Kerberos 5 context */
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+ char *identity,
+ unsigned int max_identity_len,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len);
+ unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len);
+# endif
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ /*
+ * set this flag to 1 and a sleep(1) is put into all SSL_read() and
+ * SSL_write() calls, good for nbio debuging :-)
+ */
+ int debug;
+ /* extra application data */
+ long verify_result;
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+ /* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
+ int references;
+ /* protocol behaviour */
+ unsigned long options;
+ /* API behaviour */
+ unsigned long mode;
+ long max_cert_list;
+ int first_packet;
+ /* what was passed, used for SSLv3/TLS rollback check */
+ int client_version;
+ unsigned int max_send_fragment;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extension debug callback */
+ void (*tlsext_debug_cb) (SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
+ unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg);
+ void *tlsext_debug_arg;
+ char *tlsext_hostname;
+ /*-
+ * no further mod of servername
+ * 0 : call the servername extension callback.
+ * 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback.
+ * 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello
+ */
+ int servername_done;
+ /* certificate status request info */
+ /* Status type or -1 if no status type */
+ int tlsext_status_type;
+ /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */
+ int tlsext_status_expected;
+ /* OCSP status request only */
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids;
+ X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts;
+ /* OCSP response received or to be sent */
+ unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp;
+ int tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+ /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */
+ int tlsext_ticket_expected;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ /* our list */
+ unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ /* our list */
+ unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ /*
+ * draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information to be used for
+ * handshakes
+ */
+ void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input;
+ size_t tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ /* TLS Session Ticket extension override */
+ TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *tlsext_session_ticket;
+ /* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */
+ tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn tls_session_ticket_ext_cb;
+ void *tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg;
+ /* TLS pre-shared secret session resumption */
+ tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb;
+ void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg;
+ SSL_CTX *initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /*
+ * Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
+ * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
+ * extensions. For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
+ * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, before
+ * the Finished message.
+ */
+ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated;
+ unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len;
+# endif
+# define session_ctx initial_ctx
+ /* What we'll do */
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;
+ /* What's been chosen */
+ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile;
+ /*-
+ * Is use of the Heartbeat extension negotiated?
+ * 0: disabled
+ * 1: enabled
+ * 2: enabled, but not allowed to send Requests
+ */
+ unsigned int tlsext_heartbeat;
+ /* Indicates if a HeartbeatRequest is in flight */
+ unsigned int tlsext_hb_pending;
+ /* HeartbeatRequest sequence number */
+ unsigned int tlsext_hb_seq;
+# else
+# define session_ctx ctx
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+ /*-
+ * 1 if we are renegotiating.
+ * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
+ * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest)
+ */
+ int renegotiate;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* ctx for SRP authentication */
+ SRP_CTX srp_ctx;
+# endif
+};
+
+# endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+# include <openssl/ssl2.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl3.h>
+# include <openssl/tls1.h> /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */
+# include <openssl/dtls1.h> /* Datagram TLS */
+# include <openssl/ssl23.h>
+# include <openssl/srtp.h> /* Support for the use_srtp extension */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* compatibility */
+# define SSL_set_app_data(s,arg) (SSL_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)arg))
+# define SSL_get_app_data(s) (SSL_get_ex_data(s,0))
+# define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s,a) (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)a))
+# define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s) (SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s,0))
+# define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) (SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0))
+# define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,arg) (SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,(char *)arg))
+
+/*
+ * The following are the possible values for ssl->state are are used to
+ * indicate where we are up to in the SSL connection establishment. The
+ * macros that follow are about the only things you should need to use and
+ * even then, only when using non-blocking IO. It can also be useful to work
+ * out where you were when the connection failed
+ */
+
+# define SSL_ST_CONNECT 0x1000
+# define SSL_ST_ACCEPT 0x2000
+# define SSL_ST_MASK 0x0FFF
+# define SSL_ST_INIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL_ST_BEFORE 0x4000
+# define SSL_ST_OK 0x03
+# define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT)
+# define SSL_ST_ERR 0x05
+
+# define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01
+# define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02
+# define SSL_CB_READ 0x04
+# define SSL_CB_WRITE 0x08
+# define SSL_CB_ALERT 0x4000/* used in callback */
+# define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ)
+# define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE)
+# define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
+# define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
+# define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP)
+# define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT)
+# define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START 0x10
+# define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20
+
+/* Is the SSL_connection established? */
+# define SSL_get_state(a) SSL_state(a)
+# define SSL_is_init_finished(a) (SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK)
+# define SSL_in_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT)
+# define SSL_in_before(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE)
+# define SSL_in_connect_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL_in_accept_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+
+/*
+ * The following 2 states are kept in ssl->rstate when reads fail, you should
+ * not need these
+ */
+# define SSL_ST_READ_HEADER 0xF0
+# define SSL_ST_READ_BODY 0xF1
+# define SSL_ST_READ_DONE 0xF2
+
+/*-
+ * Obtain latest Finished message
+ * -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished)
+ * -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished).
+ * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes.
+ */
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count);
+
+/*
+ * use either SSL_VERIFY_NONE or SSL_VERIFY_PEER, the last 2 options are
+ * 'ored' with SSL_VERIFY_PEER if they are desired
+ */
+# define SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0x00
+# define SSL_VERIFY_PEER 0x01
+# define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x02
+# define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 0x04
+
+# define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init()
+# define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init()
+
+/* this is for backward compatibility */
+# if 0 /* NEW_SSLEAY */
+# define SSL_CTX_set_default_verify(a,b,c) SSL_CTX_set_verify(a,b,c)
+# define SSL_set_pref_cipher(c,n) SSL_set_cipher_list(c,n)
+# define SSL_add_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_add_session((a),(b))
+# define SSL_remove_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_remove_session((a),(b))
+# define SSL_flush_sessions(a,b) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions((a),(b))
+# endif
+/* More backward compatibility */
+# define SSL_get_cipher(s) \
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
+# define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np)
+# define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
+# define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
+# define SSL_get_time(a) SSL_SESSION_get_time(a)
+# define SSL_set_time(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_time((a),(b))
+# define SSL_get_timeout(a) SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(a)
+# define SSL_set_timeout(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((a),(b))
+
+# define d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,SSL_SESSION_new,d2i_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id)
+# define i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id)
+
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
+# define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET 1000/* offset to get SSL_R_... value
+ * from SSL_AD_... */
+/* These alert types are for SSLv3 and TLSv1 */
+# define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
+# define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
+# define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
+/* Not for TLS */
+# define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
+# define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
+# define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
+# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
+# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
+# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
+# define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
+# define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED
+# define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+# define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
+# define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE
+# define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
+# define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
+# define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
+/* fatal */
+# define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
+# define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0
+# define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ 2
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE 3
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP 4
+# define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 5/* look at error stack/return
+ * value/errno */
+# define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN 6
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT 7
+# define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT 8
+# define SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA 1
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA 2
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH 3
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH 4
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB 5
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB 6
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB 7
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED 8
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST 9
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 10
+# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 11
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS 12
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS 13
+# define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT 14
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK 15
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG 16
+/* only applies to datagram connections */
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU 17
+/* Stats */
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER 20
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT 21
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD 22
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE 23
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT 24
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD 25
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE 26
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT 27
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT 28
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES 29
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS 30
+# define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL 31
+# define SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS 32
+# define SSL_CTRL_MODE 33
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD 40
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD 41
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 42
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 43
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 44
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 45
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST 50
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST 51
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT 52
+/* see tls1.h for macros based on these */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB 53
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG 54
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME 55
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB 56
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG 57
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 58
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 59
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT 60
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB 61
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG 62
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB 63
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG 64
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE 65
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 66
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 67
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 68
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 69
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 70
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 71
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB 72
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB 75
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB 76
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB 77
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG 78
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME 79
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH 80
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD 81
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+# define SSL_CTRL_TLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT 85
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 86
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS 87
+# endif
+# endif
+# define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT 73
+# define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 74
+# define DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN 75
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT 76
+# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS 77
+# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE 78
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 82
+# define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83
+# define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119
+# define DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU 120
+# define DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU 121
+# define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
+# define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,0, NULL)
+# define DTLSv1_listen(ssl, peer) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN,0, (void *)peer)
+# define SSL_session_reused(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_clear_num_renegotiations(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx,rsa) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
+# define SSL_need_tmp_RSA(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_tmp_rsa(ssl,rsa) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa)
+# define SSL_set_tmp_dh(ssl,dh) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh)
+# define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
+# define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,px509)
+# define SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS,0,NULL)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);
+BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client);
+BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to, BIO *from);
+void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *ssl_bio);
+
+# endif
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *, const char *str);
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth);
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *);
+long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t);
+long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *);
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *, X509_STORE *);
+int SSL_want(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_clear(SSL *s);
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm);
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits);
+char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
+
+int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n);
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len);
+int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_pending(const SSL *s);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd);
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd);
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio);
+BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s);
+BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s);
+# endif
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str);
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes);
+int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s);
+int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s);
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
+ int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx));
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa);
+# endif
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len);
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d,
+ long len);
+int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
+int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
+/* PEM type */
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file);
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file);
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs,
+ const char *file);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+/* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! [was: #ifndef MAC_OS_pre_X] */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs,
+ const char *dir);
+# endif
+# endif
+
+# endif
+
+void SSL_load_error_strings(void);
+const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s);
+long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
+long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t);
+void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to, const SSL *from);
+X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s);
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void);
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+ unsigned int *len);
+unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO
+int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp, const SSL_SESSION *ses);
+# endif
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses);
+int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp);
+int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session);
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c);
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *, SSL_SESSION *c);
+int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
+int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *, GEN_SESSION_CB);
+int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int id_len);
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ long length);
+
+# ifdef HEADER_X509_H
+X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s);
+# endif
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s);
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int,
+ X509_STORE_CTX *);
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
+ int (*callback) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
+ void *arg);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa);
+# endif
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d,
+ long len);
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *d, long len);
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len,
+ const unsigned char *d);
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb);
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u);
+
+int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ctx);
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+
+SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose);
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose);
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust);
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust);
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *name);
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *password);
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(SSL_CTX *ctx, int strength);
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ char *(*cb) (SSL *, void *));
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *, void *));
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *, int *, void *));
+int SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+
+int SSL_set_srp_server_param(SSL *s, const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g,
+ BIGNUM *sa, BIGNUM *v, char *info);
+int SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(SSL *s, const char *user, const char *pass,
+ const char *grp);
+
+BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_g(SSL *s);
+BIGNUM *SSL_get_srp_N(SSL *s);
+
+char *SSL_get_srp_username(SSL *s);
+char *SSL_get_srp_userinfo(SSL *s);
+# endif
+
+void SSL_free(SSL *ssl);
+int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl);
+int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl);
+int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
+int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
+int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num);
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int, void (*)(void));
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int, void (*)(void));
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int ret_code);
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s);
+
+/* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
+# endif
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS
+ * version */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available
+ * SSL/TLS version */
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); /* Negotiate highest available
+ * SSL/TLS version */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.1 */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.2 */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */
+const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s);
+
+int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s);
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s);
+int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s);
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s);
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s);
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s);
+int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method);
+const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value);
+const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value);
+const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value);
+const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value);
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list);
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list);
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s);
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *s);
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s);
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s);
+
+long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s);
+
+int SSL_library_init(void);
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *, char *buf, int size);
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk);
+
+SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *ssl);
+
+X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl);
+/*
+ * EVP_PKEY
+ */ struct evp_pkey_st *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *ssl);
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode);
+int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode);
+int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode);
+int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl);
+int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl);
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+ const char *CApath);
+# define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session/* just peek at pointer */
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl);
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */
+SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl);
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx);
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val));
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
+ int val);
+int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl);
+void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state);
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long v);
+long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl);
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *data);
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl, int idx);
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx, void *data);
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *ss, int idx);
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+ CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx, void *data);
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ssl, int idx);
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void);
+
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,t) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,t,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,m) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,0,NULL)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(ctx) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(ctx,m) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_get_max_cert_list(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_max_cert_list(ssl,m) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx,m) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_max_send_fragment(ssl,m) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT,m,NULL)
+
+ /* NB: the keylength is only applicable when is_export is true */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength));
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s);
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp);
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void);
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm);
+# else
+const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s);
+const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s);
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp);
+void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void);
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm);
+# endif
+
+/* TLS extensions functions */
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len);
+
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
+ void *arg);
+
+/* Pre-shared secret session resumption functions */
+int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
+ tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb,
+ void *arg);
+
+void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug);
+int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+const struct openssl_ssl_test_functions *SSL_test_functions(void);
+# endif
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the SSL functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 100
+# define SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED 167
+# define SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO 101
+# define SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 102
+# define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION 103
+# define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE 245
+# define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE 104
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT 246
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 295
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD 247
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM 316
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO 248
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT 249
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC 250
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY 251
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE 252
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 297
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT 305
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED 259
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 260
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 261
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 262
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 263
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 264
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 265
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 266
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 267
+# define SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES 268
+# define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED 105
+# define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 106
+# define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 107
+# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED 108
+# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO 109
+# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY 110
+# define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION 111
+# define SSL_F_READ_N 112
+# define SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 113
+# define SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH 239
+# define SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO 114
+# define SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY 240
+# define SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT 115
+# define SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO 116
+# define SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT 117
+# define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 118
+# define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO 119
+# define SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK 237
+# define SSL_F_SSL23_READ 120
+# define SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE 121
+# define SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT 122
+# define SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT 123
+# define SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT 124
+# define SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL 241
+# define SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK 234
+# define SSL_F_SSL2_READ 125
+# define SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL 236
+# define SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE 126
+# define SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE 127
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT 128
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 296
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL 233
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 304
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED 339
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL 133
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS 293
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 292
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET 388
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 289
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 137
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 138
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 139
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED 140
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 306
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO 146
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC 285
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 287
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 147
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK 235
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES 148
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N 149
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 150
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 151
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 152
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 153
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 154
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 242
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 155
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER 156
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER 291
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158
+# define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 298
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 277
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 307
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 215
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 216
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 299
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 278
+# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 308
+# define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD 160
+# define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST 161
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP 221
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST 222
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE 214
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW 162
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 163
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 280
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG 279
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR 230
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT 231
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR 164
+# define SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD 165
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST 166
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL 232
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 168
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES 309
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW 169
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST 269
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE 290
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE 226
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 219
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION 170
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST 229
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE 171
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 172
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE 220
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 173
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY 174
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 175
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 176
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 272
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 177
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 178
+# define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 179
+# define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE 180
+# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181
+# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION 217
+# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT 182
+# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY 317
+# define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY 183
+# define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184
+# define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185
+# define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 300
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 302
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 310
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 301
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 303
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT 311
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 281
+# define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 282
+# define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223
+# define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187
+# define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP 348
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 312
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW 225
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT 191
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST 271
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD 192
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY 193
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE 227
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD 194
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION 195
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 218
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT 294
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST 228
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD 196
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN 224
+# define SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT 313
+# define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION 243
+# define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION 197
+# define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE 198
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 199
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 200
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY 201
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 202
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 203
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT 273
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 204
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 205
+# define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 206
+# define SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN 207
+# define SSL_F_SSL_WRITE 208
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC 286
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 209
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 274
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC 210
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL 314
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT 315
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 275
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 276
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_PRF 284
+# define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 211
+# define SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING 212
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100
+# define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 272
+# define SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD 101
+# define SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE 102
+# define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 103
+# define SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM 104
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE 375
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE 393
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE 395
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111
+# define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112
+# define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304
+# define SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE 305
+# define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT 306
+# define SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH 332
+# define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST 105
+# define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH 271
+# define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE 113
+# define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_LENGTH 333
+# define SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE 114
+# define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH 115
+# define SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER 116
+# define SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH 316
+# define SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT 117
+# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT 118
+# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT 119
+# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH 120
+# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH 121
+# define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE 122
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 123
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH 347
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH 348
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH 349
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH 350
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS 371
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH 351
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE 352
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 353
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE 124
+# define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 125
+# define SSL_R_BAD_STATE 126
+# define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY 127
+# define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET 128
+# define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG 129
+# define SSL_R_BN_LIB 130
+# define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH 131
+# define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG 132
+# define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY 133
+# define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED 134
+# define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 135
+# define SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT 136
+# define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH 137
+# define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE 138
+# define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR 139
+# define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 226
+# define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 140
+# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED 343
+# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE 141
+# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE 307
+# define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR 142
+# define SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 143
+# define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET 144
+# define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH 308
+# define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED 145
+# define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146
+# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147
+# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281
+# define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL 372
+# define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148
+# define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149
+# define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 334
+# define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID 309
+# define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT 317
+# define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING 318
+# define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE 322
+# define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE 323
+# define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER 310
+# define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 354
+# define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150
+# define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY 282
+# define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 151
+# define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152
+# define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153
+# define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154
+# define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS 355
+# define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION 356
+# define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
+# define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
+# define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
+# define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373
+# define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 341
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME 357
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE 328
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 325
+# define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST 279
+# define SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG 284
+# define SSL_R_KRB5 285
+# define SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC 286
+# define SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED 287
+# define SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT 288
+# define SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ 289
+# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET 290
+# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT 291
+# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ 292
+# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED 293
+# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV 294
+# define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW 295
+# define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159
+# define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160
+# define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274
+# define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 161
+# define SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG 296
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT 162
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY 163
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT 164
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT 165
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY 166
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY 167
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE 168
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT 169
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT 170
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM 358
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY 171
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY 311
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY 172
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY 173
+# define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE 174
+# define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS 346
+# define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET 175
+# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176
+# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177
+# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED 178
+# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET 179
+# define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED 180
+# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE 181
+# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED 182
+# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED 183
+# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST 184
+# define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH 185
+# define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD 331
+# define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED 186
+# define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED 187
+# define SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER 330
+# define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED 188
+# define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY 189
+# define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED 190
+# define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE 191
+# define SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY 192
+# define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 339
+# define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST 324
+# define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 193
+# define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES 359
+# define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK 194
+# define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 195
+# define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196
+# define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197
+# define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344
+# define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 297
+# define SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG 327
+# define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198
+# define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT 227
+# define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG 270
+# define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE 199
+# define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR 200
+# define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE 201
+# define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE 202
+# define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER 203
+# define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 204
+# define SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 205
+# define SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS 206
+# define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN 207
+# define SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND 223
+# define SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB 224
+# define SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB 225
+# define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR 208
+# define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA 209
+# define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 210
+# define SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET 211
+# define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED 312
+# define SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE 212
+# define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH 213
+# define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE 214
+# define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL 298
+# define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG 335
+# define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR 336
+# define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH 337
+# define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING 215
+# define SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING 342
+# define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO 216
+# define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO 217
+# define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO 218
+# define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 345
+# define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275
+# define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277
+# define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219
+# define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR 360
+# define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220
+# define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC 361
+# define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES 362
+# define SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG 363
+# define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE 364
+# define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221
+# define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG 299
+# define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT 321
+# define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME 319
+# define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE 320
+# define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 300
+# define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT 222
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 1045
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 1044
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 1046
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 1030
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 1040
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 1047
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE 1041
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010
+# define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 1043
+# define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION 228
+# define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 229
+# define SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 230
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED 301
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT 302
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG 273
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH 303
+# define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 231
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 1049
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 1050
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 1022
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112
+# define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110
+# define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232
+# define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT 365
+# define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 366
+# define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL 367
+# define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 157
+# define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233
+# define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 234
+# define SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 235
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS 236
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS 313
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY 237
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS 238
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS 314
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS 239
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD 240
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES 241
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES 242
+# define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES 243
+# define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 244
+# define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD 245
+# define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED 276
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE 246
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 247
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED 248
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE 249
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 368
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE 250
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE 251
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL 252
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE 253
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION 254
+# define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE 255
+# define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 338
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 256
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 257
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE 326
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 315
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 258
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION 259
+# define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329
+# define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED 369
+# define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET 260
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 262
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS 263
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 264
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE 265
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE 370
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION 266
+# define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 267
+# define SSL_R_X509_LIB 268
+# define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS 269
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl3.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl3.h 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl3.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,730 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl3.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_SSL3_H
-# define HEADER_SSL3_H
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-# include <openssl/comp.h>
-# endif
-# include <openssl/buffer.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
- * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV)
- */
-# define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF
-
-/*
- * Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
- * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV)
- */
-# define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600
-
-# define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001
-# define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002
-# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003
-# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000004
-# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000005
-# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 0x03000006
-# define SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA 0x03000007
-# define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000008
-# define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000009
-# define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000A
-
-# define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000B
-# define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000C
-# define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000D
-# define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000E
-# define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000F
-# define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000010
-
-# define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000011
-# define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000012
-# define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000013
-# define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000014
-# define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000015
-# define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000016
-
-# define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000017
-# define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000018
-# define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000019
-# define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001A
-# define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA 0x0300001B
-
-# if 0
-# define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA 0x0300001C
-# define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA 0x0300001D
-# if 0 /* Because it clashes with KRB5, is never
- * used any more, and is safe to remove
- * according to David Hopwood
- * <david.hopwood at zetnet.co.uk> of the
- * ietf-tls list */
-# define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA 0x0300001E
-# endif
-# endif
-
-/*
- * VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries
- */
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001E
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300001F
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000020
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000021
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 0x03000022
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 0x03000023
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000024
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 0x03000025
-
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000026
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000027
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA 0x03000028
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 0x03000029
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 0x0300002A
-# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 0x0300002B
-
-# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5 "NULL-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA "NULL-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-RC4-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 "RC4-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA "RC4-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 "EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA "IDEA-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DES-CBC3-SHA"
-
-# define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-
-# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-
-# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 "ADH-RC4-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-
-# if 0
-# define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA "FZA-NULL-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA "FZA-FZA-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA "FZA-RC4-SHA"
-# endif
-
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA "KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA "KRB5-RC4-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA "KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 "KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 "KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 "KRB5-RC4-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 "KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5"
-
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA "EXP-KRB5-RC4-SHA"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5"
-# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-RC4-MD5"
-
-# define SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32
-# define SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32
-
-# define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE 48
-# define SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 32
-# define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE 32
-# define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 5
-
-# ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- /*
- * Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's not
- * actually true. Point is that malloc has to return at least 64-bit aligned
- * pointers, meaning that allocating 5 bytes wastes 3 bytes in either case.
- * Suggested pre-gaping simply moves these wasted bytes from the end of
- * allocated region to its front, but makes data payload aligned, which
- * improves performance:-)
- */
-# define SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD 8
-# else
-# if (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1))!=0
-# error "insane SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD"
-# undef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-# endif
-# endif
-
-/*
- * This is the maximum MAC (digest) size used by the SSL library. Currently
- * maximum of 20 is used by SHA1, but we reserve for future extension for
- * 512-bit hashes.
- */
-
-# define SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE 64
-
-/*
- * Maximum block size used in all ciphersuites. Currently 16 for AES.
- */
-
-# define SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16
-
-# define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA (16384)
-
-/* Maximum plaintext length: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
-# define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH 16384
-/* Maximum compression overhead: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
-# define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD 1024
-
-/*
- * The standards give a maximum encryption overhead of 1024 bytes. In
- * practice the value is lower than this. The overhead is the maximum number
- * of padding bytes (256) plus the mac size.
- */
-# define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD (256 + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE)
-
-/*
- * OpenSSL currently only uses a padding length of at most one block so the
- * send overhead is smaller.
- */
-
-# define SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
- (SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE)
-
-/* If compression isn't used don't include the compression overhead */
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-# define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
-# else
-# define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH \
- (SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
-# endif
-# define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH \
- (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
-# define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \
- (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-
-# define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST "\x43\x4C\x4E\x54"
-# define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST "\x53\x52\x56\x52"
-
-# define SSL3_VERSION 0x0300
-# define SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
-# define SSL3_VERSION_MINOR 0x00
-
-# define SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20
-# define SSL3_RT_ALERT 21
-# define SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 22
-# define SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 23
-# define TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT 24
-
-# define SSL3_AL_WARNING 1
-# define SSL3_AL_FATAL 2
-
-# define SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0
-# define SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10/* fatal */
-# define SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20/* fatal */
-# define SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30/* fatal */
-# define SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40/* fatal */
-# define SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE 41
-# define SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE 42
-# define SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 43
-# define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 44
-# define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 45
-# define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 46
-# define SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47/* fatal */
-
-# define TLS1_HB_REQUEST 1
-# define TLS1_HB_RESPONSE 2
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-typedef struct ssl3_record_st {
- /* type of record */
- /*
- * r
- */ int type;
- /* How many bytes available */
- /*
- * rw
- */ unsigned int length;
- /* read/write offset into 'buf' */
- /*
- * r
- */ unsigned int off;
- /* pointer to the record data */
- /*
- * rw
- */ unsigned char *data;
- /* where the decode bytes are */
- /*
- * rw
- */ unsigned char *input;
- /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */
- /*
- * r
- */ unsigned char *comp;
- /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */
- /*
- * r
- */ unsigned long epoch;
- /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */
- /*
- * r
- */ unsigned char seq_num[8];
-} SSL3_RECORD;
-
-typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st {
- /* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes, see ssl3_setup_buffers() */
- unsigned char *buf;
- /* buffer size */
- size_t len;
- /* where to 'copy from' */
- int offset;
- /* how many bytes left */
- int left;
-} SSL3_BUFFER;
-
-# endif
-
-# define SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN 1
-# define SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN 2
-# define SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH 3
-# define SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH 4
-# define SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH 5
-# define SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH 6
-# define SSL3_CT_FORTEZZA_DMS 20
-/*
- * SSL3_CT_NUMBER is used to size arrays and it must be large enough to
- * contain all of the cert types defined either for SSLv3 and TLSv1.
- */
-# define SSL3_CT_NUMBER 9
-
-# define SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS 0x0001
-# define SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x0002
-# define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER 0x0004
-# define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
-# define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
-# define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020
-/*
- * Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
- * Cleared after the message has been processed.
- */
-# define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
-
-/*
- * SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we restart a handshake because of
- * MS SGC and so prevents us from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's
- * reset on a renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart
- * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS attack where the
- * client handshakes in a loop using SGC to restart. Servers which permit
- * renegotiation can still be effected, but we can't prevent that.
- */
-# define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
-
-typedef struct ssl3_state_st {
- long flags;
- int delay_buf_pop_ret;
- unsigned char read_sequence[8];
- int read_mac_secret_size;
- unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char write_sequence[8];
- int write_mac_secret_size;
- unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
- unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
- /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
- int need_empty_fragments;
- int empty_fragment_done;
- /* The value of 'extra' when the buffers were initialized */
- int init_extra;
- SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; /* read IO goes into here */
- SSL3_BUFFER wbuf; /* write IO goes into here */
- SSL3_RECORD rrec; /* each decoded record goes in here */
- SSL3_RECORD wrec; /* goes out from here */
- /*
- * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet
- * processed by ssl3_read_bytes:
- */
- unsigned char alert_fragment[2];
- unsigned int alert_fragment_len;
- unsigned char handshake_fragment[4];
- unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
- /* partial write - check the numbers match */
- unsigned int wnum; /* number of bytes sent so far */
- int wpend_tot; /* number bytes written */
- int wpend_type;
- int wpend_ret; /* number of bytes submitted */
- const unsigned char *wpend_buf;
- /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */
- BIO *handshake_buffer;
- /*
- * When set of handshake digests is determined, buffer is hashed and
- * freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in this array
- */
- EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst;
- /*
- * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
- * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
- * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
- */
- int change_cipher_spec;
- int warn_alert;
- int fatal_alert;
- /*
- * we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close
- * alert via the warning alert
- */
- int alert_dispatch;
- unsigned char send_alert[2];
- /*
- * This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there
- * is no more data in the read or write buffers
- */
- int renegotiate;
- int total_renegotiations;
- int num_renegotiations;
- int in_read_app_data;
- /*
- * Opaque PRF input as used for the current handshake. These fields are
- * used only if TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input is defined (otherwise, they
- * are merely present to improve binary compatibility)
- */
- void *client_opaque_prf_input;
- size_t client_opaque_prf_input_len;
- void *server_opaque_prf_input;
- size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
- struct {
- /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
- unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
- /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
- unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
- int finish_md_len;
- unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
- int peer_finish_md_len;
- unsigned long message_size;
- int message_type;
- /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */
- const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *ecdh; /* holds short lived ECDH key */
-# endif
- /* used when SSL_ST_FLUSH_DATA is entered */
- int next_state;
- int reuse_message;
- /* used for certificate requests */
- int cert_req;
- int ctype_num;
- char ctype[SSL3_CT_NUMBER];
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names;
- int use_rsa_tmp;
- int key_block_length;
- unsigned char *key_block;
- const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc;
- const EVP_MD *new_hash;
- int new_mac_pkey_type;
- int new_mac_secret_size;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- const SSL_COMP *new_compression;
-# else
- char *new_compression;
-# endif
- int cert_request;
- } tmp;
-
- /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */
- unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char previous_client_finished_len;
- unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char previous_server_finished_len;
- int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /*
- * Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer.
- */
- int next_proto_neg_seen;
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
- * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on
- * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support.
- */
- char is_probably_safari;
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-} SSL3_STATE;
-
-# endif
-
-/* SSLv3 */
-/*
- * client
- */
-/* extra state */
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-# define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK (0x310|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK (0x320|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# endif
-/* write to server */
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-/* read from server */
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x120|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x121|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x126|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x127|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A (0x130|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B (0x131|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A (0x140|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B (0x141|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A (0x150|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B (0x151|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A (0x160|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B (0x161|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-/* write to server */
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A (0x170|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B (0x171|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C (0x172|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D (0x173|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A (0x180|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B (0x181|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A (0x190|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# endif
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-/* read from server */
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-
-/* server */
-/* extra state */
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-# define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK (0x310|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK (0x320|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# endif
-/* read from client */
-/* Do not change the number values, they do matter */
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C (0x112|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-/* write to client */
-# define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x113|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x114|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A (0x120|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B (0x121|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C (0x122|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x130|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x131|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A (0x140|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B (0x141|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A (0x150|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B (0x151|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A (0x160|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B (0x161|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A (0x170|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B (0x171|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-/* read from client */
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A (0x180|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B (0x181|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A (0x190|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B (0x191|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# endif
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-/* write to client */
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A (0x200|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B (0x201|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-
-# define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST 0
-# define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1
-# define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO 2
-# define SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET 4
-# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 11
-# define SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12
-# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
-# define SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE 14
-# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15
-# define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
-# define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20
-# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-# define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67
-# endif
-# define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
-
-# define SSL3_MT_CCS 1
-
-/* These are used when changing over to a new cipher */
-# define SSL3_CC_READ 0x01
-# define SSL3_CC_WRITE 0x02
-# define SSL3_CC_CLIENT 0x10
-# define SSL3_CC_SERVER 0x20
-# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_WRITE)
-# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_READ)
-# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_READ)
-# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_WRITE)
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl3.h (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl3.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl3.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl3.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,732 @@
+/* ssl/ssl3.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL3_H
+# define HEADER_SSL3_H
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# include <openssl/comp.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
+ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV)
+ */
+# define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF
+
+/*
+ * Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
+ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV)
+ */
+# define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600
+
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000004
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000005
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 0x03000006
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA 0x03000007
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000008
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000009
+# define SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000A
+
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000B
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000C
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300000D
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x0300000E
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300000F
+# define SSL3_CK_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000010
+
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000011
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000012
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000013
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000014
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x03000015
+# define SSL3_CK_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x03000016
+
+# define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000017
+# define SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000018
+# define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000019
+# define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001A
+# define SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA 0x0300001B
+
+# if 0
+# define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA 0x0300001C
+# define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA 0x0300001D
+# if 0 /* Because it clashes with KRB5, is never
+ * used any more, and is safe to remove
+ * according to David Hopwood
+ * <david.hopwood at zetnet.co.uk> of the
+ * ietf-tls list */
+# define SSL3_CK_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA 0x0300001E
+# endif
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries
+ */
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA 0x0300001E
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300001F
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000020
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000021
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 0x03000022
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 0x03000023
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 0x03000024
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 0x03000025
+
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000026
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA 0x03000027
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA 0x03000028
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 0x03000029
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 0x0300002A
+# define SSL3_CK_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 0x0300002B
+
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5 "NULL-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA "NULL-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-RC4-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 "RC4-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA "RC4-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5 "EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA "IDEA-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5 "ADH-RC4-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA "ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+
+# if 0
+# define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_NULL_SHA "FZA-NULL-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_FZA_SHA "FZA-FZA-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_FZA_DMS_RC4_SHA "FZA-RC4-SHA"
+# endif
+
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA "KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA "KRB5-RC4-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA "KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 "KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 "KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 "KRB5-RC4-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 "KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5"
+
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA "EXP-KRB5-RC4-SHA"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5"
+# define SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 "EXP-KRB5-RC4-MD5"
+
+# define SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32
+# define SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32
+
+# define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE 48
+# define SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 32
+# define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE 32
+# define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 5
+
+# define SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 4
+
+# ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
+ /*
+ * Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's not
+ * actually true. Point is that malloc has to return at least 64-bit aligned
+ * pointers, meaning that allocating 5 bytes wastes 3 bytes in either case.
+ * Suggested pre-gaping simply moves these wasted bytes from the end of
+ * allocated region to its front, but makes data payload aligned, which
+ * improves performance:-)
+ */
+# define SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD 8
+# else
+# if (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1))!=0
+# error "insane SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD"
+# undef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
+# endif
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * This is the maximum MAC (digest) size used by the SSL library. Currently
+ * maximum of 20 is used by SHA1, but we reserve for future extension for
+ * 512-bit hashes.
+ */
+
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE 64
+
+/*
+ * Maximum block size used in all ciphersuites. Currently 16 for AES.
+ */
+
+# define SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA (16384)
+
+/* Maximum plaintext length: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH 16384
+/* Maximum compression overhead: defined by SSL/TLS standards */
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD 1024
+
+/*
+ * The standards give a maximum encryption overhead of 1024 bytes. In
+ * practice the value is lower than this. The overhead is the maximum number
+ * of padding bytes (256) plus the mac size.
+ */
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD (256 + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE)
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL currently only uses a padding length of at most one block so the
+ * send overhead is smaller.
+ */
+
+# define SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
+ (SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE + SSL3_RT_MAX_MD_SIZE)
+
+/* If compression isn't used don't include the compression overhead */
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+# else
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH \
+ (SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
+# endif
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH \
+ (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD+SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
+# define SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE \
+ (SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+
+# define SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST "\x43\x4C\x4E\x54"
+# define SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST "\x53\x52\x56\x52"
+
+# define SSL3_VERSION 0x0300
+# define SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+# define SSL3_VERSION_MINOR 0x00
+
+# define SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20
+# define SSL3_RT_ALERT 21
+# define SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 22
+# define SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 23
+# define TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT 24
+
+# define SSL3_AL_WARNING 1
+# define SSL3_AL_FATAL 2
+
+# define SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0
+# define SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10/* fatal */
+# define SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20/* fatal */
+# define SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30/* fatal */
+# define SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40/* fatal */
+# define SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE 41
+# define SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE 42
+# define SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 43
+# define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 44
+# define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 45
+# define SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 46
+# define SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47/* fatal */
+
+# define TLS1_HB_REQUEST 1
+# define TLS1_HB_RESPONSE 2
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
+typedef struct ssl3_record_st {
+ /* type of record */
+ /*
+ * r
+ */ int type;
+ /* How many bytes available */
+ /*
+ * rw
+ */ unsigned int length;
+ /* read/write offset into 'buf' */
+ /*
+ * r
+ */ unsigned int off;
+ /* pointer to the record data */
+ /*
+ * rw
+ */ unsigned char *data;
+ /* where the decode bytes are */
+ /*
+ * rw
+ */ unsigned char *input;
+ /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */
+ /*
+ * r
+ */ unsigned char *comp;
+ /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */
+ /*
+ * r
+ */ unsigned long epoch;
+ /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */
+ /*
+ * r
+ */ unsigned char seq_num[8];
+} SSL3_RECORD;
+
+typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st {
+ /* at least SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE bytes, see ssl3_setup_buffers() */
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ /* buffer size */
+ size_t len;
+ /* where to 'copy from' */
+ int offset;
+ /* how many bytes left */
+ int left;
+} SSL3_BUFFER;
+
+# endif
+
+# define SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN 1
+# define SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN 2
+# define SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH 3
+# define SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH 4
+# define SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH 5
+# define SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH 6
+# define SSL3_CT_FORTEZZA_DMS 20
+/*
+ * SSL3_CT_NUMBER is used to size arrays and it must be large enough to
+ * contain all of the cert types defined either for SSLv3 and TLSv1.
+ */
+# define SSL3_CT_NUMBER 9
+
+# define SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS 0x0001
+# define SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x0002
+# define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER 0x0004
+# define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
+# define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
+# define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020
+/*
+ * Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
+ * Cleared after the message has been processed.
+ */
+# define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
+
+/*
+ * SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we restart a handshake because of
+ * MS SGC and so prevents us from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's
+ * reset on a renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart
+ * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS attack where the
+ * client handshakes in a loop using SGC to restart. Servers which permit
+ * renegotiation can still be effected, but we can't prevent that.
+ */
+# define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
+typedef struct ssl3_state_st {
+ long flags;
+ int delay_buf_pop_ret;
+ unsigned char read_sequence[8];
+ int read_mac_secret_size;
+ unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char write_sequence[8];
+ int write_mac_secret_size;
+ unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+ unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+ /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
+ int need_empty_fragments;
+ int empty_fragment_done;
+ /* The value of 'extra' when the buffers were initialized */
+ int init_extra;
+ SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; /* read IO goes into here */
+ SSL3_BUFFER wbuf; /* write IO goes into here */
+ SSL3_RECORD rrec; /* each decoded record goes in here */
+ SSL3_RECORD wrec; /* goes out from here */
+ /*
+ * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet
+ * processed by ssl3_read_bytes:
+ */
+ unsigned char alert_fragment[2];
+ unsigned int alert_fragment_len;
+ unsigned char handshake_fragment[4];
+ unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
+ /* partial write - check the numbers match */
+ unsigned int wnum; /* number of bytes sent so far */
+ int wpend_tot; /* number bytes written */
+ int wpend_type;
+ int wpend_ret; /* number of bytes submitted */
+ const unsigned char *wpend_buf;
+ /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */
+ BIO *handshake_buffer;
+ /*
+ * When set of handshake digests is determined, buffer is hashed and
+ * freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in this array
+ */
+ EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst;
+ /*
+ * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
+ * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
+ * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
+ */
+ int change_cipher_spec;
+ int warn_alert;
+ int fatal_alert;
+ /*
+ * we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close
+ * alert via the warning alert
+ */
+ int alert_dispatch;
+ unsigned char send_alert[2];
+ /*
+ * This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there
+ * is no more data in the read or write buffers
+ */
+ int renegotiate;
+ int total_renegotiations;
+ int num_renegotiations;
+ int in_read_app_data;
+ /*
+ * Opaque PRF input as used for the current handshake. These fields are
+ * used only if TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input is defined (otherwise, they
+ * are merely present to improve binary compatibility)
+ */
+ void *client_opaque_prf_input;
+ size_t client_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ void *server_opaque_prf_input;
+ size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ struct {
+ /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
+ unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+ /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
+ unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+ int finish_md_len;
+ unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+ int peer_finish_md_len;
+ unsigned long message_size;
+ int message_type;
+ /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */
+ const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh; /* holds short lived ECDH key */
+# endif
+ /* used when SSL_ST_FLUSH_DATA is entered */
+ int next_state;
+ int reuse_message;
+ /* used for certificate requests */
+ int cert_req;
+ int ctype_num;
+ char ctype[SSL3_CT_NUMBER];
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names;
+ int use_rsa_tmp;
+ int key_block_length;
+ unsigned char *key_block;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc;
+ const EVP_MD *new_hash;
+ int new_mac_pkey_type;
+ int new_mac_secret_size;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ const SSL_COMP *new_compression;
+# else
+ char *new_compression;
+# endif
+ int cert_request;
+ } tmp;
+
+ /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */
+ unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char previous_client_finished_len;
+ unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char previous_server_finished_len;
+ int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /*
+ * Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer.
+ */
+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /*
+ * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
+ * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on
+ * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support.
+ */
+ char is_probably_safari;
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+} SSL3_STATE;
+
+# endif
+
+/* SSLv3 */
+/*
+ * client
+ */
+/* extra state */
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+# define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK (0x310|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK (0x320|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# endif
+/* write to server */
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+/* read from server */
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x120|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x121|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x126|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x127|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A (0x130|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B (0x131|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A (0x140|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B (0x141|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A (0x150|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B (0x151|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A (0x160|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B (0x161|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+/* write to server */
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A (0x170|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B (0x171|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C (0x172|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D (0x173|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A (0x180|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B (0x181|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A (0x190|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B (0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# endif
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+/* read from server */
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+# define SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+
+/* server */
+/* extra state */
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH (0x100|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+# define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK (0x310|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK (0x320|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# endif
+/* read from client */
+/* Do not change the number values, they do matter */
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A (0x110|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B (0x111|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C (0x112|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+/* write to client */
+# define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A (0x113|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B (0x114|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A (0x120|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B (0x121|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C (0x122|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A (0x130|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B (0x131|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A (0x140|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B (0x141|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A (0x150|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B (0x151|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A (0x160|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B (0x161|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A (0x170|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B (0x171|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+/* read from client */
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A (0x180|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B (0x181|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A (0x190|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B (0x191|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A (0x1A0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B (0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A (0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B (0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A (0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B (0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# endif
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A (0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B (0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+/* write to client */
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A (0x1D0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B (0x1D1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A (0x1E0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B (0x1E1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A (0x1F0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B (0x1F1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A (0x200|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+# define SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B (0x201|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+
+# define SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST 0
+# define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1
+# define SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO 2
+# define SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET 4
+# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE 11
+# define SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12
+# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
+# define SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE 14
+# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15
+# define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
+# define SSL3_MT_FINISHED 20
+# define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS 22
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+# define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO 67
+# endif
+# define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
+
+# define SSL3_MT_CCS 1
+
+/* These are used when changing over to a new cipher */
+# define SSL3_CC_READ 0x01
+# define SSL3_CC_WRITE 0x02
+# define SSL3_CC_CLIENT 0x10
+# define SSL3_CC_SERVER 0x20
+# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_READ)
+# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ (SSL3_CC_CLIENT|SSL3_CC_READ)
+# define SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE (SSL3_CC_SERVER|SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_asn1.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_asn1.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,633 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_asn1.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st {
- ASN1_INTEGER version;
- ASN1_INTEGER ssl_version;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING cipher;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING comp_id;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id_context;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING key_arg;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING krb5_princ;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- ASN1_INTEGER time;
- ASN1_INTEGER timeout;
- ASN1_INTEGER verify_result;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_hostname;
- ASN1_INTEGER tlsext_tick_lifetime;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_tick;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity_hint;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-} SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
-
-int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
-{
-#define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2)
- int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0, v7 = 0, v8 = 0;
- unsigned char buf[4], ibuf1[LSIZE2], ibuf2[LSIZE2];
- unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2], ibuf4[LSIZE2], ibuf5[LSIZE2];
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- int v6 = 0, v9 = 0, v10 = 0;
- unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2];
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- unsigned char cbuf;
- int v11 = 0;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- int v12 = 0;
-#endif
- long l;
- SSL_SESSION_ASN1 a;
- M_ASN1_I2D_vars(in);
-
- if ((in == NULL) || ((in->cipher == NULL) && (in->cipher_id == 0)))
- return (0);
-
- /*
- * Note that I cheat in the following 2 assignments. I know that if the
- * ASN1_INTEGER passed to ASN1_INTEGER_set is > sizeof(long)+1, the
- * buffer will not be re-OPENSSL_malloc()ed. This is a bit evil but makes
- * things simple, no dynamic allocation to clean up :-)
- */
- a.version.length = LSIZE2;
- a.version.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
- a.version.data = ibuf1;
- ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.version), SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION);
-
- a.ssl_version.length = LSIZE2;
- a.ssl_version.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
- a.ssl_version.data = ibuf2;
- ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.ssl_version), in->ssl_version);
-
- a.cipher.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.cipher.data = buf;
-
- if (in->cipher == NULL)
- l = in->cipher_id;
- else
- l = in->cipher->id;
- if (in->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- a.cipher.length = 3;
- buf[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 16L)) & 0xff;
- buf[1] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xff;
- buf[2] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xff;
- } else {
- a.cipher.length = 2;
- buf[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xff;
- buf[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xff;
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (in->compress_meth) {
- cbuf = (unsigned char)in->compress_meth;
- a.comp_id.length = 1;
- a.comp_id.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.comp_id.data = &cbuf;
- }
-#endif
-
- a.master_key.length = in->master_key_length;
- a.master_key.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.master_key.data = in->master_key;
-
- a.session_id.length = in->session_id_length;
- a.session_id.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.session_id.data = in->session_id;
-
- a.session_id_context.length = in->sid_ctx_length;
- a.session_id_context.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.session_id_context.data = in->sid_ctx;
-
- a.key_arg.length = in->key_arg_length;
- a.key_arg.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.key_arg.data = in->key_arg;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (in->krb5_client_princ_len) {
- a.krb5_princ.length = in->krb5_client_princ_len;
- a.krb5_princ.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.krb5_princ.data = in->krb5_client_princ;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
- if (in->time != 0L) {
- a.time.length = LSIZE2;
- a.time.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
- a.time.data = ibuf3;
- ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.time), in->time);
- }
-
- if (in->timeout != 0L) {
- a.timeout.length = LSIZE2;
- a.timeout.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
- a.timeout.data = ibuf4;
- ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.timeout), in->timeout);
- }
-
- if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK) {
- a.verify_result.length = LSIZE2;
- a.verify_result.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
- a.verify_result.data = ibuf5;
- ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.verify_result, in->verify_result);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (in->tlsext_hostname) {
- a.tlsext_hostname.length = strlen(in->tlsext_hostname);
- a.tlsext_hostname.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.tlsext_hostname.data = (unsigned char *)in->tlsext_hostname;
- }
- if (in->tlsext_tick) {
- a.tlsext_tick.length = in->tlsext_ticklen;
- a.tlsext_tick.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.tlsext_tick.data = (unsigned char *)in->tlsext_tick;
- }
- if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0) {
- a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.length = LSIZE2;
- a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
- a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.data = ibuf6;
- ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime,
- in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (in->psk_identity_hint) {
- a.psk_identity_hint.length = strlen(in->psk_identity_hint);
- a.psk_identity_hint.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.psk_identity_hint.data = (unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity_hint);
- }
- if (in->psk_identity) {
- a.psk_identity.length = strlen(in->psk_identity);
- a.psk_identity.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.psk_identity.data = (unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (in->srp_username) {
- a.srp_username.length = strlen(in->srp_username);
- a.srp_username.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
- a.srp_username.data = (unsigned char *)(in->srp_username);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-
- M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
- M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
- M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- if (in->key_arg_length > 0)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_IMP_opt(&(a.key_arg), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- if (in->time != 0L)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.time), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 1, v1);
- if (in->timeout != 0L)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.timeout), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 2, v2);
- if (in->peer != NULL)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(in->peer, i2d_X509, 3, v3);
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.session_id_context, i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4,
- v4);
- if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.verify_result), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 5, v5);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 9,
- v9);
- if (in->tlsext_tick)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 10,
- v10);
- if (in->tlsext_hostname)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 6,
- v6);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (in->compress_meth)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11, v11);
-# endif
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (in->psk_identity_hint)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity_hint), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
- 7, v7);
- if (in->psk_identity)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8,
- v8);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (in->srp_username)
- M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12,
- v12);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-
- M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total();
-
- M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
- M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
- M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- if (in->key_arg_length > 0)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_IMP_opt(&(a.key_arg), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0);
- if (in->time != 0L)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.time), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 1, v1);
- if (in->timeout != 0L)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.timeout), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 2, v2);
- if (in->peer != NULL)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(in->peer, i2d_X509, 3, v3);
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.session_id_context, i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4,
- v4);
- if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.verify_result, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 5, v5);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (in->tlsext_hostname)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 6,
- v6);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (in->psk_identity_hint)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity_hint), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
- 7, v7);
- if (in->psk_identity)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8,
- v8);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 9,
- v9);
- if (in->tlsext_tick)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 10,
- v10);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (in->compress_meth)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11, v11);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (in->srp_username)
- M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12,
- v12);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
- M_ASN1_I2D_finish();
-}
-
-SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
- long length)
-{
- int ssl_version = 0, i;
- long id;
- ASN1_INTEGER ai, *aip;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING os, *osp;
- M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a, SSL_SESSION *, SSL_SESSION_new);
-
- aip = &ai;
- osp = &os;
-
- M_ASN1_D2I_Init();
- M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence();
-
- ai.data = NULL;
- ai.length = 0;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
- if (ai.data != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
- ai.data = NULL;
- ai.length = 0;
- }
-
- /* we don't care about the version right now :-) */
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
- ssl_version = (int)ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
- ret->ssl_version = ssl_version;
- if (ai.data != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
- ai.data = NULL;
- ai.length = 0;
- }
-
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- if (ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- if (os.length != 3) {
- c.error = SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
- c.line = __LINE__;
- goto err;
- }
- id = 0x02000000L |
- ((unsigned long)os.data[0] << 16L) |
- ((unsigned long)os.data[1] << 8L) | (unsigned long)os.data[2];
- } else if ((ssl_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
- || (ssl_version >> 8) == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR
- || ssl_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- if (os.length != 2) {
- c.error = SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
- c.line = __LINE__;
- goto err;
- }
- id = 0x03000000L |
- ((unsigned long)os.data[0] << 8L) | (unsigned long)os.data[1];
- } else {
- c.error = SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION;
- c.line = __LINE__;
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret->cipher = NULL;
- ret->cipher_id = id;
-
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- if ((ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
- i = SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- else /* if (ssl_version>>8 == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) */
- i = SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
-
- if (os.length > i)
- os.length = i;
- if (os.length > (int)sizeof(ret->session_id)) /* can't happen */
- os.length = sizeof(ret->session_id);
-
- ret->session_id_length = os.length;
- OPENSSL_assert(os.length <= (int)sizeof(ret->session_id));
- memcpy(ret->session_id, os.data, os.length);
-
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- if (os.length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- ret->master_key_length = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- else
- ret->master_key_length = os.length;
- memcpy(ret->master_key, os.data, ret->master_key_length);
-
- os.length = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- os.length = 0;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- if (os.data) {
- if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH)
- ret->krb5_client_princ_len = 0;
- else
- ret->krb5_client_princ_len = os.length;
- memcpy(ret->krb5_client_princ, os.data, ret->krb5_client_princ_len);
- OPENSSL_free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->krb5_client_princ_len = 0;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_IMP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0,
- V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
- if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
- ret->key_arg_length = SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
- else
- ret->key_arg_length = os.length;
- memcpy(ret->key_arg, os.data, ret->key_arg_length);
- if (os.data != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(os.data);
-
- ai.length = 0;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 1);
- if (ai.data != NULL) {
- ret->time = ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
- OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
- ai.data = NULL;
- ai.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
-
- ai.length = 0;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 2);
- if (ai.data != NULL) {
- ret->timeout = ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
- OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
- ai.data = NULL;
- ai.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->timeout = 3;
-
- if (ret->peer != NULL) {
- X509_free(ret->peer);
- ret->peer = NULL;
- }
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(ret->peer, d2i_X509, 3);
-
- os.length = 0;
- os.data = NULL;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4);
-
- if (os.data != NULL) {
- if (os.length > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
- c.error = SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH;
- c.line = __LINE__;
- goto err;
- } else {
- ret->sid_ctx_length = os.length;
- memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, os.data, os.length);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->sid_ctx_length = 0;
-
- ai.length = 0;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 5);
- if (ai.data != NULL) {
- ret->verify_result = ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
- OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
- ai.data = NULL;
- ai.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- os.length = 0;
- os.data = NULL;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 6);
- if (os.data) {
- ret->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
- OPENSSL_free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- os.length = 0;
- os.data = NULL;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 7);
- if (os.data) {
- ret->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
- OPENSSL_free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
-
- os.length = 0;
- os.data = NULL;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8);
- if (os.data) {
- ret->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
- OPENSSL_free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->psk_identity = NULL;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- ai.length = 0;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 9);
- if (ai.data != NULL) {
- ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
- OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
- ai.data = NULL;
- ai.length = 0;
- } else if (ret->tlsext_ticklen && ret->session_id_length)
- ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = -1;
- else
- ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
- os.length = 0;
- os.data = NULL;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 10);
- if (os.data) {
- ret->tlsext_tick = os.data;
- ret->tlsext_ticklen = os.length;
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->tlsext_tick = NULL;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- os.length = 0;
- os.data = NULL;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11);
- if (os.data) {
- ret->compress_meth = os.data[0];
- OPENSSL_free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- os.length = 0;
- os.data = NULL;
- M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12);
- if (os.data) {
- ret->srp_username = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
- OPENSSL_free(os.data);
- os.data = NULL;
- os.length = 0;
- } else
- ret->srp_username = NULL;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
-
- M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a, SSL_SESSION_free, SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION);
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_asn1.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_asn1.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_asn1.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_asn1.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,636 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_asn1.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st {
+ ASN1_INTEGER version;
+ ASN1_INTEGER ssl_version;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING cipher;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING comp_id;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING session_id_context;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING key_arg;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING krb5_princ;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ ASN1_INTEGER time;
+ ASN1_INTEGER timeout;
+ ASN1_INTEGER verify_result;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_hostname;
+ ASN1_INTEGER tlsext_tick_lifetime;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_tick;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity_hint;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+} SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
+
+int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
+{
+#define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2)
+ int v1 = 0, v2 = 0, v3 = 0, v4 = 0, v5 = 0;
+ unsigned char buf[4], ibuf1[LSIZE2], ibuf2[LSIZE2];
+ unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2], ibuf4[LSIZE2], ibuf5[LSIZE2];
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ int v6 = 0, v9 = 0, v10 = 0;
+ unsigned char ibuf6[LSIZE2];
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ int v7 = 0, v8 = 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ unsigned char cbuf;
+ int v11 = 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ int v12 = 0;
+#endif
+ long l;
+ SSL_SESSION_ASN1 a;
+ M_ASN1_I2D_vars(in);
+
+ if ((in == NULL) || ((in->cipher == NULL) && (in->cipher_id == 0)))
+ return (0);
+
+ /*
+ * Note that I cheat in the following 2 assignments. I know that if the
+ * ASN1_INTEGER passed to ASN1_INTEGER_set is > sizeof(long)+1, the
+ * buffer will not be re-OPENSSL_malloc()ed. This is a bit evil but makes
+ * things simple, no dynamic allocation to clean up :-)
+ */
+ a.version.length = LSIZE2;
+ a.version.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.version.data = ibuf1;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.version), SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION);
+
+ a.ssl_version.length = LSIZE2;
+ a.ssl_version.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.ssl_version.data = ibuf2;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.ssl_version), in->ssl_version);
+
+ a.cipher.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.cipher.data = buf;
+
+ if (in->cipher == NULL)
+ l = in->cipher_id;
+ else
+ l = in->cipher->id;
+ if (in->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ a.cipher.length = 3;
+ buf[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 16L)) & 0xff;
+ buf[1] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xff;
+ buf[2] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xff;
+ } else {
+ a.cipher.length = 2;
+ buf[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xff;
+ buf[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xff;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (in->compress_meth) {
+ cbuf = (unsigned char)in->compress_meth;
+ a.comp_id.length = 1;
+ a.comp_id.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.comp_id.data = &cbuf;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ a.master_key.length = in->master_key_length;
+ a.master_key.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.master_key.data = in->master_key;
+
+ a.session_id.length = in->session_id_length;
+ a.session_id.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.session_id.data = in->session_id;
+
+ a.session_id_context.length = in->sid_ctx_length;
+ a.session_id_context.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.session_id_context.data = in->sid_ctx;
+
+ a.key_arg.length = in->key_arg_length;
+ a.key_arg.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.key_arg.data = in->key_arg;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (in->krb5_client_princ_len) {
+ a.krb5_princ.length = in->krb5_client_princ_len;
+ a.krb5_princ.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.krb5_princ.data = in->krb5_client_princ;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ if (in->time != 0L) {
+ a.time.length = LSIZE2;
+ a.time.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.time.data = ibuf3;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.time), in->time);
+ }
+
+ if (in->timeout != 0L) {
+ a.timeout.length = LSIZE2;
+ a.timeout.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.timeout.data = ibuf4;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&(a.timeout), in->timeout);
+ }
+
+ if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK) {
+ a.verify_result.length = LSIZE2;
+ a.verify_result.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.verify_result.data = ibuf5;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.verify_result, in->verify_result);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (in->tlsext_hostname) {
+ a.tlsext_hostname.length = strlen(in->tlsext_hostname);
+ a.tlsext_hostname.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.tlsext_hostname.data = (unsigned char *)in->tlsext_hostname;
+ }
+ if (in->tlsext_tick) {
+ a.tlsext_tick.length = in->tlsext_ticklen;
+ a.tlsext_tick.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.tlsext_tick.data = (unsigned char *)in->tlsext_tick;
+ }
+ if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0) {
+ a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.length = LSIZE2;
+ a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ a.tlsext_tick_lifetime.data = ibuf6;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime,
+ in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (in->psk_identity_hint) {
+ a.psk_identity_hint.length = strlen(in->psk_identity_hint);
+ a.psk_identity_hint.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.psk_identity_hint.data = (unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+ if (in->psk_identity) {
+ a.psk_identity.length = strlen(in->psk_identity);
+ a.psk_identity.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.psk_identity.data = (unsigned char *)(in->psk_identity);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (in->srp_username) {
+ a.srp_username.length = strlen(in->srp_username);
+ a.srp_username.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ a.srp_username.data = (unsigned char *)(in->srp_username);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ if (in->key_arg_length > 0)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_IMP_opt(&(a.key_arg), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (in->time != 0L)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.time), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 1, v1);
+ if (in->timeout != 0L)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.timeout), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 2, v2);
+ if (in->peer != NULL)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(in->peer, i2d_X509, 3, v3);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.session_id_context, i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4,
+ v4);
+ if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.verify_result), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 5, v5);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 9,
+ v9);
+ if (in->tlsext_tick)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 10,
+ v10);
+ if (in->tlsext_hostname)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 6,
+ v6);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (in->compress_meth)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11, v11);
+# endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (in->psk_identity_hint)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity_hint), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ 7, v7);
+ if (in->psk_identity)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8,
+ v8);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (in->srp_username)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12,
+ v12);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+
+ M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total();
+
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.ssl_version), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.cipher), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.session_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.master_key), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (in->krb5_client_princ_len)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put(&(a.krb5_princ), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ if (in->key_arg_length > 0)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_IMP_opt(&(a.key_arg), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0);
+ if (in->time != 0L)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.time), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 1, v1);
+ if (in->timeout != 0L)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.timeout), i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 2, v2);
+ if (in->peer != NULL)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(in->peer, i2d_X509, 3, v3);
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.session_id_context, i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4,
+ v4);
+ if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.verify_result, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 5, v5);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (in->tlsext_hostname)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_hostname), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 6,
+ v6);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (in->psk_identity_hint)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity_hint), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ 7, v7);
+ if (in->psk_identity)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.psk_identity), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8,
+ v8);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&a.tlsext_tick_lifetime, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, 9,
+ v9);
+ if (in->tlsext_tick)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.tlsext_tick), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 10,
+ v10);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (in->compress_meth)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.comp_id), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11, v11);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (in->srp_username)
+ M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.srp_username), i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12,
+ v12);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+ M_ASN1_I2D_finish();
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ long length)
+{
+ int ssl_version = 0, i;
+ long id;
+ ASN1_INTEGER ai, *aip;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING os, *osp;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a, SSL_SESSION *, SSL_SESSION_new);
+
+ aip = &ai;
+ osp = &os;
+
+ M_ASN1_D2I_Init();
+ M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence();
+
+ ai.data = NULL;
+ ai.length = 0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ if (ai.data != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
+ ai.data = NULL;
+ ai.length = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* we don't care about the version right now :-) */
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
+ ssl_version = (int)ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
+ ret->ssl_version = ssl_version;
+ if (ai.data != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
+ ai.data = NULL;
+ ai.length = 0;
+ }
+
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ if (os.length != 3) {
+ c.error = SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
+ c.line = __LINE__;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ id = 0x02000000L |
+ ((unsigned long)os.data[0] << 16L) |
+ ((unsigned long)os.data[1] << 8L) | (unsigned long)os.data[2];
+ } else if ((ssl_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
+ || (ssl_version >> 8) == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR
+ || ssl_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ if (os.length != 2) {
+ c.error = SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
+ c.line = __LINE__;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ id = 0x03000000L |
+ ((unsigned long)os.data[0] << 8L) | (unsigned long)os.data[1];
+ } else {
+ c.error = SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION;
+ c.line = __LINE__;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret->cipher = NULL;
+ ret->cipher_id = id;
+
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if ((ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ i = SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ else /* if (ssl_version>>8 == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) */
+ i = SSL2_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+
+ if (os.length > i)
+ os.length = i;
+ if (os.length > (int)sizeof(ret->session_id)) /* can't happen */
+ os.length = sizeof(ret->session_id);
+
+ ret->session_id_length = os.length;
+ OPENSSL_assert(os.length <= (int)sizeof(ret->session_id));
+ memcpy(ret->session_id, os.data, os.length);
+
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (os.length > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ ret->master_key_length = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ else
+ ret->master_key_length = os.length;
+ memcpy(ret->master_key, os.data, ret->master_key_length);
+
+ os.length = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ os.length = 0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (os.data) {
+ if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH)
+ ret->krb5_client_princ_len = 0;
+ else
+ ret->krb5_client_princ_len = os.length;
+ memcpy(ret->krb5_client_princ, os.data, ret->krb5_client_princ_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ } else
+ ret->krb5_client_princ_len = 0;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_IMP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0,
+ V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (os.length > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
+ ret->key_arg_length = SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
+ else
+ ret->key_arg_length = os.length;
+ memcpy(ret->key_arg, os.data, ret->key_arg_length);
+ if (os.data != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+
+ ai.length = 0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 1);
+ if (ai.data != NULL) {
+ ret->time = ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
+ OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
+ ai.data = NULL;
+ ai.length = 0;
+ } else
+ ret->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+
+ ai.length = 0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 2);
+ if (ai.data != NULL) {
+ ret->timeout = ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
+ OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
+ ai.data = NULL;
+ ai.length = 0;
+ } else
+ ret->timeout = 3;
+
+ if (ret->peer != NULL) {
+ X509_free(ret->peer);
+ ret->peer = NULL;
+ }
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(ret->peer, d2i_X509, 3);
+
+ os.length = 0;
+ os.data = NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4);
+
+ if (os.data != NULL) {
+ if (os.length > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+ c.error = SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH;
+ c.line = __LINE__;
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ ret->sid_ctx_length = os.length;
+ memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, os.data, os.length);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ } else
+ ret->sid_ctx_length = 0;
+
+ ai.length = 0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 5);
+ if (ai.data != NULL) {
+ ret->verify_result = ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
+ OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
+ ai.data = NULL;
+ ai.length = 0;
+ } else
+ ret->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ os.length = 0;
+ os.data = NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 6);
+ if (os.data) {
+ ret->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ } else
+ ret->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ os.length = 0;
+ os.data = NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 7);
+ if (os.data) {
+ ret->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ } else
+ ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+
+ os.length = 0;
+ os.data = NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8);
+ if (os.data) {
+ ret->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ } else
+ ret->psk_identity = NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ai.length = 0;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, 9);
+ if (ai.data != NULL) {
+ ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ASN1_INTEGER_get(aip);
+ OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
+ ai.data = NULL;
+ ai.length = 0;
+ } else if (ret->tlsext_ticklen && ret->session_id_length)
+ ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = -1;
+ else
+ ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+ os.length = 0;
+ os.data = NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 10);
+ if (os.data) {
+ ret->tlsext_tick = os.data;
+ ret->tlsext_ticklen = os.length;
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ } else
+ ret->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ os.length = 0;
+ os.data = NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11);
+ if (os.data) {
+ ret->compress_meth = os.data[0];
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ os.length = 0;
+ os.data = NULL;
+ M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12);
+ if (os.data) {
+ ret->srp_username = BUF_strndup((char *)os.data, os.length);
+ OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+ os.data = NULL;
+ os.length = 0;
+ } else
+ ret->srp_username = NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+
+ M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a, SSL_SESSION_free, SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION);
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_cert.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_cert.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_cert.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,799 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * ! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
-# include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "o_dir.h"
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
-{
- static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
- ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx =
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, "SSL for verify callback",
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
- }
- }
-
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
-}
-
-static void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
-{
- /* Set digest values to defaults */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-}
-
-CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
-{
- CERT *ret;
-
- ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
- if (ret == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
- }
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
-
- ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
- ret->references = 1;
- ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
-{
- CERT *ret;
- int i;
-
- ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
- if (ret == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
-
- ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
- /*
- * or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that
- * more readable
- */
-
- ret->valid = cert->valid;
- ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
- ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
- ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
- ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) {
- RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
- ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
- }
- ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
- ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
- if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) {
- BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
- if (!b) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
- }
- if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) {
- BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
- if (!b) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
- }
- }
- ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (cert->ecdh_tmp) {
- ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
- if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
-#endif
-
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
- ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
-
- if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) {
- ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
- CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
- * chain is held inside SSL_CTX
- */
-
- ret->references = 1;
- /*
- * Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
- * will be set during handshake.
- */
- ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
-
- return (ret);
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
- err:
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
- RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
- DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
-#endif
-
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
- if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
- }
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (c == NULL)
- return;
-
- i = CRYPTO_add(&c->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("CERT", c);
-#endif
- if (i > 0)
- return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (c->rsa_tmp)
- RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (c->dh_tmp)
- DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (c->ecdh_tmp)
- EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
-#endif
-
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
- if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#if 0
- if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
-#endif
- }
- OPENSSL_free(c);
-}
-
-int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
-{
- /*
- * Create a CERT if there isn't already one (which cannot really happen,
- * as it is initially created in SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code
- * usually allows for that one being non-existant, so we follow that
- * behaviour, as it might turn out that there actually is a reason for it
- * -- but I'm not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
- * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the initialization
- * in SSL_CTX_new).
- */
-
- if (o == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (0);
- }
- if (*o == NULL) {
- if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
-{
- SESS_CERT *ret;
-
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
- if (ret == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof *ret);
- ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
- ret->references = 1;
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (sc == NULL)
- return;
-
- i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
-#endif
- if (i > 0)
- return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
-
- /* i == 0 */
- if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
-#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key.
- * These lines are just * here as a reminder
- * that we're still using a
- * not-quite-appropriate * data structure. */
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
-#endif
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
- RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
- DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_free(sc);
-}
-
-int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc, int type)
-{
- sc->peer_cert_type = type;
- return (1);
-}
-
-int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-{
- X509 *x;
- int i;
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
- return (0);
-
- x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, s->ctx->cert_store, x, sk)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-#if 0
- if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
-#endif
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
-
- /*
- * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
- * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
- * vice versa.
- */
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
- /*
- * Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
- */
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
-
- if (s->verify_callback)
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
-
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
-#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
- i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
-#else
- i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
-#endif
- else {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
- i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
-#else
- i = 0;
- ctx.error = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
-#endif
- }
-
- s->verify_result = ctx.error;
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- return (i);
-}
-
-static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
-{
- if (*ca_list != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
-
- *ca_list = name_list;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
-{
- int i;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
- X509_NAME *name;
-
- ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
- name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
- if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
- return (NULL);
- }
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
-{
- set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
-{
- set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return (ctx->client_CA);
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) { /* we are in the client */
- if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL))
- return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
- else
- return (NULL);
- } else {
- if (s->client_CA != NULL)
- return (s->client_CA);
- else
- return (s->ctx->client_CA);
- }
-}
-
-static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x)
-{
- X509_NAME *name;
-
- if (x == NULL)
- return (0);
- if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
- return (0);
-
- if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
- X509_NAME_free(name);
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
-{
- return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x));
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
- return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
-}
-
-static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
-{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-/**
- * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
- * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
- * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
- * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
- * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
- * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
- */
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
-{
- BIO *in;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk;
-
- sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-
- if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
- break;
- if (ret == NULL) {
- ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
- if (ret == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- /* check for duplicates */
- xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
- if (xn == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, xn) >= 0)
- X509_NAME_free(xn);
- else {
- sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn);
- sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
- }
- }
-
- if (0) {
- err:
- if (ret != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
- ret = NULL;
- }
- if (sk != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- if (x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
- if (ret != NULL)
- ERR_clear_error();
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-/**
- * Add a file of certs to a stack.
- * \param stack the stack to add to.
- * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
- * already in the stack will be added.
- * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
- * certs may have been added to \c stack.
- */
-
-int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
- const char *file)
-{
- BIO *in;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
- int ret = 1;
- int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
-
- oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp);
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
-
- if (in == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
- break;
- if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
- if (xn == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0)
- X509_NAME_free(xn);
- else
- sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
- }
-
- ERR_clear_error();
-
- if (0) {
- err:
- ret = 0;
- }
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- if (x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
-
- (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
- * \param stack the stack to append to.
- * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
- * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
- * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
- * included.
- * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
- * certs may have been added to \c stack.
- */
-
-int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
- const char *dir)
-{
- OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
- const char *filename;
- int ret = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
-
- /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
-
- while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
- char buf[1024];
- int r;
-
- if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof buf) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
- SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s", dir, filename);
-#else
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename);
-#endif
- if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
- goto err;
- if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (errno) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- if (d)
- OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
- return ret;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_cert.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_cert.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_cert.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_cert.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,799 @@
+/*
+ * ! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "o_dir.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+{
+ static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
+ ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx =
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, "SSL for verify callback",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+}
+
+static void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
+{
+ /* Set digest values to defaults */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
+{
+ CERT *ret;
+
+ ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+ ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
+{
+ CERT *ret;
+ int i;
+
+ ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
+ /*
+ * or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), if you find that
+ * more readable
+ */
+
+ ret->valid = cert->valid;
+ ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+ ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+ ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
+ ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) {
+ RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
+ ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
+ }
+ ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
+ ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+ if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) {
+ BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
+ if (!b) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
+ }
+ if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) {
+ BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
+ if (!b) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (cert->ecdh_tmp) {
+ ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
+ if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
+ ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+
+ if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) {
+ ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
+ * chain is held inside SSL_CTX
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
+ * will be set during handshake.
+ */
+ ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
+
+ return (ret);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
+ err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
+ if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&c->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("CERT", c);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (c->rsa_tmp)
+ RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (c->dh_tmp)
+ DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (c->ecdh_tmp)
+ EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#if 0
+ if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
+#endif
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(c);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
+{
+ /*
+ * Create a CERT if there isn't already one (which cannot really happen,
+ * as it is initially created in SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code
+ * usually allows for that one being non-existant, so we follow that
+ * behaviour, as it might turn out that there actually is a reason for it
+ * -- but I'm not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
+ * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the initialization
+ * in SSL_CTX_new).
+ */
+
+ if (o == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (*o == NULL) {
+ if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
+{
+ SESS_CERT *ret;
+
+ ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof *ret);
+ ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ ret->references = 1;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* i == 0 */
+ if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key.
+ * These lines are just * here as a reminder
+ * that we're still using a
+ * not-quite-appropriate * data structure. */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_free(sc);
+}
+
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc, int type)
+{
+ sc->peer_cert_type = type;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ X509 *x;
+ int i;
+ X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+ return (0);
+
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, s->ctx->cert_store, x, sk)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+#if 0
+ if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+#endif
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+
+ /*
+ * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
+ * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
+ * vice versa.
+ */
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+ /*
+ * Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+
+ if (s->verify_callback)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
+#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
+ i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+#else
+ i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
+#endif
+ else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
+ i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+#else
+ i = 0;
+ ctx.error = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ s->verify_result = ctx.error;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ return (i);
+}
+
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ if (*ca_list != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
+
+ *ca_list = name_list;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
+{
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
+ if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return (ctx->client_CA);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) { /* we are in the client */
+ if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL))
+ return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+ } else {
+ if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+ return (s->client_CA);
+ else
+ return (s->ctx->client_CA);
+ }
+}
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_NAME *name;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+ return (0);
+
+ if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+{
+ return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
+}
+
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/**
+ * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
+ * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
+ * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
+ * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
+ * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
+ * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
+{
+ BIO *in;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk;
+
+ sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* check for duplicates */
+ xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, xn) >= 0)
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ else {
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn);
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (0) {
+ err:
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ if (sk != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ if (x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Add a file of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to add to.
+ * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
+ * already in the stack will be added.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *file)
+{
+ BIO *in;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+
+ oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp);
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0)
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ else
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
+ }
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ if (0) {
+ err:
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ if (x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+
+ (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to append to.
+ * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
+ * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
+ * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
+ * included.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *dir)
+{
+ OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+ const char *filename;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+
+ /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+
+ while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
+ char buf[1024];
+ int r;
+
+ if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof buf) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
+ SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s", dir, filename);
+#else
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename);
+#endif
+ if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
+ goto err;
+ if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (errno) {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+ ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (d)
+ OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+ return ret;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_ciph.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_ciph.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1908 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_ciph.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-# include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0
-#define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1
-#define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2
-#define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3
-#define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4
-#define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5
-#define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6
-#define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7
-#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8
-#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9
-#define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10
-#define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11
-#define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12
-#define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13
-#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX 14
-
-static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = {
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- NULL, NULL
-};
-
-#define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX 0
-#define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX 1
-#define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX 2
-
-static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
-
-#define SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0
-#define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1
-#define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2
-#define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3
-#define SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4
-#define SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5
-/*
- * Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be defined
- * in the ssl_locl.h
- */
-#define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX SSL_MAX_DIGEST
-static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
-};
-
-/*
- * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation
- * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is
- * found
- */
-static int ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
- EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef,
- EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC
-};
-
-static int ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
-static int ssl_handshake_digest_flag[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94, 0, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
- SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384
-};
-
-#define CIPHER_ADD 1
-#define CIPHER_KILL 2
-#define CIPHER_DEL 3
-#define CIPHER_ORD 4
-#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
-
-typedef struct cipher_order_st {
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
- int active;
- int dead;
- struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
-} CIPHER_ORDER;
-
-static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = {
- /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */
- {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */
- {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
-
- /*
- * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in
- * ALL!)
- */
- {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, ~SSL_SSLV2,
- SSL_EXP_MASK, 0, 0, 0},
-
- /*
- * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here
- * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kEDH
- * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA)
- */
- {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
-
- /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
- {0, SSL_TXT_kDHr, 0, SSL_kDHr, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
- {0, SSL_TXT_kDHd, 0, SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
- {0, SSL_TXT_kDH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0},
-
- {0, SSL_TXT_kKRB5, 0, SSL_kKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
-
- {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHr, 0, SSL_kECDHr, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHe, 0, SSL_kECDHe, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_kECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0, 0},
-
- {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, 0, SSL_kSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, 0, SSL_kGOST, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
-
- /* server authentication aliases */
- {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_aKRB5, 0, 0, SSL_aKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
- {0, SSL_TXT_aDH, 0, 0, SSL_aDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_aECDH, 0, 0, SSL_aECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST94, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST94 | SSL_aGOST01, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
-
- /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
- {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_KRB5, 0, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, 0, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, 0, SSL_kSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
-
- /* symmetric encryption aliases */
- {0, SSL_TXT_DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_DES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_AES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128 | SSL_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0, 0},
-
- /* MAC aliases */
- {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
-
- /* protocol version aliases */
- {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SSLV2, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0},
-
- /* export flag */
- {0, SSL_TXT_EXP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXPORT, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_EXPORT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXPORT, 0, 0, 0},
-
- /* strength classes */
- {0, SSL_TXT_EXP40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXP40, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_EXP56, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXP56, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0},
- {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, 0, 0, 0},
- /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */
- {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS, 0, 0, 0},
-};
-
-/*
- * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if
- * it is available. Otherwise return 0
- */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-
-static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
-{
- const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
- int pkey_id = 0;
- ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1);
- if (ameth) {
- EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth);
- }
- return pkey_id;
-}
-
-#else
-
-static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
-{
- const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
- ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL;
- int pkey_id = 0;
- ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1);
- if (ameth) {
- EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth);
- }
- if (tmpeng)
- ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
- return pkey_id;
-}
-
-#endif
-
-void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
-{
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_cbc);
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX] =
- EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_ede3_cbc);
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc4);
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc2_cbc);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_idea_cbc);
-#else
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] = NULL;
-#endif
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX] =
- EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_cbc);
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX] =
- EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_cbc);
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX] =
- EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_128_cbc);
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX] =
- EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_256_cbc);
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX] =
- EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_gost89_cnt);
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_seed_cbc);
-
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX] =
- EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_gcm);
- ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX] =
- EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_gcm);
-
- ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_md5);
- ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] =
- EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]);
- OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] >= 0);
- ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha1);
- ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] =
- EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]);
- OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] >= 0);
- ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] =
- EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_GostR3411_94);
- if (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]) {
- ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] =
- EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]);
- OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] >= 0);
- }
- ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] =
- EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC);
- ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac");
- if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) {
- ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32;
- }
-
- ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha256);
- ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] =
- EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]);
- ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha384);
- ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] =
- EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-
-static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP *const *a, const SSL_COMP *const *b)
-{
- return ((*a)->id - (*b)->id);
-}
-
-static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
-{
- int got_write_lock = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
- if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL) {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL) {
- SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
-
- MemCheck_off();
- ssl_comp_methods = sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp);
- if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) {
- comp = (SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
- if (comp != NULL) {
- comp->method = COMP_zlib();
- if (comp->method && comp->method->type == NID_undef)
- OPENSSL_free(comp);
- else {
- comp->id = SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX;
- comp->name = comp->method->name;
- sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp);
- }
- }
- sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods);
- }
- MemCheck_on();
- }
- }
-
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-}
-#endif
-
-int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
- const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type,
- int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp)
-{
- int i;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-
- c = s->cipher;
- if (c == NULL)
- return (0);
- if (comp != NULL) {
- SSL_COMP ctmp;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- load_builtin_compressions();
-#endif
-
- *comp = NULL;
- ctmp.id = s->compress_meth;
- if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) {
- i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, &ctmp);
- if (i >= 0)
- *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, i);
- else
- *comp = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL))
- return (0);
-
- switch (c->algorithm_enc) {
- case SSL_DES:
- i = SSL_ENC_DES_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_3DES:
- i = SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_RC4:
- i = SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_RC2:
- i = SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_IDEA:
- i = SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_eNULL:
- i = SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_AES128:
- i = SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_AES256:
- i = SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
- i = SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
- i = SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
- i = SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_SEED:
- i = SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_AES128GCM:
- i = SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_AES256GCM:
- i = SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX;
- break;
- default:
- i = -1;
- break;
- }
-
- if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
- *enc = NULL;
- else {
- if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX)
- *enc = EVP_enc_null();
- else
- *enc = ssl_cipher_methods[i];
- }
-
- switch (c->algorithm_mac) {
- case SSL_MD5:
- i = SSL_MD_MD5_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_SHA1:
- i = SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_SHA256:
- i = SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_SHA384:
- i = SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_GOST94:
- i = SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX;
- break;
- case SSL_GOST89MAC:
- i = SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX;
- break;
- default:
- i = -1;
- break;
- }
- if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX)) {
- *md = NULL;
- if (mac_pkey_type != NULL)
- *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
- if (mac_secret_size != NULL)
- *mac_secret_size = 0;
- if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
- mac_pkey_type = NULL;
- } else {
- *md = ssl_digest_methods[i];
- if (mac_pkey_type != NULL)
- *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i];
- if (mac_secret_size != NULL)
- *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i];
- }
-
- if ((*enc != NULL) &&
- (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
- && (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) {
- const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
-
- if (s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ||
- s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION)
- return 1;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return 1;
-#endif
-
- if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 &&
- c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 &&
- (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5")))
- *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
- else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 &&
- c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
- (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
- *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
- else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 &&
- c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
- (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
- *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
- return (1);
- } else
- return (0);
-}
-
-int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int idx, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md)
-{
- if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) {
- return 0;
- }
- *mask = ssl_handshake_digest_flag[idx];
- if (*mask)
- *md = ssl_digest_methods[idx];
- else
- *md = NULL;
- return 1;
-}
-
-#define ITEM_SEP(a) \
- (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ','))
-
-static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
- CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
-{
- if (curr == *tail)
- return;
- if (curr == *head)
- *head = curr->next;
- if (curr->prev != NULL)
- curr->prev->next = curr->next;
- if (curr->next != NULL)
- curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
- (*tail)->next = curr;
- curr->prev = *tail;
- curr->next = NULL;
- *tail = curr;
-}
-
-static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
- CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
-{
- if (curr == *head)
- return;
- if (curr == *tail)
- *tail = curr->prev;
- if (curr->next != NULL)
- curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
- if (curr->prev != NULL)
- curr->prev->next = curr->next;
- (*head)->prev = curr;
- curr->next = *head;
- curr->prev = NULL;
- *head = curr;
-}
-
-static void ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth,
- unsigned long *enc, unsigned long *mac,
- unsigned long *ssl)
-{
- *mkey = 0;
- *auth = 0;
- *enc = 0;
- *mac = 0;
- *ssl = 0;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- *mkey |= SSL_kRSA;
- *auth |= SSL_aRSA;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- *auth |= SSL_aDSS;
-#endif
- *mkey |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd; /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
- *auth |= SSL_aDH;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- *mkey |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH;
- *auth |= SSL_aDH;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- *mkey |= SSL_kKRB5;
- *auth |= SSL_aKRB5;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- *auth |= SSL_aECDSA;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- *mkey |= SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHr;
- *auth |= SSL_aECDH;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- *mkey |= SSL_kPSK;
- *auth |= SSL_aPSK;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- *mkey |= SSL_kSRP;
-#endif
- /*
- * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they do not
- * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange
- */
- if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost94")) {
- *auth |= SSL_aGOST94;
- }
- if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) {
- *auth |= SSL_aGOST01;
- }
- /*
- * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available *
- */
- if ((*auth & (SSL_aGOST94 | SSL_aGOST01)) == (SSL_aGOST94 | SSL_aGOST01)) {
- *mkey |= SSL_kGOST;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_FORBID_ENULL
- *enc |= SSL_eNULL;
-#endif
-
- *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_DES : 0;
- *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_3DES : 0;
- *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_RC4 : 0;
- *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_RC2 : 0;
- *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_IDEA : 0;
- *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES128 : 0;
- *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES256 : 0;
- *enc |=
- (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX] ==
- NULL) ? SSL_AES128GCM : 0;
- *enc |=
- (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX] ==
- NULL) ? SSL_AES256GCM : 0;
- *enc |=
- (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX] ==
- NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA128 : 0;
- *enc |=
- (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX] ==
- NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA256 : 0;
- *enc |=
- (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX] ==
- NULL) ? SSL_eGOST2814789CNT : 0;
- *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SEED : 0;
-
- *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_MD5 : 0;
- *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA1 : 0;
- *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA256 : 0;
- *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA384 : 0;
- *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_GOST94 : 0;
- *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] == NULL
- || ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] ==
- NID_undef) ? SSL_GOST89MAC : 0;
-
-}
-
-static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
- int num_of_ciphers,
- unsigned long disabled_mkey,
- unsigned long disabled_auth,
- unsigned long disabled_enc,
- unsigned long disabled_mac,
- unsigned long disabled_ssl,
- CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
- CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
- CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
-{
- int i, co_list_num;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-
- /*
- * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the
- * method selected (SSLv2 and/or SSLv3, TLSv1 etc).
- * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num
- * entries.
- */
-
- /* Get the initial list of ciphers */
- co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */
- for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) {
- c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i);
- /* drop those that use any of that is not available */
- if ((c != NULL) && c->valid &&
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- (!FIPS_mode() || (c->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) &&
-#endif
- !(c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) &&
- !(c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) &&
- !(c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) &&
- !(c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac) &&
- !(c->algorithm_ssl & disabled_ssl)) {
- co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c;
- co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
- co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
- co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
- co_list_num++;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n", i, c->name, c->id,
- c->algorithm_mkey, c->algorithm_auth);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- /*
- * if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err;
- */
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Prepare linked list from list entries
- */
- if (co_list_num > 0) {
- co_list[0].prev = NULL;
-
- if (co_list_num > 1) {
- co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
-
- for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) {
- co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
- co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
- }
-
- co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
- }
-
- co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
-
- *head_p = &co_list[0];
- *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
- }
-}
-
-static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
- int num_of_group_aliases,
- unsigned long disabled_mkey,
- unsigned long disabled_auth,
- unsigned long disabled_enc,
- unsigned long disabled_mac,
- unsigned long disabled_ssl,
- CIPHER_ORDER *head)
-{
- CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr;
- const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr;
- int i;
- unsigned long mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey;
- unsigned long mask_auth = ~disabled_auth;
- unsigned long mask_enc = ~disabled_enc;
- unsigned long mask_mac = ~disabled_mac;
- unsigned long mask_ssl = ~disabled_ssl;
-
- /*
- * First, add the real ciphers as already collected
- */
- ciph_curr = head;
- ca_curr = ca_list;
- while (ciph_curr != NULL) {
- *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher;
- ca_curr++;
- ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next;
- }
-
- /*
- * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table.
- * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which
- * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask),
- * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0).
- */
- for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) {
- unsigned long algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth;
- unsigned long algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc;
- unsigned long algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac;
- unsigned long algorithm_ssl = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_ssl;
-
- if (algorithm_mkey)
- if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0)
- continue;
-
- if (algorithm_auth)
- if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0)
- continue;
-
- if (algorithm_enc)
- if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0)
- continue;
-
- if (algorithm_mac)
- if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0)
- continue;
-
- if (algorithm_ssl)
- if ((algorithm_ssl & mask_ssl) == 0)
- continue;
-
- *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i);
- ca_curr++;
- }
-
- *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */
-}
-
-static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
- unsigned long alg_mkey,
- unsigned long alg_auth,
- unsigned long alg_enc,
- unsigned long alg_mac,
- unsigned long alg_ssl,
- unsigned long algo_strength, int rule,
- int strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
- CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
-{
- CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
- const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
- int reverse = 0;
-
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
- rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl,
- algo_strength, strength_bits);
-#endif
-
- if (rule == CIPHER_DEL)
- reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between
- * currently deleted ciphers */
-
- head = *head_p;
- tail = *tail_p;
-
- if (reverse) {
- next = tail;
- last = head;
- } else {
- next = head;
- last = tail;
- }
-
- curr = NULL;
- for (;;) {
- if (curr == last)
- break;
-
- curr = next;
-
- if (curr == NULL)
- break;
-
- next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
-
- cp = curr->cipher;
-
- /*
- * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits
- * or the algorithms used.
- */
- if (strength_bits >= 0) {
- if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits)
- continue;
- } else {
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,
- "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n",
- cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth,
- cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl,
- cp->algo_strength);
-#endif
- if (algo_strength == SSL_EXP_MASK && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cp))
- goto ok;
- if (alg_ssl == ~SSL_SSLV2 && cp->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2)
- goto ok;
- if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
- continue;
- if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth))
- continue;
- if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc))
- continue;
- if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac))
- continue;
- if (alg_ssl && !(alg_ssl & cp->algorithm_ssl))
- continue;
- if ((algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)
- && !(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
- continue;
- if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
- && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
- continue;
- }
-
- ok:
-
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule);
-#endif
-
- /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
- if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
- /* reverse == 0 */
- if (!curr->active) {
- ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
- curr->active = 1;
- }
- }
- /* Move the added cipher to this location */
- else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
- /* reverse == 0 */
- if (curr->active) {
- ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
- }
- } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
- /* reverse == 1 */
- if (curr->active) {
- /*
- * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for
- * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works
- * in reverse to maintain the order)
- */
- ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
- curr->active = 0;
- }
- } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
- /* reverse == 0 */
- if (head == curr)
- head = curr->next;
- else
- curr->prev->next = curr->next;
- if (tail == curr)
- tail = curr->prev;
- curr->active = 0;
- if (curr->next != NULL)
- curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
- if (curr->prev != NULL)
- curr->prev->next = curr->next;
- curr->next = NULL;
- curr->prev = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- *head_p = head;
- *tail_p = tail;
-}
-
-static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
- CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
-{
- int max_strength_bits, i, *number_uses;
- CIPHER_ORDER *curr;
-
- /*
- * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting
- * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting
- * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list.
- */
- max_strength_bits = 0;
- curr = *head_p;
- while (curr != NULL) {
- if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits))
- max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits;
- curr = curr->next;
- }
-
- number_uses = OPENSSL_malloc((max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
- if (!number_uses) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- memset(number_uses, 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
-
- /*
- * Now find the strength_bits values actually used
- */
- curr = *head_p;
- while (curr != NULL) {
- if (curr->active)
- number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++;
- curr = curr->next;
- }
- /*
- * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending
- * order.
- */
- for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--)
- if (number_uses[i] > 0)
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p,
- tail_p);
-
- OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
- return (1);
-}
-
-static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
- CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
- CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p,
- const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list)
-{
- unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl,
- algo_strength;
- const char *l, *buf;
- int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen;
- unsigned long cipher_id = 0;
- char ch;
-
- retval = 1;
- l = rule_str;
- for (;;) {
- ch = *l;
-
- if (ch == '\0')
- break; /* done */
- if (ch == '-') {
- rule = CIPHER_DEL;
- l++;
- } else if (ch == '+') {
- rule = CIPHER_ORD;
- l++;
- } else if (ch == '!') {
- rule = CIPHER_KILL;
- l++;
- } else if (ch == '@') {
- rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
- l++;
- } else {
- rule = CIPHER_ADD;
- }
-
- if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) {
- l++;
- continue;
- }
-
- alg_mkey = 0;
- alg_auth = 0;
- alg_enc = 0;
- alg_mac = 0;
- alg_ssl = 0;
- algo_strength = 0;
-
- for (;;) {
- ch = *l;
- buf = l;
- buflen = 0;
-#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
- while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) ||
- ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
- ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
-#else
- while (isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
-#endif
- {
- ch = *(++l);
- buflen++;
- }
-
- if (buflen == 0) {
- /*
- * We hit something we cannot deal with,
- * it is no command or separator nor
- * alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
- SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
- retval = found = 0;
- l++;
- break;
- }
-
- if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
- found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */
- break; /* special treatment */
- }
-
- /* check for multi-part specification */
- if (ch == '+') {
- multi = 1;
- l++;
- } else
- multi = 0;
-
- /*
- * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful
- * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation
- * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher
- * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3.
- * So additionally check whether the cipher name found
- * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call:
- * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is
- * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot
- * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.)
- */
- j = found = 0;
- cipher_id = 0;
- while (ca_list[j]) {
- if (!strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) &&
- (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) {
- found = 1;
- break;
- } else
- j++;
- }
-
- if (!found)
- break; /* ignore this entry */
-
- if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) {
- if (alg_mkey) {
- alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
- if (!alg_mkey) {
- found = 0;
- break;
- }
- } else
- alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
- }
-
- if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) {
- if (alg_auth) {
- alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
- if (!alg_auth) {
- found = 0;
- break;
- }
- } else
- alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
- }
-
- if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) {
- if (alg_enc) {
- alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
- if (!alg_enc) {
- found = 0;
- break;
- }
- } else
- alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
- }
-
- if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) {
- if (alg_mac) {
- alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
- if (!alg_mac) {
- found = 0;
- break;
- }
- } else
- alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
- }
-
- if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) {
- if (algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) {
- algo_strength &=
- (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) |
- ~SSL_EXP_MASK;
- if (!(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)) {
- found = 0;
- break;
- }
- } else
- algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK;
- }
-
- if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) {
- if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) {
- algo_strength &=
- (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) |
- ~SSL_STRONG_MASK;
- if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) {
- found = 0;
- break;
- }
- } else
- algo_strength |=
- ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK;
- }
-
- if (ca_list[j]->valid) {
- /*
- * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not
- * become part of the search pattern!
- */
-
- cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
- } else {
- /*
- * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the
- * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern
- */
-
- if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl) {
- if (alg_ssl) {
- alg_ssl &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
- if (!alg_ssl) {
- found = 0;
- break;
- }
- } else
- alg_ssl = ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
- }
- }
-
- if (!multi)
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it
- */
- if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */
- ok = 0;
- if ((buflen == 8) && !strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8))
- ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p);
- else
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
- SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
- if (ok == 0)
- retval = 0;
- /*
- * We do not support any "multi" options
- * together with "@", so throw away the
- * rest of the command, if any left, until
- * end or ':' is found.
- */
- while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
- l++;
- } else if (found) {
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id,
- alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac,
- alg_ssl, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p,
- tail_p);
- } else {
- while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
- l++;
- }
- if (*l == '\0')
- break; /* done */
- }
-
- return (retval);
-}
-
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
- **cipher_list, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
- **cipher_list_by_id,
- const char *rule_str)
-{
- int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases;
- unsigned long disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac,
- disabled_ssl;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack, *tmp_cipher_list;
- const char *rule_p;
- CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
- const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Return with error if nothing to do.
- */
- if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- /*
- * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
- * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers.
- */
- ssl_cipher_get_disabled(&disabled_mkey, &disabled_auth, &disabled_enc,
- &disabled_mac, &disabled_ssl);
-
- /*
- * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled
- * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so
- * it is used for allocation.
- */
- num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n",
- num_of_ciphers);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- co_list =
- (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers);
- if (co_list == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL); /* Failure */
- }
-
- ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers,
- disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
- disabled_mac, disabled_ssl, co_list, &head,
- &tail);
-
- /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference: */
-
- /*
- * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key
- * exchange mechanisms
- */
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head,
- &tail);
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head,
- &tail);
-
- /* AES is our preferred symmetric cipher */
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head,
- &tail);
-
- /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
-
- /* Low priority for MD5 */
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
- &tail);
-
- /*
- * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain
- * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but
- * we prefer authenticated ciphers.)
- */
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
- &tail);
-
- /* Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end */
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
- &tail);
- /*
- * ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1,
- * &head, &tail);
- */
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
- &tail);
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
- &tail);
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
- &tail);
-
- /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move the the end */
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
- &tail);
-
- /*
- * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains
- * in force within each class
- */
- if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) {
- OPENSSL_free(co_list);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */
- ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail);
-
- /*
- * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str.
- * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names
- * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers.
- * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher
- * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise
- * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table).
- */
- num_of_group_aliases = sizeof(cipher_aliases) / sizeof(SSL_CIPHER);
- num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
- ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER *) * num_of_alias_max);
- if (ca_list == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(co_list);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL); /* Failure */
- }
- ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases,
- disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
- disabled_mac, disabled_ssl, head);
-
- /*
- * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule
- * before using the (possibly available) additional rules.
- */
- ok = 1;
- rule_p = rule_str;
- if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
- ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
- &head, &tail, ca_list);
- rule_p += 7;
- if (*rule_p == ':')
- rule_p++;
- }
-
- if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0))
- ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list);
-
- OPENSSL_free((void *)ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */
-
- if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */
- OPENSSL_free(co_list);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- /*
- * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
- * if we cannot get one.
- */
- if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(co_list);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- /*
- * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
- * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
- */
- for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (curr->active
- && (!FIPS_mode() || curr->cipher->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS))
-#else
- if (curr->active)
-#endif
- {
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher);
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name);
-#endif
- }
- }
- OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */
-
- tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack);
- if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) {
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (*cipher_list != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list);
- *cipher_list = cipherstack;
- if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id);
- *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
- (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id,
- ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
-
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id);
- return (cipherstack);
-}
-
-char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
-{
- int is_export, pkl, kl;
- const char *ver, *exp_str;
- const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
- unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, alg2;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- static const char *format =
- "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s AL=%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx\n";
-#else
- static const char *format =
- "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s\n";
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
- alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
- alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
- alg_ssl = cipher->algorithm_ssl;
-
- alg2 = cipher->algorithm2;
-
- is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cipher);
- pkl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
- kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(cipher);
- exp_str = is_export ? " export" : "";
-
- if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV2)
- ver = "SSLv2";
- else if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV3)
- ver = "SSLv3";
- else if (alg_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2)
- ver = "TLSv1.2";
- else
- ver = "unknown";
-
- switch (alg_mkey) {
- case SSL_kRSA:
- kx = is_export ? (pkl == 512 ? "RSA(512)" : "RSA(1024)") : "RSA";
- break;
- case SSL_kDHr:
- kx = "DH/RSA";
- break;
- case SSL_kDHd:
- kx = "DH/DSS";
- break;
- case SSL_kKRB5:
- kx = "KRB5";
- break;
- case SSL_kEDH:
- kx = is_export ? (pkl == 512 ? "DH(512)" : "DH(1024)") : "DH";
- break;
- case SSL_kECDHr:
- kx = "ECDH/RSA";
- break;
- case SSL_kECDHe:
- kx = "ECDH/ECDSA";
- break;
- case SSL_kEECDH:
- kx = "ECDH";
- break;
- case SSL_kPSK:
- kx = "PSK";
- break;
- case SSL_kSRP:
- kx = "SRP";
- break;
- case SSL_kGOST:
- kx = "GOST";
- break;
- default:
- kx = "unknown";
- }
-
- switch (alg_auth) {
- case SSL_aRSA:
- au = "RSA";
- break;
- case SSL_aDSS:
- au = "DSS";
- break;
- case SSL_aDH:
- au = "DH";
- break;
- case SSL_aKRB5:
- au = "KRB5";
- break;
- case SSL_aECDH:
- au = "ECDH";
- break;
- case SSL_aNULL:
- au = "None";
- break;
- case SSL_aECDSA:
- au = "ECDSA";
- break;
- case SSL_aPSK:
- au = "PSK";
- break;
- case SSL_aSRP:
- au = "SRP";
- break;
- case SSL_aGOST94:
- au = "GOST94";
- break;
- case SSL_aGOST01:
- au = "GOST01";
- break;
- default:
- au = "unknown";
- break;
- }
-
- switch (alg_enc) {
- case SSL_DES:
- enc = (is_export && kl == 5) ? "DES(40)" : "DES(56)";
- break;
- case SSL_3DES:
- enc = "3DES(168)";
- break;
- case SSL_RC4:
- enc = is_export ? (kl == 5 ? "RC4(40)" : "RC4(56)")
- : ((alg2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) ? "RC4(64)" : "RC4(128)");
- break;
- case SSL_RC2:
- enc = is_export ? (kl == 5 ? "RC2(40)" : "RC2(56)") : "RC2(128)";
- break;
- case SSL_IDEA:
- enc = "IDEA(128)";
- break;
- case SSL_eNULL:
- enc = "None";
- break;
- case SSL_AES128:
- enc = "AES(128)";
- break;
- case SSL_AES256:
- enc = "AES(256)";
- break;
- case SSL_AES128GCM:
- enc = "AESGCM(128)";
- break;
- case SSL_AES256GCM:
- enc = "AESGCM(256)";
- break;
- case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
- enc = "Camellia(128)";
- break;
- case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
- enc = "Camellia(256)";
- break;
- case SSL_SEED:
- enc = "SEED(128)";
- break;
- case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
- enc = "GOST89(256)";
- break;
- default:
- enc = "unknown";
- break;
- }
-
- switch (alg_mac) {
- case SSL_MD5:
- mac = "MD5";
- break;
- case SSL_SHA1:
- mac = "SHA1";
- break;
- case SSL_SHA256:
- mac = "SHA256";
- break;
- case SSL_SHA384:
- mac = "SHA384";
- break;
- case SSL_AEAD:
- mac = "AEAD";
- break;
- case SSL_GOST89MAC:
- mac = "GOST89";
- break;
- case SSL_GOST94:
- mac = "GOST94";
- break;
- default:
- mac = "unknown";
- break;
- }
-
- if (buf == NULL) {
- len = 128;
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (buf == NULL)
- return ("OPENSSL_malloc Error");
- } else if (len < 128)
- return ("Buffer too small");
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac,
- exp_str, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl);
-#else
- BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac,
- exp_str);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- return (buf);
-}
-
-char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (c == NULL)
- return ("(NONE)");
- i = (int)(c->id >> 24L);
- if (i == 3)
- return ("TLSv1/SSLv3");
- else if (i == 2)
- return ("SSLv2");
- else
- return ("unknown");
-}
-
-/* return the actual cipher being used */
-const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
-{
- if (c != NULL)
- return (c->name);
- return ("(NONE)");
-}
-
-/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */
-int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (c != NULL) {
- if (alg_bits != NULL)
- *alg_bits = c->alg_bits;
- ret = c->strength_bits;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
-{
- return c->id;
-}
-
-SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n)
-{
- SSL_COMP *ctmp;
- int i, nn;
-
- if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL))
- return (NULL);
- nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk);
- for (i = 0; i < nn; i++) {
- ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i);
- if (ctmp->id == n)
- return (ctmp);
- }
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-
-int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-#else
-STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
-{
- load_builtin_compressions();
- return (ssl_comp_methods);
-}
-
-int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
-{
- SSL_COMP *comp;
-
- if (cm == NULL || cm->type == NID_undef)
- return 1;
-
- /*-
- * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
- * compression number ranges should be the following:
- *
- * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF
- * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA
- * 193 to 255: reserved for private use
- */
- if (id < 193 || id > 255) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- MemCheck_off();
- comp = (SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
- comp->id = id;
- comp->method = cm;
- load_builtin_compressions();
- if (ssl_comp_methods && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, comp) >= 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(comp);
- MemCheck_on();
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,
- SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID);
- return (1);
- } else if ((ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
- || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) {
- OPENSSL_free(comp);
- MemCheck_on();
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (1);
- } else {
- MemCheck_on();
- return (0);
- }
-}
-
-const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp)
-{
- if (comp)
- return comp->name;
- return NULL;
-}
-
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_ciph.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_ciph.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_ciph.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_ciph.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1911 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_ciph.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0
+#define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1
+#define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2
+#define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3
+#define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4
+#define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5
+#define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6
+#define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7
+#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8
+#define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9
+#define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10
+#define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11
+#define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12
+#define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13
+#define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX 14
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = {
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL
+};
+
+#define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX 0
+#define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX 1
+#define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX 2
+
+static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
+
+#define SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0
+#define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1
+#define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2
+#define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3
+#define SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4
+#define SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5
+/*
+ * Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be defined
+ * in the ssl_locl.h
+ */
+#define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX SSL_MAX_DIGEST
+static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation
+ * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is
+ * found
+ */
+static int ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
+ EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef,
+ EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC
+};
+
+static int ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+};
+
+static int ssl_handshake_digest_flag[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94, 0, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384
+};
+
+#define CIPHER_ADD 1
+#define CIPHER_KILL 2
+#define CIPHER_DEL 3
+#define CIPHER_ORD 4
+#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
+
+typedef struct cipher_order_st {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ int active;
+ int dead;
+ struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
+} CIPHER_ORDER;
+
+static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = {
+ /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+
+ /*
+ * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in
+ * ALL!)
+ */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, ~SSL_SSLV2,
+ SSL_EXP_MASK, 0, 0, 0},
+
+ /*
+ * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here
+ * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kEDH
+ * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA)
+ */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+
+ /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kDHr, 0, SSL_kDHr, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kDHd, 0, SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kDH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0},
+
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kKRB5, 0, SSL_kKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHr, 0, SSL_kECDHr, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHe, 0, SSL_kECDHe, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0},
+
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, 0, SSL_kSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, 0, SSL_kGOST, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+
+ /* server authentication aliases */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aKRB5, 0, 0, SSL_aKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aDH, 0, 0, SSL_aDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aECDH, 0, 0, SSL_aECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST94, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST94 | SSL_aGOST01, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+
+ /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_KRB5, 0, SSL_kKRB5, SSL_aKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, 0, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, 0, SSL_kSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+
+ /* symmetric encryption aliases */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_DES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128 | SSL_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0},
+
+ /* MAC aliases */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+
+ /* protocol version aliases */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SSLV2, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+
+ /* export flag */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_EXP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXPORT, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_EXPORT, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXPORT, 0, 0, 0},
+
+ /* strength classes */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_EXP40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXP40, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_EXP56, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_EXP56, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, 0, 0, 0},
+ /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS, 0, 0, 0},
+};
+
+/*
+ * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if
+ * it is available. Otherwise return 0
+ */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+
+static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
+{
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+ int pkey_id = 0;
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1);
+ if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ ameth) > 0) {
+ return pkey_id;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
+{
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+ ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL;
+ int pkey_id = 0;
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1);
+ if (ameth) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ ameth) <= 0)
+ pkey_id = 0;
+ }
+ if (tmpeng)
+ ENGINE_finish(tmpeng);
+ return pkey_id;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
+{
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX] =
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_des_ede3_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc4);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_rc2_cbc);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_idea_cbc);
+#else
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] = NULL;
+#endif
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX] =
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX] =
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX] =
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_128_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX] =
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_camellia_256_cbc);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX] =
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_gost89_cnt);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX] = EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_seed_cbc);
+
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX] =
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_128_gcm);
+ ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX] =
+ EVP_get_cipherbyname(SN_aes_256_gcm);
+
+ ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_md5);
+ ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] =
+ EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] >= 0);
+ ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha1);
+ ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] =
+ EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] >= 0);
+ ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] =
+ EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_GostR3411_94);
+ if (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]) {
+ ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] =
+ EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] >= 0);
+ }
+ ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] =
+ EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC);
+ ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac");
+ if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) {
+ ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32;
+ }
+
+ ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha256);
+ ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] =
+ EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX]);
+ ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] = EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha384);
+ ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] =
+ EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX]);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+
+static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP *const *a, const SSL_COMP *const *b)
+{
+ return ((*a)->id - (*b)->id);
+}
+
+static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
+{
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL) {
+ SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
+
+ MemCheck_off();
+ ssl_comp_methods = sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp);
+ if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) {
+ comp = (SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ comp->method = COMP_zlib();
+ if (comp->method && comp->method->type == NID_undef)
+ OPENSSL_free(comp);
+ else {
+ comp->id = SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX;
+ comp->name = comp->method->name;
+ sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp);
+ }
+ }
+ sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods);
+ }
+ MemCheck_on();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
+ const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type,
+ int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp)
+{
+ int i;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+ c = s->cipher;
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ SSL_COMP ctmp;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ load_builtin_compressions();
+#endif
+
+ *comp = NULL;
+ ctmp.id = s->compress_meth;
+ if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) {
+ i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, &ctmp);
+ if (i >= 0)
+ *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, i);
+ else
+ *comp = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL))
+ return (0);
+
+ switch (c->algorithm_enc) {
+ case SSL_DES:
+ i = SSL_ENC_DES_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_3DES:
+ i = SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_RC4:
+ i = SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_RC2:
+ i = SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_IDEA:
+ i = SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_eNULL:
+ i = SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ i = SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ i = SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
+ i = SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
+ i = SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
+ i = SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SEED:
+ i = SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128GCM:
+ i = SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES256GCM:
+ i = SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX;
+ break;
+ default:
+ i = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX))
+ *enc = NULL;
+ else {
+ if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX)
+ *enc = EVP_enc_null();
+ else
+ *enc = ssl_cipher_methods[i];
+ }
+
+ switch (c->algorithm_mac) {
+ case SSL_MD5:
+ i = SSL_MD_MD5_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA1:
+ i = SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA256:
+ i = SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA384:
+ i = SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_GOST94:
+ i = SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX;
+ break;
+ case SSL_GOST89MAC:
+ i = SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX;
+ break;
+ default:
+ i = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((i < 0) || (i >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX)) {
+ *md = NULL;
+ if (mac_pkey_type != NULL)
+ *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
+ if (mac_secret_size != NULL)
+ *mac_secret_size = 0;
+ if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
+ mac_pkey_type = NULL;
+ } else {
+ *md = ssl_digest_methods[i];
+ if (mac_pkey_type != NULL)
+ *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i];
+ if (mac_secret_size != NULL)
+ *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i];
+ }
+
+ if ((*enc != NULL) &&
+ (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+ && (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) {
+ const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
+
+ if (s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ||
+ s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+ return 1;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return 1;
+#endif
+
+ if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 &&
+ c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 &&
+ (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5")))
+ *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+ else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 &&
+ c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
+ (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
+ *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+ else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 &&
+ c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
+ (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
+ *enc = evp, *md = NULL;
+ return (1);
+ } else
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int idx, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md)
+{
+ if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *mask = ssl_handshake_digest_flag[idx];
+ if (*mask)
+ *md = ssl_digest_methods[idx];
+ else
+ *md = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define ITEM_SEP(a) \
+ (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ','))
+
+static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
+{
+ if (curr == *tail)
+ return;
+ if (curr == *head)
+ *head = curr->next;
+ if (curr->prev != NULL)
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ if (curr->next != NULL)
+ curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+ (*tail)->next = curr;
+ curr->prev = *tail;
+ curr->next = NULL;
+ *tail = curr;
+}
+
+static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
+{
+ if (curr == *head)
+ return;
+ if (curr == *tail)
+ *tail = curr->prev;
+ if (curr->next != NULL)
+ curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+ if (curr->prev != NULL)
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ (*head)->prev = curr;
+ curr->next = *head;
+ curr->prev = NULL;
+ *head = curr;
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_get_disabled(unsigned long *mkey, unsigned long *auth,
+ unsigned long *enc, unsigned long *mac,
+ unsigned long *ssl)
+{
+ *mkey = 0;
+ *auth = 0;
+ *enc = 0;
+ *mac = 0;
+ *ssl = 0;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ *mkey |= SSL_kRSA;
+ *auth |= SSL_aRSA;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ *auth |= SSL_aDSS;
+#endif
+ *mkey |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd; /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+ *auth |= SSL_aDH;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ *mkey |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH;
+ *auth |= SSL_aDH;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ *mkey |= SSL_kKRB5;
+ *auth |= SSL_aKRB5;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ *auth |= SSL_aECDSA;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ *mkey |= SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHr;
+ *auth |= SSL_aECDH;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ *mkey |= SSL_kPSK;
+ *auth |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ *mkey |= SSL_kSRP;
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they do not
+ * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange
+ */
+ if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost94")) {
+ *auth |= SSL_aGOST94;
+ }
+ if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) {
+ *auth |= SSL_aGOST01;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available *
+ */
+ if ((*auth & (SSL_aGOST94 | SSL_aGOST01)) == (SSL_aGOST94 | SSL_aGOST01)) {
+ *mkey |= SSL_kGOST;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_FORBID_ENULL
+ *enc |= SSL_eNULL;
+#endif
+
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_DES_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_DES : 0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_3DES : 0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_RC4 : 0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_RC2 : 0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_IDEA : 0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES128 : 0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_AES256 : 0;
+ *enc |=
+ (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX] ==
+ NULL) ? SSL_AES128GCM : 0;
+ *enc |=
+ (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX] ==
+ NULL) ? SSL_AES256GCM : 0;
+ *enc |=
+ (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX] ==
+ NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA128 : 0;
+ *enc |=
+ (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX] ==
+ NULL) ? SSL_CAMELLIA256 : 0;
+ *enc |=
+ (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX] ==
+ NULL) ? SSL_eGOST2814789CNT : 0;
+ *enc |= (ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SEED : 0;
+
+ *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_MD5 : 0;
+ *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA1 : 0;
+ *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA256 : 0;
+ *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_SHA384 : 0;
+ *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] == NULL) ? SSL_GOST94 : 0;
+ *mac |= (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] == NULL
+ || ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] ==
+ NID_undef) ? SSL_GOST89MAC : 0;
+
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+ int num_of_ciphers,
+ unsigned long disabled_mkey,
+ unsigned long disabled_auth,
+ unsigned long disabled_enc,
+ unsigned long disabled_mac,
+ unsigned long disabled_ssl,
+ CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+{
+ int i, co_list_num;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+ /*
+ * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the
+ * method selected (SSLv2 and/or SSLv3, TLSv1 etc).
+ * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num
+ * entries.
+ */
+
+ /* Get the initial list of ciphers */
+ co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) {
+ c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i);
+ /* drop those that use any of that is not available */
+ if ((c != NULL) && c->valid &&
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ (!FIPS_mode() || (c->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS)) &&
+#endif
+ !(c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) &&
+ !(c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) &&
+ !(c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) &&
+ !(c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac) &&
+ !(c->algorithm_ssl & disabled_ssl)) {
+ co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c;
+ co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
+ co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
+ co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
+ co_list_num++;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t%d: %s %lx %lx %lx\n", i, c->name, c->id,
+ c->algorithm_mkey, c->algorithm_auth);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ /*
+ * if (!sk_push(ca_list,(char *)c)) goto err;
+ */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare linked list from list entries
+ */
+ if (co_list_num > 0) {
+ co_list[0].prev = NULL;
+
+ if (co_list_num > 1) {
+ co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
+
+ for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) {
+ co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
+ co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
+ }
+
+ co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
+ }
+
+ co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
+
+ *head_p = &co_list[0];
+ *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
+ int num_of_group_aliases,
+ unsigned long disabled_mkey,
+ unsigned long disabled_auth,
+ unsigned long disabled_enc,
+ unsigned long disabled_mac,
+ unsigned long disabled_ssl,
+ CIPHER_ORDER *head)
+{
+ CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr;
+ const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey;
+ unsigned long mask_auth = ~disabled_auth;
+ unsigned long mask_enc = ~disabled_enc;
+ unsigned long mask_mac = ~disabled_mac;
+ unsigned long mask_ssl = ~disabled_ssl;
+
+ /*
+ * First, add the real ciphers as already collected
+ */
+ ciph_curr = head;
+ ca_curr = ca_list;
+ while (ciph_curr != NULL) {
+ *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher;
+ ca_curr++;
+ ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table.
+ * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which
+ * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask),
+ * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) {
+ unsigned long algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth;
+ unsigned long algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc;
+ unsigned long algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac;
+ unsigned long algorithm_ssl = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_ssl;
+
+ if (algorithm_mkey)
+ if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_auth)
+ if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_enc)
+ if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_mac)
+ if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_ssl)
+ if ((algorithm_ssl & mask_ssl) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i);
+ ca_curr++;
+ }
+
+ *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
+ unsigned long alg_mkey,
+ unsigned long alg_auth,
+ unsigned long alg_enc,
+ unsigned long alg_mac,
+ unsigned long alg_ssl,
+ unsigned long algo_strength, int rule,
+ int strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+{
+ CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+ int reverse = 0;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Applying rule %d with %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx %08lx (%d)\n",
+ rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl,
+ algo_strength, strength_bits);
+#endif
+
+ if (rule == CIPHER_DEL)
+ reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between
+ * currently deleted ciphers */
+
+ head = *head_p;
+ tail = *tail_p;
+
+ if (reverse) {
+ next = tail;
+ last = head;
+ } else {
+ next = head;
+ last = tail;
+ }
+
+ curr = NULL;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (curr == last)
+ break;
+
+ curr = next;
+
+ if (curr == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+
+ cp = curr->cipher;
+
+ /*
+ * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits
+ * or the algorithms used.
+ */
+ if (strength_bits >= 0) {
+ if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits)
+ continue;
+ } else {
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx/%08lx Algo_strength = %08lx\n",
+ cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth,
+ cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl,
+ cp->algo_strength);
+#endif
+ if (algo_strength == SSL_EXP_MASK && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cp))
+ goto ok;
+ if (alg_ssl == ~SSL_SSLV2 && cp->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2)
+ goto ok;
+ if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_ssl && !(alg_ssl & cp->algorithm_ssl))
+ continue;
+ if ((algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)
+ && !(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
+ continue;
+ if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
+ && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ok:
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule);
+#endif
+
+ /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
+ if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
+ /* reverse == 0 */
+ if (!curr->active) {
+ ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+ curr->active = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Move the added cipher to this location */
+ else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
+ /* reverse == 0 */
+ if (curr->active) {
+ ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+ }
+ } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+ /* reverse == 1 */
+ if (curr->active) {
+ /*
+ * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for
+ * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works
+ * in reverse to maintain the order)
+ */
+ ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+ curr->active = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
+ /* reverse == 0 */
+ if (head == curr)
+ head = curr->next;
+ else
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ if (tail == curr)
+ tail = curr->prev;
+ curr->active = 0;
+ if (curr->next != NULL)
+ curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+ if (curr->prev != NULL)
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ curr->next = NULL;
+ curr->prev = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *head_p = head;
+ *tail_p = tail;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+{
+ int max_strength_bits, i, *number_uses;
+ CIPHER_ORDER *curr;
+
+ /*
+ * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting
+ * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting
+ * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list.
+ */
+ max_strength_bits = 0;
+ curr = *head_p;
+ while (curr != NULL) {
+ if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits))
+ max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits;
+ curr = curr->next;
+ }
+
+ number_uses = OPENSSL_malloc((max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
+ if (!number_uses) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ memset(number_uses, 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
+
+ /*
+ * Now find the strength_bits values actually used
+ */
+ curr = *head_p;
+ while (curr != NULL) {
+ if (curr->active)
+ number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++;
+ curr = curr->next;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending
+ * order.
+ */
+ for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--)
+ if (number_uses[i] > 0)
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p,
+ tail_p);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p,
+ const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list)
+{
+ unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl,
+ algo_strength;
+ const char *l, *buf;
+ int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen;
+ unsigned long cipher_id = 0;
+ char ch;
+
+ retval = 1;
+ l = rule_str;
+ for (;;) {
+ ch = *l;
+
+ if (ch == '\0')
+ break; /* done */
+ if (ch == '-') {
+ rule = CIPHER_DEL;
+ l++;
+ } else if (ch == '+') {
+ rule = CIPHER_ORD;
+ l++;
+ } else if (ch == '!') {
+ rule = CIPHER_KILL;
+ l++;
+ } else if (ch == '@') {
+ rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
+ l++;
+ } else {
+ rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+ }
+
+ if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) {
+ l++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ alg_mkey = 0;
+ alg_auth = 0;
+ alg_enc = 0;
+ alg_mac = 0;
+ alg_ssl = 0;
+ algo_strength = 0;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ ch = *l;
+ buf = l;
+ buflen = 0;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) ||
+ ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
+ ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
+#else
+ while (isalnum(ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.'))
+#endif
+ {
+ ch = *(++l);
+ buflen++;
+ }
+
+ if (buflen == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We hit something we cannot deal with,
+ * it is no command or separator nor
+ * alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ retval = found = 0;
+ l++;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+ found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */
+ break; /* special treatment */
+ }
+
+ /* check for multi-part specification */
+ if (ch == '+') {
+ multi = 1;
+ l++;
+ } else
+ multi = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful
+ * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation
+ * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher
+ * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3.
+ * So additionally check whether the cipher name found
+ * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call:
+ * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is
+ * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot
+ * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.)
+ */
+ j = found = 0;
+ cipher_id = 0;
+ while (ca_list[j]) {
+ if (!strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) &&
+ (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ } else
+ j++;
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ break; /* ignore this entry */
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) {
+ if (alg_mkey) {
+ alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
+ if (!alg_mkey) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) {
+ if (alg_auth) {
+ alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
+ if (!alg_auth) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) {
+ if (alg_enc) {
+ alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
+ if (!alg_enc) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) {
+ if (alg_mac) {
+ alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
+ if (!alg_mac) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) {
+ if (algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) {
+ algo_strength &=
+ (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK) |
+ ~SSL_EXP_MASK;
+ if (!(algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK)) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_EXP_MASK;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) {
+ if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) {
+ algo_strength &=
+ (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) |
+ ~SSL_STRONG_MASK;
+ if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ algo_strength |=
+ ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->valid) {
+ /*
+ * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not
+ * become part of the search pattern!
+ */
+
+ cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the
+ * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern
+ */
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl) {
+ if (alg_ssl) {
+ alg_ssl &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
+ if (!alg_ssl) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ alg_ssl = ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!multi)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it
+ */
+ if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */
+ ok = 0;
+ if ((buflen == 8) && !strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8))
+ ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p);
+ else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ if (ok == 0)
+ retval = 0;
+ /*
+ * We do not support any "multi" options
+ * together with "@", so throw away the
+ * rest of the command, if any left, until
+ * end or ':' is found.
+ */
+ while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
+ l++;
+ } else if (found) {
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id,
+ alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac,
+ alg_ssl, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p,
+ tail_p);
+ } else {
+ while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
+ l++;
+ }
+ if (*l == '\0')
+ break; /* done */
+ }
+
+ return (retval);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+ **cipher_list, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+ **cipher_list_by_id,
+ const char *rule_str)
+{
+ int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases;
+ unsigned long disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac,
+ disabled_ssl;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack, *tmp_cipher_list;
+ const char *rule_p;
+ CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
+ const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Return with error if nothing to do.
+ */
+ if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
+ * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers.
+ */
+ ssl_cipher_get_disabled(&disabled_mkey, &disabled_auth, &disabled_enc,
+ &disabled_mac, &disabled_ssl);
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled
+ * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so
+ * it is used for allocation.
+ */
+ num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssl_create_cipher_list() for %d ciphers\n",
+ num_of_ciphers);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ co_list =
+ (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers);
+ if (co_list == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL); /* Failure */
+ }
+
+ ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers,
+ disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
+ disabled_mac, disabled_ssl, co_list, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference: */
+
+ /*
+ * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key
+ * exchange mechanisms
+ */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /* AES is our preferred symmetric cipher */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* Low priority for MD5 */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /*
+ * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain
+ * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but
+ * we prefer authenticated ciphers.)
+ */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /* Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+ /*
+ * ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1,
+ * &head, &tail);
+ */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kKRB5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move the the end */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /*
+ * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains
+ * in force within each class
+ */
+ if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /*
+ * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str.
+ * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names
+ * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers.
+ * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher
+ * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise
+ * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table).
+ */
+ num_of_group_aliases = sizeof(cipher_aliases) / sizeof(SSL_CIPHER);
+ num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
+ ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER *) * num_of_alias_max);
+ if (ca_list == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL); /* Failure */
+ }
+ ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases,
+ disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
+ disabled_mac, disabled_ssl, head);
+
+ /*
+ * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule
+ * before using the (possibly available) additional rules.
+ */
+ ok = 1;
+ rule_p = rule_str;
+ if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
+ ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
+ &head, &tail, ca_list);
+ rule_p += 7;
+ if (*rule_p == ':')
+ rule_p++;
+ }
+
+ if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0))
+ ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list);
+
+ OPENSSL_free((void *)ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */
+
+ if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
+ * if we cannot get one.
+ */
+ if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
+ * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
+ */
+ for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (curr->active
+ && (!FIPS_mode() || curr->cipher->algo_strength & SSL_FIPS))
+#else
+ if (curr->active)
+#endif
+ {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher);
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */
+
+ tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack);
+ if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (*cipher_list != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list);
+ *cipher_list = cipherstack;
+ if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id);
+ *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id,
+ ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id);
+ return (cipherstack);
+}
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int is_export, pkl, kl;
+ const char *ver, *exp_str;
+ const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
+ unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, alg2;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ static const char *format =
+ "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s AL=%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx/%lx\n";
+#else
+ static const char *format =
+ "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s%s\n";
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
+ alg_ssl = cipher->algorithm_ssl;
+
+ alg2 = cipher->algorithm2;
+
+ is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cipher);
+ pkl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
+ kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(cipher);
+ exp_str = is_export ? " export" : "";
+
+ if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV2)
+ ver = "SSLv2";
+ else if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV3)
+ ver = "SSLv3";
+ else if (alg_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2)
+ ver = "TLSv1.2";
+ else
+ ver = "unknown";
+
+ switch (alg_mkey) {
+ case SSL_kRSA:
+ kx = is_export ? (pkl == 512 ? "RSA(512)" : "RSA(1024)") : "RSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kDHr:
+ kx = "DH/RSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kDHd:
+ kx = "DH/DSS";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kKRB5:
+ kx = "KRB5";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kEDH:
+ kx = is_export ? (pkl == 512 ? "DH(512)" : "DH(1024)") : "DH";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kECDHr:
+ kx = "ECDH/RSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kECDHe:
+ kx = "ECDH/ECDSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kEECDH:
+ kx = "ECDH";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kPSK:
+ kx = "PSK";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kSRP:
+ kx = "SRP";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kGOST:
+ kx = "GOST";
+ break;
+ default:
+ kx = "unknown";
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_auth) {
+ case SSL_aRSA:
+ au = "RSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aDSS:
+ au = "DSS";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aDH:
+ au = "DH";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aKRB5:
+ au = "KRB5";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aECDH:
+ au = "ECDH";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aNULL:
+ au = "None";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aECDSA:
+ au = "ECDSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aPSK:
+ au = "PSK";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aSRP:
+ au = "SRP";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aGOST94:
+ au = "GOST94";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aGOST01:
+ au = "GOST01";
+ break;
+ default:
+ au = "unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_enc) {
+ case SSL_DES:
+ enc = (is_export && kl == 5) ? "DES(40)" : "DES(56)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_3DES:
+ enc = "3DES(168)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_RC4:
+ enc = is_export ? (kl == 5 ? "RC4(40)" : "RC4(56)")
+ : ((alg2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC) ? "RC4(64)" : "RC4(128)");
+ break;
+ case SSL_RC2:
+ enc = is_export ? (kl == 5 ? "RC2(40)" : "RC2(56)") : "RC2(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_IDEA:
+ enc = "IDEA(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_eNULL:
+ enc = "None";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ enc = "AES(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ enc = "AES(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128GCM:
+ enc = "AESGCM(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES256GCM:
+ enc = "AESGCM(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
+ enc = "Camellia(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
+ enc = "Camellia(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_SEED:
+ enc = "SEED(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
+ enc = "GOST89(256)";
+ break;
+ default:
+ enc = "unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_mac) {
+ case SSL_MD5:
+ mac = "MD5";
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA1:
+ mac = "SHA1";
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA256:
+ mac = "SHA256";
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA384:
+ mac = "SHA384";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AEAD:
+ mac = "AEAD";
+ break;
+ case SSL_GOST89MAC:
+ mac = "GOST89";
+ break;
+ case SSL_GOST94:
+ mac = "GOST94";
+ break;
+ default:
+ mac = "unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ len = 128;
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return ("OPENSSL_malloc Error");
+ } else if (len < 128)
+ return ("Buffer too small");
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac,
+ exp_str, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl);
+#else
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac,
+ exp_str);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return (buf);
+}
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return ("(NONE)");
+ i = (int)(c->id >> 24L);
+ if (i == 3)
+ return ("TLSv1/SSLv3");
+ else if (i == 2)
+ return ("SSLv2");
+ else
+ return ("unknown");
+}
+
+/* return the actual cipher being used */
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ if (c != NULL)
+ return (c->name);
+ return ("(NONE)");
+}
+
+/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ if (alg_bits != NULL)
+ *alg_bits = c->alg_bits;
+ ret = c->strength_bits;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ return c->id;
+}
+
+SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n)
+{
+ SSL_COMP *ctmp;
+ int i, nn;
+
+ if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL))
+ return (NULL);
+ nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk);
+ for (i = 0; i < nn; i++) {
+ ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i);
+ if (ctmp->id == n)
+ return (ctmp);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#else
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
+{
+ load_builtin_compressions();
+ return (ssl_comp_methods);
+}
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
+{
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+ if (cm == NULL || cm->type == NID_undef)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*-
+ * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
+ * compression number ranges should be the following:
+ *
+ * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF
+ * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA
+ * 193 to 255: reserved for private use
+ */
+ if (id < 193 || id > 255) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ MemCheck_off();
+ comp = (SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
+ comp->id = id;
+ comp->method = cm;
+ load_builtin_compressions();
+ if (ssl_comp_methods && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, comp) >= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(comp);
+ MemCheck_on();
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,
+ SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID);
+ return (1);
+ } else if ((ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
+ || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(comp);
+ MemCheck_on();
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ MemCheck_on();
+ return (0);
+ }
+}
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp)
+{
+ if (comp)
+ return comp->name;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_err.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_err.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_err.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,792 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_err.c */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
- * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
- * only reason strings will be preserved.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-
-# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,func,0)
-# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,0,reason)
-
-static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE), "CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED), "CLIENT_FINISHED"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO), "CLIENT_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY), "CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION), "d2i_SSL_SESSION"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE), "DO_DTLS1_WRITE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE), "DO_SSL3_WRITE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT), "DTLS1_ACCEPT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF), "DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD), "DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM), "DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO), "DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT), "DTLS1_CONNECT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC), "DTLS1_ENC"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY), "DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE), "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT),
- "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD), "DTLS1_GET_RECORD"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT), "DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT), "DTLS1_HEARTBEAT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE),
- "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES), "DTLS1_READ_BYTES"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED), "DTLS1_READ_FAILED"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),
- "DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),
- "DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),
- "DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY), "DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST),
- "DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),
- "DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO), "DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE),
- "DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES),
- "DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED), "GET_CLIENT_FINISHED"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO), "GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY), "GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED), "GET_SERVER_FINISHED"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY), "GET_SERVER_VERIFY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION), "i2d_SSL_SESSION"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_N), "READ_N"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE), "REQUEST_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH), "SERVER_FINISH"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO), "SERVER_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY), "SERVER_VERIFY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT), "SSL23_ACCEPT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT), "SSL23_CONNECT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK), "SSL23_PEEK"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_READ), "SSL23_READ"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE), "SSL23_WRITE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT), "SSL2_ACCEPT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT), "SSL2_CONNECT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT), "SSL2_ENC_INIT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL),
- "SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK), "SSL2_PEEK"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_READ), "SSL2_READ"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL), "SSL2_READ_INTERNAL"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE), "SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE), "SSL2_WRITE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT), "SSL3_ACCEPT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF), "SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL), "SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM),
- "SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT), "SSL3_CONNECT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL), "SSL3_CTRL"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL), "SSL3_CTX_CTRL"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS),
- "SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),
- "SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC), "SSL3_ENC"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED), "SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),
- "SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS), "SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY), "SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),
- "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),
- "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED), "SSL3_GET_FINISHED"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE), "SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET),
- "SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO), "SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "SSL3_GET_RECORD"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),
- "SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC), "ssl3_handshake_mac"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK), "SSL3_PEEK"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES), "SSL3_READ_BYTES"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N), "SSL3_READ_N"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),
- "SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),
- "SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),
- "SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY), "SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),
- "SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO), "SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE),
- "SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER), "SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER), "SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES), "SSL3_WRITE_BYTES"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING), "SSL3_WRITE_PENDING"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
- "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
- "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
- "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK),
- "SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK),
- "SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
- "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
- "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
- "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD), "SSL_BAD_METHOD"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP), "SSL_CERT_DUP"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST), "SSL_CERT_INST"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE), "SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW), "SSL_CERT_NEW"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_check_private_key"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
- "SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG),
- "SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR),
- "SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT), "SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR), "SSL_clear"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD),
- "SSL_COMP_add_compression_method"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL), "SSL_ctrl"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_CTX_check_private_key"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES), "SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW), "SSL_CTX_new"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE),
- "SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE), "SSL_CTX_set_purpose"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT),
- "SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION), "SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST), "SSL_CTX_set_trust"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE), "SSL_CTX_use_certificate"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1),
- "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE),
- "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE),
- "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY), "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1),
- "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE),
- "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT),
- "SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY), "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1),
- "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE),
- "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE), "SSL_do_handshake"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION), "SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION), "SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT), "SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY), "SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY), "SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER), "SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE), "SSL_load_client_CA_file"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW), "SSL_new"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
- "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
- "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
- "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
- "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
- "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
- "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK), "SSL_peek"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
- "SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
- "SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ), "SSL_read"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP), "ssl_session_dup"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW), "SSL_SESSION_new"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP), "SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT),
- "SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW), "SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT), "SSL_SET_CERT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_set_cipher_list"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD), "SSL_set_fd"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY), "SSL_SET_PKEY"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE), "SSL_set_purpose"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD), "SSL_set_rfd"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION), "SSL_set_session"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT),
- "SSL_set_session_id_context"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT),
- "SSL_set_session_ticket_ext"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST), "SSL_set_trust"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD), "SSL_set_wfd"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN), "SSL_shutdown"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT), "SSL_SRP_CTX_init"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION),
- "SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION), "SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION),
- "SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE), "SSL_use_certificate"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1), "SSL_use_certificate_ASN1"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE), "SSL_use_certificate_file"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY), "SSL_use_PrivateKey"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_use_PrivateKey_file"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT), "SSL_use_psk_identity_hint"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY), "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1),
- "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE),
- "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN), "SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE), "SSL_write"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC), "tls1_cert_verify_mac"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
- "TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC), "TLS1_ENC"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL),
- "TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT), "SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
- "TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
- "TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF), "tls1_prf"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING), "WRITE_PENDING"},
- {0, NULL}
-};
-
-static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE), "app data in handshake"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT),
- "attempt to reuse session in different context"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD), "bad alert record"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE), "bad authentication type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC), "bad change cipher spec"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM), "bad checksum"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK),
- "bad data returned by callback"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION), "bad decompression"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH), "bad dh g length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH), "bad dh pub key length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH), "bad dh p length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH), "bad digest length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE), "bad dsa signature"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT), "bad ecc cert"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE), "bad ecdsa signature"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT), "bad ecpoint"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH), "bad handshake length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST), "bad hello request"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH), "bad length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE), "bad mac decode"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MAC_LENGTH), "bad mac length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE), "bad message type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH), "bad packet length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER),
- "bad protocol version number"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH),
- "bad psk identity hint length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT), "bad response argument"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT), "bad rsa decrypt"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT), "bad rsa encrypt"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH), "bad rsa e length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH), "bad rsa modulus length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE), "bad rsa signature"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH), "bad srp a length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH), "bad srp b length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH), "bad srp g length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH), "bad srp n length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS), "bad srp parameters"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH), "bad srp s length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE), "bad srtp mki value"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),
- "bad srtp protection profile list"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE), "bad ssl filetype"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH),
- "bad ssl session id length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_STATE), "bad state"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY), "bad write retry"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET), "bio not set"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG),
- "block cipher pad is wrong"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "ca dn length mismatch"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG), "ca dn too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY), "ccs received early"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED),
- "certificate verify failed"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "cert length mismatch"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT), "challenge is different"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH), "cipher code wrong length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE),
- "cipher or hash unavailable"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR), "cipher table src error"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "clienthello tlsext"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),
- "compressed length too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED), "compression disabled"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE), "compression failure"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE),
- "compression id not within private range"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR),
- "compression library error"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT),
- "connection id is different"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET), "connection type not set"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH), "cookie mismatch"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED),
- "data between ccs and finished"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "data length too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED), "decryption failed"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
- "decryption failed or bad record mac"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "dh key too small"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),
- "dh public value length is wrong"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED), "digest check failed"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG), "dtls message too big"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID), "duplicate compression id"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT),
- "ecc cert not for key agreement"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING), "ecc cert not for signing"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE),
- "ecc cert should have rsa signature"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE),
- "ecc cert should have sha1 signature"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER),
- "ecgroup too large for cipher"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),
- "empty srtp protection profile list"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),
- "encrypted length too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY),
- "error generating tmp rsa key"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST),
- "error in received cipher list"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE), "excessive message size"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE), "extra data in message"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS), "got a fin before a ccs"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),
- "got next proto before a ccs"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),
- "got next proto without seeing extension"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST), "https proxy request"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST), "http request"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING), "illegal padding"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK), "inappropriate fallback"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION), "inconsistent compression"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH), "invalid challenge length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND), "invalid command"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),
- "invalid compression algorithm"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE), "invalid purpose"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME), "invalid srp username"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE), "invalid status response"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH),
- "invalid ticket keys length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST), "invalid trust"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG), "key arg too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5), "krb5"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC), "krb5 client cc principal (no tkt?)"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED), "krb5 client get cred"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT), "krb5 client init"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ), "krb5 client mk_req (expired tkt?)"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET), "krb5 server bad ticket"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT), "krb5 server init"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ), "krb5 server rd_req (keytab perms?)"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED), "krb5 server tkt expired"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV), "krb5 server tkt not yet valid"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW), "krb5 server tkt skew"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "length mismatch"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT), "length too short"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG), "library bug"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS), "library has no ciphers"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG), "message too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT), "missing dh dsa cert"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY), "missing dh key"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT), "missing dh rsa cert"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT), "missing dsa signing cert"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY),
- "missing export tmp dh key"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY),
- "missing export tmp rsa key"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE), "missing rsa certificate"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT),
- "missing rsa encrypting cert"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT), "missing rsa signing cert"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM), "can't find SRP server param"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY), "missing tmp dh key"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY), "missing tmp ecdh key"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY), "missing tmp rsa key"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY), "missing tmp rsa pkey"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE), "missing verify message"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS), "multiple sgc restarts"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET), "non sslv2 initial packet"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED), "no certificates returned"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED), "no certificate assigned"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED), "no certificate returned"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET), "no certificate set"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED), "no certificate specified"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE), "no ciphers available"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED), "no ciphers passed"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED), "no ciphers specified"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST), "no cipher list"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH), "no cipher match"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD), "no client cert method"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED), "no client cert received"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED), "no compression specified"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
- "Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED), "no method specified"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY), "no privatekey"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED), "no private key assigned"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE), "no protocols available"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY), "no publickey"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION), "no renegotiation"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST),
- "digest requred for handshake isn't computed"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER), "no shared cipher"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES), "no srtp profiles"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK), "no verify callback"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX), "null ssl ctx"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED), "null ssl method passed"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),
- "old session cipher not returned"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED),
- "old session compression algorithm not returned"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),
- "only tls allowed in fips mode"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG),
- "opaque PRF input too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "packet length too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT), "parse tlsext"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG), "path too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE),
- "peer did not return a certificate"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR), "peer error"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE), "peer error certificate"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE),
- "peer error no certificate"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER), "peer error no cipher"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE),
- "peer error unsupported certificate type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "pre mac length too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS),
- "problems mapping cipher functions"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN), "protocol is shutdown"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND), "psk identity not found"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB), "psk no client cb"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB), "psk no server cb"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR), "public key encrypt error"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA), "public key is not rsa"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA), "public key not rsa"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET), "read bio not set"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED), "read timeout expired"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE), "read wrong packet type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "record length mismatch"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE), "record too large"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL), "record too small"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG), "renegotiate ext too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR),
- "renegotiation encoding err"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH), "renegotiation mismatch"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING), "required cipher missing"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING),
- "required compresssion algorithm missing"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO),
- "reuse cert length not zero"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO), "reuse cert type not zero"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO),
- "reuse cipher list not zero"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),
- "scsv received when renegotiating"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "serverhello tlsext"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),
- "session id context uninitialized"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ), "short read"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR),
- "signature algorithms error"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),
- "signature for non signing certificate"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC), "error with the srp params"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES),
- "srtp could not allocate profiles"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG),
- "srtp protection profile list too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE),
- "srtp unknown protection profile"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE),
- "ssl23 doing session id reuse"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG),
- "ssl2 connection id too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT),
- "ssl3 ext invalid ecpointformat"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME),
- "ssl3 ext invalid servername"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE),
- "ssl3 ext invalid servername type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG), "ssl3 session id too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT),
- "ssl3 session id too short"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE),
- "sslv3 alert bad certificate"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
- "sslv3 alert bad record mac"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED),
- "sslv3 alert certificate expired"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED),
- "sslv3 alert certificate revoked"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN),
- "sslv3 alert certificate unknown"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE),
- "sslv3 alert decompression failure"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),
- "sslv3 alert handshake failure"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER),
- "sslv3 alert illegal parameter"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE),
- "sslv3 alert no certificate"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),
- "sslv3 alert unexpected message"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE),
- "sslv3 alert unsupported certificate"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION),
- "ssl ctx has no default ssl version"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), "ssl handshake failure"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS),
- "ssl library has no ciphers"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED),
- "ssl session id callback failed"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT), "ssl session id conflict"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG),
- "ssl session id context too long"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH),
- "ssl session id has bad length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT),
- "ssl session id is different"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED),
- "tlsv1 alert access denied"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR), "tlsv1 alert decode error"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),
- "tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),
- "tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),
- "tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),
- "tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),
- "tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),
- "tlsv1 alert internal error"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
- "tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION),
- "tlsv1 alert protocol version"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW),
- "tlsv1 alert record overflow"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA), "tlsv1 alert unknown ca"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED),
- "tlsv1 alert user cancelled"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE),
- "tlsv1 bad certificate hash value"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE),
- "tlsv1 bad certificate status response"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE),
- "tlsv1 certificate unobtainable"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME), "tlsv1 unrecognized name"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION),
- "tlsv1 unsupported extension"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER),
- "tls client cert req with anon cipher"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT),
- "peer does not accept heartbeats"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING),
- "heartbeat request already pending"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL),
- "tls illegal exporter label"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST),
- "tls invalid ecpointformat list"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST),
- "tls peer did not respond with certificate list"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),
- "tls rsa encrypted value length is wrong"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER),
- "tried to use unsupported cipher"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS),
- "unable to decode dh certs"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS),
- "unable to decode ecdh certs"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY),
- "unable to extract public key"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS),
- "unable to find dh parameters"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS),
- "unable to find ecdh parameters"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS),
- "unable to find public key parameters"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD),
- "unable to find ssl method"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES),
- "unable to load ssl2 md5 routines"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES),
- "unable to load ssl3 md5 routines"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES),
- "unable to load ssl3 sha1 routines"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), "unexpected message"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD), "unexpected record"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED), "uninitialized"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE), "unknown alert type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE), "unknown certificate type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED), "unknown cipher returned"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE), "unknown cipher type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE),
- "unknown key exchange type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE), "unknown pkey type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL), "unknown protocol"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE),
- "unknown remote error type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION), "unknown ssl version"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE), "unknown state"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED),
- "unsafe legacy renegotiation disabled"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER), "unsupported cipher"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),
- "unsupported compression algorithm"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE), "unsupported digest type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE),
- "unsupported elliptic curve"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL), "unsupported protocol"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION), "unsupported ssl version"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE), "unsupported status type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED), "use srtp not negotiated"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET), "write bio not set"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED), "wrong cipher returned"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE), "wrong message type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS), "wrong number of key bits"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH), "wrong signature length"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE), "wrong signature size"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE), "wrong signature type"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION), "wrong ssl version"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER), "wrong version number"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_LIB), "x509 lib"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS),
- "x509 verification setup problems"},
- {0, NULL}
-};
-
-#endif
-
-void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-
- if (ERR_func_error_string(SSL_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
- ERR_load_strings(0, SSL_str_functs);
- ERR_load_strings(0, SSL_str_reasons);
- }
-#endif
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_err.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_err.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_err.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_err.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,797 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_err.c */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE), "CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED), "CLIENT_FINISHED"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO), "CLIENT_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY), "CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION), "d2i_SSL_SESSION"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE), "DO_DTLS1_WRITE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE), "DO_SSL3_WRITE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT), "DTLS1_ACCEPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF), "DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD), "DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM), "DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO), "DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT), "DTLS1_CONNECT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC), "DTLS1_ENC"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY), "DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE), "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT),
+ "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD), "DTLS1_GET_RECORD"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT), "DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT), "DTLS1_HEARTBEAT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE),
+ "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES), "DTLS1_READ_BYTES"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED), "DTLS1_READ_FAILED"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),
+ "DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),
+ "DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),
+ "DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY), "DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST),
+ "DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),
+ "DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO), "DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE),
+ "DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES),
+ "DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED), "GET_CLIENT_FINISHED"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO), "GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY), "GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED), "GET_SERVER_FINISHED"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY), "GET_SERVER_VERIFY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION), "i2d_SSL_SESSION"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_N), "READ_N"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE), "REQUEST_CERTIFICATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH), "SERVER_FINISH"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO), "SERVER_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY), "SERVER_VERIFY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT), "SSL23_ACCEPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT), "SSL23_CONNECT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK), "SSL23_PEEK"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_READ), "SSL23_READ"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE), "SSL23_WRITE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT), "SSL2_ACCEPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT), "SSL2_CONNECT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT), "SSL2_ENC_INIT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL),
+ "SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK), "SSL2_PEEK"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_READ), "SSL2_READ"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL), "SSL2_READ_INTERNAL"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE), "SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE), "SSL2_WRITE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT), "SSL3_ACCEPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF), "SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL), "SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM),
+ "SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT), "SSL3_CONNECT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL), "SSL3_CTRL"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL), "SSL3_CTX_CTRL"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS),
+ "SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),
+ "SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC), "SSL3_ENC"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED), "SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET),
+ "ssl3_generate_master_secret"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),
+ "SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS), "SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY), "SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),
+ "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),
+ "SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED), "SSL3_GET_FINISHED"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE), "SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE), "SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET),
+ "SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO), "SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD), "SSL3_GET_RECORD"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),
+ "SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_HANDSHAKE_MAC), "ssl3_handshake_mac"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET), "SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK), "SSL3_PEEK"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES), "SSL3_READ_BYTES"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N), "SSL3_READ_N"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),
+ "SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),
+ "SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),
+ "SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY), "SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),
+ "SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO), "SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE),
+ "SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER), "SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER), "SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES), "SSL3_WRITE_BYTES"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING), "SSL3_WRITE_PENDING"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
+ "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
+ "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
+ "SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK),
+ "SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK),
+ "SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
+ "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
+ "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
+ "SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD), "SSL_BAD_METHOD"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP), "SSL_CERT_DUP"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST), "SSL_CERT_INST"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE), "SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW), "SSL_CERT_NEW"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_check_private_key"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
+ "SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG),
+ "SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR),
+ "SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT), "SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR), "SSL_clear"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD),
+ "SSL_COMP_add_compression_method"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTRL), "SSL_ctrl"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY), "SSL_CTX_check_private_key"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES), "SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW), "SSL_CTX_new"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE),
+ "SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE), "SSL_CTX_set_purpose"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT),
+ "SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION), "SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST), "SSL_CTX_set_trust"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE), "SSL_CTX_use_certificate"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1),
+ "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE),
+ "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE),
+ "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY), "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1),
+ "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE),
+ "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT),
+ "SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY), "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1),
+ "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE),
+ "SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE), "SSL_do_handshake"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION), "SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION), "SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT), "SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY), "SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY), "SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER), "SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE), "SSL_load_client_CA_file"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW), "SSL_new"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
+ "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
+ "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
+ "SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),
+ "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
+ "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT),
+ "SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK), "SSL_peek"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
+ "SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
+ "SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ), "SSL_read"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP), "ssl_session_dup"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW), "SSL_SESSION_new"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP), "SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT),
+ "SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW), "SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT), "SSL_SET_CERT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST), "SSL_set_cipher_list"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD), "SSL_set_fd"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY), "SSL_SET_PKEY"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE), "SSL_set_purpose"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD), "SSL_set_rfd"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION), "SSL_set_session"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT),
+ "SSL_set_session_id_context"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT),
+ "SSL_set_session_ticket_ext"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST), "SSL_set_trust"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD), "SSL_set_wfd"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN), "SSL_shutdown"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT), "SSL_SRP_CTX_init"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION),
+ "SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION), "SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION),
+ "SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE), "SSL_use_certificate"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1), "SSL_use_certificate_ASN1"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE), "SSL_use_certificate_file"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY), "SSL_use_PrivateKey"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1), "SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE), "SSL_use_PrivateKey_file"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT), "SSL_use_psk_identity_hint"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY), "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1),
+ "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE),
+ "SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN), "SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE), "SSL_write"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC), "tls1_cert_verify_mac"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
+ "TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC), "TLS1_ENC"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL),
+ "TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT), "SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),
+ "TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT),
+ "TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF), "tls1_prf"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK), "TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING), "WRITE_PENDING"},
+ {0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE), "app data in handshake"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT),
+ "attempt to reuse session in different context"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD), "bad alert record"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE), "bad authentication type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC), "bad change cipher spec"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM), "bad checksum"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK),
+ "bad data returned by callback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION), "bad decompression"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH), "bad dh g length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE), "bad dh g value"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH), "bad dh pub key length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE), "bad dh pub key value"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH), "bad dh p length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE), "bad dh p value"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH), "bad digest length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE), "bad dsa signature"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT), "bad ecc cert"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE), "bad ecdsa signature"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT), "bad ecpoint"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH), "bad handshake length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST), "bad hello request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH), "bad length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE), "bad mac decode"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MAC_LENGTH), "bad mac length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE), "bad message type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH), "bad packet length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER),
+ "bad protocol version number"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH),
+ "bad psk identity hint length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT), "bad response argument"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT), "bad rsa decrypt"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT), "bad rsa encrypt"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH), "bad rsa e length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH), "bad rsa modulus length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE), "bad rsa signature"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH), "bad srp a length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH), "bad srp b length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH), "bad srp g length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH), "bad srp n length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS), "bad srp parameters"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH), "bad srp s length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE), "bad srtp mki value"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),
+ "bad srtp protection profile list"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE), "bad ssl filetype"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH),
+ "bad ssl session id length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_STATE), "bad state"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY), "bad write retry"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET), "bio not set"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG),
+ "block cipher pad is wrong"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BN_LIB), "bn lib"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "ca dn length mismatch"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG), "ca dn too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY), "ccs received early"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED),
+ "certificate verify failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "cert length mismatch"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT), "challenge is different"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH), "cipher code wrong length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE),
+ "cipher or hash unavailable"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR), "cipher table src error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT), "clienthello tlsext"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),
+ "compressed length too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED), "compression disabled"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE), "compression failure"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE),
+ "compression id not within private range"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR),
+ "compression library error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT),
+ "connection id is different"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET), "connection type not set"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH), "cookie mismatch"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED),
+ "data between ccs and finished"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "data length too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED), "decryption failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
+ "decryption failed or bad record mac"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "dh key too small"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),
+ "dh public value length is wrong"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED), "digest check failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG), "dtls message too big"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID), "duplicate compression id"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT),
+ "ecc cert not for key agreement"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING), "ecc cert not for signing"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE),
+ "ecc cert should have rsa signature"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE),
+ "ecc cert should have sha1 signature"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER),
+ "ecgroup too large for cipher"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),
+ "empty srtp protection profile list"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),
+ "encrypted length too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY),
+ "error generating tmp rsa key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST),
+ "error in received cipher list"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE), "excessive message size"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE), "extra data in message"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS), "got a fin before a ccs"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),
+ "got next proto before a ccs"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),
+ "got next proto without seeing extension"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST), "https proxy request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST), "http request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING), "illegal padding"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK), "inappropriate fallback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION), "inconsistent compression"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH), "invalid challenge length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND), "invalid command"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),
+ "invalid compression algorithm"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE), "invalid purpose"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME), "invalid srp username"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE), "invalid status response"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH),
+ "invalid ticket keys length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST), "invalid trust"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG), "key arg too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5), "krb5"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC), "krb5 client cc principal (no tkt?)"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED), "krb5 client get cred"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT), "krb5 client init"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ), "krb5 client mk_req (expired tkt?)"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET), "krb5 server bad ticket"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT), "krb5 server init"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ), "krb5 server rd_req (keytab perms?)"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED), "krb5 server tkt expired"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV), "krb5 server tkt not yet valid"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW), "krb5 server tkt skew"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "length mismatch"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT), "length too short"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG), "library bug"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS), "library has no ciphers"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG), "message too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT), "missing dh dsa cert"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY), "missing dh key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT), "missing dh rsa cert"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT), "missing dsa signing cert"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY),
+ "missing export tmp dh key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY),
+ "missing export tmp rsa key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE), "missing rsa certificate"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT),
+ "missing rsa encrypting cert"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT), "missing rsa signing cert"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM), "can't find SRP server param"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY), "missing tmp dh key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY), "missing tmp ecdh key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY), "missing tmp rsa key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY), "missing tmp rsa pkey"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE), "missing verify message"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS), "multiple sgc restarts"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET), "non sslv2 initial packet"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED), "no certificates returned"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED), "no certificate assigned"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED), "no certificate returned"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET), "no certificate set"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED), "no certificate specified"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE), "no ciphers available"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED), "no ciphers passed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED), "no ciphers specified"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST), "no cipher list"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH), "no cipher match"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD), "no client cert method"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED), "no client cert received"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED), "no compression specified"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
+ "Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED), "no method specified"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY), "no privatekey"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED), "no private key assigned"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE), "no protocols available"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY), "no publickey"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION), "no renegotiation"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST),
+ "digest requred for handshake isn't computed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER), "no shared cipher"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES), "no srtp profiles"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK), "no verify callback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX), "null ssl ctx"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED), "null ssl method passed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),
+ "old session cipher not returned"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED),
+ "old session compression algorithm not returned"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),
+ "only tls allowed in fips mode"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG),
+ "opaque PRF input too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "packet length too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT), "parse tlsext"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG), "path too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE),
+ "peer did not return a certificate"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR), "peer error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE), "peer error certificate"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE),
+ "peer error no certificate"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER), "peer error no cipher"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE),
+ "peer error unsupported certificate type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG), "pre mac length too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS),
+ "problems mapping cipher functions"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN), "protocol is shutdown"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND), "psk identity not found"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB), "psk no client cb"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB), "psk no server cb"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR), "public key encrypt error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA), "public key is not rsa"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA), "public key not rsa"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET), "read bio not set"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED), "read timeout expired"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE), "read wrong packet type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH), "record length mismatch"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE), "record too large"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL), "record too small"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG), "renegotiate ext too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR),
+ "renegotiation encoding err"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH), "renegotiation mismatch"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING), "required cipher missing"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING),
+ "required compresssion algorithm missing"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO),
+ "reuse cert length not zero"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO), "reuse cert type not zero"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO),
+ "reuse cipher list not zero"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),
+ "scsv received when renegotiating"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT), "serverhello tlsext"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),
+ "session id context uninitialized"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ), "short read"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR),
+ "signature algorithms error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),
+ "signature for non signing certificate"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC), "error with the srp params"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES),
+ "srtp could not allocate profiles"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG),
+ "srtp protection profile list too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE),
+ "srtp unknown protection profile"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE),
+ "ssl23 doing session id reuse"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG),
+ "ssl2 connection id too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT),
+ "ssl3 ext invalid ecpointformat"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME),
+ "ssl3 ext invalid servername"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE),
+ "ssl3 ext invalid servername type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG), "ssl3 session id too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT),
+ "ssl3 session id too short"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE),
+ "sslv3 alert bad certificate"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
+ "sslv3 alert bad record mac"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED),
+ "sslv3 alert certificate expired"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED),
+ "sslv3 alert certificate revoked"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN),
+ "sslv3 alert certificate unknown"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE),
+ "sslv3 alert decompression failure"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),
+ "sslv3 alert handshake failure"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER),
+ "sslv3 alert illegal parameter"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE),
+ "sslv3 alert no certificate"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),
+ "sslv3 alert unexpected message"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE),
+ "sslv3 alert unsupported certificate"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION),
+ "ssl ctx has no default ssl version"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), "ssl handshake failure"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS),
+ "ssl library has no ciphers"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED),
+ "ssl session id callback failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT), "ssl session id conflict"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG),
+ "ssl session id context too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH),
+ "ssl session id has bad length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT),
+ "ssl session id is different"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED),
+ "tlsv1 alert access denied"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR), "tlsv1 alert decode error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),
+ "tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),
+ "tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),
+ "tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),
+ "tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),
+ "tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),
+ "tlsv1 alert internal error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
+ "tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION),
+ "tlsv1 alert protocol version"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW),
+ "tlsv1 alert record overflow"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA), "tlsv1 alert unknown ca"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED),
+ "tlsv1 alert user cancelled"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE),
+ "tlsv1 bad certificate hash value"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE),
+ "tlsv1 bad certificate status response"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE),
+ "tlsv1 certificate unobtainable"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME), "tlsv1 unrecognized name"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION),
+ "tlsv1 unsupported extension"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER),
+ "tls client cert req with anon cipher"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT),
+ "peer does not accept heartbeats"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING),
+ "heartbeat request already pending"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL),
+ "tls illegal exporter label"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST),
+ "tls invalid ecpointformat list"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST),
+ "tls peer did not respond with certificate list"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),
+ "tls rsa encrypted value length is wrong"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER),
+ "tried to use unsupported cipher"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS),
+ "unable to decode dh certs"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS),
+ "unable to decode ecdh certs"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY),
+ "unable to extract public key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS),
+ "unable to find dh parameters"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS),
+ "unable to find ecdh parameters"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS),
+ "unable to find public key parameters"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD),
+ "unable to find ssl method"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES),
+ "unable to load ssl2 md5 routines"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES),
+ "unable to load ssl3 md5 routines"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES),
+ "unable to load ssl3 sha1 routines"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), "unexpected message"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD), "unexpected record"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED), "uninitialized"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE), "unknown alert type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE), "unknown certificate type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED), "unknown cipher returned"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE), "unknown cipher type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE),
+ "unknown key exchange type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE), "unknown pkey type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL), "unknown protocol"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE),
+ "unknown remote error type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION), "unknown ssl version"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE), "unknown state"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED),
+ "unsafe legacy renegotiation disabled"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER), "unsupported cipher"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),
+ "unsupported compression algorithm"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE), "unsupported digest type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE),
+ "unsupported elliptic curve"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL), "unsupported protocol"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION), "unsupported ssl version"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE), "unsupported status type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED), "use srtp not negotiated"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET), "write bio not set"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED), "wrong cipher returned"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE), "wrong message type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS), "wrong number of key bits"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH), "wrong signature length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE), "wrong signature size"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE), "wrong signature type"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION), "wrong ssl version"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER), "wrong version number"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_LIB), "x509 lib"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS),
+ "x509 verification setup problems"},
+ {0, NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+ if (ERR_func_error_string(SSL_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+ ERR_load_strings(0, SSL_str_functs);
+ ERR_load_strings(0, SSL_str_reasons);
+ }
+#endif
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_lib.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,3315 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions.
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-# include <assert.h>
-#endif
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-
-const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
-
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = {
- /*
- * evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library
- * bug
- */
- (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
- (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))
- ssl_undefined_function,
- (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
- (int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *))
- ssl_undefined_function,
- 0, /* finish_mac_length */
- (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
- NULL, /* client_finished_label */
- 0, /* client_finished_label_len */
- NULL, /* server_finished_label */
- 0, /* server_finished_label_len */
- (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
- (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
- size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
- int use_context))ssl_undefined_function,
-};
-
-int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
-{
-
- if (s->method == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) {
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = NULL;
- }
-
- s->error = 0;
- s->hit = 0;
- s->shutdown = 0;
-
-#if 0
- /*
- * Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
- * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation)
- */
- /*
- * This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
- * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-)
- */
- if (s->renegotiate)
- return (1);
-#else
- if (s->renegotiate) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
-
- s->type = 0;
-
- s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | ((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT);
-
- s->version = s->method->version;
- s->client_version = s->version;
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-#if 0
- s->read_ahead = s->ctx->read_ahead;
-#endif
-
- if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
- }
-
- ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
-
- s->first_packet = 0;
-
-#if 1
- /*
- * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
- * back if we are not doing session-id reuse.
- */
- if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL)
- && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) {
- s->method->ssl_free(s);
- s->method = s->ctx->method;
- if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
- return (0);
- } else
-#endif
- s->method->ssl_clear(s);
- return (1);
-}
-
-/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
-int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
-{
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-
- ctx->method = meth;
-
- sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list),
- &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
- meth->version ==
- SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" :
- SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,
- SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
- return (0);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- SSL *s;
-
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (ctx->method == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- s = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
- if (s == NULL)
- goto err;
- memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL));
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
- s->options = ctx->options;
- s->mode = ctx->mode;
- s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
-
- if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
- /*
- * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not
- * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL
- * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to
- * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were
- * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
- * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the
- * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once.
- */
-
- s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
- if (s->cert == NULL)
- goto err;
- } else
- s->cert = NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
-
- s->read_ahead = ctx->read_ahead;
- s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
- s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
- s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
-#if 0
- s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth;
-#endif
- s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
- OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
- memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
- s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
- s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id;
-
- s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
- if (!s->param)
- goto err;
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
-#if 0
- s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
- s->trust = ctx->trust;
-#endif
- s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
- s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
-
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- s->ctx = ctx;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
- s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- s->initial_ctx = ctx;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
-# endif
-#endif
-
- s->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-
- s->method = ctx->method;
-
- if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
- goto err;
-
- s->references = 1;
- s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1;
-
- SSL_clear(s);
-
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
- s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
-#endif
-
- return (s);
- err:
- if (s != NULL)
- SSL_free(s);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
- unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
-{
- if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
- SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
- memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
- unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
-{
- if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
- SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
- memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
-{
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
-{
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
- ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
- unsigned int id_len)
-{
- /*
- * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
- * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
- * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
- * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
- * by this SSL.
- */
- SSL_SESSION r, *p;
-
- if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
- return 0;
-
- r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
- r.session_id_length = id_len;
- memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
- /*
- * NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
- * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
- * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
- * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it.
- */
- if ((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
- (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
- memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
- r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- return (p != NULL);
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
-}
-
-int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
-}
-
-int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
-}
-
-int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
-}
-
-void SSL_free(SSL *s)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (s == NULL)
- return;
-
- i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("SSL", s);
-#endif
- if (i > 0)
- return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
-
- if (s->param)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
-
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
-
- if (s->bbio != NULL) {
- /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
- if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
- s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
- }
- BIO_free(s->bbio);
- s->bbio = NULL;
- }
- if (s->rbio != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
- if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
- BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
-
- if (s->init_buf != NULL)
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
-
- /* add extra stuff */
- if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
- if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-
- /* Make the next call work :-) */
- if (s->session != NULL) {
- ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- }
-
- ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
-
- if (s->cert != NULL)
- ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
- /* Free up if allocated */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_hostname)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (s->initial_ctx)
- SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
-#endif
-
- if (s->client_CA != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
-
- if (s->method != NULL)
- s->method->ssl_free(s);
-
- if (s->ctx)
- SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
- kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
- OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (s->srtp_profiles)
- sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_free(s);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio)
-{
- /*
- * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
- */
- if (s->bbio != NULL) {
- if (s->wbio == s->bbio) {
- s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio;
- s->bbio->next_bio = NULL;
- }
- }
- if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
- BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
- if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
- BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
- s->rbio = rbio;
- s->wbio = wbio;
-}
-
-BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
-{
- return (s->rbio);
-}
-
-BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
-{
- return (s->wbio);
-}
-
-int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
-{
- return (SSL_get_rfd(s));
-}
-
-int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = -1;
- BIO *b, *r;
-
- b = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
- if (r != NULL)
- BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = -1;
- BIO *b, *r;
-
- b = SSL_get_wbio(s);
- r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
- if (r != NULL)
- BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
-int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- BIO *bio = NULL;
-
- bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
-
- if (bio == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio);
- ret = 1;
- err:
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- BIO *bio = NULL;
-
- if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
- || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) {
- bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
-
- if (bio == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio);
- } else
- SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s));
- ret = 1;
- err:
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- BIO *bio = NULL;
-
- if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
- || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) {
- bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
-
- if (bio == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s));
- } else
- SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s));
- ret = 1;
- err:
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
-size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
-{
- size_t ret = 0;
-
- if (s->s3 != NULL) {
- ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
- if (count > ret)
- count = ret;
- memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
-size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
-{
- size_t ret = 0;
-
- if (s->s3 != NULL) {
- ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
- if (count > ret)
- count = ret;
- memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
-{
- return (s->verify_mode);
-}
-
-int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
-}
-
-int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
- return (s->verify_callback);
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return (ctx->verify_mode);
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
-}
-
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
- return (ctx->default_verify_callback);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
- int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
-{
- s->verify_mode = mode;
- if (callback != NULL)
- s->verify_callback = callback;
-}
-
-void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth)
-{
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes)
-{
- s->read_ahead = yes;
-}
-
-int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
-{
- return (s->read_ahead);
-}
-
-int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
-{
- /*
- * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
- * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is
- * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be
- * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is
- * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.)
- */
- return (s->method->ssl_pending(s));
-}
-
-X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
-{
- X509 *r;
-
- if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
- r = NULL;
- else
- r = s->session->peer;
-
- if (r == NULL)
- return (r);
-
- CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-
- return (r);
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
-{
- STACK_OF(X509) *r;
-
- if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)
- || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
- r = NULL;
- else
- r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
-
- /*
- * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if
- * we are a server, it does not.
- */
-
- return (r);
-}
-
-/*
- * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
- * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled
- */
-void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
-{
- CERT *tmp;
-
- /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
- SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f));
-
- /*
- * what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or vice-versa
- */
- if (t->method != f->method) {
- t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
- t->method = f->method; /* change method */
- t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
- }
-
- tmp = t->cert;
- if (f->cert != NULL) {
- CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
- t->cert = f->cert;
- } else
- t->cert = NULL;
- if (tmp != NULL)
- ssl_cert_free(tmp);
- SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length);
-}
-
-/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
-int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if ((ctx == NULL) ||
- (ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
- SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
- return (0);
- }
- if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
- SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
- return (0);
- }
- return (X509_check_private_key
- (ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
-}
-
-/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
-int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
-{
- if (ssl == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (0);
- }
- if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
- return (0);
- }
- if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
- return (0);
- }
- return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
- ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
-}
-
-int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->handshake_func == 0)
- /* Not properly initialized yet */
- SSL_set_accept_state(s);
-
- return (s->method->ssl_accept(s));
-}
-
-int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->handshake_func == 0)
- /* Not properly initialized yet */
- SSL_set_connect_state(s);
-
- return (s->method->ssl_connect(s));
-}
-
-long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
-{
- return (s->method->get_timeout());
-}
-
-int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
-{
- if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- return (0);
- }
- return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num));
-}
-
-int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
-{
- if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
- return (0);
- }
- return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num));
-}
-
-int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num)
-{
- if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
- return (-1);
- }
- return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num));
-}
-
-int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
-{
- /*
- * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
- * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but
- * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used
- * (see ssl3_shutdown).
- */
-
- if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
- return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
- else
- return (1);
-}
-
-int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->renegotiate == 0)
- s->renegotiate = 1;
-
- s->new_session = 1;
-
- return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
-}
-
-int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->renegotiate == 0)
- s->renegotiate = 1;
-
- s->new_session = 0;
-
- return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
-}
-
-int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
-{
- /*
- * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a
- * handshake has finished
- */
- return (s->renegotiate != 0);
-}
-
-long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
-{
- long l;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
- return (s->read_ahead);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
- l = s->read_ahead;
- s->read_ahead = larg;
- return (l);
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
- s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
- return (s->options |= larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
- return (s->options &= ~larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
- return (s->mode |= larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
- return (s->mode &= ~larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
- return (s->max_cert_list);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
- l = s->max_cert_list;
- s->max_cert_list = larg;
- return (l);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
- if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- return 0;
- s->max_send_fragment = larg;
- return 1;
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
- if (s->s3)
- return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
- else
- return 0;
- default:
- return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg));
- }
-}
-
-long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
-{
- switch (cmd) {
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
- s->msg_callback = (void (*)
- (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
- const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
- void *arg))(fp);
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp));
- }
-}
-
-LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return ctx->sessions;
-}
-
-long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
-{
- long l;
-
- switch (cmd) {
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
- return (ctx->read_ahead);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
- l = ctx->read_ahead;
- ctx->read_ahead = larg;
- return (l);
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
- ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
- return (ctx->max_cert_list);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
- l = ctx->max_cert_list;
- ctx->max_cert_list = larg;
- return (l);
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
- l = ctx->session_cache_size;
- ctx->session_cache_size = larg;
- return (l);
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
- return (ctx->session_cache_size);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
- l = ctx->session_cache_mode;
- ctx->session_cache_mode = larg;
- return (l);
- case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
- return (ctx->session_cache_mode);
-
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
- return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_connect);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_accept);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_hit);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_miss);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
- case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
- return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
- case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
- return (ctx->options |= larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
- return (ctx->options &= ~larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
- return (ctx->mode |= larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
- return (ctx->mode &= ~larg);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
- if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- return 0;
- ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
- return 1;
- default:
- return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg));
- }
-}
-
-long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
-{
- switch (cmd) {
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
- ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)
- (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
- const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
- void *arg))(fp);
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp));
- }
-}
-
-int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
-{
- long l;
-
- l = a->id - b->id;
- if (l == 0L)
- return (0);
- else
- return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
-}
-
-int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
- const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp)
-{
- long l;
-
- l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id;
- if (l == 0L)
- return (0);
- else
- return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
-}
-
-/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
- * preference */
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
-{
- if (s != NULL) {
- if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
- return (s->cipher_list);
- } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) {
- return (s->ctx->cipher_list);
- }
- }
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
- * algorithm id */
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s != NULL) {
- if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
- return (s->cipher_list_by_id);
- } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) {
- return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
- }
- }
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
-const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
-{
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-
- if (s == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
- return (NULL);
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
- if (c == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- return (c->name);
-}
-
-/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
-int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
-{
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-
- sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list,
- &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str);
- /*
- * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to
- * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule
- * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an
- * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
- * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated.
- */
- if (sk == NULL)
- return 0;
- else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
-int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str)
-{
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-
- sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list,
- &s->cipher_list_by_id, str);
- /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
- if (sk == NULL)
- return 0;
- else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
-char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
-{
- char *p;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
- int i;
-
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2))
- return (NULL);
-
- p = buf;
- sk = s->session->ciphers;
-
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
- return NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
- int n;
-
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
- n = strlen(c->name);
- if (n + 1 > len) {
- if (p != buf)
- --p;
- *p = '\0';
- return buf;
- }
- strcpy(p, c->name);
- p += n;
- *(p++) = ':';
- len -= n + 1;
- }
- p[-1] = '\0';
- return (buf);
-}
-
-int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
- unsigned char *p,
- int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
- unsigned char *))
-{
- int i, j = 0;
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
- unsigned char *q;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
- if (sk == NULL)
- return (0);
- q = p;
- if (put_cb == NULL)
- put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
- /* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
- if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
- (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
- continue;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)
- || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) && nokrb5)
- continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
- if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK))
- && s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
- continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP))
- && !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
- continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
- j = put_cb(c, p);
- p += j;
- }
- /*
- * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
- * applicable SCSVs.
- */
- if (p != q) {
- if (!s->renegotiate) {
- static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
- };
- j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
- p += j;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,
- "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
-#endif
- }
-
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
- static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
- };
- j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
- p += j;
- }
- }
-
- return (p - q);
-}
-
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
- int num,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
-{
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- int i, n;
-
- if (s->s3)
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
-
- n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
- if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
- SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
- return (NULL);
- }
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
- sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
- if(sk == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- } else {
- sk = *skp;
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
- /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
- if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
- (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
- (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
- /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
- SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
- p += n;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
-#endif
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
- if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
- (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
- (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
- /*
- * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
- * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
- * downgrade.
- */
- if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
- SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- if (s->s3)
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- goto err;
- }
- p += n;
- continue;
- }
-
- c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
- p += n;
- if (c != NULL) {
- if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (skp != NULL)
- *skp = sk;
- return (sk);
- err:
- if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
- * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
- */
-
-const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
-{
- if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
- return NULL;
-
- return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
- s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname;
-}
-
-int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->session
- && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->
- tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
- return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- return -1;
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/*
- * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
- * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
- * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a
- * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is
- * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte
- * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for
- * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this
- * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to
- * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If
- * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client
- * selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this
- * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first
- * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol.
- * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about
- * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any
- * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as
- * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was
- * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
- */
-int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
- const unsigned char *server,
- unsigned int server_len,
- const unsigned char *client,
- unsigned int client_len)
-{
- unsigned int i, j;
- const unsigned char *result;
- int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
-
- /*
- * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
- for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
- if (server[i] == client[j] &&
- memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
- /* We found a match */
- result = &server[i];
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
- goto found;
- }
- j += client[j];
- j++;
- }
- i += server[i];
- i++;
- }
-
- /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
- result = client;
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
- found:
- *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
- *outlen = result[0];
- return status;
-}
-
-/*
- * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the
- * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the
- * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that
- * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from
- * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
- * provided by the callback.
- */
-void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
- unsigned *len)
-{
- *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
- if (!*data) {
- *len = 0;
- } else {
- *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when
- * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
- * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is
- * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This
- * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a
- * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it
- * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the
- * ServerHello.
- */
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
- const unsigned char
- **out,
- unsigned int *outlen,
- void *arg), void *arg)
-{
- ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
- ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
-}
-
-/*
- * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
- * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
- * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
- * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The
- * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The
- * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must
- * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
- * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
- */
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
- unsigned char *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in,
- unsigned int inlen,
- void *arg), void *arg)
-{
- ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
- ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
-}
-# endif
-#endif
-
-int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
- const char *label, size_t llen,
- const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
- int use_context)
-{
- if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
- return -1;
-
- return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
- llen, p, plen,
- use_context);
-}
-
-static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
-{
- unsigned long l;
-
- l = (unsigned long)
- ((unsigned int)a->session_id[0]) |
- ((unsigned int)a->session_id[1] << 8L) |
- ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2] << 16L) |
- ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3] << 24L);
- return (l);
-}
-
-/*
- * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
- * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
- * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on
- * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing
- * session with a matching session ID.
- */
-static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
-{
- if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
- return (1);
- if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
- return (1);
- return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length));
-}
-
-/*
- * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
- * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
- * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed
- * via ssl.h.
- */
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
-
-SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
-{
- SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
-
- if (meth == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
- return (NULL);
- }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
- return NULL;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
- if (ret == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX));
-
- ret->method = meth;
-
- ret->cert_store = NULL;
- ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
- ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
- ret->session_cache_head = NULL;
- ret->session_cache_tail = NULL;
-
- /* We take the system default */
- ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout();
-
- ret->new_session_cb = 0;
- ret->remove_session_cb = 0;
- ret->get_session_cb = 0;
- ret->generate_session_id = 0;
-
- memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats));
-
- ret->references = 1;
- ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
-
-/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
-/*-
- ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
- ret->master_key=NULL;
- ret->key_arg=NULL;
- ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
-
- ret->info_callback = NULL;
-
- ret->app_verify_callback = 0;
- ret->app_verify_arg = NULL;
-
- ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
- ret->read_ahead = 0;
- ret->msg_callback = 0;
- ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL;
- ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
-#if 0
- ret->verify_depth = -1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
-#endif
- ret->sid_ctx_length = 0;
- ret->default_verify_callback = NULL;
- if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- ret->default_passwd_callback = 0;
- ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL;
- ret->client_cert_cb = 0;
- ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0;
- ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0;
-
- ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
- if (ret->sessions == NULL)
- goto err;
- ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
- if (ret->cert_store == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
- &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
- meth->version ==
- SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
- if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
- goto err2;
- }
-
- ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
- if (!ret->param)
- goto err;
-
- if ((ret->rsa_md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
- goto err2;
- }
- if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
- goto err2;
- }
- if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
- goto err2;
- }
-
- if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
-
- ret->extra_certs = NULL;
- /* No compression for DTLS */
- if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
-
- ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
- ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
- /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
- if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
- || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
- || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
- ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
-
- ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
- ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
- ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
-# endif
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- ret->psk_client_callback = NULL;
- ret->psk_server_callback = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
- ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
- ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
- if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
- goto err;
- ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
- ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
- ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
- ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
- if (!ret->wbuf_freelist) {
- OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
- goto err;
- }
- ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
- ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
- ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
-# define eng_strx(x) #x
-# define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x)
- /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
- {
- ENGINE *eng;
- eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
- if (!eng) {
- ERR_clear_error();
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
- eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
- }
- if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
-# endif
-#endif
- /*
- * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
- * deployed might change this.
- */
- ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
-
- return (ret);
- err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- err2:
- if (ret != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(ret);
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-#if 0
-static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
-{
- OPENSSL_free(comp);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-static void ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
-{
- SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
- for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next) {
- next = ent->next;
- OPENSSL_free(ent);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(list);
-}
-#endif
-
-void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (a == NULL)
- return;
-
- i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a);
-#endif
- if (i > 0)
- return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
-
- if (a->param)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
-
- /*
- * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
- * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
- * after the sessions were flushed.
- * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
- * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
- * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
- * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
- */
- if (a->sessions != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0);
-
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
-
- if (a->sessions != NULL)
- lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
-
- if (a->cert_store != NULL)
- X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
- if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
- if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
- if (a->cert != NULL)
- ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
- if (a->client_CA != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
- if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free);
-#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it
- * removes a global database */
- if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
- sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods, SSL_COMP_free);
-#else
- a->comp_methods = NULL;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (a->srtp_profiles)
- sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (a->psk_identity_hint)
- OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (a->client_cert_engine)
- ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
- if (a->wbuf_freelist)
- ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
- if (a->rbuf_freelist)
- ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_free(a);
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
-{
- ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u)
-{
- ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
- void *arg)
-{
- ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
- ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
- int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
-{
- ctx->verify_mode = mode;
- ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth)
-{
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
-}
-
-void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
-{
- CERT_PKEY *cpk;
- int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign;
- int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export;
- int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl;
- unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- X509 *x = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
- int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
-#endif
- if (c == NULL)
- return;
-
- kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
- rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
- (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
-#else
- rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
- dh_tmp_export = (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
- (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
-#else
- dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
-#endif
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
- rsa_enc = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
- rsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
- dsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
- dh_rsa = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
-/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
- dh_dsa = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
- dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- have_ecc_cert = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
-#endif
- mask_k = 0;
- mask_a = 0;
- emask_k = 0;
- emask_a = 0;
-
-#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,
- "rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
- rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc,
- rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa);
-#endif
-
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
- if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
- mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
- }
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
- if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
- mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
- }
-
- if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
- mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
- if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
- emask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
-
-#if 0
- /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
- if ((dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
- mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
- if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
- (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
- emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
-#endif
-
- if (dh_tmp_export)
- emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
-
- if (dh_tmp)
- mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
-
- if (dh_rsa)
- mask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
- if (dh_rsa_export)
- emask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
-
- if (dh_dsa)
- mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
- if (dh_dsa_export)
- emask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
-
- if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
- mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
- emask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
- }
-
- if (dsa_sign) {
- mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
- emask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
- }
-
- mask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
- emask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
- mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
- emask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
- emask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
-#endif
-
- /*
- * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites
- * depending on the key usage extension.
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (have_ecc_cert) {
- /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
- x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
- ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
- (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
- ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
- (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
- ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
- EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
- if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
- signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
- OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (ecdh_ok) {
-
- if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
- mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
- if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
- emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
- emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
- }
- }
-
- if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
- mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
- if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
- emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
- emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- if (ecdsa_ok) {
- mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
- emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
- }
-#endif
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (have_ecdh_tmp) {
- mask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
- emask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
- mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
- emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
- emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
-#endif
-
- c->mask_k = mask_k;
- c->mask_a = mask_a;
- c->export_mask_k = emask_k;
- c->export_mask_a = emask_a;
- c->valid = 1;
-}
-
-/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
-#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-
-int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int keysize = 0;
- int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
- const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-
- alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
-
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) {
- /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- if (pkey == NULL)
- return 0;
- keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (keysize > 163)
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
- if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
- signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
- OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
- }
- if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) {
- /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
- if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
- SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
- if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
- SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- /* signature alg must be RSA */
-
- if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
- SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
- /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
- if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
- SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1; /* all checks are ok */
-}
-
-#endif
-
-/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
-CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
- CERT *c;
- int i;
-
- c = s->cert;
- ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
- /*
- * we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH since no certificate is needed
- * for anon ECDH and for authenticated EECDH, the check for the auth
- * algorithm will set i correctly NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
- * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA we need an RSA cert. Placing the
- * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA checks ensures the correct cert is
- * chosen.
- */
- i = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
- i = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
- i = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
- i = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
- i = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
- if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
- i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
- else
- i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
- } else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5) {
- /* VRS something else here? */
- return (NULL);
- } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
- i = SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
- i = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
- else { /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
-
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return (NULL);
- }
-
- return c->pkeys + i;
-}
-
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s)
-{
- CERT_PKEY *cpk;
- cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
- if (!cpk)
- return NULL;
- return cpk->x509;
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
- const EVP_MD **pmd)
-{
- unsigned long alg_a;
- CERT *c;
- int idx = -1;
-
- alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
- c = s->cert;
-
- if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
- (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
- idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
- if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
- else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
- } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
- (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
- idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- if (idx == -1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (pmd)
- *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
- return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
-}
-
-void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
-{
- int i;
-
- /*
- * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
- */
- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
- return;
-
- i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
- if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
- && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
- || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session))
- && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) {
- CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- }
-
- /* auto flush every 255 connections */
- if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) {
- if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
- ? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
- : s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) {
- SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL));
- }
- }
-}
-
-const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
-{
- return (s->method);
-}
-
-int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
-{
- int conn = -1;
- int ret = 1;
-
- if (s->method != meth) {
- if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
- conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
-
- if (s->method->version == meth->version)
- s->method = meth;
- else {
- s->method->ssl_free(s);
- s->method = meth;
- ret = s->method->ssl_new(s);
- }
-
- if (conn == 1)
- s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect;
- else if (conn == 0)
- s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i)
-{
- int reason;
- unsigned long l;
- BIO *bio;
-
- if (i > 0)
- return (SSL_ERROR_NONE);
-
- /*
- * Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
- * where we do encode the error
- */
- if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) {
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
- return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
- else
- return (SSL_ERROR_SSL);
- }
-
- if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) {
- bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- if (BIO_should_read(bio))
- return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
- else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
- /*
- * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write
- * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio
- * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for.
- * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have
- * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and
- * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it
- * might be safer to keep it.
- */
- return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
- else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
- reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
- if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
- return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
- else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
- return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
- else
- return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
- }
- }
-
- if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) {
- bio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
- if (BIO_should_write(bio))
- return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
- else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
- /*
- * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio))
- */
- return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
- else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
- reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
- if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
- return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
- else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
- return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
- else
- return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
- }
- }
- if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) {
- return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
- }
-
- if (i == 0) {
- if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- /* assume it is the socket being closed */
- return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
- } else {
- if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
- (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
- return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
- }
- }
- return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
-}
-
-int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = 1;
-
- if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
-
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
- ret = s->handshake_func(s);
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so one of these
- * calls will reset it
- */
-void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
-{
- s->server = 1;
- s->shutdown = 0;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
- s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
- /* clear the current cipher */
- ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
-{
- s->server = 0;
- s->shutdown = 0;
- s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
- s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
- /* clear the current cipher */
- ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
-}
-
-int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
-{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
-{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,
- ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
-{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,
- ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (0);
-}
-
-SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
-{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
- return ("TLSv1.2");
- else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
- return ("TLSv1.1");
- else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
- return ("TLSv1");
- else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
- return ("SSLv3");
- else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
- return ("SSLv2");
- else
- return ("unknown");
-}
-
-SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
-{
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
- X509_NAME *xn;
- SSL *ret;
- int i;
-
- if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
-
- ret->version = s->version;
- ret->type = s->type;
- ret->method = s->method;
-
- if (s->session != NULL) {
- /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
- SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s);
- } else {
- /*
- * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that
- * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both
- * point to the same object, and thus we can't use
- * SSL_copy_session_id.
- */
-
- ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
- ret->method = s->method;
- ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
-
- if (s->cert != NULL) {
- if (ret->cert != NULL) {
- ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
- }
- ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
- if (ret->cert == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
-
- SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
- }
-
- ret->options = s->options;
- ret->mode = s->mode;
- SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
- SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
- ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
- ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
- SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
- SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
- ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
-
- SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s));
-
- ret->debug = s->debug;
-
- /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
- if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
- goto err;
-
- /* setup rbio, and wbio */
- if (s->rbio != NULL) {
- if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio))
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->wbio != NULL) {
- if (s->wbio != s->rbio) {
- if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio))
- goto err;
- } else
- ret->wbio = ret->rbio;
- }
- ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
- ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
- ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
- ret->server = s->server;
- ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
- ret->new_session = s->new_session;
- ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
- ret->shutdown = s->shutdown;
- ret->state = s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state,
- * though */
- ret->rstate = s->rstate;
- ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf,
- * ret->init_msg, ret->init_num,
- * ret->init_off */
- ret->hit = s->hit;
-
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
-
- /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
- if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
- if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
- if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
- if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
- == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* Dup the client_CA list */
- if (s->client_CA != NULL) {
- if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- ret->client_CA = sk;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
- xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
- if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) {
- X509_NAME_free(xn);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (0) {
- err:
- if (ret != NULL)
- SSL_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
- s->enc_read_ctx = NULL;
- }
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
- s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (s->expand != NULL) {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand = NULL;
- }
- if (s->compress != NULL) {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress = NULL;
- }
-#endif
-}
-
-/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
-X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->cert != NULL)
- return (s->cert->key->x509);
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
-EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->cert != NULL)
- return (s->cert->key->privatekey);
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
-{
- if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
- return (s->session->cipher);
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-
-const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-#else
-
-const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->compress != NULL)
- return (s->compress->meth);
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->expand != NULL)
- return (s->expand->meth);
- return (NULL);
-}
-#endif
-
-int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push)
-{
- BIO *bbio;
-
- if (s->bbio == NULL) {
- bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
- if (bbio == NULL)
- return (0);
- s->bbio = bbio;
- } else {
- bbio = s->bbio;
- if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
- s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
- }
- (void)BIO_reset(bbio);
-/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
- if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
- if (push) {
- if (s->wbio != bbio)
- s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio);
- } else {
- if (s->wbio == bbio)
- s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio);
- }
- return (1);
-}
-
-void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
-{
- if (s->bbio == NULL)
- return;
-
- if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
- /* remove buffering */
- s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
-#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids
- * adding one more preprocessor symbol */
- assert(s->wbio != NULL);
-#endif
- }
- BIO_free(s->bbio);
- s->bbio = NULL;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode)
-{
- ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode;
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return (ctx->quiet_shutdown);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
-{
- s->quiet_shutdown = mode;
-}
-
-int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
-{
- return (s->quiet_shutdown);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
-{
- s->shutdown = mode;
-}
-
-int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
-{
- return (s->shutdown);
-}
-
-int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
-{
- return (s->version);
-}
-
-SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
-{
- return (ssl->ctx);
-}
-
-SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
- if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
- return ssl->ctx;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ctx == NULL)
- ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
-#endif
- ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
- if (ocert != NULL) {
- int i;
- /* Copy negotiated digests from original */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i;
- CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i;
- rpk->digest = cpk->digest;
- }
- ssl_cert_free(ocert);
- }
-
- /*
- * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
- * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
-
- /*
- * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
- * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
- * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
- * leave it unchanged.
- */
- if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
- (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
- (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) {
- ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
- memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
- }
-
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
- ssl->ctx = ctx;
-
- return (ssl->ctx);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
- const char *CApath)
-{
- return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath));
-}
-#endif
-
-void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
-{
- ssl->info_callback = cb;
-}
-
-/*
- * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function
- * pointer.
- */
-void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ ,
- int /* type */ ,
- int /* val */ ) {
- return ssl->info_callback;
-}
-
-int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
-{
- return (ssl->state);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
-{
- ssl->state = state;
-}
-
-void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg)
-{
- ssl->verify_result = arg;
-}
-
-long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
-{
- return (ssl->verify_result);
-}
-
-int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-}
-
-int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg)
-{
- return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
-}
-
-void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx)
-{
- return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg)
-{
- return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
-}
-
-void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx)
-{
- return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
-}
-
-int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
-{
- return (1);
-}
-
-X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return (ctx->cert_store);
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
-{
- if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
- X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
- ctx->cert_store = store;
-}
-
-int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
-{
- return (s->rwstate);
-}
-
-/**
- * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
- * \param ctx the SSL context.
- * \param cb the callback
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
- int is_export,
- int keylength))
-{
- SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
- int is_export,
- int keylength))
-{
- SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DOXYGEN
-/**
- * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
- * \param ssl the SSL session.
- * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
- * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
- * of the required key in bits.
- * \return the temporary RSA key.
- * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
- */
-
-RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-/**
- * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
- * \param ctx the SSL context.
- * \param dh the callback
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
- int keylength))
-{
- SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
- int keylength))
-{
- SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
- int keylength))
-{
- SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,
- (void (*)(void))ecdh);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,
- EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
- int keylength))
-{
- SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
-{
- if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- if (identity_hint != NULL) {
- ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
- if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
- return 0;
- } else
- ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- return 1;
-}
-
-int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (s->session == NULL)
- return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
-
- if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- if (identity_hint != NULL) {
- s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
- if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
- return 0;
- } else
- s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- return 1;
-}
-
-const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
-{
- if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
- return NULL;
- return (s->session->psk_identity_hint);
-}
-
-const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
-{
- if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
- return NULL;
- return (s->session->psk_identity);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
- unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
- const char *hint,
- char *identity,
- unsigned int
- max_identity_len,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int
- max_psk_len))
-{
- s->psk_client_callback = cb;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
- const char *hint,
- char *identity,
- unsigned int
- max_identity_len,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int
- max_psk_len))
-{
- ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
-}
-
-void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
- unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
- const char *identity,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int
- max_psk_len))
-{
- s->psk_server_callback = cb;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
- const char *identity,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int
- max_psk_len))
-{
- ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
-}
-#endif
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
- int content_type, const void *buf,
- size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
-{
- SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
- void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
- int content_type, const void *buf,
- size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
-{
- SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
-}
-
-/*
- * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
- * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
- * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly
- * allocated ctx;
- */
-
-EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
- *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if (md)
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL);
- return *hash;
-}
-
-void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
-{
-
- if (*hash)
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
- *hash = NULL;
-}
-
-void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
-{
- s->debug = debug;
-}
-
-int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
-{
- return s->hit;
-}
-
-#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
-# include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
-#endif
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
-IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_lib.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_lib.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_lib.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,3318 @@
+/*
+ * ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions.
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = {
+ /*
+ * evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library
+ * bug
+ */
+ (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *))
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ 0, /* finish_mac_length */
+ (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+ NULL, /* client_finished_label */
+ 0, /* client_finished_label_len */
+ NULL, /* server_finished_label */
+ 0, /* server_finished_label_len */
+ (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
+ (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
+ size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
+ int use_context))ssl_undefined_function,
+};
+
+int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+
+ if (s->method == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ }
+
+ s->error = 0;
+ s->hit = 0;
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+
+#if 0
+ /*
+ * Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
+ * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation)
+ */
+ /*
+ * This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
+ * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-)
+ */
+ if (s->renegotiate)
+ return (1);
+#else
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s->type = 0;
+
+ s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | ((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT);
+
+ s->version = s->method->version;
+ s->client_version = s->version;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+#if 0
+ s->read_ahead = s->ctx->read_ahead;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+ s->first_packet = 0;
+
+#if 1
+ /*
+ * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
+ * back if we are not doing session-id reuse.
+ */
+ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL)
+ && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) {
+ s->method->ssl_free(s);
+ s->method = s->ctx->method;
+ if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+ return (0);
+ } else
+#endif
+ s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ ctx->method = meth;
+
+ sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list),
+ &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
+ meth->version ==
+ SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" :
+ SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ SSL *s;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (ctx->method == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ s = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
+ if (s == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ s->options = ctx->options;
+ s->mode = ctx->mode;
+ s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
+ s->references = 1;
+
+ if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not
+ * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL
+ * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to
+ * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were
+ * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
+ * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the
+ * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once.
+ */
+
+ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ s->cert = NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
+
+ s->read_ahead = ctx->read_ahead;
+ s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
+ s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
+ s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
+#if 0
+ s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth;
+#endif
+ s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
+ memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
+ s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
+ s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id;
+
+ s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (!s->param)
+ goto err;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
+#if 0
+ s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
+ s->trust = ctx->trust;
+#endif
+ s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+ s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ s->ctx = ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
+ s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ s->initial_ctx = ctx;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ s->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+ s->method = ctx->method;
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1;
+
+ SSL_clear(s);
+
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
+ s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
+#endif
+
+ return (s);
+ err:
+ if (s != NULL)
+ SSL_free(s);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+ if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+ if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+ memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+{
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+{
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int id_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
+ * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
+ * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
+ * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
+ * by this SSL.
+ */
+ SSL_SESSION r, *p;
+
+ if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
+ return 0;
+
+ r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
+ r.session_id_length = id_len;
+ memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
+ /*
+ * NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
+ * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
+ * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
+ * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it.
+ */
+ if ((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
+ (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
+ memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
+ r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return (p != NULL);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
+}
+
+void SSL_free(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("SSL", s);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (s->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+ if (s->bbio != NULL) {
+ /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
+ if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
+ s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+ }
+ BIO_free(s->bbio);
+ s->bbio = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->rbio != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+ if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
+ BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+
+ /* add extra stuff */
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+ /* Make the next call work :-) */
+ if (s->session != NULL) {
+ ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ }
+
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
+ /* Free up if allocated */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (s->initial_ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+#endif
+
+ if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+
+ if (s->method != NULL)
+ s->method->ssl_free(s);
+
+ if (s->ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
+ kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ if (s->srtp_profiles)
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio)
+{
+ /*
+ * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
+ */
+ if (s->bbio != NULL) {
+ if (s->wbio == s->bbio) {
+ s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio;
+ s->bbio->next_bio = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
+ BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+ if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
+ BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+ s->rbio = rbio;
+ s->wbio = wbio;
+}
+
+BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return (s->rbio);
+}
+
+BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return (s->wbio);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return (SSL_get_rfd(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ BIO *b, *r;
+
+ b = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ BIO *b, *r;
+
+ b = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+ r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio);
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+ if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+ || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) {
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio);
+ } else
+ SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+ if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+ || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) {
+ bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+ if (bio == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ } else
+ SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3 != NULL) {
+ ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
+ if (count > ret)
+ count = ret;
+ memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3 != NULL) {
+ ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+ if (count > ret)
+ count = ret;
+ memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return (s->verify_mode);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
+ return (s->verify_callback);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return (ctx->verify_mode);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
+ return (ctx->default_verify_callback);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
+ int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
+{
+ s->verify_mode = mode;
+ if (callback != NULL)
+ s->verify_callback = callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes)
+{
+ s->read_ahead = yes;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return (s->read_ahead);
+}
+
+int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
+{
+ /*
+ * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
+ * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is
+ * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be
+ * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is
+ * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.)
+ */
+ return (s->method->ssl_pending(s));
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
+{
+ X509 *r;
+
+ if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
+ r = NULL;
+ else
+ r = s->session->peer;
+
+ if (r == NULL)
+ return (r);
+
+ CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+ return (r);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *r;
+
+ if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)
+ || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
+ r = NULL;
+ else
+ r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if
+ * we are a server, it does not.
+ */
+
+ return (r);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
+ * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled
+ */
+void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
+{
+ CERT *tmp;
+
+ /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
+ SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f));
+
+ /*
+ * what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or vice-versa
+ */
+ if (t->method != f->method) {
+ t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
+ t->method = f->method; /* change method */
+ t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
+ }
+
+ tmp = t->cert;
+ if (f->cert != NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+ t->cert = f->cert;
+ } else
+ t->cert = NULL;
+ if (tmp != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(tmp);
+ SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length);
+}
+
+/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
+int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if ((ctx == NULL) ||
+ (ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
+ SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
+ SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (X509_check_private_key
+ (ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
+}
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ if (ssl == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
+ ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
+}
+
+int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ /* Not properly initialized yet */
+ SSL_set_accept_state(s);
+
+ return (s->method->ssl_accept(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+ /* Not properly initialized yet */
+ SSL_set_connect_state(s);
+
+ return (s->method->ssl_connect(s));
+}
+
+long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return (s->method->get_timeout());
+}
+
+int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num));
+}
+
+int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num));
+}
+
+int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num)
+{
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num));
+}
+
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
+{
+ /*
+ * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
+ * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but
+ * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used
+ * (see ssl3_shutdown).
+ */
+
+ if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
+ return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
+ else
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->renegotiate == 0)
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+
+ s->new_session = 1;
+
+ return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->renegotiate == 0)
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+
+ s->new_session = 0;
+
+ return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
+{
+ /*
+ * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a
+ * handshake has finished
+ */
+ return (s->renegotiate != 0);
+}
+
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+ long l;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+ return (s->read_ahead);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+ l = s->read_ahead;
+ s->read_ahead = larg;
+ return (l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+ s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+ return (s->options |= larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+ return (s->options &= ~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+ return (s->mode |= larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+ return (s->mode &= ~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ return (s->max_cert_list);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ l = s->max_cert_list;
+ s->max_cert_list = larg;
+ return (l);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+ if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+ s->max_send_fragment = larg;
+ return 1;
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
+ if (s->s3)
+ return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg));
+ }
+}
+
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ s->msg_callback = (void (*)
+ (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+ void *arg))(fp);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp));
+ }
+}
+
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->sessions;
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+ long l;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+ return (ctx->read_ahead);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+ l = ctx->read_ahead;
+ ctx->read_ahead = larg;
+ return (l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+ ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ return (ctx->max_cert_list);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+ l = ctx->max_cert_list;
+ ctx->max_cert_list = larg;
+ return (l);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+ l = ctx->session_cache_size;
+ ctx->session_cache_size = larg;
+ return (l);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+ return (ctx->session_cache_size);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+ l = ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ ctx->session_cache_mode = larg;
+ return (l);
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+ return (ctx->session_cache_mode);
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
+ return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_connect);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_accept);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_hit);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_miss);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
+ return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
+ case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+ return (ctx->options |= larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+ return (ctx->options &= ~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+ return (ctx->mode |= larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+ return (ctx->mode &= ~larg);
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+ if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg));
+ }
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)
+ (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+ void *arg))(fp);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp));
+ }
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
+{
+ long l;
+
+ l = a->id - b->id;
+ if (l == 0L)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
+ const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp)
+{
+ long l;
+
+ l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id;
+ if (l == 0L)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
+}
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * preference */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
+ return (s->cipher_list);
+ } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) {
+ return (s->ctx->cipher_list);
+ }
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * algorithm id */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
+ return (s->cipher_list_by_id);
+ } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) {
+ return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
+ }
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
+const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
+{
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
+ return (NULL);
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ return (c->name);
+}
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list,
+ &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str);
+ /*
+ * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to
+ * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule
+ * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an
+ * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
+ * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated.
+ */
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+ sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list,
+ &s->cipher_list_by_id, str);
+ /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ char *p;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2))
+ return (NULL);
+
+ p = buf;
+ sk = s->session->ciphers;
+
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ int n;
+
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ n = strlen(c->name);
+ if (n + 1 > len) {
+ if (p != buf)
+ --p;
+ *p = '\0';
+ return buf;
+ }
+ strcpy(p, c->name);
+ p += n;
+ *(p++) = ':';
+ len -= n + 1;
+ }
+ p[-1] = '\0';
+ return (buf);
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+ unsigned char *p,
+ int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
+ unsigned char *))
+{
+ int i, j = 0;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ unsigned char *q;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ q = p;
+ if (put_cb == NULL)
+ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ /* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
+ if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
+ (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
+ continue;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)
+ || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) && nokrb5)
+ continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK))
+ && s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+ continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+ continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+ j = put_cb(c, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
+ * applicable SCSVs.
+ */
+ if (p != q) {
+ if (!s->renegotiate) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
+ p += j;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (p - q);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+ int num,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ int i, n;
+
+ if (s->s3)
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+ n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
+ if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
+ sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
+ if(sk == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ sk = *skp;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
+ /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
+ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+ /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+ p += n;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
+#endif
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
+ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+ /*
+ * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
+ * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
+ * downgrade.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ if (s->s3)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += n;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
+ p += n;
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (skp != NULL)
+ *skp = sk;
+ return (sk);
+ err:
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
+ * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
+ */
+
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
+{
+ if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->session
+ && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->
+ tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
+ return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a
+ * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is
+ * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte
+ * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for
+ * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this
+ * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to
+ * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If
+ * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client
+ * selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this
+ * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first
+ * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol.
+ * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about
+ * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any
+ * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as
+ * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was
+ * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
+ */
+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *server,
+ unsigned int server_len,
+ const unsigned char *client,
+ unsigned int client_len)
+{
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ const unsigned char *result;
+ int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+ /*
+ * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
+ for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
+ if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+ memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
+ /* We found a match */
+ result = &server[i];
+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+ goto found;
+ }
+ j += client[j];
+ j++;
+ }
+ i += server[i];
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+ result = client;
+ status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+
+ found:
+ *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
+ *outlen = result[0];
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the
+ * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the
+ * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that
+ * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from
+ * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
+ * provided by the callback.
+ */
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned *len)
+{
+ *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
+ if (!*data) {
+ *len = 0;
+ } else {
+ *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when
+ * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is
+ * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This
+ * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a
+ * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it
+ * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the
+ * ServerHello.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const unsigned char
+ **out,
+ unsigned int *outlen,
+ void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The
+ * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The
+ * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must
+ * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
+ * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+# endif
+#endif
+
+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
+ int use_context)
+{
+ if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
+ return -1;
+
+ return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
+ llen, p, plen,
+ use_context);
+}
+
+static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ l = (unsigned long)
+ ((unsigned int)a->session_id[0]) |
+ ((unsigned int)a->session_id[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2] << 16L) |
+ ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3] << 24L);
+ return (l);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
+ * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
+ * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on
+ * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing
+ * session with a matching session ID.
+ */
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
+{
+ if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
+ return (1);
+ if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
+ return (1);
+ return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length));
+}
+
+/*
+ * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
+ * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
+ * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed
+ * via ssl.h.
+ */
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
+
+ if (meth == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+
+ ret->method = meth;
+
+ ret->cert_store = NULL;
+ ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+ ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+ ret->session_cache_head = NULL;
+ ret->session_cache_tail = NULL;
+
+ /* We take the system default */
+ ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout();
+
+ ret->new_session_cb = 0;
+ ret->remove_session_cb = 0;
+ ret->get_session_cb = 0;
+ ret->generate_session_id = 0;
+
+ memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats));
+
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
+
+/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
+/*-
+ ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
+ ret->master_key=NULL;
+ ret->key_arg=NULL;
+ ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
+
+ ret->info_callback = NULL;
+
+ ret->app_verify_callback = 0;
+ ret->app_verify_arg = NULL;
+
+ ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+ ret->read_ahead = 0;
+ ret->msg_callback = 0;
+ ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL;
+ ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+#if 0
+ ret->verify_depth = -1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
+#endif
+ ret->sid_ctx_length = 0;
+ ret->default_verify_callback = NULL;
+ if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret->default_passwd_callback = 0;
+ ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL;
+ ret->client_cert_cb = 0;
+ ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0;
+ ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0;
+
+ ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (ret->sessions == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (ret->cert_store == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
+ &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
+ meth->version ==
+ SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+ if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (!ret->param)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((ret->rsa_md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+
+ ret->extra_certs = NULL;
+ /* No compression for DTLS */
+ if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+
+ ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
+ ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
+ /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
+ if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
+ || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
+ || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
+ ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+
+ ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
+ ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
+ ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ ret->psk_client_callback = NULL;
+ ret->psk_server_callback = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+ ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+ if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
+ goto err;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+ ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+ ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+ if (!ret->wbuf_freelist) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+ ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+ ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
+# define eng_strx(x) #x
+# define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x)
+ /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
+ {
+ ENGINE *eng;
+ eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+ if (!eng) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+ }
+ if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
+ * deployed might change this.
+ */
+ ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+
+ return (ret);
+ err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ret);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+#if 0
+static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(comp);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+static void ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
+{
+ SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
+ for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next) {
+ next = ent->next;
+ OPENSSL_free(ent);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(list);
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (a->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
+
+ /*
+ * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
+ * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
+ * after the sessions were flushed.
+ * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
+ * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
+ * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
+ * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
+ */
+ if (a->sessions != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0);
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
+
+ if (a->sessions != NULL)
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
+
+ if (a->cert_store != NULL)
+ X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
+ if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
+ if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
+ if (a->cert != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
+ if (a->client_CA != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+ if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free);
+#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it
+ * removes a global database */
+ if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods, SSL_COMP_free);
+#else
+ a->comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ if (a->srtp_profiles)
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (a->psk_identity_hint)
+ OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (a->client_cert_engine)
+ ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+ if (a->wbuf_freelist)
+ ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
+ if (a->rbuf_freelist)
+ ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
+{
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u)
+{
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
+ void *arg)
+{
+ ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
+ ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
+ int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+{
+ ctx->verify_mode = mode;
+ ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+ int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign;
+ int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export;
+ int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl;
+ unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
+ int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
+#endif
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
+ rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+ (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
+#else
+ rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+ dh_tmp_export = (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+ (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
+#else
+ dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+#endif
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ rsa_enc = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
+ rsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
+ dsa_sign = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
+ dh_rsa = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
+/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
+ dh_dsa = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+ dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ have_ecc_cert = (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+#endif
+ mask_k = 0;
+ mask_a = 0;
+ emask_k = 0;
+ emask_a = 0;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+ rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc,
+ rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa);
+#endif
+
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
+ if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
+ }
+ cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
+ if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
+ mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
+ if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
+ emask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
+
+#if 0
+ /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
+ if ((dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+ mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+ if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
+ (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+ emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+#endif
+
+ if (dh_tmp_export)
+ emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+
+ if (dh_tmp)
+ mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+
+ if (dh_rsa)
+ mask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
+ if (dh_rsa_export)
+ emask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
+
+ if (dh_dsa)
+ mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+ if (dh_dsa_export)
+ emask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+
+ if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
+ mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+ }
+
+ if (dsa_sign) {
+ mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+ }
+
+ mask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+ emask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites
+ * depending on the key usage extension.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (have_ecc_cert) {
+ /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
+ x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+ (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
+ ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+ (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
+ ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
+ if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
+ signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (ecdh_ok) {
+
+ if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+ if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
+ emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+ if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
+ emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (ecdsa_ok) {
+ mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (have_ecdh_tmp) {
+ mask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
+ emask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+
+ c->mask_k = mask_k;
+ c->mask_a = mask_a;
+ c->export_mask_k = emask_k;
+ c->export_mask_a = emask_a;
+ c->valid = 1;
+}
+
+/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int keysize = 0;
+ int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+
+ alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) {
+ /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (keysize > 163)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
+ signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+ }
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) {
+ /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
+ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+ SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
+ if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+ SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ /* signature alg must be RSA */
+
+ if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+ SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
+ /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
+ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+ SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1; /* all checks are ok */
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
+CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ CERT *c;
+ int i;
+
+ c = s->cert;
+ ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ /*
+ * we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH since no certificate is needed
+ * for anon ECDH and for authenticated EECDH, the check for the auth
+ * algorithm will set i correctly NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
+ * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA we need an RSA cert. Placing the
+ * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA checks ensures the correct cert is
+ * chosen.
+ */
+ i = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
+ i = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
+ i = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
+ i = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+ i = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
+ if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
+ i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+ else
+ i = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+ } else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5) {
+ /* VRS something else here? */
+ return (NULL);
+ } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
+ i = SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+ i = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+ else { /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ return c->pkeys + i;
+}
+
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s)
+{
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+ cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+ if (!cpk)
+ return NULL;
+ return cpk->x509;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+ const EVP_MD **pmd)
+{
+ unsigned long alg_a;
+ CERT *c;
+ int idx = -1;
+
+ alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ c = s->cert;
+
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
+ (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
+ if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+ else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+ } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
+ (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (pmd)
+ *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
+ return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
+}
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
+ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
+ */
+ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
+ return;
+
+ i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
+ && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+ || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session))
+ && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) {
+ CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ }
+
+ /* auto flush every 255 connections */
+ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) {
+ if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
+ ? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
+ : s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) {
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
+{
+ return (s->method);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ int conn = -1;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (s->method != meth) {
+ if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
+ conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
+
+ if (s->method->version == meth->version)
+ s->method = meth;
+ else {
+ s->method->ssl_free(s);
+ s->method = meth;
+ ret = s->method->ssl_new(s);
+ }
+
+ if (conn == 1)
+ s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect;
+ else if (conn == 0)
+ s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i)
+{
+ int reason;
+ unsigned long l;
+ BIO *bio;
+
+ if (i > 0)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+
+ /*
+ * Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
+ * where we do encode the error
+ */
+ if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) {
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+ else
+ return (SSL_ERROR_SSL);
+ }
+
+ if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) {
+ bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+ else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+ /*
+ * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write
+ * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio
+ * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for.
+ * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have
+ * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and
+ * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it
+ * might be safer to keep it.
+ */
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+ else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+ reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+ if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+ else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+ else
+ return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) {
+ bio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+ if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+ else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+ /*
+ * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio))
+ */
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+ else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+ reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+ if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+ else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+ else
+ return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) {
+ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
+ }
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ /* assume it is the socket being closed */
+ return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+ } else {
+ if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
+ (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
+ return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+ }
+ }
+ return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+}
+
+int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
+
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
+ ret = s->handshake_func(s);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so one of these
+ * calls will reset it
+ */
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
+{
+ s->server = 1;
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+ s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
+ /* clear the current cipher */
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
+{
+ s->server = 0;
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+ s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
+ /* clear the current cipher */
+ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+}
+
+int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
+{
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
+{
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,
+ ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
+{
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,
+ ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
+{
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ return ("TLSv1.2");
+ else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ return ("TLSv1.1");
+ else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return ("TLSv1");
+ else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return ("SSLv3");
+ else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
+ return ("SSLv2");
+ else
+ return ("unknown");
+}
+
+SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
+ X509_NAME *xn;
+ SSL *ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ ret->version = s->version;
+ ret->type = s->type;
+ ret->method = s->method;
+
+ if (s->session != NULL) {
+ /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
+ SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that
+ * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both
+ * point to the same object, and thus we can't use
+ * SSL_copy_session_id.
+ */
+
+ ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
+ ret->method = s->method;
+ ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
+
+ if (s->cert != NULL) {
+ if (ret->cert != NULL) {
+ ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
+ }
+ ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
+ if (ret->cert == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+ }
+
+ ret->options = s->options;
+ ret->mode = s->mode;
+ SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
+ SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
+ ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
+ ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
+ SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
+ SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+ ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
+
+ SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s));
+
+ ret->debug = s->debug;
+
+ /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* setup rbio, and wbio */
+ if (s->rbio != NULL) {
+ if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->wbio != NULL) {
+ if (s->wbio != s->rbio) {
+ if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio))
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ ret->wbio = ret->rbio;
+ }
+ ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
+ ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
+ ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
+ ret->server = s->server;
+ ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
+ ret->new_session = s->new_session;
+ ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
+ ret->shutdown = s->shutdown;
+ ret->state = s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state,
+ * though */
+ ret->rstate = s->rstate;
+ ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf,
+ * ret->init_msg, ret->init_num,
+ * ret->init_off */
+ ret->hit = s->hit;
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
+
+ /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
+ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
+ if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+ if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
+ == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Dup the client_CA list */
+ if (s->client_CA != NULL) {
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret->client_CA = sk;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) {
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (0) {
+ err:
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ SSL_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ s->enc_read_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->compress != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
+ return (s->cert->key->x509);
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->cert != NULL)
+ return (s->cert->key->privatekey);
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
+{
+ if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+ return (s->session->cipher);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#else
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ return (s->compress->meth);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->expand != NULL)
+ return (s->expand->meth);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push)
+{
+ BIO *bbio;
+
+ if (s->bbio == NULL) {
+ bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+ if (bbio == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ s->bbio = bbio;
+ } else {
+ bbio = s->bbio;
+ if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+ s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+ }
+ (void)BIO_reset(bbio);
+/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
+ if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (push) {
+ if (s->wbio != bbio)
+ s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio);
+ } else {
+ if (s->wbio == bbio)
+ s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->bbio == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
+ /* remove buffering */
+ s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids
+ * adding one more preprocessor symbol */
+ assert(s->wbio != NULL);
+#endif
+ }
+ BIO_free(s->bbio);
+ s->bbio = NULL;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode)
+{
+ ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return (ctx->quiet_shutdown);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+ s->quiet_shutdown = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return (s->quiet_shutdown);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+ s->shutdown = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return (s->shutdown);
+}
+
+int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return (s->version);
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ return (ssl->ctx);
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
+ if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
+ return ssl->ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
+#endif
+ ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+ if (ocert != NULL) {
+ int i;
+ /* Copy negotiated digests from original */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = ocert->pkeys + i;
+ CERT_PKEY *rpk = ssl->cert->pkeys + i;
+ rpk->digest = cpk->digest;
+ }
+ ssl_cert_free(ocert);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
+ * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+
+ /*
+ * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
+ * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
+ * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
+ * leave it unchanged.
+ */
+ if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
+ (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
+ (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) {
+ ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+ memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
+ ssl->ctx = ctx;
+
+ return (ssl->ctx);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+ const char *CApath)
+{
+ return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath));
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
+{
+ ssl->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+/*
+ * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function
+ * pointer.
+ */
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ ,
+ int /* type */ ,
+ int /* val */ ) {
+ return ssl->info_callback;
+}
+
+int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ return (ssl->state);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
+{
+ ssl->state = state;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg)
+{
+ ssl->verify_result = arg;
+}
+
+long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ return (ssl->verify_result);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
+{
+ return (1);
+}
+
+X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return (ctx->cert_store);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
+{
+ if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
+ X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+ ctx->cert_store = store;
+}
+
+int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
+{
+ return (s->rwstate);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param cb the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DOXYGEN
+/**
+ * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
+ * \param ssl the SSL session.
+ * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
+ * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
+ * of the required key in bits.
+ * \return the temporary RSA key.
+ * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
+ */
+
+RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param dh the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdh);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+ int keylength))
+{
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
+{
+ if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (identity_hint != NULL) {
+ ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+ if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (s->session == NULL)
+ return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
+
+ if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (identity_hint != NULL) {
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return (s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ return (s->session->psk_identity);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
+ unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const char *hint,
+ char *identity,
+ unsigned int
+ max_identity_len,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int
+ max_psk_len))
+{
+ s->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const char *hint,
+ char *identity,
+ unsigned int
+ max_identity_len,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int
+ max_psk_len))
+{
+ ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
+ unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int
+ max_psk_len))
+{
+ s->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int
+ max_psk_len))
+{
+ ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+ int content_type, const void *buf,
+ size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+{
+ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
+ void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+ int content_type, const void *buf,
+ size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+{
+ SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
+ * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
+ * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly
+ * allocated ctx;
+ */
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
+ *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+ *hash = NULL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return *hash;
+}
+
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
+{
+
+ if (*hash)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+ *hash = NULL;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
+{
+ s->debug = debug;
+}
+
+int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
+{
+ return s->hit;
+}
+
+#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
+# include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
+#endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_locl.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1245 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_locl.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
-# define HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
-# include <stdlib.h>
-# include <time.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# include <errno.h>
-
-# include "e_os.h"
-
-# include <openssl/buffer.h>
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-# include <openssl/comp.h>
-# endif
-# include <openssl/bio.h>
-# include <openssl/stack.h>
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-# include <openssl/dsa.h>
-# endif
-# include <openssl/err.h>
-# include <openssl/ssl.h>
-# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL
-# undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
-# define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
-# endif
-
-# undef PKCS1_CHECK
-
-# define c2l(c,l) (l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \
- l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \
- l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \
- l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24))
-
-/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */
-# define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
- c+=n; \
- l1=l2=0; \
- switch (n) { \
- case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
- case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
- case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
- case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \
- case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
- case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
- case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
- case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \
- } \
- }
-
-# define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff))
-
-# define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
- l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
- l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
- l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
-
-# define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
-
-# define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
-
-# define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
- *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
-
-# define n2l6(c,l) (l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
- l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
- l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
- l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
- l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
- l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++))))
-
-/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */
-# define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
- c+=n; \
- switch (n) { \
- case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
- case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
- case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
- case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \
- case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
- case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
- case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
- case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \
- } \
- }
-
-# define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)(c[0]))<< 8)| \
- (((unsigned int)(c[1])) )),c+=2)
-# define s2n(s,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \
- c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),c+=2)
-
-# define n2l3(c,l) ((l =(((unsigned long)(c[0]))<<16)| \
- (((unsigned long)(c[1]))<< 8)| \
- (((unsigned long)(c[2])) )),c+=3)
-
-# define l2n3(l,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
- c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
- c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),c+=3)
-
-/* LOCAL STUFF */
-
-# define SSL_DECRYPT 0
-# define SSL_ENCRYPT 1
-
-# define TWO_BYTE_BIT 0x80
-# define SEC_ESC_BIT 0x40
-# define TWO_BYTE_MASK 0x7fff
-# define THREE_BYTE_MASK 0x3fff
-
-# define INC32(a) ((a)=((a)+1)&0xffffffffL)
-# define DEC32(a) ((a)=((a)-1)&0xffffffffL)
-# define MAX_MAC_SIZE 20 /* up from 16 for SSLv3 */
-
-/*
- * Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms.
- * This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers
- * etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information
- * is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms
- * can be publicly accessed.
- * Use the according functions for cipher management instead.
- *
- * The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in
- * ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting
- * that the different entities within are mutually exclusive:
- * ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME.
- */
-
-/* Bits for algorithm_mkey (key exchange algorithm) */
-/* RSA key exchange */
-# define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001L
-/* DH cert, RSA CA cert */
-/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-# define SSL_kDHr 0x00000002L
-/* DH cert, DSA CA cert */
-/* no such ciphersuite supported! */
-# define SSL_kDHd 0x00000004L
-/* tmp DH key no DH cert */
-# define SSL_kEDH 0x00000008L
-/* Kerberos5 key exchange */
-# define SSL_kKRB5 0x00000010L
-/* ECDH cert, RSA CA cert */
-# define SSL_kECDHr 0x00000020L
-/* ECDH cert, ECDSA CA cert */
-# define SSL_kECDHe 0x00000040L
-/* ephemeral ECDH */
-# define SSL_kEECDH 0x00000080L
-/* PSK */
-# define SSL_kPSK 0x00000100L
-/* GOST key exchange */
-# define SSL_kGOST 0x00000200L
-/* SRP */
-# define SSL_kSRP 0x00000400L
-
-/* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */
-/* RSA auth */
-# define SSL_aRSA 0x00000001L
-/* DSS auth */
-# define SSL_aDSS 0x00000002L
-/* no auth (i.e. use ADH or AECDH) */
-# define SSL_aNULL 0x00000004L
-/* Fixed DH auth (kDHd or kDHr) */
-/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
-# define SSL_aDH 0x00000008L
-/* Fixed ECDH auth (kECDHe or kECDHr) */
-# define SSL_aECDH 0x00000010L
-/* KRB5 auth */
-# define SSL_aKRB5 0x00000020L
-/* ECDSA auth*/
-# define SSL_aECDSA 0x00000040L
-/* PSK auth */
-# define SSL_aPSK 0x00000080L
-/* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */
-# define SSL_aGOST94 0x00000100L
-/* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
-# define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000200L
-/* SRP auth */
-# define SSL_aSRP 0x00000400L
-
-/* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
-# define SSL_DES 0x00000001L
-# define SSL_3DES 0x00000002L
-# define SSL_RC4 0x00000004L
-# define SSL_RC2 0x00000008L
-# define SSL_IDEA 0x00000010L
-# define SSL_eNULL 0x00000020L
-# define SSL_AES128 0x00000040L
-# define SSL_AES256 0x00000080L
-# define SSL_CAMELLIA128 0x00000100L
-# define SSL_CAMELLIA256 0x00000200L
-# define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT 0x00000400L
-# define SSL_SEED 0x00000800L
-# define SSL_AES128GCM 0x00001000L
-# define SSL_AES256GCM 0x00002000L
-
-# define SSL_AES (SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256|SSL_AES128GCM|SSL_AES256GCM)
-# define SSL_CAMELLIA (SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256)
-
-/* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */
-
-# define SSL_MD5 0x00000001L
-# define SSL_SHA1 0x00000002L
-# define SSL_GOST94 0x00000004L
-# define SSL_GOST89MAC 0x00000008L
-# define SSL_SHA256 0x00000010L
-# define SSL_SHA384 0x00000020L
-/* Not a real MAC, just an indication it is part of cipher */
-# define SSL_AEAD 0x00000040L
-
-/* Bits for algorithm_ssl (protocol version) */
-# define SSL_SSLV2 0x00000001UL
-# define SSL_SSLV3 0x00000002UL
-# define SSL_TLSV1 SSL_SSLV3/* for now */
-# define SSL_TLSV1_2 0x00000004UL
-
-/* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */
-
-# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 0x10
-# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA 0x20
-# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 0x40
-# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 0x80
-# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 0x100
-# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 | SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA)
-
-/*
- * When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSM_MD_NUM_IDX make
- * sure to update this constant too
- */
-# define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 6
-
-# define TLS1_PRF_DGST_MASK (0xff << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-
-# define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 10
-# define TLS1_PRF_MD5 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-# define TLS1_PRF_SHA1 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-# define TLS1_PRF_SHA256 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-# define TLS1_PRF_SHA384 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-# define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
-# define TLS1_PRF (TLS1_PRF_MD5 | TLS1_PRF_SHA1)
-
-/*
- * Stream MAC for GOST ciphersuites from cryptopro draft (currently this also
- * goes into algorithm2)
- */
-# define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x04
-
-/*
- * Export and cipher strength information. For each cipher we have to decide
- * whether it is exportable or not. This information is likely to change
- * over time, since the export control rules are no static technical issue.
- *
- * Independent of the export flag the cipher strength is sorted into classes.
- * SSL_EXP40 was denoting the 40bit US export limit of past times, which now
- * is at 56bit (SSL_EXP56). If the exportable cipher class is going to change
- * again (eg. to 64bit) the use of "SSL_EXP*" becomes blurred even more,
- * since SSL_EXP64 could be similar to SSL_LOW.
- * For this reason SSL_MICRO and SSL_MINI macros are included to widen the
- * namespace of SSL_LOW-SSL_HIGH to lower values. As development of speed
- * and ciphers goes, another extension to SSL_SUPER and/or SSL_ULTRA would
- * be possible.
- */
-# define SSL_EXP_MASK 0x00000003L
-# define SSL_STRONG_MASK 0x000001fcL
-
-# define SSL_NOT_EXP 0x00000001L
-# define SSL_EXPORT 0x00000002L
-
-# define SSL_STRONG_NONE 0x00000004L
-# define SSL_EXP40 0x00000008L
-# define SSL_MICRO (SSL_EXP40)
-# define SSL_EXP56 0x00000010L
-# define SSL_MINI (SSL_EXP56)
-# define SSL_LOW 0x00000020L
-# define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000040L
-# define SSL_HIGH 0x00000080L
-# define SSL_FIPS 0x00000100L
-
-/* we have used 000001ff - 23 bits left to go */
-
-/*-
- * Macros to check the export status and cipher strength for export ciphers.
- * Even though the macros for EXPORT and EXPORT40/56 have similar names,
- * their meaning is different:
- * *_EXPORT macros check the 'exportable' status.
- * *_EXPORT40/56 macros are used to check whether a certain cipher strength
- * is given.
- * Since the SSL_IS_EXPORT* and SSL_EXPORT* macros depend on the correct
- * algorithm structure element to be passed (algorithms, algo_strength) and no
- * typechecking can be done as they are all of type unsigned long, their
- * direct usage is discouraged.
- * Use the SSL_C_* macros instead.
- */
-# define SSL_IS_EXPORT(a) ((a)&SSL_EXPORT)
-# define SSL_IS_EXPORT56(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP56)
-# define SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP40)
-# define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT((c)->algo_strength)
-# define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT56(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT56((c)->algo_strength)
-# define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT40(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT40((c)->algo_strength)
-
-# define SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(a,s) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(s) ? 5 : \
- (a) == SSL_DES ? 8 : 7)
-# define SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(a) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ? 512 : 1024)
-# define SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH((c)->algorithm_enc, \
- (c)->algo_strength)
-# define SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH((c)->algo_strength)
-
-/* Mostly for SSLv3 */
-# define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC 0
-# define SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 1
-# define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN 2
-# define SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA 3
-# define SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA 4
-# define SSL_PKEY_ECC 5
-# define SSL_PKEY_GOST94 6
-# define SSL_PKEY_GOST01 7
-# define SSL_PKEY_NUM 8
-
-/*-
- * SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC | (RSA_TMP & RSA_SIGN) |
- * <- (EXPORT & (RSA_ENC | RSA_TMP) & RSA_SIGN)
- * SSL_kDH <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN)
- * SSL_kEDH <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN
- * SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN
- * SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN
- */
-
-/*-
-#define CERT_INVALID 0
-#define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1
-#define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2
-*/
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-/*
- * From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters
- */
-# define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE 1
-# define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE 2
-# define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-typedef struct cert_pkey_st {
- X509 *x509;
- EVP_PKEY *privatekey;
- /* Digest to use when signing */
- const EVP_MD *digest;
-} CERT_PKEY;
-
-typedef struct cert_st {
- /* Current active set */
- /*
- * ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array
- * Probably it would make more sense to store
- * an index, not a pointer.
- */
- CERT_PKEY *key;
- /*
- * The following masks are for the key and auth algorithms that are
- * supported by the certs below
- */
- int valid;
- unsigned long mask_k;
- unsigned long mask_a;
- unsigned long export_mask_k;
- unsigned long export_mask_a;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA *rsa_tmp;
- RSA *(*rsa_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize);
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh_tmp;
- DH *(*dh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize);
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *ecdh_tmp;
- /* Callback for generating ephemeral ECDH keys */
- EC_KEY *(*ecdh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize);
-# endif
- CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
- int references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */
-} CERT;
-
-typedef struct sess_cert_st {
- STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; /* as received from peer (not for SSL2) */
- /* The 'peer_...' members are used only by clients. */
- int peer_cert_type;
- CERT_PKEY *peer_key; /* points to an element of peer_pkeys (never
- * NULL!) */
- CERT_PKEY peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
- /*
- * Obviously we don't have the private keys of these, so maybe we
- * shouldn't even use the CERT_PKEY type here.
- */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA *peer_rsa_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *peer_dh_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *peer_ecdh_tmp;
-# endif
- int references; /* actually always 1 at the moment */
-} SESS_CERT;
-
-/*
- * #define MAC_DEBUG
- */
-
-/*
- * #define ERR_DEBUG
- */
-/*
- * #define ABORT_DEBUG
- */
-/*
- * #define PKT_DEBUG 1
- */
-/*
- * #define DES_DEBUG
- */
-/*
- * #define DES_OFB_DEBUG
- */
-/*
- * #define SSL_DEBUG
- */
-/*
- * #define RSA_DEBUG
- */
-/*
- * #define IDEA_DEBUG
- */
-
-# define FP_ICC (int (*)(const void *,const void *))
-# define ssl_put_cipher_by_char(ssl,ciph,ptr) \
- ((ssl)->method->put_cipher_by_char((ciph),(ptr)))
-# define ssl_get_cipher_by_char(ssl,ptr) \
- ((ssl)->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr))
-
-/*
- * This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff It is a bit
- * of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as an opaque structure :-)
- */
-typedef struct ssl3_enc_method {
- int (*enc) (SSL *, int);
- int (*mac) (SSL *, unsigned char *, int);
- int (*setup_key_block) (SSL *);
- int (*generate_master_secret) (SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *,
- int);
- int (*change_cipher_state) (SSL *, int);
- int (*final_finish_mac) (SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *);
- int finish_mac_length;
- int (*cert_verify_mac) (SSL *, int, unsigned char *);
- const char *client_finished_label;
- int client_finished_label_len;
- const char *server_finished_label;
- int server_finished_label_len;
- int (*alert_value) (int);
- int (*export_keying_material) (SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t,
- const char *, size_t,
- const unsigned char *, size_t,
- int use_context);
-} SSL3_ENC_METHOD;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-/* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */
-typedef struct ssl3_comp_st {
- int comp_id; /* The identifier byte for this compression
- * type */
- char *name; /* Text name used for the compression type */
- COMP_METHOD *method; /* The method :-) */
-} SSL3_COMP;
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
-typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st {
- size_t chunklen;
- unsigned int len;
- struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *head;
-} SSL3_BUF_FREELIST;
-
-typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st {
- struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *next;
-} SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY;
-# endif
-
-extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method;
-OPENSSL_EXTERN const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[];
-OPENSSL_EXTERN SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[];
-
-SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver);
-
-extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data;
-extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data;
-extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data;
-
-# define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
-
-# define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, func_name, s_accept, s_connect, \
- s_get_meth) \
-const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
- { \
- static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
- version, \
- tls1_new, \
- tls1_clear, \
- tls1_free, \
- s_accept, \
- s_connect, \
- ssl3_read, \
- ssl3_peek, \
- ssl3_write, \
- ssl3_shutdown, \
- ssl3_renegotiate, \
- ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
- ssl3_get_message, \
- ssl3_read_bytes, \
- ssl3_write_bytes, \
- ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
- ssl3_ctrl, \
- ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
- ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
- ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
- ssl3_pending, \
- ssl3_num_ciphers, \
- ssl3_get_cipher, \
- s_get_meth, \
- tls1_default_timeout, \
- &TLSv1_enc_data, \
- ssl_undefined_void_function, \
- ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
- ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
- }; \
- return &func_name##_data; \
- }
-
-# define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
-const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
- { \
- static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
- SSL3_VERSION, \
- ssl3_new, \
- ssl3_clear, \
- ssl3_free, \
- s_accept, \
- s_connect, \
- ssl3_read, \
- ssl3_peek, \
- ssl3_write, \
- ssl3_shutdown, \
- ssl3_renegotiate, \
- ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
- ssl3_get_message, \
- ssl3_read_bytes, \
- ssl3_write_bytes, \
- ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
- ssl3_ctrl, \
- ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
- ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
- ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
- ssl3_pending, \
- ssl3_num_ciphers, \
- ssl3_get_cipher, \
- s_get_meth, \
- ssl3_default_timeout, \
- &SSLv3_enc_data, \
- ssl_undefined_void_function, \
- ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
- ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
- }; \
- return &func_name##_data; \
- }
-
-# define IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
-const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
- { \
- static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
- TLS1_2_VERSION, \
- tls1_new, \
- tls1_clear, \
- tls1_free, \
- s_accept, \
- s_connect, \
- ssl23_read, \
- ssl23_peek, \
- ssl23_write, \
- ssl_undefined_function, \
- ssl_undefined_function, \
- ssl_ok, \
- ssl3_get_message, \
- ssl3_read_bytes, \
- ssl3_write_bytes, \
- ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
- ssl3_ctrl, \
- ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
- ssl23_get_cipher_by_char, \
- ssl23_put_cipher_by_char, \
- ssl_undefined_const_function, \
- ssl23_num_ciphers, \
- ssl23_get_cipher, \
- s_get_meth, \
- ssl23_default_timeout, \
- &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \
- ssl_undefined_void_function, \
- ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
- ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
- }; \
- return &func_name##_data; \
- }
-
-# define IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
-const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
- { \
- static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
- SSL2_VERSION, \
- ssl2_new, /* local */ \
- ssl2_clear, /* local */ \
- ssl2_free, /* local */ \
- s_accept, \
- s_connect, \
- ssl2_read, \
- ssl2_peek, \
- ssl2_write, \
- ssl2_shutdown, \
- ssl_ok, /* NULL - renegotiate */ \
- ssl_ok, /* NULL - check renegotiate */ \
- NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_message */ \
- NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_record */ \
- NULL, /* NULL - ssl_write_bytes */ \
- NULL, /* NULL - dispatch_alert */ \
- ssl2_ctrl, /* local */ \
- ssl2_ctx_ctrl, /* local */ \
- ssl2_get_cipher_by_char, \
- ssl2_put_cipher_by_char, \
- ssl2_pending, \
- ssl2_num_ciphers, \
- ssl2_get_cipher, \
- s_get_meth, \
- ssl2_default_timeout, \
- &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \
- ssl_undefined_void_function, \
- ssl2_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \
- ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \
- }; \
- return &func_name##_data; \
- }
-
-# define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
-const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
- { \
- static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
- DTLS1_VERSION, \
- dtls1_new, \
- dtls1_clear, \
- dtls1_free, \
- s_accept, \
- s_connect, \
- ssl3_read, \
- ssl3_peek, \
- ssl3_write, \
- dtls1_shutdown, \
- ssl3_renegotiate, \
- ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
- dtls1_get_message, \
- dtls1_read_bytes, \
- dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \
- dtls1_dispatch_alert, \
- dtls1_ctrl, \
- ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
- ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
- ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
- ssl3_pending, \
- ssl3_num_ciphers, \
- dtls1_get_cipher, \
- s_get_meth, \
- dtls1_default_timeout, \
- &DTLSv1_enc_data, \
- ssl_undefined_void_function, \
- ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
- ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
- }; \
- return &func_name##_data; \
- }
-
-struct openssl_ssl_test_functions {
- int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer) (SSL *s, int push);
- int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers) (SSL *s);
- int (*p_tls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s);
- int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s);
-};
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
-
-void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s);
-int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s);
-CERT *ssl_cert_new(void);
-CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
-int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o);
-void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c);
-SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void);
-void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc);
-int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
-int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
-int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session, int len,
- const unsigned char *limit);
-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
-int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b);
-DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
-int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
- const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp);
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
- int num,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp);
-int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
- unsigned char *p,
- int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
- unsigned char *));
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted,
- const char *rule_str);
-void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
-int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
- const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type,
- int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp);
-int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int i, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md);
-int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
-int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s);
-int ssl_undefined_void_function(void);
-int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s);
-CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s);
-X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *);
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd);
-int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
-int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
-void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
-int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
-
-int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
-int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);
-int ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send_data);
-void ssl2_mac(SSL *s, unsigned char *mac, int send_data);
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
-int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p);
-int ssl2_part_read(SSL *s, unsigned long f, int i);
-int ssl2_do_write(SSL *s);
-int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len,
- const unsigned char *data);
-void ssl2_return_error(SSL *s, int reason);
-void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s);
-int ssl2_num_ciphers(void);
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
-int ssl2_new(SSL *s);
-void ssl2_free(SSL *s);
-int ssl2_accept(SSL *s);
-int ssl2_connect(SSL *s);
-int ssl2_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int ssl2_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int ssl2_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
-int ssl2_shutdown(SSL *s);
-void ssl2_clear(SSL *s);
-long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long ssl2_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long ssl2_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
-long ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
-int ssl2_pending(const SSL *s);
-long ssl2_default_timeout(void);
-
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
-int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p);
-void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int state_a, int state_b);
-int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int state_a, int state_b);
-int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
-void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type);
-int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc);
-int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned char *p, int len);
-int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
-long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
-int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen);
-int ssl3_num_ciphers(void);
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
-int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl);
-int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl);
-int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
-int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
-int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen,
- unsigned char *p);
-int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
-void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len);
-int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send_data);
-int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send_data);
-void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s);
-unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x);
-SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr);
-int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_new(SSL *s);
-void ssl3_free(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_accept(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_connect(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
-int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s);
-void ssl3_clear(SSL *s);
-long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
-long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
-int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s);
-
-void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq);
-int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
-long ssl3_default_timeout(void);
-
-int ssl23_num_ciphers(void);
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
-int ssl23_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int ssl23_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
-int ssl23_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
-int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p);
-const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
-long ssl23_default_timeout(void);
-
-long tls1_default_timeout(void);
-int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type);
-int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend);
-int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
-int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl);
-int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
-int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len);
-unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s,
- unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
- unsigned long len,
- unsigned long frag_off,
- unsigned long frag_len);
-
-int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
-int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
-
-int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b);
-int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen);
-unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x);
-int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code);
-int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs);
-int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq,
- unsigned long frag_off, int *found);
-int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs);
-int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data,
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr);
-void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr);
-void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw);
-long dtls1_default_timeout(void);
-struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft);
-int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s);
-const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
-void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
-unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s);
-unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
-void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag);
-
-/* some client-only functions */
-int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
-int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
-# endif
-# endif
-
-int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
-
-/* some server-only functions */
-int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s);
-# endif
-
-int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s);
-
-int ssl23_accept(SSL *s);
-int ssl23_connect(SSL *s);
-int ssl23_read_bytes(SSL *s, int n);
-int ssl23_write_bytes(SSL *s);
-
-int tls1_new(SSL *s);
-void tls1_free(SSL *s);
-void tls1_clear(SSL *s);
-long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
-
-int dtls1_new(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_accept(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_connect(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_free(SSL *s);
-void dtls1_clear(SSL *s);
-long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
-int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s);
-
-long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
-int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s);
-int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement);
-int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd);
-
-int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push);
-void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s);
-
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
-int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd);
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
- const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p);
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int snd);
-int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
- unsigned char *p, int len);
-int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
- const char *label, size_t llen,
- const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
- int use_context);
-int tls1_alert_code(int code);
-int ssl3_alert_code(int code);
-int ssl_ok(SSL *s);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s);
-# endif
-
-SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id);
-int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid);
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned char *limit);
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned char *limit);
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data,
- unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data,
- unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
-int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s);
-int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s);
-# endif
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-# define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha1
-# else
-# define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha256
-# endif
-int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret);
-
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
- const EVP_MD *md);
-int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk);
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg);
-
-# endif
-EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md);
-void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash);
-int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
- int maxlen);
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
- int *al);
-int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
- int maxlen);
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
- int *al);
-long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s);
-int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize);
-int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
-
-int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
- int maxlen);
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
- int *al);
-int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
- int maxlen);
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
- int *al);
-
-/* s3_cbc.c */
-void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
- const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
- unsigned md_size, unsigned orig_len);
-int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
- SSL3_RECORD *rec,
- unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
-int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
- SSL3_RECORD *rec,
- unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
-char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *md_out,
- size_t *md_out_size,
- const unsigned char header[13],
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_plus_mac_size,
- size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
- const unsigned char *mac_secret,
- unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
-
-void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
- EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
-
-int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al);
-
-# else
-
-# define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer
-# define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers
-# define tls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_tls1_process_heartbeat
-# define dtls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_dtls1_process_heartbeat
-
-# endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_locl.h (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_locl.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_locl.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1245 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_locl.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_SSL_LOCL_H
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <errno.h>
+
+# include "e_os.h"
+
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# include <openssl/comp.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/stack.h>
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# endif
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+# include <openssl/symhacks.h>
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL
+# undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
+# define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT
+# endif
+
+# undef PKCS1_CHECK
+
+# define c2l(c,l) (l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \
+ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \
+ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \
+ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24))
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */
+# define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \
+ c+=n; \
+ l1=l2=0; \
+ switch (n) { \
+ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \
+ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \
+ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \
+ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \
+ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \
+ } \
+ }
+
+# define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff))
+
+# define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
+ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
+ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
+ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++))))
+
+# define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
+
+# define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
+
+# define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
+
+# define n2l6(c,l) (l =((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<40, \
+ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<32, \
+ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<24, \
+ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<<16, \
+ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \
+ l|=((BN_ULLONG)(*((c)++))))
+
+/* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */
+# define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \
+ c+=n; \
+ switch (n) { \
+ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \
+ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \
+ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \
+ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \
+ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \
+ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \
+ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \
+ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \
+ } \
+ }
+
+# define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)(c[0]))<< 8)| \
+ (((unsigned int)(c[1])) )),c+=2)
+# define s2n(s,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),c+=2)
+
+# define n2l3(c,l) ((l =(((unsigned long)(c[0]))<<16)| \
+ (((unsigned long)(c[1]))<< 8)| \
+ (((unsigned long)(c[2])) )),c+=3)
+
+# define l2n3(l,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ c[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ c[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),c+=3)
+
+/* LOCAL STUFF */
+
+# define SSL_DECRYPT 0
+# define SSL_ENCRYPT 1
+
+# define TWO_BYTE_BIT 0x80
+# define SEC_ESC_BIT 0x40
+# define TWO_BYTE_MASK 0x7fff
+# define THREE_BYTE_MASK 0x3fff
+
+# define INC32(a) ((a)=((a)+1)&0xffffffffL)
+# define DEC32(a) ((a)=((a)-1)&0xffffffffL)
+# define MAX_MAC_SIZE 20 /* up from 16 for SSLv3 */
+
+/*
+ * Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms.
+ * This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers
+ * etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information
+ * is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms
+ * can be publicly accessed.
+ * Use the according functions for cipher management instead.
+ *
+ * The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in
+ * ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting
+ * that the different entities within are mutually exclusive:
+ * ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME.
+ */
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_mkey (key exchange algorithm) */
+/* RSA key exchange */
+# define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001L
+/* DH cert, RSA CA cert */
+/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+# define SSL_kDHr 0x00000002L
+/* DH cert, DSA CA cert */
+/* no such ciphersuite supported! */
+# define SSL_kDHd 0x00000004L
+/* tmp DH key no DH cert */
+# define SSL_kEDH 0x00000008L
+/* Kerberos5 key exchange */
+# define SSL_kKRB5 0x00000010L
+/* ECDH cert, RSA CA cert */
+# define SSL_kECDHr 0x00000020L
+/* ECDH cert, ECDSA CA cert */
+# define SSL_kECDHe 0x00000040L
+/* ephemeral ECDH */
+# define SSL_kEECDH 0x00000080L
+/* PSK */
+# define SSL_kPSK 0x00000100L
+/* GOST key exchange */
+# define SSL_kGOST 0x00000200L
+/* SRP */
+# define SSL_kSRP 0x00000400L
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */
+/* RSA auth */
+# define SSL_aRSA 0x00000001L
+/* DSS auth */
+# define SSL_aDSS 0x00000002L
+/* no auth (i.e. use ADH or AECDH) */
+# define SSL_aNULL 0x00000004L
+/* Fixed DH auth (kDHd or kDHr) */
+/* no such ciphersuites supported! */
+# define SSL_aDH 0x00000008L
+/* Fixed ECDH auth (kECDHe or kECDHr) */
+# define SSL_aECDH 0x00000010L
+/* KRB5 auth */
+# define SSL_aKRB5 0x00000020L
+/* ECDSA auth*/
+# define SSL_aECDSA 0x00000040L
+/* PSK auth */
+# define SSL_aPSK 0x00000080L
+/* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */
+# define SSL_aGOST94 0x00000100L
+/* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
+# define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000200L
+/* SRP auth */
+# define SSL_aSRP 0x00000400L
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
+# define SSL_DES 0x00000001L
+# define SSL_3DES 0x00000002L
+# define SSL_RC4 0x00000004L
+# define SSL_RC2 0x00000008L
+# define SSL_IDEA 0x00000010L
+# define SSL_eNULL 0x00000020L
+# define SSL_AES128 0x00000040L
+# define SSL_AES256 0x00000080L
+# define SSL_CAMELLIA128 0x00000100L
+# define SSL_CAMELLIA256 0x00000200L
+# define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT 0x00000400L
+# define SSL_SEED 0x00000800L
+# define SSL_AES128GCM 0x00001000L
+# define SSL_AES256GCM 0x00002000L
+
+# define SSL_AES (SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256|SSL_AES128GCM|SSL_AES256GCM)
+# define SSL_CAMELLIA (SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256)
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */
+
+# define SSL_MD5 0x00000001L
+# define SSL_SHA1 0x00000002L
+# define SSL_GOST94 0x00000004L
+# define SSL_GOST89MAC 0x00000008L
+# define SSL_SHA256 0x00000010L
+# define SSL_SHA384 0x00000020L
+/* Not a real MAC, just an indication it is part of cipher */
+# define SSL_AEAD 0x00000040L
+
+/* Bits for algorithm_ssl (protocol version) */
+# define SSL_SSLV2 0x00000001UL
+# define SSL_SSLV3 0x00000002UL
+# define SSL_TLSV1 SSL_SSLV3/* for now */
+# define SSL_TLSV1_2 0x00000004UL
+
+/* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */
+
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 0x10
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA 0x20
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 0x40
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 0x80
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 0x100
+# define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 | SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA)
+
+/*
+ * When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSM_MD_NUM_IDX make
+ * sure to update this constant too
+ */
+# define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 6
+
+# define TLS1_PRF_DGST_MASK (0xff << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+
+# define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 10
+# define TLS1_PRF_MD5 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF_SHA1 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF_SHA256 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF_SHA384 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+# define TLS1_PRF (TLS1_PRF_MD5 | TLS1_PRF_SHA1)
+
+/*
+ * Stream MAC for GOST ciphersuites from cryptopro draft (currently this also
+ * goes into algorithm2)
+ */
+# define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x04
+
+/*
+ * Export and cipher strength information. For each cipher we have to decide
+ * whether it is exportable or not. This information is likely to change
+ * over time, since the export control rules are no static technical issue.
+ *
+ * Independent of the export flag the cipher strength is sorted into classes.
+ * SSL_EXP40 was denoting the 40bit US export limit of past times, which now
+ * is at 56bit (SSL_EXP56). If the exportable cipher class is going to change
+ * again (eg. to 64bit) the use of "SSL_EXP*" becomes blurred even more,
+ * since SSL_EXP64 could be similar to SSL_LOW.
+ * For this reason SSL_MICRO and SSL_MINI macros are included to widen the
+ * namespace of SSL_LOW-SSL_HIGH to lower values. As development of speed
+ * and ciphers goes, another extension to SSL_SUPER and/or SSL_ULTRA would
+ * be possible.
+ */
+# define SSL_EXP_MASK 0x00000003L
+# define SSL_STRONG_MASK 0x000001fcL
+
+# define SSL_NOT_EXP 0x00000001L
+# define SSL_EXPORT 0x00000002L
+
+# define SSL_STRONG_NONE 0x00000004L
+# define SSL_EXP40 0x00000008L
+# define SSL_MICRO (SSL_EXP40)
+# define SSL_EXP56 0x00000010L
+# define SSL_MINI (SSL_EXP56)
+# define SSL_LOW 0x00000020L
+# define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000040L
+# define SSL_HIGH 0x00000080L
+# define SSL_FIPS 0x00000100L
+
+/* we have used 000001ff - 23 bits left to go */
+
+/*-
+ * Macros to check the export status and cipher strength for export ciphers.
+ * Even though the macros for EXPORT and EXPORT40/56 have similar names,
+ * their meaning is different:
+ * *_EXPORT macros check the 'exportable' status.
+ * *_EXPORT40/56 macros are used to check whether a certain cipher strength
+ * is given.
+ * Since the SSL_IS_EXPORT* and SSL_EXPORT* macros depend on the correct
+ * algorithm structure element to be passed (algorithms, algo_strength) and no
+ * typechecking can be done as they are all of type unsigned long, their
+ * direct usage is discouraged.
+ * Use the SSL_C_* macros instead.
+ */
+# define SSL_IS_EXPORT(a) ((a)&SSL_EXPORT)
+# define SSL_IS_EXPORT56(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP56)
+# define SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ((a)&SSL_EXP40)
+# define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT((c)->algo_strength)
+# define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT56(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT56((c)->algo_strength)
+# define SSL_C_IS_EXPORT40(c) SSL_IS_EXPORT40((c)->algo_strength)
+
+# define SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(a,s) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(s) ? 5 : \
+ (a) == SSL_DES ? 8 : 7)
+# define SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(a) (SSL_IS_EXPORT40(a) ? 512 : 1024)
+# define SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH((c)->algorithm_enc, \
+ (c)->algo_strength)
+# define SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(c) SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH((c)->algo_strength)
+
+/* Mostly for SSLv3 */
+# define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC 0
+# define SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 1
+# define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN 2
+# define SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA 3
+# define SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA 4
+# define SSL_PKEY_ECC 5
+# define SSL_PKEY_GOST94 6
+# define SSL_PKEY_GOST01 7
+# define SSL_PKEY_NUM 8
+
+/*-
+ * SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC | (RSA_TMP & RSA_SIGN) |
+ * <- (EXPORT & (RSA_ENC | RSA_TMP) & RSA_SIGN)
+ * SSL_kDH <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN)
+ * SSL_kEDH <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN
+ * SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN
+ * SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN
+ */
+
+/*-
+#define CERT_INVALID 0
+#define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2
+*/
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*
+ * From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters
+ */
+# define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE 1
+# define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE 2
+# define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+typedef struct cert_pkey_st {
+ X509 *x509;
+ EVP_PKEY *privatekey;
+ /* Digest to use when signing */
+ const EVP_MD *digest;
+} CERT_PKEY;
+
+typedef struct cert_st {
+ /* Current active set */
+ /*
+ * ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array
+ * Probably it would make more sense to store
+ * an index, not a pointer.
+ */
+ CERT_PKEY *key;
+ /*
+ * The following masks are for the key and auth algorithms that are
+ * supported by the certs below
+ */
+ int valid;
+ unsigned long mask_k;
+ unsigned long mask_a;
+ unsigned long export_mask_k;
+ unsigned long export_mask_a;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa_tmp;
+ RSA *(*rsa_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh_tmp;
+ DH *(*dh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh_tmp;
+ /* Callback for generating ephemeral ECDH keys */
+ EC_KEY *(*ecdh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize);
+# endif
+ CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+ int references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */
+} CERT;
+
+typedef struct sess_cert_st {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain; /* as received from peer (not for SSL2) */
+ /* The 'peer_...' members are used only by clients. */
+ int peer_cert_type;
+ CERT_PKEY *peer_key; /* points to an element of peer_pkeys (never
+ * NULL!) */
+ CERT_PKEY peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+ /*
+ * Obviously we don't have the private keys of these, so maybe we
+ * shouldn't even use the CERT_PKEY type here.
+ */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *peer_rsa_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *peer_dh_tmp; /* not used for SSL 2 */
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *peer_ecdh_tmp;
+# endif
+ int references; /* actually always 1 at the moment */
+} SESS_CERT;
+
+/*
+ * #define MAC_DEBUG
+ */
+
+/*
+ * #define ERR_DEBUG
+ */
+/*
+ * #define ABORT_DEBUG
+ */
+/*
+ * #define PKT_DEBUG 1
+ */
+/*
+ * #define DES_DEBUG
+ */
+/*
+ * #define DES_OFB_DEBUG
+ */
+/*
+ * #define SSL_DEBUG
+ */
+/*
+ * #define RSA_DEBUG
+ */
+/*
+ * #define IDEA_DEBUG
+ */
+
+# define FP_ICC (int (*)(const void *,const void *))
+# define ssl_put_cipher_by_char(ssl,ciph,ptr) \
+ ((ssl)->method->put_cipher_by_char((ciph),(ptr)))
+# define ssl_get_cipher_by_char(ssl,ptr) \
+ ((ssl)->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr))
+
+/*
+ * This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff It is a bit
+ * of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as an opaque structure :-)
+ */
+typedef struct ssl3_enc_method {
+ int (*enc) (SSL *, int);
+ int (*mac) (SSL *, unsigned char *, int);
+ int (*setup_key_block) (SSL *);
+ int (*generate_master_secret) (SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *,
+ int);
+ int (*change_cipher_state) (SSL *, int);
+ int (*final_finish_mac) (SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *);
+ int finish_mac_length;
+ int (*cert_verify_mac) (SSL *, int, unsigned char *);
+ const char *client_finished_label;
+ int client_finished_label_len;
+ const char *server_finished_label;
+ int server_finished_label_len;
+ int (*alert_value) (int);
+ int (*export_keying_material) (SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t,
+ const char *, size_t,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t,
+ int use_context);
+} SSL3_ENC_METHOD;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+/* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */
+typedef struct ssl3_comp_st {
+ int comp_id; /* The identifier byte for this compression
+ * type */
+ char *name; /* Text name used for the compression type */
+ COMP_METHOD *method; /* The method :-) */
+} SSL3_COMP;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_st {
+ size_t chunklen;
+ unsigned int len;
+ struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *head;
+} SSL3_BUF_FREELIST;
+
+typedef struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st {
+ struct ssl3_buf_freelist_entry_st *next;
+} SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY;
+# endif
+
+extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method;
+OPENSSL_EXTERN const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[];
+OPENSSL_EXTERN SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[];
+
+SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver);
+
+extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data;
+extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data;
+extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data;
+
+# define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, func_name, s_accept, s_connect, \
+ s_get_meth) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
+ { \
+ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+ version, \
+ tls1_new, \
+ tls1_clear, \
+ tls1_free, \
+ s_accept, \
+ s_connect, \
+ ssl3_read, \
+ ssl3_peek, \
+ ssl3_write, \
+ ssl3_shutdown, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
+ ssl3_get_message, \
+ ssl3_read_bytes, \
+ ssl3_write_bytes, \
+ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
+ ssl3_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_pending, \
+ ssl3_num_ciphers, \
+ ssl3_get_cipher, \
+ s_get_meth, \
+ tls1_default_timeout, \
+ &TLSv1_enc_data, \
+ ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+ }; \
+ return &func_name##_data; \
+ }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
+ { \
+ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+ SSL3_VERSION, \
+ ssl3_new, \
+ ssl3_clear, \
+ ssl3_free, \
+ s_accept, \
+ s_connect, \
+ ssl3_read, \
+ ssl3_peek, \
+ ssl3_write, \
+ ssl3_shutdown, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
+ ssl3_get_message, \
+ ssl3_read_bytes, \
+ ssl3_write_bytes, \
+ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
+ ssl3_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_pending, \
+ ssl3_num_ciphers, \
+ ssl3_get_cipher, \
+ s_get_meth, \
+ ssl3_default_timeout, \
+ &SSLv3_enc_data, \
+ ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+ }; \
+ return &func_name##_data; \
+ }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
+ { \
+ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+ TLS1_2_VERSION, \
+ tls1_new, \
+ tls1_clear, \
+ tls1_free, \
+ s_accept, \
+ s_connect, \
+ ssl23_read, \
+ ssl23_peek, \
+ ssl23_write, \
+ ssl_undefined_function, \
+ ssl_undefined_function, \
+ ssl_ok, \
+ ssl3_get_message, \
+ ssl3_read_bytes, \
+ ssl3_write_bytes, \
+ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \
+ ssl3_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+ ssl23_get_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl23_put_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl_undefined_const_function, \
+ ssl23_num_ciphers, \
+ ssl23_get_cipher, \
+ s_get_meth, \
+ ssl23_default_timeout, \
+ &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \
+ ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+ }; \
+ return &func_name##_data; \
+ }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
+ { \
+ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+ SSL2_VERSION, \
+ ssl2_new, /* local */ \
+ ssl2_clear, /* local */ \
+ ssl2_free, /* local */ \
+ s_accept, \
+ s_connect, \
+ ssl2_read, \
+ ssl2_peek, \
+ ssl2_write, \
+ ssl2_shutdown, \
+ ssl_ok, /* NULL - renegotiate */ \
+ ssl_ok, /* NULL - check renegotiate */ \
+ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_message */ \
+ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_get_record */ \
+ NULL, /* NULL - ssl_write_bytes */ \
+ NULL, /* NULL - dispatch_alert */ \
+ ssl2_ctrl, /* local */ \
+ ssl2_ctx_ctrl, /* local */ \
+ ssl2_get_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl2_put_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl2_pending, \
+ ssl2_num_ciphers, \
+ ssl2_get_cipher, \
+ s_get_meth, \
+ ssl2_default_timeout, \
+ &ssl3_undef_enc_method, \
+ ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+ ssl2_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \
+ ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl, /* local */ \
+ }; \
+ return &func_name##_data; \
+ }
+
+# define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect, s_get_meth) \
+const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
+ { \
+ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \
+ DTLS1_VERSION, \
+ dtls1_new, \
+ dtls1_clear, \
+ dtls1_free, \
+ s_accept, \
+ s_connect, \
+ ssl3_read, \
+ ssl3_peek, \
+ ssl3_write, \
+ dtls1_shutdown, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate, \
+ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \
+ dtls1_get_message, \
+ dtls1_read_bytes, \
+ dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \
+ dtls1_dispatch_alert, \
+ dtls1_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \
+ ssl3_pending, \
+ ssl3_num_ciphers, \
+ dtls1_get_cipher, \
+ s_get_meth, \
+ dtls1_default_timeout, \
+ &DTLSv1_enc_data, \
+ ssl_undefined_void_function, \
+ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \
+ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \
+ }; \
+ return &func_name##_data; \
+ }
+
+struct openssl_ssl_test_functions {
+ int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer) (SSL *s, int push);
+ int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers) (SSL *s);
+ int (*p_tls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s);
+ int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s);
+};
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
+
+void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s);
+int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s);
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void);
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
+int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o);
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c);
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void);
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc);
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
+int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session, int len,
+ const unsigned char *limit);
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
+int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b);
+DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
+int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
+ const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp);
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+ int num,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp);
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+ unsigned char *p,
+ int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
+ unsigned char *));
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted,
+ const char *rule_str);
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
+int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
+ const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type,
+ int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp);
+int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int i, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md);
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
+int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s);
+int ssl_undefined_void_function(void);
+int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s);
+CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s);
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *);
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd);
+int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s);
+int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
+void ssl_load_ciphers(void);
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len);
+
+int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client);
+int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_enc(SSL *s, int send_data);
+void ssl2_mac(SSL *s, unsigned char *mac, int send_data);
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
+int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p);
+int ssl2_part_read(SSL *s, unsigned long f, int i);
+int ssl2_do_write(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len,
+ const unsigned char *data);
+void ssl2_return_error(SSL *s, int reason);
+void ssl2_write_error(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_num_ciphers(void);
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl2_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
+int ssl2_new(SSL *s);
+void ssl2_free(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_accept(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_connect(SSL *s);
+int ssl2_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl2_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl2_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
+int ssl2_shutdown(SSL *s);
+void ssl2_clear(SSL *s);
+long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long ssl2_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long ssl2_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
+long ssl2_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
+int ssl2_pending(const SSL *s);
+long ssl2_default_timeout(void);
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
+int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p);
+void ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int state_a, int state_b);
+int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int state_a, int state_b);
+int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
+void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type);
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc);
+int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned char *p, int len);
+int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
+long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
+int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen);
+int ssl3_num_ciphers(void);
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
+int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl);
+int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl);
+int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
+int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen,
+ unsigned char *p);
+int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
+void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len);
+int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send_data);
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send_data);
+void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s);
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x);
+SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr);
+int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_new(SSL *s);
+void ssl3_free(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_accept(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_connect(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
+int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s);
+void ssl3_clear(SSL *s);
+long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
+long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
+int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s);
+
+void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq);
+int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
+long ssl3_default_timeout(void);
+
+int ssl23_num_ciphers(void);
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
+int ssl23_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl23_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len);
+int ssl23_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len);
+int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p);
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl23_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p);
+long ssl23_default_timeout(void);
+
+long tls1_default_timeout(void);
+int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type);
+int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend);
+int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek);
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl);
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
+int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len);
+unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s,
+ unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
+ unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len);
+
+int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
+int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len);
+
+int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b);
+int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen);
+unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x);
+int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code);
+int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs);
+int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq,
+ unsigned long frag_off, int *found);
+int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs);
+int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data,
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr);
+void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr);
+void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw);
+long dtls1_default_timeout(void);
+struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft);
+int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s);
+const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
+void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s);
+unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag);
+
+/* some client-only functions */
+int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
+int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
+int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
+# endif
+# endif
+
+int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
+
+/* some server-only functions */
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s);
+# endif
+
+int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s);
+
+int ssl23_accept(SSL *s);
+int ssl23_connect(SSL *s);
+int ssl23_read_bytes(SSL *s, int n);
+int ssl23_write_bytes(SSL *s);
+
+int tls1_new(SSL *s);
+void tls1_free(SSL *s);
+void tls1_clear(SSL *s);
+long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void));
+
+int dtls1_new(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_accept(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_connect(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_free(SSL *s);
+void dtls1_clear(SSL *s);
+long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
+int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s);
+
+long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok);
+int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s);
+int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement);
+int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd);
+
+int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push);
+void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s);
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
+int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
+int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd);
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
+ const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p);
+int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
+int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int snd);
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+ unsigned char *p, int len);
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
+ int use_context);
+int tls1_alert_code(int code);
+int ssl3_alert_code(int code);
+int ssl_ok(SSL *s);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s);
+# endif
+
+SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id);
+int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned char *limit);
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned char *limit);
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned char *limit, int *al);
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned char *d, int n, int *al);
+int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s);
+int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s);
+int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s);
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+# define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha1
+# else
+# define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha256
+# endif
+int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret);
+
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
+ const EVP_MD *md);
+int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk);
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg);
+
+# endif
+EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md);
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash);
+int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+ int maxlen);
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+ int *al);
+int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+ int maxlen);
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+ int *al);
+long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s);
+int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize);
+int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
+
+int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+ int maxlen);
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+ int *al);
+int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+ int maxlen);
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+ int *al);
+
+/* s3_cbc.c */
+void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
+ const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+ unsigned md_size, unsigned orig_len);
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+ unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
+int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+ unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *md_out,
+ size_t *md_out_size,
+ const unsigned char header[13],
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+ const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+ unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
+
+void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
+
+int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al);
+
+# else
+
+# define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer
+# define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers
+# define tls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_tls1_process_heartbeat
+# define dtls1_process_heartbeat SSL_test_functions()->p_dtls1_process_heartbeat
+
+# endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_rsa.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_rsa.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,730 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_rsa.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/pem.h>
-
-static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509);
-static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
-int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
-{
- if (x == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (0);
- }
- if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- return (ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, x));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
-{
- int j;
- BIO *in;
- int ret = 0;
- X509 *x = NULL;
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
- if (in == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
- if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
- j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
- x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
- } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
- j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
- x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,
- ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (x == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, j);
- goto end;
- }
-
- ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x);
- end:
- if (x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len)
-{
- X509 *x;
- int ret;
-
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &d, (long)len);
- if (x == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-
- ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x);
- X509_free(x);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- int ret;
-
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (0);
- }
- if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-
- RSA_up_ref(rsa);
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
-
- ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- int i;
-
- i = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
- if (i < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
- EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
- pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509);
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
- ERR_clear_error();
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- /*
- * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart
- * cards.
- */
- if ((pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) &&
- (RSA_flags(pkey->pkey.rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)) ;
- else
-#endif
- if (!X509_check_private_key(c->pkeys[i].x509, pkey)) {
- X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
- c->pkeys[i].x509 = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
- CRYPTO_add(&pkey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- c->pkeys[i].privatekey = pkey;
- c->key = &(c->pkeys[i]);
-
- c->valid = 0;
- return (1);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
-{
- int j, ret = 0;
- BIO *in;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
- if (in == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
- if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
- j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
- rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
- } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
- j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
- rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in, NULL,
- ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,
- ssl->
- ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
- goto end;
- }
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
- goto end;
- }
- ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- end:
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- return (ret);
-}
-# endif
-
-int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len)
-{
- int ret;
- const unsigned char *p;
- RSA *rsa;
-
- p = d;
- if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-
- ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-
-int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- int ret;
-
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (0);
- }
- if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
-{
- int j, ret = 0;
- BIO *in;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
- if (in == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
- if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
- j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
- pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,
- ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,
- ssl->
- ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
- } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
- j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
- pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
- goto end;
- }
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
- goto end;
- }
- ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- end:
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d,
- long len)
-{
- int ret;
- const unsigned char *p;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-
- p = d;
- if ((pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-
- ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
- if (x == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (0);
- }
- if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- return (ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, x));
-}
-
-static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
-{
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- int i;
-
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT, SSL_R_X509_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-
- i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
- if (i < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) {
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
- ERR_clear_error();
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- /*
- * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart
- * cards.
- */
- if ((c->pkeys[i].privatekey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) &&
- (RSA_flags(c->pkeys[i].privatekey->pkey.rsa) &
- RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)) ;
- else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
- if (!X509_check_private_key(x, c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) {
- /*
- * don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private
- * key (when switching to a different cert & key, first this
- * function should be used, then ssl_set_pkey
- */
- EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
- c->pkeys[i].privatekey = NULL;
- /* clear error queue */
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
- if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- c->pkeys[i].x509 = x;
- c->key = &(c->pkeys[i]);
-
- c->valid = 0;
- return (1);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
-{
- int j;
- BIO *in;
- int ret = 0;
- X509 *x = NULL;
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
- if (in == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
- if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
- j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
- x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
- } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
- j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
- x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback,
- ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (x == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, j);
- goto end;
- }
-
- ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
- end:
- if (x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len,
- const unsigned char *d)
-{
- X509 *x;
- int ret;
-
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &d, (long)len);
- if (x == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-
- ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
- X509_free(x);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa)
-{
- int ret;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (0);
- }
- if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-
- RSA_up_ref(rsa);
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
-
- ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
-{
- int j, ret = 0;
- BIO *in;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
- if (in == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
- if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
- j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
- rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
- } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
- j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
- rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in, NULL,
- ctx->default_passwd_callback,
- ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
- goto end;
- }
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
- goto end;
- }
- ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- end:
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- return (ret);
-}
-# endif
-
-int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d,
- long len)
-{
- int ret;
- const unsigned char *p;
- RSA *rsa;
-
- p = d;
- if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-
- ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return (0);
- }
- if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- return (ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
-{
- int j, ret = 0;
- BIO *in;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
- if (in == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
- if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
- j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
- pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,
- ctx->default_passwd_callback,
- ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
- } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
- j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
- pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
- goto end;
- }
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
- goto end;
- }
- ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- end:
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx,
- const unsigned char *d, long len)
-{
- int ret;
- const unsigned char *p;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-
- p = d;
- if ((pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
-
- ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
-/*
- * Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format, possibly
- * followed by a sequence of CA certificates that should be sent to the peer
- * in the Certificate message.
- */
-int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
-{
- BIO *in;
- int ret = 0;
- X509 *x = NULL;
-
- ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for
- * SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */
-
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
- if (in == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
-
- x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback,
- ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
- if (x == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
-
- ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
-
- if (ERR_peek_error() != 0)
- ret = 0; /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply
- * ret==0 ... */
- if (ret) {
- /*
- * If we could set up our certificate, now proceed to the CA
- * certificates.
- */
- X509 *ca;
- int r;
- unsigned long err;
-
- if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL) {
- sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
- ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
- }
-
- while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL,
- ctx->default_passwd_callback,
- ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
- != NULL) {
- r = SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
- if (!r) {
- X509_free(ca);
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- /*
- * Note that we must not free r if it was successfully added to
- * the chain (while we must free the main certificate, since its
- * reference count is increased by SSL_CTX_use_certificate).
- */
- }
- /* When the while loop ends, it's usually just EOF. */
- err = ERR_peek_last_error();
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM
- && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)
- ERR_clear_error();
- else
- ret = 0; /* some real error */
- }
-
- end:
- if (x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
- if (in != NULL)
- BIO_free(in);
- return (ret);
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_rsa.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_rsa.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_rsa.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_rsa.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,749 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_rsa.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509);
+static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+{
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, x));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
+{
+ int j;
+ BIO *in;
+ int ret = 0;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+ j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
+ } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+ j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+ ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x);
+ end:
+ if (x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len)
+{
+ X509 *x;
+ int ret;
+
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, &d, (long)len);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x);
+ X509_free(x);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ i = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+ pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ if (pktmp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
+ * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
+ */
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ /*
+ * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart
+ * cards.
+ */
+ if ((pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) &&
+ (RSA_flags(pkey->pkey.rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)) ;
+ else
+#endif
+ if (!X509_check_private_key(c->pkeys[i].x509, pkey)) {
+ X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ c->pkeys[i].x509 = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+ CRYPTO_add(&pkey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ c->pkeys[i].privatekey = pkey;
+ c->key = &(c->pkeys[i]);
+
+ c->valid = 0;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
+{
+ int j, ret = 0;
+ BIO *in;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+ j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
+ } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+ j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in, NULL,
+ ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+ ssl->
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ end:
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return (ret);
+}
+# endif
+
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len)
+{
+ int ret;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ RSA *rsa;
+
+ p = d;
+ if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ssl->cert)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
+{
+ int j, ret = 0;
+ BIO *in;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+ j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,
+ ssl->ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+ ssl->
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+ j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ end:
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d,
+ long len)
+{
+ int ret;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+ p = d;
+ if ((pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, x));
+}
+
+static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ int i;
+
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT, SSL_R_X509_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
+ * ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
+ */
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ /*
+ * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart
+ * cards.
+ */
+ if ((c->pkeys[i].privatekey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) &&
+ (RSA_flags(c->pkeys[i].privatekey->pkey.rsa) &
+ RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)) ;
+ else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+ if (!X509_check_private_key(x, c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) {
+ /*
+ * don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private
+ * key (when switching to a different cert & key, first this
+ * function should be used, then ssl_set_pkey
+ */
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+ c->pkeys[i].privatekey = NULL;
+ /* clear error queue */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+ if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ c->pkeys[i].x509 = x;
+ c->key = &(c->pkeys[i]);
+
+ c->valid = 0;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+ int j;
+ BIO *in;
+ int ret = 0;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+ j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
+ } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+ j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+ end:
+ if (x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len,
+ const unsigned char *d)
+{
+ X509 *x;
+ int ret;
+
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, &d, (long)len);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+ X509_free(x);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ int ret;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) <= 0) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+ int j, ret = 0;
+ BIO *in;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+ j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
+ } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+ j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(in, NULL,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ end:
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return (ret);
+}
+# endif
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d,
+ long len)
+{
+ int ret;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ RSA *rsa;
+
+ p = d;
+ if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_cert_inst(&ctx->cert)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
+{
+ int j, ret = 0;
+ BIO *in;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
+ j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
+ pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ } else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
+ j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
+ pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE, j);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ end:
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *d, long len)
+{
+ int ret;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+ p = d;
+ if ((pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)len)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/*
+ * Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format, possibly
+ * followed by a sequence of CA certificates that should be sent to the peer
+ * in the Certificate message.
+ */
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
+{
+ BIO *in;
+ int ret = 0;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for
+ * SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() != 0)
+ ret = 0; /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply
+ * ret==0 ... */
+ if (ret) {
+ /*
+ * If we could set up our certificate, now proceed to the CA
+ * certificates.
+ */
+ X509 *ca;
+ int r;
+ unsigned long err;
+
+ if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
+ ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
+ }
+
+ while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback,
+ ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata))
+ != NULL) {
+ r = SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
+ if (!r) {
+ X509_free(ca);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Note that we must not free r if it was successfully added to
+ * the chain (while we must free the main certificate, since its
+ * reference count is increased by SSL_CTX_use_certificate).
+ */
+ }
+ /* When the while loop ends, it's usually just EOF. */
+ err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM
+ && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ else
+ ret = 0; /* some real error */
+ }
+
+ end:
+ if (x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ return (ret);
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_sess.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1305 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
-static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
-
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
-/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
-{
- return (ssl->session);
-}
-
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
-/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
-{
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- /*
- * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
- * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null
- * and when we up the reference count.
- */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- sess = ssl->session;
- if (sess)
- sess->references++;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- return (sess);
-}
-
-int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
- CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-}
-
-int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
-{
- return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
-}
-
-void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
-{
- return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
-}
-
-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
-{
- SSL_SESSION *ss;
-
- ss = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
- if (ss == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- memset(ss, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
-
- ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
- ss->references = 1;
- ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
- ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- ss->prev = NULL;
- ss->next = NULL;
- ss->compress_meth = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
-# endif
-#endif
- CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- ss->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- ss->psk_identity = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- ss->srp_username = NULL;
-#endif
- return (ss);
-}
-
-/*
- * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
- * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
- */
-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
-{
- SSL_SESSION *dest;
-
- dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
- if (dest == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
-
- /*
- * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
- * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- dest->psk_identity = NULL;
-#endif
- dest->ciphers = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
-# endif
-#endif
- dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- dest->srp_username = NULL;
-#endif
- memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
-
- /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
- dest->prev = NULL;
- dest->next = NULL;
-
- dest->references = 1;
-
- if (src->sess_cert != NULL)
- CRYPTO_add(&src->sess_cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
-
- if (src->peer != NULL)
- CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (src->psk_identity_hint) {
- dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
- if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (src->psk_identity) {
- dest->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity);
- if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if(src->ciphers != NULL) {
- dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
- if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
- &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (src->tlsext_hostname) {
- dest->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
- if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
- dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
- BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
- if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
- if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
- dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
- BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
- src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
- if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
-# endif
-#endif
-
- if (ticket != 0) {
- dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
- if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
- goto err;
- } else {
- dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
- dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (src->srp_username) {
- dest->srp_username = BUF_strdup(src->srp_username);
- if (dest->srp_username == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- return dest;
-err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
- unsigned int *len)
-{
- if (len)
- *len = s->session_id_length;
- return s->session_id;
-}
-
-unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
-{
- return s->compress_meth;
-}
-
-/*
- * Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space.
- * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random
- * gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one
- * iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it
- * takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a
- * reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or
- * someone is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL
- * sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps
- * a more interesting question ...
- */
-
-#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
-static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
- unsigned int *id_len)
-{
- unsigned int retry = 0;
- do
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
- return 0;
- while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
- (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ;
- if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
- return 1;
- /* else - woops a session_id match */
- /*
- * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of
- * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent
- * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have
- * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make
- * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the
- * internal cache as well).
- */
- return 0;
-}
-
-int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
-{
- /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
-
- unsigned int tmp;
- SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
- GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
-
- if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
- if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
- ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
- else
- ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
-
- if (s->session != NULL) {
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = NULL;
- }
-
- if (session) {
- if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- ss->ssl_version = SSL2_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- } else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
- ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- } else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
- ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- } else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- } else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
- ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- } else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
- ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return (0);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /*-
- * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
- * Note that:
- * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
- * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
- * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
- * ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
- * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
- * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
- * whether a ticket is expected or not.
- *
- * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
- * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
- * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- ss->session_id_length = 0;
- goto sess_id_done;
- }
-#endif
- /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if (s->generate_session_id)
- cb = s->generate_session_id;
- else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
- cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- /* Choose a session ID */
- tmp = ss->session_id_length;
- if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
- /* The callback failed */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
- SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return (0);
- }
- /*
- * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor
- * set it higher than it was.
- */
- if (!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) {
- /* The callback set an illegal length */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
- SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return (0);
- }
- /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
- if ((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
- memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
- else
- ss->session_id_length = tmp;
- /* Finally, check for a conflict */
- if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
- ss->session_id_length)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return (0);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- sess_id_done:
- if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
- ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
- if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) ==
- NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return 0;
- }
- ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
- }
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
- if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
- if ((ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) ==
- NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return 0;
- }
- ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
- s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- memcpy(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
- s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
- }
-# endif
-#endif
- } else {
- ss->session_id_length = 0;
- }
-
- if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
- ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
- s->session = ss;
- ss->ssl_version = s->version;
- ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-
- return (1);
-}
-
-/*-
- * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
- * connection. It is only called by servers.
- *
- * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
- * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
- * extension, if any.
- * len: the length of the session ID.
- * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -1: error
- * 0: a session may have been found.
- *
- * Side effects:
- * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
- * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
- * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
- * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
- */
-int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- const unsigned char *limit)
-{
- /* This is used only by servers. */
-
- SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
- int fatal = 0;
- int try_session_cache = 1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- int r;
-#endif
-
- if (len < 0 || len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
- goto err;
-
- if (session_id + len > limit) {
- fatal = 1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (len == 0)
- try_session_cache = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
- r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
- switch (r) {
- case -1: /* Error during processing */
- fatal = 1;
- goto err;
- case 0: /* No ticket found */
- case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
- break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
- case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
- case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
- try_session_cache = 0;
- break;
- default:
- abort();
- }
-#endif
-
- if (try_session_cache &&
- ret == NULL &&
- !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
- SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
- SSL_SESSION data;
- data.ssl_version = s->version;
- data.session_id_length = len;
- if (len == 0)
- return 0;
- memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, len);
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
- if (ret != NULL) {
- /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- }
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if (ret == NULL)
- s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
- }
-
- if (try_session_cache &&
- ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
- int copy = 1;
-
- if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id, len, ©))) {
- s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
-
- /*
- * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
- * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
- * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
- * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
- * thread-safe).
- */
- if (copy)
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-
- /*
- * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
- * well if and only if we are supposed to.
- */
- if (!
- (s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
- SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
- /*
- * The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are
- * very strange
- */
- SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
- }
- }
-
- if (ret == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
-
- if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
- || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
- /*
- * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
- * use it in this context.
- */
- goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
- }
-
- if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
- /*
- * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
- * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
- * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
- * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
- * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
- * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
- * noticing).
- */
-
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
- SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
- fatal = 1;
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
- unsigned char buf[5], *p;
- unsigned long l;
-
- p = buf;
- l = ret->cipher_id;
- l2n(l, p);
- if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
- ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
- else
- ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
- if (ret->cipher == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */
- s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
- if (try_session_cache) {
- /* session was from the cache, so remove it */
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
- }
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
- if (s->session != NULL)
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = ret;
- s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
- return 1;
-
- err:
- if (ret != NULL) {
- SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (!try_session_cache) {
- /*
- * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
- * the new session
- */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- }
-#endif
- }
- if (fatal)
- return -1;
- else
- return 0;
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- SSL_SESSION *s;
-
- /*
- * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though
- * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and
- * an lhash
- */
- CRYPTO_add(&c->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- /*
- * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later
- */
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
-
- /*
- * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this
- * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
- * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
- */
- if (s != NULL && s != c) {
- /* We *are* in trouble ... */
- SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
- SSL_SESSION_free(s);
- /*
- * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
- * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the
- * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently
- * obtain the same session from an external cache)
- */
- s = NULL;
- }
-
- /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
- if (s == NULL)
- SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
-
- if (s != NULL) {
- /*
- * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
- * count because it already takes into account the cache
- */
-
- SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
- ret = 0;
- } else {
- /*
- * new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large
- */
-
- ret = 1;
-
- if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
- while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
- SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
- if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
- break;
- else
- ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
- }
- }
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
-{
- return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
-}
-
-static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
-{
- SSL_SESSION *r;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
- if (lck)
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
- ret = 1;
- r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
- SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
- }
-
- if (lck)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- if (ret) {
- r->not_resumable = 1;
- if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
- ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r);
- SSL_SESSION_free(r);
- }
- } else
- ret = 0;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (ss == NULL)
- return;
-
- i = CRYPTO_add(&ss->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
-#endif
- if (i > 0)
- return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
-
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg, sizeof ss->key_arg);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof ss->master_key);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof ss->session_id);
- if (ss->sess_cert != NULL)
- ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
- if (ss->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(ss->peer);
- if (ss->ciphers != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
- if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (ss->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
- if (ss->psk_identity != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (ss->srp_username != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
-#endif
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ss, sizeof(*ss));
- OPENSSL_free(ss);
-}
-
-int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
-{
- int ret = 0;
- const SSL_METHOD *meth;
-
- if (session != NULL) {
- meth = s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
- if (meth == NULL)
- meth = s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
- if (meth == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
- return (0);
- }
-
- if (meth != s->method) {
- if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
- return (0);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
- session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) {
- s->kssl_ctx->client_princ =
- (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
- memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ, session->krb5_client_princ,
- session->krb5_client_princ_len);
- s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
- /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
- CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- if (s->session != NULL)
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = session;
- s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
- /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
- ret = 1;
- } else {
- if (s->session != NULL) {
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session = NULL;
- }
-
- meth = s->ctx->method;
- if (meth != s->method) {
- if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
- return (0);
- }
- ret = 1;
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return (0);
- s->timeout = t;
- return (1);
-}
-
-long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return (0);
- return (s->timeout);
-}
-
-long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return (0);
- return (s->time);
-}
-
-long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return (0);
- s->time = t;
- return (t);
-}
-
-X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s)
-{
- return s->peer;
-}
-
-int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
- unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
-{
- if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,
- SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
- memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
-{
- long l;
- if (s == NULL)
- return (0);
- l = s->session_timeout;
- s->session_timeout = t;
- return (l);
-}
-
-long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return (0);
- return (s->session_timeout);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
- int (*tls_session_secret_cb) (SSL *s,
- void *secret,
- int *secret_len,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
- *peer_ciphers,
- SSL_CIPHER
- **cipher,
- void *arg),
- void *arg)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return (0);
- s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
- s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
- return (1);
-}
-
-int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
- void *arg)
-{
- if (s == NULL)
- return (0);
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
- return (1);
-}
-
-int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
-{
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
- if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
- s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
- }
-
- s->tlsext_session_ticket =
- OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
- if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ext_data) {
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
- memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
- } else {
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
-
-typedef struct timeout_param_st {
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- long time;
- LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
-} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
-
-static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
-{
- if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) { /* timeout */
- /*
- * The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to save on
- * locking overhead
- */
- (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s);
- SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx, s);
- s->not_resumable = 1;
- if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
- p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx, s);
- SSL_SESSION_free(s);
- }
-}
-
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM)
-
-void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
-{
- unsigned long i;
- TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
-
- tp.ctx = s;
- tp.cache = s->sessions;
- if (tp.cache == NULL)
- return;
- tp.time = t;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- i = CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load;
- CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = 0;
- lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout),
- TIMEOUT_PARAM, &tp);
- CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = i;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-}
-
-int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
-{
- if ((s->session != NULL) &&
- !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
- !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
- return (1);
- } else
- return (0);
-}
-
-/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
-{
- if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL))
- return;
-
- if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
- /* last element in list */
- if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
- /* only one element in list */
- ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
- ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
- } else {
- ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
- s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
- }
- } else {
- if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
- /* first element in list */
- ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
- s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
- } else {
- /* middle of list */
- s->next->prev = s->prev;
- s->prev->next = s->next;
- }
- }
- s->prev = s->next = NULL;
-}
-
-static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
-{
- if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
- SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
-
- if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
- ctx->session_cache_head = s;
- ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
- s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
- s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
- } else {
- s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
- s->next->prev = s;
- s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
- ctx->session_cache_head = s;
- }
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
- SSL_SESSION *sess))
-{
- ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
-}
-
-int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
- return ctx->new_session_cb;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess))
-{
- ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
-}
-
-void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION *sess) {
- return ctx->remove_session_cb;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
- unsigned char *data, int len,
- int *copy))
-{
- ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
-}
-
-SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl,
- unsigned char *data,
- int len, int *copy) {
- return ctx->get_session_cb;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
-{
- ctx->info_callback = cb;
-}
-
-void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
- int val) {
- return ctx->info_callback;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey))
-{
- ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
-}
-
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
- return ctx->client_cert_cb;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
-{
- if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
- SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
- ENGINE_finish(e);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->client_cert_engine = e;
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
- unsigned char *cookie,
- unsigned int *cookie_len))
-{
- ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb;
-}
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
- int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
- unsigned int cookie_len))
-{
- ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb;
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,
- SSL_SESSION)
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_sess.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssl_sess.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_sess.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1305 @@
+/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
+/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
+{
+ return (ssl->session);
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
+/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ /*
+ * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
+ * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null
+ * and when we up the reference count.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ sess = ssl->session;
+ if (sess)
+ sess->references++;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ return (sess);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+ CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *ss;
+
+ ss = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ if (ss == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ memset(ss, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+
+ ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
+ ss->references = 1;
+ ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
+ ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ ss->prev = NULL;
+ ss->next = NULL;
+ ss->compress_meth = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ ss->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ ss->psk_identity = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ ss->srp_username = NULL;
+#endif
+ return (ss);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
+ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
+ */
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *dest;
+
+ dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
+ * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ dest->psk_identity = NULL;
+#endif
+ dest->ciphers = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+# endif
+ dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ dest->srp_username = NULL;
+#endif
+ memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
+
+ /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
+ dest->prev = NULL;
+ dest->next = NULL;
+
+ dest->references = 1;
+
+ if (src->sess_cert != NULL)
+ CRYPTO_add(&src->sess_cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+
+ if (src->peer != NULL)
+ CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (src->psk_identity_hint) {
+ dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (src->psk_identity) {
+ dest->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity);
+ if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(src->ciphers != NULL) {
+ dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
+ if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
+ &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (src->tlsext_hostname) {
+ dest->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+ dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+ BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+ dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+ BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+ src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if (ticket != 0) {
+ dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
+ if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+ dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (src->srp_username) {
+ dest->srp_username = BUF_strdup(src->srp_username);
+ if (dest->srp_username == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return dest;
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+ unsigned int *len)
+{
+ if (len)
+ *len = s->session_id_length;
+ return s->session_id;
+}
+
+unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+ return s->compress_meth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space.
+ * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random
+ * gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one
+ * iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it
+ * takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a
+ * reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or
+ * someone is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL
+ * sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps
+ * a more interesting question ...
+ */
+
+#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int *id_len)
+{
+ unsigned int retry = 0;
+ do
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+ (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ;
+ if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+ return 1;
+ /* else - woops a session_id match */
+ /*
+ * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of
+ * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent
+ * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have
+ * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make
+ * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the
+ * internal cache as well).
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
+{
+ /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
+ unsigned int tmp;
+ SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
+ GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
+
+ if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
+ if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
+ ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
+ else
+ ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+
+ if (s->session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (session) {
+ if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = SSL2_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /*-
+ * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
+ * Note that:
+ * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
+ * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
+ * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
+ * ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
+ * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
+ * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
+ * whether a ticket is expected or not.
+ *
+ * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
+ * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
+ * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ ss->session_id_length = 0;
+ goto sess_id_done;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (s->generate_session_id)
+ cb = s->generate_session_id;
+ else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
+ cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ /* Choose a session ID */
+ tmp = ss->session_id_length;
+ if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
+ /* The callback failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor
+ * set it higher than it was.
+ */
+ if (!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) {
+ /* The callback set an illegal length */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
+ if ((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
+ memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
+ else
+ ss->session_id_length = tmp;
+ /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+ if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
+ ss->session_id_length)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ sess_id_done:
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
+ ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+ if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) ==
+ NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+ if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+ if ((ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) ==
+ NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ memcpy(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+ } else {
+ ss->session_id_length = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+ ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
+ s->session = ss;
+ ss->ssl_version = s->version;
+ ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
+ * connection. It is only called by servers.
+ *
+ * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
+ * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
+ * extension, if any.
+ * len: the length of the session ID.
+ * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1: error
+ * 0: a session may have been found.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
+ * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
+ * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
+ * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
+ */
+int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ const unsigned char *limit)
+{
+ /* This is used only by servers. */
+
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
+ int fatal = 0;
+ int try_session_cache = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ int r;
+#endif
+
+ if (len < 0 || len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (session_id + len > limit) {
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ try_session_cache = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
+ r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
+ switch (r) {
+ case -1: /* Error during processing */
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ case 0: /* No ticket found */
+ case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
+ break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
+ case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
+ case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
+ try_session_cache = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ abort();
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (try_session_cache &&
+ ret == NULL &&
+ !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+ SSL_SESSION data;
+ data.ssl_version = s->version;
+ data.session_id_length = len;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, len);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
+ }
+
+ if (try_session_cache &&
+ ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
+ int copy = 1;
+
+ if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id, len, ©))) {
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
+
+ /*
+ * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
+ * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
+ * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
+ * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
+ * thread-safe).
+ */
+ if (copy)
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
+ /*
+ * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
+ * well if and only if we are supposed to.
+ */
+ if (!
+ (s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
+ /*
+ * The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are
+ * very strange
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
+
+ if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
+ || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
+ /*
+ * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
+ * use it in this context.
+ */
+ goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
+ }
+
+ if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
+ * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
+ * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
+ * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
+ * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
+ * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
+ * noticing).
+ */
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
+ unsigned char buf[5], *p;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ p = buf;
+ l = ret->cipher_id;
+ l2n(l, p);
+ if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
+ else
+ ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
+ if (ret->cipher == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
+ if (try_session_cache) {
+ /* session was from the cache, so remove it */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = ret;
+ s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (!try_session_cache) {
+ /*
+ * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
+ * the new session
+ */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ if (fatal)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION *s;
+
+ /*
+ * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though
+ * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and
+ * an lhash
+ */
+ CRYPTO_add(&c->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ /*
+ * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later
+ */
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
+
+ /*
+ * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this
+ * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
+ * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
+ */
+ if (s != NULL && s != c) {
+ /* We *are* in trouble ... */
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ /*
+ * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
+ * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the
+ * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently
+ * obtain the same session from an external cache)
+ */
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
+ if (s == NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
+
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
+ * count because it already takes into account the cache
+ */
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large
+ */
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
+ while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
+ SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+ if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
+ break;
+ else
+ ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+{
+ return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
+}
+
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *r;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
+ if (lck)
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
+ ret = 1;
+ r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
+ }
+
+ if (lck)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ r->not_resumable = 1;
+ if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(r);
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = 0;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (ss == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&ss->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg, sizeof ss->key_arg);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof ss->master_key);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof ss->session_id);
+ if (ss->sess_cert != NULL)
+ ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
+ if (ss->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(ss->peer);
+ if (ss->ciphers != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (ss->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (ss->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (ss->srp_username != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ss, sizeof(*ss));
+ OPENSSL_free(ss);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const SSL_METHOD *meth;
+
+ if (session != NULL) {
+ meth = s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ meth = s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
+ if (meth == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (meth != s->method) {
+ if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
+ return (0);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
+ session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) {
+ s->kssl_ctx->client_princ =
+ (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
+ memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ, session->krb5_client_princ,
+ session->krb5_client_princ_len);
+ s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
+ CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ if (s->session != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = session;
+ s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+ /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (s->session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+ }
+
+ meth = s->ctx->method;
+ if (meth != s->method) {
+ if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
+ return (0);
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ s->timeout = t;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ return (s->timeout);
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ return (s->time);
+}
+
+long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ s->time = t;
+ return (t);
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+ return s->peer;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+ unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+ if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+ memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
+{
+ long l;
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ l = s->session_timeout;
+ s->session_timeout = t;
+ return (l);
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ return (s->session_timeout);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
+ int (*tls_session_secret_cb) (SSL *s,
+ void *secret,
+ int *secret_len,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+ *peer_ciphers,
+ SSL_CIPHER
+ **cipher,
+ void *arg),
+ void *arg)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
+{
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
+ if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
+ }
+
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
+ if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ext_data) {
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
+ memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
+ } else {
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+typedef struct timeout_param_st {
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ long time;
+ LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
+} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
+
+static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
+{
+ if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) { /* timeout */
+ /*
+ * The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to save on
+ * locking overhead
+ */
+ (void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx, s);
+ s->not_resumable = 1;
+ if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx, s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ }
+}
+
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM)
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
+{
+ unsigned long i;
+ TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
+
+ tp.ctx = s;
+ tp.cache = s->sessions;
+ if (tp.cache == NULL)
+ return;
+ tp.time = t;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ i = CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load;
+ CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = 0;
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout),
+ TIMEOUT_PARAM, &tp);
+ CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = i;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+}
+
+int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
+{
+ if ((s->session != NULL) &&
+ !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
+ !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+ return (1);
+ } else
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+ if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL))
+ return;
+
+ if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
+ /* last element in list */
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+ /* only one element in list */
+ ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
+ s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
+ /* first element in list */
+ ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
+ s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ } else {
+ /* middle of list */
+ s->next->prev = s->prev;
+ s->prev->next = s->next;
+ }
+ }
+ s->prev = s->next = NULL;
+}
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+ if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+
+ if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
+ ctx->session_cache_head = s;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
+ s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ } else {
+ s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
+ s->next->prev = s;
+ s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ ctx->session_cache_head = s;
+ }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ SSL_SESSION *sess))
+{
+ ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+ return ctx->new_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess))
+{
+ ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+ return ctx->remove_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ unsigned char *data, int len,
+ int *copy))
+{
+ ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char *data,
+ int len, int *copy) {
+ return ctx->get_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
+{
+ ctx->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
+ int val) {
+ return ctx->info_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey))
+{
+ ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
+ return ctx->client_cert_cb;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
+{
+ if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
+ SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->client_cert_engine = e;
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int *cookie_len))
+{
+ ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
+ unsigned int cookie_len))
+{
+ ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb;
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,
+ SSL_SESSION)
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssltest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssltest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssltest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2519 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/ssltest.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-/* Or gethostname won't be declared properly on Linux and GNU platforms. */
-#define _BSD_SOURCE 1
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#define USE_SOCKETS
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-/*
- * Or isascii won't be declared properly on VMS (at least with DECompHP C).
- */
-# define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500
-#endif
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-# include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-# include <openssl/srp.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-/*
- * Or gethostname won't be declared properly
- * on Compaq platforms (at least with DEC C).
- * Do not try to put it earlier, or IPv6 includes
- * get screwed...
- */
-#define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED 1
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
-# include <winsock.h>
-#else
-# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "SYS$DISK:[-.APPS]SERVER.PEM"
-# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "SYS$DISK:[-.APPS]CLIENT.PEM"
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
-# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "\\OpenSSL\\server.pem"
-# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "\\OpenSSL\\client.pem"
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "\\openssl\\apps\\server.pem"
-# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "\\openssl\\apps\\client.pem"
-#else
-# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "../apps/server.pem"
-# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "../apps/client.pem"
-#endif
-
-/*
- * There is really no standard for this, so let's assign some tentative
- * numbers. In any case, these numbers are only for this test
- */
-#define COMP_RLE 255
-#define COMP_ZLIB 1
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength);
-static void free_tmp_rsa(void);
-#endif
-static int MS_CALLBACK app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
-#define APP_CALLBACK_STRING "Test Callback Argument"
-struct app_verify_arg {
- char *string;
- int app_verify;
- int allow_proxy_certs;
- char *proxy_auth;
- char *proxy_cond;
-};
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-static DH *get_dh512(void);
-static DH *get_dh1024(void);
-static DH *get_dh1024dsa(void);
-#endif
-
-static char *psk_key = NULL; /* by default PSK is not used */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
- char *identity,
- unsigned int max_identity_len,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len);
-static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-/* SRP client */
-/* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */
-typedef struct srp_client_arg_st {
- char *srppassin;
- char *srplogin;
-} SRP_CLIENT_ARG;
-
-# define PWD_STRLEN 1024
-
-static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
-{
- SRP_CLIENT_ARG *srp_client_arg = (SRP_CLIENT_ARG *)arg;
- return BUF_strdup((char *)srp_client_arg->srppassin);
-}
-
-/* SRP server */
-/* This is a context that we pass to SRP server callbacks */
-typedef struct srp_server_arg_st {
- char *expected_user;
- char *pass;
-} SRP_SERVER_ARG;
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
-{
- SRP_SERVER_ARG *p = (SRP_SERVER_ARG *)arg;
-
- if (strcmp(p->expected_user, SSL_get_srp_username(s)) != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "User %s doesn't exist\n", SSL_get_srp_username(s));
- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- }
- if (SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(s, p->expected_user, p->pass, "1024") < 0) {
- *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- }
- return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
-}
-#endif
-
-static BIO *bio_err = NULL;
-static BIO *bio_stdout = NULL;
-
-static char *cipher = NULL;
-static int verbose = 0;
-static int debug = 0;
-#if 0
-/* Not used yet. */
-# ifdef FIONBIO
-static int s_nbio = 0;
-# endif
-#endif
-
-static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
-
-int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long bytes, clock_t *s_time,
- clock_t *c_time);
-int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long bytes);
-static int do_test_cipherlist(void);
-static void sv_usage(void)
-{
- fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssltest [args ...]\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- fprintf(stderr, "-F - run test in FIPS mode\n");
-#endif
- fprintf(stderr, " -server_auth - check server certificate\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -client_auth - do client authentication\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -proxy - allow proxy certificates\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -proxy_auth <val> - set proxy policy rights\n");
- fprintf(stderr,
- " -proxy_cond <val> - experssion to test proxy policy rights\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -v - more output\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -d - debug output\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -reuse - use session-id reuse\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -num <val> - number of connections to perform\n");
- fprintf(stderr,
- " -bytes <val> - number of bytes to swap between client/server\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- fprintf(stderr,
- " -dhe512 - use 512 bit key for DHE (to test failure)\n");
- fprintf(stderr,
- " -dhe1024 - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE (default, no-op)\n");
- fprintf(stderr,
- " -dhe1024dsa - use 1024 bit key (with 160-bit subprime) for DHE\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -no_dhe - disable DHE\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- fprintf(stderr, " -no_ecdhe - disable ECDHE\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- fprintf(stderr, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- fprintf(stderr, " -srpuser user - SRP username to use\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -srppass arg - password for 'user'\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
- fprintf(stderr, " -ssl2 - use SSLv2\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
- fprintf(stderr, " -ssl3 - use SSLv3\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
- fprintf(stderr, " -tls1 - use TLSv1\n");
-#endif
- fprintf(stderr, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -cert arg - Server certificate file\n");
- fprintf(stderr,
- " -key arg - Server key file (default: same as -cert)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -c_cert arg - Client certificate file\n");
- fprintf(stderr,
- " -c_key arg - Client key file (default: same as -c_cert)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -cipher arg - The cipher list\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -bio_pair - Use BIO pairs\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -f - Test even cases that can't work\n");
- fprintf(stderr,
- " -time - measure processor time used by client and server\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -zlib - use zlib compression\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -rle - use rle compression\n");
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- fprintf(stderr,
- " -named_curve arg - Elliptic curve name to use for ephemeral ECDH keys.\n"
- " Use \"openssl ecparam -list_curves\" for all names\n"
- " (default is sect163r2).\n");
-#endif
- fprintf(stderr,
- " -test_cipherlist - Verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists.\n"
- " When this option is requested, the cipherlist\n"
- " tests are run instead of handshake tests.\n");
-}
-
-static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
-{
- const SSL_CIPHER *ciph;
- X509 *cert;
-
- ciph = SSL_get_current_cipher(c_ssl);
- BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%s%s, cipher %s %s",
- prefix,
- SSL_get_version(c_ssl),
- SSL_CIPHER_get_version(ciph), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(ciph));
- cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(c_ssl);
- if (cert != NULL) {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
- if (pkey != NULL) {
- if (0) ;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->pkey.rsa != NULL
- && pkey->pkey.rsa->n != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_stdout, ", %d bit RSA",
- BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n));
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && pkey->pkey.dsa != NULL
- && pkey->pkey.dsa->p != NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_stdout, ", %d bit DSA",
- BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa->p));
- }
-#endif
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- }
- X509_free(cert);
- }
- /*
- * The SSL API does not allow us to look at temporary RSA/DH keys,
- * otherwise we should print their lengths too
- */
- BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "\n");
-}
-
-static void lock_dbg_cb(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
-{
- static int modes[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS]; /* = {0, 0, ... } */
- const char *errstr = NULL;
- int rw;
-
- rw = mode & (CRYPTO_READ | CRYPTO_WRITE);
- if (!((rw == CRYPTO_READ) || (rw == CRYPTO_WRITE))) {
- errstr = "invalid mode";
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (type < 0 || type >= CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS) {
- errstr = "type out of bounds";
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
- if (modes[type]) {
- errstr = "already locked";
- /*
- * must not happen in a single-threaded program (would deadlock)
- */
- goto err;
- }
-
- modes[type] = rw;
- } else if (mode & CRYPTO_UNLOCK) {
- if (!modes[type]) {
- errstr = "not locked";
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (modes[type] != rw) {
- errstr = (rw == CRYPTO_READ) ?
- "CRYPTO_r_unlock on write lock" :
- "CRYPTO_w_unlock on read lock";
- }
-
- modes[type] = 0;
- } else {
- errstr = "invalid mode";
- goto err;
- }
-
- err:
- if (errstr) {
- /* we cannot use bio_err here */
- fprintf(stderr,
- "openssl (lock_dbg_cb): %s (mode=%d, type=%d) at %s:%d\n",
- errstr, mode, type, file, line);
- }
-}
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-struct cb_info_st {
- void *input;
- size_t len;
- int ret;
-};
-struct cb_info_st co1 = { "C", 1, 1 }; /* try to negotiate oqaque PRF input */
-struct cb_info_st co2 = { "C", 1, 2 }; /* insist on oqaque PRF input */
-struct cb_info_st so1 = { "S", 1, 1 }; /* try to negotiate oqaque PRF input */
-struct cb_info_st so2 = { "S", 1, 2 }; /* insist on oqaque PRF input */
-
-int opaque_prf_input_cb(SSL *ssl, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg_)
-{
- struct cb_info_st *arg = arg_;
-
- if (arg == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- if (!SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, arg->input, arg->len))
- return 0;
- return arg->ret;
-}
-#endif
-
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-{
- char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
- int badop = 0;
- int bio_pair = 0;
- int force = 0;
- int tls1 = 0, ssl2 = 0, ssl3 = 0, ret = 1;
- int client_auth = 0;
- int server_auth = 0, i;
- struct app_verify_arg app_verify_arg =
- { APP_CALLBACK_STRING, 0, 0, NULL, NULL };
- char *server_cert = TEST_SERVER_CERT;
- char *server_key = NULL;
- char *client_cert = TEST_CLIENT_CERT;
- char *client_key = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- char *named_curve = NULL;
-#endif
- SSL_CTX *s_ctx = NULL;
- SSL_CTX *c_ctx = NULL;
- const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL;
- SSL *c_ssl, *s_ssl;
- int number = 1, reuse = 0;
- long bytes = 256L;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh;
- int dhe512 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* client */
- SRP_CLIENT_ARG srp_client_arg = { NULL, NULL };
- /* server */
- SRP_SERVER_ARG srp_server_arg = { NULL, NULL };
-#endif
- int no_dhe = 0;
- int no_ecdhe = 0;
- int no_psk = 0;
- int print_time = 0;
- clock_t s_time = 0, c_time = 0;
- int comp = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- COMP_METHOD *cm = NULL;
- STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
-#endif
- int test_cipherlist = 0;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- int fips_mode = 0;
-#endif
- int no_protocol = 0;
-
- verbose = 0;
- debug = 0;
- cipher = 0;
-
- bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
-
- CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(lock_dbg_cb);
-
- /* enable memory leak checking unless explicitly disabled */
- if (!((getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY") != NULL)
- && (0 == strcmp(getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"), "off")))) {
- CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
- CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
- } else {
- /* OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=off */
- CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions(0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
- }
- CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
-
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
-
- bio_stdout = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
-
- argc--;
- argv++;
-
- while (argc >= 1) {
- if (!strcmp(*argv, "-F")) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- fips_mode = 1;
-#else
- fprintf(stderr,
- "not compiled with FIPS support, so exitting without running.\n");
- EXIT(0);
-#endif
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_auth") == 0)
- server_auth = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_auth") == 0)
- client_auth = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-proxy_auth") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- app_verify_arg.proxy_auth = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-proxy_cond") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- app_verify_arg.proxy_cond = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-v") == 0)
- verbose = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-d") == 0)
- debug = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reuse") == 0)
- reuse = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe512") == 0) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- dhe512 = 1;
-#else
- fprintf(stderr,
- "ignoring -dhe512, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
-#endif
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe1024dsa") == 0) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- dhe1024dsa = 1;
-#else
- fprintf(stderr,
- "ignoring -dhe1024dsa, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
-#endif
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0)
- no_dhe = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ecdhe") == 0)
- no_ecdhe = 1;
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- psk_key = *(++argv);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (strspn(psk_key, "abcdefABCDEF1234567890") != strlen(psk_key)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv);
- goto bad;
- }
-#else
- no_psk = 1;
-#endif
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuser") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srp_server_arg.expected_user = srp_client_arg.srplogin =
- *(++argv);
- tls1 = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srppass") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- srp_server_arg.pass = srp_client_arg.srppassin = *(++argv);
- tls1 = 1;
- }
-#endif
- else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
- no_protocol = 1;
-#endif
- ssl2 = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
- no_protocol = 1;
-#endif
- tls1 = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
- no_protocol = 1;
-#endif
- ssl3 = 1;
- } else if (strncmp(*argv, "-num", 4) == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- number = atoi(*(++argv));
- if (number == 0)
- number = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bytes") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- bytes = atol(*(++argv));
- if (bytes == 0L)
- bytes = 1L;
- i = strlen(argv[0]);
- if (argv[0][i - 1] == 'k')
- bytes *= 1024L;
- if (argv[0][i - 1] == 'm')
- bytes *= 1024L * 1024L;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- server_cert = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-s_cert") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- server_cert = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- server_key = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-s_key") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- server_key = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-c_cert") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- client_cert = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-c_key") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- client_key = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cipher") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- cipher = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- CApath = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
- CAfile = *(++argv);
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bio_pair") == 0) {
- bio_pair = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-f") == 0) {
- force = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-time") == 0) {
- print_time = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-zlib") == 0) {
- comp = COMP_ZLIB;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rle") == 0) {
- comp = COMP_RLE;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-named_curve") == 0) {
- if (--argc < 1)
- goto bad;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- named_curve = *(++argv);
-#else
- fprintf(stderr,
- "ignoring -named_curve, since I'm compiled without ECDH\n");
- ++argv;
-#endif
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-app_verify") == 0) {
- app_verify_arg.app_verify = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-proxy") == 0) {
- app_verify_arg.allow_proxy_certs = 1;
- } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-test_cipherlist") == 0) {
- test_cipherlist = 1;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
- badop = 1;
- break;
- }
- argc--;
- argv++;
- }
- if (badop) {
- bad:
- sv_usage();
- goto end;
- }
-
- /*
- * test_cipherlist prevails over protocol switch: we test the cipherlist
- * for all enabled protocols.
- */
- if (test_cipherlist == 1) {
- /*
- * ensure that the cipher list are correctly sorted and exit
- */
- fprintf(stdout, "Testing cipherlist order only. Ignoring all "
- "other options.\n");
- if (do_test_cipherlist() == 0)
- EXIT(1);
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (ssl2 + ssl3 + tls1 > 1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl2, -ssl3, or -tls1 should "
- "be requested.\n");
- EXIT(1);
- }
-
- /*
- * Testing was requested for a compiled-out protocol (e.g. SSLv2).
- * Ideally, we would error out, but the generic test wrapper can't know
- * when to expect failure. So we do nothing and return success.
- */
- if (no_protocol) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Testing was requested for a disabled protocol. "
- "Skipping tests.\n");
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force) {
- fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work. Use -f to perform "
- "the test anyway (and\n-d to see what happens), "
- "or add one of -ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -reuse\n"
- "to avoid protocol mismatch.\n");
- EXIT(1);
- }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (fips_mode) {
- if (!FIPS_mode_set(1)) {
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
- ERR_print_errors(BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE));
- EXIT(1);
- } else
- fprintf(stderr, "*** IN FIPS MODE ***\n");
- }
-#endif
-
- if (print_time) {
- if (!bio_pair) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Using BIO pair (-bio_pair)\n");
- bio_pair = 1;
- }
- if (number < 50 && !force)
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Warning: For accurate timings, use more connections (e.g. -num 1000)\n");
- }
-
-/* if (cipher == NULL) cipher=getenv("SSL_CIPHER"); */
-
- SSL_library_init();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (comp == COMP_ZLIB)
- cm = COMP_zlib();
- if (comp == COMP_RLE)
- cm = COMP_rle();
- if (cm != NULL) {
- if (cm->type != NID_undef) {
- if (SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(comp, cm) != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Failed to add compression method\n");
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- }
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Warning: %s compression not supported\n",
- (comp == COMP_RLE ? "rle" :
- (comp == COMP_ZLIB ? "zlib" : "unknown")));
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- }
- }
- ssl_comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
- fprintf(stderr, "Available compression methods:\n");
- {
- int j, n = sk_SSL_COMP_num(ssl_comp_methods);
- if (n == 0)
- fprintf(stderr, " NONE\n");
- else
- for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
- SSL_COMP *c = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, j);
- fprintf(stderr, " %d: %s\n", c->id, c->name);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * At this point, ssl2/ssl3/tls1 is only set if the protocol is
- * available. (Otherwise we exit early.) However the compiler doesn't
- * know this, so we ifdef.
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
- if (ssl2)
- meth = SSLv2_method();
- else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- if (ssl3)
- meth = SSLv3_method();
- else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
- if (tls1)
- meth = TLSv1_method();
- else
-#endif
- meth = SSLv23_method();
-
- c_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
- s_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
- if ((c_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx == NULL)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (cipher != NULL) {
- SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(c_ctx, cipher);
- SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx, cipher);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (!no_dhe) {
- if (dhe1024dsa) {
- /*
- * use SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE to avoid small subgroup attacks
- */
- SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
- dh = get_dh1024dsa();
- } else if (dhe512)
- dh = get_dh512();
- else
- dh = get_dh1024();
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx, dh);
- DH_free(dh);
- }
-#else
- (void)no_dhe;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (!no_ecdhe) {
- int nid;
-
- if (named_curve != NULL) {
- nid = OBJ_sn2nid(named_curve);
- if (nid == 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", named_curve);
- goto end;
- }
- } else
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
-# else
- nid = NID_sect163r2;
-# endif
-
- ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- if (ecdh == NULL) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve\n");
- goto end;
- }
-
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(s_ctx, ecdh);
- SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
- EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
- }
-#else
- (void)no_ecdhe;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(s_ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(c_ctx, opaque_prf_input_cb);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s_ctx, opaque_prf_input_cb);
- /* or &co2 or NULL */
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(c_ctx, &co1);
- /* or &so2 or NULL */
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(s_ctx, &so1);
-#endif
-
- if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s_ctx, server_cert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- } else if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(s_ctx,
- (server_key ? server_key :
- server_cert),
- SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (client_auth) {
- SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(c_ctx, client_cert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
- SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(c_ctx,
- (client_key ? client_key : client_cert),
- SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
- }
-
- if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
- (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx)) ||
- (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
- (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(c_ctx))) {
- /* fprintf(stderr,"SSL_load_verify_locations\n"); */
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- /* goto end; */
- }
-
- if (client_auth) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "client authentication\n");
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx,
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
- verify_callback);
- SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, app_verify_callback,
- &app_verify_arg);
- }
- if (server_auth) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "server authentication\n");
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(c_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback);
- SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(c_ctx, app_verify_callback,
- &app_verify_arg);
- }
-
- {
- int session_id_context = 0;
- SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx, (void *)&session_id_context,
- sizeof session_id_context);
- }
-
- /* Use PSK only if PSK key is given */
- if (psk_key != NULL) {
- /*
- * no_psk is used to avoid putting psk command to openssl tool
- */
- if (no_psk) {
- /*
- * if PSK is not compiled in and psk key is given, do nothing and
- * exit successfully
- */
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(c_ctx, psk_client_callback);
- SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(s_ctx, psk_server_callback);
- if (debug)
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
- if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(s_ctx, "ctx server identity_hint")) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (srp_client_arg.srplogin) {
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.srplogin)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n");
- goto end;
- }
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(c_ctx, &srp_client_arg);
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(c_ctx,
- ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb);
- /*
- * SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.strength);
- */
- }
-
- if (srp_server_arg.expected_user != NULL) {
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx, &srp_server_arg);
- SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
- }
-#endif
-
- c_ssl = SSL_new(c_ctx);
- s_ssl = SSL_new(s_ctx);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (c_ssl && c_ssl->kssl_ctx) {
- char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 2];
-
- if (gethostname(localhost, sizeof localhost - 1) == 0) {
- localhost[sizeof localhost - 1] = '\0';
- if (strlen(localhost) == sizeof localhost - 1) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "localhost name too long\n");
- goto end;
- }
- kssl_ctx_setstring(c_ssl->kssl_ctx, KSSL_SERVER, localhost);
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
- for (i = 0; i < number; i++) {
- if (!reuse)
- SSL_set_session(c_ssl, NULL);
- if (bio_pair)
- ret = doit_biopair(s_ssl, c_ssl, bytes, &s_time, &c_time);
- else
- ret = doit(s_ssl, c_ssl, bytes);
- }
-
- if (!verbose) {
- print_details(c_ssl, "");
- }
- if ((number > 1) || (bytes > 1L))
- BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%d handshakes of %ld bytes done\n", number,
- bytes);
- if (print_time) {
-#ifdef CLOCKS_PER_SEC
- /*
- * "To determine the time in seconds, the value returned by the clock
- * function should be divided by the value of the macro
- * CLOCKS_PER_SEC." -- ISO/IEC 9899
- */
- BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Approximate total server time: %6.2f s\n"
- "Approximate total client time: %6.2f s\n",
- (double)s_time / CLOCKS_PER_SEC,
- (double)c_time / CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
-#else
- /*
- * "`CLOCKS_PER_SEC' undeclared (first use this function)" -- cc on
- * NeXTstep/OpenStep
- */
- BIO_printf(bio_stdout,
- "Approximate total server time: %6.2f units\n"
- "Approximate total client time: %6.2f units\n",
- (double)s_time, (double)c_time);
-#endif
- }
-
- SSL_free(s_ssl);
- SSL_free(c_ssl);
-
- end:
- if (s_ctx != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx);
- if (c_ctx != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(c_ctx);
-
- if (bio_stdout != NULL)
- BIO_free(bio_stdout);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- free_tmp_rsa();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ENGINE_cleanup();
-#endif
- CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
- ERR_free_strings();
- ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
- EVP_cleanup();
- CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err);
- if (bio_err != NULL)
- BIO_free(bio_err);
- EXIT(ret);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count,
- clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time)
-{
- long cw_num = count, cr_num = count, sw_num = count, sr_num = count;
- BIO *s_ssl_bio = NULL, *c_ssl_bio = NULL;
- BIO *server = NULL, *server_io = NULL, *client = NULL, *client_io = NULL;
- int ret = 1;
-
- size_t bufsiz = 256; /* small buffer for testing */
-
- if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&server, bufsiz, &server_io, bufsiz))
- goto err;
- if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&client, bufsiz, &client_io, bufsiz))
- goto err;
-
- s_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
- if (!s_ssl_bio)
- goto err;
-
- c_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
- if (!c_ssl_bio)
- goto err;
-
- SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
- SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, client, client);
- (void)BIO_set_ssl(c_ssl_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
- SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, server, server);
- (void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- do {
- /*-
- * c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
- *
- * client: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
- *
- * client_io: client's SSL communication; usually to be
- * relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
- * test program, we're the server, too:
- *
- * server_io: server's SSL communication
- *
- * server: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
- *
- * s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
- *
- * The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
- * client + client_io, server + server_io.
- * BIO pairs are symmetric. A BIO pair behaves similar
- * to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
- * be handled by the same thread).
- * [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
- * of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
- * suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
- *
- * Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
- *
- * BIO_ctrl_pending(bio) number of bytes we can read now
- * BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio) number of bytes needed to fulfil
- * other side's read attempt
- * BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio) number of bytes we can write now
- *
- * ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
- * it depends on the application which one you should use.
- */
-
- /*
- * We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but
- * can be sure that there is *some* progress in each iteration; so we
- * don't have to worry about ..._SHOULD_READ or ..._SHOULD_WRITE --
- * we just try everything in each iteration
- */
-
- {
- /* CLIENT */
-
- MS_STATIC char cbuf[1024 * 8];
- int i, r;
- clock_t c_clock = clock();
-
- memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
-
- if (debug)
- if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
- printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
- SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
-
- if (cw_num > 0) {
- /* Write to server. */
-
- if (cw_num > (long)sizeof cbuf)
- i = sizeof cbuf;
- else
- i = (int)cw_num;
- r = BIO_write(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, i);
- if (r < 0) {
- if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * BIO_should_retry(...) can just be ignored here. The
- * library expects us to call BIO_write with the same
- * arguments again, and that's what we will do in the
- * next iteration.
- */
- } else if (r == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (debug)
- printf("client wrote %d\n", r);
- cw_num -= r;
- }
- }
-
- if (cr_num > 0) {
- /* Read from server. */
-
- r = BIO_read(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, sizeof(cbuf));
- if (r < 0) {
- if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Again, "BIO_should_retry" can be ignored.
- */
- } else if (r == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (debug)
- printf("client read %d\n", r);
- cr_num -= r;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * c_time and s_time increments will typically be very small
- * (depending on machine speed and clock tick intervals), but
- * sampling over a large number of connections should result in
- * fairly accurate figures. We cannot guarantee a lot, however
- * -- if each connection lasts for exactly one clock tick, it
- * will be counted only for the client or only for the server or
- * even not at all.
- */
- *c_time += (clock() - c_clock);
- }
-
- {
- /* SERVER */
-
- MS_STATIC char sbuf[1024 * 8];
- int i, r;
- clock_t s_clock = clock();
-
- memset(sbuf, 0, sizeof(sbuf));
-
- if (debug)
- if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
- printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
- SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
-
- if (sw_num > 0) {
- /* Write to client. */
-
- if (sw_num > (long)sizeof sbuf)
- i = sizeof sbuf;
- else
- i = (int)sw_num;
- r = BIO_write(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, i);
- if (r < 0) {
- if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
- goto err;
- }
- /* Ignore "BIO_should_retry". */
- } else if (r == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (debug)
- printf("server wrote %d\n", r);
- sw_num -= r;
- }
- }
-
- if (sr_num > 0) {
- /* Read from client. */
-
- r = BIO_read(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
- if (r < 0) {
- if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
- goto err;
- }
- /* blah, blah */
- } else if (r == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (debug)
- printf("server read %d\n", r);
- sr_num -= r;
- }
- }
-
- *s_time += (clock() - s_clock);
- }
-
- {
- /* "I/O" BETWEEN CLIENT AND SERVER. */
-
- size_t r1, r2;
- BIO *io1 = server_io, *io2 = client_io;
- /*
- * we use the non-copying interface for io1 and the standard
- * BIO_write/BIO_read interface for io2
- */
-
- static int prev_progress = 1;
- int progress = 0;
-
- /* io1 to io2 */
- do {
- size_t num;
- int r;
-
- r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io1);
- r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(io2);
-
- num = r1;
- if (r2 < num)
- num = r2;
- if (num) {
- char *dataptr;
-
- if (INT_MAX < num) /* yeah, right */
- num = INT_MAX;
-
- r = BIO_nread(io1, &dataptr, (int)num);
- assert(r > 0);
- assert(r <= (int)num);
- /*
- * possibly r < num (non-contiguous data)
- */
- num = r;
- r = BIO_write(io2, dataptr, (int)num);
- if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_write could not write "
- "BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() bytes");
- goto err;
- }
- progress = 1;
-
- if (debug)
- printf((io1 == client_io) ?
- "C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" :
- "S->C relaying: %d bytes\n", (int)num);
- }
- }
- while (r1 && r2);
-
- /* io2 to io1 */
- {
- size_t num;
- int r;
-
- r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io2);
- r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(io1);
- /*
- * here we could use ..._get_write_guarantee instead of
- * ..._get_read_request, but by using the latter we test
- * restartability of the SSL implementation more thoroughly
- */
- num = r1;
- if (r2 < num)
- num = r2;
- if (num) {
- char *dataptr;
-
- if (INT_MAX < num)
- num = INT_MAX;
-
- if (num > 1)
- --num; /* test restartability even more thoroughly */
-
- r = BIO_nwrite0(io1, &dataptr);
- assert(r > 0);
- if (r < (int)num)
- num = r;
- r = BIO_read(io2, dataptr, (int)num);
- if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_read could not read "
- "BIO_ctrl_pending() bytes");
- goto err;
- }
- progress = 1;
- r = BIO_nwrite(io1, &dataptr, (int)num);
- if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_nwrite() did not accept "
- "BIO_nwrite0() bytes");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (debug)
- printf((io2 == client_io) ?
- "C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" :
- "S->C relaying: %d bytes\n", (int)num);
- }
- } /* no loop, BIO_ctrl_get_read_request now
- * returns 0 anyway */
-
- if (!progress && !prev_progress)
- if (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: got stuck\n");
- if (strcmp("SSLv2", SSL_get_version(c_ssl)) == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "This can happen for SSL2 because "
- "CLIENT-FINISHED and SERVER-VERIFY are written \n"
- "concurrently ...");
- if (strncmp("2SCF", SSL_state_string(c_ssl), 4) == 0
- && strncmp("2SSV", SSL_state_string(s_ssl),
- 4) == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, " ok.\n");
- goto end;
- }
- }
- fprintf(stderr, " ERROR.\n");
- goto err;
- }
- prev_progress = progress;
- }
- }
- while (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0);
-
- if (verbose)
- print_details(c_ssl, "DONE via BIO pair: ");
- end:
- ret = 0;
-
- err:
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-
- if (server)
- BIO_free(server);
- if (server_io)
- BIO_free(server_io);
- if (client)
- BIO_free(client);
- if (client_io)
- BIO_free(client_io);
- if (s_ssl_bio)
- BIO_free(s_ssl_bio);
- if (c_ssl_bio)
- BIO_free(c_ssl_bio);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-#define W_READ 1
-#define W_WRITE 2
-#define C_DONE 1
-#define S_DONE 2
-
-int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
-{
- MS_STATIC char cbuf[1024 * 8], sbuf[1024 * 8];
- long cw_num = count, cr_num = count;
- long sw_num = count, sr_num = count;
- int ret = 1;
- BIO *c_to_s = NULL;
- BIO *s_to_c = NULL;
- BIO *c_bio = NULL;
- BIO *s_bio = NULL;
- int c_r, c_w, s_r, s_w;
- int i, j;
- int done = 0;
- int c_write, s_write;
- int do_server = 0, do_client = 0;
-
- memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
- memset(sbuf, 0, sizeof(sbuf));
-
- c_to_s = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- s_to_c = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
-
- c_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
- s_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
- if ((c_bio == NULL) || (s_bio == NULL)) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
-
- SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
- SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, s_to_c, c_to_s);
- BIO_set_ssl(c_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
- SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, c_to_s, s_to_c);
- BIO_set_ssl(s_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-
- c_r = 0;
- s_r = 1;
- c_w = 1;
- s_w = 0;
- c_write = 1, s_write = 0;
-
- /* We can always do writes */
- for (;;) {
- do_server = 0;
- do_client = 0;
-
- i = (int)BIO_pending(s_bio);
- if ((i && s_r) || s_w)
- do_server = 1;
-
- i = (int)BIO_pending(c_bio);
- if ((i && c_r) || c_w)
- do_client = 1;
-
- if (do_server && debug) {
- if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
- printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
- SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
-/*-
- else if (s_write)
- printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
- else
- printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */
- }
-
- if (do_client && debug) {
- if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
- printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
- SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
-/*-
- else if (c_write)
- printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
- else
- printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */
- }
-
- if (!do_client && !do_server) {
- fprintf(stdout, "ERROR IN STARTUP\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- if (do_client && !(done & C_DONE)) {
- if (c_write) {
- j = (cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf)) ?
- (int)sizeof(cbuf) : (int)cw_num;
- i = BIO_write(c_bio, cbuf, j);
- if (i < 0) {
- c_r = 0;
- c_w = 0;
- if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) {
- if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
- c_r = 1;
- if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
- c_w = 1;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (i == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (debug)
- printf("client wrote %d\n", i);
- /* ok */
- s_r = 1;
- c_write = 0;
- cw_num -= i;
- }
- } else {
- i = BIO_read(c_bio, cbuf, sizeof(cbuf));
- if (i < 0) {
- c_r = 0;
- c_w = 0;
- if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) {
- if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
- c_r = 1;
- if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
- c_w = 1;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (i == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (debug)
- printf("client read %d\n", i);
- cr_num -= i;
- if (sw_num > 0) {
- s_write = 1;
- s_w = 1;
- }
- if (cr_num <= 0) {
- s_write = 1;
- s_w = 1;
- done = S_DONE | C_DONE;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (do_server && !(done & S_DONE)) {
- if (!s_write) {
- i = BIO_read(s_bio, sbuf, sizeof(cbuf));
- if (i < 0) {
- s_r = 0;
- s_w = 0;
- if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) {
- if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
- s_r = 1;
- if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
- s_w = 1;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (i == 0) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- fprintf(stderr,
- "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_read\n");
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (debug)
- printf("server read %d\n", i);
- sr_num -= i;
- if (cw_num > 0) {
- c_write = 1;
- c_w = 1;
- }
- if (sr_num <= 0) {
- s_write = 1;
- s_w = 1;
- c_write = 0;
- }
- }
- } else {
- j = (sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf)) ?
- (int)sizeof(sbuf) : (int)sw_num;
- i = BIO_write(s_bio, sbuf, j);
- if (i < 0) {
- s_r = 0;
- s_w = 0;
- if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) {
- if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
- s_r = 1;
- if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
- s_w = 1;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (i == 0) {
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- fprintf(stderr,
- "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_write\n");
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (debug)
- printf("server wrote %d\n", i);
- sw_num -= i;
- s_write = 0;
- c_r = 1;
- if (sw_num <= 0)
- done |= S_DONE;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if ((done & S_DONE) && (done & C_DONE))
- break;
- }
-
- if (verbose)
- print_details(c_ssl, "DONE: ");
- ret = 0;
- err:
- /*
- * We have to set the BIO's to NULL otherwise they will be
- * OPENSSL_free()ed twice. Once when th s_ssl is SSL_free()ed and again
- * when c_ssl is SSL_free()ed. This is a hack required because s_ssl and
- * c_ssl are sharing the same BIO structure and SSL_set_bio() and
- * SSL_free() automatically BIO_free non NULL entries. You should not
- * normally do this or be required to do this
- */
- if (s_ssl != NULL) {
- s_ssl->rbio = NULL;
- s_ssl->wbio = NULL;
- }
- if (c_ssl != NULL) {
- c_ssl->rbio = NULL;
- c_ssl->wbio = NULL;
- }
-
- if (c_to_s != NULL)
- BIO_free(c_to_s);
- if (s_to_c != NULL)
- BIO_free(s_to_c);
- if (c_bio != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(c_bio);
- if (s_bio != NULL)
- BIO_free_all(s_bio);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(void)
-{
- static volatile int idx = -1;
- if (idx < 0) {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if (idx < 0) {
- idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
- "SSLtest for verify callback",
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- }
- return idx;
-}
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
- char *s, buf[256];
-
- s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert), buf,
- sizeof buf);
- if (s != NULL) {
- if (ok)
- fprintf(stderr, "depth=%d %s\n", ctx->error_depth, buf);
- else {
- fprintf(stderr, "depth=%d error=%d %s\n",
- ctx->error_depth, ctx->error, buf);
- }
- }
-
- if (ok == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Error string: %s\n",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
- switch (ctx->error) {
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
- case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
- fprintf(stderr, " ... ignored.\n");
- ok = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (ok == 1) {
- X509 *xs = ctx->current_cert;
-#if 0
- X509 *xi = ctx->current_issuer;
-#endif
-
- if (xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
- unsigned int *letters = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
- get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx
- ());
-
- if (letters) {
- int found_any = 0;
- int i;
- PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci =
- X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo,
- NULL, NULL);
-
- switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage)) {
- case NID_Independent:
- /*
- * Completely meaningless in this program, as there's no
- * way to grant explicit rights to a specific PrC.
- * Basically, using id-ppl-Independent is the perfect way
- * to grant no rights at all.
- */
- fprintf(stderr, " Independent proxy certificate");
- for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
- letters[i] = 0;
- break;
- case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll:
- /*
- * This is basically a NOP, we simply let the current
- * rights stand as they are.
- */
- fprintf(stderr, " Proxy certificate inherits all");
- break;
- default:
- s = (char *)
- pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data;
- i = pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length;
-
- /*
- * The algorithm works as follows: it is assumed that
- * previous iterations or the initial granted rights has
- * already set some elements of `letters'. What we need
- * to do is to clear those that weren't granted by the
- * current PrC as well. The easiest way to do this is to
- * add 1 to all the elements whose letters are given with
- * the current policy. That way, all elements that are
- * set by the current policy and were already set by
- * earlier policies and through the original grant of
- * rights will get the value 2 or higher. The last thing
- * to do is to sweep through `letters' and keep the
- * elements having the value 2 as set, and clear all the
- * others.
- */
-
- fprintf(stderr, " Certificate proxy rights = %*.*s", i,
- i, s);
- while (i-- > 0) {
- int c = *s++;
- if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c)) {
- if (islower(c))
- c = toupper(c);
- letters[c - 'A']++;
- }
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
- if (letters[i] < 2)
- letters[i] = 0;
- else
- letters[i] = 1;
- }
-
- found_any = 0;
- fprintf(stderr, ", resulting proxy rights = ");
- for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
- if (letters[i]) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%c", i + 'A');
- found_any = 1;
- }
- if (!found_any)
- fprintf(stderr, "none");
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-
- PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
- }
- }
- }
-
- return (ok);
-}
-
-static void process_proxy_debug(int indent, const char *format, ...)
-{
- /* That's 80 > */
- static const char indentation[] =
- ">>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>"
- ">>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>";
- char my_format[256];
- va_list args;
-
- BIO_snprintf(my_format, sizeof(my_format), "%*.*s %s",
- indent, indent, indentation, format);
-
- va_start(args, format);
- vfprintf(stderr, my_format, args);
- va_end(args);
-}
-
-/*-
- * Priority levels:
- * 0 [!]var, ()
- * 1 & ^
- * 2 |
- */
-static int process_proxy_cond_adders(unsigned int letters[26],
- const char *cond, const char **cond_end,
- int *pos, int indent);
-static int process_proxy_cond_val(unsigned int letters[26], const char *cond,
- const char **cond_end, int *pos, int indent)
-{
- int c;
- int ok = 1;
- int negate = 0;
-
- while (isspace((int)*cond)) {
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- }
- c = *cond;
-
- if (debug)
- process_proxy_debug(indent,
- "Start process_proxy_cond_val at position %d: %s\n",
- *pos, cond);
-
- while (c == '!') {
- negate = !negate;
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- while (isspace((int)*cond)) {
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- }
- c = *cond;
- }
-
- if (c == '(') {
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- ok = process_proxy_cond_adders(letters, cond, cond_end, pos,
- indent + 1);
- cond = *cond_end;
- if (ok < 0)
- goto end;
- while (isspace((int)*cond)) {
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- }
- c = *cond;
- if (c != ')') {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Weird condition character in position %d: "
- "%c\n", *pos, c);
- ok = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- } else if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c)) {
- if (islower(c))
- c = toupper(c);
- ok = letters[c - 'A'];
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Weird condition character in position %d: " "%c\n", *pos, c);
- ok = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- end:
- *cond_end = cond;
- if (ok >= 0 && negate)
- ok = !ok;
-
- if (debug)
- process_proxy_debug(indent,
- "End process_proxy_cond_val at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
- *pos, cond, ok);
-
- return ok;
-}
-
-static int process_proxy_cond_multipliers(unsigned int letters[26],
- const char *cond,
- const char **cond_end, int *pos,
- int indent)
-{
- int ok;
- char c;
-
- if (debug)
- process_proxy_debug(indent,
- "Start process_proxy_cond_multipliers at position %d: %s\n",
- *pos, cond);
-
- ok = process_proxy_cond_val(letters, cond, cond_end, pos, indent + 1);
- cond = *cond_end;
- if (ok < 0)
- goto end;
-
- while (ok >= 0) {
- while (isspace((int)*cond)) {
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- }
- c = *cond;
-
- switch (c) {
- case '&':
- case '^':
- {
- int save_ok = ok;
-
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- ok = process_proxy_cond_val(letters,
- cond, cond_end, pos, indent + 1);
- cond = *cond_end;
- if (ok < 0)
- break;
-
- switch (c) {
- case '&':
- ok &= save_ok;
- break;
- case '^':
- ok ^= save_ok;
- break;
- default:
- fprintf(stderr, "SOMETHING IS SERIOUSLY WRONG!"
- " STOPPING\n");
- EXIT(1);
- }
- }
- break;
- default:
- goto end;
- }
- }
- end:
- if (debug)
- process_proxy_debug(indent,
- "End process_proxy_cond_multipliers at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
- *pos, cond, ok);
-
- *cond_end = cond;
- return ok;
-}
-
-static int process_proxy_cond_adders(unsigned int letters[26],
- const char *cond, const char **cond_end,
- int *pos, int indent)
-{
- int ok;
- char c;
-
- if (debug)
- process_proxy_debug(indent,
- "Start process_proxy_cond_adders at position %d: %s\n",
- *pos, cond);
-
- ok = process_proxy_cond_multipliers(letters, cond, cond_end, pos,
- indent + 1);
- cond = *cond_end;
- if (ok < 0)
- goto end;
-
- while (ok >= 0) {
- while (isspace((int)*cond)) {
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- }
- c = *cond;
-
- switch (c) {
- case '|':
- {
- int save_ok = ok;
-
- cond++;
- (*pos)++;
- ok = process_proxy_cond_multipliers(letters,
- cond, cond_end, pos,
- indent + 1);
- cond = *cond_end;
- if (ok < 0)
- break;
-
- switch (c) {
- case '|':
- ok |= save_ok;
- break;
- default:
- fprintf(stderr, "SOMETHING IS SERIOUSLY WRONG!"
- " STOPPING\n");
- EXIT(1);
- }
- }
- break;
- default:
- goto end;
- }
- }
- end:
- if (debug)
- process_proxy_debug(indent,
- "End process_proxy_cond_adders at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
- *pos, cond, ok);
-
- *cond_end = cond;
- return ok;
-}
-
-static int process_proxy_cond(unsigned int letters[26],
- const char *cond, const char **cond_end)
-{
- int pos = 1;
- return process_proxy_cond_adders(letters, cond, cond_end, &pos, 1);
-}
-
-static int MS_CALLBACK app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
-{
- int ok = 1;
- struct app_verify_arg *cb_arg = arg;
- unsigned int letters[26]; /* only used with proxy_auth */
-
- if (cb_arg->app_verify) {
- char *s = NULL, buf[256];
-
- fprintf(stderr, "In app_verify_callback, allowing cert. ");
- fprintf(stderr, "Arg is: %s\n", cb_arg->string);
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Finished printing do we have a context? 0x%p a cert? 0x%p\n",
- (void *)ctx, (void *)ctx->cert);
- if (ctx->cert)
- s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->cert), buf, 256);
- if (s != NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "cert depth=%d %s\n", ctx->error_depth, buf);
- }
- return (1);
- }
- if (cb_arg->proxy_auth) {
- int found_any = 0, i;
- char *sp;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
- letters[i] = 0;
- for (sp = cb_arg->proxy_auth; *sp; sp++) {
- int c = *sp;
- if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c)) {
- if (islower(c))
- c = toupper(c);
- letters[c - 'A'] = 1;
- }
- }
-
- fprintf(stderr, " Initial proxy rights = ");
- for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
- if (letters[i]) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%c", i + 'A');
- found_any = 1;
- }
- if (!found_any)
- fprintf(stderr, "none");
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,
- get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(), letters);
- }
- if (cb_arg->allow_proxy_certs) {
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
- ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
-#endif
-
- if (cb_arg->proxy_auth) {
- if (ok > 0) {
- const char *cond_end = NULL;
-
- ok = process_proxy_cond(letters, cb_arg->proxy_cond, &cond_end);
-
- if (ok < 0)
- EXIT(3);
- if (*cond_end) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Stopped processing condition before it's end.\n");
- ok = 0;
- }
- if (!ok)
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Proxy rights check with condition '%s' proved invalid\n",
- cb_arg->proxy_cond);
- else
- fprintf(stderr,
- "Proxy rights check with condition '%s' proved valid\n",
- cb_arg->proxy_cond);
- }
- }
- return (ok);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL;
-
-static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
-{
- BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
- if (rsa_tmp == NULL) {
- bn = BN_new();
- rsa_tmp = RSA_new();
- if (!bn || !rsa_tmp || !BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory error...");
- goto end;
- }
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating temp (%d bit) RSA key...", keylength);
- (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
- if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_tmp, keylength, bn, NULL)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error generating key.");
- RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
- rsa_tmp = NULL;
- }
- end:
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
- (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
- }
- if (bn)
- BN_free(bn);
- return (rsa_tmp);
-}
-
-static void free_tmp_rsa(void)
-{
- if (rsa_tmp != NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
- rsa_tmp = NULL;
- }
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-/*-
- * These DH parameters have been generated as follows:
- * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 512
- * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 1024
- * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout -dsaparam 1024
- * (The third function has been renamed to avoid name conflicts.)
- */
-static DH *get_dh512()
-{
- static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
- 0xCB, 0xC8, 0xE1, 0x86, 0xD0, 0x1F, 0x94, 0x17, 0xA6, 0x99, 0xF0,
- 0xC6,
- 0x1F, 0x0D, 0xAC, 0xB6, 0x25, 0x3E, 0x06, 0x39, 0xCA, 0x72, 0x04,
- 0xB0,
- 0x6E, 0xDA, 0xC0, 0x61, 0xE6, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x25, 0xE8, 0x3B, 0xB9,
- 0x5F,
- 0x9A, 0xB6, 0xB5, 0xFE, 0x99, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x33,
- 0xB8,
- 0xE1, 0xF1, 0x13, 0x4F, 0x59, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x26, 0x21,
- 0x33,
- 0x02, 0xC5, 0xAE, 0x23,
- };
- static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
- 0x02,
- };
- DH *dh;
-
- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
- dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
- if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) {
- DH_free(dh);
- return (NULL);
- }
- return (dh);
-}
-
-static DH *get_dh1024()
-{
- static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
- 0xF8, 0x81, 0x89, 0x7D, 0x14, 0x24, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xBF,
- 0x3A,
- 0xE4, 0x90, 0xF4, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xFB, 0x34, 0xB5, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x56,
- 0xA2,
- 0xEA, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0xC0, 0xC0, 0xCE, 0x89, 0xE1, 0xFA, 0x63, 0x3F,
- 0xB0,
- 0x6B, 0x32, 0x66, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x7B, 0xB0, 0x00, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x87,
- 0xC2,
- 0xAE, 0x98, 0x89, 0x26, 0x17, 0xC2, 0x05, 0xD2, 0xEC, 0x08, 0xD0,
- 0x8C,
- 0xFF, 0x17, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xC5, 0x07, 0x93, 0x03, 0xB1, 0xF6, 0x2F,
- 0xB8,
- 0x1C, 0x52, 0x47, 0x27, 0x1B, 0xDB, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x69, 0x1D,
- 0x52,
- 0x4B, 0x32, 0x81, 0xAA, 0x7F, 0x00, 0xC8, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xD9, 0xCC,
- 0xC1,
- 0x11, 0x2D, 0x37, 0x34, 0x6C, 0xEA, 0x02, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xBB,
- 0xB1,
- 0x71, 0x33, 0x09, 0x15, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x23, 0x87, 0x07, 0x5E, 0x89,
- 0xAB,
- 0x6B, 0x7C, 0x5F, 0xEC, 0xA6, 0x24, 0xDC, 0x53,
- };
- static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
- 0x02,
- };
- DH *dh;
-
- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
- dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
- if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) {
- DH_free(dh);
- return (NULL);
- }
- return (dh);
-}
-
-static DH *get_dh1024dsa()
-{
- static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
- 0xC8, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x08, 0x07, 0x89, 0x4D, 0x90, 0x53, 0xF3, 0xD5,
- 0x00,
- 0x21, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xA6, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x23, 0x9A, 0xC7, 0x87,
- 0x19,
- 0x3B, 0x47, 0xB6, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x6F, 0xFF, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0xB8, 0x65,
- 0xD2,
- 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x31, 0x83, 0x4A, 0xA7, 0x5F, 0x2F, 0x88, 0x38, 0xB6,
- 0x55,
- 0xCF, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x6D, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xDA, 0xAC, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xAF,
- 0xFC,
- 0x33, 0x84, 0x37, 0x5B, 0x82, 0x4A, 0x31, 0x5D, 0xE7, 0xBD, 0x52,
- 0x97,
- 0xA1, 0x77, 0xBF, 0x10, 0x9E, 0x37, 0xEA, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x28,
- 0x8D,
- 0x9D, 0x3B, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0x09, 0x5C, 0x68, 0xC7, 0x45, 0x90, 0xFD,
- 0xBB,
- 0x70, 0xC9, 0x3A, 0xBB, 0xDF, 0xD4, 0x21, 0x0F, 0xC4, 0x6A, 0x3C,
- 0xF6,
- 0x61, 0xCF, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x13, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0xBC, 0xCF, 0xBC, 0x26,
- 0x9E,
- 0xBC, 0x0B, 0xBD, 0xAB, 0x5D, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x39,
- };
- static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
- 0x3B, 0x40, 0x86, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6C, 0xDE, 0x67, 0x1C, 0xCC, 0x80,
- 0x05,
- 0x5A, 0xDF, 0xFE, 0xBD, 0x20, 0x27, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x24, 0xC9, 0x03,
- 0xF3,
- 0xE1, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x98, 0x27, 0x40, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x8C, 0x6A,
- 0xE9,
- 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x3A, 0xD6, 0x86, 0x83, 0x5E, 0x72, 0x41, 0xCE, 0x85,
- 0x3C,
- 0xD2, 0xB3, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xCE, 0x37, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0x1C, 0x7B,
- 0x65,
- 0xD3, 0xE6, 0xA6, 0x00, 0xF5, 0x5A, 0x95, 0x43, 0x5E, 0x81, 0xCF,
- 0x60,
- 0xA2, 0x23, 0xFC, 0x36, 0xA7, 0x5D, 0x7A, 0x4C, 0x06, 0x91, 0x6E,
- 0xF6,
- 0x57, 0xEE, 0x36, 0xCB, 0x06, 0xEA, 0xF5, 0x3D, 0x95, 0x49, 0xCB,
- 0xA7,
- 0xDD, 0x81, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x09, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x22, 0x72,
- 0xA1,
- 0x7F, 0xC4, 0x70, 0x56, 0x70, 0xE8, 0x20, 0x10, 0x18, 0x8F, 0x2E,
- 0x60,
- 0x07, 0xE7, 0x68, 0x1A, 0x82, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xA2,
- };
- DH *dh;
-
- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
- dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
- if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) {
- DH_free(dh);
- return (NULL);
- }
- dh->length = 160;
- return (dh);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-/* convert the PSK key (psk_key) in ascii to binary (psk) */
-static int psk_key2bn(const char *pskkey, unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len)
-{
- int ret;
- BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
-
- ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, pskkey);
- if (!ret) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n",
- pskkey);
- if (bn)
- BN_free(bn);
- return 0;
- }
- if (BN_num_bytes(bn) > (int)max_psk_len) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n",
- max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn));
- BN_free(bn);
- return 0;
- }
- ret = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk);
- BN_free(bn);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
- char *identity,
- unsigned int max_identity_len,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len)
-{
- int ret;
- unsigned int psk_len = 0;
-
- ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "Client_identity");
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out_err;
- if (debug)
- fprintf(stderr, "client: created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity,
- ret);
- ret = psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out_err;
- psk_len = ret;
- out_err:
- return psk_len;
-}
-
-static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
- unsigned char *psk,
- unsigned int max_psk_len)
-{
- unsigned int psk_len = 0;
-
- if (strcmp(identity, "Client_identity") != 0) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "server: PSK error: client identity not found\n");
- return 0;
- }
- psk_len = psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len);
- return psk_len;
-}
-#endif
-
-static int do_test_cipherlist(void)
-{
- int i = 0;
- const SSL_METHOD *meth;
- const SSL_CIPHER *ci, *tci = NULL;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
- fprintf(stderr, "testing SSLv2 cipher list order: ");
- meth = SSLv2_method();
- while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL) {
- if (tci != NULL)
- if (ci->id >= tci->id) {
- fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
- return 0;
- }
- tci = ci;
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- fprintf(stderr, "testing SSLv3 cipher list order: ");
- meth = SSLv3_method();
- tci = NULL;
- while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL) {
- if (tci != NULL)
- if (ci->id >= tci->id) {
- fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
- return 0;
- }
- tci = ci;
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
- fprintf(stderr, "testing TLSv1 cipher list order: ");
- meth = TLSv1_method();
- tci = NULL;
- while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL) {
- if (tci != NULL)
- if (ci->id >= tci->id) {
- fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
- return 0;
- }
- tci = ci;
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
-#endif
-
- return 1;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssltest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/ssltest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssltest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/ssltest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2520 @@
+/* ssl/ssltest.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+/* Or gethostname won't be declared properly on Linux and GNU platforms. */
+#define _BSD_SOURCE 1
+#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE 1
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+/*
+ * Or isascii won't be declared properly on VMS (at least with DECompHP C).
+ */
+# define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500
+#endif
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+# include <openssl/srp.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+/*
+ * Or gethostname won't be declared properly
+ * on Compaq platforms (at least with DEC C).
+ * Do not try to put it earlier, or IPv6 includes
+ * get screwed...
+ */
+#define _XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED 1
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+# include <winsock.h>
+#else
+# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "SYS$DISK:[-.APPS]SERVER.PEM"
+# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "SYS$DISK:[-.APPS]CLIENT.PEM"
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "\\OpenSSL\\server.pem"
+# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "\\OpenSSL\\client.pem"
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "\\openssl\\apps\\server.pem"
+# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "\\openssl\\apps\\client.pem"
+#else
+# define TEST_SERVER_CERT "../apps/server.pem"
+# define TEST_CLIENT_CERT "../apps/client.pem"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * There is really no standard for this, so let's assign some tentative
+ * numbers. In any case, these numbers are only for this test
+ */
+#define COMP_RLE 255
+#define COMP_ZLIB 1
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength);
+static void free_tmp_rsa(void);
+#endif
+static int MS_CALLBACK app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+#define APP_CALLBACK_STRING "Test Callback Argument"
+struct app_verify_arg {
+ char *string;
+ int app_verify;
+ int allow_proxy_certs;
+ char *proxy_auth;
+ char *proxy_cond;
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *get_dh512(void);
+static DH *get_dh1024(void);
+static DH *get_dh1024dsa(void);
+#endif
+
+static char *psk_key = NULL; /* by default PSK is not used */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+ char *identity,
+ unsigned int max_identity_len,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len);
+static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+/* SRP client */
+/* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */
+typedef struct srp_client_arg_st {
+ char *srppassin;
+ char *srplogin;
+} SRP_CLIENT_ARG;
+
+# define PWD_STRLEN 1024
+
+static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+ SRP_CLIENT_ARG *srp_client_arg = (SRP_CLIENT_ARG *)arg;
+ return BUF_strdup((char *)srp_client_arg->srppassin);
+}
+
+/* SRP server */
+/* This is a context that we pass to SRP server callbacks */
+typedef struct srp_server_arg_st {
+ char *expected_user;
+ char *pass;
+} SRP_SERVER_ARG;
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+ SRP_SERVER_ARG *p = (SRP_SERVER_ARG *)arg;
+
+ if (strcmp(p->expected_user, SSL_get_srp_username(s)) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "User %s doesn't exist\n", SSL_get_srp_username(s));
+ return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ }
+ if (SSL_set_srp_server_param_pw(s, p->expected_user, p->pass, "1024") < 0) {
+ *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ }
+ return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static BIO *bio_err = NULL;
+static BIO *bio_stdout = NULL;
+
+static char *cipher = NULL;
+static int verbose = 0;
+static int debug = 0;
+#if 0
+/* Not used yet. */
+# ifdef FIONBIO
+static int s_nbio = 0;
+# endif
+#endif
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+ "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long bytes, clock_t *s_time,
+ clock_t *c_time);
+int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long bytes);
+static int do_test_cipherlist(void);
+static void sv_usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssltest [args ...]\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ fprintf(stderr, "-F - run test in FIPS mode\n");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr, " -server_auth - check server certificate\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -client_auth - do client authentication\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -proxy - allow proxy certificates\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -proxy_auth <val> - set proxy policy rights\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -proxy_cond <val> - experssion to test proxy policy rights\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -v - more output\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -d - debug output\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -reuse - use session-id reuse\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -num <val> - number of connections to perform\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -bytes <val> - number of bytes to swap between client/server\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -dhe512 - use 512 bit key for DHE (to test failure)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -dhe1024 - use 1024 bit key (safe prime) for DHE (default, no-op)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -dhe1024dsa - use 1024 bit key (with 160-bit subprime) for DHE\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -no_dhe - disable DHE\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ fprintf(stderr, " -no_ecdhe - disable ECDHE\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ fprintf(stderr, " -psk arg - PSK in hex (without 0x)\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ fprintf(stderr, " -srpuser user - SRP username to use\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -srppass arg - password for 'user'\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ fprintf(stderr, " -ssl2 - use SSLv2\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ fprintf(stderr, " -ssl3 - use SSLv3\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+ fprintf(stderr, " -tls1 - use TLSv1\n");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -cert arg - Server certificate file\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -key arg - Server key file (default: same as -cert)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -c_cert arg - Client certificate file\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -c_key arg - Client key file (default: same as -c_cert)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -cipher arg - The cipher list\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -bio_pair - Use BIO pairs\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -f - Test even cases that can't work\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -time - measure processor time used by client and server\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -zlib - use zlib compression\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -rle - use rle compression\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -named_curve arg - Elliptic curve name to use for ephemeral ECDH keys.\n"
+ " Use \"openssl ecparam -list_curves\" for all names\n"
+ " (default is sect163r2).\n");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " -test_cipherlist - Verifies the order of the ssl cipher lists.\n"
+ " When this option is requested, the cipherlist\n"
+ " tests are run instead of handshake tests.\n");
+}
+
+static void print_details(SSL *c_ssl, const char *prefix)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *ciph;
+ X509 *cert;
+
+ ciph = SSL_get_current_cipher(c_ssl);
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%s%s, cipher %s %s",
+ prefix,
+ SSL_get_version(c_ssl),
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(ciph), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(ciph));
+ cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(c_ssl);
+ if (cert != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ if (0) ;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->pkey.rsa != NULL
+ && pkey->pkey.rsa->n != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, ", %d bit RSA",
+ BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n));
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && pkey->pkey.dsa != NULL
+ && pkey->pkey.dsa->p != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, ", %d bit DSA",
+ BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa->p));
+ }
+#endif
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+ X509_free(cert);
+ }
+ /*
+ * The SSL API does not allow us to look at temporary RSA/DH keys,
+ * otherwise we should print their lengths too
+ */
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "\n");
+}
+
+static void lock_dbg_cb(int mode, int type, const char *file, int line)
+{
+ static int modes[CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS]; /* = {0, 0, ... } */
+ const char *errstr = NULL;
+ int rw;
+
+ rw = mode & (CRYPTO_READ | CRYPTO_WRITE);
+ if (!((rw == CRYPTO_READ) || (rw == CRYPTO_WRITE))) {
+ errstr = "invalid mode";
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (type < 0 || type >= CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS) {
+ errstr = "type out of bounds";
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
+ if (modes[type]) {
+ errstr = "already locked";
+ /*
+ * must not happen in a single-threaded program (would deadlock)
+ */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ modes[type] = rw;
+ } else if (mode & CRYPTO_UNLOCK) {
+ if (!modes[type]) {
+ errstr = "not locked";
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (modes[type] != rw) {
+ errstr = (rw == CRYPTO_READ) ?
+ "CRYPTO_r_unlock on write lock" :
+ "CRYPTO_w_unlock on read lock";
+ }
+
+ modes[type] = 0;
+ } else {
+ errstr = "invalid mode";
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ if (errstr) {
+ /* we cannot use bio_err here */
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "openssl (lock_dbg_cb): %s (mode=%d, type=%d) at %s:%d\n",
+ errstr, mode, type, file, line);
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+struct cb_info_st {
+ void *input;
+ size_t len;
+ int ret;
+};
+struct cb_info_st co1 = { "C", 1, 1 }; /* try to negotiate oqaque PRF input */
+struct cb_info_st co2 = { "C", 1, 2 }; /* insist on oqaque PRF input */
+struct cb_info_st so1 = { "S", 1, 1 }; /* try to negotiate oqaque PRF input */
+struct cb_info_st so2 = { "S", 1, 2 }; /* insist on oqaque PRF input */
+
+int opaque_prf_input_cb(SSL *ssl, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg_)
+{
+ struct cb_info_st *arg = arg_;
+
+ if (arg == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, arg->input, arg->len))
+ return 0;
+ return arg->ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
+ int badop = 0;
+ int bio_pair = 0;
+ int force = 0;
+ int tls1 = 0, ssl2 = 0, ssl3 = 0, ret = 1;
+ int client_auth = 0;
+ int server_auth = 0, i;
+ struct app_verify_arg app_verify_arg =
+ { APP_CALLBACK_STRING, 0, 0, NULL, NULL };
+ char *server_cert = TEST_SERVER_CERT;
+ char *server_key = NULL;
+ char *client_cert = TEST_CLIENT_CERT;
+ char *client_key = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ char *named_curve = NULL;
+#endif
+ SSL_CTX *s_ctx = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *c_ctx = NULL;
+ const SSL_METHOD *meth = NULL;
+ SSL *c_ssl, *s_ssl;
+ int number = 1, reuse = 0;
+ long bytes = 256L;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh;
+ int dhe512 = 0, dhe1024dsa = 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* client */
+ SRP_CLIENT_ARG srp_client_arg = { NULL, NULL };
+ /* server */
+ SRP_SERVER_ARG srp_server_arg = { NULL, NULL };
+#endif
+ int no_dhe = 0;
+ int no_ecdhe = 0;
+ int no_psk = 0;
+ int print_time = 0;
+ clock_t s_time = 0, c_time = 0;
+ int comp = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_METHOD *cm = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+ int test_cipherlist = 0;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ int fips_mode = 0;
+#endif
+ int no_protocol = 0;
+
+ verbose = 0;
+ debug = 0;
+ cipher = 0;
+
+ bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(lock_dbg_cb);
+
+ /* enable memory leak checking unless explicitly disabled */
+ if (!((getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY") != NULL)
+ && (0 == strcmp(getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"), "off")))) {
+ CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+ } else {
+ /* OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=off */
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions(0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+
+ bio_stdout = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+
+ while (argc >= 1) {
+ if (!strcmp(*argv, "-F")) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ fips_mode = 1;
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "not compiled with FIPS support, so exitting without running.\n");
+ EXIT(0);
+#endif
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server_auth") == 0)
+ server_auth = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-client_auth") == 0)
+ client_auth = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-proxy_auth") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ app_verify_arg.proxy_auth = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-proxy_cond") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ app_verify_arg.proxy_cond = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-v") == 0)
+ verbose = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-d") == 0)
+ debug = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-reuse") == 0)
+ reuse = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe512") == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dhe512 = 1;
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ignoring -dhe512, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
+#endif
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dhe1024dsa") == 0) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dhe1024dsa = 1;
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ignoring -dhe1024dsa, since I'm compiled without DH\n");
+#endif
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_dhe") == 0)
+ no_dhe = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ecdhe") == 0)
+ no_ecdhe = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-psk") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ psk_key = *(++argv);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (strspn(psk_key, "abcdefABCDEF1234567890") != strlen(psk_key)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", *argv);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+#else
+ no_psk = 1;
+#endif
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuser") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ srp_server_arg.expected_user = srp_client_arg.srplogin =
+ *(++argv);
+ tls1 = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srppass") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ srp_server_arg.pass = srp_client_arg.srppassin = *(++argv);
+ tls1 = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl2") == 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+ ssl2 = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-tls1") == 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+ no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+ tls1 = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-ssl3") == 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+ ssl3 = 1;
+ } else if (strncmp(*argv, "-num", 4) == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ number = atoi(*(++argv));
+ if (number == 0)
+ number = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bytes") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ bytes = atol(*(++argv));
+ if (bytes == 0L)
+ bytes = 1L;
+ i = strlen(argv[0]);
+ if (argv[0][i - 1] == 'k')
+ bytes *= 1024L;
+ if (argv[0][i - 1] == 'm')
+ bytes *= 1024L * 1024L;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ server_cert = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-s_cert") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ server_cert = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ server_key = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-s_key") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ server_key = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-c_cert") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ client_cert = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-c_key") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ client_key = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cipher") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ cipher = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CApath") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ CApath = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-CAfile") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+ CAfile = *(++argv);
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-bio_pair") == 0) {
+ bio_pair = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-f") == 0) {
+ force = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-time") == 0) {
+ print_time = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-zlib") == 0) {
+ comp = COMP_ZLIB;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-rle") == 0) {
+ comp = COMP_RLE;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-named_curve") == 0) {
+ if (--argc < 1)
+ goto bad;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ named_curve = *(++argv);
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ignoring -named_curve, since I'm compiled without ECDH\n");
+ ++argv;
+#endif
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-app_verify") == 0) {
+ app_verify_arg.app_verify = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-proxy") == 0) {
+ app_verify_arg.allow_proxy_certs = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-test_cipherlist") == 0) {
+ test_cipherlist = 1;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
+ badop = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ }
+ if (badop) {
+ bad:
+ sv_usage();
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * test_cipherlist prevails over protocol switch: we test the cipherlist
+ * for all enabled protocols.
+ */
+ if (test_cipherlist == 1) {
+ /*
+ * ensure that the cipher list are correctly sorted and exit
+ */
+ fprintf(stdout, "Testing cipherlist order only. Ignoring all "
+ "other options.\n");
+ if (do_test_cipherlist() == 0)
+ EXIT(1);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl2 + ssl3 + tls1 > 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl2, -ssl3, or -tls1 should "
+ "be requested.\n");
+ EXIT(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Testing was requested for a compiled-out protocol (e.g. SSLv2).
+ * Ideally, we would error out, but the generic test wrapper can't know
+ * when to expect failure. So we do nothing and return success.
+ */
+ if (no_protocol) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Testing was requested for a disabled protocol. "
+ "Skipping tests.\n");
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl2 && !ssl3 && !tls1 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work. Use -f to perform "
+ "the test anyway (and\n-d to see what happens), "
+ "or add one of -ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -reuse\n"
+ "to avoid protocol mismatch.\n");
+ EXIT(1);
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (fips_mode) {
+ if (!FIPS_mode_set(1)) {
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ ERR_print_errors(BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE));
+ EXIT(1);
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "*** IN FIPS MODE ***\n");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (print_time) {
+ if (!bio_pair) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using BIO pair (-bio_pair)\n");
+ bio_pair = 1;
+ }
+ if (number < 50 && !force)
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Warning: For accurate timings, use more connections (e.g. -num 1000)\n");
+ }
+
+/* if (cipher == NULL) cipher=getenv("SSL_CIPHER"); */
+
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (comp == COMP_ZLIB)
+ cm = COMP_zlib();
+ if (comp == COMP_RLE)
+ cm = COMP_rle();
+ if (cm != NULL) {
+ if (cm->type != NID_undef) {
+ if (SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(comp, cm) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to add compression method\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Warning: %s compression not supported\n",
+ (comp == COMP_RLE ? "rle" :
+ (comp == COMP_ZLIB ? "zlib" : "unknown")));
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ }
+ }
+ ssl_comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+ fprintf(stderr, "Available compression methods:\n");
+ {
+ int j, n = sk_SSL_COMP_num(ssl_comp_methods);
+ if (n == 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, " NONE\n");
+ else
+ for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
+ SSL_COMP *c = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, j);
+ fprintf(stderr, " %d: %s\n", c->id, c->name);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, ssl2/ssl3/tls1 is only set if the protocol is
+ * available. (Otherwise we exit early.) However the compiler doesn't
+ * know this, so we ifdef.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ if (ssl2)
+ meth = SSLv2_method();
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if (ssl3)
+ meth = SSLv3_method();
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+ if (tls1)
+ meth = TLSv1_method();
+ else
+#endif
+ meth = SSLv23_method();
+
+ c_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+ s_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+ if ((c_ctx == NULL) || (s_ctx == NULL)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher != NULL) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(c_ctx, cipher);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(s_ctx, cipher);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (!no_dhe) {
+ if (dhe1024dsa) {
+ /*
+ * use SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE to avoid small subgroup attacks
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ dh = get_dh1024dsa();
+ } else if (dhe512)
+ dh = get_dh512();
+ else
+ dh = get_dh1024();
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(s_ctx, dh);
+ DH_free(dh);
+ }
+#else
+ (void)no_dhe;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (!no_ecdhe) {
+ int nid;
+
+ if (named_curve != NULL) {
+ nid = OBJ_sn2nid(named_curve);
+ if (nid == 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown curve name (%s)\n", named_curve);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+# else
+ nid = NID_sect163r2;
+# endif
+
+ ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ if (ecdh == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to create curve\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(s_ctx, ecdh);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ }
+#else
+ (void)no_ecdhe;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(s_ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(c_ctx, opaque_prf_input_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s_ctx, opaque_prf_input_cb);
+ /* or &co2 or NULL */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(c_ctx, &co1);
+ /* or &so2 or NULL */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(s_ctx, &so1);
+#endif
+
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s_ctx, server_cert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ } else if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(s_ctx,
+ (server_key ? server_key :
+ server_cert),
+ SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (client_auth) {
+ SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(c_ctx, client_cert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(c_ctx,
+ (client_key ? client_key : client_cert),
+ SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ }
+
+ if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(s_ctx)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c_ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
+ (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(c_ctx))) {
+ /* fprintf(stderr,"SSL_load_verify_locations\n"); */
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ /* goto end; */
+ }
+
+ if (client_auth) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "client authentication\n");
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx,
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
+ verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, app_verify_callback,
+ &app_verify_arg);
+ }
+ if (server_auth) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "server authentication\n");
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(c_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(c_ctx, app_verify_callback,
+ &app_verify_arg);
+ }
+
+ {
+ int session_id_context = 0;
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s_ctx, (void *)&session_id_context,
+ sizeof session_id_context);
+ }
+
+ /* Use PSK only if PSK key is given */
+ if (psk_key != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * no_psk is used to avoid putting psk command to openssl tool
+ */
+ if (no_psk) {
+ /*
+ * if PSK is not compiled in and psk key is given, do nothing and
+ * exit successfully
+ */
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(c_ctx, psk_client_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(s_ctx, psk_server_callback);
+ if (debug)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(s_ctx, "ctx server identity_hint")) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to s_ctx\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (srp_client_arg.srplogin) {
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.srplogin)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(c_ctx, &srp_client_arg);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(c_ctx,
+ ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb);
+ /*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(c_ctx, srp_client_arg.strength);
+ */
+ }
+
+ if (srp_server_arg.expected_user != NULL) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(s_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(s_ctx, &srp_server_arg);
+ SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(s_ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ c_ssl = SSL_new(c_ctx);
+ s_ssl = SSL_new(s_ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (c_ssl && c_ssl->kssl_ctx) {
+ char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 2];
+
+ if (gethostname(localhost, sizeof localhost - 1) == 0) {
+ localhost[sizeof localhost - 1] = '\0';
+ if (strlen(localhost) == sizeof localhost - 1) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "localhost name too long\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ kssl_ctx_setstring(c_ssl->kssl_ctx, KSSL_SERVER, localhost);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < number; i++) {
+ if (!reuse)
+ SSL_set_session(c_ssl, NULL);
+ if (bio_pair)
+ ret = doit_biopair(s_ssl, c_ssl, bytes, &s_time, &c_time);
+ else
+ ret = doit(s_ssl, c_ssl, bytes);
+ }
+
+ if (!verbose) {
+ print_details(c_ssl, "");
+ }
+ if ((number > 1) || (bytes > 1L))
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "%d handshakes of %ld bytes done\n", number,
+ bytes);
+ if (print_time) {
+#ifdef CLOCKS_PER_SEC
+ /*
+ * "To determine the time in seconds, the value returned by the clock
+ * function should be divided by the value of the macro
+ * CLOCKS_PER_SEC." -- ISO/IEC 9899
+ */
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout, "Approximate total server time: %6.2f s\n"
+ "Approximate total client time: %6.2f s\n",
+ (double)s_time / CLOCKS_PER_SEC,
+ (double)c_time / CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
+#else
+ /*
+ * "`CLOCKS_PER_SEC' undeclared (first use this function)" -- cc on
+ * NeXTstep/OpenStep
+ */
+ BIO_printf(bio_stdout,
+ "Approximate total server time: %6.2f units\n"
+ "Approximate total client time: %6.2f units\n",
+ (double)s_time, (double)c_time);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ SSL_free(s_ssl);
+ SSL_free(c_ssl);
+
+ end:
+ if (s_ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(s_ctx);
+ if (c_ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(c_ctx);
+
+ if (bio_stdout != NULL)
+ BIO_free(bio_stdout);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ free_tmp_rsa();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ENGINE_cleanup();
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ ERR_free_strings();
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+ EVP_cleanup();
+ CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err);
+ if (bio_err != NULL)
+ BIO_free(bio_err);
+ EXIT(ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count,
+ clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time)
+{
+ long cw_num = count, cr_num = count, sw_num = count, sr_num = count;
+ BIO *s_ssl_bio = NULL, *c_ssl_bio = NULL;
+ BIO *server = NULL, *server_io = NULL, *client = NULL, *client_io = NULL;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ size_t bufsiz = 256; /* small buffer for testing */
+
+ if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&server, bufsiz, &server_io, bufsiz))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&client, bufsiz, &client_io, bufsiz))
+ goto err;
+
+ s_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ if (!s_ssl_bio)
+ goto err;
+
+ c_ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ if (!c_ssl_bio)
+ goto err;
+
+ SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
+ SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, client, client);
+ (void)BIO_set_ssl(c_ssl_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
+ SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, server, server);
+ (void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ do {
+ /*-
+ * c_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
+ *
+ * client: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
+ *
+ * client_io: client's SSL communication; usually to be
+ * relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
+ * test program, we're the server, too:
+ *
+ * server_io: server's SSL communication
+ *
+ * server: pseudo-I/O for SSL library
+ *
+ * s_ssl_bio: SSL filter BIO
+ *
+ * The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
+ * client + client_io, server + server_io.
+ * BIO pairs are symmetric. A BIO pair behaves similar
+ * to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
+ * be handled by the same thread).
+ * [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
+ * of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
+ * suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
+ *
+ * Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
+ *
+ * BIO_ctrl_pending(bio) number of bytes we can read now
+ * BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio) number of bytes needed to fulfil
+ * other side's read attempt
+ * BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio) number of bytes we can write now
+ *
+ * ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
+ * it depends on the application which one you should use.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but
+ * can be sure that there is *some* progress in each iteration; so we
+ * don't have to worry about ..._SHOULD_READ or ..._SHOULD_WRITE --
+ * we just try everything in each iteration
+ */
+
+ {
+ /* CLIENT */
+
+ MS_STATIC char cbuf[1024 * 8];
+ int i, r;
+ clock_t c_clock = clock();
+
+ memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
+
+ if (debug)
+ if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
+ printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
+ SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
+
+ if (cw_num > 0) {
+ /* Write to server. */
+
+ if (cw_num > (long)sizeof cbuf)
+ i = sizeof cbuf;
+ else
+ i = (int)cw_num;
+ r = BIO_write(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, i);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * BIO_should_retry(...) can just be ignored here. The
+ * library expects us to call BIO_write with the same
+ * arguments again, and that's what we will do in the
+ * next iteration.
+ */
+ } else if (r == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("client wrote %d\n", r);
+ cw_num -= r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cr_num > 0) {
+ /* Read from server. */
+
+ r = BIO_read(c_ssl_bio, cbuf, sizeof(cbuf));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(c_ssl_bio)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Again, "BIO_should_retry" can be ignored.
+ */
+ } else if (r == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("client read %d\n", r);
+ cr_num -= r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * c_time and s_time increments will typically be very small
+ * (depending on machine speed and clock tick intervals), but
+ * sampling over a large number of connections should result in
+ * fairly accurate figures. We cannot guarantee a lot, however
+ * -- if each connection lasts for exactly one clock tick, it
+ * will be counted only for the client or only for the server or
+ * even not at all.
+ */
+ *c_time += (clock() - c_clock);
+ }
+
+ {
+ /* SERVER */
+
+ MS_STATIC char sbuf[1024 * 8];
+ int i, r;
+ clock_t s_clock = clock();
+
+ memset(sbuf, 0, sizeof(sbuf));
+
+ if (debug)
+ if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
+ printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
+ SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
+
+ if (sw_num > 0) {
+ /* Write to client. */
+
+ if (sw_num > (long)sizeof sbuf)
+ i = sizeof sbuf;
+ else
+ i = (int)sw_num;
+ r = BIO_write(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, i);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Ignore "BIO_should_retry". */
+ } else if (r == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("server wrote %d\n", r);
+ sw_num -= r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sr_num > 0) {
+ /* Read from client. */
+
+ r = BIO_read(s_ssl_bio, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (!BIO_should_retry(s_ssl_bio)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* blah, blah */
+ } else if (r == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("server read %d\n", r);
+ sr_num -= r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *s_time += (clock() - s_clock);
+ }
+
+ {
+ /* "I/O" BETWEEN CLIENT AND SERVER. */
+
+ size_t r1, r2;
+ BIO *io1 = server_io, *io2 = client_io;
+ /*
+ * we use the non-copying interface for io1 and the standard
+ * BIO_write/BIO_read interface for io2
+ */
+
+ static int prev_progress = 1;
+ int progress = 0;
+
+ /* io1 to io2 */
+ do {
+ size_t num;
+ int r;
+
+ r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io1);
+ r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(io2);
+
+ num = r1;
+ if (r2 < num)
+ num = r2;
+ if (num) {
+ char *dataptr;
+
+ if (INT_MAX < num) /* yeah, right */
+ num = INT_MAX;
+
+ r = BIO_nread(io1, &dataptr, (int)num);
+ assert(r > 0);
+ assert(r <= (int)num);
+ /*
+ * possibly r < num (non-contiguous data)
+ */
+ num = r;
+ r = BIO_write(io2, dataptr, (int)num);
+ if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_write could not write "
+ "BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee() bytes");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ progress = 1;
+
+ if (debug)
+ printf((io1 == client_io) ?
+ "C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" :
+ "S->C relaying: %d bytes\n", (int)num);
+ }
+ }
+ while (r1 && r2);
+
+ /* io2 to io1 */
+ {
+ size_t num;
+ int r;
+
+ r1 = BIO_ctrl_pending(io2);
+ r2 = BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(io1);
+ /*
+ * here we could use ..._get_write_guarantee instead of
+ * ..._get_read_request, but by using the latter we test
+ * restartability of the SSL implementation more thoroughly
+ */
+ num = r1;
+ if (r2 < num)
+ num = r2;
+ if (num) {
+ char *dataptr;
+
+ if (INT_MAX < num)
+ num = INT_MAX;
+
+ if (num > 1)
+ --num; /* test restartability even more thoroughly */
+
+ r = BIO_nwrite0(io1, &dataptr);
+ assert(r > 0);
+ if (r < (int)num)
+ num = r;
+ r = BIO_read(io2, dataptr, (int)num);
+ if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_read could not read "
+ "BIO_ctrl_pending() bytes");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ progress = 1;
+ r = BIO_nwrite(io1, &dataptr, (int)num);
+ if (r != (int)num) { /* can't happen */
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: BIO_nwrite() did not accept "
+ "BIO_nwrite0() bytes");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (debug)
+ printf((io2 == client_io) ?
+ "C->S relaying: %d bytes\n" :
+ "S->C relaying: %d bytes\n", (int)num);
+ }
+ } /* no loop, BIO_ctrl_get_read_request now
+ * returns 0 anyway */
+
+ if (!progress && !prev_progress)
+ if (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: got stuck\n");
+ if (strcmp("SSLv2", SSL_get_version(c_ssl)) == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "This can happen for SSL2 because "
+ "CLIENT-FINISHED and SERVER-VERIFY are written \n"
+ "concurrently ...");
+ if (strncmp("2SCF", SSL_state_string(c_ssl), 4) == 0
+ && strncmp("2SSV", SSL_state_string(s_ssl),
+ 4) == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, " ok.\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, " ERROR.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ prev_progress = progress;
+ }
+ }
+ while (cw_num > 0 || cr_num > 0 || sw_num > 0 || sr_num > 0);
+
+ if (verbose)
+ print_details(c_ssl, "DONE via BIO pair: ");
+ end:
+ ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+
+ if (server)
+ BIO_free(server);
+ if (server_io)
+ BIO_free(server_io);
+ if (client)
+ BIO_free(client);
+ if (client_io)
+ BIO_free(client_io);
+ if (s_ssl_bio)
+ BIO_free(s_ssl_bio);
+ if (c_ssl_bio)
+ BIO_free(c_ssl_bio);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define W_READ 1
+#define W_WRITE 2
+#define C_DONE 1
+#define S_DONE 2
+
+int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
+{
+ MS_STATIC char cbuf[1024 * 8], sbuf[1024 * 8];
+ long cw_num = count, cr_num = count;
+ long sw_num = count, sr_num = count;
+ int ret = 1;
+ BIO *c_to_s = NULL;
+ BIO *s_to_c = NULL;
+ BIO *c_bio = NULL;
+ BIO *s_bio = NULL;
+ int c_r, c_w, s_r, s_w;
+ int i, j;
+ int done = 0;
+ int c_write, s_write;
+ int do_server = 0, do_client = 0;
+
+ memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf));
+ memset(sbuf, 0, sizeof(sbuf));
+
+ c_to_s = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ s_to_c = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ c_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ s_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
+ if ((c_bio == NULL) || (s_bio == NULL)) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_connect_state(c_ssl);
+ SSL_set_bio(c_ssl, s_to_c, c_to_s);
+ BIO_set_ssl(c_bio, c_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ SSL_set_accept_state(s_ssl);
+ SSL_set_bio(s_ssl, c_to_s, s_to_c);
+ BIO_set_ssl(s_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ c_r = 0;
+ s_r = 1;
+ c_w = 1;
+ s_w = 0;
+ c_write = 1, s_write = 0;
+
+ /* We can always do writes */
+ for (;;) {
+ do_server = 0;
+ do_client = 0;
+
+ i = (int)BIO_pending(s_bio);
+ if ((i && s_r) || s_w)
+ do_server = 1;
+
+ i = (int)BIO_pending(c_bio);
+ if ((i && c_r) || c_w)
+ do_client = 1;
+
+ if (do_server && debug) {
+ if (SSL_in_init(s_ssl))
+ printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
+ SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
+/*-
+ else if (s_write)
+ printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
+ else
+ printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */
+ }
+
+ if (do_client && debug) {
+ if (SSL_in_init(c_ssl))
+ printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
+ SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
+/*-
+ else if (c_write)
+ printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
+ else
+ printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */
+ }
+
+ if (!do_client && !do_server) {
+ fprintf(stdout, "ERROR IN STARTUP\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (do_client && !(done & C_DONE)) {
+ if (c_write) {
+ j = (cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf)) ?
+ (int)sizeof(cbuf) : (int)cw_num;
+ i = BIO_write(c_bio, cbuf, j);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ c_r = 0;
+ c_w = 0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) {
+ if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
+ c_r = 1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
+ c_w = 1;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (i == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("client wrote %d\n", i);
+ /* ok */
+ s_r = 1;
+ c_write = 0;
+ cw_num -= i;
+ }
+ } else {
+ i = BIO_read(c_bio, cbuf, sizeof(cbuf));
+ if (i < 0) {
+ c_r = 0;
+ c_w = 0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(c_bio)) {
+ if (BIO_should_read(c_bio))
+ c_r = 1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(c_bio))
+ c_w = 1;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in CLIENT\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (i == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSL CLIENT STARTUP FAILED\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("client read %d\n", i);
+ cr_num -= i;
+ if (sw_num > 0) {
+ s_write = 1;
+ s_w = 1;
+ }
+ if (cr_num <= 0) {
+ s_write = 1;
+ s_w = 1;
+ done = S_DONE | C_DONE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (do_server && !(done & S_DONE)) {
+ if (!s_write) {
+ i = BIO_read(s_bio, sbuf, sizeof(cbuf));
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s_r = 0;
+ s_w = 0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) {
+ if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
+ s_r = 1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
+ s_w = 1;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (i == 0) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_read\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("server read %d\n", i);
+ sr_num -= i;
+ if (cw_num > 0) {
+ c_write = 1;
+ c_w = 1;
+ }
+ if (sr_num <= 0) {
+ s_write = 1;
+ s_w = 1;
+ c_write = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ j = (sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf)) ?
+ (int)sizeof(sbuf) : (int)sw_num;
+ i = BIO_write(s_bio, sbuf, j);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s_r = 0;
+ s_w = 0;
+ if (BIO_should_retry(s_bio)) {
+ if (BIO_should_read(s_bio))
+ s_r = 1;
+ if (BIO_should_write(s_bio))
+ s_w = 1;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR in SERVER\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (i == 0) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "SSL SERVER STARTUP FAILED in SSL_write\n");
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (debug)
+ printf("server wrote %d\n", i);
+ sw_num -= i;
+ s_write = 0;
+ c_r = 1;
+ if (sw_num <= 0)
+ done |= S_DONE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((done & S_DONE) && (done & C_DONE))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose)
+ print_details(c_ssl, "DONE: ");
+ ret = 0;
+ err:
+ /*
+ * We have to set the BIO's to NULL otherwise they will be
+ * OPENSSL_free()ed twice. Once when th s_ssl is SSL_free()ed and again
+ * when c_ssl is SSL_free()ed. This is a hack required because s_ssl and
+ * c_ssl are sharing the same BIO structure and SSL_set_bio() and
+ * SSL_free() automatically BIO_free non NULL entries. You should not
+ * normally do this or be required to do this
+ */
+ if (s_ssl != NULL) {
+ s_ssl->rbio = NULL;
+ s_ssl->wbio = NULL;
+ }
+ if (c_ssl != NULL) {
+ c_ssl->rbio = NULL;
+ c_ssl->wbio = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (c_to_s != NULL)
+ BIO_free(c_to_s);
+ if (s_to_c != NULL)
+ BIO_free(s_to_c);
+ if (c_bio != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(c_bio);
+ if (s_bio != NULL)
+ BIO_free_all(s_bio);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(void)
+{
+ static volatile int idx = -1;
+ if (idx < 0) {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (idx < 0) {
+ idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+ "SSLtest for verify callback",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ }
+ return idx;
+}
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ char *s, buf[256];
+
+ s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert), buf,
+ sizeof buf);
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ if (ok)
+ fprintf(stderr, "depth=%d %s\n", ctx->error_depth, buf);
+ else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "depth=%d error=%d %s\n",
+ ctx->error_depth, ctx->error, buf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ok == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error string: %s\n",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
+ switch (ctx->error) {
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ fprintf(stderr, " ... ignored.\n");
+ ok = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ok == 1) {
+ X509 *xs = ctx->current_cert;
+#if 0
+ X509 *xi = ctx->current_issuer;
+#endif
+
+ if (xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+ unsigned int *letters = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
+ get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx
+ ());
+
+ if (letters) {
+ int found_any = 0;
+ int i;
+ PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci =
+ X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo,
+ NULL, NULL);
+
+ switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage)) {
+ case NID_Independent:
+ /*
+ * Completely meaningless in this program, as there's no
+ * way to grant explicit rights to a specific PrC.
+ * Basically, using id-ppl-Independent is the perfect way
+ * to grant no rights at all.
+ */
+ fprintf(stderr, " Independent proxy certificate");
+ for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
+ letters[i] = 0;
+ break;
+ case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll:
+ /*
+ * This is basically a NOP, we simply let the current
+ * rights stand as they are.
+ */
+ fprintf(stderr, " Proxy certificate inherits all");
+ break;
+ default:
+ s = (char *)
+ pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data;
+ i = pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length;
+
+ /*
+ * The algorithm works as follows: it is assumed that
+ * previous iterations or the initial granted rights has
+ * already set some elements of `letters'. What we need
+ * to do is to clear those that weren't granted by the
+ * current PrC as well. The easiest way to do this is to
+ * add 1 to all the elements whose letters are given with
+ * the current policy. That way, all elements that are
+ * set by the current policy and were already set by
+ * earlier policies and through the original grant of
+ * rights will get the value 2 or higher. The last thing
+ * to do is to sweep through `letters' and keep the
+ * elements having the value 2 as set, and clear all the
+ * others.
+ */
+
+ fprintf(stderr, " Certificate proxy rights = %*.*s", i,
+ i, s);
+ while (i-- > 0) {
+ int c = *s++;
+ if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c)) {
+ if (islower(c))
+ c = toupper(c);
+ letters[c - 'A']++;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
+ if (letters[i] < 2)
+ letters[i] = 0;
+ else
+ letters[i] = 1;
+ }
+
+ found_any = 0;
+ fprintf(stderr, ", resulting proxy rights = ");
+ for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
+ if (letters[i]) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%c", i + 'A');
+ found_any = 1;
+ }
+ if (!found_any)
+ fprintf(stderr, "none");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+
+ PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+static void process_proxy_debug(int indent, const char *format, ...)
+{
+ /* That's 80 > */
+ static const char indentation[] =
+ ">>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>"
+ ">>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>";
+ char my_format[256];
+ va_list args;
+
+ BIO_snprintf(my_format, sizeof(my_format), "%*.*s %s",
+ indent, indent, indentation, format);
+
+ va_start(args, format);
+ vfprintf(stderr, my_format, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Priority levels:
+ * 0 [!]var, ()
+ * 1 & ^
+ * 2 |
+ */
+static int process_proxy_cond_adders(unsigned int letters[26],
+ const char *cond, const char **cond_end,
+ int *pos, int indent);
+static int process_proxy_cond_val(unsigned int letters[26], const char *cond,
+ const char **cond_end, int *pos, int indent)
+{
+ int c;
+ int ok = 1;
+ int negate = 0;
+
+ while (isspace((int)*cond)) {
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ }
+ c = *cond;
+
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "Start process_proxy_cond_val at position %d: %s\n",
+ *pos, cond);
+
+ while (c == '!') {
+ negate = !negate;
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ while (isspace((int)*cond)) {
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ }
+ c = *cond;
+ }
+
+ if (c == '(') {
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ ok = process_proxy_cond_adders(letters, cond, cond_end, pos,
+ indent + 1);
+ cond = *cond_end;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ goto end;
+ while (isspace((int)*cond)) {
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ }
+ c = *cond;
+ if (c != ')') {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Weird condition character in position %d: "
+ "%c\n", *pos, c);
+ ok = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ } else if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c)) {
+ if (islower(c))
+ c = toupper(c);
+ ok = letters[c - 'A'];
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Weird condition character in position %d: " "%c\n", *pos, c);
+ ok = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ end:
+ *cond_end = cond;
+ if (ok >= 0 && negate)
+ ok = !ok;
+
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "End process_proxy_cond_val at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
+ *pos, cond, ok);
+
+ return ok;
+}
+
+static int process_proxy_cond_multipliers(unsigned int letters[26],
+ const char *cond,
+ const char **cond_end, int *pos,
+ int indent)
+{
+ int ok;
+ char c;
+
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "Start process_proxy_cond_multipliers at position %d: %s\n",
+ *pos, cond);
+
+ ok = process_proxy_cond_val(letters, cond, cond_end, pos, indent + 1);
+ cond = *cond_end;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ while (ok >= 0) {
+ while (isspace((int)*cond)) {
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ }
+ c = *cond;
+
+ switch (c) {
+ case '&':
+ case '^':
+ {
+ int save_ok = ok;
+
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ ok = process_proxy_cond_val(letters,
+ cond, cond_end, pos, indent + 1);
+ cond = *cond_end;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ break;
+
+ switch (c) {
+ case '&':
+ ok &= save_ok;
+ break;
+ case '^':
+ ok ^= save_ok;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "SOMETHING IS SERIOUSLY WRONG!"
+ " STOPPING\n");
+ EXIT(1);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ end:
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "End process_proxy_cond_multipliers at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
+ *pos, cond, ok);
+
+ *cond_end = cond;
+ return ok;
+}
+
+static int process_proxy_cond_adders(unsigned int letters[26],
+ const char *cond, const char **cond_end,
+ int *pos, int indent)
+{
+ int ok;
+ char c;
+
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "Start process_proxy_cond_adders at position %d: %s\n",
+ *pos, cond);
+
+ ok = process_proxy_cond_multipliers(letters, cond, cond_end, pos,
+ indent + 1);
+ cond = *cond_end;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ while (ok >= 0) {
+ while (isspace((int)*cond)) {
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ }
+ c = *cond;
+
+ switch (c) {
+ case '|':
+ {
+ int save_ok = ok;
+
+ cond++;
+ (*pos)++;
+ ok = process_proxy_cond_multipliers(letters,
+ cond, cond_end, pos,
+ indent + 1);
+ cond = *cond_end;
+ if (ok < 0)
+ break;
+
+ switch (c) {
+ case '|':
+ ok |= save_ok;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "SOMETHING IS SERIOUSLY WRONG!"
+ " STOPPING\n");
+ EXIT(1);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ end:
+ if (debug)
+ process_proxy_debug(indent,
+ "End process_proxy_cond_adders at position %d: %s, returning %d\n",
+ *pos, cond, ok);
+
+ *cond_end = cond;
+ return ok;
+}
+
+static int process_proxy_cond(unsigned int letters[26],
+ const char *cond, const char **cond_end)
+{
+ int pos = 1;
+ return process_proxy_cond_adders(letters, cond, cond_end, &pos, 1);
+}
+
+static int MS_CALLBACK app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
+{
+ int ok = 1;
+ struct app_verify_arg *cb_arg = arg;
+ unsigned int letters[26]; /* only used with proxy_auth */
+
+ if (cb_arg->app_verify) {
+ char *s = NULL, buf[256];
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "In app_verify_callback, allowing cert. ");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Arg is: %s\n", cb_arg->string);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Finished printing do we have a context? 0x%p a cert? 0x%p\n",
+ (void *)ctx, (void *)ctx->cert);
+ if (ctx->cert)
+ s = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->cert), buf, 256);
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "cert depth=%d %s\n", ctx->error_depth, buf);
+ }
+ return (1);
+ }
+ if (cb_arg->proxy_auth) {
+ int found_any = 0, i;
+ char *sp;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
+ letters[i] = 0;
+ for (sp = cb_arg->proxy_auth; *sp; sp++) {
+ int c = *sp;
+ if (isascii(c) && isalpha(c)) {
+ if (islower(c))
+ c = toupper(c);
+ letters[c - 'A'] = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ fprintf(stderr, " Initial proxy rights = ");
+ for (i = 0; i < 26; i++)
+ if (letters[i]) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%c", i + 'A');
+ found_any = 1;
+ }
+ if (!found_any)
+ fprintf(stderr, "none");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,
+ get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(), letters);
+ }
+ if (cb_arg->allow_proxy_certs) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
+ ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+#endif
+
+ if (cb_arg->proxy_auth) {
+ if (ok > 0) {
+ const char *cond_end = NULL;
+
+ ok = process_proxy_cond(letters, cb_arg->proxy_cond, &cond_end);
+
+ if (ok < 0)
+ EXIT(3);
+ if (*cond_end) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Stopped processing condition before it's end.\n");
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!ok)
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Proxy rights check with condition '%s' proved invalid\n",
+ cb_arg->proxy_cond);
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Proxy rights check with condition '%s' proved valid\n",
+ cb_arg->proxy_cond);
+ }
+ }
+ return (ok);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL;
+
+static RSA MS_CALLBACK *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+{
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+ if (rsa_tmp == NULL) {
+ bn = BN_new();
+ rsa_tmp = RSA_new();
+ if (!bn || !rsa_tmp || !BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory error...");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generating temp (%d bit) RSA key...", keylength);
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+ if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_tmp, keylength, bn, NULL)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error generating key.");
+ RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
+ rsa_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+ end:
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
+ (void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
+ }
+ if (bn)
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return (rsa_tmp);
+}
+
+static void free_tmp_rsa(void)
+{
+ if (rsa_tmp != NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
+ rsa_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/*-
+ * These DH parameters have been generated as follows:
+ * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 512
+ * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout 1024
+ * $ openssl dhparam -C -noout -dsaparam 1024
+ * (The third function has been renamed to avoid name conflicts.)
+ */
+static DH *get_dh512()
+{
+ static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
+ 0xCB, 0xC8, 0xE1, 0x86, 0xD0, 0x1F, 0x94, 0x17, 0xA6, 0x99, 0xF0,
+ 0xC6,
+ 0x1F, 0x0D, 0xAC, 0xB6, 0x25, 0x3E, 0x06, 0x39, 0xCA, 0x72, 0x04,
+ 0xB0,
+ 0x6E, 0xDA, 0xC0, 0x61, 0xE6, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x25, 0xE8, 0x3B, 0xB9,
+ 0x5F,
+ 0x9A, 0xB6, 0xB5, 0xFE, 0x99, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x33,
+ 0xB8,
+ 0xE1, 0xF1, 0x13, 0x4F, 0x59, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x26, 0x21,
+ 0x33,
+ 0x02, 0xC5, 0xAE, 0x23,
+ };
+ static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
+ 0x02,
+ };
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
+ dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
+ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ return (dh);
+}
+
+static DH *get_dh1024()
+{
+ static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
+ 0xF8, 0x81, 0x89, 0x7D, 0x14, 0x24, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xBF,
+ 0x3A,
+ 0xE4, 0x90, 0xF4, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xFB, 0x34, 0xB5, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x56,
+ 0xA2,
+ 0xEA, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0xC0, 0xC0, 0xCE, 0x89, 0xE1, 0xFA, 0x63, 0x3F,
+ 0xB0,
+ 0x6B, 0x32, 0x66, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x7B, 0xB0, 0x00, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x87,
+ 0xC2,
+ 0xAE, 0x98, 0x89, 0x26, 0x17, 0xC2, 0x05, 0xD2, 0xEC, 0x08, 0xD0,
+ 0x8C,
+ 0xFF, 0x17, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xC5, 0x07, 0x93, 0x03, 0xB1, 0xF6, 0x2F,
+ 0xB8,
+ 0x1C, 0x52, 0x47, 0x27, 0x1B, 0xDB, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x69, 0x1D,
+ 0x52,
+ 0x4B, 0x32, 0x81, 0xAA, 0x7F, 0x00, 0xC8, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xD9, 0xCC,
+ 0xC1,
+ 0x11, 0x2D, 0x37, 0x34, 0x6C, 0xEA, 0x02, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xBB,
+ 0xB1,
+ 0x71, 0x33, 0x09, 0x15, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x23, 0x87, 0x07, 0x5E, 0x89,
+ 0xAB,
+ 0x6B, 0x7C, 0x5F, 0xEC, 0xA6, 0x24, 0xDC, 0x53,
+ };
+ static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
+ 0x02,
+ };
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
+ dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
+ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ return (dh);
+}
+
+static DH *get_dh1024dsa()
+{
+ static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
+ 0xC8, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x08, 0x07, 0x89, 0x4D, 0x90, 0x53, 0xF3, 0xD5,
+ 0x00,
+ 0x21, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xA6, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x23, 0x9A, 0xC7, 0x87,
+ 0x19,
+ 0x3B, 0x47, 0xB6, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x6F, 0xFF, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0xB8, 0x65,
+ 0xD2,
+ 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x31, 0x83, 0x4A, 0xA7, 0x5F, 0x2F, 0x88, 0x38, 0xB6,
+ 0x55,
+ 0xCF, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x6D, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xDA, 0xAC, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xAF,
+ 0xFC,
+ 0x33, 0x84, 0x37, 0x5B, 0x82, 0x4A, 0x31, 0x5D, 0xE7, 0xBD, 0x52,
+ 0x97,
+ 0xA1, 0x77, 0xBF, 0x10, 0x9E, 0x37, 0xEA, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x28,
+ 0x8D,
+ 0x9D, 0x3B, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0x09, 0x5C, 0x68, 0xC7, 0x45, 0x90, 0xFD,
+ 0xBB,
+ 0x70, 0xC9, 0x3A, 0xBB, 0xDF, 0xD4, 0x21, 0x0F, 0xC4, 0x6A, 0x3C,
+ 0xF6,
+ 0x61, 0xCF, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x13, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0xBC, 0xCF, 0xBC, 0x26,
+ 0x9E,
+ 0xBC, 0x0B, 0xBD, 0xAB, 0x5D, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x39,
+ };
+ static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
+ 0x3B, 0x40, 0x86, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6C, 0xDE, 0x67, 0x1C, 0xCC, 0x80,
+ 0x05,
+ 0x5A, 0xDF, 0xFE, 0xBD, 0x20, 0x27, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x24, 0xC9, 0x03,
+ 0xF3,
+ 0xE1, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x98, 0x27, 0x40, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x8C, 0x6A,
+ 0xE9,
+ 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x3A, 0xD6, 0x86, 0x83, 0x5E, 0x72, 0x41, 0xCE, 0x85,
+ 0x3C,
+ 0xD2, 0xB3, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xCE, 0x37, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0x1C, 0x7B,
+ 0x65,
+ 0xD3, 0xE6, 0xA6, 0x00, 0xF5, 0x5A, 0x95, 0x43, 0x5E, 0x81, 0xCF,
+ 0x60,
+ 0xA2, 0x23, 0xFC, 0x36, 0xA7, 0x5D, 0x7A, 0x4C, 0x06, 0x91, 0x6E,
+ 0xF6,
+ 0x57, 0xEE, 0x36, 0xCB, 0x06, 0xEA, 0xF5, 0x3D, 0x95, 0x49, 0xCB,
+ 0xA7,
+ 0xDD, 0x81, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x09, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA8, 0x22, 0x72,
+ 0xA1,
+ 0x7F, 0xC4, 0x70, 0x56, 0x70, 0xE8, 0x20, 0x10, 0x18, 0x8F, 0x2E,
+ 0x60,
+ 0x07, 0xE7, 0x68, 0x1A, 0x82, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xA2,
+ };
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
+ dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
+ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ dh->length = 160;
+ return (dh);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+/* convert the PSK key (psk_key) in ascii to binary (psk) */
+static int psk_key2bn(const char *pskkey, unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+ int ret;
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+
+ ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, pskkey);
+ if (!ret) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to BIGNUM\n",
+ pskkey);
+ if (bn)
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bytes(bn) > (int)max_psk_len) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%d)\n",
+ max_psk_len, BN_num_bytes(bn));
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = BN_bn2bin(bn, psk);
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static unsigned int psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+ char *identity,
+ unsigned int max_identity_len,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int psk_len = 0;
+
+ ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "Client_identity");
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_err;
+ if (debug)
+ fprintf(stderr, "client: created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity,
+ ret);
+ ret = psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_err;
+ psk_len = ret;
+ out_err:
+ return psk_len;
+}
+
+static unsigned int psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+ unsigned char *psk,
+ unsigned int max_psk_len)
+{
+ unsigned int psk_len = 0;
+
+ if (strcmp(identity, "Client_identity") != 0) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "server: PSK error: client identity not found\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ psk_len = psk_key2bn(psk_key, psk, max_psk_len);
+ return psk_len;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int do_test_cipherlist(void)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ const SSL_METHOD *meth;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *ci, *tci = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ fprintf(stderr, "testing SSLv2 cipher list order: ");
+ meth = SSLv2_method();
+ while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL) {
+ if (tci != NULL)
+ if (ci->id >= tci->id) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tci = ci;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ fprintf(stderr, "testing SSLv3 cipher list order: ");
+ meth = SSLv3_method();
+ tci = NULL;
+ while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL) {
+ if (tci != NULL)
+ if (ci->id >= tci->id) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tci = ci;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
+ fprintf(stderr, "testing TLSv1 cipher list order: ");
+ meth = TLSv1_method();
+ tci = NULL;
+ while ((ci = meth->get_cipher(i++)) != NULL) {
+ if (tci != NULL)
+ if (ci->id >= tci->id) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "failed %lx vs. %lx\n", ci->id, tci->id);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tci = ci;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "ok\n");
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_enc.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/t1_enc.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_enc.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1325 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-# include <openssl/comp.h>
-#endif
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-# include <openssl/des.h>
-#endif
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
- int sec_len,
- const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
- const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
- const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
- const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
- const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
- unsigned char *out, int olen)
-{
- int chunk;
- size_t j;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
- unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t A1_len;
- int ret = 0;
-
- chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
- OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
- if (!mac_key)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
- goto err;
- if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- /* Reinit mac contexts */
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
- goto err;
- if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
- goto err;
-
- if (olen > chunk) {
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
- goto err;
- out += j;
- olen -= j;
- /* calc the next A1 value */
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
- goto err;
- } else { /* last one */
-
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
- goto err;
- memcpy(out, A1, olen);
- break;
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
- const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
- const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
- const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
- const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
- const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
- const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
- unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen)
-{
- int len, i, idx, count;
- const unsigned char *S1;
- long m;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
- count = 0;
- for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
- if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
- count++;
- }
- if (!count) {
- /* Should never happen */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- len = slen / count;
- if (count == 1)
- slen = 0;
- S1 = sec;
- memset(out1, 0, olen);
- for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
- if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
- if (!md) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1),
- seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
- seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len,
- out2, olen))
- goto err;
- S1 += len;
- for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
- out1[i] ^= out2[i];
- }
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
- unsigned char *tmp, int num)
-{
- int ret;
- ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num);
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
- s->session->master_key_length);
- {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- return ret;
-}
-
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
-{
- static const unsigned char empty[] = "";
- unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
- unsigned char *exp_label;
- unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
- unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
- unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
- int client_write;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- const SSL_COMP *comp;
-#endif
- const EVP_MD *m;
- int mac_type;
- int *mac_secret_size;
- EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
- int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl;
- int reuse_dd = 0;
-
- is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
- m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
- mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
- fprintf(stderr, "\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp);
- fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
- fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
- c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len);
- fprintf(stderr, "\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ",
- s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
- {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-
- if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
- reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_read_ctx =
- OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
- goto err;
- else
- /*
- * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
- */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
- dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
- mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (s->expand != NULL) {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
- s->expand = NULL;
- }
- if (comp != NULL) {
- s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (s->expand == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
- if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
- */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
- mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
- mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
- } else {
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
- s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- else
- s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if (!mac_ctx)
- goto err;
- s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
- } else
- mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (s->compress != NULL) {
- COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
- s->compress = NULL;
- }
- if (comp != NULL) {
- s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
- if (s->compress == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- }
-#endif
- /*
- * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
- */
- if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
- memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
- mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
- mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
- }
-
- if (reuse_dd)
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
-
- p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
- i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
-
- cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
- cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
- /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
- /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
- else
- k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
- (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
- ms = &(p[0]);
- n = i + i;
- key = &(p[n]);
- n += j + j;
- iv = &(p[n]);
- n += k + k;
- exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write = 1;
- } else {
- n = i;
- ms = &(p[n]);
- n += i + j;
- key = &(p[n]);
- n += j + k;
- iv = &(p[n]);
- n += k;
- exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
- exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
- client_write = 0;
- }
-
- if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
-
- memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
-
- if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
- mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
- EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key);
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
- {
- int z;
- for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
- printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
- }
-#endif
- if (is_export) {
- /*
- * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value
- * since only the correct one will be used :-).
- */
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- exp_label, exp_label_len,
- s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
- key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
- goto err2;
- key = tmp1;
-
- if (k > 0) {
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2))
- goto err2;
- if (client_write)
- iv = iv1;
- else
- iv = &(iv1[k]);
- }
- }
-
- s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- int i;
- fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "\tkey= ");
- for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", key[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= ");
- for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", iv[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
- || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- } else {
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
- }
- /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
- && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
- *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err2;
- }
-
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
- {
- int z;
- for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++)
- printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
- }
- printf("\niv=");
- {
- int z;
- for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
- printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
- }
- printf("\n");
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
- return (1);
- err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- err2:
- return (0);
-}
-
-int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL;
- const EVP_CIPHER *c;
- const EVP_MD *hash;
- int num;
- SSL_COMP *comp;
- int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
- int ret = 0;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
- return (1);
-
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
- (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
- return (0);
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
- s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
- s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
- s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
- num =
- EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- num *= 2;
-
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
- s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1;
-
- if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- OPENSSL_free(p1);
- goto err;
- }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- printf("client random\n");
- {
- int z;
- for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
- printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
- ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
- }
- printf("server random\n");
- {
- int z;
- for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
- printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
- ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
- }
- printf("pre-master\n");
- {
- int z;
- for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
- printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
- ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
- }
-#endif
- if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num))
- goto err;
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- printf("\nkey block\n");
- {
- int z;
- for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
- printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
- && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
- /*
- * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
- * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
- */
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
-
- if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
- s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-#endif
- }
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- err:
- if (p2) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num);
- OPENSSL_free(p2);
- }
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/*-
- * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
- *
- * Returns:
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
- * short etc).
- * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
- * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
- * an internal error occured.
- */
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
- unsigned long l;
- int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
- if (send) {
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
- int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
- }
- ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
- rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
- if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else {
- int ivlen;
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
- /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
- if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
- && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
- else
- ivlen = 0;
- if (ivlen > 1) {
- if (rec->data != rec->input)
- /*
- * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
- * happen?? (steve)
- */
- fprintf(stderr,
- "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__);
- else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
- return -1;
- }
- }
- } else {
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
- int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
- }
- ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
- rec = &(s->s3->rrec);
- if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
- }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
- memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
- rec->input = rec->data;
- ret = 1;
- } else {
- l = rec->length;
- bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
- unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq;
-
- seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
-
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
-
- s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
- memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
- memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8);
- } else {
- memcpy(buf, seq, 8);
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
- }
-
- buf[8] = rec->type;
- buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
- buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
- buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
- buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
- pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
- EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf);
- if (pad <= 0)
- return -1;
- if (send) {
- l += pad;
- rec->length += pad;
- }
- } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
- i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
-
- /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
-
- /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
- j = i - 1;
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) {
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
- j++;
- }
- for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
- rec->input[k] = j;
- l += i;
- rec->length += i;
- }
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned long ui;
- fprintf(stderr,
- "EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
- ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
- fprintf(stderr,
- "\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
- ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, DES_KEY_SZ,
- DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ds->cipher->iv_len);
- fprintf(stderr, "\t\tIV: ");
- for (i = 0; i < ds->cipher->iv_len; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ds->iv[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "\trec->input=");
- for (ui = 0; ui < l; ui++)
- fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->input[ui]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (!send) {
- if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
- return 0;
- }
-
- i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
- ? (i < 0)
- : (i == 0))
- return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
- rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- }
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned long i;
- fprintf(stderr, "\trec->data=");
- for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->data[i]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- ret = 1;
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
- if (pad && !send)
- rec->length -= pad;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
-{
- unsigned int ret;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
- int i;
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return 0;
-
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]
- && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
- d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!d) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return ((int)ret);
-}
-
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
- const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
-{
- unsigned int i;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char *q, buf2[12];
- int idx;
- long mask;
- int err = 0;
- const EVP_MD *md;
-
- q = buf;
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return 0;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
- for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) {
- if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
- int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
- EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
- if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0
- || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) {
- /*
- * internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite!
- */
- err = 1;
- } else {
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
- !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) ||
- (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
- err = 1;
- q += hashsize;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
- s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
- out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
- err = 1;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (int)(q - buf));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2));
- if (err)
- return 0;
- else
- return sizeof buf2;
-}
-
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
-{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- unsigned char *seq;
- EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
- size_t md_size, orig_len;
- int i;
- EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
- unsigned char header[13];
- int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
- : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
- int t;
-
- if (send) {
- rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
- seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
- hash = ssl->write_hash;
- } else {
- rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
- seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
- hash = ssl->read_hash;
- }
-
- t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
- md_size = t;
-
- /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
- if (stream_mac) {
- mac_ctx = hash;
- } else {
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash))
- return -1;
- mac_ctx = &hmac;
- }
-
- if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
-
- s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
- memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
-
- memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
- } else
- memcpy(header, seq, 8);
-
- /*
- * kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type
- */
- orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8);
- rec->type &= 0xff;
-
- header[8] = rec->type;
- header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
- header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
- header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
- header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
-
- if (!send &&
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
- /*
- * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
- * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
- * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
- */
- /* Final param == not SSLv3 */
- ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
- md, &md_size,
- header, rec->input,
- rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
- ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
- ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0);
- } else {
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
- t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (!send && FIPS_mode())
- tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
- mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length, orig_len);
-#endif
- }
-
- if (!stream_mac)
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
- {
- int z;
- for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
- {
- unsigned int z;
- for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif
-
- if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
- }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
- {
- unsigned int z;
- for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
-#endif
- return (md_size);
-}
-
-int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
- int len)
-{
- unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
- int col = 0, sol = 0;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p,
- len);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL
- && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL
- && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0
- && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
- co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
- col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
- so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
- /*
- * must be same as col (see
- * draft-resc-00.txts-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1)
- */
- sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
- }
-#endif
-
- tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- co, col,
- s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff);
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
- BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
- fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
- BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
- BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
- BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
- SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-}
-
-int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
- const char *label, size_t llen,
- const unsigned char *context,
- size_t contextlen, int use_context)
-{
- unsigned char *buff;
- unsigned char *val = NULL;
- size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
- int rv;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n",
- s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
- if (buff == NULL)
- goto err2;
-
- /*
- * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
- * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
- * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
- */
- vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
- if (use_context) {
- vallen += 2 + contextlen;
- }
-
- val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
- if (val == NULL)
- goto err2;
- currentvalpos = 0;
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
- currentvalpos += llen;
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- if (use_context) {
- val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
- currentvalpos++;
- val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
- currentvalpos++;
- if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
- * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
- * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
- */
- if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
- goto err1;
- if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
- goto err1;
- if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
- goto err1;
- if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
- goto err1;
-
- rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
- val, vallen,
- NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0,
- NULL, 0,
- s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
- out, buff, olen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen);
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- goto ret;
- err1:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL,
- SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
- rv = 0;
- goto ret;
- err2:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- rv = 0;
- ret:
- if (buff != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(buff);
- if (val != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(val);
- return (rv);
-}
-
-int tls1_alert_code(int code)
-{
- switch (code) {
- case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
- return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
- case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
- return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
- return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
- return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
- return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
- case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
- return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
- return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
- return (-1);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
- return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
- case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
- return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
- return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
- return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
- return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
- case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
- return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
- return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
- case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
- return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
- case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
- return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
- return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
- return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
- case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
- return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
- case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
- return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
- case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
- return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
- return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
- case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
- return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
- return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
- return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
- case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
- return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
- return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
- return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
- case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
- return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
- case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
- return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-#if 0
- /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
- case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE:
- return (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
-#endif
- default:
- return (-1);
- }
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_enc.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/t1_enc.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_enc.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_enc.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1343 @@
+/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+# include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+# include <openssl/des.h>
+#endif
+
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
+static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
+ int sec_len,
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+ unsigned char *out, int olen)
+{
+ int chunk;
+ size_t j;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+ unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t A1_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+ if (!mac_key)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Reinit mac contexts */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (olen > chunk) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
+ goto err;
+ out += j;
+ olen -= j;
+ /* calc the next A1 value */
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ } else { /* last one */
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(out, A1, olen);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
+static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+ const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
+ unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen)
+{
+ int len, i, idx, count;
+ const unsigned char *S1;
+ long m;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
+ count = 0;
+ for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
+ if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
+ count++;
+ }
+ if (!count) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ len = slen / count;
+ if (count == 1)
+ slen = 0;
+ S1 = sec;
+ memset(out1, 0, olen);
+ for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
+ if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
+ if (!md) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1),
+ seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3,
+ seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len,
+ out2, olen))
+ goto err;
+ S1 += len;
+ for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
+ out1[i] ^= out2[i];
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
+ unsigned char *tmp, int num)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num);
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
+ s->session->master_key_length);
+ {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+{
+ static const unsigned char empty[] = "";
+ unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
+ unsigned char *exp_label;
+ unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
+ int client_write;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ const SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+ const EVP_MD *m;
+ int mac_type;
+ int *mac_secret_size;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
+ int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl;
+ int reuse_dd = 0;
+
+ is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+ m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+ mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
+ c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ",
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
+ {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
+
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_read_ctx =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ else
+ /*
+ * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
+ if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+ s->expand = NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ if (s->expand == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+ if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
+ */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+ mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+ mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
+ } else {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ else
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ reuse_dd = 1;
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
+ } else {
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
+ if (mac_ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (s->compress != NULL) {
+ COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+ s->compress = NULL;
+ }
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+ if (s->compress == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION
+ */
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+ mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+ mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
+ }
+
+ if (reuse_dd)
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
+
+ p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+ i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+
+ cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+ j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
+ cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+ /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
+ /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+ (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ ms = &(p[0]);
+ n = i + i;
+ key = &(p[n]);
+ n += j + j;
+ iv = &(p[n]);
+ n += k + k;
+ exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ client_write = 1;
+ } else {
+ n = i;
+ ms = &(p[n]);
+ n += i + j;
+ key = &(p[n]);
+ n += j + k;
+ iv = &(p[n]);
+ n += k;
+ exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+ exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+ client_write = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
+
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
+ mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
+ if (mac_key == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+ }
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < i; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+#endif
+ if (is_export) {
+ /*
+ * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value
+ * since only the correct one will be used :-).
+ */
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ exp_label, exp_label_len,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+ goto err2;
+ key = tmp1;
+
+ if (k > 0) {
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2))
+ goto err2;
+ if (client_write)
+ iv = iv1;
+ else
+ iv = &(iv1[k]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ int i;
+ fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tkey= ");
+ for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x", key[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t iv= ");
+ for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x", iv[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+ || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size
+ && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+ *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("\niv=");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < k; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
+ return (1);
+ err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ const EVP_MD *hash;
+ int num;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+ int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
+ return (1);
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
+ (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
+ num =
+ EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ num *= 2;
+
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
+ s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1;
+
+ if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(p1);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ printf("client random\n");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
+ ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("server random\n");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
+ ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("pre-master\n");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
+ ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num))
+ goto err;
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ printf("\nkey block\n");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
+ && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
+ /*
+ * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
+ * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
+
+ if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (p2) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(p2);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * short etc).
+ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ * an internal error occured.
+ */
+int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+{
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+
+ if (send) {
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
+ int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
+ ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else {
+ int ivlen;
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
+ && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
+ else
+ ivlen = 0;
+ if (ivlen > 1) {
+ if (rec->data != rec->input)
+ /*
+ * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
+ * happen?? (steve)
+ */
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+ __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
+ int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
+ ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
+ rec = &(s->s3->rrec);
+ if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
+ memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
+ rec->input = rec->data;
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ l = rec->length;
+ bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+ unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq;
+
+ seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
+ memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+ memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buf, seq, 8);
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ buf[8] = rec->type;
+ buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
+ buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+ buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
+ buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
+ pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+ EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf);
+ if (pad <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (send) {
+ l += pad;
+ rec->length += pad;
+ }
+ } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
+ i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
+
+ /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
+
+ /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
+ j = i - 1;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) {
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
+ j++;
+ }
+ for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
+ rec->input[k] = j;
+ l += i;
+ rec->length += i;
+ }
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ unsigned long ui;
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
+ ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n",
+ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, DES_KEY_SZ,
+ DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ds->cipher->iv_len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\t\tIV: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < ds->cipher->iv_len; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X", ds->iv[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\trec->input=");
+ for (ui = 0; ui < l; ui++)
+ fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->input[ui]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (!send) {
+ if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+ ? (i < 0)
+ : (i == 0))
+ return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
+ rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ }
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ unsigned long i;
+ fprintf(stderr, "\trec->data=");
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, " %02x", rec->data[i]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ ret = 1;
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if ((bs != 1) && !send)
+ ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+ if (pad && !send)
+ rec->length -= pad;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
+{
+ unsigned int ret;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]
+ && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
+ d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!d) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d) <=0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret) <= 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return ((int)ret);
+}
+
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
+ const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *q, buf2[12];
+ int idx;
+ long mask;
+ int err = 0;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+
+ q = buf;
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+ for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) {
+ if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
+ int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
+ if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0
+ || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) {
+ /*
+ * internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite!
+ */
+ err = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
+ !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) ||
+ (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
+ err = 1;
+ q += hashsize;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+ s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+ out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
+ err = 1;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (int)(q - buf));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2));
+ if (err)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return sizeof buf2;
+}
+
+int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+{
+ SSL3_RECORD *rec;
+ unsigned char *seq;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
+ size_t md_size, orig_len;
+ int i;
+ EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
+ unsigned char header[13];
+ int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
+ : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
+ int t;
+
+ if (send) {
+ rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+ seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
+ hash = ssl->write_hash;
+ } else {
+ rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+ seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
+ hash = ssl->read_hash;
+ }
+
+ t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ md_size = t;
+
+ /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
+ if (stream_mac) {
+ mac_ctx = hash;
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash))
+ return -1;
+ mac_ctx = &hmac;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
+ memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+
+ memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
+ } else
+ memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+
+ /*
+ * kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type
+ */
+ orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8);
+ rec->type &= 0xff;
+
+ header[8] = rec->type;
+ header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
+ header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+ header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
+ header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
+
+ if (!send &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
+ /*
+ * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
+ * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
+ */
+ /* Final param == not SSLv3 */
+ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
+ if (!stream_mac)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
+ if (!stream_mac)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+ tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+ mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length, orig_len);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (!stream_mac)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
+ {
+ int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < 8; z++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
+ {
+ unsigned int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ {
+ unsigned int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif
+ return (md_size);
+}
+
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
+ int len)
+{
+ unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
+ int col = 0, sol = 0;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p,
+ len);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL
+ && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL
+ && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0
+ && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
+ co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
+ col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
+ /*
+ * must be same as col (see
+ * draft-resc-00.txts-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1)
+ */
+ sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ co, col,
+ s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
+ BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key,
+ SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+}
+
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *context,
+ size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+{
+ unsigned char *buff;
+ unsigned char *val = NULL;
+ size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+ int rv;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n",
+ s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+ if (buff == NULL)
+ goto err2;
+
+ /*
+ * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather
+ * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the
+ * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label.
+ */
+ vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+ if (use_context) {
+ vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+ }
+
+ val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+ if (val == NULL)
+ goto err2;
+ currentvalpos = 0;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen);
+ currentvalpos += llen;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ if (use_context) {
+ val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+ currentvalpos++;
+ val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+ currentvalpos++;
+ if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
+ memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
+ * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and
+ * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+ */
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+ if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+
+ rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
+ val, vallen,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ NULL, 0,
+ s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+ out, buff, olen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ goto ret;
+ err1:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL,
+ SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+ rv = 0;
+ goto ret;
+ err2:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ rv = 0;
+ ret:
+ if (buff != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(buff);
+ if (val != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(val);
+ return (rv);
+}
+
+int tls1_alert_code(int code)
+{
+ switch (code) {
+ case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+ case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+ return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+ return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+ case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (-1);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+ return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+ return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+ case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+ return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+ return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
+ case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+ return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
+ case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+ return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+ return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+ return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
+ case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+ return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+ return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+ return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
+ case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+ return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+ return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+ return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+ return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+ return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+ return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+ return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
+ return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+#if 0
+ /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
+ case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE:
+ return (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return (-1);
+ }
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_lib.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/t1_lib.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,2697 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess);
-#endif
-
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
-};
-
-long tls1_default_timeout(void)
-{
- /*
- * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
- * http, the cache would over fill
- */
- return (60 * 60 * 2);
-}
-
-int tls1_new(SSL *s)
-{
- if (!ssl3_new(s))
- return (0);
- s->method->ssl_clear(s);
- return (1);
-}
-
-void tls1_free(SSL *s)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
- ssl3_free(s);
-}
-
-void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
-{
- ssl3_clear(s);
- s->version = s->method->version;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-
-static int nid_list[] = {
- NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
- NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
-};
-
-static int pref_list[] = {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
-# endif
- NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
-# endif
- NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
-# endif
- NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
-# endif
- NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
-# endif
- NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
-# endif
- NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
-};
-
-int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
-{
- /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
- if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
- sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
- return 0;
- return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
-}
-
-int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
-{
- /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
- switch (nid) {
- case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
- return 1;
- case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
- return 2;
- case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
- return 3;
- case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
- return 4;
- case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
- return 5;
- case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
- return 6;
- case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
- return 7;
- case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
- return 8;
- case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
- return 9;
- case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
- return 10;
- case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
- return 11;
- case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
- return 12;
- case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
- return 13;
- case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
- return 14;
- case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
- return 15;
- case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
- return 16;
- case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
- return 17;
- case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
- return 18;
- case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
- return 19;
- case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
- return 20;
- case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
- return 21;
- case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
- return 22;
- case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
- return 23;
- case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
- return 24;
- case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
- return 25;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-
-/*
- * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
- * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
- */
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
-# else
-# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
-# endif
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
-# else
-# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
-# endif
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
- /* */
-# else
-# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
-# endif
-
-# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
-
-static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
-# endif
-};
-
-int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
-{
- size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
- if (p)
- memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
- return (int)slen;
-}
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned char *limit)
-{
- int extdatalen = 0;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
-
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return orig;
-
- ret += 2;
-
- if (ret >= limit)
- return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
- unsigned long size_str;
- long lenmax;
-
- /*-
- * check for enough space.
- * 4 for the servername type and entension length
- * 2 for servernamelist length
- * 1 for the hostname type
- * 2 for hostname length
- * + hostname length
- */
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
- || (size_str =
- strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
- return NULL;
-
- /* extension type and length */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
- s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
-
- /* length of servername list */
- s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
-
- /* hostname type, length and hostname */
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- s2n(size_str, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
- ret += size_str;
- }
-
- /* Add RI if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate) {
- int el;
-
- if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret += el;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* Add SRP username if there is one */
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
- * Client Hello message */
-
- int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /*-
- * check for enough space.
- * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
- * 1 for the srp user identity
- * + srp user identity length
- */
- if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- /* fill in the extension */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
- s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
- (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
- memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
- ret += login_len;
- }
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) {
- /*
- * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
- */
- long lenmax;
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
- return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
- s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
- ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- }
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) {
- /*
- * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
- */
- long lenmax;
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
- return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
- s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
-
- s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
- s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
- ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- }
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
- int ticklen;
- if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
- ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
- else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
- ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
- s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
- return NULL;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
- s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
- } else
- ticklen = 0;
- if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
- goto skip_ext;
- /*
- * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
- * ticket
- */
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
- s2n(ticklen, ret);
- if (ticklen) {
- memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
- ret += ticklen;
- }
- }
- skip_ext:
-
- if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
- s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
- s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
- memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
- ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
- }
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
- size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
- return NULL;
- if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
- s2n(col + 2, ret);
- s2n(col, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
- ret += col;
- }
-# endif
-
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
- int i;
- long extlen, idlen, itmp;
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
-
- idlen = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
- id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
- if (itmp <= 0)
- return NULL;
- idlen += itmp + 2;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
- extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
- if (extlen < 0)
- return NULL;
- } else
- extlen = 0;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
- *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
- s2n(idlen, ret);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
- /* save position of id len */
- unsigned char *q = ret;
- id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
- /* skip over id len */
- ret += 2;
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
- /* write id len */
- s2n(itmp, q);
- }
- s2n(extlen, ret);
- if (extlen > 0)
- i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /* Add Heartbeat extension */
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
- s2n(1, ret);
- /*-
- * Set mode:
- * 1: peer may send requests
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
- */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- else
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
- /*
- * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
- * for Next Protocol Negotiation
- */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
- int el;
-
- ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret += el;
- }
-# endif
- /*
- * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
- * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
- * appear last.
- */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
- int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- /*
- * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
- * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
- * does not.
- */
- if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
- hlen -= 5;
- if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
- hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
- if (hlen >= 4)
- hlen -= 4;
- else
- hlen = 0;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
- s2n(hlen, ret);
- memset(ret, 0, hlen);
- ret += hlen;
- }
- }
-
- if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
- return orig;
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
-}
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned char *limit)
-{
- int extdatalen = 0;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- int next_proto_neg_seen;
-# endif
-
- /*
- * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
- */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return orig;
-
- ret += 2;
- if (ret >= limit)
- return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
- && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
- int el;
-
- if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret += el;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) {
- /*
- * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
- */
- long lenmax;
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
- return NULL;
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
- s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
- ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-
- }
- /*
- * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
- * extension
- */
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
- size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
- s2n(sol + 2, ret);
- s2n(sol, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
- ret += sol;
- }
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
- int el;
-
- ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret += el;
- }
-# endif
-
- if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
- && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
- const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
- 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
- 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
- 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
- 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
- 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
- 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
- };
- if (limit - ret < 36)
- return NULL;
- memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
- ret += 36;
-
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
- s2n(1, ret);
- /*-
- * Set mode:
- * 1: peer may send requests
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
- */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- else
- *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-
- }
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
- const unsigned char *npa;
- unsigned int npalen;
- int r;
-
- r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
- s->
- ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
- s2n(npalen, ret);
- memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
- ret += npalen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
- }
-# endif
-
- if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
- return orig;
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-/*-
- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
- * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
- * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
- * SNI,
- * elliptic_curves
- * ec_point_formats
- *
- * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
- * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
- * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
- * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
- */
-static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- const unsigned char *d, int n)
-{
- unsigned short type, size;
- static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
- 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
- 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
- 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
- 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
-
- 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
- 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
- 0x01, /* 1 point format */
- 0x00, /* uncompressed */
- };
-
- /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
- static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
- 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
- 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
- 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
- 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
- 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
- };
-
- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
- return;
- data += 2;
-
- if (data > (d + n - 4))
- return;
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-
- if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- return;
-
- if (data + size > d + n)
- return;
- data += size;
-
- if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
-
- if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
- return;
- if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
- return;
- if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
- return;
- } else {
- const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-
- if (data + len != d + n)
- return;
- if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
- return;
- }
-
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
-}
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
- int n, int *al)
-{
- unsigned short type;
- unsigned short size;
- unsigned short len;
- unsigned char *data = *p;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- int sigalg_seen = 0;
-
- s->servername_done = 0;
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
- ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
- s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
- }
-# endif
-
- s->srtp_profile = NULL;
-
- if (data == d + n)
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (data > (d + n - 2))
- goto err;
-
- n2s(data, len);
-
- if (data > (d + n - len))
- goto err;
-
- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-
- if (data + size > (d + n))
- goto err;
-# if 0
- fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
-# endif
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-/*-
- * The servername extension is treated as follows:
- *
- * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
- * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
- * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
- * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
- * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
- * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
- * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
- * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
- * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
- * the value of the Host: field.
- * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
- * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
- * extension.
- * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
- *
- */
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- unsigned char *sdata;
- int servname_type;
- int dsize;
-
- if (size < 2)
- goto err;
- n2s(data, dsize);
- size -= 2;
- if (dsize > size)
- goto err;
-
- sdata = data;
- while (dsize > 3) {
- servname_type = *(sdata++);
- n2s(sdata, len);
- dsize -= 3;
-
- if (len > dsize)
- goto err;
-
- if (s->servername_done == 0)
- switch (servname_type) {
- case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
- goto err;
-
- if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
- OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
- s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
- if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- s->servername_done = 1;
-
- } else
- s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
- && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
- && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
- (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
-
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- dsize -= len;
- }
- if (dsize != 0)
- goto err;
-
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
- if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
- goto err;
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
- s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
-
- if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
- goto err;
- }
-# endif
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
- int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
- if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
- goto err;
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
- ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
- ecpointformatlist_length);
- }
-# if 0
- fprintf(stderr,
- "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
- sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-# endif
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
- int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
- ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
-
- if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
- ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
- /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
- ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
- goto err;
-
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
- goto err;
-
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
- ellipticcurvelist_length;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
- ellipticcurvelist_length);
- }
-# if 0
- fprintf(stderr,
- "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
- sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-# endif
- }
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
-
- if (size < 2) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
- /* shouldn't really happen */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
- }
-
- /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
- else
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
- BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-# endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
- int dsize;
- if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
- goto err;
- sigalg_seen = 1;
- n2s(data, dsize);
- size -= 2;
- if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
- goto err;
- if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
- goto err;
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
-
- if (size < 5)
- goto err;
-
- s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
- size--;
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- const unsigned char *sdata;
- int dsize;
- /* Read in responder_id_list */
- n2s(data, dsize);
- size -= 2;
- if (dsize > size)
- goto err;
- while (dsize > 0) {
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
- int idsize;
- if (dsize < 4)
- goto err;
- n2s(data, idsize);
- dsize -= 2 + idsize;
- size -= 2 + idsize;
- if (dsize < 0)
- goto err;
- sdata = data;
- data += idsize;
- id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
- if (!id)
- goto err;
- if (data != sdata) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
- && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Read in request_extensions */
- if (size < 2)
- goto err;
- n2s(data, dsize);
- size -= 2;
- if (dsize != size)
- goto err;
- sdata = data;
- if (dsize > 0) {
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
- X509_EXTENSION_free);
- }
-
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
- d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /*
- * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
- */
- else
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
- switch (data[0]) {
- case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- break;
- case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- break;
- default:
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- /*-
- * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
- * renegotiation.
- *
- * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
- * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
- * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
- * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
- * anything like that, but this might change).
- *
- * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
- * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
- * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
- * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
- * Finished message could have been computed.)
- */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
-# endif
-
- /* session ticket processed earlier */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
- && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
- return 0;
- }
-# endif
-
- data += size;
- }
-
- /* Spurious data on the end */
- if (data != d + n)
- goto err;
-
- *p = data;
-
- ri_check:
-
- /* Need RI if renegotiating */
-
- if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-err:
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
-}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/*
- * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
- * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
- * fill the length of the block.
- */
-static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
-{
- unsigned int off = 0;
-
- while (off < len) {
- if (d[off] == 0)
- return 0;
- off += d[off];
- off++;
- }
-
- return off == len;
-}
-# endif
-
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
- int n, int *al)
-{
- unsigned short length;
- unsigned short type;
- unsigned short size;
- unsigned char *data = *p;
- int tlsext_servername = 0;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-# endif
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
-# endif
-
- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
- goto ri_check;
-
- n2s(data, length);
- if (data + length != d + n) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-
- if (data + size > (d + n))
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- tlsext_servername = 1;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
- int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
- if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
- ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!s->hit) {
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
- ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
- ecpointformatlist_length);
- }
-# if 0
- fprintf(stderr,
- "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
- sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-# endif
- }
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
- || (size > 0)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- }
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
- unsigned char *sdata = data;
-
- if (size < 2) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
- /* shouldn't really happen */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
- }
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
- /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
- } else {
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
- BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-# endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
- /*
- * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
- * request message.
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- unsigned char *selected;
- unsigned char selected_len;
-
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /* The data must be valid */
- if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->
- ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
- size,
- s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
- SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
-# endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
- switch (data[0]) {
- case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- break;
- case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- break;
- default:
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
- return 0;
- }
-# endif
-
- data += size;
- }
-
- if (data != d + n) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- *p = data;
-
- ri_check:
-
- /*
- * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
- * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
- * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
- * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
- * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
- * initial connect only.
- */
- if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
- * suite, send the point formats and elliptic curves we support.
- */
- int using_ecc = 0;
- int i;
- unsigned char *j;
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
- SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
-
- alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
- using_ecc = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
- if (using_ecc) {
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] =
- TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] =
- TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
-
- /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
- s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
- sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
- if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
- s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
- sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) {
- int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
- s2n(id, j);
- }
- }
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- {
- int r = 1;
-
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
- s->
- ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
- if (!r)
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
- /* shouldn't really happen */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
- /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
- } else {
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
- BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
- s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
- }
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
- s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
- }
-
- if (r == 2)
- /*
- * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
- * server opaque PRF input
- */
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
- s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
- }
-# endif
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats
- * we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note
- * that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
- */
-
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-
- if (using_ecc) {
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] =
- TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
- s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] =
- TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
- }
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
- * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
- /*
- * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
- * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
-# endif
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- {
- /*
- * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
- * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
- * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
- */
-
- int r = 1;
-
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
- s->
- ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
- if (!r) {
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
- /* shouldn't really happen */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
- }
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
-
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
- s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
- /*
- * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
- * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
- */
-
- if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
- /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
- } else {
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
- BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
- s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
- }
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
- s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
- }
- }
-
- if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
- /*
- * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
- * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
- * handshake.
- */
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- }
- }
-
- err:
-# endif
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done = 0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
- int al;
-
- /*
- * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
- * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has
- * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because
- * this may influence which certificate is sent
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
- int r;
- CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
- certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
- /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
- if (certpkey == NULL) {
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
- * et al can pick it up.
- */
- s->cert->key = certpkey;
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- switch (r) {
- /* We don't want to send a status request response */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* status request response should be sent */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* something bad happened */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
- err:
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
- * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
- * must contain uncompressed.
- */
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
- /* we are using an ECC cipher */
- size_t i;
- unsigned char *list;
- int found_uncompressed = 0;
- list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
- if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
- found_uncompressed = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found_uncompressed) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
-# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
- /*
- * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
- * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
- * value from the server too.
- */
-
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- }
-
- /*
- * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
- * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
- */
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
- s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
- s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- }
- }
-# endif
-
- /*
- * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
- * callback
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
- && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
- int r;
- /*
- * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
- * response.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- }
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- if (r == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- }
- if (r < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- }
- }
-
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done = 0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-/*-
- * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
- * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
- * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
- *
- * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
- * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
- * extension, if any.
- * len: the length of the session ID.
- * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
- * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- * point to the resulting session.
- *
- * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
- * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
- * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
- * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
- * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
- * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
- * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
- *
- * Side effects:
- * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
- * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
- * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
- * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
- * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
- * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
- */
-int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
-{
- /* Point after session ID in client hello */
- const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
- unsigned short i;
-
- *ret = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-
- /*
- * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
- * resumption.
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
- return 0;
- if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
- return 0;
- if (p >= limit)
- return -1;
- /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- i = *(p++);
- p += i;
- if (p >= limit)
- return -1;
- }
- /* Skip past cipher list */
- n2s(p, i);
- p += i;
- if (p >= limit)
- return -1;
- /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
- i = *(p++);
- p += i;
- if (p > limit)
- return -1;
- /* Now at start of extensions */
- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
- return 0;
- n2s(p, i);
- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
- unsigned short type, size;
- n2s(p, type);
- n2s(p, size);
- if (p + size > limit)
- return 0;
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- int r;
- if (size == 0) {
- /*
- * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
- * one.
- */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 1;
- }
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
- /*
- * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
- * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
- * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
- * calculate the master secret later.
- */
- return 2;
- }
- r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
- switch (r) {
- case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 2;
- case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
- return r;
- case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 3;
- default: /* fatal error */
- return -1;
- }
- }
- p += size;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*-
- * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
- *
- * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
- * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
- * sess_id: points at the session ID.
- * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
- * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- * point to the resulting session.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
- * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
- */
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
- int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
- int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
-{
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned char *sdec;
- const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
- unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
- if (eticklen < 48)
- return 2;
- /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
- unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
- int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
- &ctx, &hctx, 0);
- if (rv < 0)
- return -1;
- if (rv == 0)
- return 2;
- if (rv == 2)
- renew_ticket = 1;
- } else {
- /* Check key name matches */
- if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
- return 2;
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
- }
- /*
- * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
- * checks on ticket.
- */
- mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
- if (mlen < 0) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- eticklen -= mlen;
- /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return 2;
- }
- /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
- /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
- p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (!sdec) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
- if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- return 2;
- }
- slen += mlen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- p = sdec;
-
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
- OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- if (sess) {
- /*
- * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
- * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
- * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
- * standard.
- */
- if (sesslen)
- memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
- sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
- *psess = sess;
- if (renew_ticket)
- return 4;
- else
- return 3;
- }
- ERR_clear_error();
- /*
- * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
- */
- return 2;
-}
-
-/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
-
-typedef struct {
- int nid;
- int id;
-} tls12_lookup;
-
-static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
- {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
- {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
-# endif
-};
-
-static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
-# endif
-};
-
-static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
-{
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- if (table[i].nid == nid)
- return table[i].id;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
-# if 0
-static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
-{
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- if (table[i].id == id)
- return table[i].nid;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-# endif
-
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
- const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- int sig_id, md_id;
- if (!md)
- return 0;
- md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (md_id == -1)
- return 0;
- sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
- if (sig_id == -1)
- return 0;
- p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
- p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
- return 1;
-}
-
-int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
-{
- return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-}
-
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
-{
- switch (hash_alg) {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
- return EVP_sha1();
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
- return EVP_sha224();
-
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
- return EVP_sha256();
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
- return EVP_sha384();
-
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
- return EVP_sha512();
-# endif
- default:
- return NULL;
-
- }
-}
-
-/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
-
-int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
-{
- int i, idx;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
- return 1;
- /* Should never happen */
- if (!c)
- return 0;
-
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) {
- unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1];
-
- switch (sig_alg) {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
- break;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
- idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
- break;
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- break;
-# endif
- default:
- continue;
- }
-
- if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
- md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
- if (md) {
- c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
- }
- }
-
- }
-
- /*
- * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
- * supported it stays as NULL.
- */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
- }
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
-# endif
- return 1;
-}
-
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
- unsigned short hbtype;
- unsigned int payload;
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
- return 0; /* silently discard */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
- return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
- pl = p;
-
- if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
- unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
- int r;
-
- /*
- * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
- * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
- */
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
- bp = buffer;
-
- /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
- *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
- s2n(payload, bp);
- memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
- bp += payload;
- /* Random padding */
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
- return -1;
- }
-
- r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
- 3 + payload + padding);
-
- if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- OPENSSL_free(buffer);
-
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
- unsigned int seq;
-
- /*
- * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
- * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
- */
- n2s(pl, seq);
-
- if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *buf, *p;
- int ret = -1;
- unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
-
- /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
- if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
- s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
- * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
-
- /*-
- * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
- * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
- * some random stuff.
- * - Message Type, 1 byte
- * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
- * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
- * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
- * - Padding
- */
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
- p = buf;
- /* Message Type */
- *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
- /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
- s2n(payload, p);
- /* Sequence number */
- s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
- /* 16 random bytes */
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- p += 16;
- /* Random padding */
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
- if (ret >= 0) {
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buf, 3 + payload + padding,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
- }
-
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_lib.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/t1_lib.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_lib.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/t1_lib.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,2704 @@
+/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
+ const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
+ SSL_SESSION **psess);
+#endif
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+ tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+};
+
+long tls1_default_timeout(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
+ * http, the cache would over fill
+ */
+ return (60 * 60 * 2);
+}
+
+int tls1_new(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (!ssl3_new(s))
+ return (0);
+ s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+void tls1_free(SSL *s)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+ ssl3_free(s);
+}
+
+void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+ ssl3_clear(s);
+ s->version = s->method->version;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+static int nid_list[] = {
+ NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
+};
+
+static int pref_list[] = {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+# endif
+ NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+# endif
+ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+# endif
+ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+# endif
+ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+# endif
+ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+# endif
+ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+};
+
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
+{
+ /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
+ if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
+ sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
+ return 0;
+ return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
+}
+
+int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
+{
+ /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ return 1;
+ case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ return 2;
+ case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ return 3;
+ case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ return 4;
+ case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ return 5;
+ case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ return 6;
+ case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ return 7;
+ case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ return 8;
+ case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ return 9;
+ case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ return 10;
+ case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ return 11;
+ case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ return 12;
+ case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ return 13;
+ case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ return 14;
+ case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ return 15;
+ case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ return 16;
+ case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ return 17;
+ case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ return 18;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ return 19;
+ case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ return 20;
+ case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ return 21;
+ case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ return 22;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ return 23;
+ case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ return 24;
+ case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ return 25;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+/*
+ * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
+ * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
+ */
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
+# else
+# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
+# else
+# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
+ /* */
+# else
+# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
+# endif
+
+# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
+ tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
+ tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
+ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
+
+static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+# endif
+};
+
+int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+ if (p)
+ memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
+ return (int)slen;
+}
+
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned char *limit)
+{
+ int extdatalen = 0;
+ unsigned char *orig = buf;
+ unsigned char *ret = buf;
+
+ /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
+ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ return orig;
+
+ ret += 2;
+
+ if (ret >= limit)
+ return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+ /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
+ unsigned long size_str;
+ long lenmax;
+
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 for the servername type and entension length
+ * 2 for servernamelist length
+ * 1 for the hostname type
+ * 2 for hostname length
+ * + hostname length
+ */
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
+ || (size_str =
+ strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* extension type and length */
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
+ s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
+
+ /* length of servername list */
+ s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
+
+ /* hostname type, length and hostname */
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+ s2n(size_str, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
+ ret += size_str;
+ }
+
+ /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ int el;
+
+ if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
+
+ if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret += el;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* Add SRP username if there is one */
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
+ * Client Hello message */
+
+ int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * check for enough space.
+ * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
+ * 1 for the srp user identity
+ * + srp user identity length
+ */
+ if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* fill in the extension */
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
+ s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
+ (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
+ memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
+ ret += login_len;
+ }
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
+ */
+ long lenmax;
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
+ return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret);
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ }
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
+ */
+ long lenmax;
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
+ return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
+
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ }
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
+ int ticklen;
+ if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
+ else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
+ ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
+ s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+ } else
+ ticklen = 0;
+ if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+ s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
+ goto skip_ext;
+ /*
+ * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
+ * ticket
+ */
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
+ s2n(ticklen, ret);
+ if (ticklen) {
+ memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
+ ret += ticklen;
+ }
+ }
+ skip_ext:
+
+ if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
+ s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
+ s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
+ memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
+ ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+ }
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
+ return NULL;
+ if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
+ s2n(col + 2, ret);
+ s2n(col, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
+ ret += col;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ int i;
+ long extlen, idlen, itmp;
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+
+ idlen = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
+ id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+ itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
+ if (itmp <= 0)
+ return NULL;
+ idlen += itmp + 2;
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
+ extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
+ if (extlen < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ } else
+ extlen = 0;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+ if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
+ *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
+ s2n(idlen, ret);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
+ /* save position of id len */
+ unsigned char *q = ret;
+ id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+ /* skip over id len */
+ ret += 2;
+ itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
+ /* write id len */
+ s2n(itmp, q);
+ }
+ s2n(extlen, ret);
+ if (extlen > 0)
+ i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /* Add Heartbeat extension */
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
+ s2n(1, ret);
+ /*-
+ * Set mode:
+ * 1: peer may send requests
+ * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ else
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
+ /*
+ * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
+ * for Next Protocol Negotiation
+ */
+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
+ int el;
+
+ ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
+
+ if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret += el;
+ }
+# endif
+ /*
+ * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
+ * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
+ * appear last.
+ */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
+ int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /*
+ * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
+ * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
+ * does not.
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ hlen -= 5;
+ if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
+ hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+ if (hlen >= 4)
+ hlen -= 4;
+ else
+ hlen = 0;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+ s2n(hlen, ret);
+ memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+ ret += hlen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
+ return orig;
+
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned char *limit)
+{
+ int extdatalen = 0;
+ unsigned char *orig = buf;
+ unsigned char *ret = buf;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
+# endif
+
+ /*
+ * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
+ */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ return orig;
+
+ ret += 2;
+ if (ret >= limit)
+ return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+
+ if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
+ && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
+ int el;
+
+ if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
+
+ if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret += el;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
+ */
+ long lenmax;
+
+ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
+ return NULL;
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
+ s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret);
+ *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+
+ }
+ /*
+ * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
+ * extension
+ */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
+ s2n(sol + 2, ret);
+ s2n(sol, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
+ ret += sol;
+ }
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
+ int el;
+
+ ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
+
+ if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret += el;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
+ && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
+ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
+ 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
+ 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
+ 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
+ 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
+ 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
+ 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
+ };
+ if (limit - ret < 36)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
+ ret += 36;
+
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
+ s2n(1, ret);
+ /*-
+ * Set mode:
+ * 1: peer may send requests
+ * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ else
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+
+ }
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+ if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
+ const unsigned char *npa;
+ unsigned int npalen;
+ int r;
+
+ r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
+ s->
+ ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
+ s2n(npalen, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
+ ret += npalen;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
+ return orig;
+
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/*-
+ * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ * SNI,
+ * elliptic_curves
+ * ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ const unsigned char *limit)
+{
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
+ 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+ 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
+ 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
+ 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
+
+ 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
+ 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
+ 0x01, /* 1 point format */
+ 0x00, /* uncompressed */
+ };
+
+ /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+ static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
+ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
+ 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
+ 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+ };
+
+ if (data >= (limit - 2))
+ return;
+ data += 2;
+
+ if (data > (limit - 4))
+ return;
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+ if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ return;
+
+ if (data + size > limit)
+ return;
+ data += size;
+
+ if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+ if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+ return;
+ } else {
+ const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+ if (data + len != limit)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ unsigned char *limit, int *al)
+{
+ unsigned short type;
+ unsigned short size;
+ unsigned short len;
+ unsigned char *data = *p;
+ int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+ int sigalg_seen = 0;
+
+ s->servername_done = 0;
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+ SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+ ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ s->srtp_profile = NULL;
+
+ if (data == limit)
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ if (data > (limit - 2))
+ goto err;
+
+ n2s(data, len);
+
+ if (data + len != limit)
+ goto err;
+
+ while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+ if (data + size > (limit))
+ goto err;
+# if 0
+ fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
+# endif
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+/*-
+ * The servername extension is treated as follows:
+ *
+ * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
+ * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
+ * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
+ * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
+ * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
+ * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
+ * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
+ * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
+ * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
+ * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
+ * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
+ * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
+ * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
+ * the value of the Host: field.
+ * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
+ * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
+ * extension.
+ * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
+ *
+ */
+
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
+ unsigned char *sdata;
+ int servname_type;
+ int dsize;
+
+ if (size < 2)
+ goto err;
+ n2s(data, dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize > size)
+ goto err;
+
+ sdata = data;
+ while (dsize > 3) {
+ servname_type = *(sdata++);
+ n2s(sdata, len);
+ dsize -= 3;
+
+ if (len > dsize)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (s->servername_done == 0)
+ switch (servname_type) {
+ case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
+ if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->servername_done = 1;
+
+ } else
+ s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
+ && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
+ && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
+ (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ dsize -= len;
+ }
+ if (dsize != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
+ if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
+ s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
+
+ if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
+ goto err;
+ }
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+
+ if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+ goto err;
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
+ ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
+ ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+# if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+# endif
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
+ ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
+
+ if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
+ ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
+ /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
+ ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
+ ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
+ ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ }
+# if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
+ s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+# endif
+ }
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+
+ if (size < 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+ }
+
+ /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ else
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
+ BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ renegotiate_seen = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
+ int dsize;
+ if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
+ goto err;
+ sigalg_seen = 1;
+ n2s(data, dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
+ goto err;
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
+
+ if (size < 5)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
+ size--;
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ const unsigned char *sdata;
+ int dsize;
+ /* Read in responder_id_list */
+ n2s(data, dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize > size)
+ goto err;
+ while (dsize > 0) {
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+ int idsize;
+ if (dsize < 4)
+ goto err;
+ n2s(data, idsize);
+ dsize -= 2 + idsize;
+ size -= 2 + idsize;
+ if (dsize < 0)
+ goto err;
+ sdata = data;
+ data += idsize;
+ id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
+ if (!id)
+ goto err;
+ if (data != sdata) {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
+ && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Read in request_extensions */
+ if (size < 2)
+ goto err;
+ n2s(data, dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize != size)
+ goto err;
+ sdata = data;
+ if (dsize > 0) {
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+ X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ }
+
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
+ d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
+ if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
+ */
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
+ switch (data[0]) {
+ case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ break;
+ case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ /*-
+ * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
+ * renegotiation.
+ *
+ * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
+ * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
+ * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
+ * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
+ * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
+ * anything like that, but this might change).
+ *
+ * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
+ * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
+ * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
+ * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
+ * Finished message could have been computed.)
+ */
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ /* session ticket processed earlier */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
+ && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
+ if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ data += size;
+ }
+
+ /* Spurious data on the end */
+ if (data != limit)
+ goto err;
+
+ *p = data;
+
+ ri_check:
+
+ /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+err:
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
+ * fill the length of the block.
+ */
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
+{
+ unsigned int off = 0;
+
+ while (off < len) {
+ if (d[off] == 0)
+ return 0;
+ off += d[off];
+ off++;
+ }
+
+ return off == len;
+}
+# endif
+
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
+ int n, int *al)
+{
+ unsigned short length;
+ unsigned short type;
+ unsigned short size;
+ unsigned char *data = *p;
+ int tlsext_servername = 0;
+ int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+# endif
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+ SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+# endif
+
+ if (data >= (d + n - 2))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ n2s(data, length);
+ if (data + length != d + n) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+ if (data + size > (d + n))
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tlsext_servername = 1;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+ int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+
+ if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
+ ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
+ ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
+ ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+# if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+# endif
+ }
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+ !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
+ s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ || (size > 0)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ }
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ unsigned char *sdata = data;
+
+ if (size < 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+ }
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
+ /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
+ BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ /*
+ * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
+ * request message.
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ unsigned char *selected;
+ unsigned char selected_len;
+
+ /* We must have requested it. */
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* The data must be valid */
+ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
+ size,
+ s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
+ SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ }
+# endif
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ renegotiate_seen = 1;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
+ switch (data[0]) {
+ case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ break;
+ case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
+ if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ data += size;
+ }
+
+ if (data != d + n) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *p = data;
+
+ ri_check:
+
+ /*
+ * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
+ * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
+ * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
+ * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
+ * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
+ * initial connect only.
+ */
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /*
+ * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
+ * suite, send the point formats and elliptic curves we support.
+ */
+ int using_ecc = 0;
+ int i;
+ unsigned char *j;
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
+ SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
+
+ alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+ using_ecc = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
+ if (using_ecc) {
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] =
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] =
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+
+ /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
+ sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
+ if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
+ sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) {
+ int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
+ s2n(id, j);
+ }
+ }
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ {
+ int r = 1;
+
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
+ s->
+ ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
+ if (!r)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
+ }
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
+ /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
+ BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ }
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+
+ if (r == 2)
+ /*
+ * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
+ * server opaque PRF input
+ */
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /*
+ * If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats
+ * we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note
+ * that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
+ */
+
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+ using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
+
+ if (using_ecc) {
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] =
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+ s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] =
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
+ }
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /*
+ * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
+ * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
+ */
+ /*
+ * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
+ * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
+ */
+# endif
+
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret =
+ s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
+ && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret =
+ s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->
+ initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ {
+ /*
+ * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
+ * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
+ * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
+ */
+
+ int r = 1;
+
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
+ s->
+ ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
+ if (!r) {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ /* shouldn't really happen */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
+ }
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
+ /*
+ * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
+ * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
+ */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
+ /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
+ BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
+ }
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
+ s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
+ * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
+ * handshake.
+ */
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err:
+# endif
+ switch (ret) {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->servername_done = 0;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ int al;
+
+ /*
+ * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
+ * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has
+ * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because
+ * this may influence which certificate is sent
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
+ int r;
+ CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+ certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+ /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+ if (certpkey == NULL) {
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
+ * et al can pick it up.
+ */
+ s->cert->key = certpkey;
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ switch (r) {
+ /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* status request response should be sent */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* something bad happened */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+ err:
+ switch (ret) {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /*
+ * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
+ * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
+ * must contain uncompressed.
+ */
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
+ && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+ /* we are using an ECC cipher */
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char *list;
+ int found_uncompressed = 0;
+ list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
+ if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
+ found_uncompressed = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found_uncompressed) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret =
+ s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
+ && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
+ ret =
+ s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->
+ initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
+ /*
+ * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
+ * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
+ * value from the server too.
+ */
+
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
+ * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
+ s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+
+ /*
+ * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
+ * callback
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
+ int r;
+ /*
+ * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
+ * response.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ if (r < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+ return 1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->servername_done = 0;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
+ * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
+ * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
+ *
+ * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
+ * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
+ * extension, if any.
+ * len: the length of the session ID.
+ * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
+ * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ * point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
+ * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
+ * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
+ * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
+ * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
+ * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
+ * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
+ * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
+ * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
+ * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
+ * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
+ * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
+ * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
+ */
+int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
+{
+ /* Point after session ID in client hello */
+ const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
+ unsigned short i;
+
+ *ret = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
+ * resumption.
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ return 0;
+ if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
+ return 0;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ i = *(p++);
+ p += i;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Skip past cipher list */
+ n2s(p, i);
+ p += i;
+ if (p >= limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+ i = *(p++);
+ p += i;
+ if (p > limit)
+ return -1;
+ /* Now at start of extensions */
+ if ((p + 2) >= limit)
+ return 0;
+ n2s(p, i);
+ while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ n2s(p, type);
+ n2s(p, size);
+ if (p + size > limit)
+ return 0;
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ int r;
+ if (size == 0) {
+ /*
+ * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
+ * one.
+ */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ /*
+ * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
+ * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
+ * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
+ * calculate the master secret later.
+ */
+ return 2;
+ }
+ r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
+ switch (r) {
+ case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 2;
+ case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
+ return r;
+ case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 3;
+ default: /* fatal error */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ p += size;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
+ *
+ * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
+ * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
+ * sess_id: points at the session ID.
+ * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
+ * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ * point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
+ * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
+ * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
+ */
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
+ int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
+ int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned char *sdec;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
+ unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
+ if (eticklen < 48)
+ return 2;
+ /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
+ int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
+ &ctx, &hctx, 0);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (rv == 0)
+ return 2;
+ if (rv == 2)
+ renew_ticket = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Check key name matches */
+ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
+ return 2;
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+ etick + 16) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
+ * checks on ticket.
+ */
+ mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
+ if (mlen < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ eticklen -= mlen;
+ /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
+ if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+ || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return 2;
+ }
+ /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
+ if (!sdec || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ return 2;
+ }
+ slen += mlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ p = sdec;
+
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ if (sess) {
+ /*
+ * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
+ * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
+ * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
+ * standard.
+ */
+ if (sesslen)
+ memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
+ sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
+ *psess = sess;
+ if (renew_ticket)
+ return 4;
+ else
+ return 3;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ /*
+ * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
+ */
+ return 2;
+err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
+
+typedef struct {
+ int nid;
+ int id;
+} tls12_lookup;
+
+static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
+ {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
+ {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
+# endif
+};
+
+static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
+# endif
+};
+
+static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ if (table[i].nid == nid)
+ return table[i].id;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+# if 0
+static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ if (table[i].id == id)
+ return table[i].nid;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+# endif
+
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
+ const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ int sig_id, md_id;
+ if (!md)
+ return 0;
+ md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
+ sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ if (md_id == -1)
+ return 0;
+ sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
+ if (sig_id == -1)
+ return 0;
+ p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
+ p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+ return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
+ sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
+{
+ switch (hash_alg) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
+ return EVP_sha1();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
+ return EVP_sha224();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
+ return EVP_sha256();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
+ return EVP_sha384();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
+ return EVP_sha512();
+# endif
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+
+ }
+}
+
+/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
+
+int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
+{
+ int i, idx;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ return 1;
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (!c)
+ return 0;
+
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) {
+ unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1];
+
+ switch (sig_alg) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+ break;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+ break;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ break;
+# endif
+ default:
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
+ md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
+ if (md) {
+ c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
+ * supported it stays as NULL.
+ */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+# endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
+ unsigned short hbtype;
+ unsigned int payload;
+ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
+ if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
+ unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
+ * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
+ */
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ bp = buffer;
+
+ /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+ *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
+ s2n(payload, bp);
+ memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
+ bp += payload;
+ /* Random padding */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
+ 3 + payload + padding);
+
+ if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
+ unsigned int seq;
+
+ /*
+ * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
+ * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
+ */
+ n2s(pl, seq);
+
+ if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+ int ret = -1;
+ unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
+ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+ /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
+ if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
+ * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
+
+ /*-
+ * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+ * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
+ * some random stuff.
+ * - Message Type, 1 byte
+ * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
+ * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
+ * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
+ * - Padding
+ */
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ p = buf;
+ /* Message Type */
+ *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+ /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
+ s2n(payload, p);
+ /* Sequence number */
+ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
+ /* 16 random bytes */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += 16;
+ /* Random padding */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buf, 3 + payload + padding,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
+ }
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/tls1.h
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/tls1.h 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/tls1.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,788 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/tls1.h */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core at openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_TLS1_H
-# define HEADER_TLS1_H
-
-# include <openssl/buffer.h>
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-# define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0
-
-# define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
-# define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
-# define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303
-# define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_2_VERSION
-
-# define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
-# define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
-
-# define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
-# define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02
-
-# define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
-# define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
-
-# define TLS1_get_version(s) \
- ((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
-
-# define TLS1_get_client_version(s) \
- ((s->client_version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->client_version : 0)
-
-# define TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21
-# define TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22
-# define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA 48/* fatal */
-# define TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED 49/* fatal */
-# define TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR 50/* fatal */
-# define TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR 51
-# define TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 60/* fatal */
-# define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70/* fatal */
-# define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71/* fatal */
-# define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80/* fatal */
-# define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86/* fatal */
-# define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90
-# define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100
-/* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
-# define TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 110
-# define TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 111
-# define TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112
-# define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 113
-# define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 114
-# define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115/* fatal */
-
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC3546 / RFC4366 / RFC6066 */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name 0
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length 1
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url 2
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys 3
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac 4
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request 5
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC4681 */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping 6
-
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC5878 */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz 7
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz 8
-
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC6091 */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type 9
-
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC4492 */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves 10
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats 11
-
-/* ExtensionType value from RFC5054 */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_srp 12
-
-/* ExtensionType values from RFC5246 */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms 13
-
-/* ExtensionType value from RFC5764 */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp 14
-
-/* ExtensionType value from RFC5620 */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat 15
-
-/*
- * ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension.
- * http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
- * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
- */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding 21
-
-/* ExtensionType value from RFC4507 */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket 35
-
-/* ExtensionType value from draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt */
-# if 0
-/*
- * will have to be provided externally for now ,
- * i.e. build with -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=38183
- * using whatever extension number you'd like to try
- */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input ?? */
-# endif
-
-/* Temporary extension type */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
-# define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172
-# endif
-
-/* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
-# define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
-/* status request value from RFC 3546 */
-# define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1
-
-/* ECPointFormat values from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
-# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first 0
-# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed 0
-# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime 1
-# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 2
-# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last 2
-
-/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC 5246 */
-
-# define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous 0
-# define TLSEXT_signature_rsa 1
-# define TLSEXT_signature_dsa 2
-# define TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa 3
-
-# define TLSEXT_hash_none 0
-# define TLSEXT_hash_md5 1
-# define TLSEXT_hash_sha1 2
-# define TLSEXT_hash_sha224 3
-# define TLSEXT_hash_sha256 4
-# define TLSEXT_hash_sha384 5
-# define TLSEXT_hash_sha512 6
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-
-# define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255
-
-const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type);
-int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s);
-/*
- * SSL_export_keying_material exports a value derived from the master secret,
- * as specified in RFC 5705. It writes |olen| bytes to |out| given a label and
- * optional context. (Since a zero length context is allowed, the |use_context|
- * flag controls whether a context is included.) It returns 1 on success and
- * zero otherwise.
- */
-int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
- const char *label, size_t llen,
- const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
- int use_context);
-
-# define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s,name) \
-SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME,TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name,(char *)name)
-
-# define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(ssl, cb) \
-SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
-
-# define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
-
-# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(ssl, type) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE,type, NULL)
-
-# define SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg)
-
-# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg)
-
-# define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg)
-
-# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg)
-
-# define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,0, (void *)arg)
-
-# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg, arglen) \
-SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,arglen, (void *)arg)
-
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, cb) \
-SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
-
-# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK 0
-# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING 1
-# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL 2
-# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK 3
-
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, arg) \
-SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
-
-# define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys))
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \
- SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys))
-
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ssl, cb) \
-SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
-
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ssl, arg) \
-SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
-
-# define SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(s, src, len) \
-SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT, len, src)
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb) \
-SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB, (void (*)(void))cb)
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg) \
-SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG, 0, arg)
-
-# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, cb) \
-SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
-# define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED 0x01
-# define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS 0x02
-# define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS 0x04
-
-# define SSL_get_tlsext_heartbeat_pending(ssl) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING,0,NULL)
-# define SSL_set_tlsext_heartbeat_no_requests(ssl, arg) \
- SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS,arg,NULL)
-# endif
-# endif
-
-/* PSK ciphersuites from 4279 */
-# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300008A
-# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300008B
-# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300008C
-# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300008D
-
-/*
- * Additional TLS ciphersuites from expired Internet Draft
- * draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt (available if
- * TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES is defined, see s3_lib.c). We
- * actually treat them like SSL 3.0 ciphers, which we probably shouldn't.
- * Note that the first two are actually not in the IDs.
- */
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 0x03000060/* not in
- * ID */
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 0x03000061/* not in
- * ID */
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x03000062
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x03000063
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA 0x03000064
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA 0x03000065
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000066
-
-/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
-
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x0300002F
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000030
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000031
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000032
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000033
-# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000034
-
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000035
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000036
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000037
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000038
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000039
-# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x0300003A
-
-/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x0300003B
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300003C
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300003D
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300003E
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300003F
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x03000040
-
-/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000041
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000042
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000043
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000044
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000045
-# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000046
-
-/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x03000067
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x03000068
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x03000069
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300006A
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300006B
-# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300006C
-# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300006D
-
-/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000084
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000085
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000086
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000087
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000088
-# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000089
-
-/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000096
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000097
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000098
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000099
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x0300009A
-# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x0300009B
-
-/* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300009C
-# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300009D
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300009E
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300009F
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A0
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A1
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A2
-# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A3
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A4
-# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A5
-# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A6
-# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A7
-
-/*
- * ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with changes soon to be in
- * draft 13
- */
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C001
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C002
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C003
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C004
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C005
-
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C006
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C007
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C008
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C009
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00A
-
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C00B
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C00C
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C00D
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00E
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00F
-
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C010
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C011
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C012
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C013
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C014
-
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C015
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C016
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C017
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C018
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C019
-
-/* SRP ciphersuites from RFC 5054 */
-# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01A
-# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01B
-# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01C
-# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01D
-# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01E
-# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01F
-# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C020
-# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C021
-# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C022
-
-/* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C023
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C024
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C025
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C026
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C027
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C028
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C029
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C02A
-
-/* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02B
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C02C
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02D
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C02E
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02F
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C030
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C031
-# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C032
-
-/*
- * XXX Inconsistency alert: The OpenSSL names of ciphers with ephemeral DH
- * here include the string "DHE", while elsewhere it has always been "EDH".
- * (The alias for the list of all such ciphers also is "EDH".) The
- * specifications speak of "EDH"; maybe we should allow both forms for
- * everything.
- */
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 "EXP1024-RC4-MD5"
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 "EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5"
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA "EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA "EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA "EXP1024-RC4-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA "EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
-
-/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "AES128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA "ADH-AES128-SHA"
-
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "AES256-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA "ADH-AES256-SHA"
-
-/* ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"
-
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"
-
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-RSA-NULL-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA"
-
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
-
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA "AECDH-NULL-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "AECDH-RC4-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "AECDH-AES128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "AECDH-AES256-SHA"
-
-/* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 4279 */
-# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "PSK-RC4-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
-
-/* SRP ciphersuite from RFC 5054 */
-# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
-
-/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
-
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
-
-/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "SEED-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA "DH-DSS-SEED-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "DH-RSA-SEED-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA "ADH-SEED-SHA"
-
-/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 "NULL-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "AES128-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "AES256-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ADH-AES128-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "ADH-AES256-SHA256"
-
-/* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-
-/* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
-
-/* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
-# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
-
-# define TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN 1
-# define TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN 2
-# define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH 3
-# define TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH 4
-# define TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN 64
-# define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH 65
-# define TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH 66
-# define TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN 21
-# define TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN 22
-/*
- * when correcting this number, correct also SSL3_CT_NUMBER in ssl3.h (see
- * comment there)
- */
-# define TLS_CT_NUMBER 9
-
-# define TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH 12
-
-# define TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE 20
-# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST "client finished"
-# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE 15
-# define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST "server finished"
-# define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE 15
-# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "server write key"
-# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16
-# define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST "key expansion"
-# define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE 13
-# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST "client write key"
-# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16
-# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "server write key"
-# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16
-# define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST "IV block"
-# define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE 8
-# define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "master secret"
-# define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE 13
-
-# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-# undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
-/*
- * client finished
- */
-# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64"
-
-# undef TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
-/*
- * server finished
- */
-# define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64"
-
-# undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST
-/*
- * server write key
- */
-# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"
-
-# undef TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST
-/*
- * key expansion
- */
-# define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST "\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x65\x78\x70\x61\x6e\x73\x69\x6f\x6e"
-
-# undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST
-/*
- * client write key
- */
-# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"
-
-# undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST
-/*
- * server write key
- */
-# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"
-
-# undef TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST
-/*
- * IV block
- */
-# define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST "\x49\x56\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b"
-
-# undef TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST
-/*
- * master secret
- */
-# define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74"
-# endif
-
-/* TLS Session Ticket extension struct */
-struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st {
- unsigned short length;
- void *data;
-};
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-#endif
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/tls1.h (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/ssl/tls1.h)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/tls1.h (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/ssl/tls1.h 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,785 @@
+/* ssl/tls1.h */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_TLS1_H
+# define HEADER_TLS1_H
+
+# include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+# define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0
+
+# define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
+# define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
+# define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303
+# define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_2_VERSION
+
+# define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+# define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
+
+# define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+# define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02
+
+# define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+# define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
+
+# define TLS1_get_version(s) \
+ ((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
+
+# define TLS1_get_client_version(s) \
+ ((s->client_version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->client_version : 0)
+
+# define TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21
+# define TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22
+# define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA 48/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED 49/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR 50/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR 51
+# define TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 60/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86/* fatal */
+# define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90
+# define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100
+/* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
+# define TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 110
+# define TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 111
+# define TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112
+# define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 113
+# define TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 114
+# define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115/* fatal */
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC3546 / RFC4366 / RFC6066 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name 0
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length 1
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url 2
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys 3
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac 4
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request 5
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC4681 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping 6
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC5878 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz 7
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz 8
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC6091 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type 9
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC4492 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves 10
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats 11
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC5054 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_srp 12
+
+/* ExtensionType values from RFC5246 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms 13
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC5764 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp 14
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC5620 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat 15
+
+/*
+ * ExtensionType value for TLS padding extension.
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding
+ */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding 21
+
+/* ExtensionType value from RFC4507 */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket 35
+
+/* ExtensionType value from draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt */
+# if 0
+/*
+ * will have to be provided externally for now ,
+ * i.e. build with -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=38183
+ * using whatever extension number you'd like to try
+ */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input ?? */
+# endif
+
+/* Temporary extension type */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
+# define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg 13172
+# endif
+
+/* NameType value from RFC3546 */
+# define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
+/* status request value from RFC3546 */
+# define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp 1
+
+/* ECPointFormat values from RFC4492 */
+# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_first 0
+# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed 0
+# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime 1
+# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 2
+# define TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_last 2
+
+/* Signature and hash algorithms from RFC5246 */
+# define TLSEXT_signature_anonymous 0
+# define TLSEXT_signature_rsa 1
+# define TLSEXT_signature_dsa 2
+# define TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa 3
+
+# define TLSEXT_hash_none 0
+# define TLSEXT_hash_md5 1
+# define TLSEXT_hash_sha1 2
+# define TLSEXT_hash_sha224 3
+# define TLSEXT_hash_sha256 4
+# define TLSEXT_hash_sha384 5
+# define TLSEXT_hash_sha512 6
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+# define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255
+
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type);
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s);
+/*
+ * SSL_export_keying_material exports a value derived from the master secret,
+ * as specified in RFC 5705. It writes |olen| bytes to |out| given a label and
+ * optional context. (Since a zero length context is allowed, the |use_context|
+ * flag controls whether a context is included.) It returns 1 on success and
+ * zero otherwise.
+ */
+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ const char *label, size_t llen,
+ const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
+ int use_context);
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s,name) \
+SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME,TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name,(char *)name)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(ssl, cb) \
+SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(ssl, type) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE,type, NULL)
+
+# define SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_exts(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg, arglen) \
+SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,arglen, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK 0
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING 1
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL 2
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK 3
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, arg) \
+SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys))
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(ctx, keys, keylen) \
+ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS,(keylen),(keys))
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ssl, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ssl, arg) \
+SSL_CTX_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG,0, (void *)arg)
+
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(s, src, len) \
+SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT, len, src)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB, (void (*)(void))cb)
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg) \
+SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG, 0, arg)
+
+# define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, cb) \
+SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED 0x01
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS 0x02
+# define SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS 0x04
+
+# define SSL_get_tlsext_heartbeat_pending(ssl) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING,0,NULL)
+# define SSL_set_tlsext_heartbeat_no_requests(ssl, arg) \
+ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS,arg,NULL)
+# endif
+# endif
+
+/* PSK ciphersuites from 4279 */
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300008A
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300008B
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300008C
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300008D
+
+/*
+ * Additional TLS ciphersuites from expired Internet Draft
+ * draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt (available if
+ * TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES is defined, see s3_lib.c). We
+ * actually treat them like SSL 3.0 ciphers, which we probably shouldn't.
+ * Note that the first two are actually not in the IDs.
+ */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 0x03000060/* not in
+ * ID */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 0x03000061/* not in
+ * ID */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x03000062
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x03000063
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA 0x03000064
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA 0x03000065
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000066
+
+/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x0300002F
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000030
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000031
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000032
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000033
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000034
+
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000035
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000036
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000037
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000038
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x03000039
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA 0x0300003A
+
+/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x0300003B
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300003C
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300003D
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300003E
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300003F
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x03000040
+
+/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000041
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000042
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000043
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000044
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000045
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000046
+
+/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x03000067
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x03000068
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x03000069
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300006A
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300006B
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300006C
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300006D
+
+/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000084
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000085
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000086
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000087
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000088
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000089
+
+/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000096
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000097
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000098
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000099
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x0300009A
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x0300009B
+
+/* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300009C
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300009D
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300009E
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300009F
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A0
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A1
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A2
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A3
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A4
+# define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A5
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A6
+# define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A7
+
+/*
+ * ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with changes soon to be in
+ * draft 13
+ */
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C001
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C002
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C003
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C004
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C005
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C006
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C007
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C008
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C009
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00A
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C00B
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C00C
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C00D
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00E
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C00F
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C010
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C011
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C012
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C013
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C014
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C015
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C016
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C017
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C018
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C019
+
+/* SRP ciphersuites from RFC 5054 */
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01A
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01B
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01C
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01D
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01E
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0300C01F
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C020
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C021
+# define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C022
+
+/* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C023
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C024
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C025
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C026
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C027
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C028
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C029
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C02A
+
+/* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02B
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C02C
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02D
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C02E
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02F
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C030
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C031
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C032
+
+/*
+ * XXX Inconsistency alert: The OpenSSL names of ciphers with ephemeral DH
+ * here include the string "DHE", while elsewhere it has always been "EDH".
+ * (The alias for the list of all such ciphers also is "EDH".) The
+ * specifications speak of "EDH"; maybe we should allow both forms for
+ * everything.
+ */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 "EXP1024-RC4-MD5"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 "EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA "EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA "EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA "EXP1024-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA "EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
+
+/* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA "ADH-AES128-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "AES256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA "ADH-AES256-SHA"
+
+/* ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-RSA-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA "AECDH-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "AECDH-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "AECDH-AES128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "AECDH-AES256-SHA"
+
+/* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 4279 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "PSK-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
+
+/* SRP ciphersuite from RFC 5054 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA "SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA "SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
+
+/* Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
+
+/* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "SEED-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA "DH-DSS-SEED-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "DH-RSA-SEED-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA "ADH-SEED-SHA"
+
+/* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 "NULL-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "AES256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ADH-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "ADH-AES256-SHA256"
+
+/* TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+
+/* ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
+
+/* ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+
+# define TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN 1
+# define TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN 2
+# define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH 3
+# define TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH 4
+# define TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN 64
+# define TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH 65
+# define TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH 66
+# define TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN 21
+# define TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN 22
+/*
+ * when correcting this number, correct also SSL3_CT_NUMBER in ssl3.h (see
+ * comment there)
+ */
+# define TLS_CT_NUMBER 9
+
+# define TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH 12
+
+# define TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE 20
+# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST "client finished"
+# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE 15
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST "server finished"
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE 15
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "server write key"
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16
+# define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST "key expansion"
+# define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE 13
+# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST "client write key"
+# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "server write key"
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE 16
+# define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST "IV block"
+# define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE 8
+# define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "master secret"
+# define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE 13
+
+# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+# undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
+/*
+ * client finished
+ */
+# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64"
+
+# undef TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
+/*
+ * server finished
+ */
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x66\x69\x6e\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64"
+
+# undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST
+/*
+ * server write key
+ */
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"
+
+# undef TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST
+/*
+ * key expansion
+ */
+# define TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST "\x6b\x65\x79\x20\x65\x78\x70\x61\x6e\x73\x69\x6f\x6e"
+
+# undef TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST
+/*
+ * client write key
+ */
+# define TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x63\x6c\x69\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"
+
+# undef TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST
+/*
+ * server write key
+ */
+# define TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST "\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x20\x77\x72\x69\x74\x65\x20\x6b\x65\x79"
+
+# undef TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST
+/*
+ * IV block
+ */
+# define TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST "\x49\x56\x20\x62\x6c\x6f\x63\x6b"
+
+# undef TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST
+/*
+ * master secret
+ */
+# define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74"
+# endif
+
+/* TLS Session Ticket extension struct */
+struct tls_session_ticket_ext_st {
+ unsigned short length;
+ void *data;
+};
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/Makefile
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/Makefile 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/Makefile 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,799 +0,0 @@
-#
-# test/Makefile
-#
-
-DIR= test
-TOP= ..
-CC= cc
-INCLUDES= -I$(TOP) -I../include $(KRB5_INCLUDES)
-CFLAG= -g
-MAKEDEPEND= $(TOP)/util/domd $(TOP) -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG)
-PERL= perl
-# KRB5 stuff
-KRB5_INCLUDES=
-LIBKRB5=
-
-PEX_LIBS=
-EX_LIBS= #-lnsl -lsocket
-
-CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
-
-GENERAL=Makefile maketests.com \
- tests.com testenc.com tx509.com trsa.com tcrl.com tsid.com treq.com \
- tpkcs7.com tpkcs7d.com tverify.com testgen.com testss.com testssl.com \
- testca.com VMSca-response.1 VMSca-response.2
-
-DLIBCRYPTO= ../libcrypto.a
-DLIBSSL= ../libssl.a
-LIBCRYPTO= -L.. -lcrypto
-LIBSSL= -L.. -lssl
-
-BNTEST= bntest
-ECTEST= ectest
-ECDSATEST= ecdsatest
-ECDHTEST= ecdhtest
-EXPTEST= exptest
-IDEATEST= ideatest
-SHATEST= shatest
-SHA1TEST= sha1test
-SHA256TEST= sha256t
-SHA512TEST= sha512t
-MDC2TEST= mdc2test
-RMDTEST= rmdtest
-MD2TEST= md2test
-MD4TEST= md4test
-MD5TEST= md5test
-HMACTEST= hmactest
-WPTEST= wp_test
-RC2TEST= rc2test
-RC4TEST= rc4test
-RC5TEST= rc5test
-BFTEST= bftest
-CASTTEST= casttest
-DESTEST= destest
-RANDTEST= randtest
-DHTEST= dhtest
-DSATEST= dsatest
-METHTEST= methtest
-SSLTEST= ssltest
-RSATEST= rsa_test
-ENGINETEST= enginetest
-EVPTEST= evp_test
-EVPEXTRATEST=evp_extra_test
-IGETEST= igetest
-JPAKETEST= jpaketest
-SRPTEST= srptest
-ASN1TEST= asn1test
-HEARTBEATTEST= heartbeat_test
-CONSTTIMETEST= constant_time_test
-
-TESTS= alltests
-
-EXE= $(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IDEATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
- $(MD2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(MD4TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(MD5TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HMACTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(WPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
- $(RC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RC4TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RC5TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
- $(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA256TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA512TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
- $(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
- $(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
- $(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
- $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
- $(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
-
-# $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
-
-OBJ= $(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o $(ECDSATEST).o $(ECDHTEST).o $(IDEATEST).o \
- $(MD2TEST).o $(MD4TEST).o $(MD5TEST).o \
- $(HMACTEST).o $(WPTEST).o \
- $(RC2TEST).o $(RC4TEST).o $(RC5TEST).o \
- $(DESTEST).o $(SHATEST).o $(SHA1TEST).o $(SHA256TEST).o $(SHA512TEST).o \
- $(MDC2TEST).o $(RMDTEST).o \
- $(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \
- $(BFTEST).o $(SSLTEST).o $(DSATEST).o $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
- $(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o \
- $(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
-
-SRC= $(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
- $(MD2TEST).c $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
- $(HMACTEST).c $(WPTEST).c \
- $(RC2TEST).c $(RC4TEST).c $(RC5TEST).c \
- $(DESTEST).c $(SHATEST).c $(SHA1TEST).c $(MDC2TEST).c $(RMDTEST).c \
- $(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \
- $(BFTEST).c $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
- $(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \
- $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c
-
-EXHEADER=
-HEADER= $(EXHEADER)
-
-ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
-
-top:
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=$(DIR) TESTS=$(TESTS) all)
-
-all: exe
-
-exe: $(EXE) dummytest$(EXE_EXT)
-
-files:
- $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
-
-links:
-
-generate: $(SRC)
-$(SRC):
- @sh $(TOP)/util/point.sh dummytest.c $@
-
-errors:
-
-install:
-
-tags:
- ctags $(SRC)
-
-tests: exe apps $(TESTS)
-
-apps:
- @(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=apps all)
-
-alltests: \
- test_des test_idea test_sha test_md4 test_md5 test_hmac \
- test_md2 test_mdc2 test_wp \
- test_rmd test_rc2 test_rc4 test_rc5 test_bf test_cast test_aes \
- test_rand test_bn test_ec test_ecdsa test_ecdh \
- test_enc test_x509 test_rsa test_crl test_sid \
- test_gen test_req test_pkcs7 test_verify test_dh test_dsa \
- test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_evp_extra test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \
- test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_heartbeat test_constant_time
-
-test_evp:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt
-
-test_evp_extra:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPEXTRATEST)
-
-test_des:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DESTEST)
-
-test_idea:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(IDEATEST)
-
-test_sha:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHATEST)
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA1TEST)
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA256TEST)
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA512TEST)
-
-test_mdc2:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MDC2TEST)
-
-test_md5:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD5TEST)
-
-test_md4:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD4TEST)
-
-test_hmac:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(HMACTEST)
-
-test_wp:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(WPTEST)
-
-test_md2:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD2TEST)
-
-test_rmd:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RMDTEST)
-
-test_bf:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(BFTEST)
-
-test_cast:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CASTTEST)
-
-test_rc2:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC2TEST)
-
-test_rc4:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC4TEST)
-
-test_rc5:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC5TEST)
-
-test_rand:
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RANDTEST)
-
-test_enc:
- @sh ./testenc
-
-test_x509:
- echo test normal x509v1 certificate
- sh ./tx509 2>/dev/null
- echo test first x509v3 certificate
- sh ./tx509 v3-cert1.pem 2>/dev/null
- echo test second x509v3 certificate
- sh ./tx509 v3-cert2.pem 2>/dev/null
-
-test_rsa: $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
- @sh ./trsa 2>/dev/null
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RSATEST)
-
-test_crl:
- @sh ./tcrl 2>/dev/null
-
-test_sid:
- @sh ./tsid 2>/dev/null
-
-test_req:
- @sh ./treq 2>/dev/null
- @sh ./treq testreq2.pem 2>/dev/null
-
-test_pkcs7:
- @sh ./tpkcs7 2>/dev/null
- @sh ./tpkcs7d 2>/dev/null
-
-test_bn:
- @echo starting big number library test, could take a while...
- @../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(BNTEST) >tmp.bntest
- @echo quit >>tmp.bntest
- @echo "running bc"
- @<tmp.bntest sh -c "`sh ./bctest ignore`" | $(PERL) -e '$$i=0; while (<STDIN>) {if (/^test (.*)/) {print STDERR "\nverify $$1";} elsif (!/^0\r?$$/) {die "\nFailed! bc: $$_";} else {print STDERR "."; $$i++;}} print STDERR "\n$$i tests passed\n"'
- @echo 'test a^b%c implementations'
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EXPTEST)
-
-test_ec:
- @echo 'test elliptic curves'
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECTEST)
-
-test_ecdsa:
- @echo 'test ecdsa'
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECDSATEST)
-
-test_ecdh:
- @echo 'test ecdh'
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECDHTEST)
-
-test_verify:
- @echo "The following command should have some OK's and some failures"
- @echo "There are definitly a few expired certificates"
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl verify -CApath ../certs/demo ../certs/demo/*.pem
-
-test_dh:
- @echo "Generate a set of DH parameters"
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DHTEST)
-
-test_dsa:
- @echo "Generate a set of DSA parameters"
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DSATEST)
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DSATEST) -app2_1
-
-test_gen:
- @echo "Generate and verify a certificate request"
- @sh ./testgen
-
-test_ss keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss certP1.ss keyP1.ss certP2.ss keyP2.ss \
- intP1.ss intP2.ss: testss
- @echo "Generate and certify a test certificate"
- @sh ./testss
- @cat certCA.ss certU.ss > intP1.ss
- @cat certCA.ss certU.ss certP1.ss > intP2.ss
-
-test_engine:
- @echo "Manipulate the ENGINE structures"
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ENGINETEST)
-
-test_ssl: keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss certP1.ss keyP1.ss certP2.ss keyP2.ss \
- intP1.ss intP2.ss
- @echo "test SSL protocol"
- @if [ -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ]; then \
- sh ./testfipsssl keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss; \
- fi
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SSLTEST) -test_cipherlist
- @sh ./testssl keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss
- @sh ./testsslproxy keyP1.ss certP1.ss intP1.ss
- @sh ./testsslproxy keyP2.ss certP2.ss intP2.ss
-
-test_ca:
- @if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then \
- echo "skipping CA.sh test -- requires RSA"; \
- else \
- echo "Generate and certify a test certificate via the 'ca' program"; \
- sh ./testca; \
- fi
-
-test_aes: #$(AESTEST)
-# @echo "test Rijndael"
-# ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(AESTEST)
-
-test_tsa:
- @if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then \
- echo "skipping testtsa test -- requires RSA"; \
- else \
- sh ./testtsa; \
- fi
-
-test_ige: $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
- @echo "Test IGE mode"
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(IGETEST)
-
-test_jpake: $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
- @echo "Test JPAKE"
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(JPAKETEST)
-
-test_cms:
- @echo "CMS consistency test"
- $(PERL) cms-test.pl
-
-test_srp: $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
- @echo "Test SRP"
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./srptest
-
-test_heartbeat: $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(HEARTBEATTEST)
-
-test_constant_time: $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
- @echo "Test constant time utilites"
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CONSTTIMETEST)
-
-lint:
- lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
-
-update: local_depend
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
-
-depend: local_depend
- @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
-local_depend:
- @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
-
-dclean:
- $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
- mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
- rm -f $(SRC) $(SHA256TEST).c $(SHA512TEST).c evptests.txt newkey.pem testkey.pem \
- testreq.pem
-
-clean:
- rm -f .rnd tmp.bntest tmp.bctest *.o *.obj *.dll lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff $(EXE) *.ss *.srl log dummytest
-
-$(DLIBSSL):
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libssl)
-
-$(DLIBCRYPTO):
- (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libcrypto)
-
-BUILD_CMD=shlib_target=; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
- shlib_target="$(SHLIB_TARGET)"; \
- fi; \
- LIBRARIES="$(LIBSSL) $(LIBCRYPTO) $(LIBKRB5)"; \
- $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile.shared -e \
- CC="$${CC}" APPNAME=$$target$(EXE_EXT) OBJECTS="$$target.o" \
- LIBDEPS="$(PEX_LIBS) $$LIBRARIES $(EX_LIBS)" \
- link_app.$${shlib_target}
-
-FIPS_BUILD_CMD=shlib_target=; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
- shlib_target="$(SHLIB_TARGET)"; \
- fi; \
- LIBRARIES="$(LIBSSL) $(LIBCRYPTO) $(LIBKRB5)"; \
- if [ -z "$(SHARED_LIBS)" -a -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] ; then \
- FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; export CC FIPSLD_CC; \
- fi; \
- $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile.shared -e \
- CC="$${CC}" APPNAME=$$target$(EXE_EXT) OBJECTS="$$target.o" \
- LIBDEPS="$(PEX_LIBS) $$LIBRARIES $(EX_LIBS)" \
- link_app.$${shlib_target}
-
-BUILD_CMD_STATIC=shlib_target=; \
- LIBRARIES="$(DLIBSSL) $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(LIBKRB5)"; \
- $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile.shared -e \
- APPNAME=$$target$(EXE_EXT) OBJECTS="$$target.o" \
- LIBDEPS="$(PEX_LIBS) $$LIBRARIES $(EX_LIBS)" \
- link_app.$${shlib_target}
-
-$(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RSATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(RSATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(BNTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(BNTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ECTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(ECTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(EXPTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(EXPTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(IDEATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(IDEATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(IDEATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(MD2TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(MD2TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(MD2TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(SHATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SHATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(SHATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(SHA1TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SHA1TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(SHA1TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(SHA256TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SHA256TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(SHA256TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(SHA512TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SHA512TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(SHA512TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RMDTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(RMDTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(MDC2TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(MDC2TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(MD4TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(MD4TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(MD4TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(MD5TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(MD5TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(MD5TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(HMACTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(HMACTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(HMACTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(WPTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(WPTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(WPTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(RC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RC2TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(RC2TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(BFTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(BFTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CASTTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(CASTTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(RC4TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RC4TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(RC4TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(RC5TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RC5TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(RC5TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(DESTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(DESTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RANDTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(RANDTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(DHTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(DHTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(DSATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(DSATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(METHTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(METHTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SSLTEST).o $(DLIBSSL) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(SSLTEST); $(FIPS_BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ENGINETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(ENGINETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(EVPTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(EVPTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(EVPEXTRATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ECDSATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(ECDSATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(ECDHTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ECDHTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(ECDHTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(IGETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(IGETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(JPAKETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(JPAKETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ASN1TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(ASN1TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SRPTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(SRPTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-$(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=$(HEARTBEATTEST); $(BUILD_CMD_STATIC)
-
-$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
- @target=$(CONSTTIMETEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-#$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c
-# $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c
-
-#$(AESTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(AESTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
-# if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" = "hpux-shared" -o "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" = "darwin-shared" ] ; then \
-# $(CC) -o $(AESTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CFLAGS) $(AESTEST).o $(PEX_LIBS) $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(EX_LIBS) ; \
-# else \
-# $(CC) -o $(AESTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CFLAGS) $(AESTEST).o $(PEX_LIBS) $(LIBCRYPTO) $(EX_LIBS) ; \
-# fi
-
-dummytest$(EXE_EXT): dummytest.o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
- @target=dummytest; $(BUILD_CMD)
-
-# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
-
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/asn1_mac.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h asn1test.c
-bftest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/blowfish.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-bftest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bftest.c
-bntest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-bntest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h bntest.c
-casttest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/cast.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-casttest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h casttest.c
-constant_time_test.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h
-constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h constant_time_test.c
-destest.o: ../include/openssl/des.h ../include/openssl/des_old.h
-destest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-destest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-destest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-destest.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/ui_compat.h destest.c
-dhtest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
-dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
-dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h dhtest.c
-dsatest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
-dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
-dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h dsatest.c
-ecdhtest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecdhtest.c
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-ecdsatest.o: ecdsatest.c
-ectest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-ectest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ectest.c
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-enginetest.o: enginetest.c
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-evp_extra_test.o: evp_extra_test.c
-evp_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h evp_test.c
-exptest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
-exptest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-exptest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-exptest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-exptest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-exptest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-exptest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h exptest.c
-heartbeat_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../ssl/ssl_locl.h
-heartbeat_test.o: ../test/testutil.h heartbeat_test.c
-hmactest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h hmactest.c
-ideatest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/idea.h
-ideatest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ideatest.c
-igetest.o: ../include/openssl/aes.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-igetest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-igetest.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h igetest.c
-jpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-jpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-jpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-jpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-jpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h jpaketest.c
-md2test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-md2test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-md2test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-md2test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-md2test.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h md2test.c
-md4test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-md4test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-md4test.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/md4.h
-md4test.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-md4test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-md4test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-md4test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h md4test.c
-md5test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-md5test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-md5test.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
-md5test.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-md5test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-md5test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-md5test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h md5test.c
-mdc2test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/des.h
-mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/des_old.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/mdc2.h
-mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/ui_compat.h mdc2test.c
-randtest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-randtest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-randtest.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h randtest.c
-rc2test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-rc2test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/rc2.h rc2test.c
-rc4test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-rc4test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/rc4.h
-rc4test.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h rc4test.c
-rc5test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-rc5test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-rc5test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-rc5test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-rc5test.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h rc5test.c
-rmdtest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h rmdtest.c
-rsa_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
-rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_test.c
-sha1test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h sha1test.c
-shatest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-shatest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-shatest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-shatest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-shatest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-shatest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
-shatest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h shatest.c
-srptest.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
-srptest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-srptest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-srptest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-srptest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-srptest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/srp.h
-srptest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h srptest.c
-ssltest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srp.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h ssltest.c
-wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/whrlpool.h wp_test.c
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/Makefile (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/Makefile)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/Makefile (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/Makefile 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,854 @@
+#
+# test/Makefile
+#
+
+DIR= test
+TOP= ..
+CC= cc
+INCLUDES= -I$(TOP) -I../include $(KRB5_INCLUDES)
+CFLAG= -g
+MAKEDEPEND= $(TOP)/util/domd $(TOP) -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG)
+PERL= perl
+# KRB5 stuff
+KRB5_INCLUDES=
+LIBKRB5=
+
+PEX_LIBS=
+EX_LIBS= #-lnsl -lsocket
+
+CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
+
+GENERAL=Makefile maketests.com \
+ tests.com testenc.com tx509.com trsa.com tcrl.com tsid.com treq.com \
+ tpkcs7.com tpkcs7d.com tverify.com testgen.com testss.com testssl.com \
+ testca.com VMSca-response.1 VMSca-response.2
+
+DLIBCRYPTO= ../libcrypto.a
+DLIBSSL= ../libssl.a
+LIBCRYPTO= -L.. -lcrypto
+LIBSSL= -L.. -lssl
+
+BNTEST= bntest
+ECTEST= ectest
+ECDSATEST= ecdsatest
+ECDHTEST= ecdhtest
+EXPTEST= exptest
+IDEATEST= ideatest
+SHATEST= shatest
+SHA1TEST= sha1test
+SHA256TEST= sha256t
+SHA512TEST= sha512t
+MDC2TEST= mdc2test
+RMDTEST= rmdtest
+MD2TEST= md2test
+MD4TEST= md4test
+MD5TEST= md5test
+HMACTEST= hmactest
+WPTEST= wp_test
+RC2TEST= rc2test
+RC4TEST= rc4test
+RC5TEST= rc5test
+BFTEST= bftest
+CASTTEST= casttest
+DESTEST= destest
+RANDTEST= randtest
+DHTEST= dhtest
+DSATEST= dsatest
+METHTEST= methtest
+SSLTEST= ssltest
+RSATEST= rsa_test
+ENGINETEST= enginetest
+EVPTEST= evp_test
+EVPEXTRATEST=evp_extra_test
+IGETEST= igetest
+JPAKETEST= jpaketest
+SRPTEST= srptest
+ASN1TEST= asn1test
+HEARTBEATTEST= heartbeat_test
+CONSTTIMETEST= constant_time_test
+VERIFYEXTRATEST= verify_extra_test
+CLIENTHELLOTEST= clienthellotest
+
+TESTS= alltests
+
+EXE= $(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IDEATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+ $(MD2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(MD4TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(MD5TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HMACTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(WPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+ $(RC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RC4TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RC5TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+ $(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA256TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA512TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+ $(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+ $(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+ $(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+ $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+ $(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+ $(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+
+# $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+
+OBJ= $(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o $(ECDSATEST).o $(ECDHTEST).o $(IDEATEST).o \
+ $(MD2TEST).o $(MD4TEST).o $(MD5TEST).o \
+ $(HMACTEST).o $(WPTEST).o \
+ $(RC2TEST).o $(RC4TEST).o $(RC5TEST).o \
+ $(DESTEST).o $(SHATEST).o $(SHA1TEST).o $(SHA256TEST).o $(SHA512TEST).o \
+ $(MDC2TEST).o $(RMDTEST).o \
+ $(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \
+ $(BFTEST).o $(SSLTEST).o $(DSATEST).o $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
+ $(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o \
+ $(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o \
+ $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o
+
+SRC= $(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
+ $(MD2TEST).c $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
+ $(HMACTEST).c $(WPTEST).c \
+ $(RC2TEST).c $(RC4TEST).c $(RC5TEST).c \
+ $(DESTEST).c $(SHATEST).c $(SHA1TEST).c $(MDC2TEST).c $(RMDTEST).c \
+ $(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \
+ $(BFTEST).c $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
+ $(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \
+ $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c \
+ $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).c
+
+EXHEADER=
+HEADER= $(EXHEADER)
+
+ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
+
+top:
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=$(DIR) TESTS=$(TESTS) all)
+
+all: exe
+
+exe: $(EXE) dummytest$(EXE_EXT)
+
+files:
+ $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
+
+links:
+
+generate: $(SRC)
+$(SRC):
+ @sh $(TOP)/util/point.sh dummytest.c $@
+
+errors:
+
+install:
+
+tags:
+ ctags $(SRC)
+
+tests: exe apps $(TESTS)
+
+apps:
+ @(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=apps all)
+
+alltests: \
+ test_des test_idea test_sha test_md4 test_md5 test_hmac \
+ test_md2 test_mdc2 test_wp \
+ test_rmd test_rc2 test_rc4 test_rc5 test_bf test_cast test_aes \
+ test_rand test_bn test_ec test_ecdsa test_ecdh \
+ test_enc test_x509 test_rsa test_crl test_sid \
+ test_gen test_req test_pkcs7 test_verify test_dh test_dsa \
+ test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_evp_extra test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \
+ test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_heartbeat test_constant_time test_verify_extra \
+ test_clienthello
+
+test_evp:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt
+
+test_evp_extra:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPEXTRATEST)
+
+test_des:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DESTEST)
+
+test_idea:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(IDEATEST)
+
+test_sha:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHATEST)
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA1TEST)
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA256TEST)
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SHA512TEST)
+
+test_mdc2:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MDC2TEST)
+
+test_md5:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD5TEST)
+
+test_md4:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD4TEST)
+
+test_hmac:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(HMACTEST)
+
+test_wp:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(WPTEST)
+
+test_md2:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(MD2TEST)
+
+test_rmd:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RMDTEST)
+
+test_bf:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(BFTEST)
+
+test_cast:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CASTTEST)
+
+test_rc2:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC2TEST)
+
+test_rc4:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC4TEST)
+
+test_rc5:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RC5TEST)
+
+test_rand:
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RANDTEST)
+
+test_enc:
+ @sh ./testenc
+
+test_x509:
+ echo test normal x509v1 certificate
+ sh ./tx509 2>/dev/null
+ echo test first x509v3 certificate
+ sh ./tx509 v3-cert1.pem 2>/dev/null
+ echo test second x509v3 certificate
+ sh ./tx509 v3-cert2.pem 2>/dev/null
+
+test_rsa: $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ @sh ./trsa 2>/dev/null
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(RSATEST)
+
+test_crl:
+ @sh ./tcrl 2>/dev/null
+
+test_sid:
+ @sh ./tsid 2>/dev/null
+
+test_req:
+ @sh ./treq 2>/dev/null
+ @sh ./treq testreq2.pem 2>/dev/null
+
+test_pkcs7:
+ @sh ./tpkcs7 2>/dev/null
+ @sh ./tpkcs7d 2>/dev/null
+
+test_bn:
+ @echo starting big number library test, could take a while...
+ @../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(BNTEST) >tmp.bntest
+ @echo quit >>tmp.bntest
+ @echo "running bc"
+ @<tmp.bntest sh -c "`sh ./bctest ignore`" | $(PERL) -e '$$i=0; while (<STDIN>) {if (/^test (.*)/) {print STDERR "\nverify $$1";} elsif (!/^0\r?$$/) {die "\nFailed! bc: $$_";} else {print STDERR "."; $$i++;}} print STDERR "\n$$i tests passed\n"'
+ @echo 'test a^b%c implementations'
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EXPTEST)
+
+test_ec:
+ @echo 'test elliptic curves'
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECTEST)
+
+test_ecdsa:
+ @echo 'test ecdsa'
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECDSATEST)
+
+test_ecdh:
+ @echo 'test ecdh'
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECDHTEST)
+
+test_verify:
+ @echo "The following command should have some OK's and some failures"
+ @echo "There are definitly a few expired certificates"
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl verify -CApath ../certs/demo ../certs/demo/*.pem
+
+test_dh:
+ @echo "Generate a set of DH parameters"
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DHTEST)
+
+test_dsa:
+ @echo "Generate a set of DSA parameters"
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DSATEST)
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(DSATEST) -app2_1
+
+test_gen:
+ @echo "Generate and verify a certificate request"
+ @sh ./testgen
+
+test_ss keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss certP1.ss keyP1.ss certP2.ss keyP2.ss \
+ intP1.ss intP2.ss: testss
+ @echo "Generate and certify a test certificate"
+ @sh ./testss
+ @cat certCA.ss certU.ss > intP1.ss
+ @cat certCA.ss certU.ss certP1.ss > intP2.ss
+
+test_engine:
+ @echo "Manipulate the ENGINE structures"
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ENGINETEST)
+
+test_ssl: keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss certP1.ss keyP1.ss certP2.ss keyP2.ss \
+ intP1.ss intP2.ss
+ @echo "test SSL protocol"
+ @if [ -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ]; then \
+ sh ./testfipsssl keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss; \
+ fi
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SSLTEST) -test_cipherlist
+ @sh ./testssl keyU.ss certU.ss certCA.ss
+ @sh ./testsslproxy keyP1.ss certP1.ss intP1.ss
+ @sh ./testsslproxy keyP2.ss certP2.ss intP2.ss
+
+test_ca:
+ @if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then \
+ echo "skipping CA.sh test -- requires RSA"; \
+ else \
+ echo "Generate and certify a test certificate via the 'ca' program"; \
+ sh ./testca; \
+ fi
+
+test_aes: #$(AESTEST)
+# @echo "test Rijndael"
+# ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(AESTEST)
+
+test_tsa:
+ @if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then \
+ echo "skipping testtsa test -- requires RSA"; \
+ else \
+ sh ./testtsa; \
+ fi
+
+test_ige: $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ @echo "Test IGE mode"
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(IGETEST)
+
+test_jpake: $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ @echo "Test JPAKE"
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(JPAKETEST)
+
+test_cms:
+ @echo "CMS consistency test"
+ $(PERL) cms-test.pl
+
+test_srp: $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ @echo "Test SRP"
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./srptest
+
+test_heartbeat: $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(HEARTBEATTEST)
+
+test_constant_time: $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ @echo "Test constant time utilites"
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CONSTTIMETEST)
+
+test_verify_extra: $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ @echo $(START) $@
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)
+
+test_clienthello: $(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ @echo $(START) $@
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)
+
+lint:
+ lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+
+update: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+
+depend: local_depend
+ @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
+ @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
+
+dclean:
+ $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
+ mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
+ rm -f $(SRC) $(SHA256TEST).c $(SHA512TEST).c evptests.txt newkey.pem testkey.pem \
+ testreq.pem
+
+clean:
+ rm -f .rnd tmp.bntest tmp.bctest *.o *.obj *.dll lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff $(EXE) *.ss *.srl log dummytest
+
+$(DLIBSSL):
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libssl)
+
+$(DLIBCRYPTO):
+ (cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libcrypto)
+
+BUILD_CMD=shlib_target=; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
+ shlib_target="$(SHLIB_TARGET)"; \
+ fi; \
+ LIBRARIES="$(LIBSSL) $(LIBCRYPTO) $(LIBKRB5)"; \
+ $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile.shared -e \
+ CC="$${CC}" APPNAME=$$target$(EXE_EXT) OBJECTS="$$target.o" \
+ LIBDEPS="$(PEX_LIBS) $$LIBRARIES $(EX_LIBS)" \
+ link_app.$${shlib_target}
+
+FIPS_BUILD_CMD=shlib_target=; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \
+ shlib_target="$(SHLIB_TARGET)"; \
+ fi; \
+ LIBRARIES="$(LIBSSL) $(LIBCRYPTO) $(LIBKRB5)"; \
+ if [ -z "$(SHARED_LIBS)" -a -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] ; then \
+ FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; export CC FIPSLD_CC; \
+ fi; \
+ $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile.shared -e \
+ CC="$${CC}" APPNAME=$$target$(EXE_EXT) OBJECTS="$$target.o" \
+ LIBDEPS="$(PEX_LIBS) $$LIBRARIES $(EX_LIBS)" \
+ link_app.$${shlib_target}
+
+BUILD_CMD_STATIC=shlib_target=; \
+ LIBRARIES="$(DLIBSSL) $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(LIBKRB5)"; \
+ $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile.shared -e \
+ APPNAME=$$target$(EXE_EXT) OBJECTS="$$target.o" \
+ LIBDEPS="$(PEX_LIBS) $$LIBRARIES $(EX_LIBS)" \
+ link_app.$${shlib_target}
+
+$(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RSATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(RSATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(BNTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(BNTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ECTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(ECTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(EXPTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(EXPTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(IDEATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(IDEATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(IDEATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(MD2TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(MD2TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(MD2TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(SHATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SHATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(SHATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(SHA1TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SHA1TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(SHA1TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(SHA256TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SHA256TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(SHA256TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(SHA512TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SHA512TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(SHA512TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RMDTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(RMDTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(MDC2TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(MDC2TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(MD4TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(MD4TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(MD4TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(MD5TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(MD5TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(MD5TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(HMACTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(HMACTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(HMACTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(WPTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(WPTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(WPTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(RC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RC2TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(RC2TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(BFTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(BFTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CASTTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(CASTTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(RC4TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RC4TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(RC4TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(RC5TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RC5TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(RC5TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(DESTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(DESTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RANDTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(RANDTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(DHTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(DHTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(DSATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(DSATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(METHTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(METHTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SSLTEST).o $(DLIBSSL) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(SSLTEST); $(FIPS_BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ENGINETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(ENGINETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(EVPTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(EVPTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(EVPEXTRATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ECDSATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(ECDSATEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(ECDHTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ECDHTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(ECDHTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(IGETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(IGETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(JPAKETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(JPAKETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ASN1TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(ASN1TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SRPTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(SRPTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(HEARTBEATTEST); $(BUILD_CMD_STATIC)
+
+$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
+ @target=$(CONSTTIMETEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
+ @target=$(VERIFYEXTRATEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o
+ @target=$(CLIENTHELLOTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+#$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c
+# $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c
+
+#$(AESTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(AESTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+# if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" = "hpux-shared" -o "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" = "darwin-shared" ] ; then \
+# $(CC) -o $(AESTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CFLAGS) $(AESTEST).o $(PEX_LIBS) $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(EX_LIBS) ; \
+# else \
+# $(CC) -o $(AESTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CFLAGS) $(AESTEST).o $(PEX_LIBS) $(LIBCRYPTO) $(EX_LIBS) ; \
+# fi
+
+dummytest$(EXE_EXT): dummytest.o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=dummytest; $(BUILD_CMD)
+
+# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
+
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/asn1_mac.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+asn1test.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h asn1test.c
+bftest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/blowfish.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+bftest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bftest.c
+bntest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+bntest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h bntest.c
+casttest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/cast.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+casttest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h casttest.c
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+clienthellotest.o: clienthellotest.c
+constant_time_test.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h
+constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h constant_time_test.c
+destest.o: ../include/openssl/des.h ../include/openssl/des_old.h
+destest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+destest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+destest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+destest.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/ui_compat.h destest.c
+dhtest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
+dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
+dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+dhtest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h dhtest.c
+dsatest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
+dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
+dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+dsatest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h dsatest.c
+ecdhtest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ecdhtest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecdhtest.c
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+ecdsatest.o: ecdsatest.c
+ectest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+ectest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ectest.c
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+enginetest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+enginetest.o: enginetest.c
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+evp_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+evp_extra_test.o: evp_extra_test.c
+evp_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/engine.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+evp_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h evp_test.c
+exptest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
+exptest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+exptest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+exptest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+exptest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+exptest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+exptest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h exptest.c
+heartbeat_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../ssl/ssl_locl.h
+heartbeat_test.o: ../test/testutil.h heartbeat_test.c
+hmactest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+hmactest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h hmactest.c
+ideatest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/idea.h
+ideatest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ideatest.c
+igetest.o: ../include/openssl/aes.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+igetest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+igetest.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h igetest.c
+jpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+jpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+jpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+jpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+jpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h jpaketest.c
+md2test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+md2test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+md2test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+md2test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+md2test.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h md2test.c
+md4test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+md4test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+md4test.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/md4.h
+md4test.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+md4test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+md4test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+md4test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h md4test.c
+md5test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+md5test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+md5test.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/md5.h
+md5test.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+md5test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+md5test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+md5test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h md5test.c
+mdc2test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/des.h
+mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/des_old.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/mdc2.h
+mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+mdc2test.o: ../include/openssl/ui.h ../include/openssl/ui_compat.h mdc2test.c
+randtest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+randtest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+randtest.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h randtest.c
+rc2test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+rc2test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/rc2.h rc2test.c
+rc4test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+rc4test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/rc4.h
+rc4test.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h rc4test.c
+rc5test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+rc5test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+rc5test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+rc5test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+rc5test.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h rc5test.c
+rmdtest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+rmdtest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h rmdtest.c
+rsa_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+rsa_test.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h rsa_test.c
+sha1test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+sha1test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h sha1test.c
+shatest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+shatest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+shatest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+shatest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+shatest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+shatest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+shatest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h shatest.c
+srptest.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
+srptest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+srptest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+srptest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+srptest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+srptest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/srp.h
+srptest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h srptest.c
+ssltest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dh.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srp.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h ssltest.c
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+verify_extra_test.o: verify_extra_test.c
+wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/whrlpool.h wp_test.c
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bftest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/bftest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bftest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/bf/bftest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bftest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/bftest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bftest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bftest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/bf/bftest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bntest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/bntest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bntest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/bn/bntest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bntest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/bntest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bntest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/bntest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/bn/bntest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/casttest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/casttest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/casttest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/cast/casttest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/casttest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/casttest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/casttest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/casttest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/cast/casttest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/clienthellotest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/clienthellotest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/clienthellotest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/clienthellotest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../ssl/clienthellotest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/constant_time_test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/constant_time_test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/constant_time_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/constant_time_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/constant_time_test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/constant_time_test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/constant_time_test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/constant_time_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/constant_time_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/destest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/destest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/destest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/des/destest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/destest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/destest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/destest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/destest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/des/destest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dhtest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/dhtest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dhtest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/dh/dhtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dhtest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/dhtest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dhtest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dhtest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/dh/dhtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dsatest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/dsatest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dsatest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/dsa/dsatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dsatest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/dsatest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dsatest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/dsatest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/dsa/dsatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdhtest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/ecdhtest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdhtest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/ecdh/ecdhtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdhtest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/ecdhtest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdhtest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdhtest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/ecdh/ecdhtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdsatest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/ecdsatest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdsatest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdsatest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/ecdsatest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdsatest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ecdsatest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ectest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/ectest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ectest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/ec/ectest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ectest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/ectest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ectest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ectest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/ec/ectest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/enginetest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/enginetest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/enginetest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/engine/enginetest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/enginetest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/enginetest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/enginetest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/enginetest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/engine/enginetest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_extra_test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/evp_extra_test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_extra_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_extra_test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/evp_extra_test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_extra_test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_extra_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/evp_test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/evp/evp_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/evp_test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/evp_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/evp/evp_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/exptest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/exptest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/exptest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/bn/exptest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/exptest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/exptest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/exptest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/exptest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/bn/exptest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/heartbeat_test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/heartbeat_test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/heartbeat_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../ssl/heartbeat_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/heartbeat_test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/heartbeat_test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/heartbeat_test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/heartbeat_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../ssl/heartbeat_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/hmactest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/hmactest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/hmactest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/hmac/hmactest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/hmactest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/hmactest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/hmactest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/hmactest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/hmac/hmactest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ideatest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/ideatest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ideatest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/idea/ideatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ideatest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/ideatest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ideatest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ideatest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/idea/ideatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/jpaketest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/jpaketest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/jpaketest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link dummytest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/jpaketest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/jpaketest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/jpaketest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/jpaketest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/dummytest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md2test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/md2test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md2test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link dummytest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md2test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/md2test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md2test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md2test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/dummytest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md4test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/md4test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md4test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/md4/md4test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md4test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/md4test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md4test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md4test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/md4/md4test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md5test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/md5test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md5test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/md5/md5test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md5test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/md5test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md5test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/md5test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/md5/md5test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/mdc2test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/mdc2test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/mdc2test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/mdc2test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/mdc2test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/mdc2test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/mdc2test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/randtest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/randtest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/randtest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/rand/randtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/randtest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/randtest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/randtest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/randtest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/rand/randtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc2test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/rc2test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc2test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/rc2/rc2test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc2test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/rc2test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc2test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc2test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/rc2/rc2test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc4test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/rc4test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc4test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/rc4/rc4test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc4test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/rc4test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc4test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc4test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/rc4/rc4test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc5test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/rc5test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc5test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link dummytest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc5test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/rc5test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc5test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rc5test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/dummytest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rmdtest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/rmdtest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rmdtest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/ripemd/rmdtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rmdtest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/rmdtest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rmdtest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rmdtest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/ripemd/rmdtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rsa_test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/rsa_test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rsa_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rsa_test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/rsa_test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rsa_test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/rsa_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha1test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/sha1test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha1test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/sha/sha1test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha1test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/sha1test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha1test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha1test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/sha/sha1test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha256t.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/sha256t.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha256t.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/sha/sha256t.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha256t.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/sha256t.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha256t.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha256t.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/sha/sha256t.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha512t.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/sha512t.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha512t.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/sha/sha512t.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha512t.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/sha512t.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha512t.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/sha512t.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/sha/sha512t.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/shatest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/shatest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/shatest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/sha/shatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/shatest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/shatest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/shatest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/shatest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/sha/shatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/srptest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/srptest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/srptest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/srp/srptest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/srptest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/srptest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/srptest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/srptest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/srp/srptest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ssltest.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/ssltest.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ssltest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../ssl/ssltest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ssltest.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/ssltest.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ssltest.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/ssltest.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../ssl/ssltest.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/testssl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/testssl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/testssl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-if [ "$1" = "" ]; then
- key=../apps/server.pem
-else
- key="$1"
-fi
-if [ "$2" = "" ]; then
- cert=../apps/server.pem
-else
- cert="$2"
-fi
-ssltest="../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -key $key -cert $cert -c_key $key -c_cert $cert"
-
-if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl x509 -in $cert -text -noout | fgrep 'DSA Public Key' >/dev/null; then
- dsa_cert=YES
-else
- dsa_cert=NO
-fi
-
-if [ "$3" = "" ]; then
- CA="-CApath ../certs"
-else
- CA="-CAfile $3"
-fi
-
-if [ "$4" = "" ]; then
- extra=""
-else
- extra="$4"
-fi
-
-#############################################################################
-
-echo test sslv2
-$ssltest -ssl2 $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2 with server authentication
-$ssltest -ssl2 -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then
- echo test sslv2 with client authentication
- $ssltest -ssl2 -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
- echo test sslv2 with both client and server authentication
- $ssltest -ssl2 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-fi
-
-echo test sslv3
-$ssltest -ssl3 $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv3 with server authentication
-$ssltest -ssl3 -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv3 with client authentication
-$ssltest -ssl3 -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv3 with both client and server authentication
-$ssltest -ssl3 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2/sslv3
-$ssltest $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication
-$ssltest -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2/sslv3 with client authentication
-$ssltest -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication
-$ssltest -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2 via BIO pair
-$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2 with server authentication via BIO pair
-$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then
- echo test sslv2 with client authentication via BIO pair
- $ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
- echo test sslv2 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair
- $ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-fi
-
-echo test sslv3 via BIO pair
-$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv3 with server authentication via BIO pair
-$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv3 with client authentication via BIO pair
-$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair
-$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2/sslv3 via BIO pair
-$ssltest $extra || exit 1
-
-if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then
- echo 'test sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE via BIO pair'
- $ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe -no_ecdhe $extra || exit 1
-fi
-
-echo test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair
-$ssltest -bio_pair -dhe1024dsa -v $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication
-$ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2/sslv3 with client authentication via BIO pair
-$ssltest -bio_pair -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair
-$ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify
-$ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth -client_auth -app_verify $CA $extra || exit 1
-
-test_cipher() {
- local cipher=$1
- local protocol=$2
- echo "Testing $cipher"
- prot=""
- if [ $protocol = "SSLv3" ] ; then
- prot="-ssl3"
- fi
- $ssltest -cipher $cipher $prot
- if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
- echo "Failed $cipher"
- exit 1
- fi
-}
-
-echo "Testing ciphersuites"
-for protocol in TLSv1.2 SSLv3; do
- echo "Testing ciphersuites for $protocol"
- for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "RSA+$protocol" | tr ':' ' '`; do
- test_cipher $cipher $protocol
- done
- if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then
- echo "skipping RSA+DHE tests"
- else
- for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "EDH+aRSA+$protocol:-EXP" | tr ':' ' '`; do
- test_cipher $cipher $protocol
- done
- echo "testing connection with weak DH, expecting failure"
- if [ $protocol = "SSLv3" ] ; then
- $ssltest -cipher EDH -dhe512 -ssl3
- else
- $ssltest -cipher EDH -dhe512
- fi
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- echo "FAIL: connection with weak DH succeeded"
- exit 1
- fi
- fi
- if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-ec; then
- echo "skipping RSA+ECDHE tests"
- else
- for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "EECDH+aRSA+$protocol:-EXP" | tr ':' ' '`; do
- test_cipher $cipher $protocol
- done
- fi
-done
-
-#############################################################################
-
-if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then
- echo skipping anonymous DH tests
-else
- echo test tls1 with 1024bit anonymous DH, multiple handshakes
- $ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cipher ADH -dhe1024dsa -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
-fi
-
-if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then
- echo skipping RSA tests
-else
- echo 'test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, no (EC)DHE, multiple handshakes'
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -no_dhe -no_ecdhe -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
-
- if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then
- echo skipping RSA+DHE tests
- else
- echo test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, 1024bit DHE, multiple handshakes
- ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -dhe1024dsa -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
- fi
-fi
-
-echo test tls1 with PSK
-$ssltest -tls1 -cipher PSK -psk abc123 $extra || exit 1
-
-echo test tls1 with PSK via BIO pair
-$ssltest -bio_pair -tls1 -cipher PSK -psk abc123 $extra || exit 1
-
-if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-srp; then
- echo skipping SRP tests
-else
- echo test tls1 with SRP
- $ssltest -tls1 -cipher SRP -srpuser test -srppass abc123
-
- echo test tls1 with SRP via BIO pair
- $ssltest -bio_pair -tls1 -cipher SRP -srpuser test -srppass abc123
-
- echo test tls1 with SRP auth
- $ssltest -tls1 -cipher aSRP -srpuser test -srppass abc123
-
- echo test tls1 with SRP auth via BIO pair
- $ssltest -bio_pair -tls1 -cipher aSRP -srpuser test -srppass abc123
-fi
-
-exit 0
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/testssl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/testssl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/testssl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/testssl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+if [ "$1" = "" ]; then
+ key=../apps/server.pem
+else
+ key="$1"
+fi
+if [ "$2" = "" ]; then
+ cert=../apps/server.pem
+else
+ cert="$2"
+fi
+ssltest="../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -key $key -cert $cert -c_key $key -c_cert $cert"
+
+if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl x509 -in $cert -text -noout | fgrep 'DSA Public Key' >/dev/null; then
+ dsa_cert=YES
+else
+ dsa_cert=NO
+fi
+
+if [ "$3" = "" ]; then
+ CA="-CApath ../certs"
+else
+ CA="-CAfile $3"
+fi
+
+if [ "$4" = "" ]; then
+ extra=""
+else
+ extra="$4"
+fi
+
+#############################################################################
+
+echo test sslv2
+$ssltest -ssl2 $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2 with server authentication
+$ssltest -ssl2 -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then
+ echo test sslv2 with client authentication
+ $ssltest -ssl2 -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+ echo test sslv2 with both client and server authentication
+ $ssltest -ssl2 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+fi
+
+echo test sslv3
+$ssltest -ssl3 $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv3 with server authentication
+$ssltest -ssl3 -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv3 with client authentication
+$ssltest -ssl3 -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv3 with both client and server authentication
+$ssltest -ssl3 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3
+$ssltest $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication
+$ssltest -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with client authentication
+$ssltest -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication
+$ssltest -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2 via BIO pair
+$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2 with server authentication via BIO pair
+$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then
+ echo test sslv2 with client authentication via BIO pair
+ $ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+ echo test sslv2 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair
+ $ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+fi
+
+echo test sslv3 via BIO pair
+$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv3 with server authentication via BIO pair
+$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv3 with client authentication via BIO pair
+$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair
+$ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 via BIO pair
+$ssltest $extra || exit 1
+
+if [ $dsa_cert = NO ]; then
+ echo 'test sslv2/sslv3 w/o (EC)DHE via BIO pair'
+ $ssltest -bio_pair -no_dhe -no_ecdhe $extra || exit 1
+fi
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair
+$ssltest -bio_pair -dhe1024dsa -v $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication
+$ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with client authentication via BIO pair
+$ssltest -bio_pair -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair
+$ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth -client_auth $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify
+$ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth -client_auth -app_verify $CA $extra || exit 1
+
+test_cipher() {
+ _cipher=$1
+ echo "Testing $_cipher"
+ prot=""
+ if [ $2 = "SSLv3" ] ; then
+ prot="-ssl3"
+ fi
+ $ssltest -cipher $_cipher $prot
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+ echo "Failed $_cipher"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+}
+
+echo "Testing ciphersuites"
+for protocol in TLSv1.2 SSLv3; do
+ echo "Testing ciphersuites for $protocol"
+ for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "RSA+$protocol" | tr ':' ' '`; do
+ test_cipher $cipher $protocol
+ done
+ if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then
+ echo "skipping RSA+DHE tests"
+ else
+ for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "EDH+aRSA+$protocol:-EXP" | tr ':' ' '`; do
+ test_cipher $cipher $protocol
+ done
+ echo "testing connection with weak DH, expecting failure"
+ if [ $protocol = "SSLv3" ] ; then
+ $ssltest -cipher EDH -dhe512 -ssl3
+ else
+ $ssltest -cipher EDH -dhe512
+ fi
+ if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+ echo "FAIL: connection with weak DH succeeded"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ fi
+ if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-ec; then
+ echo "skipping RSA+ECDHE tests"
+ else
+ for cipher in `../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers "EECDH+aRSA+$protocol:-EXP" | tr ':' ' '`; do
+ test_cipher $cipher $protocol
+ done
+ fi
+done
+
+#############################################################################
+
+if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then
+ echo skipping anonymous DH tests
+else
+ echo test tls1 with 1024bit anonymous DH, multiple handshakes
+ $ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cipher ADH -dhe1024dsa -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
+fi
+
+if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-rsa; then
+ echo skipping RSA tests
+else
+ echo 'test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, no (EC)DHE, multiple handshakes'
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -no_dhe -no_ecdhe -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
+
+ if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-dh; then
+ echo skipping RSA+DHE tests
+ else
+ echo test tls1 with 1024bit RSA, 1024bit DHE, multiple handshakes
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./ssltest -v -bio_pair -tls1 -cert ../apps/server2.pem -dhe1024dsa -num 10 -f -time $extra || exit 1
+ fi
+fi
+
+echo test tls1 with PSK
+$ssltest -tls1 -cipher PSK -psk abc123 $extra || exit 1
+
+echo test tls1 with PSK via BIO pair
+$ssltest -bio_pair -tls1 -cipher PSK -psk abc123 $extra || exit 1
+
+if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl no-srp; then
+ echo skipping SRP tests
+else
+ echo test tls1 with SRP
+ $ssltest -tls1 -cipher SRP -srpuser test -srppass abc123 || exit 1
+
+ echo test tls1 with SRP via BIO pair
+ $ssltest -bio_pair -tls1 -cipher SRP -srpuser test -srppass abc123 || exit 1
+
+ echo test tls1 with SRP auth
+ $ssltest -tls1 -cipher aSRP -srpuser test -srppass abc123 || exit 1
+
+ echo test tls1 with SRP auth via BIO pair
+ $ssltest -bio_pair -tls1 -cipher aSRP -srpuser test -srppass abc123 || exit 1
+fi
+
+exit 0
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/verify_extra_test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/verify_extra_test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/verify_extra_test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/verify_extra_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/wp_test.c
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/wp_test.c 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/wp_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-link ../crypto/whrlpool/wp_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/wp_test.c (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/test/wp_test.c)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/wp_test.c (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/test/wp_test.c 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+link openssl-1.0.1q/../crypto/whrlpool/wp_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/indent.pro
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/indent.pro 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/indent.pro 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,751 +0,0 @@
--bap
--bbo
--br
--brs
--c33
--cd33
--ce
--ci4
--cli0
--cp33
--d0
--di1
--hnl
--i4
--il1
--ip0
--l78
--lp
--nbad
--nbc
--ncdb
--ncs
--nfc1
--nfca
--npcs
--nprs
--npsl
--nsc
--ppi1
--saf
--sai
--saw
--sob
--ss
--ts0
--T ACCESS_DESCRIPTION
--T ADDED_OBJ
--T AEP_BBOOL
--T AEP_CHAR
--T AEP_CHAR_PTR
--T AEP_CONNECTION_ENTRY
--T AEP_CONNECTION_HNDL
--T AEP_CONNECTION_HNDL_PTR
--T AEP_FLAGS
--T AEP_RV
--T AEP_TRANSACTION_ID
--T AEP_TRANSACTION_ID_PTR
--T AEP_U16
--T AEP_U32
--T AEP_U32_PTR
--T AEP_U64_PTR
--T AEP_U8
--T AEP_U8_PTR
--T AEP_VOID_PTR
--T AEP_VOID_PTR_PTR
--T AES_KEY
--T APP_INFO
--T ARGS
--T ASIdOrRange
--T ASIdOrRanges
--T ASIdentifierChoice
--T ASIdentifiers
--T ASN1_ADB
--T ASN1_ADB_TABLE
--T ASN1_AUX
--T ASN1_BIT_STRING
--T ASN1_BMPSTRING
--T ASN1_BOOLEAN
--T ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS
--T ASN1_CTX
--T ASN1_ENCODING
--T ASN1_ENUMERATED
--T ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS
--T ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
--T ASN1_GENERALSTRING
--T ASN1_IA5STRING
--T ASN1_INTEGER
--T ASN1_ITEM
--T ASN1_ITEM_EXP
--T ASN1_NULL
--T ASN1_OBJECT
--T ASN1_OCTET_STRING
--T ASN1_PCTX
--T ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS
--T ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
--T ASN1_PRINT_ARG
--T ASN1_SCTX
--T ASN1_STREAM_ARG
--T ASN1_STRING
--T ASN1_STRING_TABLE
--T ASN1_T61STRING
--T ASN1_TEMPLATE
--T ASN1_TIME
--T ASN1_TLC
--T ASN1_TYPE
--T ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING
--T ASN1_UTCTIME
--T ASN1_UTF8STRING
--T ASN1_VALUE
--T ASN1_VISIBLESTRING
--T ASN1_const_CTX
--T AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS
--T AUTHORITY_KEYID
--T BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
--T BF_KEY
--T BF_LONG
--T BIGNUM
--T BIO
--T BIO_ACCEPT
--T BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX
--T BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS
--T BIO_B64_CTX
--T BIO_CONNECT
--T BIO_ENC_CTX
--T BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX
--T BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX
--T BIO_METHOD
--T BIO_OK_CTX
--T BIO_SSL
--T BIT_STRING_BITNAME
--T BN_BLINDING
--T BN_CTX
--T BN_GENCB
--T BN_MONT_CTX
--T BN_POOL
--T BN_POOL_ITEM
--T BN_RECP_CTX
--T BN_STACK
--T BN_ULONG
--T BUF_MEM
--T BY_DIR
--T BY_DIR_ENTRY
--T BY_DIR_HASH
--T Bytef
--T CAMELLIA_KEY
--T CAST_KEY
--T CAST_LONG
--T CA_DB
--T CCM128_CONTEXT
--T CERT
--T CERTIFICATEPOLICIES
--T CERT_PKEY
--T CIPHER_ORDER
--T CMAC_CTX
--T CMS_AuthenticatedData
--T CMS_CertificateChoices
--T CMS_CompressedData
--T CMS_ContentInfo
--T CMS_DigestedData
--T CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo
--T CMS_EncryptedContentInfo
--T CMS_EncryptedData
--T CMS_EnvelopedData
--T CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber
--T CMS_KEKIdentifier
--T CMS_KEKRecipientInfo
--T CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier
--T CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
--T CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo
--T CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
--T CMS_OriginatorInfo
--T CMS_OriginatorPublicKey
--T CMS_OtherCertificateFormat
--T CMS_OtherKeyAttribute
--T CMS_OtherRecipientInfo
--T CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat
--T CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo
--T CMS_Receipt
--T CMS_ReceiptRequest
--T CMS_ReceiptsFrom
--T CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey
--T CMS_RecipientIdentifier
--T CMS_RecipientInfo
--T CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier
--T CMS_RevocationInfoChoice
--T CMS_SignedData
--T CMS_SignerIdentifier
--T CMS_SignerInfo
--T COMP_CTX
--T COMP_METHOD
--T CONF
--T CONF_IMODULE
--T CONF_METHOD
--T CONF_MODULE
--T CONF_VALUE
--T CRYPTO_EX_DATA
--T CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS
--T CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL
--T CRYPTO_EX_dup
--T CRYPTO_EX_dup
--T CRYPTO_EX_free
--T CRYPTO_EX_free
--T CRYPTO_EX_new
--T CRYPTO_EX_new
--T CRYPTO_MEM_LEAK_CB
--T CRYPTO_THREADID
--T CRYPTO_dynlock_value
--T DB_ATTR
--T DES_LONG
--T DES_cblock
--T DES_key_schedule
--T DH
--T DH_METHOD
--T DH_PKEY_CTX
--T DIST_POINT
--T DIST_POINT_NAME
--T DRBG_CTX
--T DSA
--T DSA_METHOD
--T DSA_SIG
--T DSO
--T DSO_FUNC_TYPE
--T DSO_MERGER_FUNC
--T DSO_METHOD
--T DSO_NAME_CONVERTER_FUNC
--T DSO_VMS_INTERNAL
--T DTLS1_BITMAP
--T DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
--T DTLS1_STATE
--T Dl_info
--T ECDH_DATA
--T ECDH_METHOD
--T ECDSA_DATA
--T ECDSA_METHOD
--T ECDSA_SIG
--T ECPARAMETERS
--T ECPKPARAMETERS
--T EC_EXTRA_DATA
--T EC_GROUP
--T EC_KEY
--T EC_METHOD
--T EC_POINT
--T EC_PRE_COMP
--T EC_PRIVATEKEY
--T EC_builtin_curve
--T EDIPARTYNAME
--T ENGINE
--T ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR
--T ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB
--T ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM
--T ENGINE_CMD_DEFN
--T ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR
--T ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR
--T ENGINE_GEN_FUNC_PTR
--T ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR
--T ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR
--T ENGINE_PILE
--T ENGINE_PILE_DOALL
--T ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR
--T ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR
--T ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR
--T ENGINE_TABLE
--T ENUMERATED_NAMES
--T ERR_FNS
--T ERR_STATE
--T ERR_STRING_DATA
--T ESS_CERT_ID
--T ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL
--T ESS_SIGNING_CERT
--T EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1
--T EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256
--T EVP_CIPHER
--T EVP_CIPHER_CTX
--T EVP_CIPHER_INFO
--T EVP_ENCODE_CTX
--T EVP_MD
--T EVP_MD_CTX
--T EVP_PBE_CTL
--T EVP_PBE_KEYGEN
--T EVP_PKEY
--T EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD
--T EVP_PKEY_CTX
--T EVP_PKEY_METHOD
--T EVP_PKEY_gen_cb
--T EX_CLASS_ITEM
--T E_GMP_RSA_CTX
--T E_RSAX_MOD_CTX
--T FILE
--T F_DIGITALSIGNATUREVERIFY
--T F_PUBLICKEYEXTRACT
--T GCM128_CONTEXT
--T GENERAL_NAME
--T GENERAL_NAMES
--T GENERAL_SUBTREE
--T GEN_SESSION_CB
--T HASH_CTX
--T HEAPENTRY32
--T HEAPLIST32
--T HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE
--T HMAC_CTX
--T ICA_KEY_RSA_CRT
--T ICA_KEY_RSA_CRT_REC
--T ICA_KEY_RSA_MODEXPO
--T ICA_KEY_RSA_MODEXPO_REC
--T IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE
--T IPAddrBlocks
--T IPAddressFamily
--T IPAddressOrRange
--T IPAddressOrRanges
--T ISSUING_DIST_POINT
--T JPAKE_CTX
--T JPAKE_STEP1
--T JPAKE_STEP2
--T JPAKE_STEP3A
--T JPAKE_STEP3B
--T JPAKE_STEP_PART
--T JPAKE_ZKP
--T KEY_TABLE_TYPE
--T KRB5_APREQBODY
--T KRB5_AUTHDATA
--T KRB5_AUTHENTBODY
--T KRB5_CHECKSUM
--T KRB5_ENCDATA
--T KRB5_ENCKEY
--T KRB5_PRINCNAME
--T KRB5_TKTBODY
--T KSSL_CTX
--T KSSL_ERR
--T LHASH
--T LHASH_COMP_FN_TYPE
--T LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE
--T LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE
--T LHASH_HASH_FN_TYPE
--T LHASH_NODE
--T LPDIR_CTX
--T LPHEAPENTRY32
--T LPHEAPLIST32
--T LPMODULEENTRY32
--T LPMODULEENTRY32W
--T LPPROCESSENTRY32
--T LPPROCESSENTRY32W
--T LPTHREADENTRY32
--T LP_DIR_CTX
--T MD2_CTX
--T MD4_CTX
--T MD5_CTX
--T MDC2_CTX
--T MD_DATA
--T MEM
--T MEM_LEAK
--T MEM_OBJECT_DATA
--T MIME_HEADER
--T MIME_PARAM
--T MODULEENTRY32
--T MODULEENTRY32W
--T MS_FAR
--T NAME_CONSTRAINTS
--T NAME_FUNCS
--T NBIO_TEST
--T NDEF_SUPPORT
--T NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE
--T NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY
--T NETSCAPE_PKEY
--T NETSCAPE_SPKAC
--T NETSCAPE_SPKI
--T NETSCAPE_X509
--T NET_API_FUNCTION
--T NOTICEREF
--T OBJ_NAME
--T OCB128_CONTEXT
--T OCB_BLOCK
--T OCSP_BASICRESP
--T OCSP_CERTID
--T OCSP_CERTSTATUS
--T OCSP_CRLID
--T OCSP_ONEREQ
--T OCSP_REQINFO
--T OCSP_REQUEST
--T OCSP_REQ_CTX
--T OCSP_RESPBYTES
--T OCSP_RESPDATA
--T OCSP_RESPID
--T OCSP_RESPONSE
--T OCSP_REVOKEDINFO
--T OCSP_SERVICELOC
--T OCSP_SIGNATURE
--T OCSP_SINGLERESP
--T OCSP_TBLSTR
--T OPENSSL_BLOCK
--T OPENSSL_CSTRING
--T OPENSSL_DIR_CTX
--T OPENSSL_ITEM
--T OPENSSL_PSTRING
--T OPENSSL_STRING
--T OPENSSL_STRING
--T OTHERNAME
--T P256_POINT
--T P256_POINT_AFFINE
--T PBE2PARAM
--T PBEPARAM
--T PBKDF2PARAM
--T PCRYPTO_MEM_LEAK_CB
--T PEM_CTX
--T PEM_ENCODE_SEAL_CTX
--T PEM_USER
--T PHEAPENTRY32
--T PHEAPLIST32
--T PKCS12
--T PKCS12_BAGS
--T PKCS12_SAFEBAG
--T PKCS7
--T PKCS7_DIGEST
--T PKCS7_ENCRYPT
--T PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT
--T PKCS7_ENVELOPE
--T PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL
--T PKCS7_RECIP_INFO
--T PKCS7_SIGNED
--T PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
--T PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE
--T PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO
--T PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD
--T PMODULEENTRY32
--T PMODULEENTRY32W
--T POLICYINFO
--T POLICYQUALINFO
--T POLICY_CONSTRAINTS
--T POLICY_MAPPING
--T POLICY_MAPPINGS
--T PPROCESSENTRY32
--T PPROCESSENTRY32W
--T PRECOMP256_ROW
--T PROCESSENTRY32
--T PROCESSENTRY32W
--T PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION
--T PROXY_POLICY
--T PTHREADENTRY32
--T PW_CB_DATA
--T RAND_METHOD
--T RC2_KEY
--T RC4_KEY
--T RC5_32_KEY
--T RIPEMD160_CTX
--T RSA
--T RSA_METHOD
--T RSA_OAEP_PARAMS
--T RSA_PKEY_CTX
--T RSA_PSS_PARAMS
--T SCT
--T SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE
--T SESS_CERT
--T SHA256_CTX
--T SHA512_CTX
--T SHA_CTX
--T SRP_ARG
--T SRP_CLIENT_ARG
--T SRP_CTX
--T SRP_SERVER_ARG
--T SRP_VBASE
--T SRP_gN_cache
--T SRP_user_pwd
--T SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
--T SSL
--T SSL2_STATE
--T SSL3_BUFFER
--T SSL3_BUF_FREELIST
--T SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY
--T SSL3_COMP
--T SSL3_ENC_METHOD
--T SSL3_RECORD
--T SSL3_STATE
--T SSL_CIPHER
--T SSL_COMP
--T SSL_CONF_CTX
--T SSL_CTX
--T SSL_EXCERT
--T SSL_METHOD
--T SSL_SESSION
--T SSL_SESSION_ASN1
--T STACK_OF
--T STORE
--T STORE_ATTR_INFO
--T STORE_ATTR_TYPES
--T STORE_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
--T STORE_CLEANUP_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_END_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_GENERATE_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_GENERIC_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_GET_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_HANDLE_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_INITIALISE_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_METHOD
--T STORE_MODIFY_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_NEXT_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_OBJECT
--T STORE_OBJECT_TYPES
--T STORE_PARAM_TYPES
--T STORE_START_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
--T STORE_STORE_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
--T SW_ALGTYPE
--T SW_BYTE
--T SW_COMMAND_BITMAP
--T SW_COMMAND_CODE
--T SW_CONTEXT_HANDLE
--T SW_CRT
--T SW_DSA
--T SW_EXP
--T SW_LARGENUMBER
--T SW_NVDATA
--T SW_OSHANDLE
--T SW_PARAM
--T SW_STATE
--T SW_STATUS
--T SW_U16
--T SW_U32
--T SW_U64
--T SXNET
--T SXNETID
--T TCHAR
--T TEST_INFO
--T THREADENTRY32
--T TIMEOUT_PARAM
--T TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT
--T TLS_SIGALGS
--T TS_ACCURACY
--T TS_MSG_IMPRINT
--T TS_REQ
--T TS_RESP
--T TS_RESP_CTX
--T TS_STATUS_INFO
--T TS_TST_INFO
--T TS_VERIFY_CTX
--T TXT_DB
--T UI
--T UINT64
--T UI_METHOD
--T UI_STRING
--T USERNOTICE
--T WCHAR
--T WHIRLPOOL_CTX
--T WINAPI
--T WSAAPI
--T X509
--T X509V3_CONF_METHOD
--T X509V3_CTX
--T X509V3_EXT_D2I
--T X509V3_EXT_FREE
--T X509V3_EXT_I2D
--T X509V3_EXT_I2R
--T X509V3_EXT_I2S
--T X509V3_EXT_METHOD
--T X509V3_EXT_NEW
--T X509V3_EXT_R2I
--T X509V3_EXT_S2I
--T X509V3_EXT_V2I
--T X509_ALGOR
--T X509_ATTRIBUTE
--T X509_CERT_AUX
--T X509_CERT_FILE_CTX
--T X509_CERT_PAIR
--T X509_CINF
--T X509_CRL
--T X509_CRL_INFO
--T X509_CRL_METHOD
--T X509_EXTENSION
--T X509_INFO
--T X509_LOOKUP
--T X509_LOOKUP_METHOD
--T X509_NAME
--T X509_NAME_ENTRY
--T X509_OBJECT
--T X509_OBJECTS
--T X509_PKEY
--T X509_POLICY_CACHE
--T X509_POLICY_DATA
--T X509_POLICY_LEVEL
--T X509_POLICY_NODE
--T X509_POLICY_TREE
--T X509_PUBKEY
--T X509_PURPOSE
--T X509_REQ
--T X509_REQ_INFO
--T X509_REVOKED
--T X509_SIG
--T X509_STORE
--T X509_STORE_CTX
--T X509_TRUST
--T X509_VAL
--T X509_VERIFY_PARAM
--T X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
--T X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO
--T X9_62_CURVE
--T X9_62_FIELDID
--T X9_62_PENTANOMIAL
--T XTS128_CONTEXT
--T ZEN_MD_DATA
--T _LHASH
--T _STACK
--T __int64
--T _ossl_old_des_cblock
--T asn1_ps_func
--T bio_dgram_data
--T bio_info_cb
--T char_io
--T conf_finish_func
--T conf_init_func
--T const_DES_cblock
--T d2i_of_void
--T des_cblock
--T dynamic_data_ctx
--T dynamic_fns
--T engine_table_doall_cb
--T i2d_of_void
--T int_dhx942_dh
--T nid_triple
--T pem_password_cb
--T pitem
--T piterator
--T pqueue_s
--T session_op
--T size_t
--T tag_exp_arg
--T testdata
--T time_t
--T time_t
--T u32
--T u64
--T u8
--T v3_ext_ctx
--T v3_ext_method
--T STACK_OF_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_
--T STACK_OF_ASIdOrRange_
--T STACK_OF_ASN1_ADB_TABLE_
--T STACK_OF_ASN1_INTEGER_
--T STACK_OF_ASN1_OBJECT_
--T STACK_OF_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_
--T STACK_OF_ASN1_TYPE_
--T STACK_OF_ASN1_UTF8STRING_
--T STACK_OF_ASN1_VALUE_
--T STACK_OF_BIO_
--T STACK_OF_BY_DIR_ENTRY_
--T STACK_OF_BY_DIR_HASH_
--T STACK_OF_CMS_CertificateChoices_
--T STACK_OF_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_
--T STACK_OF_CMS_RecipientInfo_
--T STACK_OF_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_
--T STACK_OF_CMS_SignerInfo_
--T STACK_OF_CONF_IMODULE_
--T STACK_OF_CONF_MODULE_
--T STACK_OF_CONF_VALUE_
--T STACK_OF_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_
--T STACK_OF_CRYPTO_dynlock_
--T STACK_OF_DIST_POINT_
--T STACK_OF_ENGINE_
--T STACK_OF_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_
--T STACK_OF_ESS_CERT_ID_
--T STACK_OF_EVP_PBE_CTL_
--T STACK_OF_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_
--T STACK_OF_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_
--T STACK_OF_GENERAL_NAMES_
--T STACK_OF_GENERAL_NAME_
--T STACK_OF_GENERAL_SUBTREE_
--T STACK_OF_IPAddressFamily_
--T STACK_OF_IPAddressOrRange_
--T STACK_OF_KRB5_APREQBODY_
--T STACK_OF_KRB5_AUTHENTBODY_
--T STACK_OF_KRB5_TKTBODY_
--T STACK_OF_MEM_OBJECT_DATA_
--T STACK_OF_MIME_HEADER_
--T STACK_OF_MIME_PARAM_
--T STACK_OF_NAME_FUNCS_
--T STACK_OF_OCSP_CERTID_
--T STACK_OF_OCSP_ONEREQ_
--T STACK_OF_OCSP_RESPID_
--T STACK_OF_OCSP_SINGLERESP_
--T STACK_OF_OPENSSL_BLOCK_
--T STACK_OF_OPENSSL_PSTRING_
--T STACK_OF_OPENSSL_STRING_
--T STACK_OF_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_
--T STACK_OF_PKCS7_
--T STACK_OF_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_
--T STACK_OF_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_
--T STACK_OF_POLICYINFO_
--T STACK_OF_POLICYQUALINFO_
--T STACK_OF_POLICY_MAPPING_
--T STACK_OF_Request_
--T STACK_OF_SCT_
--T STACK_OF_SRP_gN_
--T STACK_OF_SRP_gN_cache_
--T STACK_OF_SRP_user_pwd_
--T STACK_OF_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_
--T STACK_OF_SSL_CIPHER_
--T STACK_OF_SSL_COMP_
--T STACK_OF_STORE_ATTR_INFO_
--T STACK_OF_STRING_
--T STACK_OF_SXNETID_
--T STACK_OF_SingleResponse_
--T STACK_OF_UI_STRING_
--T STACK_OF_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_
--T STACK_OF_X509_
--T STACK_OF_X509_ALGOR_
--T STACK_OF_X509_ATTRIBUTE_
--T STACK_OF_X509_CRL_
--T STACK_OF_X509_EXTENSION_
--T STACK_OF_X509_INFO_
--T STACK_OF_X509_LOOKUP_
--T STACK_OF_X509_NAME_
--T STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_
--T STACK_OF_X509_OBJECT_
--T STACK_OF_X509_POLICY_DATA_
--T STACK_OF_X509_POLICY_NODE_
--T STACK_OF_X509_PURPOSE_
--T STACK_OF_X509_REVOKED_
--T STACK_OF_X509_TRUST_
--T STACK_OF_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_
--T STACK_OF_nid_triple_
--T STACK_OF_void_
--T LHASH_OF_ADDED_OBJ_
--T LHASH_OF_APP_INFO_
--T LHASH_OF_CONF_VALUE_
--T LHASH_OF_ENGINE_PILE_
--T LHASH_OF_ERR_STATE_
--T LHASH_OF_ERR_STRING_DATA_
--T LHASH_OF_EX_CLASS_ITEM_
--T LHASH_OF_FUNCTION_
--T LHASH_OF_MEM_
--T LHASH_OF_OBJ_NAME_
--T LHASH_OF_OPENSSL_STRING_
--T LHASH_OF_SSL_SESSION_
--T LHASH_OF_STRING_
--T clock_t
--T custom_ext_methods
--T hm_fragment
--T krb5_auth_context
--T krb5_authdata
--T KRB5_CALLCONV
--T krb5_ccache
--T krb5_context
--T krb5_creds
--T krb5_data
--T krb5_deltat
--T krb5_flags
--T krb5_int32
--T krb5_keyblock
--T krb5_keytab
--T krb5_keytab_entry
--T krb5_octet
--T krb5_principal
--T krb5_principal_data
--T krb5_rcache
--T krb5_ticket
--T krb5_ticket_times
--T krb5_timestamp
--T record_pqueue
--T ssl_ctx_st
--T ssl_flag_tbl
--T ssl_st
--T ssl_trace_tbl
--T _stdcall
--T tls12_lookup
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/indent.pro (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/indent.pro)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/indent.pro (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/indent.pro 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,767 @@
+-bap
+-bbo
+-br
+-brs
+-c33
+-cd33
+-ce
+-ci4
+-cli0
+-cp33
+-d0
+-di1
+-hnl
+-i4
+-il1
+-ip0
+-l78
+-lp
+-nbad
+-nbc
+-ncdb
+-ncs
+-nfc1
+-nfca
+-npcs
+-nprs
+-npsl
+-nsc
+-ppi1
+-saf
+-sai
+-saw
+-sob
+-ss
+-ts0
+-T ACCESS_DESCRIPTION
+-T ADDED_OBJ
+-T AEP_BBOOL
+-T AEP_CHAR
+-T AEP_CHAR_PTR
+-T AEP_CONNECTION_ENTRY
+-T AEP_CONNECTION_HNDL
+-T AEP_CONNECTION_HNDL_PTR
+-T AEP_FLAGS
+-T AEP_RV
+-T AEP_TRANSACTION_ID
+-T AEP_TRANSACTION_ID_PTR
+-T AEP_U16
+-T AEP_U32
+-T AEP_U32_PTR
+-T AEP_U64_PTR
+-T AEP_U8
+-T AEP_U8_PTR
+-T AEP_VOID_PTR
+-T AEP_VOID_PTR_PTR
+-T AES_KEY
+-T APP_INFO
+-T ARGS
+-T ASIdOrRange
+-T ASIdOrRanges
+-T ASIdentifierChoice
+-T ASIdentifiers
+-T ASN1_ADB
+-T ASN1_ADB_TABLE
+-T ASN1_AUX
+-T ASN1_BIT_STRING
+-T ASN1_BMPSTRING
+-T ASN1_BOOLEAN
+-T ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS
+-T ASN1_CTX
+-T ASN1_ENCODING
+-T ASN1_ENUMERATED
+-T ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS
+-T ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
+-T ASN1_GENERALSTRING
+-T ASN1_IA5STRING
+-T ASN1_INTEGER
+-T ASN1_ITEM
+-T ASN1_ITEM_EXP
+-T ASN1_NULL
+-T ASN1_OBJECT
+-T ASN1_OCTET_STRING
+-T ASN1_PCTX
+-T ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS
+-T ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
+-T ASN1_PRINT_ARG
+-T ASN1_SCTX
+-T ASN1_STREAM_ARG
+-T ASN1_STRING
+-T ASN1_STRING_TABLE
+-T ASN1_T61STRING
+-T ASN1_TEMPLATE
+-T ASN1_TIME
+-T ASN1_TLC
+-T ASN1_TYPE
+-T ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING
+-T ASN1_UTCTIME
+-T ASN1_UTF8STRING
+-T ASN1_VALUE
+-T ASN1_VISIBLESTRING
+-T ASN1_const_CTX
+-T AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS
+-T AUTHORITY_KEYID
+-T BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
+-T BF_KEY
+-T BF_LONG
+-T BIGNUM
+-T BIO
+-T BIO_ACCEPT
+-T BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX
+-T BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS
+-T BIO_B64_CTX
+-T BIO_CONNECT
+-T BIO_ENC_CTX
+-T BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX
+-T BIO_LINEBUFFER_CTX
+-T BIO_METHOD
+-T BIO_OK_CTX
+-T BIO_SSL
+-T BIT_STRING_BITNAME
+-T BN_BLINDING
+-T BN_CTX
+-T BN_GENCB
+-T BN_MONT_CTX
+-T BN_POOL
+-T BN_POOL_ITEM
+-T BN_RECP_CTX
+-T BN_STACK
+-T BN_ULONG
+-T BUF_MEM
+-T BY_DIR
+-T BY_DIR_ENTRY
+-T BY_DIR_HASH
+-T Bytef
+-T CAMELLIA_KEY
+-T CAST_KEY
+-T CAST_LONG
+-T CA_DB
+-T CCM128_CONTEXT
+-T CERT
+-T CERTIFICATEPOLICIES
+-T CERT_PKEY
+-T CIPHER_ORDER
+-T CMAC_CTX
+-T CMS_AuthenticatedData
+-T CMS_CertificateChoices
+-T CMS_CompressedData
+-T CMS_ContentInfo
+-T CMS_DigestedData
+-T CMS_EncapsulatedContentInfo
+-T CMS_EncryptedContentInfo
+-T CMS_EncryptedData
+-T CMS_EnvelopedData
+-T CMS_IssuerAndSerialNumber
+-T CMS_KEKIdentifier
+-T CMS_KEKRecipientInfo
+-T CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier
+-T CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
+-T CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo
+-T CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
+-T CMS_OriginatorInfo
+-T CMS_OriginatorPublicKey
+-T CMS_OtherCertificateFormat
+-T CMS_OtherKeyAttribute
+-T CMS_OtherRecipientInfo
+-T CMS_OtherRevocationInfoFormat
+-T CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo
+-T CMS_Receipt
+-T CMS_ReceiptRequest
+-T CMS_ReceiptsFrom
+-T CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey
+-T CMS_RecipientIdentifier
+-T CMS_RecipientInfo
+-T CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier
+-T CMS_RevocationInfoChoice
+-T CMS_SignedData
+-T CMS_SignerIdentifier
+-T CMS_SignerInfo
+-T COMP_CTX
+-T COMP_METHOD
+-T CONF
+-T CONF_IMODULE
+-T CONF_METHOD
+-T CONF_MODULE
+-T CONF_VALUE
+-T CRYPTO_EX_DATA
+-T CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS
+-T CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL
+-T CRYPTO_EX_dup
+-T CRYPTO_EX_dup
+-T CRYPTO_EX_free
+-T CRYPTO_EX_free
+-T CRYPTO_EX_new
+-T CRYPTO_EX_new
+-T CRYPTO_MEM_LEAK_CB
+-T CRYPTO_THREADID
+-T CRYPTO_dynlock_value
+-T DB_ATTR
+-T DES_LONG
+-T DES_cblock
+-T DES_key_schedule
+-T DH
+-T DH_METHOD
+-T DH_PKEY_CTX
+-T DIST_POINT
+-T DIST_POINT_NAME
+-T DRBG_CTX
+-T DSA
+-T DSA_METHOD
+-T DSA_SIG
+-T DSO
+-T DSO_FUNC_TYPE
+-T DSO_MERGER_FUNC
+-T DSO_METHOD
+-T DSO_NAME_CONVERTER_FUNC
+-T DSO_VMS_INTERNAL
+-T DTLS1_BITMAP
+-T DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
+-T DTLS1_STATE
+-T Dl_info
+-T ECDH_DATA
+-T ECDH_METHOD
+-T ECDSA_DATA
+-T ECDSA_METHOD
+-T ECDSA_SIG
+-T ECPARAMETERS
+-T ECPKPARAMETERS
+-T EC_EXTRA_DATA
+-T EC_GROUP
+-T EC_KEY
+-T EC_METHOD
+-T EC_POINT
+-T EC_PRE_COMP
+-T EC_PRIVATEKEY
+-T EC_builtin_curve
+-T EDIPARTYNAME
+-T ENGINE
+-T ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR
+-T ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB
+-T ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM
+-T ENGINE_CMD_DEFN
+-T ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR
+-T ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR
+-T ENGINE_GEN_FUNC_PTR
+-T ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR
+-T ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR
+-T ENGINE_PILE
+-T ENGINE_PILE_DOALL
+-T ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR
+-T ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR
+-T ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR
+-T ENGINE_TABLE
+-T ENUMERATED_NAMES
+-T ERR_FNS
+-T ERR_STATE
+-T ERR_STRING_DATA
+-T ESS_CERT_ID
+-T ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL
+-T ESS_SIGNING_CERT
+-T EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1
+-T EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA256
+-T EVP_CIPHER
+-T EVP_CIPHER_CTX
+-T EVP_CIPHER_INFO
+-T EVP_ENCODE_CTX
+-T EVP_MD
+-T EVP_MD_CTX
+-T EVP_PBE_CTL
+-T EVP_PBE_KEYGEN
+-T EVP_PKEY
+-T EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD
+-T EVP_PKEY_CTX
+-T EVP_PKEY_METHOD
+-T EVP_PKEY_gen_cb
+-T EX_CLASS_ITEM
+-T E_GMP_RSA_CTX
+-T E_RSAX_MOD_CTX
+-T FILE
+-T F_DIGITALSIGNATUREVERIFY
+-T F_PUBLICKEYEXTRACT
+-T GCM128_CONTEXT
+-T GENERAL_NAME
+-T GENERAL_NAMES
+-T GENERAL_SUBTREE
+-T GEN_SESSION_CB
+-T HASH_CTX
+-T HEAPENTRY32
+-T HEAPLIST32
+-T HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE
+-T HMAC_CTX
+-T ICA_KEY_RSA_CRT
+-T ICA_KEY_RSA_CRT_REC
+-T ICA_KEY_RSA_MODEXPO
+-T ICA_KEY_RSA_MODEXPO_REC
+-T IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE
+-T IPAddrBlocks
+-T IPAddressFamily
+-T IPAddressOrRange
+-T IPAddressOrRanges
+-T ISSUING_DIST_POINT
+-T JPAKE_CTX
+-T JPAKE_STEP1
+-T JPAKE_STEP2
+-T JPAKE_STEP3A
+-T JPAKE_STEP3B
+-T JPAKE_STEP_PART
+-T JPAKE_ZKP
+-T KEY_TABLE_TYPE
+-T KRB5_APREQBODY
+-T KRB5_AUTHDATA
+-T KRB5_AUTHENTBODY
+-T KRB5_CHECKSUM
+-T KRB5_ENCDATA
+-T KRB5_ENCKEY
+-T KRB5_PRINCNAME
+-T KRB5_TKTBODY
+-T KSSL_CTX
+-T KSSL_ERR
+-T LHASH
+-T LHASH_COMP_FN_TYPE
+-T LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE
+-T LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE
+-T LHASH_HASH_FN_TYPE
+-T LHASH_NODE
+-T LPDIR_CTX
+-T LPHEAPENTRY32
+-T LPHEAPLIST32
+-T LPMODULEENTRY32
+-T LPMODULEENTRY32W
+-T LPPROCESSENTRY32
+-T LPPROCESSENTRY32W
+-T LPTHREADENTRY32
+-T LP_DIR_CTX
+-T MD2_CTX
+-T MD4_CTX
+-T MD5_CTX
+-T MDC2_CTX
+-T MD_DATA
+-T MEM
+-T MEM_LEAK
+-T MEM_OBJECT_DATA
+-T MIME_HEADER
+-T MIME_PARAM
+-T MODULEENTRY32
+-T MODULEENTRY32W
+-T MS_FAR
+-T NAME_CONSTRAINTS
+-T NAME_FUNCS
+-T NBIO_TEST
+-T NDEF_SUPPORT
+-T NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE
+-T NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY
+-T NETSCAPE_PKEY
+-T NETSCAPE_SPKAC
+-T NETSCAPE_SPKI
+-T NETSCAPE_X509
+-T NET_API_FUNCTION
+-T NOTICEREF
+-T OBJ_NAME
+-T OCB128_CONTEXT
+-T OCB_BLOCK
+-T OCSP_BASICRESP
+-T OCSP_CERTID
+-T OCSP_CERTSTATUS
+-T OCSP_CRLID
+-T OCSP_ONEREQ
+-T OCSP_REQINFO
+-T OCSP_REQUEST
+-T OCSP_REQ_CTX
+-T OCSP_RESPBYTES
+-T OCSP_RESPDATA
+-T OCSP_RESPID
+-T OCSP_RESPONSE
+-T OCSP_REVOKEDINFO
+-T OCSP_SERVICELOC
+-T OCSP_SIGNATURE
+-T OCSP_SINGLERESP
+-T OCSP_TBLSTR
+-T OPENSSL_BLOCK
+-T OPENSSL_CSTRING
+-T OPENSSL_DIR_CTX
+-T OPENSSL_ITEM
+-T OPENSSL_PSTRING
+-T OPENSSL_STRING
+-T OPENSSL_STRING
+-T OTHERNAME
+-T P256_POINT
+-T P256_POINT_AFFINE
+-T PBE2PARAM
+-T PBEPARAM
+-T PBKDF2PARAM
+-T PCRYPTO_MEM_LEAK_CB
+-T PEM_CTX
+-T PEM_ENCODE_SEAL_CTX
+-T PEM_USER
+-T PHEAPENTRY32
+-T PHEAPLIST32
+-T PKCS12
+-T PKCS12_BAGS
+-T PKCS12_SAFEBAG
+-T PKCS7
+-T PKCS7_DIGEST
+-T PKCS7_ENCRYPT
+-T PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT
+-T PKCS7_ENVELOPE
+-T PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL
+-T PKCS7_RECIP_INFO
+-T PKCS7_SIGNED
+-T PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
+-T PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE
+-T PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO
+-T PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD
+-T PMODULEENTRY32
+-T PMODULEENTRY32W
+-T POLICYINFO
+-T POLICYQUALINFO
+-T POLICY_CONSTRAINTS
+-T POLICY_MAPPING
+-T POLICY_MAPPINGS
+-T PPROCESSENTRY32
+-T PPROCESSENTRY32W
+-T PRECOMP256_ROW
+-T PROCESSENTRY32
+-T PROCESSENTRY32W
+-T PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION
+-T PROXY_POLICY
+-T PTHREADENTRY32
+-T PW_CB_DATA
+-T RAND_METHOD
+-T RC2_KEY
+-T RC4_KEY
+-T RC5_32_KEY
+-T RIPEMD160_CTX
+-T RSA
+-T RSA_METHOD
+-T RSA_OAEP_PARAMS
+-T RSA_PKEY_CTX
+-T RSA_PSS_PARAMS
+-T SCT
+-T SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE
+-T SESS_CERT
+-T SHA256_CTX
+-T SHA512_CTX
+-T SHA_CTX
+-T SRP_ARG
+-T SRP_CLIENT_ARG
+-T SRP_CTX
+-T SRP_SERVER_ARG
+-T SRP_VBASE
+-T SRP_gN_cache
+-T SRP_user_pwd
+-T SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
+-T SSL
+-T SSL2_STATE
+-T SSL3_BUFFER
+-T SSL3_BUF_FREELIST
+-T SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY
+-T SSL3_COMP
+-T SSL3_ENC_METHOD
+-T SSL3_RECORD
+-T SSL3_STATE
+-T SSL_CIPHER
+-T SSL_COMP
+-T SSL_CONF_CTX
+-T SSL_CTX
+-T SSL_EXCERT
+-T SSL_METHOD
+-T SSL_SESSION
+-T SSL_SESSION_ASN1
+-T STACK_OF
+-T STORE
+-T STORE_ATTR_INFO
+-T STORE_ATTR_TYPES
+-T STORE_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
+-T STORE_CLEANUP_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_END_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_GENERATE_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_GENERIC_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_GET_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_HANDLE_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_INITIALISE_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_METHOD
+-T STORE_MODIFY_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_NEXT_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_OBJECT
+-T STORE_OBJECT_TYPES
+-T STORE_PARAM_TYPES
+-T STORE_START_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
+-T STORE_STORE_OBJECT_FUNC_PTR
+-T SW_ALGTYPE
+-T SW_BYTE
+-T SW_COMMAND_BITMAP
+-T SW_COMMAND_CODE
+-T SW_CONTEXT_HANDLE
+-T SW_CRT
+-T SW_DSA
+-T SW_EXP
+-T SW_LARGENUMBER
+-T SW_NVDATA
+-T SW_OSHANDLE
+-T SW_PARAM
+-T SW_STATE
+-T SW_STATUS
+-T SW_U16
+-T SW_U32
+-T SW_U64
+-T SXNET
+-T SXNETID
+-T TCHAR
+-T TEST_INFO
+-T THREADENTRY32
+-T TIMEOUT_PARAM
+-T TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT
+-T TLS_SIGALGS
+-T TS_ACCURACY
+-T TS_MSG_IMPRINT
+-T TS_REQ
+-T TS_RESP
+-T TS_RESP_CTX
+-T TS_STATUS_INFO
+-T TS_TST_INFO
+-T TS_VERIFY_CTX
+-T TXT_DB
+-T UI
+-T UINT64
+-T UI_METHOD
+-T UI_STRING
+-T USERNOTICE
+-T WCHAR
+-T WHIRLPOOL_CTX
+-T WINAPI
+-T WSAAPI
+-T X509
+-T X509V3_CONF_METHOD
+-T X509V3_CTX
+-T X509V3_EXT_D2I
+-T X509V3_EXT_FREE
+-T X509V3_EXT_I2D
+-T X509V3_EXT_I2R
+-T X509V3_EXT_I2S
+-T X509V3_EXT_METHOD
+-T X509V3_EXT_NEW
+-T X509V3_EXT_R2I
+-T X509V3_EXT_S2I
+-T X509V3_EXT_V2I
+-T X509_ALGOR
+-T X509_ATTRIBUTE
+-T X509_CERT_AUX
+-T X509_CERT_FILE_CTX
+-T X509_CERT_PAIR
+-T X509_CINF
+-T X509_CRL
+-T X509_CRL_INFO
+-T X509_CRL_METHOD
+-T X509_EXTENSION
+-T X509_INFO
+-T X509_LOOKUP
+-T X509_LOOKUP_METHOD
+-T X509_NAME
+-T X509_NAME_ENTRY
+-T X509_OBJECT
+-T X509_OBJECTS
+-T X509_PKEY
+-T X509_POLICY_CACHE
+-T X509_POLICY_DATA
+-T X509_POLICY_LEVEL
+-T X509_POLICY_NODE
+-T X509_POLICY_TREE
+-T X509_PUBKEY
+-T X509_PURPOSE
+-T X509_REQ
+-T X509_REQ_INFO
+-T X509_REVOKED
+-T X509_SIG
+-T X509_STORE
+-T X509_STORE_CTX
+-T X509_TRUST
+-T X509_VAL
+-T X509_VERIFY_PARAM
+-T X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
+-T X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO
+-T X9_62_CURVE
+-T X9_62_FIELDID
+-T X9_62_PENTANOMIAL
+-T XTS128_CONTEXT
+-T ZEN_MD_DATA
+-T _LHASH
+-T _STACK
+-T __int64
+-T _ossl_old_des_cblock
+-T asn1_ps_func
+-T bio_dgram_data
+-T bio_info_cb
+-T char_io
+-T conf_finish_func
+-T conf_init_func
+-T const_DES_cblock
+-T d2i_of_void
+-T des_cblock
+-T dynamic_data_ctx
+-T dynamic_fns
+-T engine_table_doall_cb
+-T i2d_of_void
+-T int_dhx942_dh
+-T nid_triple
+-T pem_password_cb
+-T pitem
+-T piterator
+-T pqueue_s
+-T session_op
+-T size_t
+-T tag_exp_arg
+-T testdata
+-T time_t
+-T time_t
+-T u32
+-T u64
+-T u8
+-T v3_ext_ctx
+-T v3_ext_method
+-T STACK_OF_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_
+-T STACK_OF_ASIdOrRange_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_ADB_TABLE_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_INTEGER_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_OBJECT_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_TYPE_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_UTF8STRING_
+-T STACK_OF_ASN1_VALUE_
+-T STACK_OF_BIO_
+-T STACK_OF_BY_DIR_ENTRY_
+-T STACK_OF_BY_DIR_HASH_
+-T STACK_OF_CMS_CertificateChoices_
+-T STACK_OF_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_
+-T STACK_OF_CMS_RecipientInfo_
+-T STACK_OF_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_
+-T STACK_OF_CMS_SignerInfo_
+-T STACK_OF_CONF_IMODULE_
+-T STACK_OF_CONF_MODULE_
+-T STACK_OF_CONF_VALUE_
+-T STACK_OF_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_
+-T STACK_OF_CRYPTO_dynlock_
+-T STACK_OF_DIST_POINT_
+-T STACK_OF_ENGINE_
+-T STACK_OF_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_
+-T STACK_OF_ESS_CERT_ID_
+-T STACK_OF_EVP_PBE_CTL_
+-T STACK_OF_EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD_
+-T STACK_OF_EVP_PKEY_METHOD_
+-T STACK_OF_GENERAL_NAMES_
+-T STACK_OF_GENERAL_NAME_
+-T STACK_OF_GENERAL_SUBTREE_
+-T STACK_OF_IPAddressFamily_
+-T STACK_OF_IPAddressOrRange_
+-T STACK_OF_KRB5_APREQBODY_
+-T STACK_OF_KRB5_AUTHENTBODY_
+-T STACK_OF_KRB5_TKTBODY_
+-T STACK_OF_MEM_OBJECT_DATA_
+-T STACK_OF_MIME_HEADER_
+-T STACK_OF_MIME_PARAM_
+-T STACK_OF_NAME_FUNCS_
+-T STACK_OF_OCSP_CERTID_
+-T STACK_OF_OCSP_ONEREQ_
+-T STACK_OF_OCSP_RESPID_
+-T STACK_OF_OCSP_SINGLERESP_
+-T STACK_OF_OPENSSL_BLOCK_
+-T STACK_OF_OPENSSL_PSTRING_
+-T STACK_OF_OPENSSL_STRING_
+-T STACK_OF_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_
+-T STACK_OF_PKCS7_
+-T STACK_OF_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_
+-T STACK_OF_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_
+-T STACK_OF_POLICYINFO_
+-T STACK_OF_POLICYQUALINFO_
+-T STACK_OF_POLICY_MAPPING_
+-T STACK_OF_Request_
+-T STACK_OF_SCT_
+-T STACK_OF_SRP_gN_
+-T STACK_OF_SRP_gN_cache_
+-T STACK_OF_SRP_user_pwd_
+-T STACK_OF_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_
+-T STACK_OF_SSL_CIPHER_
+-T STACK_OF_SSL_COMP_
+-T STACK_OF_STORE_ATTR_INFO_
+-T STACK_OF_STRING_
+-T STACK_OF_SXNETID_
+-T STACK_OF_SingleResponse_
+-T STACK_OF_UI_STRING_
+-T STACK_OF_X509V3_EXT_METHOD_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_ALGOR_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_ATTRIBUTE_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_CRL_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_EXTENSION_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_INFO_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_LOOKUP_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_NAME_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_OBJECT_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_POLICY_DATA_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_POLICY_NODE_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_PURPOSE_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_REVOKED_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_TRUST_
+-T STACK_OF_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_
+-T STACK_OF_nid_triple_
+-T STACK_OF_void_
+-T LHASH_OF_ADDED_OBJ_
+-T LHASH_OF_APP_INFO_
+-T LHASH_OF_CONF_VALUE_
+-T LHASH_OF_ENGINE_PILE_
+-T LHASH_OF_ERR_STATE_
+-T LHASH_OF_ERR_STRING_DATA_
+-T LHASH_OF_EX_CLASS_ITEM_
+-T LHASH_OF_FUNCTION_
+-T LHASH_OF_MEM_
+-T LHASH_OF_OBJ_NAME_
+-T LHASH_OF_OPENSSL_STRING_
+-T LHASH_OF_SSL_SESSION_
+-T LHASH_OF_STRING_
+-T clock_t
+-T custom_ext_methods
+-T hm_fragment
+-T krb5_auth_context
+-T krb5_authdata
+-T KRB5_CALLCONV
+-T krb5_ccache
+-T krb5_context
+-T krb5_creds
+-T krb5_data
+-T krb5_deltat
+-T krb5_flags
+-T krb5_int32
+-T krb5_keyblock
+-T krb5_keytab
+-T krb5_keytab_entry
+-T krb5_octet
+-T krb5_principal
+-T krb5_principal_data
+-T krb5_rcache
+-T krb5_ticket
+-T krb5_ticket_times
+-T krb5_timestamp
+-T record_pqueue
+-T ssl_ctx_st
+-T ssl_flag_tbl
+-T ssl_st
+-T ssl_trace_tbl
+-T _stdcall
+-T tls12_lookup
+-T OPTIONS
+-T OPT_PAIR
+-T uint64_t
+-T int64_t
+-T uint32_t
+-T int32_t
+-T uint16_t
+-T int16_t
+-T uint8_t
+-T int8_t
+-T STRINT_PAIR
+-T felem
+-T felem_bytearray
+-T SH_LIST
+-T PACKET
+-T RECORD_LAYER
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mk1mf.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/mk1mf.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mk1mf.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,1233 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/local/bin/perl
-# A bit of an evil hack but it post processes the file ../MINFO which
-# is generated by `make files` in the top directory.
-# This script outputs one mega makefile that has no shell stuff or any
-# funny stuff
-#
-
-$INSTALLTOP="/usr/local/ssl";
-$OPENSSLDIR="/usr/local/ssl";
-$OPTIONS="";
-$ssl_version="";
-$banner="\t\@echo Building OpenSSL";
-
-my $no_static_engine = 1;
-my $engines = "";
-my $otherlibs = "";
-local $zlib_opt = 0; # 0 = no zlib, 1 = static, 2 = dynamic
-local $zlib_lib = "";
-local $perl_asm = 0; # 1 to autobuild asm files from perl scripts
-
-my $ex_l_libs = "";
-
-# Options to import from top level Makefile
-
-my %mf_import = (
- VERSION => \$ssl_version,
- OPTIONS => \$OPTIONS,
- INSTALLTOP => \$INSTALLTOP,
- OPENSSLDIR => \$OPENSSLDIR,
- PLATFORM => \$mf_platform,
- CFLAG => \$mf_cflag,
- DEPFLAG => \$mf_depflag,
- CPUID_OBJ => \$mf_cpuid_asm,
- BN_ASM => \$mf_bn_asm,
- DES_ENC => \$mf_des_asm,
- AES_ENC => \$mf_aes_asm,
- BF_ENC => \$mf_bf_asm,
- CAST_ENC => \$mf_cast_asm,
- RC4_ENC => \$mf_rc4_asm,
- RC5_ENC => \$mf_rc5_asm,
- MD5_ASM_OBJ => \$mf_md5_asm,
- SHA1_ASM_OBJ => \$mf_sha_asm,
- RMD160_ASM_OBJ => \$mf_rmd_asm,
- WP_ASM_OBJ => \$mf_wp_asm,
- CMLL_ENC => \$mf_cm_asm,
- BASEADDR => \$baseaddr,
- FIPSDIR => \$fipsdir,
-);
-
-
-open(IN,"<Makefile") || die "unable to open Makefile!\n";
-while(<IN>) {
- my ($mf_opt, $mf_ref);
- while (($mf_opt, $mf_ref) = each %mf_import) {
- if (/^$mf_opt\s*=\s*(.*)$/) {
- $$mf_ref = $1;
- }
- }
-}
-close(IN);
-
-$debug = 1 if $mf_platform =~ /^debug-/;
-
-die "Makefile is not the toplevel Makefile!\n" if $ssl_version eq "";
-
-$infile="MINFO";
-
-%ops=(
- "VC-WIN32", "Microsoft Visual C++ [4-6] - Windows NT or 9X",
- "VC-WIN64I", "Microsoft C/C++ - Win64/IA-64",
- "VC-WIN64A", "Microsoft C/C++ - Win64/x64",
- "VC-CE", "Microsoft eMbedded Visual C++ 3.0 - Windows CE ONLY",
- "VC-NT", "Microsoft Visual C++ [4-6] - Windows NT ONLY",
- "Mingw32", "GNU C++ - Windows NT or 9x",
- "Mingw32-files", "Create files with DOS copy ...",
- "BC-NT", "Borland C++ 4.5 - Windows NT",
- "linux-elf","Linux elf",
- "ultrix-mips","DEC mips ultrix",
- "FreeBSD","FreeBSD distribution",
- "OS2-EMX", "EMX GCC OS/2",
- "netware-clib", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - CLib - with WinSock Sockets",
- "netware-clib-bsdsock", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - CLib - with BSD Sockets",
- "netware-libc", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - LibC - with WinSock Sockets",
- "netware-libc-bsdsock", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - LibC - with BSD Sockets",
- "default","cc under unix",
- "auto", "auto detect from top level Makefile"
- );
-
-$platform="";
-my $xcflags="";
-foreach (@ARGV)
- {
- if (!&read_options && !defined($ops{$_}))
- {
- print STDERR "unknown option - $_\n";
- print STDERR "usage: perl mk1mf.pl [options] [system]\n";
- print STDERR "\nwhere [system] can be one of the following\n";
- foreach $i (sort keys %ops)
- { printf STDERR "\t%-10s\t%s\n",$i,$ops{$i}; }
- print STDERR <<"EOF";
-and [options] can be one of
- no-md2 no-md4 no-md5 no-sha no-mdc2 - Skip this digest
- no-ripemd
- no-rc2 no-rc4 no-rc5 no-idea no-des - Skip this symetric cipher
- no-bf no-cast no-aes no-camellia no-seed
- no-rsa no-dsa no-dh - Skip this public key cipher
- no-ssl2 no-ssl3 - Skip this version of SSL
- just-ssl - remove all non-ssl keys/digest
- no-asm - No x86 asm
- no-krb5 - No KRB5
- no-srp - No SRP
- no-ec - No EC
- no-ecdsa - No ECDSA
- no-ecdh - No ECDH
- no-engine - No engine
- no-hw - No hw
- nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm
- nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare
- nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare
- gaswin - Use GNU as with Mingw32
- no-socks - No socket code
- no-err - No error strings
- dll/shlib - Build shared libraries (MS)
- debug - Debug build
- profile - Profiling build
- gcc - Use Gcc (unix)
-
-Values that can be set
-TMP=tmpdir OUT=outdir SRC=srcdir BIN=binpath INC=header-outdir CC=C-compiler
-
--L<ex_lib_path> -l<ex_lib> - extra library flags (unix)
--<ex_cc_flags> - extra 'cc' flags,
- added (MS), or replace (unix)
-EOF
- exit(1);
- }
- $platform=$_;
- }
-foreach (grep(!/^$/, split(/ /, $OPTIONS)))
- {
- print STDERR "unknown option - $_\n" if !&read_options;
- }
-
-$no_static_engine = 0 if (!$shlib);
-
-$no_mdc2=1 if ($no_des);
-
-$no_ssl3=1 if ($no_md5 || $no_sha);
-$no_ssl3=1 if ($no_rsa && $no_dh);
-
-$no_ssl2=1 if ($no_md5);
-$no_ssl2=1 if ($no_rsa);
-
-$out_def="out";
-$inc_def="outinc";
-$tmp_def="tmp";
-
-$perl="perl" unless defined $perl;
-$mkdir="-mkdir" unless defined $mkdir;
-
-($ssl,$crypto)=("ssl","crypto");
-$ranlib="echo ranlib";
-
-$cc=(defined($VARS{'CC'}))?$VARS{'CC'}:'cc';
-$src_dir=(defined($VARS{'SRC'}))?$VARS{'SRC'}:'.';
-$bin_dir=(defined($VARS{'BIN'}))?$VARS{'BIN'}:'';
-
-# $bin_dir.=$o causes a core dump on my sparc :-(
-
-
-$NT=0;
-
-push(@INC,"util/pl","pl");
-
-if ($platform eq "auto") {
- $platform = $mf_platform;
- print STDERR "Imported platform $mf_platform\n";
-}
-
-if (($platform =~ /VC-(.+)/))
- {
- $FLAVOR=$1;
- $NT = 1 if $1 eq "NT";
- require 'VC-32.pl';
- }
-elsif ($platform eq "Mingw32")
- {
- require 'Mingw32.pl';
- }
-elsif ($platform eq "Mingw32-files")
- {
- require 'Mingw32f.pl';
- }
-elsif ($platform eq "BC-NT")
- {
- $bc=1;
- require 'BC-32.pl';
- }
-elsif ($platform eq "FreeBSD")
- {
- require 'unix.pl';
- $cflags='-DTERMIO -D_ANSI_SOURCE -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer';
- }
-elsif ($platform eq "linux-elf")
- {
- require "unix.pl";
- require "linux.pl";
- $unix=1;
- }
-elsif ($platform eq "ultrix-mips")
- {
- require "unix.pl";
- require "ultrix.pl";
- $unix=1;
- }
-elsif ($platform eq "OS2-EMX")
- {
- $wc=1;
- require 'OS2-EMX.pl';
- }
-elsif (($platform eq "netware-clib") || ($platform eq "netware-libc") ||
- ($platform eq "netware-clib-bsdsock") || ($platform eq "netware-libc-bsdsock"))
- {
- $LIBC=1 if $platform eq "netware-libc" || $platform eq "netware-libc-bsdsock";
- $BSDSOCK=1 if ($platform eq "netware-libc-bsdsock") || ($platform eq "netware-clib-bsdsock");
- require 'netware.pl';
- }
-else
- {
- require "unix.pl";
-
- $unix=1;
- $cflags.=' -DTERMIO';
- }
-
-$fipsdir =~ s/\//${o}/g;
-
-$out_dir=(defined($VARS{'OUT'}))?$VARS{'OUT'}:$out_def.($debug?".dbg":"");
-$tmp_dir=(defined($VARS{'TMP'}))?$VARS{'TMP'}:$tmp_def.($debug?".dbg":"");
-$inc_dir=(defined($VARS{'INC'}))?$VARS{'INC'}:$inc_def;
-
-$bin_dir=$bin_dir.$o unless ((substr($bin_dir,-1,1) eq $o) || ($bin_dir eq ''));
-
-$cflags= "$xcflags$cflags" if $xcflags ne "";
-
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_IDEA" if $no_idea;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_AES" if $no_aes;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA" if $no_camellia;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SEED" if $no_seed;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RC2" if $no_rc2;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RC4" if $no_rc4;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5" if $no_rc5;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2" if $no_md2;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MD4" if $no_md4;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MD5" if $no_md5;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SHA" if $no_sha;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SHA1" if $no_sha1;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD" if $no_ripemd;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MDC2" if $no_mdc2;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_BF" if $no_bf;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CAST" if $no_cast;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_DES" if $no_des;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RSA" if $no_rsa;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_DSA" if $no_dsa;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_DH" if $no_dh;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL" if $no_whirlpool;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SOCK" if $no_sock;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2" if $no_ssl2;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL3" if $no_ssl3;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT" if $no_tlsext;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SRP" if $no_srp;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CMS" if $no_cms;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ERR" if $no_err;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5" if $no_krb5;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC" if $no_ec;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ECDSA" if $no_ecdsa;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ECDH" if $no_ecdh;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake;
-$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m;
-$cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
-$cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
-
-if ($no_static_engine)
- {
- $cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE";
- }
-else
- {
- $cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE";
- }
-
-#$cflags.=" -DRSAref" if $rsaref ne "";
-
-## if ($unix)
-## { $cflags="$c_flags" if ($c_flags ne ""); }
-##else
- { $cflags="$c_flags$cflags" if ($c_flags ne ""); }
-
-$ex_libs="$l_flags$ex_libs" if ($l_flags ne "");
-
-
-%shlib_ex_cflags=("SSL" => " -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL",
- "CRYPTO" => " -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO");
-
-if ($msdos)
- {
- $banner ="\t\@echo Make sure you have run 'perl Configure $platform' in the\n";
- $banner.="\t\@echo top level directory, if you don't have perl, you will\n";
- $banner.="\t\@echo need to probably edit crypto/bn/bn.h, check the\n";
- $banner.="\t\@echo documentation for details.\n";
- }
-
-# have to do this to allow $(CC) under unix
-$link="$bin_dir$link" if ($link !~ /^\$/);
-
-$INSTALLTOP =~ s|/|$o|g;
-$OPENSSLDIR =~ s|/|$o|g;
-
-#############################################
-# We parse in input file and 'store' info for later printing.
-open(IN,"<$infile") || die "unable to open $infile:$!\n";
-$_=<IN>;
-for (;;)
- {
- s/\s*$//; # was chop, didn't work in mixture of perls for Windows...
-
- ($key,$val)=/^([^=]+)=(.*)/;
- if ($key eq "RELATIVE_DIRECTORY")
- {
- if ($lib ne "")
- {
- $uc=$lib;
- $uc =~ s/^lib(.*)\.a/$1/;
- $uc =~ tr/a-z/A-Z/;
- $lib_nam{$uc}=$uc;
- $lib_obj{$uc}.=$libobj." ";
- }
- last if ($val eq "FINISHED");
- $lib="";
- $libobj="";
- $dir=$val;
- }
-
- if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES")
- { $cflags .= " $val";}
-
- if ($key eq "ZLIB_INCLUDE")
- { $cflags .= " $val" if $val ne "";}
-
- if ($key eq "LIBZLIB")
- { $zlib_lib = "$val" if $val ne "";}
-
- if ($key eq "LIBKRB5")
- { $ex_libs .= " $val" if $val ne "";}
-
- if ($key eq "TEST")
- { $test.=&var_add($dir,$val, 0); }
-
- if (($key eq "PROGS") || ($key eq "E_OBJ"))
- { $e_exe.=&var_add($dir,$val, 0); }
-
- if ($key eq "LIB")
- {
- $lib=$val;
- $lib =~ s/^.*\/([^\/]+)$/$1/;
- }
- if ($key eq "LIBNAME" && $no_static_engine)
- {
- $lib=$val;
- $lib =~ s/^.*\/([^\/]+)$/$1/;
- $otherlibs .= " $lib";
- }
-
- if ($key eq "EXHEADER")
- { $exheader.=&var_add($dir,$val, 1); }
-
- if ($key eq "HEADER")
- { $header.=&var_add($dir,$val, 1); }
-
- if ($key eq "LIBOBJ" && ($dir ne "engines" || !$no_static_engine))
- { $libobj=&var_add($dir,$val, 0); }
- if ($key eq "LIBNAMES" && $dir eq "engines" && $no_static_engine)
- { $engines.=$val }
-
- if (!($_=<IN>))
- { $_="RELATIVE_DIRECTORY=FINISHED\n"; }
- }
-close(IN);
-
-if ($shlib)
- {
- $extra_install= <<"EOF";
- \$(CP) \"\$(O_SSL)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\"
- \$(CP) \"\$(O_CRYPTO)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\"
- \$(CP) \"\$(L_SSL)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\"
- \$(CP) \"\$(L_CRYPTO)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\"
-EOF
- if ($no_static_engine)
- {
- $extra_install .= <<"EOF"
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib${o}engines\"
- \$(CP) \"\$(E_SHLIB)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib${o}engines\"
-EOF
- }
- }
-else
- {
- $extra_install= <<"EOF";
- \$(CP) \"\$(O_SSL)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\"
- \$(CP) \"\$(O_CRYPTO)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\"
-EOF
- $ex_libs .= " $zlib_lib" if $zlib_opt == 1;
- if ($fips)
- {
- $build_targets .= " \$(LIB_D)$o$crypto_compat \$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)";
- $ex_l_libs .= " \$(O_FIPSCANISTER)";
- }
- }
-
-$defs= <<"EOF";
-# This makefile has been automatically generated from the OpenSSL distribution.
-# This single makefile will build the complete OpenSSL distribution and
-# by default leave the 'intertesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff
-# that needs deleting in .${o}tmp.
-# The file was generated by running 'make makefile.one', which
-# does a 'make files', which writes all the environment variables from all
-# the makefiles to the file call MINFO. This file is used by
-# util${o}mk1mf.pl to generate makefile.one.
-# The 'makefile per directory' system suites me when developing this
-# library and also so I can 'distribute' indervidual library sections.
-# The one monster makefile better suits building in non-unix
-# environments.
-
-EOF
-
-$defs .= $preamble if defined $preamble;
-
-$defs.= <<"EOF";
-INSTALLTOP=$INSTALLTOP
-OPENSSLDIR=$OPENSSLDIR
-
-# Set your compiler options
-PLATFORM=$platform
-CC=$bin_dir${cc}
-CFLAG=$cflags
-APP_CFLAG=$app_cflag
-LIB_CFLAG=$lib_cflag
-SHLIB_CFLAG=$shl_cflag
-APP_EX_OBJ=$app_ex_obj
-SHLIB_EX_OBJ=$shlib_ex_obj
-# add extra libraries to this define, for solaris -lsocket -lnsl would
-# be added
-EX_LIBS=$ex_libs
-
-# The OpenSSL directory
-SRC_D=$src_dir
-
-LINK=$link
-LFLAGS=$lflags
-RSC=$rsc
-
-# The output directory for everything intersting
-OUT_D=$out_dir
-# The output directory for all the temporary muck
-TMP_D=$tmp_dir
-# The output directory for the header files
-INC_D=$inc_dir
-INCO_D=$inc_dir${o}openssl
-
-PERL=$perl
-CP=$cp
-RM=$rm
-RANLIB=$ranlib
-MKDIR=$mkdir
-MKLIB=$bin_dir$mklib
-MLFLAGS=$mlflags
-ASM=$bin_dir$asm
-
-# FIPS validated module and support file locations
-
-FIPSDIR=$fipsdir
-BASEADDR=$baseaddr
-FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSDIR)${o}lib
-FIPS_PREMAIN_SRC=\$(FIPSLIB_D)${o}fips_premain.c
-O_FIPSCANISTER=\$(FIPSLIB_D)${o}fipscanister.lib
-FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPSDIR)${o}bin${o}fips_standalone_sha1${exep}
-E_PREMAIN_DSO=fips_premain_dso
-PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=\$(BIN_D)${o}fips_premain_dso$exep
-FIPSLINK=\$(PERL) \$(FIPSDIR)${o}bin${o}fipslink.pl
-
-######################################################
-# You should not need to touch anything below this point
-######################################################
-
-E_EXE=openssl
-SSL=$ssl
-CRYPTO=$crypto
-
-# BIN_D - Binary output directory
-# TEST_D - Binary test file output directory
-# LIB_D - library output directory
-# ENG_D - dynamic engine output directory
-# Note: if you change these point to different directories then uncomment out
-# the lines around the 'NB' comment below.
-#
-BIN_D=\$(OUT_D)
-TEST_D=\$(OUT_D)
-LIB_D=\$(OUT_D)
-ENG_D=\$(OUT_D)
-
-# INCL_D - local library directory
-# OBJ_D - temp object file directory
-OBJ_D=\$(TMP_D)
-INCL_D=\$(TMP_D)
-
-O_SSL= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(SSL)$shlibp
-O_CRYPTO= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(CRYPTO)$shlibp
-SO_SSL= $plib\$(SSL)$so_shlibp
-SO_CRYPTO= $plib\$(CRYPTO)$so_shlibp
-L_SSL= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(SSL)$libp
-L_CRYPTO= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(CRYPTO)$libp
-
-L_LIBS= \$(L_SSL) \$(L_CRYPTO) $ex_l_libs
-
-######################################################
-# Don't touch anything below this point
-######################################################
-
-INC=-I\$(INC_D) -I\$(INCL_D)
-APP_CFLAGS=\$(INC) \$(CFLAG) \$(APP_CFLAG)
-LIB_CFLAGS=\$(INC) \$(CFLAG) \$(LIB_CFLAG)
-SHLIB_CFLAGS=\$(INC) \$(CFLAG) \$(LIB_CFLAG) \$(SHLIB_CFLAG)
-LIBS_DEP=\$(O_CRYPTO) \$(O_SSL)
-
-#############################################
-EOF
-
-$rules=<<"EOF";
-all: banner \$(TMP_D) \$(BIN_D) \$(TEST_D) \$(LIB_D) \$(INCO_D) headers lib exe $build_targets
-
-banner:
-$banner
-
-\$(TMP_D):
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(TMP_D)\"
-# NB: uncomment out these lines if BIN_D, TEST_D and LIB_D are different
-#\$(BIN_D):
-# \$(MKDIR) \$(BIN_D)
-#
-#\$(TEST_D):
-# \$(MKDIR) \$(TEST_D)
-
-\$(LIB_D):
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(LIB_D)\"
-
-\$(INCO_D): \$(INC_D)
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INCO_D)\"
-
-\$(INC_D):
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INC_D)\"
-
-headers: \$(HEADER) \$(EXHEADER)
- @
-
-lib: \$(LIBS_DEP) \$(E_SHLIB)
-
-exe: \$(T_EXE) \$(BIN_D)$o\$(E_EXE)$exep
-
-install: all
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)\"
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\"
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}include\"
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}include${o}openssl\"
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\"
- \$(CP) \"\$(INCO_D)${o}*.\[ch\]\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}include${o}openssl\"
- \$(CP) \"\$(BIN_D)$o\$(E_EXE)$exep \$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\"
- \$(MKDIR) \"\$(OPENSSLDIR)\"
- \$(CP) apps${o}openssl.cnf \"\$(OPENSSLDIR)\"
-$extra_install
-
-
-test: \$(T_EXE)
- cd \$(BIN_D)
- ..${o}ms${o}test
-
-clean:
- \$(RM) \$(TMP_D)$o*.*
-
-vclean:
- \$(RM) \$(TMP_D)$o*.*
- \$(RM) \$(OUT_D)$o*.*
-
-EOF
-
-my $platform_cpp_symbol = "MK1MF_PLATFORM_$platform";
-$platform_cpp_symbol =~ s/-/_/g;
-if (open(IN,"crypto/buildinf.h"))
- {
- # Remove entry for this platform in existing file buildinf.h.
-
- my $old_buildinf_h = "";
- while (<IN>)
- {
- if (/^\#ifdef $platform_cpp_symbol$/)
- {
- while (<IN>) { last if (/^\#endif/); }
- }
- else
- {
- $old_buildinf_h .= $_;
- }
- }
- close(IN);
-
- open(OUT,">crypto/buildinf.h") || die "Can't open buildinf.h";
- print OUT $old_buildinf_h;
- close(OUT);
- }
-
-open (OUT,">>crypto/buildinf.h") || die "Can't open buildinf.h";
-printf OUT <<EOF;
-#ifdef $platform_cpp_symbol
- /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
- #define CFLAGS "compiler: $cc $cflags"
- #define PLATFORM "$platform"
-EOF
-printf OUT " #define DATE \"%s\"\n", scalar gmtime();
-printf OUT "#endif\n";
-close(OUT);
-
-# Strip of trailing ' '
-foreach (keys %lib_obj) { $lib_obj{$_}=&clean_up_ws($lib_obj{$_}); }
-$test=&clean_up_ws($test);
-$e_exe=&clean_up_ws($e_exe);
-$exheader=&clean_up_ws($exheader);
-$header=&clean_up_ws($header);
-
-# First we strip the exheaders from the headers list
-foreach (split(/\s+/,$exheader)){ $h{$_}=1; }
-foreach (split(/\s+/,$header)) { $h.=$_." " unless $h{$_}; }
-chop($h); $header=$h;
-
-$defs.=&do_defs("HEADER",$header,"\$(INCL_D)","");
-$rules.=&do_copy_rule("\$(INCL_D)",$header,"");
-
-$defs.=&do_defs("EXHEADER",$exheader,"\$(INCO_D)","");
-$rules.=&do_copy_rule("\$(INCO_D)",$exheader,"");
-
-$defs.=&do_defs("T_OBJ",$test,"\$(OBJ_D)",$obj);
-$rules.=&do_compile_rule("\$(OBJ_D)",$test,"\$(APP_CFLAGS)");
-
-$defs.=&do_defs("E_OBJ",$e_exe,"\$(OBJ_D)",$obj);
-$rules.=&do_compile_rule("\$(OBJ_D)",$e_exe,'-DMONOLITH $(APP_CFLAGS)');
-
-# Special case rule for fips_premain_dso
-
-if ($fips)
- {
- $rules.=&cc_compile_target("\$(OBJ_D)${o}\$(E_PREMAIN_DSO)$obj",
- "\$(FIPS_PREMAIN_SRC)",
- "-DFINGERPRINT_PREMAIN_DSO_LOAD \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS)", "");
- $rules.=&do_link_rule("\$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)","\$(OBJ_D)${o}\$(E_PREMAIN_DSO)$obj \$(CRYPTOOBJ) \$(O_FIPSCANISTER)","","\$(EX_LIBS)", 1);
- }
-
-foreach (values %lib_nam)
- {
- $lib_obj=$lib_obj{$_};
- local($slib)=$shlib;
-
- $defs.=&do_defs(${_}."OBJ",$lib_obj,"\$(OBJ_D)",$obj);
- $lib=($slib)?" \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS)".$shlib_ex_cflags{$_}:" \$(LIB_CFLAGS)";
- $rules.=&do_compile_rule("\$(OBJ_D)",$lib_obj{$_},$lib);
- }
-
-# hack to add version info on MSVC
-if (($platform eq "VC-WIN32") || ($platform eq "VC-WIN64A")
- || ($platform eq "VC-WIN64I") || ($platform eq "VC-NT")) {
- $rules.= <<"EOF";
-\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(CRYPTO).res: ms\\version32.rc
- \$(RSC) /fo"\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(CRYPTO).res" /d CRYPTO ms\\version32.rc
-
-\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(SSL).res: ms\\version32.rc
- \$(RSC) /fo"\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(SSL).res" /d SSL ms\\version32.rc
-
-EOF
-}
-
-$defs.=&do_defs("T_EXE",$test,"\$(TEST_D)",$exep);
-foreach (split(/\s+/,$test))
- {
- $t=&bname($_);
- $tt="\$(OBJ_D)${o}$t${obj}";
- $rules.=&do_link_rule("\$(TEST_D)$o$t$exep",$tt,"\$(LIBS_DEP)","\$(L_LIBS) \$(EX_LIBS)");
- }
-
-$defs.=&do_defs("E_SHLIB",$engines . $otherlibs,"\$(ENG_D)",$shlibp);
-
-foreach (split(/\s+/,$engines))
- {
- $rules.=&do_compile_rule("\$(OBJ_D)","engines${o}e_$_",$lib);
- $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(OBJ_D)${o}e_${_}.obj","\$(ENG_D)$o$_$shlibp","",$shlib,"");
- }
-
-
-
-$rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(SSLOBJ)","\$(O_SSL)",$ssl,$shlib,"\$(SO_SSL)");
-
-if ($fips)
- {
- if ($shlib)
- {
- $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(CRYPTOOBJ) \$(O_FIPSCANISTER)",
- "\$(O_CRYPTO)", "$crypto",
- $shlib, "\$(SO_CRYPTO)", "\$(BASEADDR)");
- }
- else
- {
- $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(CRYPTOOBJ)",
- "\$(O_CRYPTO)",$crypto,$shlib,"\$(SO_CRYPTO)", "");
- $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(CRYPTOOBJ) \$(O_FIPSCANISTER)",
- "\$(LIB_D)$o$crypto_compat",$crypto,$shlib,"\$(SO_CRYPTO)", "");
- }
- }
- else
- {
- $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(CRYPTOOBJ)","\$(O_CRYPTO)",$crypto,$shlib,
- "\$(SO_CRYPTO)");
- }
-
-foreach (split(" ",$otherlibs))
- {
- my $uc = $_;
- $uc =~ tr /a-z/A-Z/;
- $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(${uc}OBJ)","\$(ENG_D)$o$_$shlibp", "", $shlib, "");
-
- }
-
-$rules.=&do_link_rule("\$(BIN_D)$o\$(E_EXE)$exep","\$(E_OBJ)","\$(LIBS_DEP)","\$(L_LIBS) \$(EX_LIBS)", ($fips && !$shlib) ? 2 : 0);
-
-print $defs;
-
-if ($platform eq "linux-elf") {
- print <<"EOF";
-# Generate perlasm output files
-%.cpp:
- (cd \$(\@D)/..; PERL=perl make -f Makefile asm/\$(\@F))
-EOF
-}
-print "###################################################################\n";
-print $rules;
-
-###############################################
-# strip off any trailing .[och] and append the relative directory
-# also remembering to do nothing if we are in one of the dropped
-# directories
-sub var_add
- {
- local($dir,$val,$keepext)=@_;
- local(@a,$_,$ret);
-
- return("") if $no_engine && $dir =~ /\/engine/;
- return("") if $no_hw && $dir =~ /\/hw/;
- return("") if $no_idea && $dir =~ /\/idea/;
- return("") if $no_aes && $dir =~ /\/aes/;
- return("") if $no_camellia && $dir =~ /\/camellia/;
- return("") if $no_seed && $dir =~ /\/seed/;
- return("") if $no_rc2 && $dir =~ /\/rc2/;
- return("") if $no_rc4 && $dir =~ /\/rc4/;
- return("") if $no_rc5 && $dir =~ /\/rc5/;
- return("") if $no_rsa && $dir =~ /\/rsa/;
- return("") if $no_rsa && $dir =~ /^rsaref/;
- return("") if $no_dsa && $dir =~ /\/dsa/;
- return("") if $no_dh && $dir =~ /\/dh/;
- return("") if $no_ec && $dir =~ /\/ec/;
- return("") if $no_gost && $dir =~ /\/ccgost/;
- return("") if $no_cms && $dir =~ /\/cms/;
- return("") if $no_jpake && $dir =~ /\/jpake/;
- if ($no_des && $dir =~ /\/des/)
- {
- if ($val =~ /read_pwd/)
- { return("$dir/read_pwd "); }
- else
- { return(""); }
- }
- return("") if $no_mdc2 && $dir =~ /\/mdc2/;
- return("") if $no_sock && $dir =~ /\/proxy/;
- return("") if $no_bf && $dir =~ /\/bf/;
- return("") if $no_cast && $dir =~ /\/cast/;
- return("") if $no_whirlpool && $dir =~ /\/whrlpool/;
-
- $val =~ s/^\s*(.*)\s*$/$1/;
- @a=split(/\s+/,$val);
- grep(s/\.[och]$//, at a) unless $keepext;
-
- @a=grep(!/^e_.*_3d$/, at a) if $no_des;
- @a=grep(!/^e_.*_d$/, at a) if $no_des;
- @a=grep(!/^e_.*_ae$/, at a) if $no_idea;
- @a=grep(!/^e_.*_i$/, at a) if $no_aes;
- @a=grep(!/^e_.*_r2$/, at a) if $no_rc2;
- @a=grep(!/^e_.*_r5$/, at a) if $no_rc5;
- @a=grep(!/^e_.*_bf$/, at a) if $no_bf;
- @a=grep(!/^e_.*_c$/, at a) if $no_cast;
- @a=grep(!/^e_rc4$/, at a) if $no_rc4;
- @a=grep(!/^e_camellia$/, at a) if $no_camellia;
- @a=grep(!/^e_seed$/, at a) if $no_seed;
-
- #@a=grep(!/(^s2_)|(^s23_)/, at a) if $no_ssl2;
- #@a=grep(!/(^s3_)|(^s23_)/, at a) if $no_ssl3;
-
- @a=grep(!/(_sock$)|(_acpt$)|(_conn$)|(^pxy_)/, at a) if $no_sock;
-
- @a=grep(!/(^md2)|(_md2$)/, at a) if $no_md2;
- @a=grep(!/(^md4)|(_md4$)/, at a) if $no_md4;
- @a=grep(!/(^md5)|(_md5$)/, at a) if $no_md5;
- @a=grep(!/(rmd)|(ripemd)/, at a) if $no_ripemd;
-
- @a=grep(!/(^d2i_r_)|(^i2d_r_)/, at a) if $no_rsa;
- @a=grep(!/(^p_open$)|(^p_seal$)/, at a) if $no_rsa;
- @a=grep(!/(^pem_seal$)/, at a) if $no_rsa;
-
- @a=grep(!/(m_dss$)|(m_dss1$)/, at a) if $no_dsa;
- @a=grep(!/(^d2i_s_)|(^i2d_s_)|(_dsap$)/, at a) if $no_dsa;
-
- @a=grep(!/^n_pkey$/, at a) if $no_rsa || $no_rc4;
-
- @a=grep(!/_dhp$/, at a) if $no_dh;
-
- @a=grep(!/(^sha[^1])|(_sha$)|(m_dss$)/, at a) if $no_sha;
- @a=grep(!/(^sha1)|(_sha1$)|(m_dss1$)/, at a) if $no_sha1;
- @a=grep(!/_mdc2$/, at a) if $no_mdc2;
-
- @a=grep(!/(srp)/, at a) if $no_srp;
-
- @a=grep(!/^engine$/, at a) if $no_engine;
- @a=grep(!/^hw$/, at a) if $no_hw;
- @a=grep(!/(^rsa$)|(^genrsa$)/, at a) if $no_rsa;
- @a=grep(!/(^dsa$)|(^gendsa$)|(^dsaparam$)/, at a) if $no_dsa;
- @a=grep(!/^gendsa$/, at a) if $no_sha1;
- @a=grep(!/(^dh$)|(^gendh$)/, at a) if $no_dh;
-
- @a=grep(!/(^dh)|(_sha1$)|(m_dss1$)/, at a) if $no_sha1;
-
- grep($_="$dir/$_", at a);
- @a=grep(!/(^|\/)s_/, at a) if $no_sock;
- @a=grep(!/(^|\/)bio_sock/, at a) if $no_sock;
- $ret=join(' ', at a)." ";
- return($ret);
- }
-
-# change things so that each 'token' is only separated by one space
-sub clean_up_ws
- {
- local($w)=@_;
-
- $w =~ s/^\s*(.*)\s*$/$1/;
- $w =~ s/\s+/ /g;
- return($w);
- }
-
-sub do_defs
- {
- local($var,$files,$location,$postfix)=@_;
- local($_,$ret,$pf);
- local(*OUT,$tmp,$t);
-
- $files =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
- $ret="$var=";
- $n=1;
- $Vars{$var}.="";
- foreach (split(/ /,$files))
- {
- $orig=$_;
- $_=&bname($_) unless /^\$/;
- if ($n++ == 2)
- {
- $n=0;
- $ret.="\\\n\t";
- }
- if (($_ =~ /bss_file/) && ($postfix eq ".h"))
- { $pf=".c"; }
- else { $pf=$postfix; }
- if ($_ =~ /BN_ASM/) { $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /BNCO_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /AES_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /DES_ENC/) { $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /BF_ENC/) { $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /CAST_ENC/){ $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /RC4_ENC/) { $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /RC5_ENC/) { $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /MD5_ASM/) { $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /SHA1_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /RMD160_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /WHIRLPOOL_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
- elsif ($_ =~ /CPUID_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
- else { $t="$location${o}$_$pf "; }
-
- $Vars{$var}.="$t ";
- $ret.=$t;
- }
- # hack to add version info on MSVC
- if ($shlib && (($platform eq "VC-WIN32") || ($platfrom eq "VC-WIN64I") || ($platform eq "VC-WIN64A") || ($platform eq "VC-NT")))
- {
- if ($var eq "CRYPTOOBJ")
- { $ret.="\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(CRYPTO).res "; }
- elsif ($var eq "SSLOBJ")
- { $ret.="\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(SSL).res "; }
- }
- chomp($ret);
- $ret.="\n\n";
- return($ret);
- }
-
-# return the name with the leading path removed
-sub bname
- {
- local($ret)=@_;
- $ret =~ s/^.*[\\\/]([^\\\/]+)$/$1/;
- return($ret);
- }
-
-# return the leading path
-sub dname
- {
- my $ret=shift;
- $ret =~ s/(^.*)[\\\/][^\\\/]+$/$1/;
- return($ret);
- }
-
-##############################################################
-# do a rule for each file that says 'compile' to new direcory
-# compile the files in '$files' into $to
-sub do_compile_rule
- {
- local($to,$files,$ex)=@_;
- local($ret,$_,$n,$d,$s);
-
- $files =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
- foreach (split(/\s+/,$files))
- {
- $n=&bname($_);
- $d=&dname($_);
- if (-f "${_}.c")
- {
- $ret.=&cc_compile_target("$to${o}$n$obj","${_}.c",$ex)
- }
- elsif (-f ($s="${d}${o}asm${o}${n}.pl") or
- ($s=~s/sha256/sha512/ and -f $s) or
- -f ($s="${d}${o}${n}.pl"))
- {
- $ret.=&perlasm_compile_target("$to${o}$n$obj",$s,$n);
- }
- elsif (-f ($s="${d}${o}asm${o}${n}.S") or
- -f ($s="${d}${o}${n}.S"))
- {
- $ret.=&Sasm_compile_target("$to${o}$n$obj",$s,$n);
- }
- else { die "no rule for $_"; }
- }
- return($ret);
- }
-
-##############################################################
-# do a rule for each file that says 'compile' to new direcory
-sub perlasm_compile_target
- {
- my($target,$source,$bname)=@_;
- my($ret);
-
- $bname =~ s/(.*)\.[^\.]$/$1/;
- $ret ="\$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm: $source\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(PERL) $source $asmtype \$(CFLAG) >\$\@\n\n";
- $ret.="$target: \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(ASM) $afile\$\@ \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm\n\n";
- return($ret);
- }
-
-sub Sasm_compile_target
- {
- my($target,$source,$bname)=@_;
- my($ret);
-
- $bname =~ s/(.*)\.[^\.]$/$1/;
- $ret ="\$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm: $source\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(CC) -E \$(CFLAG) $source >\$\@\n\n";
- $ret.="$target: \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(ASM) $afile\$\@ \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm\n\n";
- return($ret);
- }
-
-sub cc_compile_target
- {
- local($target,$source,$ex_flags, $srcd)=@_;
- local($ret);
-
- $ex_flags.=" -DMK1MF_BUILD -D$platform_cpp_symbol" if ($source =~ /cversion/);
- $target =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne "/";
- $source =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne "/";
- $srcd = "\$(SRC_D)$o" unless defined $srcd;
- $ret ="$target: $srcd$source\n\t";
- $ret.="\$(CC) ${ofile}$target $ex_flags -c $srcd$source\n\n";
- return($ret);
- }
-
-##############################################################
-sub do_asm_rule
- {
- local($target,$src)=@_;
- local($ret, at s, at t,$i);
-
- $target =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne "/";
- $src =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne "/";
-
- @t=split(/\s+/,$target);
- @s=split(/\s+/,$src);
-
-
- for ($i=0; $i<=$#s; $i++)
- {
- my $objfile = $t[$i];
- my $srcfile = $s[$i];
-
- if ($perl_asm == 1)
- {
- my $plasm = $objfile;
- $plasm =~ s/${obj}/.pl/;
- $ret.="$srcfile: $plasm\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(PERL) $plasm $asmtype \$(CFLAG) >$srcfile\n\n";
- }
-
- $ret.="$objfile: $srcfile\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(ASM) $afile$objfile \$(SRC_D)$o$srcfile\n\n";
- }
- return($ret);
- }
-
-sub do_shlib_rule
- {
- local($n,$def)=@_;
- local($ret,$nn);
- local($t);
-
- ($nn=$n) =~ tr/a-z/A-Z/;
- $ret.="$n.dll: \$(${nn}OBJ)\n";
- if ($vc && $w32)
- {
- $ret.="\t\$(MKSHLIB) $efile$n.dll $def @<<\n \$(${nn}OBJ_F)\n<<\n";
- }
- $ret.="\n";
- return($ret);
- }
-
-# do a rule for each file that says 'copy' to new direcory on change
-sub do_copy_rule
- {
- local($to,$files,$p)=@_;
- local($ret,$_,$n,$pp);
-
- $files =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
- foreach (split(/\s+/,$files))
- {
- $n=&bname($_);
- if ($n =~ /bss_file/)
- { $pp=".c"; }
- else { $pp=$p; }
- $ret.="$to${o}$n$pp: \$(SRC_D)$o$_$pp\n\t\$(CP) \"\$(SRC_D)$o$_$pp\" \"$to${o}$n$pp\"\n\n";
- }
- return($ret);
- }
-
-# Options picked up from the OPTIONS line in the top level Makefile
-# generated by Configure.
-
-sub read_options
- {
- # Many options are handled in a similar way. In particular
- # no-xxx sets zero or more scalars to 1.
- # Process these using the %valid_options hash containing the option
- # name and reference to the scalars to set. In some cases the option
- # needs no special handling and can be ignored: this is done by
- # setting the value to 0.
-
- my %valid_options = (
- "no-rc2" => \$no_rc2,
- "no-rc4" => \$no_rc4,
- "no-rc5" => \$no_rc5,
- "no-idea" => \$no_idea,
- "no-aes" => \$no_aes,
- "no-camellia" => \$no_camellia,
- "no-seed" => \$no_seed,
- "no-des" => \$no_des,
- "no-bf" => \$no_bf,
- "no-cast" => \$no_cast,
- "no-md2" => \$no_md2,
- "no-md4" => \$no_md4,
- "no-md5" => \$no_md5,
- "no-sha" => \$no_sha,
- "no-sha1" => \$no_sha1,
- "no-ripemd" => \$no_ripemd,
- "no-mdc2" => \$no_mdc2,
- "no-whirlpool" => \$no_whirlpool,
- "no-patents" =>
- [\$no_rc2, \$no_rc4, \$no_rc5, \$no_idea, \$no_rsa],
- "no-rsa" => \$no_rsa,
- "no-dsa" => \$no_dsa,
- "no-dh" => \$no_dh,
- "no-hmac" => \$no_hmac,
- "no-asm" => \$no_asm,
- "nasm" => \$nasm,
- "nw-nasm" => \$nw_nasm,
- "nw-mwasm" => \$nw_mwasm,
- "gaswin" => \$gaswin,
- "no-ssl2" => \$no_ssl2,
- "no-ssl3" => \$no_ssl3,
- "no-ssl3-method" => 0,
- "no-tlsext" => \$no_tlsext,
- "no-srp" => \$no_srp,
- "no-cms" => \$no_cms,
- "no-ec2m" => \$no_ec2m,
- "no-jpake" => \$no_jpake,
- "no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => 0,
- "no-err" => \$no_err,
- "no-sock" => \$no_sock,
- "no-krb5" => \$no_krb5,
- "no-ec" => \$no_ec,
- "no-ecdsa" => \$no_ecdsa,
- "no-ecdh" => \$no_ecdh,
- "no-gost" => \$no_gost,
- "no-engine" => \$no_engine,
- "no-hw" => \$no_hw,
- "no-rsax" => 0,
- "just-ssl" =>
- [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast,
- \$no_md2, \$no_sha, \$no_mdc2, \$no_dsa, \$no_dh,
- \$no_ssl2, \$no_err, \$no_ripemd, \$no_rc5,
- \$no_aes, \$no_camellia, \$no_seed, \$no_srp],
- "rsaref" => 0,
- "gcc" => \$gcc,
- "debug" => \$debug,
- "profile" => \$profile,
- "shlib" => \$shlib,
- "dll" => \$shlib,
- "shared" => 0,
- "no-sctp" => 0,
- "no-srtp" => 0,
- "no-gmp" => 0,
- "no-rfc3779" => 0,
- "no-montasm" => 0,
- "no-shared" => 0,
- "no-store" => 0,
- "no-unit-test" => 0,
- "no-zlib" => 0,
- "no-zlib-dynamic" => 0,
- "fips" => \$fips
- );
-
- if (exists $valid_options{$_})
- {
- my $r = $valid_options{$_};
- if ( ref $r eq "SCALAR")
- { $$r = 1;}
- elsif ( ref $r eq "ARRAY")
- {
- my $r2;
- foreach $r2 (@$r)
- {
- $$r2 = 1;
- }
- }
- }
- elsif (/^no-comp$/) { $xcflags = "-DOPENSSL_NO_COMP $xcflags"; }
- elsif (/^enable-zlib$/) { $zlib_opt = 1 if $zlib_opt == 0 }
- elsif (/^enable-zlib-dynamic$/)
- {
- $zlib_opt = 2;
- }
- elsif (/^no-static-engine/)
- {
- $no_static_engine = 1;
- }
- elsif (/^enable-static-engine/)
- {
- $no_static_engine = 0;
- }
- # There are also enable-xxx options which correspond to
- # the no-xxx. Since the scalars are enabled by default
- # these can be ignored.
- elsif (/^enable-/)
- {
- my $t = $_;
- $t =~ s/^enable/no/;
- if (exists $valid_options{$t})
- {return 1;}
- return 0;
- }
- # experimental-xxx is mostly like enable-xxx, but opensslconf.v
- # will still set OPENSSL_NO_xxx unless we set OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_xxx.
- # (No need to fail if we don't know the algorithm -- this is for adventurous users only.)
- elsif (/^experimental-/)
- {
- my $algo, $ALGO;
- ($algo = $_) =~ s/^experimental-//;
- ($ALGO = $algo) =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/;
-
- $xcflags="-DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO $xcflags";
-
- }
- elsif (/^--with-krb5-flavor=(.*)$/)
- {
- my $krb5_flavor = $1;
- if ($krb5_flavor =~ /^force-[Hh]eimdal$/)
- {
- $xcflags="-DKRB5_HEIMDAL $xcflags";
- }
- elsif ($krb5_flavor =~ /^MIT/i)
- {
- $xcflags="-DKRB5_MIT $xcflags";
- if ($krb5_flavor =~ /^MIT[._-]*1[._-]*[01]/i)
- {
- $xcflags="-DKRB5_MIT_OLD11 $xcflags"
- }
- }
- }
- elsif (/^([^=]*)=(.*)$/){ $VARS{$1}=$2; }
- elsif (/^-[lL].*$/) { $l_flags.="$_ "; }
- elsif ((!/^-help/) && (!/^-h/) && (!/^-\?/) && /^-.*$/)
- { $c_flags.="$_ "; }
- else { return(0); }
- return(1);
- }
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mk1mf.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/mk1mf.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mk1mf.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mk1mf.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,1233 @@
+#!/usr/local/bin/perl
+# A bit of an evil hack but it post processes the file ../MINFO which
+# is generated by `make files` in the top directory.
+# This script outputs one mega makefile that has no shell stuff or any
+# funny stuff
+#
+
+$INSTALLTOP="/usr/local/ssl";
+$OPENSSLDIR="/usr/local/ssl";
+$OPTIONS="";
+$ssl_version="";
+$banner="\t\@echo Building OpenSSL";
+
+my $no_static_engine = 1;
+my $engines = "";
+my $otherlibs = "";
+local $zlib_opt = 0; # 0 = no zlib, 1 = static, 2 = dynamic
+local $zlib_lib = "";
+local $perl_asm = 0; # 1 to autobuild asm files from perl scripts
+
+my $ex_l_libs = "";
+
+# Options to import from top level Makefile
+
+my %mf_import = (
+ VERSION => \$ssl_version,
+ OPTIONS => \$OPTIONS,
+ INSTALLTOP => \$INSTALLTOP,
+ OPENSSLDIR => \$OPENSSLDIR,
+ PLATFORM => \$mf_platform,
+ CFLAG => \$mf_cflag,
+ DEPFLAG => \$mf_depflag,
+ CPUID_OBJ => \$mf_cpuid_asm,
+ BN_ASM => \$mf_bn_asm,
+ DES_ENC => \$mf_des_asm,
+ AES_ENC => \$mf_aes_asm,
+ BF_ENC => \$mf_bf_asm,
+ CAST_ENC => \$mf_cast_asm,
+ RC4_ENC => \$mf_rc4_asm,
+ RC5_ENC => \$mf_rc5_asm,
+ MD5_ASM_OBJ => \$mf_md5_asm,
+ SHA1_ASM_OBJ => \$mf_sha_asm,
+ RMD160_ASM_OBJ => \$mf_rmd_asm,
+ WP_ASM_OBJ => \$mf_wp_asm,
+ CMLL_ENC => \$mf_cm_asm,
+ BASEADDR => \$baseaddr,
+ FIPSDIR => \$fipsdir,
+);
+
+
+open(IN,"<Makefile") || die "unable to open Makefile!\n";
+while(<IN>) {
+ my ($mf_opt, $mf_ref);
+ while (($mf_opt, $mf_ref) = each %mf_import) {
+ if (/^$mf_opt\s*=\s*(.*)$/) {
+ $$mf_ref = $1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+close(IN);
+
+$debug = 1 if $mf_platform =~ /^debug-/;
+
+die "Makefile is not the toplevel Makefile!\n" if $ssl_version eq "";
+
+$infile="MINFO";
+
+%ops=(
+ "VC-WIN32", "Microsoft Visual C++ [4-6] - Windows NT or 9X",
+ "VC-WIN64I", "Microsoft C/C++ - Win64/IA-64",
+ "VC-WIN64A", "Microsoft C/C++ - Win64/x64",
+ "VC-CE", "Microsoft eMbedded Visual C++ 3.0 - Windows CE ONLY",
+ "VC-NT", "Microsoft Visual C++ [4-6] - Windows NT ONLY",
+ "Mingw32", "GNU C++ - Windows NT or 9x",
+ "Mingw32-files", "Create files with DOS copy ...",
+ "BC-NT", "Borland C++ 4.5 - Windows NT",
+ "linux-elf","Linux elf",
+ "ultrix-mips","DEC mips ultrix",
+ "FreeBSD","FreeBSD distribution",
+ "OS2-EMX", "EMX GCC OS/2",
+ "netware-clib", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - CLib - with WinSock Sockets",
+ "netware-clib-bsdsock", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - CLib - with BSD Sockets",
+ "netware-libc", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - LibC - with WinSock Sockets",
+ "netware-libc-bsdsock", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - LibC - with BSD Sockets",
+ "default","cc under unix",
+ "auto", "auto detect from top level Makefile"
+ );
+
+$platform="";
+my $xcflags="";
+foreach (@ARGV)
+ {
+ if (!&read_options && !defined($ops{$_}))
+ {
+ print STDERR "unknown option - $_\n";
+ print STDERR "usage: perl mk1mf.pl [options] [system]\n";
+ print STDERR "\nwhere [system] can be one of the following\n";
+ foreach $i (sort keys %ops)
+ { printf STDERR "\t%-10s\t%s\n",$i,$ops{$i}; }
+ print STDERR <<"EOF";
+and [options] can be one of
+ no-md2 no-md4 no-md5 no-sha no-mdc2 - Skip this digest
+ no-ripemd
+ no-rc2 no-rc4 no-rc5 no-idea no-des - Skip this symetric cipher
+ no-bf no-cast no-aes no-camellia no-seed
+ no-rsa no-dsa no-dh - Skip this public key cipher
+ no-ssl2 no-ssl3 - Skip this version of SSL
+ just-ssl - remove all non-ssl keys/digest
+ no-asm - No x86 asm
+ no-krb5 - No KRB5
+ no-srp - No SRP
+ no-ec - No EC
+ no-ecdsa - No ECDSA
+ no-ecdh - No ECDH
+ no-engine - No engine
+ no-hw - No hw
+ nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm
+ nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare
+ nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare
+ gaswin - Use GNU as with Mingw32
+ no-socks - No socket code
+ no-err - No error strings
+ dll/shlib - Build shared libraries (MS)
+ debug - Debug build
+ profile - Profiling build
+ gcc - Use Gcc (unix)
+
+Values that can be set
+TMP=tmpdir OUT=outdir SRC=srcdir BIN=binpath INC=header-outdir CC=C-compiler
+
+-L<ex_lib_path> -l<ex_lib> - extra library flags (unix)
+-<ex_cc_flags> - extra 'cc' flags,
+ added (MS), or replace (unix)
+EOF
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ $platform=$_;
+ }
+foreach (grep(!/^$/, split(/ /, $OPTIONS)))
+ {
+ print STDERR "unknown option - $_\n" if !&read_options;
+ }
+
+$no_static_engine = 0 if (!$shlib);
+
+$no_mdc2=1 if ($no_des);
+
+$no_ssl3=1 if ($no_md5 || $no_sha);
+$no_ssl3=1 if ($no_rsa && $no_dh);
+
+$no_ssl2=1 if ($no_md5);
+$no_ssl2=1 if ($no_rsa);
+
+$out_def="out";
+$inc_def="outinc";
+$tmp_def="tmp";
+
+$perl="perl" unless defined $perl;
+$mkdir="-mkdir" unless defined $mkdir;
+
+($ssl,$crypto)=("ssl","crypto");
+$ranlib="echo ranlib";
+
+$cc=(defined($VARS{'CC'}))?$VARS{'CC'}:'cc';
+$src_dir=(defined($VARS{'SRC'}))?$VARS{'SRC'}:'.';
+$bin_dir=(defined($VARS{'BIN'}))?$VARS{'BIN'}:'';
+
+# $bin_dir.=$o causes a core dump on my sparc :-(
+
+
+$NT=0;
+
+push(@INC,"util/pl","pl");
+
+if ($platform eq "auto") {
+ $platform = $mf_platform;
+ print STDERR "Imported platform $mf_platform\n";
+}
+
+if (($platform =~ /VC-(.+)/))
+ {
+ $FLAVOR=$1;
+ $NT = 1 if $1 eq "NT";
+ require 'VC-32.pl';
+ }
+elsif ($platform eq "Mingw32")
+ {
+ require 'Mingw32.pl';
+ }
+elsif ($platform eq "Mingw32-files")
+ {
+ require 'Mingw32f.pl';
+ }
+elsif ($platform eq "BC-NT")
+ {
+ $bc=1;
+ require 'BC-32.pl';
+ }
+elsif ($platform eq "FreeBSD")
+ {
+ require 'unix.pl';
+ $cflags='-DTERMIO -D_ANSI_SOURCE -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer';
+ }
+elsif ($platform eq "linux-elf")
+ {
+ require "unix.pl";
+ require "linux.pl";
+ $unix=1;
+ }
+elsif ($platform eq "ultrix-mips")
+ {
+ require "unix.pl";
+ require "ultrix.pl";
+ $unix=1;
+ }
+elsif ($platform eq "OS2-EMX")
+ {
+ $wc=1;
+ require 'OS2-EMX.pl';
+ }
+elsif (($platform eq "netware-clib") || ($platform eq "netware-libc") ||
+ ($platform eq "netware-clib-bsdsock") || ($platform eq "netware-libc-bsdsock"))
+ {
+ $LIBC=1 if $platform eq "netware-libc" || $platform eq "netware-libc-bsdsock";
+ $BSDSOCK=1 if ($platform eq "netware-libc-bsdsock") || ($platform eq "netware-clib-bsdsock");
+ require 'netware.pl';
+ }
+else
+ {
+ require "unix.pl";
+
+ $unix=1;
+ $cflags.=' -DTERMIO';
+ }
+
+$fipsdir =~ s/\//${o}/g;
+
+$out_dir=(defined($VARS{'OUT'}))?$VARS{'OUT'}:$out_def.($debug?".dbg":"");
+$tmp_dir=(defined($VARS{'TMP'}))?$VARS{'TMP'}:$tmp_def.($debug?".dbg":"");
+$inc_dir=(defined($VARS{'INC'}))?$VARS{'INC'}:$inc_def;
+
+$bin_dir=$bin_dir.$o unless ((substr($bin_dir,-1,1) eq $o) || ($bin_dir eq ''));
+
+$cflags= "$xcflags$cflags" if $xcflags ne "";
+
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_IDEA" if $no_idea;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_AES" if $no_aes;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA" if $no_camellia;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SEED" if $no_seed;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RC2" if $no_rc2;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RC4" if $no_rc4;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5" if $no_rc5;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2" if $no_md2;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MD4" if $no_md4;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MD5" if $no_md5;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SHA" if $no_sha;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SHA1" if $no_sha1;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD" if $no_ripemd;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MDC2" if $no_mdc2;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_BF" if $no_bf;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CAST" if $no_cast;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_DES" if $no_des;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RSA" if $no_rsa;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_DSA" if $no_dsa;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_DH" if $no_dh;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL" if $no_whirlpool;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SOCK" if $no_sock;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2" if $no_ssl2;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL3" if $no_ssl3;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT" if $no_tlsext;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SRP" if $no_srp;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CMS" if $no_cms;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ERR" if $no_err;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5" if $no_krb5;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC" if $no_ec;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ECDSA" if $no_ecdsa;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ECDH" if $no_ecdh;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m;
+$cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
+$cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
+
+if ($no_static_engine)
+ {
+ $cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE";
+ }
+else
+ {
+ $cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE";
+ }
+
+#$cflags.=" -DRSAref" if $rsaref ne "";
+
+## if ($unix)
+## { $cflags="$c_flags" if ($c_flags ne ""); }
+##else
+ { $cflags="$c_flags$cflags" if ($c_flags ne ""); }
+
+$ex_libs="$l_flags$ex_libs" if ($l_flags ne "");
+
+
+%shlib_ex_cflags=("SSL" => " -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL",
+ "CRYPTO" => " -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO");
+
+if ($msdos)
+ {
+ $banner ="\t\@echo Make sure you have run 'perl Configure $platform' in the\n";
+ $banner.="\t\@echo top level directory, if you don't have perl, you will\n";
+ $banner.="\t\@echo need to probably edit crypto/bn/bn.h, check the\n";
+ $banner.="\t\@echo documentation for details.\n";
+ }
+
+# have to do this to allow $(CC) under unix
+$link="$bin_dir$link" if ($link !~ /^\$/);
+
+$INSTALLTOP =~ s|/|$o|g;
+$OPENSSLDIR =~ s|/|$o|g;
+
+#############################################
+# We parse in input file and 'store' info for later printing.
+open(IN,"<$infile") || die "unable to open $infile:$!\n";
+$_=<IN>;
+for (;;)
+ {
+ s/\s*$//; # was chop, didn't work in mixture of perls for Windows...
+
+ ($key,$val)=/^([^=]+)=(.*)/;
+ if ($key eq "RELATIVE_DIRECTORY")
+ {
+ if ($lib ne "")
+ {
+ $uc=$lib;
+ $uc =~ s/^lib(.*)\.a/$1/;
+ $uc =~ tr/a-z/A-Z/;
+ $lib_nam{$uc}=$uc;
+ $lib_obj{$uc}.=$libobj." ";
+ }
+ last if ($val eq "FINISHED");
+ $lib="";
+ $libobj="";
+ $dir=$val;
+ }
+
+ if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES")
+ { $cflags .= " $val";}
+
+ if ($key eq "ZLIB_INCLUDE")
+ { $cflags .= " $val" if $val ne "";}
+
+ if ($key eq "LIBZLIB")
+ { $zlib_lib = "$val" if $val ne "";}
+
+ if ($key eq "LIBKRB5")
+ { $ex_libs .= " $val" if $val ne "";}
+
+ if ($key eq "TEST")
+ { $test.=&var_add($dir,$val, 0); }
+
+ if (($key eq "PROGS") || ($key eq "E_OBJ"))
+ { $e_exe.=&var_add($dir,$val, 0); }
+
+ if ($key eq "LIB")
+ {
+ $lib=$val;
+ $lib =~ s/^.*\/([^\/]+)$/$1/;
+ }
+ if ($key eq "LIBNAME" && $no_static_engine)
+ {
+ $lib=$val;
+ $lib =~ s/^.*\/([^\/]+)$/$1/;
+ $otherlibs .= " $lib";
+ }
+
+ if ($key eq "EXHEADER")
+ { $exheader.=&var_add($dir,$val, 1); }
+
+ if ($key eq "HEADER")
+ { $header.=&var_add($dir,$val, 1); }
+
+ if ($key eq "LIBOBJ" && ($dir ne "engines" || !$no_static_engine))
+ { $libobj=&var_add($dir,$val, 0); }
+ if ($key eq "LIBNAMES" && $dir eq "engines" && $no_static_engine)
+ { $engines.=$val }
+
+ if (!($_=<IN>))
+ { $_="RELATIVE_DIRECTORY=FINISHED\n"; }
+ }
+close(IN);
+
+if ($shlib)
+ {
+ $extra_install= <<"EOF";
+ \$(CP) \"\$(O_SSL)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\"
+ \$(CP) \"\$(O_CRYPTO)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\"
+ \$(CP) \"\$(L_SSL)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\"
+ \$(CP) \"\$(L_CRYPTO)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\"
+EOF
+ if ($no_static_engine)
+ {
+ $extra_install .= <<"EOF"
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib${o}engines\"
+ \$(CP) \"\$(E_SHLIB)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib${o}engines\"
+EOF
+ }
+ }
+else
+ {
+ $extra_install= <<"EOF";
+ \$(CP) \"\$(O_SSL)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\"
+ \$(CP) \"\$(O_CRYPTO)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\"
+EOF
+ $ex_libs .= " $zlib_lib" if $zlib_opt == 1;
+ if ($fips)
+ {
+ $build_targets .= " \$(LIB_D)$o$crypto_compat \$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)";
+ $ex_l_libs .= " \$(O_FIPSCANISTER)";
+ }
+ }
+
+$defs= <<"EOF";
+# This makefile has been automatically generated from the OpenSSL distribution.
+# This single makefile will build the complete OpenSSL distribution and
+# by default leave the 'interesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff
+# that needs deleting in .${o}tmp.
+# The file was generated by running 'make makefile.one', which
+# does a 'make files', which writes all the environment variables from all
+# the makefiles to the file call MINFO. This file is used by
+# util${o}mk1mf.pl to generate makefile.one.
+# The 'makefile per directory' system suites me when developing this
+# library and also so I can 'distribute' indervidual library sections.
+# The one monster makefile better suits building in non-unix
+# environments.
+
+EOF
+
+$defs .= $preamble if defined $preamble;
+
+$defs.= <<"EOF";
+INSTALLTOP=$INSTALLTOP
+OPENSSLDIR=$OPENSSLDIR
+
+# Set your compiler options
+PLATFORM=$platform
+CC=$bin_dir${cc}
+CFLAG=$cflags
+APP_CFLAG=$app_cflag
+LIB_CFLAG=$lib_cflag
+SHLIB_CFLAG=$shl_cflag
+APP_EX_OBJ=$app_ex_obj
+SHLIB_EX_OBJ=$shlib_ex_obj
+# add extra libraries to this define, for solaris -lsocket -lnsl would
+# be added
+EX_LIBS=$ex_libs
+
+# The OpenSSL directory
+SRC_D=$src_dir
+
+LINK=$link
+LFLAGS=$lflags
+RSC=$rsc
+
+# The output directory for everything intersting
+OUT_D=$out_dir
+# The output directory for all the temporary muck
+TMP_D=$tmp_dir
+# The output directory for the header files
+INC_D=$inc_dir
+INCO_D=$inc_dir${o}openssl
+
+PERL=$perl
+CP=$cp
+RM=$rm
+RANLIB=$ranlib
+MKDIR=$mkdir
+MKLIB=$bin_dir$mklib
+MLFLAGS=$mlflags
+ASM=$bin_dir$asm
+
+# FIPS validated module and support file locations
+
+FIPSDIR=$fipsdir
+BASEADDR=$baseaddr
+FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSDIR)${o}lib
+FIPS_PREMAIN_SRC=\$(FIPSLIB_D)${o}fips_premain.c
+O_FIPSCANISTER=\$(FIPSLIB_D)${o}fipscanister.lib
+FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPSDIR)${o}bin${o}fips_standalone_sha1${exep}
+E_PREMAIN_DSO=fips_premain_dso
+PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=\$(BIN_D)${o}fips_premain_dso$exep
+FIPSLINK=\$(PERL) \$(FIPSDIR)${o}bin${o}fipslink.pl
+
+######################################################
+# You should not need to touch anything below this point
+######################################################
+
+E_EXE=openssl
+SSL=$ssl
+CRYPTO=$crypto
+
+# BIN_D - Binary output directory
+# TEST_D - Binary test file output directory
+# LIB_D - library output directory
+# ENG_D - dynamic engine output directory
+# Note: if you change these point to different directories then uncomment out
+# the lines around the 'NB' comment below.
+#
+BIN_D=\$(OUT_D)
+TEST_D=\$(OUT_D)
+LIB_D=\$(OUT_D)
+ENG_D=\$(OUT_D)
+
+# INCL_D - local library directory
+# OBJ_D - temp object file directory
+OBJ_D=\$(TMP_D)
+INCL_D=\$(TMP_D)
+
+O_SSL= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(SSL)$shlibp
+O_CRYPTO= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(CRYPTO)$shlibp
+SO_SSL= $plib\$(SSL)$so_shlibp
+SO_CRYPTO= $plib\$(CRYPTO)$so_shlibp
+L_SSL= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(SSL)$libp
+L_CRYPTO= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(CRYPTO)$libp
+
+L_LIBS= \$(L_SSL) \$(L_CRYPTO) $ex_l_libs
+
+######################################################
+# Don't touch anything below this point
+######################################################
+
+INC=-I\$(INC_D) -I\$(INCL_D)
+APP_CFLAGS=\$(INC) \$(CFLAG) \$(APP_CFLAG)
+LIB_CFLAGS=\$(INC) \$(CFLAG) \$(LIB_CFLAG)
+SHLIB_CFLAGS=\$(INC) \$(CFLAG) \$(LIB_CFLAG) \$(SHLIB_CFLAG)
+LIBS_DEP=\$(O_CRYPTO) \$(O_SSL)
+
+#############################################
+EOF
+
+$rules=<<"EOF";
+all: banner \$(TMP_D) \$(BIN_D) \$(TEST_D) \$(LIB_D) \$(INCO_D) headers lib exe $build_targets
+
+banner:
+$banner
+
+\$(TMP_D):
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(TMP_D)\"
+# NB: uncomment out these lines if BIN_D, TEST_D and LIB_D are different
+#\$(BIN_D):
+# \$(MKDIR) \$(BIN_D)
+#
+#\$(TEST_D):
+# \$(MKDIR) \$(TEST_D)
+
+\$(LIB_D):
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(LIB_D)\"
+
+\$(INCO_D): \$(INC_D)
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INCO_D)\"
+
+\$(INC_D):
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INC_D)\"
+
+headers: \$(HEADER) \$(EXHEADER)
+ @
+
+lib: \$(LIBS_DEP) \$(E_SHLIB)
+
+exe: \$(T_EXE) \$(BIN_D)$o\$(E_EXE)$exep
+
+install: all
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)\"
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\"
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}include\"
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}include${o}openssl\"
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\"
+ \$(CP) \"\$(INCO_D)${o}*.\[ch\]\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}include${o}openssl\"
+ \$(CP) \"\$(BIN_D)$o\$(E_EXE)$exep \$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\"
+ \$(MKDIR) \"\$(OPENSSLDIR)\"
+ \$(CP) apps${o}openssl.cnf \"\$(OPENSSLDIR)\"
+$extra_install
+
+
+test: \$(T_EXE)
+ cd \$(BIN_D)
+ ..${o}ms${o}test
+
+clean:
+ \$(RM) \$(TMP_D)$o*.*
+
+vclean:
+ \$(RM) \$(TMP_D)$o*.*
+ \$(RM) \$(OUT_D)$o*.*
+
+EOF
+
+my $platform_cpp_symbol = "MK1MF_PLATFORM_$platform";
+$platform_cpp_symbol =~ s/-/_/g;
+if (open(IN,"crypto/buildinf.h"))
+ {
+ # Remove entry for this platform in existing file buildinf.h.
+
+ my $old_buildinf_h = "";
+ while (<IN>)
+ {
+ if (/^\#ifdef $platform_cpp_symbol$/)
+ {
+ while (<IN>) { last if (/^\#endif/); }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $old_buildinf_h .= $_;
+ }
+ }
+ close(IN);
+
+ open(OUT,">crypto/buildinf.h") || die "Can't open buildinf.h";
+ print OUT $old_buildinf_h;
+ close(OUT);
+ }
+
+open (OUT,">>crypto/buildinf.h") || die "Can't open buildinf.h";
+printf OUT <<EOF;
+#ifdef $platform_cpp_symbol
+ /* auto-generated/updated by util/mk1mf.pl for crypto/cversion.c */
+ #define CFLAGS "compiler: $cc $cflags"
+ #define PLATFORM "$platform"
+EOF
+printf OUT " #define DATE \"%s\"\n", scalar gmtime();
+printf OUT "#endif\n";
+close(OUT);
+
+# Strip of trailing ' '
+foreach (keys %lib_obj) { $lib_obj{$_}=&clean_up_ws($lib_obj{$_}); }
+$test=&clean_up_ws($test);
+$e_exe=&clean_up_ws($e_exe);
+$exheader=&clean_up_ws($exheader);
+$header=&clean_up_ws($header);
+
+# First we strip the exheaders from the headers list
+foreach (split(/\s+/,$exheader)){ $h{$_}=1; }
+foreach (split(/\s+/,$header)) { $h.=$_." " unless $h{$_}; }
+chop($h); $header=$h;
+
+$defs.=&do_defs("HEADER",$header,"\$(INCL_D)","");
+$rules.=&do_copy_rule("\$(INCL_D)",$header,"");
+
+$defs.=&do_defs("EXHEADER",$exheader,"\$(INCO_D)","");
+$rules.=&do_copy_rule("\$(INCO_D)",$exheader,"");
+
+$defs.=&do_defs("T_OBJ",$test,"\$(OBJ_D)",$obj);
+$rules.=&do_compile_rule("\$(OBJ_D)",$test,"\$(APP_CFLAGS)");
+
+$defs.=&do_defs("E_OBJ",$e_exe,"\$(OBJ_D)",$obj);
+$rules.=&do_compile_rule("\$(OBJ_D)",$e_exe,'-DMONOLITH $(APP_CFLAGS)');
+
+# Special case rule for fips_premain_dso
+
+if ($fips)
+ {
+ $rules.=&cc_compile_target("\$(OBJ_D)${o}\$(E_PREMAIN_DSO)$obj",
+ "\$(FIPS_PREMAIN_SRC)",
+ "-DFINGERPRINT_PREMAIN_DSO_LOAD \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS)", "");
+ $rules.=&do_link_rule("\$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)","\$(OBJ_D)${o}\$(E_PREMAIN_DSO)$obj \$(CRYPTOOBJ) \$(O_FIPSCANISTER)","","\$(EX_LIBS)", 1);
+ }
+
+foreach (values %lib_nam)
+ {
+ $lib_obj=$lib_obj{$_};
+ local($slib)=$shlib;
+
+ $defs.=&do_defs(${_}."OBJ",$lib_obj,"\$(OBJ_D)",$obj);
+ $lib=($slib)?" \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS)".$shlib_ex_cflags{$_}:" \$(LIB_CFLAGS)";
+ $rules.=&do_compile_rule("\$(OBJ_D)",$lib_obj{$_},$lib);
+ }
+
+# hack to add version info on MSVC
+if (($platform eq "VC-WIN32") || ($platform eq "VC-WIN64A")
+ || ($platform eq "VC-WIN64I") || ($platform eq "VC-NT")) {
+ $rules.= <<"EOF";
+\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(CRYPTO).res: ms\\version32.rc
+ \$(RSC) /fo"\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(CRYPTO).res" /d CRYPTO ms\\version32.rc
+
+\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(SSL).res: ms\\version32.rc
+ \$(RSC) /fo"\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(SSL).res" /d SSL ms\\version32.rc
+
+EOF
+}
+
+$defs.=&do_defs("T_EXE",$test,"\$(TEST_D)",$exep);
+foreach (split(/\s+/,$test))
+ {
+ $t=&bname($_);
+ $tt="\$(OBJ_D)${o}$t${obj}";
+ $rules.=&do_link_rule("\$(TEST_D)$o$t$exep",$tt,"\$(LIBS_DEP)","\$(L_LIBS) \$(EX_LIBS)");
+ }
+
+$defs.=&do_defs("E_SHLIB",$engines . $otherlibs,"\$(ENG_D)",$shlibp);
+
+foreach (split(/\s+/,$engines))
+ {
+ $rules.=&do_compile_rule("\$(OBJ_D)","engines${o}e_$_",$lib);
+ $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(OBJ_D)${o}e_${_}.obj","\$(ENG_D)$o$_$shlibp","",$shlib,"");
+ }
+
+
+
+$rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(SSLOBJ)","\$(O_SSL)",$ssl,$shlib,"\$(SO_SSL)");
+
+if ($fips)
+ {
+ if ($shlib)
+ {
+ $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(CRYPTOOBJ) \$(O_FIPSCANISTER)",
+ "\$(O_CRYPTO)", "$crypto",
+ $shlib, "\$(SO_CRYPTO)", "\$(BASEADDR)");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(CRYPTOOBJ)",
+ "\$(O_CRYPTO)",$crypto,$shlib,"\$(SO_CRYPTO)", "");
+ $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(CRYPTOOBJ) \$(O_FIPSCANISTER)",
+ "\$(LIB_D)$o$crypto_compat",$crypto,$shlib,"\$(SO_CRYPTO)", "");
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(CRYPTOOBJ)","\$(O_CRYPTO)",$crypto,$shlib,
+ "\$(SO_CRYPTO)");
+ }
+
+foreach (split(" ",$otherlibs))
+ {
+ my $uc = $_;
+ $uc =~ tr /a-z/A-Z/;
+ $rules.= &do_lib_rule("\$(${uc}OBJ)","\$(ENG_D)$o$_$shlibp", "", $shlib, "");
+
+ }
+
+$rules.=&do_link_rule("\$(BIN_D)$o\$(E_EXE)$exep","\$(E_OBJ)","\$(LIBS_DEP)","\$(L_LIBS) \$(EX_LIBS)", ($fips && !$shlib) ? 2 : 0);
+
+print $defs;
+
+if ($platform eq "linux-elf") {
+ print <<"EOF";
+# Generate perlasm output files
+%.cpp:
+ (cd \$(\@D)/..; PERL=perl make -f Makefile asm/\$(\@F))
+EOF
+}
+print "###################################################################\n";
+print $rules;
+
+###############################################
+# strip off any trailing .[och] and append the relative directory
+# also remembering to do nothing if we are in one of the dropped
+# directories
+sub var_add
+ {
+ local($dir,$val,$keepext)=@_;
+ local(@a,$_,$ret);
+
+ return("") if $no_engine && $dir =~ /\/engine/;
+ return("") if $no_hw && $dir =~ /\/hw/;
+ return("") if $no_idea && $dir =~ /\/idea/;
+ return("") if $no_aes && $dir =~ /\/aes/;
+ return("") if $no_camellia && $dir =~ /\/camellia/;
+ return("") if $no_seed && $dir =~ /\/seed/;
+ return("") if $no_rc2 && $dir =~ /\/rc2/;
+ return("") if $no_rc4 && $dir =~ /\/rc4/;
+ return("") if $no_rc5 && $dir =~ /\/rc5/;
+ return("") if $no_rsa && $dir =~ /\/rsa/;
+ return("") if $no_rsa && $dir =~ /^rsaref/;
+ return("") if $no_dsa && $dir =~ /\/dsa/;
+ return("") if $no_dh && $dir =~ /\/dh/;
+ return("") if $no_ec && $dir =~ /\/ec/;
+ return("") if $no_gost && $dir =~ /\/ccgost/;
+ return("") if $no_cms && $dir =~ /\/cms/;
+ return("") if $no_jpake && $dir =~ /\/jpake/;
+ if ($no_des && $dir =~ /\/des/)
+ {
+ if ($val =~ /read_pwd/)
+ { return("$dir/read_pwd "); }
+ else
+ { return(""); }
+ }
+ return("") if $no_mdc2 && $dir =~ /\/mdc2/;
+ return("") if $no_sock && $dir =~ /\/proxy/;
+ return("") if $no_bf && $dir =~ /\/bf/;
+ return("") if $no_cast && $dir =~ /\/cast/;
+ return("") if $no_whirlpool && $dir =~ /\/whrlpool/;
+
+ $val =~ s/^\s*(.*)\s*$/$1/;
+ @a=split(/\s+/,$val);
+ grep(s/\.[och]$//, at a) unless $keepext;
+
+ @a=grep(!/^e_.*_3d$/, at a) if $no_des;
+ @a=grep(!/^e_.*_d$/, at a) if $no_des;
+ @a=grep(!/^e_.*_ae$/, at a) if $no_idea;
+ @a=grep(!/^e_.*_i$/, at a) if $no_aes;
+ @a=grep(!/^e_.*_r2$/, at a) if $no_rc2;
+ @a=grep(!/^e_.*_r5$/, at a) if $no_rc5;
+ @a=grep(!/^e_.*_bf$/, at a) if $no_bf;
+ @a=grep(!/^e_.*_c$/, at a) if $no_cast;
+ @a=grep(!/^e_rc4$/, at a) if $no_rc4;
+ @a=grep(!/^e_camellia$/, at a) if $no_camellia;
+ @a=grep(!/^e_seed$/, at a) if $no_seed;
+
+ #@a=grep(!/(^s2_)|(^s23_)/, at a) if $no_ssl2;
+ #@a=grep(!/(^s3_)|(^s23_)/, at a) if $no_ssl3;
+
+ @a=grep(!/(_sock$)|(_acpt$)|(_conn$)|(^pxy_)/, at a) if $no_sock;
+
+ @a=grep(!/(^md2)|(_md2$)/, at a) if $no_md2;
+ @a=grep(!/(^md4)|(_md4$)/, at a) if $no_md4;
+ @a=grep(!/(^md5)|(_md5$)/, at a) if $no_md5;
+ @a=grep(!/(rmd)|(ripemd)/, at a) if $no_ripemd;
+
+ @a=grep(!/(^d2i_r_)|(^i2d_r_)/, at a) if $no_rsa;
+ @a=grep(!/(^p_open$)|(^p_seal$)/, at a) if $no_rsa;
+ @a=grep(!/(^pem_seal$)/, at a) if $no_rsa;
+
+ @a=grep(!/(m_dss$)|(m_dss1$)/, at a) if $no_dsa;
+ @a=grep(!/(^d2i_s_)|(^i2d_s_)|(_dsap$)/, at a) if $no_dsa;
+
+ @a=grep(!/^n_pkey$/, at a) if $no_rsa || $no_rc4;
+
+ @a=grep(!/_dhp$/, at a) if $no_dh;
+
+ @a=grep(!/(^sha[^1])|(_sha$)|(m_dss$)/, at a) if $no_sha;
+ @a=grep(!/(^sha1)|(_sha1$)|(m_dss1$)/, at a) if $no_sha1;
+ @a=grep(!/_mdc2$/, at a) if $no_mdc2;
+
+ @a=grep(!/(srp)/, at a) if $no_srp;
+
+ @a=grep(!/^engine$/, at a) if $no_engine;
+ @a=grep(!/^hw$/, at a) if $no_hw;
+ @a=grep(!/(^rsa$)|(^genrsa$)/, at a) if $no_rsa;
+ @a=grep(!/(^dsa$)|(^gendsa$)|(^dsaparam$)/, at a) if $no_dsa;
+ @a=grep(!/^gendsa$/, at a) if $no_sha1;
+ @a=grep(!/(^dh$)|(^gendh$)/, at a) if $no_dh;
+
+ @a=grep(!/(^dh)|(_sha1$)|(m_dss1$)/, at a) if $no_sha1;
+
+ grep($_="$dir/$_", at a);
+ @a=grep(!/(^|\/)s_/, at a) if $no_sock;
+ @a=grep(!/(^|\/)bio_sock/, at a) if $no_sock;
+ $ret=join(' ', at a)." ";
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+# change things so that each 'token' is only separated by one space
+sub clean_up_ws
+ {
+ local($w)=@_;
+
+ $w =~ s/^\s*(.*)\s*$/$1/;
+ $w =~ s/\s+/ /g;
+ return($w);
+ }
+
+sub do_defs
+ {
+ local($var,$files,$location,$postfix)=@_;
+ local($_,$ret,$pf);
+ local(*OUT,$tmp,$t);
+
+ $files =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
+ $ret="$var=";
+ $n=1;
+ $Vars{$var}.="";
+ foreach (split(/ /,$files))
+ {
+ $orig=$_;
+ $_=&bname($_) unless /^\$/;
+ if ($n++ == 2)
+ {
+ $n=0;
+ $ret.="\\\n\t";
+ }
+ if (($_ =~ /bss_file/) && ($postfix eq ".h"))
+ { $pf=".c"; }
+ else { $pf=$postfix; }
+ if ($_ =~ /BN_ASM/) { $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /BNCO_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /AES_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /DES_ENC/) { $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /BF_ENC/) { $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /CAST_ENC/){ $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /RC4_ENC/) { $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /RC5_ENC/) { $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /MD5_ASM/) { $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /SHA1_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /RMD160_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /WHIRLPOOL_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
+ elsif ($_ =~ /CPUID_ASM/){ $t="$_ "; }
+ else { $t="$location${o}$_$pf "; }
+
+ $Vars{$var}.="$t ";
+ $ret.=$t;
+ }
+ # hack to add version info on MSVC
+ if ($shlib && (($platform eq "VC-WIN32") || ($platfrom eq "VC-WIN64I") || ($platform eq "VC-WIN64A") || ($platform eq "VC-NT")))
+ {
+ if ($var eq "CRYPTOOBJ")
+ { $ret.="\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(CRYPTO).res "; }
+ elsif ($var eq "SSLOBJ")
+ { $ret.="\$(OBJ_D)\\\$(SSL).res "; }
+ }
+ chomp($ret);
+ $ret.="\n\n";
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+# return the name with the leading path removed
+sub bname
+ {
+ local($ret)=@_;
+ $ret =~ s/^.*[\\\/]([^\\\/]+)$/$1/;
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+# return the leading path
+sub dname
+ {
+ my $ret=shift;
+ $ret =~ s/(^.*)[\\\/][^\\\/]+$/$1/;
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+##############################################################
+# do a rule for each file that says 'compile' to new direcory
+# compile the files in '$files' into $to
+sub do_compile_rule
+ {
+ local($to,$files,$ex)=@_;
+ local($ret,$_,$n,$d,$s);
+
+ $files =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
+ foreach (split(/\s+/,$files))
+ {
+ $n=&bname($_);
+ $d=&dname($_);
+ if (-f "${_}.c")
+ {
+ $ret.=&cc_compile_target("$to${o}$n$obj","${_}.c",$ex)
+ }
+ elsif (-f ($s="${d}${o}asm${o}${n}.pl") or
+ ($s=~s/sha256/sha512/ and -f $s) or
+ -f ($s="${d}${o}${n}.pl"))
+ {
+ $ret.=&perlasm_compile_target("$to${o}$n$obj",$s,$n);
+ }
+ elsif (-f ($s="${d}${o}asm${o}${n}.S") or
+ -f ($s="${d}${o}${n}.S"))
+ {
+ $ret.=&Sasm_compile_target("$to${o}$n$obj",$s,$n);
+ }
+ else { die "no rule for $_"; }
+ }
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+##############################################################
+# do a rule for each file that says 'compile' to new direcory
+sub perlasm_compile_target
+ {
+ my($target,$source,$bname)=@_;
+ my($ret);
+
+ $bname =~ s/(.*)\.[^\.]$/$1/;
+ $ret ="\$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm: $source\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(PERL) $source $asmtype \$(CFLAG) >\$\@\n\n";
+ $ret.="$target: \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(ASM) $afile\$\@ \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm\n\n";
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+sub Sasm_compile_target
+ {
+ my($target,$source,$bname)=@_;
+ my($ret);
+
+ $bname =~ s/(.*)\.[^\.]$/$1/;
+ $ret ="\$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm: $source\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(CC) -E \$(CFLAG) $source >\$\@\n\n";
+ $ret.="$target: \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(ASM) $afile\$\@ \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm\n\n";
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+sub cc_compile_target
+ {
+ local($target,$source,$ex_flags, $srcd)=@_;
+ local($ret);
+
+ $ex_flags.=" -DMK1MF_BUILD -D$platform_cpp_symbol" if ($source =~ /cversion/);
+ $target =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne "/";
+ $source =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne "/";
+ $srcd = "\$(SRC_D)$o" unless defined $srcd;
+ $ret ="$target: $srcd$source\n\t";
+ $ret.="\$(CC) ${ofile}$target $ex_flags -c $srcd$source\n\n";
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+##############################################################
+sub do_asm_rule
+ {
+ local($target,$src)=@_;
+ local($ret, at s, at t,$i);
+
+ $target =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne "/";
+ $src =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne "/";
+
+ @t=split(/\s+/,$target);
+ @s=split(/\s+/,$src);
+
+
+ for ($i=0; $i<=$#s; $i++)
+ {
+ my $objfile = $t[$i];
+ my $srcfile = $s[$i];
+
+ if ($perl_asm == 1)
+ {
+ my $plasm = $objfile;
+ $plasm =~ s/${obj}/.pl/;
+ $ret.="$srcfile: $plasm\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(PERL) $plasm $asmtype \$(CFLAG) >$srcfile\n\n";
+ }
+
+ $ret.="$objfile: $srcfile\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(ASM) $afile$objfile \$(SRC_D)$o$srcfile\n\n";
+ }
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+sub do_shlib_rule
+ {
+ local($n,$def)=@_;
+ local($ret,$nn);
+ local($t);
+
+ ($nn=$n) =~ tr/a-z/A-Z/;
+ $ret.="$n.dll: \$(${nn}OBJ)\n";
+ if ($vc && $w32)
+ {
+ $ret.="\t\$(MKSHLIB) $efile$n.dll $def @<<\n \$(${nn}OBJ_F)\n<<\n";
+ }
+ $ret.="\n";
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+# do a rule for each file that says 'copy' to new direcory on change
+sub do_copy_rule
+ {
+ local($to,$files,$p)=@_;
+ local($ret,$_,$n,$pp);
+
+ $files =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
+ foreach (split(/\s+/,$files))
+ {
+ $n=&bname($_);
+ if ($n =~ /bss_file/)
+ { $pp=".c"; }
+ else { $pp=$p; }
+ $ret.="$to${o}$n$pp: \$(SRC_D)$o$_$pp\n\t\$(CP) \"\$(SRC_D)$o$_$pp\" \"$to${o}$n$pp\"\n\n";
+ }
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+# Options picked up from the OPTIONS line in the top level Makefile
+# generated by Configure.
+
+sub read_options
+ {
+ # Many options are handled in a similar way. In particular
+ # no-xxx sets zero or more scalars to 1.
+ # Process these using the %valid_options hash containing the option
+ # name and reference to the scalars to set. In some cases the option
+ # needs no special handling and can be ignored: this is done by
+ # setting the value to 0.
+
+ my %valid_options = (
+ "no-rc2" => \$no_rc2,
+ "no-rc4" => \$no_rc4,
+ "no-rc5" => \$no_rc5,
+ "no-idea" => \$no_idea,
+ "no-aes" => \$no_aes,
+ "no-camellia" => \$no_camellia,
+ "no-seed" => \$no_seed,
+ "no-des" => \$no_des,
+ "no-bf" => \$no_bf,
+ "no-cast" => \$no_cast,
+ "no-md2" => \$no_md2,
+ "no-md4" => \$no_md4,
+ "no-md5" => \$no_md5,
+ "no-sha" => \$no_sha,
+ "no-sha1" => \$no_sha1,
+ "no-ripemd" => \$no_ripemd,
+ "no-mdc2" => \$no_mdc2,
+ "no-whirlpool" => \$no_whirlpool,
+ "no-patents" =>
+ [\$no_rc2, \$no_rc4, \$no_rc5, \$no_idea, \$no_rsa],
+ "no-rsa" => \$no_rsa,
+ "no-dsa" => \$no_dsa,
+ "no-dh" => \$no_dh,
+ "no-hmac" => \$no_hmac,
+ "no-asm" => \$no_asm,
+ "nasm" => \$nasm,
+ "nw-nasm" => \$nw_nasm,
+ "nw-mwasm" => \$nw_mwasm,
+ "gaswin" => \$gaswin,
+ "no-ssl2" => \$no_ssl2,
+ "no-ssl3" => \$no_ssl3,
+ "no-ssl3-method" => 0,
+ "no-tlsext" => \$no_tlsext,
+ "no-srp" => \$no_srp,
+ "no-cms" => \$no_cms,
+ "no-ec2m" => \$no_ec2m,
+ "no-jpake" => \$no_jpake,
+ "no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => 0,
+ "no-err" => \$no_err,
+ "no-sock" => \$no_sock,
+ "no-krb5" => \$no_krb5,
+ "no-ec" => \$no_ec,
+ "no-ecdsa" => \$no_ecdsa,
+ "no-ecdh" => \$no_ecdh,
+ "no-gost" => \$no_gost,
+ "no-engine" => \$no_engine,
+ "no-hw" => \$no_hw,
+ "no-rsax" => 0,
+ "just-ssl" =>
+ [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast,
+ \$no_md2, \$no_sha, \$no_mdc2, \$no_dsa, \$no_dh,
+ \$no_ssl2, \$no_err, \$no_ripemd, \$no_rc5,
+ \$no_aes, \$no_camellia, \$no_seed, \$no_srp],
+ "rsaref" => 0,
+ "gcc" => \$gcc,
+ "debug" => \$debug,
+ "profile" => \$profile,
+ "shlib" => \$shlib,
+ "dll" => \$shlib,
+ "shared" => 0,
+ "no-sctp" => 0,
+ "no-srtp" => 0,
+ "no-gmp" => 0,
+ "no-rfc3779" => 0,
+ "no-montasm" => 0,
+ "no-shared" => 0,
+ "no-store" => 0,
+ "no-unit-test" => 0,
+ "no-zlib" => 0,
+ "no-zlib-dynamic" => 0,
+ "fips" => \$fips
+ );
+
+ if (exists $valid_options{$_})
+ {
+ my $r = $valid_options{$_};
+ if ( ref $r eq "SCALAR")
+ { $$r = 1;}
+ elsif ( ref $r eq "ARRAY")
+ {
+ my $r2;
+ foreach $r2 (@$r)
+ {
+ $$r2 = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ elsif (/^no-comp$/) { $xcflags = "-DOPENSSL_NO_COMP $xcflags"; }
+ elsif (/^enable-zlib$/) { $zlib_opt = 1 if $zlib_opt == 0 }
+ elsif (/^enable-zlib-dynamic$/)
+ {
+ $zlib_opt = 2;
+ }
+ elsif (/^no-static-engine/)
+ {
+ $no_static_engine = 1;
+ }
+ elsif (/^enable-static-engine/)
+ {
+ $no_static_engine = 0;
+ }
+ # There are also enable-xxx options which correspond to
+ # the no-xxx. Since the scalars are enabled by default
+ # these can be ignored.
+ elsif (/^enable-/)
+ {
+ my $t = $_;
+ $t =~ s/^enable/no/;
+ if (exists $valid_options{$t})
+ {return 1;}
+ return 0;
+ }
+ # experimental-xxx is mostly like enable-xxx, but opensslconf.v
+ # will still set OPENSSL_NO_xxx unless we set OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_xxx.
+ # (No need to fail if we don't know the algorithm -- this is for adventurous users only.)
+ elsif (/^experimental-/)
+ {
+ my $algo, $ALGO;
+ ($algo = $_) =~ s/^experimental-//;
+ ($ALGO = $algo) =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/;
+
+ $xcflags="-DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO $xcflags";
+
+ }
+ elsif (/^--with-krb5-flavor=(.*)$/)
+ {
+ my $krb5_flavor = $1;
+ if ($krb5_flavor =~ /^force-[Hh]eimdal$/)
+ {
+ $xcflags="-DKRB5_HEIMDAL $xcflags";
+ }
+ elsif ($krb5_flavor =~ /^MIT/i)
+ {
+ $xcflags="-DKRB5_MIT $xcflags";
+ if ($krb5_flavor =~ /^MIT[._-]*1[._-]*[01]/i)
+ {
+ $xcflags="-DKRB5_MIT_OLD11 $xcflags"
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ elsif (/^([^=]*)=(.*)$/){ $VARS{$1}=$2; }
+ elsif (/^-[lL].*$/) { $l_flags.="$_ "; }
+ elsif ((!/^-help/) && (!/^-h/) && (!/^-\?/) && /^-.*$/)
+ { $c_flags.="$_ "; }
+ else { return(0); }
+ return(1);
+ }
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkrc.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/mkrc.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkrc.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkrc.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#!/bin/env perl
+#
+open FD,"crypto/opensslv.h";
+while(<FD>) {
+ if (/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER\s+(0x[0-9a-f]+)/i) {
+ $ver = hex($1);
+ $v1 = ($ver>>28);
+ $v2 = ($ver>>20)&0xff;
+ $v3 = ($ver>>12)&0xff;
+ $v4 = ($ver>> 4)&0xff;
+ $beta = $ver&0xf;
+ $version = "$v1.$v2.$v3";
+ if ($beta==0xf) { $version .= chr(ord('a')+$v4-1) if ($v4); }
+ elsif ($beta==0){ $version .= "-dev"; }
+ else { $version .= "-beta$beta"; }
+ last;
+ }
+}
+close(FD);
+
+$filename = $ARGV[0]; $filename =~ /(.*)\.([^.]+)$/;
+$basename = $1;
+$extname = $2;
+
+if ($extname =~ /dll/i) { $description = "OpenSSL shared library"; }
+else { $description = "OpenSSL application"; }
+
+print <<___;
+#include <winver.h>
+
+LANGUAGE 0x09,0x01
+
+1 VERSIONINFO
+ FILEVERSION $v1,$v2,$v3,$v4
+ PRODUCTVERSION $v1,$v2,$v3,$v4
+ FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
+#ifdef _DEBUG
+ FILEFLAGS 0x01L
+#else
+ FILEFLAGS 0x00L
+#endif
+ FILEOS VOS__WINDOWS32
+ FILETYPE VFT_DLL
+ FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
+BEGIN
+ BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
+ BEGIN
+ BLOCK "040904b0"
+ BEGIN
+ // Required:
+ VALUE "CompanyName", "The OpenSSL Project, http://www.openssl.org/\\0"
+ VALUE "FileDescription", "$description\\0"
+ VALUE "FileVersion", "$version\\0"
+ VALUE "InternalName", "$basename\\0"
+ VALUE "OriginalFilename", "$filename\\0"
+ VALUE "ProductName", "The OpenSSL Toolkit\\0"
+ VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0"
+ // Optional:
+ //VALUE "Comments", "\\0"
+ VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright © 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright © 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
+ //VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0"
+ //VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0"
+ //VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0"
+ END
+ END
+ BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
+ BEGIN
+ VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 0x4b0
+ END
+END
+___
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkstack.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/mkstack.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkstack.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/local/bin/perl -w
-
-# This is a utility that searches out "DECLARE_STACK_OF()"
-# declarations in .h and .c files, and updates/creates/replaces
-# the corresponding macro declarations in crypto/stack/safestack.h.
-# As it's not generally possible to have macros that generate macros,
-# we need to control this from the "outside", here in this script.
-#
-# Geoff Thorpe, June, 2000 (with massive Perl-hacking
-# help from Steve Robb)
-
-my $safestack = "crypto/stack/safestack";
-
-my $do_write;
-while (@ARGV) {
- my $arg = $ARGV[0];
- if($arg eq "-write") {
- $do_write = 1;
- }
- shift @ARGV;
-}
-
-
- at source = (<crypto/*.[ch]>, <crypto/*/*.[ch]>, <ssl/*.[ch]>, <apps/*.[ch]>);
-foreach $file (@source) {
- next if -l $file;
-
- # Open the .c/.h file for reading
- open(IN, "< $file") || die "Can't open $file for reading: $!";
-
- while(<IN>) {
- if (/^DECLARE_STACK_OF\(([^)]+)\)/) {
- push @stacklst, $1;
- }
- if (/^DECLARE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF\(([^,\s]+)\s*,\s*([^>\s]+)\)/) {
- push @sstacklst, [$1, $2];
- }
- if (/^DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF\(([^)]+)\)/) {
- push @asn1setlst, $1;
- }
- if (/^DECLARE_PKCS12_STACK_OF\(([^)]+)\)/) {
- push @p12stklst, $1;
- }
- if (/^DECLARE_LHASH_OF\(([^)]+)\)/) {
- push @lhashlst, $1;
- }
- }
- close(IN);
-}
-
-
-
-my $old_stackfile = "";
-my $new_stackfile = "";
-my $inside_block = 0;
-my $type_thing;
-
-open(IN, "< $safestack.h") || die "Can't open input file: $!";
-while(<IN>) {
- $old_stackfile .= $_;
-
- if (m|^/\* This block of defines is updated by util/mkstack.pl, please do not touch! \*/|) {
- $inside_block = 1;
- }
- if (m|^/\* End of util/mkstack.pl block, you may now edit :-\) \*/|) {
- $inside_block = 0;
- } elsif ($inside_block == 0) {
- $new_stackfile .= $_;
- }
- next if($inside_block != 1);
- $new_stackfile .= "/* This block of defines is updated by util/mkstack.pl, please do not touch! */";
-
- foreach $type_thing (sort @stacklst) {
- $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
-
-#define sk_${type_thing}_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new($type_thing, (cmp))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null($type_thing)
-#define sk_${type_thing}_free(st) SKM_sk_free($type_thing, (st))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_num(st) SKM_sk_num($type_thing, (st))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value($type_thing, (st), (i))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set($type_thing, (st), (i), (val))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero($type_thing, (st))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push($type_thing, (st), (val))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift($type_thing, (st), (val))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find($type_thing, (st), (val))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_find_ex(st, val) SKM_sk_find_ex($type_thing, (st), (val))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete($type_thing, (st), (i))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr($type_thing, (st), (ptr))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert($type_thing, (st), (val), (i))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func($type_thing, (st), (cmp))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup($type_thing, st)
-#define sk_${type_thing}_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free($type_thing, (st), (free_func))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift($type_thing, (st))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop($type_thing, (st))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort($type_thing, (st))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted($type_thing, (st))
-EOF
- }
-
- foreach $type_thing (sort @sstacklst) {
- my $t1 = $type_thing->[0];
- my $t2 = $type_thing->[1];
- $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
-
-#define sk_${t1}_new(cmp) ((STACK_OF($t1) *)sk_new(CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC($t2, cmp)))
-#define sk_${t1}_new_null() ((STACK_OF($t1) *)sk_new_null())
-#define sk_${t1}_push(st, val) sk_push(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val))
-#define sk_${t1}_find(st, val) sk_find(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val))
-#define sk_${t1}_value(st, i) (($t1)sk_value(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), i))
-#define sk_${t1}_num(st) SKM_sk_num($t1, st)
-#define sk_${t1}_pop_free(st, free_func) sk_pop_free(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC2($t1, free_func))
-#define sk_${t1}_insert(st, val, i) sk_insert(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val), i)
-#define sk_${t1}_free(st) SKM_sk_free(${t1}, st)
-#define sk_${t1}_set(st, i, val) sk_set(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), i, CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val))
-#define sk_${t1}_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero($t1, (st))
-#define sk_${t1}_unshift(st, val) sk_unshift(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val))
-#define sk_${t1}_find_ex(st, val) sk_find_ex((_STACK *)CHECKED_CONST_PTR_OF(STACK_OF($t1), st), CHECKED_CONST_PTR_OF($t2, val))
-#define sk_${t1}_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete($t1, (st), (i))
-#define sk_${t1}_delete_ptr(st, ptr) ($t1 *)sk_delete_ptr(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, ptr))
-#define sk_${t1}_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) \\
- ((int (*)(const $t2 * const *,const $t2 * const *)) \\
- sk_set_cmp_func(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC($t2, cmp)))
-#define sk_${t1}_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup($t1, st)
-#define sk_${t1}_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift($t1, (st))
-#define sk_${t1}_pop(st) ($t2 *)sk_pop(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st))
-#define sk_${t1}_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort($t1, (st))
-#define sk_${t1}_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted($t1, (st))
-
-EOF
- }
-
- foreach $type_thing (sort @asn1setlst) {
- $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
-
-#define d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_${type_thing}(st, pp, length, d2i_func, free_func, ex_tag, ex_class) \\
- SKM_ASN1_SET_OF_d2i($type_thing, (st), (pp), (length), (d2i_func), (free_func), (ex_tag), (ex_class))
-#define i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_${type_thing}(st, pp, i2d_func, ex_tag, ex_class, is_set) \\
- SKM_ASN1_SET_OF_i2d($type_thing, (st), (pp), (i2d_func), (ex_tag), (ex_class), (is_set))
-#define ASN1_seq_pack_${type_thing}(st, i2d_func, buf, len) \\
- SKM_ASN1_seq_pack($type_thing, (st), (i2d_func), (buf), (len))
-#define ASN1_seq_unpack_${type_thing}(buf, len, d2i_func, free_func) \\
- SKM_ASN1_seq_unpack($type_thing, (buf), (len), (d2i_func), (free_func))
-EOF
- }
- foreach $type_thing (sort @p12stklst) {
- $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
-
-#define PKCS12_decrypt_d2i_${type_thing}(algor, d2i_func, free_func, pass, passlen, oct, seq) \\
- SKM_PKCS12_decrypt_d2i($type_thing, (algor), (d2i_func), (free_func), (pass), (passlen), (oct), (seq))
-EOF
- }
-
- foreach $type_thing (sort @lhashlst) {
- my $lc_tt = lc $type_thing;
- $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
-
-#define lh_${type_thing}_new() LHM_lh_new(${type_thing},${lc_tt})
-#define lh_${type_thing}_insert(lh,inst) LHM_lh_insert(${type_thing},lh,inst)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_retrieve(lh,inst) LHM_lh_retrieve(${type_thing},lh,inst)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_delete(lh,inst) LHM_lh_delete(${type_thing},lh,inst)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_doall(lh,fn) LHM_lh_doall(${type_thing},lh,fn)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_doall_arg(lh,fn,arg_type,arg) \\
- LHM_lh_doall_arg(${type_thing},lh,fn,arg_type,arg)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_error(lh) LHM_lh_error(${type_thing},lh)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_num_items(lh) LHM_lh_num_items(${type_thing},lh)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_down_load(lh) LHM_lh_down_load(${type_thing},lh)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_node_stats_bio(lh,out) \\
- LHM_lh_node_stats_bio(${type_thing},lh,out)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_node_usage_stats_bio(lh,out) \\
- LHM_lh_node_usage_stats_bio(${type_thing},lh,out)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_stats_bio(lh,out) \\
- LHM_lh_stats_bio(${type_thing},lh,out)
-#define lh_${type_thing}_free(lh) LHM_lh_free(${type_thing},lh)
-EOF
- }
-
- $new_stackfile .= "/* End of util/mkstack.pl block, you may now edit :-) */\n";
- $inside_block = 2;
-}
-
-
-if ($new_stackfile eq $old_stackfile) {
- print "No changes to $safestack.h.\n";
- exit 0; # avoid unnecessary rebuild
-}
-
-if ($do_write) {
- print "Writing new $safestack.h.\n";
- open OUT, ">$safestack.h" || die "Can't open output file";
- print OUT $new_stackfile;
- close OUT;
-}
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkstack.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/mkstack.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkstack.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/mkstack.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#!/usr/local/bin/perl -w
+
+# This is a utility that searches out "DECLARE_STACK_OF()"
+# declarations in .h and .c files, and updates/creates/replaces
+# the corresponding macro declarations in crypto/stack/safestack.h.
+# As it's not generally possible to have macros that generate macros,
+# we need to control this from the "outside", here in this script.
+#
+# Geoff Thorpe, June, 2000 (with massive Perl-hacking
+# help from Steve Robb)
+
+my $safestack = "crypto/stack/safestack";
+
+my $do_write;
+while (@ARGV) {
+ my $arg = $ARGV[0];
+ if($arg eq "-write") {
+ $do_write = 1;
+ }
+ shift @ARGV;
+}
+
+
+ at source = (<crypto/*.[ch]>, <crypto/*/*.[ch]>, <ssl/*.[ch]>, <apps/*.[ch]>);
+foreach $file (@source) {
+ next if -l $file;
+
+ # Open the .c/.h file for reading
+ open(IN, "< $file") || die "Can't open $file for reading: $!";
+
+ while(<IN>) {
+ if (/^DECLARE_STACK_OF\(([^)]+)\)/) {
+ push @stacklst, $1;
+ }
+ if (/^DECLARE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF\(([^,\s]+)\s*,\s*([^>\s]+)\)/) {
+ push @sstacklst, [$1, $2];
+ }
+ if (/^DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF\(([^)]+)\)/) {
+ push @asn1setlst, $1;
+ }
+ if (/^DECLARE_PKCS12_STACK_OF\(([^)]+)\)/) {
+ push @p12stklst, $1;
+ }
+ if (/^DECLARE_LHASH_OF\(([^)]+)\)/) {
+ push @lhashlst, $1;
+ }
+ }
+ close(IN);
+}
+
+
+
+my $old_stackfile = "";
+my $new_stackfile = "";
+my $inside_block = 0;
+my $type_thing;
+
+open(IN, "< $safestack.h") || die "Can't open input file: $!";
+while(<IN>) {
+ $old_stackfile .= $_;
+
+ if (m|^/\* This block of defines is updated by util/mkstack.pl, please do not touch! \*/|) {
+ $inside_block = 1;
+ }
+ if (m|^/\* End of util/mkstack.pl block, you may now edit :-\) \*/|) {
+ $inside_block = 0;
+ } elsif ($inside_block == 0) {
+ $new_stackfile .= $_;
+ }
+ next if($inside_block != 1);
+ $new_stackfile .= "/* This block of defines is updated by util/mkstack.pl, please do not touch! */";
+
+ foreach $type_thing (sort @stacklst) {
+ $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
+
+#define sk_${type_thing}_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new($type_thing, (cmp))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null($type_thing)
+#define sk_${type_thing}_free(st) SKM_sk_free($type_thing, (st))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_num(st) SKM_sk_num($type_thing, (st))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value($type_thing, (st), (i))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set($type_thing, (st), (i), (val))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero($type_thing, (st))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push($type_thing, (st), (val))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift($type_thing, (st), (val))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find($type_thing, (st), (val))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_find_ex(st, val) SKM_sk_find_ex($type_thing, (st), (val))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete($type_thing, (st), (i))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr($type_thing, (st), (ptr))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert($type_thing, (st), (val), (i))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func($type_thing, (st), (cmp))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup($type_thing, st)
+#define sk_${type_thing}_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free($type_thing, (st), (free_func))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift($type_thing, (st))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop($type_thing, (st))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort($type_thing, (st))
+#define sk_${type_thing}_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted($type_thing, (st))
+EOF
+ }
+
+ foreach $type_thing (sort { $a->[0] cmp $b->[0]} @sstacklst) {
+ my $t1 = $type_thing->[0];
+ my $t2 = $type_thing->[1];
+ $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
+
+#define sk_${t1}_new(cmp) ((STACK_OF($t1) *)sk_new(CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC($t2, cmp)))
+#define sk_${t1}_new_null() ((STACK_OF($t1) *)sk_new_null())
+#define sk_${t1}_push(st, val) sk_push(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val))
+#define sk_${t1}_find(st, val) sk_find(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val))
+#define sk_${t1}_value(st, i) (($t1)sk_value(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), i))
+#define sk_${t1}_num(st) SKM_sk_num($t1, st)
+#define sk_${t1}_pop_free(st, free_func) sk_pop_free(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC2($t1, free_func))
+#define sk_${t1}_insert(st, val, i) sk_insert(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val), i)
+#define sk_${t1}_free(st) SKM_sk_free(${t1}, st)
+#define sk_${t1}_set(st, i, val) sk_set(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), i, CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val))
+#define sk_${t1}_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero($t1, (st))
+#define sk_${t1}_unshift(st, val) sk_unshift(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val))
+#define sk_${t1}_find_ex(st, val) sk_find_ex((_STACK *)CHECKED_CONST_PTR_OF(STACK_OF($t1), st), CHECKED_CONST_PTR_OF($t2, val))
+#define sk_${t1}_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete($t1, (st), (i))
+#define sk_${t1}_delete_ptr(st, ptr) ($t1 *)sk_delete_ptr(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, ptr))
+#define sk_${t1}_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) \\
+ ((int (*)(const $t2 * const *,const $t2 * const *)) \\
+ sk_set_cmp_func(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st), CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC($t2, cmp)))
+#define sk_${t1}_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup($t1, st)
+#define sk_${t1}_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift($t1, (st))
+#define sk_${t1}_pop(st) ($t2 *)sk_pop(CHECKED_STACK_OF($t1, st))
+#define sk_${t1}_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort($t1, (st))
+#define sk_${t1}_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted($t1, (st))
+
+EOF
+ }
+
+ foreach $type_thing (sort @asn1setlst) {
+ $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
+
+#define d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_${type_thing}(st, pp, length, d2i_func, free_func, ex_tag, ex_class) \\
+ SKM_ASN1_SET_OF_d2i($type_thing, (st), (pp), (length), (d2i_func), (free_func), (ex_tag), (ex_class))
+#define i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_${type_thing}(st, pp, i2d_func, ex_tag, ex_class, is_set) \\
+ SKM_ASN1_SET_OF_i2d($type_thing, (st), (pp), (i2d_func), (ex_tag), (ex_class), (is_set))
+#define ASN1_seq_pack_${type_thing}(st, i2d_func, buf, len) \\
+ SKM_ASN1_seq_pack($type_thing, (st), (i2d_func), (buf), (len))
+#define ASN1_seq_unpack_${type_thing}(buf, len, d2i_func, free_func) \\
+ SKM_ASN1_seq_unpack($type_thing, (buf), (len), (d2i_func), (free_func))
+EOF
+ }
+ foreach $type_thing (sort @p12stklst) {
+ $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
+
+#define PKCS12_decrypt_d2i_${type_thing}(algor, d2i_func, free_func, pass, passlen, oct, seq) \\
+ SKM_PKCS12_decrypt_d2i($type_thing, (algor), (d2i_func), (free_func), (pass), (passlen), (oct), (seq))
+EOF
+ }
+
+ foreach $type_thing (sort @lhashlst) {
+ my $lc_tt = lc $type_thing;
+ $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;
+
+#define lh_${type_thing}_new() LHM_lh_new(${type_thing},${lc_tt})
+#define lh_${type_thing}_insert(lh,inst) LHM_lh_insert(${type_thing},lh,inst)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_retrieve(lh,inst) LHM_lh_retrieve(${type_thing},lh,inst)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_delete(lh,inst) LHM_lh_delete(${type_thing},lh,inst)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_doall(lh,fn) LHM_lh_doall(${type_thing},lh,fn)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_doall_arg(lh,fn,arg_type,arg) \\
+ LHM_lh_doall_arg(${type_thing},lh,fn,arg_type,arg)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_error(lh) LHM_lh_error(${type_thing},lh)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_num_items(lh) LHM_lh_num_items(${type_thing},lh)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_down_load(lh) LHM_lh_down_load(${type_thing},lh)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_node_stats_bio(lh,out) \\
+ LHM_lh_node_stats_bio(${type_thing},lh,out)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_node_usage_stats_bio(lh,out) \\
+ LHM_lh_node_usage_stats_bio(${type_thing},lh,out)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_stats_bio(lh,out) \\
+ LHM_lh_stats_bio(${type_thing},lh,out)
+#define lh_${type_thing}_free(lh) LHM_lh_free(${type_thing},lh)
+EOF
+ }
+
+ $new_stackfile .= "/* End of util/mkstack.pl block, you may now edit :-) */\n";
+ $inside_block = 2;
+}
+
+
+if ($new_stackfile eq $old_stackfile) {
+ print "No changes to $safestack.h.\n";
+ exit 0; # avoid unnecessary rebuild
+}
+
+if ($do_write) {
+ print "Writing new $safestack.h.\n";
+ open OUT, ">$safestack.h" || die "Can't open output file";
+ print OUT $new_stackfile;
+ close OUT;
+}
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/pl/VC-32.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/pl/VC-32.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/pl/VC-32.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,400 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/local/bin/perl
-# VC-32.pl - unified script for Microsoft Visual C++, covering Win32,
-# Win64 and WinCE [follow $FLAVOR variable to trace the differences].
-#
-
-$ssl= "ssleay32";
-$crypto="libeay32";
-
-if ($fips && !$shlib)
- {
- $crypto="libeayfips32";
- $crypto_compat = "libeaycompat32.lib";
- }
-else
- {
- $crypto="libeay32";
- }
-
-$o='\\';
-$cp='$(PERL) util/copy.pl';
-$mkdir='$(PERL) util/mkdir-p.pl';
-$rm='del /Q';
-
-$zlib_lib="zlib1.lib";
-
-# Santize -L options for ms link
-$l_flags =~ s/-L("\[^"]+")/\/libpath:$1/g;
-$l_flags =~ s/-L(\S+)/\/libpath:$1/g;
-
-my $ff = "";
-
-# C compiler stuff
-$cc='cl';
-if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64/)
- {
- # Note that we currently don't have /WX on Win64! There is a lot of
- # warnings, but only of two types:
- #
- # C4344: conversion from '__int64' to 'int/long', possible loss of data
- # C4267: conversion from 'size_t' to 'int/long', possible loss of data
- #
- # Amount of latter type is minimized by aliasing strlen to function of
- # own desing and limiting its return value to 2GB-1 (see e_os.h). As
- # per 0.9.8 release remaining warnings were explicitly examined and
- # considered safe to ignore.
- #
- $base_cflags= " $mf_cflag";
- my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT';
- $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib
- $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox';
- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
- $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
-
- *::perlasm_compile_target = sub {
- my ($target,$source,$bname)=@_;
- my $ret;
-
- $bname =~ s/(.*)\.[^\.]$/$1/;
- $ret=<<___;
-\$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm: $source
- set ASM=\$(ASM)
- \$(PERL) $source \$\@
-
-$target: \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm
- \$(ASM) $afile\$\@ \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm
-
-___
- }
- }
-elsif ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/)
- {
- # sanity check
- die '%OSVERSION% is not defined' if (!defined($ENV{'OSVERSION'}));
- die '%PLATFORM% is not defined' if (!defined($ENV{'PLATFORM'}));
- die '%TARGETCPU% is not defined' if (!defined($ENV{'TARGETCPU'}));
-
- #
- # Idea behind this is to mimic flags set by eVC++ IDE...
- #
- $wcevers = $ENV{'OSVERSION'}; # WCENNN
- die '%OSVERSION% value is insane' if ($wcevers !~ /^WCE([1-9])([0-9]{2})$/);
- $wcecdefs = "-D_WIN32_WCE=$1$2 -DUNDER_CE=$1$2"; # -D_WIN32_WCE=NNN
- $wcelflag = "/subsystem:windowsce,$1.$2"; # ...,N.NN
-
- $wceplatf = $ENV{'PLATFORM'};
- $wceplatf =~ tr/a-z0-9 /A-Z0-9_/d;
- $wcecdefs .= " -DWCE_PLATFORM_$wceplatf";
-
- $wcetgt = $ENV{'TARGETCPU'}; # just shorter name...
- SWITCH: for($wcetgt) {
- /^X86/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -Dx86 -D_X86_ -D_i386_ -Di_386_";
- $wcelflag.=" /machine:IX86"; last; };
- /^ARMV4[IT]/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DARM -D_ARM_ -D$wcetgt";
- $wcecdefs.=" -DTHUMB -D_THUMB_" if($wcetgt=~/T$/);
- $wcecdefs.=" -QRarch4T -QRinterwork-return";
- $wcelflag.=" /machine:THUMB"; last; };
- /^ARM/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DARM -D_ARM_ -D$wcetgt";
- $wcelflag.=" /machine:ARM"; last; };
- /^MIPSIV/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt";
- $wcecdefs.=" -D_MIPS64 -QMmips4 -QMn32";
- $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPSFPU"; last; };
- /^MIPS16/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt";
- $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPSII -QMmips16";
- $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS16"; last; };
- /^MIPSII/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt";
- $wcecdefs.=" -QMmips2";
- $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS"; last; };
- /^R4[0-9]{3}/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000";
- $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS"; last; };
- /^SH[0-9]/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -D$wcetgt -D_$wcetgt_ -DSHx";
- $wcecdefs.=" -Qsh4" if ($wcetgt =~ /^SH4/);
- $wcelflag.=" /machine:$wcetgt"; last; };
- { $wcecdefs.=" -D$wcetgt -D_$wcetgt_";
- $wcelflag.=" /machine:$wcetgt"; last; };
- }
-
- $cc='$(CC)';
- $base_cflags=' /W3 /WX /GF /Gy /nologo -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WINCE -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -DNO_CHMOD -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT';
- $base_cflags.=" $wcecdefs";
- $base_cflags.=' -I$(WCECOMPAT)/include' if (defined($ENV{'WCECOMPAT'}));
- $base_cflags.=' -I$(PORTSDK_LIBPATH)/../../include' if (defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'}));
- $opt_cflags=' /MC /O1i'; # optimize for space, but with intrinsics...
- $dbg_cflags=' /MC /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
- $lflags="/nologo /opt:ref $wcelflag";
- }
-else # Win32
- {
- $base_cflags= " $mf_cflag";
- my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT';
- $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib
- $ff = "/fixed";
- $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox /O2 /Ob2';
- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
- $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
- }
-$mlflags='';
-
-$out_def ="out32"; $out_def.="dll" if ($shlib);
- $out_def.='_$(TARGETCPU)' if ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/);
-$tmp_def ="tmp32"; $tmp_def.="dll" if ($shlib);
- $tmp_def.='_$(TARGETCPU)' if ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/);
-$inc_def="inc32";
-
-if ($debug)
- {
- $cflags=$dbg_cflags.$base_cflags;
- }
-else
- {
- $cflags=$opt_cflags.$base_cflags;
- }
-
-# generate symbols.pdb unconditionally
-$app_cflag.=" /Zi /Fd\$(TMP_D)/app";
-$lib_cflag.=" /Zi /Fd\$(TMP_D)/lib";
-$lflags.=" /debug";
-
-$obj='.obj';
-$asm_suffix='.asm';
-$ofile="/Fo";
-
-# EXE linking stuff
-$link="link";
-$rsc="rc";
-$efile="/out:";
-$exep='.exe';
-if ($no_sock) { $ex_libs=''; }
-elsif ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/) { $ex_libs='winsock.lib'; }
-else { $ex_libs='ws2_32.lib'; }
-
-if ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/)
- {
- $ex_libs.=' $(WCECOMPAT)/lib/wcecompatex.lib' if (defined($ENV{'WCECOMPAT'}));
- $ex_libs.=' $(PORTSDK_LIBPATH)/portlib.lib' if (defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'}));
- $ex_libs.=' /nodefaultlib:oldnames.lib coredll.lib corelibc.lib' if ($ENV{'TARGETCPU'} eq "X86");
- }
-else
- {
- $ex_libs.=' gdi32.lib advapi32.lib crypt32.lib user32.lib';
- $ex_libs.=' bufferoverflowu.lib' if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64/ and `cl 2>&1` =~ /14\.00\.4[0-9]{4}\./);
- # WIN32 UNICODE build gets linked with unicows.lib for
- # backward compatibility with Win9x.
- $ex_libs="unicows.lib $ex_libs" if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN32/ and $cflags =~ /\-DUNICODE/);
- }
-
-# static library stuff
-$mklib='lib /nologo';
-$ranlib='';
-$plib="";
-$libp=".lib";
-$shlibp=($shlib)?".dll":".lib";
-$lfile='/out:';
-
-$shlib_ex_obj="";
-$app_ex_obj="setargv.obj" if ($FLAVOR !~ /CE/);
-if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64A/) {
- if (`nasm -v 2>NUL` =~ /NASM version ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && $1 >= 2.0) {
- $asm='nasm -f win64 -DNEAR -Ox -g';
- $afile='-o ';
- } else {
- $asm='ml64 /c /Cp /Cx /Zi';
- $afile='/Fo';
- }
-} elsif ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64I/) {
- $asm='ias -d debug';
- $afile="-o ";
-} elsif ($nasm) {
- my $ver=`nasm -v 2>NUL`;
- my $vew=`nasmw -v 2>NUL`;
- # pick newest version
- $asm=($ver ge $vew?"nasm":"nasmw")." -f win32";
- $asmtype="win32n";
- $afile='-o ';
-} else {
- $asm='ml /nologo /Cp /coff /c /Cx /Zi';
- $afile='/Fo';
- $asmtype="win32";
-}
-
-$bn_asm_obj='';
-$bn_asm_src='';
-$des_enc_obj='';
-$des_enc_src='';
-$bf_enc_obj='';
-$bf_enc_src='';
-
-if (!$no_asm)
- {
- win32_import_asm($mf_bn_asm, "bn", \$bn_asm_obj, \$bn_asm_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_aes_asm, "aes", \$aes_asm_obj, \$aes_asm_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_des_asm, "des", \$des_enc_obj, \$des_enc_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_bf_asm, "bf", \$bf_enc_obj, \$bf_enc_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_cast_asm, "cast", \$cast_enc_obj, \$cast_enc_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_rc4_asm, "rc4", \$rc4_enc_obj, \$rc4_enc_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_rc5_asm, "rc5", \$rc5_enc_obj, \$rc5_enc_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_md5_asm, "md5", \$md5_asm_obj, \$md5_asm_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_sha_asm, "sha", \$sha1_asm_obj, \$sha1_asm_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_rmd_asm, "ripemd", \$rmd160_asm_obj, \$rmd160_asm_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_wp_asm, "whrlpool", \$whirlpool_asm_obj, \$whirlpool_asm_src);
- win32_import_asm($mf_cpuid_asm, "", \$cpuid_asm_obj, \$cpuid_asm_src);
- $perl_asm = 1;
- }
-
-if ($shlib && $FLAVOR !~ /CE/)
- {
- $mlflags.=" $lflags /dll";
- $lib_cflag.=" -D_WINDLL";
- #
- # Engage Applink...
- #
- $app_ex_obj.=" \$(OBJ_D)\\applink.obj /implib:\$(TMP_D)\\junk.lib";
- $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK -I.";
- # I'm open for better suggestions than overriding $banner...
- $banner=<<'___';
- @echo Building OpenSSL
-
-$(OBJ_D)\applink.obj: ms\applink.c
- $(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\applink.obj $(APP_CFLAGS) -c ms\applink.c
-$(OBJ_D)\uplink.obj: ms\uplink.c ms\applink.c
- $(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\uplink.obj $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c ms\uplink.c
-$(INCO_D)\applink.c: ms\applink.c
- $(CP) ms\applink.c $(INCO_D)\applink.c
-
-EXHEADER= $(EXHEADER) $(INCO_D)\applink.c
-
-LIBS_DEP=$(LIBS_DEP) $(OBJ_D)\applink.obj
-CRYPTOOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\uplink.obj $(CRYPTOOBJ)
-___
- $banner.=<<'___' if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64/);
-CRYPTOOBJ=ms\uptable.obj $(CRYPTOOBJ)
-___
- }
-elsif ($shlib && $FLAVOR =~ /CE/)
- {
- $mlflags.=" $lflags /dll";
- $lflags.=' /entry:mainCRTstartup' if(defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'}));
- $lib_cflag.=" -D_WINDLL -D_DLL";
- }
-
-sub do_lib_rule
- {
- my($objs,$target,$name,$shlib,$ign,$base_addr) = @_;
- local($ret);
-
- $taget =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
- my $base_arg;
- if ($base_addr ne "")
- {
- $base_arg= " /base:$base_addr";
- }
- else
- {
- $base_arg = "";
- }
- if ($name ne "")
- {
- $name =~ tr/a-z/A-Z/;
- $name = "/def:ms/${name}.def";
- }
-
-# $target="\$(LIB_D)$o$target";
-# $ret.="$target: $objs\n";
- if (!$shlib)
- {
-# $ret.="\t\$(RM) \$(O_$Name)\n";
- $ret.="$target: $objs\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(MKLIB) $lfile$target @<<\n $objs\n<<\n";
- }
- else
- {
- local($ex)=($target =~ /O_CRYPTO/)?'':' $(L_CRYPTO)';
- $ex.=" $zlib_lib" if $zlib_opt == 1 && $target =~ /O_CRYPTO/;
-
- if ($fips && $target =~ /O_CRYPTO/)
- {
- $ret.="$target: $objs \$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)";
- $ret.="\n\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK)\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC=\$(CC)\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC_ARGS=/Fo\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c\n";
- $ret.="\tSET PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=\$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE)\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPS_TARGET=$target\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSLIB_D)\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $ff /map $base_arg $efile$target ";
- $ret.="$name @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs \$(EX_LIBS) ";
- $ret.="\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj $ex\n<<\n";
- }
- else
- {
- $ret.="$target: $objs";
- $ret.="\n\t\$(LINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target $name @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex \$(EX_LIBS)\n<<\n";
- }
- $ret.="\tIF EXIST \$@.manifest mt -nologo -manifest \$@.manifest -outputresource:\$@;2\n\n";
- }
- $ret.="\n";
- return($ret);
- }
-
-sub do_link_rule
- {
- my($target,$files,$dep_libs,$libs,$standalone)=@_;
- local($ret,$_);
- $file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
- $n=&bname($target);
- $ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
- if ($standalone == 1)
- {
- $ret.=" \$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n\t";
- $ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) " if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild);
- $ret.="$files $libs\n<<\n";
- }
- elsif ($standalone == 2)
- {
- $ret.="\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK)\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC=\$(CC)\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC_ARGS=/Fo\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c\n";
- $ret.="\tSET PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPS_TARGET=$target\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE)\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSLIB_D)\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(LFLAGS) $ff /map $efile$target @<<\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files \$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj $libs\n<<\n";
- }
- else
- {
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files $libs\n<<\n";
- }
- $ret.="\tIF EXIST \$@.manifest mt -nologo -manifest \$@.manifest -outputresource:\$@;1\n\n";
- return($ret);
- }
-
-sub win32_import_asm
- {
- my ($mf_var, $asm_name, $oref, $sref) = @_;
- my $asm_dir;
- if ($asm_name eq "")
- {
- $asm_dir = "crypto\\";
- }
- else
- {
- $asm_dir = "crypto\\$asm_name\\asm\\";
- }
-
- $$oref = "";
- $mf_var =~ s/\.o$/.obj/g;
-
- foreach (split(/ /, $mf_var))
- {
- $$oref .= $asm_dir . $_ . " ";
- }
- $$oref =~ s/ $//;
- $$sref = $$oref;
- $$sref =~ s/\.obj/.asm/g;
-
- }
-
-
-1;
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/pl/VC-32.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/pl/VC-32.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/pl/VC-32.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/pl/VC-32.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
+#!/usr/local/bin/perl
+# VC-32.pl - unified script for Microsoft Visual C++, covering Win32,
+# Win64 and WinCE [follow $FLAVOR variable to trace the differences].
+#
+
+$ssl= "ssleay32";
+$crypto="libeay32";
+
+if ($fips && !$shlib)
+ {
+ $crypto="libeayfips32";
+ $crypto_compat = "libeaycompat32.lib";
+ }
+else
+ {
+ $crypto="libeay32";
+ }
+
+$o='\\';
+$cp='$(PERL) util/copy.pl';
+$mkdir='$(PERL) util/mkdir-p.pl';
+$rm='del /Q';
+
+$zlib_lib="zlib1.lib";
+
+# Santize -L options for ms link
+$l_flags =~ s/-L("\[^"]+")/\/libpath:$1/g;
+$l_flags =~ s/-L(\S+)/\/libpath:$1/g;
+
+my $ff = "";
+
+# C compiler stuff
+$cc='cl';
+if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64/)
+ {
+ # Note that we currently don't have /WX on Win64! There is a lot of
+ # warnings, but only of two types:
+ #
+ # C4344: conversion from '__int64' to 'int/long', possible loss of data
+ # C4267: conversion from 'size_t' to 'int/long', possible loss of data
+ #
+ # Amount of latter type is minimized by aliasing strlen to function of
+ # own desing and limiting its return value to 2GB-1 (see e_os.h). As
+ # per 0.9.8 release remaining warnings were explicitly examined and
+ # considered safe to ignore.
+ #
+ $base_cflags= " $mf_cflag";
+ my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT';
+ $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib
+ $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox';
+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
+ $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
+
+ *::perlasm_compile_target = sub {
+ my ($target,$source,$bname)=@_;
+ my $ret;
+
+ $bname =~ s/(.*)\.[^\.]$/$1/;
+ $ret=<<___;
+\$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm: $source
+ set ASM=\$(ASM)
+ \$(PERL) $source \$\@
+
+$target: \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm
+ \$(ASM) $afile\$\@ \$(TMP_D)$o$bname.asm
+
+___
+ }
+ }
+elsif ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/)
+ {
+ # sanity check
+ die '%OSVERSION% is not defined' if (!defined($ENV{'OSVERSION'}));
+ die '%PLATFORM% is not defined' if (!defined($ENV{'PLATFORM'}));
+ die '%TARGETCPU% is not defined' if (!defined($ENV{'TARGETCPU'}));
+
+ #
+ # Idea behind this is to mimic flags set by eVC++ IDE...
+ #
+ $wcevers = $ENV{'OSVERSION'}; # WCENNN
+ die '%OSVERSION% value is insane' if ($wcevers !~ /^WCE([1-9])([0-9]{2})$/);
+ $wcecdefs = "-D_WIN32_WCE=$1$2 -DUNDER_CE=$1$2"; # -D_WIN32_WCE=NNN
+ $wcelflag = "/subsystem:windowsce,$1.$2"; # ...,N.NN
+
+ $wceplatf = $ENV{'PLATFORM'};
+ $wceplatf =~ tr/a-z0-9 /A-Z0-9_/d;
+ $wcecdefs .= " -DWCE_PLATFORM_$wceplatf";
+
+ $wcetgt = $ENV{'TARGETCPU'}; # just shorter name...
+ SWITCH: for($wcetgt) {
+ /^X86/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -Dx86 -D_X86_ -D_i386_ -Di_386_";
+ $wcelflag.=" /machine:IX86"; last; };
+ /^ARMV4[IT]/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DARM -D_ARM_ -D$wcetgt";
+ $wcecdefs.=" -DTHUMB -D_THUMB_" if($wcetgt=~/T$/);
+ $wcecdefs.=" -QRarch4T -QRinterwork-return";
+ $wcelflag.=" /machine:THUMB"; last; };
+ /^ARM/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DARM -D_ARM_ -D$wcetgt";
+ $wcelflag.=" /machine:ARM"; last; };
+ /^MIPSIV/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt";
+ $wcecdefs.=" -D_MIPS64 -QMmips4 -QMn32";
+ $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPSFPU"; last; };
+ /^MIPS16/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt";
+ $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPSII -QMmips16";
+ $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS16"; last; };
+ /^MIPSII/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000 -D$wcetgt";
+ $wcecdefs.=" -QMmips2";
+ $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS"; last; };
+ /^R4[0-9]{3}/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -DMIPS -D_MIPS_ -DR4000";
+ $wcelflag.=" /machine:MIPS"; last; };
+ /^SH[0-9]/ && do { $wcecdefs.=" -D$wcetgt -D_$wcetgt_ -DSHx";
+ $wcecdefs.=" -Qsh4" if ($wcetgt =~ /^SH4/);
+ $wcelflag.=" /machine:$wcetgt"; last; };
+ { $wcecdefs.=" -D$wcetgt -D_$wcetgt_";
+ $wcelflag.=" /machine:$wcetgt"; last; };
+ }
+
+ $cc='$(CC)';
+ $base_cflags=' /W3 /WX /GF /Gy /nologo -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WINCE -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -DNO_CHMOD -DOPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT';
+ $base_cflags.=" $wcecdefs";
+ $base_cflags.=' -I$(WCECOMPAT)/include' if (defined($ENV{'WCECOMPAT'}));
+ $base_cflags.=' -I$(PORTSDK_LIBPATH)/../../include' if (defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'}));
+ $opt_cflags=' /MC /O1i'; # optimize for space, but with intrinsics...
+ $dbg_cflags=' /MC /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
+ $lflags="/nologo /opt:ref $wcelflag";
+ }
+else # Win32
+ {
+ $base_cflags= " $mf_cflag";
+ my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT';
+ $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib
+ $ff = "/fixed";
+ $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox /O2 /Ob2';
+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
+ $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
+ }
+$mlflags='';
+
+$out_def ="out32"; $out_def.="dll" if ($shlib);
+ $out_def.='_$(TARGETCPU)' if ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/);
+$tmp_def ="tmp32"; $tmp_def.="dll" if ($shlib);
+ $tmp_def.='_$(TARGETCPU)' if ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/);
+$inc_def="inc32";
+
+if ($debug)
+ {
+ $cflags=$dbg_cflags.$base_cflags;
+ }
+else
+ {
+ $cflags=$opt_cflags.$base_cflags;
+ }
+
+# generate symbols.pdb unconditionally
+$app_cflag.=" /Zi /Fd\$(TMP_D)/app";
+$lib_cflag.=" /Zi /Fd\$(TMP_D)/lib";
+$lflags.=" /debug";
+
+$obj='.obj';
+$asm_suffix='.asm';
+$ofile="/Fo";
+
+# EXE linking stuff
+$link="link";
+$rsc="rc";
+$efile="/out:";
+$exep='.exe';
+if ($no_sock) { $ex_libs=''; }
+elsif ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/) { $ex_libs='winsock.lib'; }
+else { $ex_libs='ws2_32.lib'; }
+
+if ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/)
+ {
+ $ex_libs.=' $(WCECOMPAT)/lib/wcecompatex.lib' if (defined($ENV{'WCECOMPAT'}));
+ $ex_libs.=' $(PORTSDK_LIBPATH)/portlib.lib' if (defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'}));
+ $ex_libs.=' /nodefaultlib:oldnames.lib coredll.lib corelibc.lib' if ($ENV{'TARGETCPU'} eq "X86");
+ }
+else
+ {
+ $ex_libs.=' gdi32.lib advapi32.lib crypt32.lib user32.lib';
+ $ex_libs.=' bufferoverflowu.lib' if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64/ and `cl 2>&1` =~ /14\.00\.4[0-9]{4}\./);
+ # WIN32 UNICODE build gets linked with unicows.lib for
+ # backward compatibility with Win9x.
+ $ex_libs="unicows.lib $ex_libs" if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN32/ and $cflags =~ /\-DUNICODE/);
+ }
+
+# static library stuff
+$mklib='lib /nologo';
+$ranlib='';
+$plib="";
+$libp=".lib";
+$shlibp=($shlib)?".dll":".lib";
+$lfile='/out:';
+
+$shlib_ex_obj="";
+$app_ex_obj="setargv.obj" if ($FLAVOR !~ /CE/);
+if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64A/) {
+ if (`nasm -v 2>NUL` =~ /NASM version ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && $1 >= 2.0) {
+ $asm='nasm -f win64 -DNEAR -Ox -g';
+ $afile='-o ';
+ } else {
+ $asm='ml64 /c /Cp /Cx /Zi';
+ $afile='/Fo';
+ }
+} elsif ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64I/) {
+ $asm='ias -d debug';
+ $afile="-o ";
+} elsif ($nasm) {
+ my $ver=`nasm -v 2>NUL`;
+ my $vew=`nasmw -v 2>NUL`;
+ # pick newest version
+ $asm=($ver ge $vew?"nasm":"nasmw")." -f win32";
+ $asmtype="win32n";
+ $afile='-o ';
+} else {
+ $asm='ml /nologo /Cp /coff /c /Cx /Zi';
+ $afile='/Fo';
+ $asmtype="win32";
+}
+
+$bn_asm_obj='';
+$bn_asm_src='';
+$des_enc_obj='';
+$des_enc_src='';
+$bf_enc_obj='';
+$bf_enc_src='';
+
+if (!$no_asm)
+ {
+ win32_import_asm($mf_bn_asm, "bn", \$bn_asm_obj, \$bn_asm_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_aes_asm, "aes", \$aes_asm_obj, \$aes_asm_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_des_asm, "des", \$des_enc_obj, \$des_enc_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_bf_asm, "bf", \$bf_enc_obj, \$bf_enc_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_cast_asm, "cast", \$cast_enc_obj, \$cast_enc_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_rc4_asm, "rc4", \$rc4_enc_obj, \$rc4_enc_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_rc5_asm, "rc5", \$rc5_enc_obj, \$rc5_enc_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_md5_asm, "md5", \$md5_asm_obj, \$md5_asm_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_sha_asm, "sha", \$sha1_asm_obj, \$sha1_asm_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_rmd_asm, "ripemd", \$rmd160_asm_obj, \$rmd160_asm_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_wp_asm, "whrlpool", \$whirlpool_asm_obj, \$whirlpool_asm_src);
+ win32_import_asm($mf_cpuid_asm, "", \$cpuid_asm_obj, \$cpuid_asm_src);
+ $perl_asm = 1;
+ }
+
+if ($shlib && $FLAVOR !~ /CE/)
+ {
+ $mlflags.=" $lflags /dll";
+ $lib_cflag.=" -D_WINDLL";
+ #
+ # Engage Applink...
+ #
+ $app_ex_obj.=" \$(OBJ_D)\\applink.obj /implib:\$(TMP_D)\\junk.lib";
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_USE_APPLINK -I.";
+ # I'm open for better suggestions than overriding $banner...
+ $banner=<<'___';
+ @echo Building OpenSSL
+
+$(OBJ_D)\applink.obj: ms\applink.c
+ $(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\applink.obj $(APP_CFLAGS) -c ms\applink.c
+$(OBJ_D)\uplink.obj: ms\uplink.c ms\applink.c
+ $(CC) /Fo$(OBJ_D)\uplink.obj $(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c ms\uplink.c
+$(INCO_D)\applink.c: ms\applink.c
+ $(CP) ms\applink.c $(INCO_D)\applink.c
+
+EXHEADER= $(EXHEADER) $(INCO_D)\applink.c
+
+LIBS_DEP=$(LIBS_DEP) $(OBJ_D)\applink.obj
+CRYPTOOBJ=$(OBJ_D)\uplink.obj $(CRYPTOOBJ)
+___
+ $banner.=<<'___' if ($FLAVOR =~ /WIN64/);
+CRYPTOOBJ=ms\uptable.obj $(CRYPTOOBJ)
+___
+ }
+elsif ($shlib && $FLAVOR =~ /CE/)
+ {
+ $mlflags.=" $lflags /dll";
+ $lflags.=' /entry:mainCRTstartup' if(defined($ENV{'PORTSDK_LIBPATH'}));
+ $lib_cflag.=" -D_WINDLL -D_DLL";
+ }
+
+sub do_lib_rule
+ {
+ my($objs,$target,$name,$shlib,$ign,$base_addr) = @_;
+ local($ret);
+
+ $taget =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
+ my $base_arg;
+ if ($base_addr ne "")
+ {
+ $base_arg= " /base:$base_addr";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $base_arg = "";
+ }
+ if ($name ne "")
+ {
+ $name =~ tr/a-z/A-Z/;
+ $name = "/def:ms/${name}.def";
+ }
+
+# $target="\$(LIB_D)$o$target";
+# $ret.="$target: $objs\n";
+ if (!$shlib)
+ {
+# $ret.="\t\$(RM) \$(O_$Name)\n";
+ $ret.="$target: $objs\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(MKLIB) $lfile$target @<<\n $objs\n<<\n";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ local($ex)=($target =~ /O_CRYPTO/)?'':' $(L_CRYPTO)';
+ $ex.=" $zlib_lib" if $zlib_opt == 1 && $target =~ /O_CRYPTO/;
+
+ if ($fips && $target =~ /O_CRYPTO/)
+ {
+ $ret.="$target: $objs \$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)";
+ $ret.="\n\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK)\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC=\$(CC)\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC_ARGS=/Fo\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=\$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE)\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPS_TARGET=$target\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSLIB_D)\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $ff /map $base_arg $efile$target ";
+ $ret.="$name @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs \$(EX_LIBS) ";
+ $ret.="\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj $ex\n<<\n";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $ret.="$target: $objs";
+ $ret.="\n\t\$(LINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target $name @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex \$(EX_LIBS)\n<<\n";
+ }
+ $ret.="\tIF EXIST \$@.manifest mt -nologo -manifest \$@.manifest -outputresource:\$@;2\n\n";
+ }
+ $ret.="\n";
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+sub do_link_rule
+ {
+ my($target,$files,$dep_libs,$libs,$standalone)=@_;
+ local($ret,$_);
+ $file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
+ $n=&bname($target);
+ $ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs";
+ if ($standalone == 1)
+ {
+ $ret.=" \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj\n";
+ $ret.=" \$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n\t";
+ $ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj " if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild);
+ $ret.="$files $libs\n<<\n";
+ }
+ elsif ($standalone == 2)
+ {
+ $ret.="\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK)\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC=\$(CC)\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC_ARGS=/Fo\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPS_TARGET=$target\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPS_SHA1_EXE=\$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE)\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPSLIB_D=\$(FIPSLIB_D)\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(FIPSLINK) \$(LFLAGS) $ff /map $efile$target @<<\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files \$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj $libs\n<<\n";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $ret.="\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files $libs\n<<\n";
+ }
+ $ret.="\tIF EXIST \$@.manifest mt -nologo -manifest \$@.manifest -outputresource:\$@;1\n\n";
+ return($ret);
+ }
+
+sub win32_import_asm
+ {
+ my ($mf_var, $asm_name, $oref, $sref) = @_;
+ my $asm_dir;
+ if ($asm_name eq "")
+ {
+ $asm_dir = "crypto\\";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $asm_dir = "crypto\\$asm_name\\asm\\";
+ }
+
+ $$oref = "";
+ $mf_var =~ s/\.o$/.obj/g;
+
+ foreach (split(/ /, $mf_var))
+ {
+ $$oref .= $asm_dir . $_ . " ";
+ }
+ $$oref =~ s/ $//;
+ $$sref = $$oref;
+ $$sref =~ s/\.obj/.asm/g;
+
+ }
+
+
+1;
Deleted: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/selftest.pl
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/selftest.pl 2015-12-01 10:49:51 UTC (rev 7388)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/selftest.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/local/bin/perl -w
-#
-# Run the test suite and generate a report
-#
-
-if (! -f "Configure") {
- print "Please run perl util/selftest.pl in the OpenSSL directory.\n";
- exit 1;
-}
-
-my $report="testlog";
-my $os="??";
-my $version="??";
-my $platform0="??";
-my $platform="??";
-my $options="??";
-my $last="??";
-my $ok=0;
-my $cc="cc";
-my $cversion="??";
-my $sep="-----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n";
-my $not_our_fault="\nPlease ask your system administrator/vendor for more information.\n[Problems with your operating system setup should not be reported\nto the OpenSSL project.]\n";
-
-open(OUT,">$report") or die;
-
-print OUT "OpenSSL self-test report:\n\n";
-
-$uname=`uname -a`;
-$uname="??\n" if $uname eq "";
-
-$c=`sh config -t`;
-foreach $_ (split("\n",$c)) {
- $os=$1 if (/Operating system: (.*)$/);
- $platform0=$1 if (/Configuring for (.*)$/);
-}
-
-system "sh config" if (! -f "Makefile");
-
-if (open(IN,"<Makefile")) {
- while (<IN>) {
- $version=$1 if (/^VERSION=(.*)$/);
- $platform=$1 if (/^PLATFORM=(.*)$/);
- $options=$1 if (/^OPTIONS=(.*)$/);
- $cc=$1 if (/^CC= *(.*)$/);
- }
- close(IN);
-} else {
- print OUT "Error running config!\n";
-}
-
-$cversion=`$cc -v 2>&1`;
-$cversion=`$cc -V 2>&1` if $cversion =~ "[Uu]sage";
-$cversion=`$cc -V |head -1` if $cversion =~ "Error";
-$cversion=`$cc --version` if $cversion eq "";
-$cversion =~ s/Reading specs.*\n//;
-$cversion =~ s/usage.*\n//;
-chomp $cversion;
-
-if (open(IN,"<CHANGES")) {
- while(<IN>) {
- if (/\*\) (.{0,55})/ && !/applies to/) {
- $last=$1;
- last;
- }
- }
- close(IN);
-}
-
-print OUT "OpenSSL version: $version\n";
-print OUT "Last change: $last...\n";
-print OUT "Options: $options\n" if $options ne "";
-print OUT "OS (uname): $uname";
-print OUT "OS (config): $os\n";
-print OUT "Target (default): $platform0\n";
-print OUT "Target: $platform\n";
-print OUT "Compiler: $cversion\n";
-print OUT "\n";
-
-print "Checking compiler...\n";
-if (open(TEST,">cctest.c")) {
- print TEST "#include <stdio.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <errno.h>\nmain(){printf(\"Hello world\\n\");}\n";
- close(TEST);
- system("$cc -o cctest cctest.c");
- if (`./cctest` !~ /Hello world/) {
- print OUT "Compiler doesn't work.\n";
- print OUT $not_our_fault;
- goto err;
- }
- system("ar r cctest.a /dev/null");
- if (not -f "cctest.a") {
- print OUT "Check your archive tool (ar).\n";
- print OUT $not_our_fault;
- goto err;
- }
-} else {
- print OUT "Can't create cctest.c\n";
-}
-if (open(TEST,">cctest.c")) {
- print TEST "#include <stdio.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <openssl/opensslv.h>\nmain(){printf(OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT);}\n";
- close(TEST);
- system("$cc -o cctest -Iinclude cctest.c");
- $cctest = `./cctest`;
- if ($cctest !~ /OpenSSL $version/) {
- if ($cctest =~ /OpenSSL/) {
- print OUT "#include uses headers from different OpenSSL version!\n";
- } else {
- print OUT "Can't compile test program!\n";
- }
- print OUT $not_our_fault;
- goto err;
- }
-} else {
- print OUT "Can't create cctest.c\n";
-}
-
-print "Running make...\n";
-if (system("make 2>&1 | tee make.log") > 255) {
-
- print OUT "make failed!\n";
- if (open(IN,"<make.log")) {
- print OUT $sep;
- while (<IN>) {
- print OUT;
- }
- close(IN);
- print OUT $sep;
- } else {
- print OUT "make.log not found!\n";
- }
- goto err;
-}
-
-# Not sure why this is here. The tests themselves can detect if their
-# particular feature isn't included, and should therefore skip themselves.
-# To skip *all* tests just because one algorithm isn't included is like
-# shooting mosquito with an elephant gun...
-# -- Richard Levitte, inspired by problem report 1089
-#
-#$_=$options;
-#s/no-asm//;
-#s/no-shared//;
-#s/no-krb5//;
-#if (/no-/)
-#{
-# print OUT "Test skipped.\n";
-# goto err;
-#}
-
-print "Running make test...\n";
-if (system("make test 2>&1 | tee maketest.log") > 255)
- {
- print OUT "make test failed!\n";
-} else {
- $ok=1;
-}
-
-if ($ok and open(IN,"<maketest.log")) {
- while (<IN>) {
- $ok=2 if /^platform: $platform/;
- }
- close(IN);
-}
-
-if ($ok != 2) {
- print OUT "Failure!\n";
- if (open(IN,"<make.log")) {
- print OUT $sep;
- while (<IN>) {
- print OUT;
- }
- close(IN);
- print OUT $sep;
- } else {
- print OUT "make.log not found!\n";
- }
- if (open(IN,"<maketest.log")) {
- while (<IN>) {
- print OUT;
- }
- close(IN);
- print OUT $sep;
- } else {
- print OUT "maketest.log not found!\n";
- }
-} else {
- print OUT "Test passed.\n";
-}
-err:
-close(OUT);
-
-print "\n";
-open(IN,"<$report") or die;
-while (<IN>) {
- if (/$sep/) {
- print "[...]\n";
- last;
- }
- print;
-}
-print "\nTest report in file $report\n";
-
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/selftest.pl (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/selftest.pl)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/selftest.pl (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/selftest.pl 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+#!/usr/local/bin/perl -w
+#
+# Run the test suite and generate a report
+#
+
+if (! -f "Configure") {
+ print "Please run perl util/selftest.pl in the OpenSSL directory.\n";
+ exit 1;
+}
+
+my $report="testlog";
+my $os="??";
+my $version="??";
+my $platform0="??";
+my $platform="??";
+my $options="??";
+my $last="??";
+my $ok=0;
+my $cc="cc";
+my $cversion="??";
+my $sep="-----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n";
+my $not_our_fault="\nPlease ask your system administrator/vendor for more information.\n[Problems with your operating system setup should not be reported\nto the OpenSSL project.]\n";
+
+open(OUT,">$report") or die;
+
+print OUT "OpenSSL self-test report:\n\n";
+
+$uname=`uname -a`;
+$uname="??\n" if $uname eq "";
+
+$c=`sh config -t`;
+foreach $_ (split("\n",$c)) {
+ $os=$1 if (/Operating system: (.*)$/);
+ $platform0=$1 if (/Configuring for (.*)$/);
+}
+
+system "sh config" if (! -f "Makefile");
+
+if (open(IN,"<Makefile")) {
+ while (<IN>) {
+ $version=$1 if (/^VERSION=(.*)$/);
+ $platform=$1 if (/^PLATFORM=(.*)$/);
+ $options=$1 if (/^OPTIONS=(.*)$/);
+ $cc=$1 if (/^CC= *(.*)$/);
+ }
+ close(IN);
+} else {
+ print OUT "Error running config!\n";
+}
+
+$cversion=`$cc -v 2>&1`;
+$cversion=`$cc -V 2>&1` if $cversion =~ "[Uu]sage";
+$cversion=`$cc -V |head -1` if $cversion =~ "Error";
+$cversion=`$cc --version` if $cversion eq "";
+$cversion =~ s/Reading specs.*\n//;
+$cversion =~ s/usage.*\n//;
+chomp $cversion;
+
+if (open(IN,"<CHANGES")) {
+ while(<IN>) {
+ if (/\*\) (.{0,55})/ && !/applies to/) {
+ $last=$1;
+ last;
+ }
+ }
+ close(IN);
+}
+
+print OUT "OpenSSL version: $version\n";
+print OUT "Last change: $last...\n";
+print OUT "Options: $options\n" if $options ne "";
+print OUT "OS (uname): $uname";
+print OUT "OS (config): $os\n";
+print OUT "Target (default): $platform0\n";
+print OUT "Target: $platform\n";
+print OUT "Compiler: $cversion\n";
+print OUT "\n";
+
+print "Checking compiler...\n";
+if (open(TEST,">cctest.c")) {
+ print TEST "#include <stdio.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <errno.h>\nmain(){printf(\"Hello world\\n\");}\n";
+ close(TEST);
+ system("$cc -o cctest cctest.c");
+ if (`./cctest` !~ /Hello world/) {
+ print OUT "Compiler doesn't work.\n";
+ print OUT $not_our_fault;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ system("ar r cctest.a /dev/null");
+ if (not -f "cctest.a") {
+ print OUT "Check your archive tool (ar).\n";
+ print OUT $not_our_fault;
+ goto err;
+ }
+} else {
+ print OUT "Can't create cctest.c\n";
+}
+if (open(TEST,">cctest.c")) {
+ print TEST "#include <stdio.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <openssl/opensslv.h>\nmain(){printf(OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT);}\n";
+ close(TEST);
+ system("$cc -o cctest -Iinclude cctest.c");
+ $cctest = `./cctest`;
+ if ($cctest !~ /OpenSSL $version/) {
+ if ($cctest =~ /OpenSSL/) {
+ print OUT "#include uses headers from different OpenSSL version!\n";
+ } else {
+ print OUT "Can't compile test program!\n";
+ }
+ print OUT $not_our_fault;
+ goto err;
+ }
+} else {
+ print OUT "Can't create cctest.c\n";
+}
+
+print "Running make...\n";
+if (system("make 2>&1 | tee make.log") > 255) {
+
+ print OUT "make failed!\n";
+ if (open(IN,"<make.log")) {
+ print OUT $sep;
+ while (<IN>) {
+ print OUT;
+ }
+ close(IN);
+ print OUT $sep;
+ } else {
+ print OUT "make.log not found!\n";
+ }
+ goto err;
+}
+
+# Not sure why this is here. The tests themselves can detect if their
+# particular feature isn't included, and should therefore skip themselves.
+# To skip *all* tests just because one algorithm isn't included is like
+# shooting mosquito with an elephant gun...
+# -- Richard Levitte, inspired by problem report 1089
+#
+#$_=$options;
+#s/no-asm//;
+#s/no-shared//;
+#s/no-krb5//;
+#if (/no-/)
+#{
+# print OUT "Test skipped.\n";
+# goto err;
+#}
+
+print "Running make test...\n";
+if (system("make test 2>&1 | tee maketest.log") > 255)
+ {
+ print OUT "make test failed!\n";
+} else {
+ $ok=1;
+}
+
+if ($ok and open(IN,"<maketest.log")) {
+ while (<IN>) {
+ $ok=2 if /^platform: $platform/;
+ }
+ close(IN);
+}
+
+if ($ok != 2) {
+ print OUT "Failure!\n";
+ if (open(IN,"<make.log")) {
+ print OUT $sep;
+ while (<IN>) {
+ print OUT;
+ }
+ close(IN);
+ print OUT $sep;
+ } else {
+ print OUT "make.log not found!\n";
+ }
+ if (open(IN,"<maketest.log")) {
+ while (<IN>) {
+ print OUT;
+ }
+ close(IN);
+ print OUT $sep;
+ } else {
+ print OUT "maketest.log not found!\n";
+ }
+} else {
+ print OUT "Test passed.\n";
+}
+err:
+close(OUT);
+
+print "\n";
+open(IN,"<$report") or die;
+while (<IN>) {
+ if (/$sep/) {
+ print "[...]\n";
+ last;
+ }
+ print;
+}
+print "\nTest report in file $report\n";
+
+die if $ok != 2;
Copied: vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/toutf8.sh (from rev 7389, vendor-crypto/openssl/dist/util/toutf8.sh)
===================================================================
--- vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/toutf8.sh (rev 0)
+++ vendor-crypto/openssl/1.0.1q/util/toutf8.sh 2015-12-05 17:55:59 UTC (rev 7390)
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+#
+# Very simple script to detect and convert files that we want to re-encode to UTF8
+
+git ls-tree -r --name-only HEAD | \
+ while read F; do
+ charset=`file -bi "$F" | sed -e 's|.*charset=||'`
+ if [ "$charset" != "utf-8" -a "$charset" != "binary" -a "$charset" != "us-ascii" ]; then
+ iconv -f ISO-8859-1 -t UTF8 < "$F" > "$F.utf8" && \
+ ( cmp -s "$F" "$F.utf8" || \
+ ( echo "$F"
+ mv "$F" "$F.iso-8859-1"
+ mv "$F.utf8" "$F"
+ )
+ )
+ fi
+ done
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